Title | Simplicius on Empedocles: A note on his Commentary in Phys. 157.25–161.20 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2024 |
Journal | Shagi/Steps |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 183-196 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Anna Afonasina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The present study attempts to show what influence a commentary can have on the formation of ideas about a preceding philosophical tradition. A case in point is Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s “Physics” and on fragments of Empedocles’ poem. The selected passage, though small in size, is quite remarkable in terms of content and the way Simplicius deals with it. With regard to content, we are dealing here with one of the fundamental problematic plots of Empedocles’ philosophy about the alternate rule of Love and Strife. But Simplicius adds to this his own view of Empedocles’ philosophy, dictated by his desire to harmonize the views of all the pagan philosophers and place them within a single consistent scheme. Simplicius wanted to counterpose something to Christianity, which was gaining in strength, and to show that all Greek philosophy developed along a certain path and contains no internal disagreements. On the one hand, Simplicius has preserved for us very valuable material — fairly lengthy sections of the text of Empedocles’ poem. On the other hand, wishing to implement his program, Simplicius chose those fragments of the poem that fit well into it. Therefore, the question arises whether we should take into account the context in which the fragments are quoted, or simply extract from the general body of the commentary those fragments of Empedocles’ poem that we need and consider them independently? [author's abstrac] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GQwsce7zWyeDLxe |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1580","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1580,"authors_free":[{"id":2761,"entry_id":1580,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Anna Afonasina","free_first_name":"Anna ","free_last_name":"Afonasina","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Empedocles: A note on his Commentary in Phys. 157.25\u2013161.20","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Empedocles: A note on his Commentary in Phys. 157.25\u2013161.20"},"abstract":"The present study attempts to show what influence a\r\ncommentary can have on the formation of ideas about a preceding\r\nphilosophical tradition. A case in point is Simplicius\u2019 commentary\r\non Aristotle\u2019s \u201cPhysics\u201d and on fragments of Empedocles\u2019 poem.\r\nThe selected passage, though small in size, is quite remarkable in\r\nterms of content and the way Simplicius deals with it. With regard\r\nto content, we are dealing here with one of the fundamental problematic\r\nplots of Empedocles\u2019 philosophy about the alternate rule of\r\nLove and Strife. But Simplicius adds to this his own view of Empedocles\u2019\r\nphilosophy, dictated by his desire to harmonize the views of\r\nall the pagan philosophers and place them within a single consistent\r\nscheme. Simplicius wanted to counterpose something to Christianity,\r\nwhich was gaining in strength, and to show that all Greek\r\nphilosophy developed along a certain path and contains no internal\r\ndisagreements. On the one hand, Simplicius has preserved for us\r\nvery valuable material \u2014 fairly lengthy sections of the text of Empedocles\u2019\r\npoem. On the other hand, wishing to implement his program,\r\nSimplicius chose those fragments of the poem that fit well\r\ninto it. Therefore, the question arises whether we should take into\r\naccount the context in which the fragments are quoted, or simply\r\nextract from the general body of the commentary those fragments\r\nof Empedocles\u2019 poem that we need and consider them independently? [author's abstrac]","btype":3,"date":"2024","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GQwsce7zWyeDLxe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1580,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Shagi\/Steps","volume":"10","issue":"2","pages":"183-196"}},"sort":[2024]}
Title | Aristotle’s “Now” and the Definition of Time: Method and Exegesis in Simplicius’ Interpretation of Physics IV.10 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2024 |
Journal | History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis |
Volume | 26 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 366-386 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Thomas Seissl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Physics IV.10 (217b30–218a30) is pivotal in Aristotle’s discussion of time, preceding his own account from IV.11 onward. Aristotle presents three puzzles about the existence of time with reference to the “Now”. Modern interpretations often view this section as an aporetic prelude with Aristotle’s failure to provide explicit solutions. This paper examines Simplicius’ alternative interpretation, which draws upon the theory of proof and the syllogistic model from the Posterior Analytics. Simplicius contends that the arguments’ failure lies in their inability to fit within the suitable syllogistic framework to establish a demonstrable definition of time, not in their aporetic nature. Every science has to prove the relation between (i) establishing whether X exists and (ii) showing what X is by establishing what the cause of X is. In evaluating Simplicius’ interpretation, this paper addresses two key aspects of the exegesis of IV.10: firstly, Simplicius can show why the “Now” is not part of the definition of time, and secondly, the ancient commentator underscores the close connection between the arguments in Physics IV.10 and the broader context of Aristotle’s discussion of time. Modern interpreters fail to address both of these issues. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mOkF4fvV0VKbyeR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1587","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1587,"authors_free":[{"id":2786,"entry_id":1587,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Thomas Seissl","free_first_name":"Thomas","free_last_name":"Seissl","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Aristotle\u2019s \u201cNow\u201d and the Definition of Time: Method and Exegesis in Simplicius\u2019 Interpretation of Physics IV.10","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle\u2019s \u201cNow\u201d and the Definition of Time: Method and Exegesis in Simplicius\u2019 Interpretation of Physics IV.10"},"abstract":"Physics IV.10 (217b30\u2013218a30) is pivotal in Aristotle\u2019s discussion of time, preceding his own account from IV.11 onward. Aristotle presents three puzzles about the existence of time with reference to the \u201cNow\u201d. Modern interpretations often view this section as an aporetic prelude with Aristotle\u2019s failure to provide explicit solutions. This paper examines Simplicius\u2019 alternative interpretation, which draws upon the theory of proof and the syllogistic model from the Posterior Analytics. Simplicius contends that the arguments\u2019 failure lies in their inability to fit within the suitable syllogistic framework to establish a demonstrable definition of time, not in their aporetic nature. Every science has to prove the relation between (i) establishing whether X exists and (ii) showing what X is by establishing what the cause of X is. In evaluating Simplicius\u2019 interpretation, this paper addresses two key aspects of the exegesis of IV.10: firstly, Simplicius can show why the \u201cNow\u201d is not part of the definition of time, and secondly, the ancient commentator underscores the close connection between the arguments in Physics IV.10 and the broader context of Aristotle\u2019s discussion of time. Modern interpreters fail to address both of these issues. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2024","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mOkF4fvV0VKbyeR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1587,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis ","volume":"26","issue":"2","pages":"366-386"}},"sort":[2024]}
Title | Les conséquences tragiques pour Parménide d'une erreur d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2024 |
Journal | Journal of Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Nestor-Luis Cordero |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The difficulty of grasping the thought of Parmenides led interpreters already in antiquity to approach his philosophy according to later schemes of thought. This was the case of Aristotle, whose interpretation was inherited by his disciple Theophrastus and by his commentators, especially Simplicius. Simplicius, a Neoplatonist and Aristotelian at the same time, proposed an interpretation, strongly dualistic (dominated by the sensible/intelligible dichotomy), which is not found in the recovered quotations. The origin of this interpretation is an "error" of Aristotle, inherited by Simplicius, who attributed to Parmenides himself the paternity of the "opinions of mortals". In 1795 G.G.Fülleborn, inspired by Simplicius, proposed a division of the Poem into two "parts", unanimously accepted today, and which must be urgently revised and rejected. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RcInmMNzff21NUZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1589","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1589,"authors_free":[{"id":2788,"entry_id":1589,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Nestor-Luis Cordero","free_first_name":"Nestor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Les cons\u00e9quences tragiques pour Parm\u00e9nide d'une erreur d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Les cons\u00e9quences tragiques pour Parm\u00e9nide d'une erreur d'Aristote"},"abstract":"The difficulty of grasping the thought of Parmenides led interpreters already in antiquity to approach his philosophy according to later schemes of thought. This was the case of Aristotle, whose interpretation was inherited by his disciple Theophrastus and by his commentators, especially Simplicius. Simplicius, a Neoplatonist and Aristotelian at the same time, proposed an interpretation, strongly dualistic (dominated by the sensible\/intelligible dichotomy), which is not found in the recovered quotations. The origin of this interpretation is an \"error\" of Aristotle, inherited by Simplicius, who attributed to Parmenides himself the paternity of the \"opinions of mortals\". In 1795 G.G.F\u00fclleborn, inspired by Simplicius, proposed a division of the Poem into two \"parts\", unanimously accepted today, and which must be urgently revised and rejected. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2024","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RcInmMNzff21NUZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1589,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"18","issue":"1","pages":"1-24"}},"sort":[2024]}
Title | Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato’s Conception of Not-Being |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2023 |
Journal | Méthexis |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 185-200 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Roberto Granieri |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius’ own philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kxUtLJkrkZD05av |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1588","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1588,"authors_free":[{"id":2787,"entry_id":1588,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Roberto Granieri","free_first_name":"Roberto","free_last_name":"Granieri","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato\u2019s Conception of Not-Being","main_title":{"title":"Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato\u2019s Conception of Not-Being"},"abstract":"In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato\u2019s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander\u2019s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato\u2019s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius\u2019 own philosophical background, notably in Damascius\u2019 De principiis. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2023","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kxUtLJkrkZD05av","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1588,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"M\u00e9thexis","volume":"35","issue":"1","pages":"185-200"}},"sort":[2023]}
Title | De Simplicius À Ḥunayn: La Transmission d'Une Doxographie Dans Les Résumés au Traité Sur Les Éléments de Galien |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2023 |
Journal | Arabic Sciences and Philosophy |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-23 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mathilde Brémond |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper examines two doxographies present in Ḥunayn’s summaries to Galen’s treatise On the Elements. We track the origin of these doxographies back, from Greek scolia to Galen’s treatise to Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, which we show to be the ultimate source. We also point out that Simplicius’ Commentary inspired an interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus that we find in Ḥunayn’s texts. This allows us to see remnants of Simplicius’ Commentary in the Arabic world and to shed some light on the production of these summaries to Galen’s work called Summaria Alexandrinorum. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zlN6Bivl0O6bw9q |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1594","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1594,"authors_free":[{"id":2794,"entry_id":1594,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mathilde Br\u00e9mond","free_first_name":"Mathilde","free_last_name":"Br\u00e9mond","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"De Simplicius \u00c0 \u1e24unayn: La Transmission d'Une Doxographie Dans Les R\u00e9sum\u00e9s au Trait\u00e9 Sur Les \u00c9l\u00e9ments de Galien","main_title":{"title":"De Simplicius \u00c0 \u1e24unayn: La Transmission d'Une Doxographie Dans Les R\u00e9sum\u00e9s au Trait\u00e9 Sur Les \u00c9l\u00e9ments de Galien"},"abstract":"This paper examines two doxographies present in \u1e24unayn\u2019s summaries to Galen\u2019s treatise On the Elements. We track the origin of these doxographies back, from Greek scolia to Galen\u2019s treatise to Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics, which we show to be the ultimate source. We also point out that Simplicius\u2019 Commentary inspired an interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus that we find in \u1e24unayn\u2019s texts. This allows us to see remnants of Simplicius\u2019 Commentary in the Arabic world and to shed some light on the production of these summaries to Galen\u2019s work called Summaria Alexandrinorum. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2023","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zlN6Bivl0O6bw9q","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1594,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Arabic Sciences and Philosophy","volume":"33","issue":"1","pages":"1-23"}},"sort":[2023]}
Title | Stoici e Peripatetici su agire, patire e movimento: la testimonianza di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2023 |
Journal | Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico |
Volume | 44 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 333-365 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Giuseppe Nastasi |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories contains the most extended testimony about the Stoic conception of acting (ποιεῖν) and undergoing (πάσχειν). Simplicius ascribed to the Stoics the idea that acting and undergoing are to be reduced to the movement. To this opinion Simplicius opposed the Aristotelian view according to which acting and undergoing are two different categories. In this paper I intend to outline the original Stoic position comparing the reportage of Simplicius with other Stoic sources. Later, I will deal with Boethus’ defense of the distinction between the categories of acting and undergoing. I will argue that Boethus directly reacted against the Stoic opinion reformulating it in Aristotelian language. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8cin65Qpb0Uymcj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1599","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1599,"authors_free":[{"id":2799,"entry_id":1599,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Giuseppe Nastasi","free_first_name":"Giuseppe","free_last_name":" Nastasi","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Stoici e Peripatetici su agire, patire e movimento: la testimonianza di Simplicio","main_title":{"title":"Stoici e Peripatetici su agire, patire e movimento: la testimonianza di Simplicio"},"abstract":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories contains the most extended testimony about the Stoic conception of acting (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd) and undergoing (\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd). Simplicius ascribed to the Stoics the idea that acting and undergoing are to be reduced to the movement. To this opinion Simplicius opposed the Aristotelian view according to which acting and undergoing are two different categories. In this paper I intend to outline the original Stoic position comparing the reportage of Simplicius with other Stoic sources. Later, I will deal with Boethus\u2019 defense of the distinction between the categories of acting and undergoing. I will argue that Boethus directly reacted against the Stoic opinion reformulating it in Aristotelian language. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2023","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8cin65Qpb0Uymcj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1599,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico ","volume":"44","issue":"2","pages":"333-365"}},"sort":[2023]}
Title | Neoplatonic Political Subjectivity? Prohairesis, to eph’ hēmīn, and Self-constitution in Simplicius’ Commentary on Epictetus’ Encheiridion |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2022 |
Journal | International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 152-177 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tim Riggs |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I argue that in his commentary on Epictetus’ Encheiridion, Simplicius derives a method by which his students can enter into the process of self-constitution, which is only achieved through completion of the study of Plato’s dialogues. The result of following the method is the attainment of a perspective consonant with the level of political virtue, which I call ‘political subjectivity’. This is a speculative interpretation of the effect the student would. experience in following the method, accomplished through analyses of Simplicius’ interpretation of Epictetus’ concept of to eph’ hēmīn and the related prohairesis. I complement this with an analysis of the metaphysical foundation Simplicius gives the method in light of Charles Taylor’s notion of ‘strong evaluation’. In this way, I show how Simplicius adapts these concepts to his Neoplatonic psychology and virtue theory to make the method serve as preparation for the development of virtue prior to study of Plato. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1aSuGa63BJmxeQ0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1595","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1595,"authors_free":[{"id":2795,"entry_id":1595,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tim Riggs","free_first_name":"Tim","free_last_name":"Riggs","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Political Subjectivity? Prohairesis, to eph\u2019 h\u0113m\u012bn, and Self-constitution in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Epictetus\u2019 Encheiridion ","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Political Subjectivity? Prohairesis, to eph\u2019 h\u0113m\u012bn, and Self-constitution in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Epictetus\u2019 Encheiridion "},"abstract":"I argue that in his commentary on Epictetus\u2019 Encheiridion, Simplicius derives a method by which his students can enter into the process of self-constitution, which is only achieved through completion of the study of Plato\u2019s dialogues. The result of following the method is the attainment of a perspective consonant with the level of political virtue, which I call \u2018political subjectivity\u2019. This is a speculative interpretation of the effect the student would. experience in following the method, accomplished through analyses of Simplicius\u2019 interpretation of Epictetus\u2019 concept of to eph\u2019 h\u0113m\u012bn and the related prohairesis. I complement this with an analysis of the metaphysical foundation Simplicius gives the method in light of Charles Taylor\u2019s notion of \u2018strong evaluation\u2019. In this way, I show how Simplicius adapts these concepts to his Neoplatonic psychology and virtue theory to make the method serve as preparation for the development of virtue prior to study of Plato. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2022","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1aSuGa63BJmxeQ0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1595,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition ","volume":"18","issue":"2","pages":"152-177"}},"sort":[2022]}
Title | Wenn der Steuermann ruft..." (Epiktet, Encheiridion 7) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2022 |
Journal | Hyperboreus |
Volume | 28 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 111-122 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Krämer, Benedikt |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die vorliegende Betrachtung hat eine Interpretation angeboten, die sich eng an den Wortlaut von Kapitel 7 des Encheiridion hält. Demnach beschreibt Epiktet in der Tat zwei verschiedene Lebenssituationen zweier Menschen (oder desselben Menschen in unterschiedlichen Lebensphasen). Im ersten Fall thematisiert Epiktet die schicksalsbedingte Veränderung der Peristasen, der man entweder freiwillig oder unter Zwang Folge leisten kann. Im zweiten Fall kündigt der Ruf des Steuermanns den bevorstehenden Tod an. Das verbindende Element der Lebensbeschreibungen ist die stoische Spannungslehre. Der tugendhafte Mensch richtet sich in allen Situationen und bei allen Entscheidungen auf Gott aus und erhöht so den Tonos seines seelischen Pneumas. Im zweiten Fall spricht Epiktet aus seiner eigenen persönlichen Religiosität heraus psychagogisch wirksam die persönliche Religiosität des Lesers an. Wer den seelischen Tonos und die aufmerksame Ausrichtung auf Gott auch im fortgeschrittenen Alter bewahrt, wird den Tod – für eine gewisse Zeit – überdauern und eine Gemeinschaft mit Gott erleben. [conclusion p. 120-121] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zHBaqqHklM9rLNZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1555","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1555,"authors_free":[{"id":2718,"entry_id":1555,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kr\u00e4mer, Benedikt","free_first_name":"Benedikt","free_last_name":"Kr\u00e4mer","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Wenn der Steuermann ruft...\" (Epiktet, Encheiridion 7)","main_title":{"title":"Wenn der Steuermann ruft...\" (Epiktet, Encheiridion 7)"},"abstract":"Die vorliegende Betrachtung hat eine Interpretation angeboten, die sich eng an den Wortlaut von Kapitel 7 des Encheiridion h\u00e4lt. Demnach beschreibt Epiktet in der Tat zwei verschiedene Lebenssituationen zweier Menschen (oder desselben Menschen in unterschiedlichen Lebensphasen).\r\n\r\nIm ersten Fall thematisiert Epiktet die schicksalsbedingte Ver\u00e4nderung der Peristasen, der man entweder freiwillig oder unter Zwang Folge leisten kann. Im zweiten Fall k\u00fcndigt der Ruf des Steuermanns den bevorstehenden Tod an.\r\n\r\nDas verbindende Element der Lebensbeschreibungen ist die stoische Spannungslehre. Der tugendhafte Mensch richtet sich in allen Situationen und bei allen Entscheidungen auf Gott aus und erh\u00f6ht so den Tonos seines seelischen Pneumas.\r\n\r\nIm zweiten Fall spricht Epiktet aus seiner eigenen pers\u00f6nlichen Religiosit\u00e4t heraus psychagogisch wirksam die pers\u00f6nliche Religiosit\u00e4t des Lesers an. Wer den seelischen Tonos und die aufmerksame Ausrichtung auf Gott auch im fortgeschrittenen Alter bewahrt, wird den Tod \u2013 f\u00fcr eine gewisse Zeit \u2013 \u00fcberdauern und eine Gemeinschaft mit Gott erleben.\r\n[conclusion p. 120-121]","btype":3,"date":"2022","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zHBaqqHklM9rLNZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1555,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hyperboreus","volume":"28","issue":"1","pages":"111-122"}},"sort":[2022]}
Title | El extraño criterio utilizado para crear "la Doxa" de Parménides |
Type | Article |
Language | Spanish |
Date | 2021 |
Journal | Dianoia |
Volume | 66 |
Issue | 87 |
Pages | 141-151 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Néstor-Luis Cordero |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In 1795 G.G. Fülleborn, a philologist of Kantian origin, grouped in two "parts" the recovered fragments of the Poem of Parmenides -"the Truth" and "the Doxa". With small modifications, this structure became classic and is accepted unanimously today. However, a reading of each fragment in an isolated way does not justify such division, which is based on an interpretation of Simplicius influenced by Aristotle, who finds already in Parmenides a sketch of the Platonic dualism between the "sensible" and the "intelligible", not actually present in the latter. This work analyzes critically the criterion used by Fülleborn, which is anachronistic in the case of a preplatonic thinker. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MC7go0ESvT7PDWp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1592","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1592,"authors_free":[{"id":2792,"entry_id":1592,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis Cordero","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"El extra\u00f1o criterio utilizado para crear \"la Doxa\" de Parm\u00e9nides","main_title":{"title":"El extra\u00f1o criterio utilizado para crear \"la Doxa\" de Parm\u00e9nides"},"abstract":"In 1795 G.G. F\u00fclleborn, a philologist of Kantian origin, grouped in two \"parts\" the recovered fragments of the Poem of Parmenides -\"the Truth\" and \"the Doxa\". With small modifications, this structure became classic and is accepted unanimously today. However, a reading of each fragment in an isolated way does not justify such division, which is based on an interpretation of Simplicius influenced by Aristotle, who finds already in Parmenides a sketch of the Platonic dualism between the \"sensible\" and the \"intelligible\", not actually present in the latter. This work analyzes critically the criterion used by F\u00fclleborn, which is anachronistic in the case of a preplatonic thinker. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"Spanish","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MC7go0ESvT7PDWp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1592,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Dianoia","volume":"66","issue":"87","pages":"141-151"}},"sort":[2021]}
Title | Formal Argument and Olympiodorus’ Development as a Plato-Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2021 |
Journal | History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 210-241 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarrant, Harold |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Olympiodorus led the Platonist school of philosophy at Alexandria for several decades in the sixth century, and both Platonic and Aristotelian commentaries ascribed to him survive. During this time the school’s attitude to the teaching of Aristotelian syllogistic, originally owing something to Ammonius, changed markedly, with an early tendency to reinforce the teaching of syllogistic even in Platonist lectures giving way to a greater awareness of its limitations. The vocabulary for arguments and their construction becomes far commoner than the language of syllogistic and syllogistic figures, and also of demonstration. I discuss the value of these changes for the dating of certain works, especially where the text lectured on does not demand different emphases. The commitment to argument rather than to authority continues, but a greater emphasis eventually falls on the establishment of the premises than on formal validity. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/F0bFT161R2MXdut |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1464","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1464,"authors_free":[{"id":2537,"entry_id":1464,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":122,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tarrant, Harold","free_first_name":"Harold","free_last_name":"Tarrant","norm_person":{"id":122,"first_name":"Harold ","last_name":"Tarrant","full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132040077","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Formal Argument and Olympiodorus\u2019 Development as a Plato-Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Formal Argument and Olympiodorus\u2019 Development as a Plato-Commentator"},"abstract":"Olympiodorus led the Platonist school of philosophy at Alexandria for several decades in the sixth century,\r\nand both Platonic and Aristotelian commentaries ascribed to him survive. During this time the school\u2019s\r\nattitude to the teaching of Aristotelian syllogistic, originally owing something to Ammonius,\r\nchanged markedly, with an early tendency to reinforce the teaching of syllogistic even in Platonist\r\nlectures giving way to a greater awareness of its limitations. The vocabulary for arguments and their\r\nconstruction becomes far commoner than the language of syllogistic and syllogistic figures, and also of\r\ndemonstration. I discuss the value of these changes for the dating of certain works, especially where the\r\ntext lectured on does not demand different emphases. The commitment to argument rather than to authority\r\ncontinues, but a greater emphasis eventually falls on the establishment of the premises than on formal\r\nvalidity. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/F0bFT161R2MXdut","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":122,"full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1464,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"210-241"}},"sort":[2021]}
Title | Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2021 |
Journal | History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 122-139 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius’ use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle’s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius’ assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle’s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle’s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/agke78hkU27DIVu |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1463","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1463,"authors_free":[{"id":2536,"entry_id":1463,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics","main_title":{"title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics"},"abstract":"In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius\u2019 use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle\u2019s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius\u2019 assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle\u2019s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle\u2019s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/agke78hkU27DIVu","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1463,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"122-139"}},"sort":[2021]}
Title | Book Review: Ivan A. Licciardi (2017). Critica dell’apparente e critica apparente. Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel Commentario al de Caelo di Aristotele, Saggio introduttivo, raccolta dei testi, traduzione e commentario (Symbolon 44). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2020 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 41 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 201-207 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Manfred Kraus |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
È fuori d ’ogni dubbio che i commentari di Simplicio alla Fisica e al De Caelo di Aristotele siano d’importanza primaria per la nostra conoscenza della filosofia di Parmenide, come anche –ed anzitutto –per la trasmissione di una gran parte dei frammenti. Nell’anno 2016 Ivan Licciardi ha pubblicato il suo libro intitolato Parmenide tràdito, Parmenide tradìto, in cui ha dedicato la sua analisi al commentario alla Fisica. Solo un anno dopo, Licciardi ha completato questo primo studio con un altro libro, anch’esso con un titolo provocante: Critica dell’apparente e critica apparente, dedicato al commentario al De Caelo. Ambedue i libri sono strettamente legati l’uno all’altro. Nella premessa, l’Autore dice che quando ha pubblicato il primo libro aveva già raccolto quasi tutti i materiali per il secondo. Ha deciso, tuttavia, di pubblicarli in due volumi separati, da un lato per ragioni di quantità (perché un solo libro avrebbe superato le mille pagine), ma anche per una ragione scientifica sostanziale, e cioè perché nei due commentari, secondo Licciardi, Simplicio contempla il pensiero parmenideo da prospettive diverse. Mentre nel commentario alla Fisica l’interpretazione è incentrata sul rapporto fra l’essere e l’uno, nell’altro commentario, invece, il Commentatore si occupa del rapporto fra essere sen- sibile ed essere intelligibile e quindi del problema della generazione e del divenire. [Introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/xCZ6vrIKvYZF5PU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1583","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1583,"authors_free":[{"id":2778,"entry_id":1583,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Manfred Kraus","free_first_name":"Manfred","free_last_name":"Kraus","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Book Review: Ivan A. Licciardi (2017). Critica dell\u2019apparente e critica apparente. Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel Commentario al de Caelo di Aristotele, Saggio introduttivo, raccolta dei testi, traduzione e commentario (Symbolon 44). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. ","main_title":{"title":"Book Review: Ivan A. Licciardi (2017). Critica dell\u2019apparente e critica apparente. Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel Commentario al de Caelo di Aristotele, Saggio introduttivo, raccolta dei testi, traduzione e commentario (Symbolon 44). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. "},"abstract":"\u00c8 fuori d \u2019ogni dubbio che i commentari di Simplicio alla Fisica e al De Caelo di\r\nAristotele siano d\u2019importanza primaria per la nostra conoscenza della filosofia\r\ndi Parmenide, come anche \u2013ed anzitutto \u2013per la trasmissione di una gran\r\nparte dei frammenti. Nell\u2019anno 2016 Ivan Licciardi ha pubblicato il suo libro\r\nintitolato Parmenide tr\u00e0dito, Parmenide trad\u00ecto, in cui ha dedicato la sua\r\nanalisi al commentario alla Fisica. Solo un anno dopo, Licciardi ha completato\r\nquesto primo studio con un altro libro, anch\u2019esso con un titolo provocante: \r\nCritica dell\u2019apparente e critica apparente, dedicato al commentario al De Caelo.\r\nAmbedue i libri sono strettamente legati l\u2019uno all\u2019altro. Nella premessa,\r\nl\u2019Autore dice che quando ha pubblicato il primo libro aveva gi\u00e0 raccolto quasi \r\ntutti i materiali per il secondo. Ha deciso, tuttavia, di pubblicarli in due volumi\r\nseparati, da un lato per ragioni di quantit\u00e0 (perch\u00e9 un solo libro avrebbe\r\nsuperato le mille pagine), ma anche per una ragione scientifica sostanziale, e\r\ncio\u00e8 perch\u00e9 nei due commentari, secondo Licciardi, Simplicio contempla il\r\npensiero parmenideo da prospettive diverse. Mentre nel commentario alla\r\nFisica l\u2019interpretazione \u00e8 incentrata sul rapporto fra l\u2019essere e l\u2019uno, nell\u2019altro\r\ncommentario, invece, il Commentatore si occupa del rapporto fra essere sen-\r\nsibile ed essere intelligibile e quindi del problema della generazione e del\r\ndivenire. [Introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2020","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xCZ6vrIKvYZF5PU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1583,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"41","issue":"1","pages":"201-207"}},"sort":[2020]}
Title | The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2020 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-22 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gabor, Gary |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The traditional ascription of the Neoplatonic commentary on the De Anima to Simplicius has prominently been disputed by Carlos Steel and Fernand Bossier, along with J.O. Urmson and Francesco Piccolomini, among others. Citing problems with terminology, diction, cross-references, doctrine, and other features, these authors have argued that the commentary cannot have been composed by Simplicius and that Priscian of Lydia is a favored alternative. In this paper, I present some new arguments for why the traditional attribution to Simplicius is, in fact, the correct one. In particular, while addressing some of the terminological facts that have also been discussed by Christina Luna, Peter Lautner, Patricia Huby, and Philippe Vallat, among others, I offer a more secure basis for identifying the author of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius than has so far been proposed. In place of the disputes regarding terminology, which the debate has largely centered upon, I argue that certain unique and characteristic interpretive procedures, which one only finds in the undisputed Simplician works, allow us to identify the authorship of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius securely. Further, comparison of these methodological features with the extant works of Priscian rules out the possibility of his authorship of the commentary. I also provide some suggestions for resolving a few remaining issues of cross-reference between the De Anima commentary and the rest of Simplicius’s work. Finally, I conclude with some words on how that particular form of harmonization pursued by Simplicius’s contemporaries differs from both that of the De Anima commentary as well as his other works. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pVUbfH8m3jQVsKw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1466","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1466,"authors_free":[{"id":2539,"entry_id":1466,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":106,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gabor, Gary","free_first_name":"Gary","free_last_name":"Gabor","norm_person":{"id":106,"first_name":"Gary","last_name":"Gabor ","full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima","main_title":{"title":"The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima"},"abstract":"The traditional ascription of the Neoplatonic commentary on the De Anima to Sim\u00adplicius has prominently been disputed by Carlos Steel and Fernand Bossier, along with J.O. Urmson and Francesco Piccolomini, among others. Citing problems with terminology, diction, cross-references, doctrine, and other features, these authors have argued that the commentary cannot have been composed by Simplicius and that Priscian of Lydia is a favored alternative. In this paper, I present some new arguments for why the traditional attribution to Simplicius is, in fact, the correct one. In particular, while addressing some of the terminological facts that have also been discussed by Christina Luna, Peter Lautner, Patricia Huby, and Philippe Vallat, among others, I offer a more secure basis for identifying the author of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius than has so far been proposed. In place of the disputes regarding terminology, which the debate has largely centered upon, I argue that certain unique and characteristic interpretive procedures, which one only finds in the undisputed Simplician works, allow us to identify the authorship of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius securely. Further, comparison of these methodological features with the extant works of Priscian rules out the possibility of his authorship of the commentary. I also provide some suggestions for resolving a few remaining issues of cross-reference between the De Anima commentary and the rest of Simplicius\u2019s work. Finally, I conclude with some words on how that particular form of harmonization pursued by Simplicius\u2019s contemporaries differs from both that of the De Anima commentary as well as his other works. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2020","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pVUbfH8m3jQVsKw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":106,"full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1466,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"35","issue":"1","pages":"1-22"}},"sort":[2020]}
Title | Commentary on Gabor: The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2020 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 23-27 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Miller, Dana R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper gives a brief discussion of the problem of ascribing authorship to ancient philosophical texts when there is evidence both for and against traditional ascription. The case in point is tradition’s claim that Simplicius is the author of the De Anima commentary. It is argued here that, while Gabor provides new and important methodological evidence for Simplicius’s authorship, we should not expect certainty. It is suggested that, in cases where historical fact may never be ascertained, we will be better served by the notion of credences. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3xAEvu1rDgjfUMU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1467","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1467,"authors_free":[{"id":2540,"entry_id":1467,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":539,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Miller, Dana R.","free_first_name":"Dana R.","free_last_name":"Miller","norm_person":{"id":539,"first_name":"Dana R.","last_name":"Miller","full_name":"Miller, Dana R.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128406704","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Commentary on Gabor: The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima","main_title":{"title":"Commentary on Gabor: The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima"},"abstract":"This paper gives a brief discussion of the problem of ascribing authorship to ancient philosophical texts when there is evidence both for and against traditional ascription. The case in point is tradition\u2019s claim that Simplicius is the author of the De Anima commentary. It is argued here that, while Gabor provides new and important methodological evidence for Simplicius\u2019s authorship, we should not expect certainty. It is suggested that, in cases where historical fact may never be ascertained, we will be better served by the notion of credences. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2020","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3xAEvu1rDgjfUMU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":539,"full_name":"Miller, Dana R.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1467,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"35","issue":"2","pages":"23-27"}},"sort":[2020]}
Title | Simplicius on the Individuation of Material Substances |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2019 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 401-429 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schwark, Marina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In his commentary on Physics I 9, Simplicius claims that individual forms individuate matter. Given that in the same text he calls the immanent form ‘universal,’it seems reasonable to conclude that the individual forms are individual instances of one universal species–form. However, Simplicius also mentions accidental properties that are peculiar to form rather than to matter. On the basis of Simplicius’ commentaries on the Categories and on the Physics, I argue that the individuating accidents are not part of the individual forms, but that each individual’s form coordinates the individual’s accidental features. By belonging to a certain species, the individual form sets limits as to which accidents a matter–form compound can assume. This approach enables Simplicius to combine hylomorphism with a theory of individuation through properties. Furthermore, in his commentary on De Caelo I 9 Simplicius explains the uniqueness of each individual’s conglomeration of properties in light of his Neoplatonic cosmology: each individual corresponds to an individual cosmic disposition that determines its characteristic features. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cpvCFatZj4VcLdC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1377","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1377,"authors_free":[{"id":2121,"entry_id":1377,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":289,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schwark, Marina","free_first_name":"Marina","free_last_name":"Schwark","norm_person":{"id":289,"first_name":"Marina","last_name":"Schwark","full_name":"Schwark, Marina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Individuation of Material Substances","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Individuation of Material Substances"},"abstract":"In his commentary on Physics I 9, Simplicius claims that individual forms individuate matter. Given that in the same text he calls the immanent form \u2018universal,\u2019it seems reasonable to conclude that the individual forms are individual instances of one universal species\u2013form. However, Simplicius also mentions accidental properties that are peculiar to form rather than to matter. On the basis of Simplicius\u2019 commentaries on the Categories and on the Physics, I argue that the individuating\r\naccidents are not part of the individual forms, but that each individual\u2019s form coordinates the individual\u2019s accidental features. By belonging to a certain species, the individual form sets limits as to which accidents a matter\u2013form compound can\r\nassume. This approach enables Simplicius to combine hylomorphism with a theory\r\nof individuation through properties. Furthermore, in his commentary on De Caelo I 9 Simplicius explains the uniqueness of each individual\u2019s conglomeration of properties in light of his Neoplatonic cosmology: each individual corresponds to an individual cosmic disposition that determines its characteristic features. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2019","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cpvCFatZj4VcLdC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":289,"full_name":"Schwark, Marina","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1377,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"40","issue":"2","pages":"401-429"}},"sort":[2019]}
Title | Simplicius on the Principal Meaning of Physis in Aristotle's Physics II. 1-3 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2019 |
Journal | Analogia |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | Byzantine Aristotle |
Pages | 43-82 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mouzala, Melina G. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
At the beginning of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics II.2, Simplicius attempts to reveal the principal meaning of physis, that which in his view is preeminent above all others presented by Aristotle in Physics II.1. Through the arguments he uses to show what the principal meaning of physis is, we are also able to better understand the other meanings. These other meanings are, on the one hand, those which are discovered in the light of Simplicius’ insightful reading of it. Simplicius appears to recognize—or at least to be conscious of the fact—that this part of his Commentary constitutes an autonomous analysis and explanation of the different meanings of physis, which sets out to reveal its concealed principal meaning. My aim in this paper is to show that in his comments on Physics II.1, Simplicius is trying to offer an exegesis of the Aristotelian arguments, while in his comments regarding the beginning of Physics II.2, he proceeds to a bold reading of what Aristotle has said in chapter one. He does this by giving his own interpretation of the meaning of physis, within the frame which Aristotle had already sketched out in the previous chapter, but also by deviating to some extent from Aristotle. For Simplicius, the principal, albeit concealed, meaning of physis, within the Aristotelian philosophical framework, lies in the idea that nature is a sort of propensity for being moved and a sort of life, to wit, the lowest sort of life (eschatê zôê). [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BnCCI5k1m32XM47 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1541","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1541,"authors_free":[{"id":2691,"entry_id":1541,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mouzala, Melina G. ","free_first_name":"Melina G.","free_last_name":"Mouzala","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Principal Meaning of Physis in Aristotle's Physics II. 1-3","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Principal Meaning of Physis in Aristotle's Physics II. 1-3"},"abstract":"At the beginning of his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics II.2, Simplicius attempts to reveal the principal meaning of physis, that which in his view is preeminent above all others presented by Aristotle in Physics II.1. Through the arguments he uses to show what the principal meaning of physis is, we are also able to better understand the other meanings. These other meanings are, on the one hand, those which are discovered in the light of Simplicius\u2019 insightful reading of it. Simplicius appears to recognize\u2014or at least to be conscious of the fact\u2014that this part of his Commentary constitutes an autonomous analysis and explanation of the different meanings of physis, which sets out to reveal its concealed principal meaning.\r\n\r\nMy aim in this paper is to show that in his comments on Physics II.1, Simplicius is trying to offer an exegesis of the Aristotelian arguments, while in his comments regarding the beginning of Physics II.2, he proceeds to a bold reading of what Aristotle has said in chapter one. He does this by giving his own interpretation of the meaning of physis, within the frame which Aristotle had already sketched out in the previous chapter, but also by deviating to some extent from Aristotle. For Simplicius, the principal, albeit concealed, meaning of physis, within the Aristotelian philosophical framework, lies in the idea that nature is a sort of propensity for being moved and a sort of life, to wit, the lowest sort of life (eschat\u00ea z\u00f4\u00ea). [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2019","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/BnCCI5k1m32XM47","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1541,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Analogia","volume":"7","issue":"Byzantine Aristotle","pages":"43-82"}},"sort":[2019]}
Title | Sinfonia dei Presocratici. Su due παρεκβάσεις in Simplicio (in PHYS. 6.31–8.15 e 28.32–37.9) |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2019 |
Journal | Epekeina. International Journal of Ontology History and Critics |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-32 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Licciardi, Ivan Adriano |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Osserviamo, a bilancio finale, quanto segue: Simplicio affida a due digressioni di In Physica I la sua veduta complessiva sui Presocratici. Mentre Aristotele, nella sua ricostruzione storico-dialettica, inserisce i predecessori dentro griglie concettuali nelle quali le posizioni vengono poste come contraddittorie fra di loro, Simplicio muove invece dal presupposto che la filosofia dei Presocratici nel suo complesso sia in realtà unitaria, armonica e coerente. Ma Simplicio, a differenza dello Stagirita, opera alla fine del mondo antico, e la sua necessità fu innanzitutto quella di tramandare ai posteri la tradizione antica affinché tale patrimonio non andasse disperso. Trattasi, qui, non di una necessità archeologica o erudita, bensì filosofica e ideologica a un tempo. Occorreva, peraltro, tramandare questo patrimonio come un che di armonico, unitario e intimamente coerente a un grado almeno paritetico rispetto a un’altra tradizione, quella cristiana, che dopo le incertezze e le transizioni che avevano caratterizzato il suo affacciarsi alla storia mondiale, aveva ormai consolidato il suo apparato dogmatico (specialmente dopo i concili di Efeso, Nicea e Calcedonia) e aveva dato concretezza strategica al suo piano di espansione e diffusione per il tramite di adeguati strumenti politici (editti di Milano e Tessalonica) atti a imporsi definitivamente quale visione dominante nell’Occidente alla fine del mondo antico. Lo strumentario di cui si serve Simplicio è un ampio ricorso alla citazione diretta dei predecessori, congiuntamente a un trattamento mirante a “limare” le differenze che intercorrono fra loro e ad accentuarne i tratti comuni. La cornice teorica che accoglie questo tipo di operazione, in buona sostanza una “platonizzazione” di tutti i Presocratici, è il neoplatonismo, della cui tradizione Simplicio è l’ultimo erede pagano. Vale la pena, a tal proposito, sottolineare un ultimo fatto: quando Simplicio fa riferimento a una tradizione filosofica unitaria e coerente, che dalle origini giunge fino al suo tempo, egli non qualifica siffatta tradizione come platonica, bensì come antica. Si tratta di un fatto che solo apparentemente contraddice quanto abbiamo asserito, e cioè che la teoria della συμφωνία dei Presocratici scaturisca da un’interpretazione, fondamentalmente, neoplatonica. Il riferirsi, da parte di Simplicio, a una tradizione indeterminata di veteres non andrà interpretato come uno sbiadimento della consapevolezza di possedere un’identità e un’eredità storica e filosofica ben determinata (che, fondamentalmente, è quella del neoplatonismo ateniese), bensì come testimonianza di un passaggio storico ormai avvenuto. Questo passaggio storico consiste in questo: Simplicio non opera in un contesto quale quello dell’età classica, in cui l’Accademia e il Peripato si contendevano l’egemonia filosofica e culturale ateniese, e non opera nemmeno, a seguire, in un contesto paragonabile al periodo successivo alla morte di Alessandro Magno, in cui il pensiero greco si trova disperso nei rivoli delle αἱρέσεις ellenistiche e in cui una delle cifre dominanti è costituita da un agonismo che non sembra avere mai fine. Il contesto storico in cui opera Simplicio è, diversamente, quello della fine di un mondo, quello pagano, a cui ne sta per subentrare un altro, quello della Christianitas. Non si tratta più, in sostanza, di affermare il primato di una scuola o di una tradizione di pensiero rispetto ad altre tradizioni che non appartengono a quella platonica, perché le priorità, adesso, sono mutate. In questo passaggio epocale, la proposta filosofica e culturale di Simplicio sembra consistere, in altre parole, in una sorta di panellenismo filosofico. Come Isocrate, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Persiani, aveva cercato di superare i contrasti fra le varie πόλεις, cercando di radunare le loro energie e di riunirle politicamente sotto l’egemonia ateniese, così Simplicio, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Cristiani, mira a superare i contrasti e le divergenze fra le varie tradizioni di pensiero, dichiarandoli apparenti, e teorizza, appunto, la loro συμφωνία, sotto l’egemonia platonica. L’ermeneutica che caratterizza il procedere di Simplicio è segnata, in particolare, dalla coppia concettuale “enigma/chiarezza”. Secondo il Commentatore, il secondo modulo espressivo appartiene in modo eminente a Platone (e in parte anche ad Aristotele), mentre il primo ai Presocratici, e in particolare a Parmenide, Empedocle e i Pitagorici. Sarebbe proprio la modalità espressiva enigmatica, per Simplicio, la causa principale dei fraintendimenti che avrebbero condotto alcuni a concepire i Presocratici in agonismo fra di loro, proprio come vorrebbe lasciar intendere certa dossografia cristiana. La classificazione simpliciana dei Presocratici (che, come si è visto, è una tripartizione) è funzionale, però, solo a una migliore comprensione delle ragioni della loro profonda unità. Conformemente all’uso tecnico e tardo settecentesco del termine «sinfonia», possiamo dire che nell’ottica di Simplicio la filosofia dei Presocratici fu una sinfonia nel senso di un brano composto da più movimenti – più propriamente una “sonata per orchestra”: ἡ παλαιὰ φιλοσοφία μένει ἀνέλεγκτος. [conclusion p. 29-32] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/d1OxzfD4Xu8EZnr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1554","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1554,"authors_free":[{"id":2717,"entry_id":1554,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","free_first_name":"Ivan Adriano","free_last_name":"Licciardi","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Sinfonia dei Presocratici. Su due \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b2\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in Simplicio (in PHYS. 6.31\u20138.15 e 28.32\u201337.9)","main_title":{"title":"Sinfonia dei Presocratici. Su due \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b2\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in Simplicio (in PHYS. 6.31\u20138.15 e 28.32\u201337.9)"},"abstract":"Osserviamo, a bilancio finale, quanto segue: Simplicio affida a due digressioni di In Physica I la sua veduta complessiva sui Presocratici. Mentre Aristotele, nella sua ricostruzione storico-dialettica, inserisce i predecessori dentro griglie concettuali nelle quali le posizioni vengono poste come contraddittorie fra di loro, Simplicio muove invece dal presupposto che la filosofia dei Presocratici nel suo complesso sia in realt\u00e0 unitaria, armonica e coerente. Ma Simplicio, a differenza dello Stagirita, opera alla fine del mondo antico, e la sua necessit\u00e0 fu innanzitutto quella di tramandare ai posteri la tradizione antica affinch\u00e9 tale patrimonio non andasse disperso.\r\n\r\nTrattasi, qui, non di una necessit\u00e0 archeologica o erudita, bens\u00ec filosofica e ideologica a un tempo. Occorreva, peraltro, tramandare questo patrimonio come un che di armonico, unitario e intimamente coerente a un grado almeno paritetico rispetto a un\u2019altra tradizione, quella cristiana, che dopo le incertezze e le transizioni che avevano caratterizzato il suo affacciarsi alla storia mondiale, aveva ormai consolidato il suo apparato dogmatico (specialmente dopo i concili di Efeso, Nicea e Calcedonia) e aveva dato concretezza strategica al suo piano di espansione e diffusione per il tramite di adeguati strumenti politici (editti di Milano e Tessalonica) atti a imporsi definitivamente quale visione dominante nell\u2019Occidente alla fine del mondo antico.\r\n\r\nLo strumentario di cui si serve Simplicio \u00e8 un ampio ricorso alla citazione diretta dei predecessori, congiuntamente a un trattamento mirante a \u201climare\u201d le differenze che intercorrono fra loro e ad accentuarne i tratti comuni. La cornice teorica che accoglie questo tipo di operazione, in buona sostanza una \u201cplatonizzazione\u201d di tutti i Presocratici, \u00e8 il neoplatonismo, della cui tradizione Simplicio \u00e8 l\u2019ultimo erede pagano. Vale la pena, a tal proposito, sottolineare un ultimo fatto: quando Simplicio fa riferimento a una tradizione filosofica unitaria e coerente, che dalle origini giunge fino al suo tempo, egli non qualifica siffatta tradizione come platonica, bens\u00ec come antica.\r\n\r\nSi tratta di un fatto che solo apparentemente contraddice quanto abbiamo asserito, e cio\u00e8 che la teoria della \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 dei Presocratici scaturisca da un\u2019interpretazione, fondamentalmente, neoplatonica. Il riferirsi, da parte di Simplicio, a una tradizione indeterminata di veteres non andr\u00e0 interpretato come uno sbiadimento della consapevolezza di possedere un\u2019identit\u00e0 e un\u2019eredit\u00e0 storica e filosofica ben determinata (che, fondamentalmente, \u00e8 quella del neoplatonismo ateniese), bens\u00ec come testimonianza di un passaggio storico ormai avvenuto.\r\n\r\nQuesto passaggio storico consiste in questo: Simplicio non opera in un contesto quale quello dell\u2019et\u00e0 classica, in cui l\u2019Accademia e il Peripato si contendevano l\u2019egemonia filosofica e culturale ateniese, e non opera nemmeno, a seguire, in un contesto paragonabile al periodo successivo alla morte di Alessandro Magno, in cui il pensiero greco si trova disperso nei rivoli delle \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 ellenistiche e in cui una delle cifre dominanti \u00e8 costituita da un agonismo che non sembra avere mai fine.\r\n\r\nIl contesto storico in cui opera Simplicio \u00e8, diversamente, quello della fine di un mondo, quello pagano, a cui ne sta per subentrare un altro, quello della Christianitas. Non si tratta pi\u00f9, in sostanza, di affermare il primato di una scuola o di una tradizione di pensiero rispetto ad altre tradizioni che non appartengono a quella platonica, perch\u00e9 le priorit\u00e0, adesso, sono mutate.\r\n\r\nIn questo passaggio epocale, la proposta filosofica e culturale di Simplicio sembra consistere, in altre parole, in una sorta di panellenismo filosofico. Come Isocrate, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Persiani, aveva cercato di superare i contrasti fra le varie \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, cercando di radunare le loro energie e di riunirle politicamente sotto l\u2019egemonia ateniese, cos\u00ec Simplicio, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Cristiani, mira a superare i contrasti e le divergenze fra le varie tradizioni di pensiero, dichiarandoli apparenti, e teorizza, appunto, la loro \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, sotto l\u2019egemonia platonica.\r\n\r\nL\u2019ermeneutica che caratterizza il procedere di Simplicio \u00e8 segnata, in particolare, dalla coppia concettuale \u201cenigma\/chiarezza\u201d. Secondo il Commentatore, il secondo modulo espressivo appartiene in modo eminente a Platone (e in parte anche ad Aristotele), mentre il primo ai Presocratici, e in particolare a Parmenide, Empedocle e i Pitagorici.\r\n\r\nSarebbe proprio la modalit\u00e0 espressiva enigmatica, per Simplicio, la causa principale dei fraintendimenti che avrebbero condotto alcuni a concepire i Presocratici in agonismo fra di loro, proprio come vorrebbe lasciar intendere certa dossografia cristiana. La classificazione simpliciana dei Presocratici (che, come si \u00e8 visto, \u00e8 una tripartizione) \u00e8 funzionale, per\u00f2, solo a una migliore comprensione delle ragioni della loro profonda unit\u00e0.\r\n\r\nConformemente all\u2019uso tecnico e tardo settecentesco del termine \u00absinfonia\u00bb, possiamo dire che nell\u2019ottica di Simplicio la filosofia dei Presocratici fu una sinfonia nel senso di un brano composto da pi\u00f9 movimenti \u2013 pi\u00f9 propriamente una \u201csonata per orchestra\u201d: \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\r\n[conclusion p. 29-32]","btype":3,"date":"2019","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/d1OxzfD4Xu8EZnr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1554,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Epekeina. International Journal of Ontology History and Critics","volume":"10","issue":"1","pages":"1-32"}},"sort":[2019]}
Title | Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin’s Aristotle’s Categories in the Early Roman Empire |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2018 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 29 |
Pages | 13-43 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Menn, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Griffin, Rashed, and Chiaradonna have shown how we can use Simplicius’ Categories commentary to reconstruct much of Porphyry’s greater Categories commentary (also witnessed by the Archimedes Palimpsest), and then use this to reconstruct much of the work of Boethus, and to a lesser extent Andronicus, on the Categories. In some cases building on Griffin, in other cases disagreeing with him, I bring out some ways in which Andronicus and Boethus differ from most later interpreters; this can help us understand Alexander’s and Porphyry’s responses. I reconstruct (i) Andronicus’ interpretation of ‘in’ and ‘said of, which is based on Aristotle’s distinction between abstract nouns and paronymous concrete nouns, and avoids the metaphysical freight that later interpreters load onto the notion of ‘said o f; (ii) Boethus’ use of De Interpretation 1 to explain how a universal term can be synonymous without positing either universals in re or Stoic XeKid, and the consequences he draws for the different aims of the Categories and De Interpretation; and (iii) Boethus’ solution to the tension between Aristotle’s hylomorphism and the Categories’ account of substance. Boethus, unlike later interpreters, thinks the form is in the matter, and is therefore not a substance but (typically) a quality, but that it is nonetheless able to constitute the composite as a substance distinct from the matter. I bring out the Aristotelian basis for Boethus’ reading, connect it with Boethus’ accounts of differentiae and of the soul, and show how Boethus’ views help motivate Porphyry’s responses. In some cases Porphyry constructs his views by triangulating between Boethus and Alexander. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QBnyRLAL62sCzX0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1141","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1141,"authors_free":[{"id":1715,"entry_id":1141,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire","main_title":{"title":"Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire"},"abstract":"Griffin, Rashed, and Chiaradonna have shown how we can use Simplicius\u2019 Categories commentary to reconstruct much of Porphyry\u2019s greater Categories commentary (also witnessed by the Archimedes Palimpsest), and then use this to reconstruct much of the work of Boethus, and to a lesser extent Andronicus, on the Categories. In some cases \r\nbuilding on Griffin, in other cases disagreeing with him, I bring out some ways in which Andronicus and Boethus differ from most later interpreters; this can help us understand Alexander\u2019s and Porphyry\u2019s responses. I reconstruct (i) Andronicus\u2019 interpretation of \u2018in\u2019 and \u2018said of, which is based on Aristotle\u2019s distinction between abstract nouns and paronymous concrete nouns, and avoids the metaphysical freight that later interpreters load onto the notion of \u2018said o f; (ii) Boethus\u2019 use of De Interpretation 1 to explain how \r\na universal term can be synonymous without positing either universals in re or Stoic \r\nXeKid, and the consequences he draws for the different aims of the Categories and De Interpretation; and (iii) Boethus\u2019 solution to the tension between Aristotle\u2019s hylomorphism and the Categories\u2019 account of substance. Boethus, unlike later interpreters, thinks the \r\nform is in the matter, and is therefore not a substance but (typically) a quality, but that it \r\nis nonetheless able to constitute the composite as a substance distinct from the matter. I bring out the Aristotelian basis for Boethus\u2019 reading, connect it with Boethus\u2019 accounts of differentiae and of the soul, and show how Boethus\u2019 views help motivate Porphyry\u2019s responses. In some cases Porphyry constructs his views by triangulating between Boethus and Alexander. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QBnyRLAL62sCzX0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1141,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"29","issue":"","pages":"13-43"}},"sort":[2018]}
Title | Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (μορφή) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2018 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 29 |
Pages | 59 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schwark, Marina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The present article examines how Simplicius and Iamblichus conceive of the quality shape (μορφή) and its relation to other qualities. As Simplicius’ commentary on Categories 8 shows, Simplicius follows Iamblichus in almost all aspects of his analysis. In particular,Simplicius shares Iamblichus’ assumption that shape is ultimately caused by intelligibleprinciples. Yet, Simplicius departs from Iamblichus’ position by asserting that shape isconstituted by figure, color, and perhaps even other qualities. Iamblichus opposes thisview, presumably because he takes it to interfere with his own metaphysical explanationof shape. Simplicius, however, suggests that his claim is in accord with Iamblichus’assumptions. In his attempt to harmonize the ’constitution thesis with Iamblichus’theory of intelligible principles, Simplicius relies on the notion of σύλληψισς. He argues that shape as a common conjunction (κοινὴ σύλληψις) includes, the other qualities inquestion, albeit as its parts or elements different from itself. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vLFTw1MUlOcJyPx |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1144","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1144,"authors_free":[{"id":1717,"entry_id":1144,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":289,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schwark, Marina","free_first_name":"Marina","free_last_name":"Schwark","norm_person":{"id":289,"first_name":"Marina","last_name":"Schwark","full_name":"Schwark, Marina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f75)","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f75)"},"abstract":"The present article examines how Simplicius and Iamblichus conceive of the quality shape (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f75) and its relation to other qualities. As Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Categories 8 shows, Simplicius follows Iamblichus in almost all aspects of his analysis. In particular,Simplicius shares Iamblichus\u2019 assumption that shape is ultimately caused by intelligibleprinciples. Yet, Simplicius departs from Iamblichus\u2019 position by asserting that shape isconstituted by figure, color, and perhaps even other qualities. Iamblichus opposes thisview, presumably because he takes it to interfere with his own metaphysical explanationof shape. Simplicius, however, suggests that his claim is in accord with Iamblichus\u2019assumptions. In his attempt to harmonize the \u2019constitution thesis with Iamblichus\u2019theory of intelligible principles, Simplicius relies on the notion of \u03c3\u1f7b\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c3\u03c2. He argues that shape as a common conjunction (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c3\u1f7b\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2) includes, the other qualities inquestion, albeit as its parts or elements different from itself. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vLFTw1MUlOcJyPx","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":289,"full_name":"Schwark, Marina","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1144,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"29","issue":"","pages":"59"}},"sort":[2018]}
Title | Porphyry's Isagoge and Early Greek Neoplatonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2018 |
Journal | Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medieval |
Volume | 43 |
Pages | 13-39 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chiaradonna, Riccardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper focuses on Porphyry’s Isagoge against the wider background of debates about genera and the hierarchy of being in early Neoplatonism from Plotinus to Iamblichus. Three works are considered: Porphyry’s Isagoge, Plotinus tripartite treatise On The Genera of Being (VI, 1-3 [42-44]), Iamblichus’ Reply to Porphyry (the so-called De Mysteriis). In addition to this, the discussion focuses on some passages on genus and predication from Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ lost commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories preserved in Simplicius. In his account of genus, Porphyry draws on Aristotle and apparently claims that an amended version of the genus/species relation is able to express the hierarchy of different levels of being. This view is different from that of Plotinus, who instead argues that intelligible and sensible beings are homonymous, as well as from that of Iamblichus, who rejects the existence of a common genus above intelligible and sensible beings, while emphasising the analogy subsisting between different levels in the hierarchy. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/duFoYG09YhVIWUx |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1523","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1523,"authors_free":[{"id":2647,"entry_id":1523,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":49,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo","free_first_name":"Riccardo","free_last_name":"Chiaradonna","norm_person":{"id":49,"first_name":"Riccardo ","last_name":"Chiaradonna","full_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1142403548","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Porphyry's Isagoge and Early Greek Neoplatonism","main_title":{"title":"Porphyry's Isagoge and Early Greek Neoplatonism"},"abstract":"This paper focuses on Porphyry\u2019s Isagoge against the wider background of debates about genera and the hierarchy of being in early Neoplatonism from Plotinus to Iamblichus. Three works are considered: Porphyry\u2019s Isagoge, Plotinus tripartite treatise On The Genera of Being (VI, 1-3 [42-44]), Iamblichus\u2019 Reply to Porphyry (the so-called De Mysteriis). In addition to this, the discussion focuses on some passages on genus and predication from Porphyry\u2019s and\r\nIamblichus\u2019 lost commentaries on Aristotle\u2019s Categories preserved in Simplicius. In his account of genus, Porphyry draws on Aristotle and apparently\r\nclaims that an amended version of the genus\/species relation is able to express the hierarchy of different levels of being. This view is different from that of Plotinus, who instead argues that intelligible and sensible beings are homonymous, as well as from that of Iamblichus, who rejects the existence of a common genus above intelligible and sensible beings, while emphasising the analogy subsisting between different levels in the hierarchy. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/duFoYG09YhVIWUx","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":49,"full_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1523,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medieval","volume":"43","issue":"","pages":"13-39"}},"sort":[2018]}
Title | Il male come "privazione". Simplicio e Filopono in difesa della materia |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | PEITHO / EXAMINA ANTIQUA |
Volume | 1 |
Issue | 8 |
Pages | 391-408 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cardullo, R. Loredana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ay8T0flgyMGienR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1216","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1216,"authors_free":[{"id":1798,"entry_id":1216,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":24,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana","free_first_name":"R. Loredana","free_last_name":"Cardullo","norm_person":{"id":24,"first_name":"R. Loredana ","last_name":"Cardullo","full_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139800220","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Il male come \"privazione\". Simplicio e Filopono in difesa della materia","main_title":{"title":"Il male come \"privazione\". Simplicio e Filopono in difesa della materia"},"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato\u2019s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., \u201cparasitic\u201d or \u201ccollateral\u201d existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the \u201cprivative\u201d role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2017","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ay8T0flgyMGienR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":24,"full_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1216,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"PEITHO \/ EXAMINA ANTIQUA","volume":"1","issue":"8","pages":"391-408"}},"sort":[2017]}
Title | Zum Problem der Gattung des Seienden bei Marius Victorinus und im antiken Neuplatonismus |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (Neue Folge) |
Volume | 160 |
Pages | 161-193 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Němec, Václav |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The article is concerned with the problem of the genus of being in Neoplatonism. Specifically, it focuses on Pierre Hadot’s hypothesis, according to which some Neoplatonic authors, such as Porphyry, and under his influence Marius Victorinus and Dexippus, presupposed a common genus of being or substance in the Aristotelian sense, encompassing various ontological levels of the Platonic universe, namely the intelligible and sensible being or substance. A comprehensive analysis of relevant texts of Neoplatonic interpreters of and commentators on Aristotle’s writings shows that Hadot’s hypothesis is not tenable. In fact, Neoplatonists from Plotinus to Porphyry and Dexippus to Simplicius presupposed one genus of intelligible substance, which is the source of being for every other substance, including the sensible substance. Nevertheless, the intelligible substance or being is the "highest genus" only in the sense of Plato’s Sophist, and not in the sense of Aristotle’s Categories. Accordingly, the relationship between the highest "genus" and other "arts" of substance is not regarded as one of synonymy but as one of homonymy. More precisely, this is not homonymy "by chance" but homonymy "by intention," which can be specified as homonymy "based on analogy," "based on derivation from a single source," or "based on relation to a single thing." Moreover, the author argues that the crucial passage from Victorinus’s Against Arius Ib, which Hadot considered the main basis for his hypothesis, allows an alternative reading that is fully in accordance with the Neoplatonic doctrine as reconstructed in the article. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1R6jT31lIQv4mO1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1403","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1403,"authors_free":[{"id":2188,"entry_id":1403,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":380,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"N\u011bmec, V\u00e1clav","free_first_name":"V\u00e1clav","free_last_name":"N\u011bmec","norm_person":{"id":380,"first_name":"V\u00e1clav","last_name":"N\u011bmec","full_name":"N\u011bmec, V\u00e1clav","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/121953627X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zum Problem der Gattung des Seienden bei Marius Victorinus und im antiken Neuplatonismus","main_title":{"title":"Zum Problem der Gattung des Seienden bei Marius Victorinus und im antiken Neuplatonismus"},"abstract":"The article is concerned with the problem of the genus of being in Neoplatonism. Specifically, it focuses on Pierre Hadot\u2019s hypothesis, according to which some Neoplatonic authors, such as Porphyry, and under his influence Marius Victorinus and Dexippus, presupposed a common genus of being or substance in the Aristotelian sense, encompassing various ontological levels of the Platonic universe, namely the intelligible and sensible being or substance.\r\n\r\nA comprehensive analysis of relevant texts of Neoplatonic interpreters of and commentators on Aristotle\u2019s writings shows that Hadot\u2019s hypothesis is not tenable. In fact, Neoplatonists from Plotinus to Porphyry and Dexippus to Simplicius presupposed one genus of intelligible substance, which is the source of being for every other substance, including the sensible substance. Nevertheless, the intelligible substance or being is the \"highest genus\" only in the sense of Plato\u2019s Sophist, and not in the sense of Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Accordingly, the relationship between the highest \"genus\" and other \"arts\" of substance is not regarded as one of synonymy but as one of homonymy. More precisely, this is not homonymy \"by chance\" but homonymy \"by intention,\" which can be specified as homonymy \"based on analogy,\" \"based on derivation from a single source,\" or \"based on relation to a single thing.\"\r\n\r\nMoreover, the author argues that the crucial passage from Victorinus\u2019s Against Arius Ib, which Hadot considered the main basis for his hypothesis, allows an alternative reading that is fully in accordance with the Neoplatonic doctrine as reconstructed in the article. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2017","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1R6jT31lIQv4mO1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":380,"full_name":"N\u011bmec, V\u00e1clav","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1403,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie (Neue Folge)","volume":"160","issue":"","pages":"161-193"}},"sort":[2017]}
Title | Parmenide neoplatonico: intorno a un nuovo studio sulla presenza di Parmenide nel commento alla Fisica di Simplicio (Book discussion of: Ivan A. Licciardi, Parmenide tràdito, Parmenide tradìto nel commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele (Symbolon 42), Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2016) |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | Méthexis |
Volume | 29 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 188-198 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoine, Pieter d’ |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In conclusione, mi permetto ancora alcune osservazioni sulla forma di quest’opera. Benché Simplicio apprezzi la laconicità (cioè la famosa brachylogia) degli antichi, credo che nessuno abbia mai pensato che il commentatore tenti di imitarla. Anzi, i suoi commentari sono caratterizzati da una certa prolissità e da ripetizioni che non sempre sono necessitate da bisogni esegetici. Per di più, il filo conduttore delle sue analisi è spesso interrotto da discussioni dossografiche o da digressioni che sono sì interessanti, ma non sempre pertinenti all’esegesi del testo in considerazione. Temo che anche il commentario di Ivan Licciardi non sia del tutto privo di queste imperfezioni. Inoltre, penso che alcune scelte formali – come quella di presentare il greco non a fronte della traduzione, ma piuttosto di seguito, e quella di non usare note nella parte del commentario – non abbiano contribuito a rendere più facile la navigazione attraverso le ricche informazioni che questo libro offre. Sotto questi aspetti, il libro ha l’impronta di un’opera prima, ma va detto che nella sua premessa l’autore stesso se ne mostra ben conscio (p. 19). Esprimendo queste riserve, non ho l’intenzione di ridurre i meriti di questo studio né di sollevare dubbi sul contributo dato da questo libro alla nostra comprensione dei temi discussi. Il merito di questo libro è soprattutto quello di aver consentito una migliore comprensione del contesto storico e filosofico in cui e delle ragioni per cui Simplicio ci ha trasmesso Parmenide. Anche se questo libro può aiutare gli studiosi dei presocratici a contestualizzare la loro stessa interpretazione del filosofo di Elea, è soprattutto agli studi neoplatonici che l’autore contribuisce. Infatti, il Parmenide di Simplicio è innanzitutto un Parmenide neoplatonico. Il senso storico e critico moderno fanno sì che noi non abbiamo più a nostra disposizione quella chiave ermeneutica neoplatonica che consiste nel riferire contraddizioni apparenti a diversi piani della realtà presenti solo implicitamente nel pensiero degli autori che studiamo. Il nostro obiettivo non è più quello di difendere la fondamentale unità del pensiero antico contro i cristiani né quello di mostrare la verità eternamente infallibile del platonismo. Diversamente, pensiamo che sia più sensato rintracciare non solo i punti di accordo, ma anche le discordanze e le discontinuità nella storia del pensiero, in cui lo stesso Simplicio merita una posizione di rilievo. L’interpretazione simpliciana di Parmenide ha sì ‘salvato’ parecchie linee del Poema dall’oblio, ma il prezzo che l’Eleate ha pagato è stato quello di essere stato forzato, nelle parole di Licciardi, in una ‘griglia concettuale totalmente estranea alla logica del Poema’ (p. 43). L’ironia di questa vicenda è che sia stato proprio l’intento di Simplicio di coltivare l’amicizia con tutti i filosofi pagani ad averlo spinto, in fin dei conti, a tradire tutti. [conclusion p. 197-198] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AZQTPKFglABgm9k |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1484","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1484,"authors_free":[{"id":2569,"entry_id":1484,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":104,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoine, Pieter d\u2019","free_first_name":"Pieter d\u2019","free_last_name":"Hoine","norm_person":{"id":104,"first_name":"Pieter d' ","last_name":"Hoine","full_name":"Hoine, Pieter d' ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051361575","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenide neoplatonico: intorno a un nuovo studio sulla presenza di Parmenide nel commento alla Fisica di Simplicio (Book discussion of: Ivan A. Licciardi, Parmenide tr\u00e0dito, Parmenide trad\u00ecto nel commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele (Symbolon 42), Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2016)","main_title":{"title":"Parmenide neoplatonico: intorno a un nuovo studio sulla presenza di Parmenide nel commento alla Fisica di Simplicio (Book discussion of: Ivan A. Licciardi, Parmenide tr\u00e0dito, Parmenide trad\u00ecto nel commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele (Symbolon 42), Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2016)"},"abstract":"In conclusione, mi permetto ancora alcune osservazioni sulla forma di quest\u2019opera. Bench\u00e9 Simplicio apprezzi la laconicit\u00e0 (cio\u00e8 la famosa brachylogia) degli antichi, credo che nessuno abbia mai pensato che il commentatore tenti di imitarla. Anzi, i suoi commentari sono caratterizzati da una certa prolissit\u00e0 e da ripetizioni che non sempre sono necessitate da bisogni esegetici. Per di pi\u00f9, il filo conduttore delle sue analisi \u00e8 spesso interrotto da discussioni dossografiche o da digressioni che sono s\u00ec interessanti, ma non sempre pertinenti all\u2019esegesi del testo in considerazione.\r\n\r\nTemo che anche il commentario di Ivan Licciardi non sia del tutto privo di queste imperfezioni. Inoltre, penso che alcune scelte formali \u2013 come quella di presentare il greco non a fronte della traduzione, ma piuttosto di seguito, e quella di non usare note nella parte del commentario \u2013 non abbiano contribuito a rendere pi\u00f9 facile la navigazione attraverso le ricche informazioni che questo libro offre. Sotto questi aspetti, il libro ha l\u2019impronta di un\u2019opera prima, ma va detto che nella sua premessa l\u2019autore stesso se ne mostra ben conscio (p. 19).\r\n\r\nEsprimendo queste riserve, non ho l\u2019intenzione di ridurre i meriti di questo studio n\u00e9 di sollevare dubbi sul contributo dato da questo libro alla nostra comprensione dei temi discussi. Il merito di questo libro \u00e8 soprattutto quello di aver consentito una migliore comprensione del contesto storico e filosofico in cui e delle ragioni per cui Simplicio ci ha trasmesso Parmenide. Anche se questo libro pu\u00f2 aiutare gli studiosi dei presocratici a contestualizzare la loro stessa interpretazione del filosofo di Elea, \u00e8 soprattutto agli studi neoplatonici che l\u2019autore contribuisce.\r\n\r\nInfatti, il Parmenide di Simplicio \u00e8 innanzitutto un Parmenide neoplatonico. Il senso storico e critico moderno fanno s\u00ec che noi non abbiamo pi\u00f9 a nostra disposizione quella chiave ermeneutica neoplatonica che consiste nel riferire contraddizioni apparenti a diversi piani della realt\u00e0 presenti solo implicitamente nel pensiero degli autori che studiamo. Il nostro obiettivo non \u00e8 pi\u00f9 quello di difendere la fondamentale unit\u00e0 del pensiero antico contro i cristiani n\u00e9 quello di mostrare la verit\u00e0 eternamente infallibile del platonismo.\r\n\r\nDiversamente, pensiamo che sia pi\u00f9 sensato rintracciare non solo i punti di accordo, ma anche le discordanze e le discontinuit\u00e0 nella storia del pensiero, in cui lo stesso Simplicio merita una posizione di rilievo. L\u2019interpretazione simpliciana di Parmenide ha s\u00ec \u2018salvato\u2019 parecchie linee del Poema dall\u2019oblio, ma il prezzo che l\u2019Eleate ha pagato \u00e8 stato quello di essere stato forzato, nelle parole di Licciardi, in una \u2018griglia concettuale totalmente estranea alla logica del Poema\u2019 (p. 43).\r\n\r\nL\u2019ironia di questa vicenda \u00e8 che sia stato proprio l\u2019intento di Simplicio di coltivare l\u2019amicizia con tutti i filosofi pagani ad averlo spinto, in fin dei conti, a tradire tutti.\r\n[conclusion p. 197-198]","btype":3,"date":"2017","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AZQTPKFglABgm9k","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":104,"full_name":"Hoine, Pieter d' ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1484,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"M\u00e9thexis","volume":"29","issue":"1","pages":"188-198"}},"sort":[2017]}
Title | La critique aristotélicienne des Idées en Physique II 2 et l’interprétation de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques |
Volume | 101 |
Pages | 569-584 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Physics II 2, 193b35–194a1, Aristotle criticizes in passing the partisans of the Ideas, comparing them to the mathematicians. The present article first attempts to specify the identity of the Academicians Aristotle has in view and to explain how their method resembles the mathematical one. In a second step, the article sheds light on Simplicius' manner of deflecting the Aristotelian critique, showing that, despite appearances, the Stagirite acknowledges that the forms of natural realities, after the fashion of mathematical realities, can be thought of separately, that is to say, without matter. The Neoplatonist's reflection casts new light on the notion of methexis, basically identical to that of phusikos logos or "form in itself," which is like intelligible Form. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CX8My3vkHJrymmk |
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Title | The notion of ἐπιτηδειότης in Simplicius' discussion of quality |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 27 |
Pages | 65-83 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hauer, Mareike |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper deals with the meaning and function of epitêdeiotês in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, particularly in chapter 8, the discussion of the category of quality. Based on the question as to whether Simplicius uses epitêdeiotês as a technical term or as a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of dynamis, different passages of chapter 8 will be analyzed and compared with Aristotle's discussion of dynamis. It will be argued that Simplicius distinguishes between two senses of epitêdeiotês, one of which can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of dynamis; the other sense, however, differs from the Aristotelian notion of dynamis and, instead, appears to be in agreement with the use of epitêdeiotês in the theory of participation established by Simplicius' Neoplatonic predecessors. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/uZGcu7N3ynTApz0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1150","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1150,"authors_free":[{"id":1725,"entry_id":1150,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in Simplicius' discussion of quality","main_title":{"title":"The notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in Simplicius' discussion of quality"},"abstract":"This paper deals with the meaning and function of epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, particularly in chapter 8, the discussion of the category of quality. Based on the question as to whether Simplicius uses epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas as a technical term or as a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of dynamis, different passages of chapter 8 will be analyzed and compared with Aristotle's discussion of dynamis. It will be argued that Simplicius distinguishes between two senses of epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas, one of which can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of dynamis; the other sense, however, differs from the Aristotelian notion of dynamis and, instead, appears to be in agreement with the use of epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas in the theory of participation established by Simplicius' Neoplatonic predecessors. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/uZGcu7N3ynTApz0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1150,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"27","issue":"","pages":"65-83"}},"sort":[2016]}
Title | Simplicius on the Relation between Quality and Qualified |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Méthexis |
Volume | 28 |
Pages | 111-140 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hauer, Mareike |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius claims in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categoriesthat quality is prior to the qualified according to nature. However, in an interesting passage in the same commentary, Simplicius describes the relation between quality and qualified in such a way that it strongly suggests an ontological simultaneity. The aim of this paper is to clarify Simplicius' notion of natural priority and to investigate the extent to which the assumption of a natural priority of the quality over the qualified is compatible with the assumption of a co-existence of quality and qualified. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DTcssHAheWWZmpg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"387","_score":null,"_source":{"id":387,"authors_free":[{"id":506,"entry_id":387,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Relation between Quality and Qualified","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Relation between Quality and Qualified"},"abstract":"Simplicius claims in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categoriesthat quality is prior to the qualified according to nature. However, in an interesting passage in the same com\u00admentary, Simplicius describes the relation between quality and qualified in such a way that it strongly suggests an ontological simultaneity. The aim of this paper is to clarify Simplicius' notion of natural priority and to investigate the extent to which the as\u00adsumption of a natural priority of the quality over the qualified is compatible with the assumption of a co-existence of quality and qualified. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DTcssHAheWWZmpg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":387,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"M\u00e9thexis","volume":"28","issue":"","pages":"111-140"}},"sort":[2016]}
Title | L'esperienza estetica fra logica e cosmologia nel Commentario alla Fisica di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Athenaeum |
Volume | 104 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 186-200 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Licciardi, Ivan Adriano |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I will explain some passages of Simplicius, in Phys. 1, in which the Commentator discusses the Aristotelian expression pephyke de ek tôn gvorimoteron (Phys. 1.1, 184a. 16). Here Simplicius distinguishes ta gnorimotera from to autopiston, such as the definitions and the immediate premises, and from the dianoetic knowledge, which is syllogistic and demonstrative. Notwithstanding the topic o f these passages is epistemological, here the Commentator, through a syllogism in which there is an evident reminiscence o f Plato’s Timaeus, cites the beauty o f the universe as an initial step to raise to the goodness o f die Demiurge. After an articulated investigation (in which are involved, as well, Aristotle’s Rhetoric and above all P osteriorA nalytics), Simplicius concludes that to kalon has the same statute of gnorimoteron hemîn (Arise. Phys. 1.1.184a.l6). The purpose o f the Commentator seems that to conciliate Plato and Aristotle, and the result is an original and creative, but at the same rime exact and careful, way to do the exegesis of Aristotle’s Physics. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5jR4LzCbg0vHYAp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"405","_score":null,"_source":{"id":405,"authors_free":[{"id":544,"entry_id":405,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":246,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","free_first_name":"Ivan Adriano","free_last_name":"Licciardi","norm_person":{"id":246,"first_name":"Ivan Adriano","last_name":"Licciardi","full_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L'esperienza estetica fra logica e cosmologia nel Commentario alla Fisica di Simplicio","main_title":{"title":"L'esperienza estetica fra logica e cosmologia nel Commentario alla Fisica di Simplicio"},"abstract":"In this paper I will explain some passages of Simplicius, in Phys. 1, in which the Commentator discusses the Aristotelian expression pephyke de ek t\u00f4n gvorimoteron (Phys. 1.1, 184a. 16). Here Simplicius distinguishes ta gnorimotera from to autopiston, such as the def\u00adinitions and the immediate premises, and from the dianoetic knowledge, which is syllogistic and demonstrative. Notwithstanding the topic o f these passages is epistemological, here the Com\u00admentator, through a syllogism in which there is an evident reminiscence o f Plato\u2019s Timaeus, cites the beauty o f the universe as an initial step to raise to the goodness o f die Demiurge. After an articulated investigation (in which are involved, as well, Aristotle\u2019s Rhetoric and above all P osteriorA nalytics), Simplicius concludes that to kalon has the same statute of gnorimoteron hem\u00een (Arise. Phys. 1.1.184a.l6). The purpose o f the Commentator seems that to conciliate Plato and Aristotle, and the result is an original and creative, but at the same rime exact and careful, way to do the exegesis of Aristotle\u2019s Physics. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5jR4LzCbg0vHYAp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":246,"full_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":405,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Athenaeum","volume":"104","issue":"1","pages":"186-200"}},"sort":[2016]}
Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 50 |
Pages | 237-288 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason. Ps.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will. On this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons. This account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions? You are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent. [conclusion p. 286] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason.\r\n\r\nPs.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will.\r\n\r\nOn this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons.\r\n\r\nThis account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions?\r\n\r\nYou are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent.\r\n[conclusion p. 286]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":[2016]}
Title | Review: Bowen, A.C., Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Studia graeco-arabica |
Volume | 6 |
Pages | 294-301 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | D'Ancona Costa, Cristina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Within the history of the reception of ancient cosmology in later ages, Aristotle’s De Caelo plays an important role. Simplicius’ work on the planets and their motions is devoted to a specific point in the late antique exegesis of this Aristotelian treatise, namely the problem of planetary motions and the solution to it provided by Simplicius (d. 555 AD) in his commentary on De Caelo. Planetary motions indeed pose a problem for him: while throughout his commentary he is committed to showing that Aristotle’s description of the heavens is the correct one, on this particular issue he substitutes Ptolemy’s system for Aristotle’s (pp. 84-86). Bowen focuses on Simplicius’ “preference for post-Aristotelian planetary hypotheses” (p. 51) and questions the reason for this. For Bowen, the answer lies in the well-known debate on the nature of the heavens that arose in the first half of the 6th century between Simplicius and Philoponus. Challenged by Philoponus in a lost work—whose main, though not exclusive, source of knowledge for us is Simplicius himself—the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity and divinity of the heavens was defended by Simplicius in his commentary on De Caelo, where he also directed harsh criticisms at Philoponus. In Bowen’s book, four introductory chapters (pp. 27-93) precede the translation of Simplicius’ In De Caelo II, 10-12 (= pp. 470.29-510.35 Heiberg), followed by a series of comments on selected topics (pp. 201-98). Figures and tables are provided at the end of the introduction (pp. 22-25) and between the translation and the comments (pp. 181-97). Bowen frames much of his discussion against the backdrop of Simplicius’ struggle against Philoponus. Chapter One opens with the claim: “The great digression at the end of Simplicius’ In De Caelo 2.12 [492.25-510.35] is an apologia precipitated by Philoponus, the renegade Platonist, and his attack on Aristotle’s arguments for a fifth simple body, aether” (p. 27). Even though Philoponus’ rejection of Aristotelian cosmology is not explicitly mentioned in Simplicius’ commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12, Bowen considers it Simplicius’ real target. Philoponus’ attack on the theory of the aether and its movement lies in the background of what, at first glance, appears to be a highly specialized discussion of the difficulties in the homocentric theory and an excursus on their solutions. Bowen’s interpretation centers on the idea that Simplicius was well aware of the limitations of the homocentric theory. Faced with Philoponus’ objections, he sought a solution that was compatible with his own assumption of the circular and, consequently, eternal motion of the heavens. Philoponus’ main objection is as follows: if it were true that the entire cosmos rotates about its center, then the planets should not exhibit rotations about their own axes, nor should they have apogees and perigees—an argument that, according to Bowen, Simplicius could only agree with. In fact, this was precisely the reason he sided with Ptolemy. However, Simplicius could by no means endorse the general conclusion Philoponus drew from this, namely that there is no aether endowed with circular, eternal motion. Bowen argues that Philoponus’ criticism “brings to the fore two points against Aristotle,” namely the rotation of the planets about their axes and their apogees and perigees, “in which he sides with Philoponus.” The danger here is heresy: Simplicius is now obliged to show that his agreement with Philoponus does not lead to Philoponus’ blasphemous conclusion (p. 28), hence the subtitle of Bowen’s book, In Defense of a Heresy. This reconstruction hinges on linking Simplicius’ statements in his commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12—especially in the section labeled “digression”—to Philoponus. As Bowen puts it, “The digression is the apologia in full” (p. 64). As noted earlier, this long passage, which concludes Simplicius’ commentary on De Caelo II, 12, addresses difficulties in the cosmic model presented in Metaphysics XII 8, where all the spheres rotate around the Earth, the center of the universe (pp. 14, 92). However, Bowen maintains that, beyond its explicit content, the “digression” is in reality a response to Philoponus. The latter is not mentioned directly; instead, Simplicius presents Xenarchus’ objections and counters them with the arguments developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Only after addressing these objections, “long after Philoponus’ objections to the Aristotelian aether have been answered, does Simplicius again take up, without mentioning Philoponus, the question of the homocentric planetary theory (...). So the astronomical digression (παρέκβασις) at the close of In De Caelo 2.12 is, logically speaking, a part of Simplicius’ attempt to deal with Philoponus” (p. 15). [introduction p. 294-295] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PxYyMRyYuxV6BPl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1410","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1410,"authors_free":[{"id":2205,"entry_id":1410,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":60,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"D'Ancona Costa, Cristina","free_first_name":"D'Ancona Costa","free_last_name":"Cristina","norm_person":{"id":60,"first_name":"Cristina","last_name":"D'Ancona Costa","full_name":"D'Ancona Costa, Cristina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/138912297","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review: Bowen, A.C., Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy","main_title":{"title":"Review: Bowen, A.C., Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy"},"abstract":"Within the history of the reception of ancient cosmology in later ages, Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo plays an important role. Simplicius\u2019 work on the planets and their motions is devoted to a specific point in the late antique exegesis of this Aristotelian treatise, namely the problem of planetary motions and the solution to it provided by Simplicius (d. 555 AD) in his commentary on De Caelo. Planetary motions indeed pose a problem for him: while throughout his commentary he is committed to showing that Aristotle\u2019s description of the heavens is the correct one, on this particular issue he substitutes Ptolemy\u2019s system for Aristotle\u2019s (pp. 84-86). Bowen focuses on Simplicius\u2019 \u201cpreference for post-Aristotelian planetary hypotheses\u201d (p. 51) and questions the reason for this.\r\n\r\nFor Bowen, the answer lies in the well-known debate on the nature of the heavens that arose in the first half of the 6th century between Simplicius and Philoponus. Challenged by Philoponus in a lost work\u2014whose main, though not exclusive, source of knowledge for us is Simplicius himself\u2014the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity and divinity of the heavens was defended by Simplicius in his commentary on De Caelo, where he also directed harsh criticisms at Philoponus.\r\n\r\nIn Bowen\u2019s book, four introductory chapters (pp. 27-93) precede the translation of Simplicius\u2019 In De Caelo II, 10-12 (= pp. 470.29-510.35 Heiberg), followed by a series of comments on selected topics (pp. 201-98). Figures and tables are provided at the end of the introduction (pp. 22-25) and between the translation and the comments (pp. 181-97). Bowen frames much of his discussion against the backdrop of Simplicius\u2019 struggle against Philoponus. Chapter One opens with the claim:\r\n\r\n \u201cThe great digression at the end of Simplicius\u2019 In De Caelo 2.12 [492.25-510.35] is an apologia precipitated by Philoponus, the renegade Platonist, and his attack on Aristotle\u2019s arguments for a fifth simple body, aether\u201d (p. 27).\r\n\r\nEven though Philoponus\u2019 rejection of Aristotelian cosmology is not explicitly mentioned in Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12, Bowen considers it Simplicius\u2019 real target. Philoponus\u2019 attack on the theory of the aether and its movement lies in the background of what, at first glance, appears to be a highly specialized discussion of the difficulties in the homocentric theory and an excursus on their solutions.\r\n\r\nBowen\u2019s interpretation centers on the idea that Simplicius was well aware of the limitations of the homocentric theory. Faced with Philoponus\u2019 objections, he sought a solution that was compatible with his own assumption of the circular and, consequently, eternal motion of the heavens. Philoponus\u2019 main objection is as follows: if it were true that the entire cosmos rotates about its center, then the planets should not exhibit rotations about their own axes, nor should they have apogees and perigees\u2014an argument that, according to Bowen, Simplicius could only agree with. In fact, this was precisely the reason he sided with Ptolemy. However, Simplicius could by no means endorse the general conclusion Philoponus drew from this, namely that there is no aether endowed with circular, eternal motion.\r\n\r\nBowen argues that Philoponus\u2019 criticism \u201cbrings to the fore two points against Aristotle,\u201d namely the rotation of the planets about their axes and their apogees and perigees, \u201cin which he sides with Philoponus.\u201d The danger here is heresy: Simplicius is now obliged to show that his agreement with Philoponus does not lead to Philoponus\u2019 blasphemous conclusion (p. 28), hence the subtitle of Bowen\u2019s book, In Defense of a Heresy.\r\n\r\nThis reconstruction hinges on linking Simplicius\u2019 statements in his commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12\u2014especially in the section labeled \u201cdigression\u201d\u2014to Philoponus. As Bowen puts it, \u201cThe digression is the apologia in full\u201d (p. 64). As noted earlier, this long passage, which concludes Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De Caelo II, 12, addresses difficulties in the cosmic model presented in Metaphysics XII 8, where all the spheres rotate around the Earth, the center of the universe (pp. 14, 92). However, Bowen maintains that, beyond its explicit content, the \u201cdigression\u201d is in reality a response to Philoponus. The latter is not mentioned directly; instead, Simplicius presents Xenarchus\u2019 objections and counters them with the arguments developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias.\r\n\r\nOnly after addressing these objections, \u201clong after Philoponus\u2019 objections to the Aristotelian aether have been answered, does Simplicius again take up, without mentioning Philoponus, the question of the homocentric planetary theory (...). So the astronomical digression (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03ba\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) at the close of In De Caelo 2.12 is, logically speaking, a part of Simplicius\u2019 attempt to deal with Philoponus\u201d (p. 15). [introduction p. 294-295]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PxYyMRyYuxV6BPl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":60,"full_name":"D'Ancona Costa, Cristina","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1410,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"6","issue":"","pages":"294-301"}},"sort":[2016]}
Title | Book review: Simplicius on Aristotle Physics 8.1-5, written by Istvan Bodnár, Michael Chase and Michael Share |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 9 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 124 –125 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hatzistavrou, Antony |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This is a fine addition to the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, which is under the general editorship of Richard Sorabji. The volume contains a translation of Simplicius’ commentary on the first five chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle’s Physics. The translators are Michael Chase (who has been involved in the translation of most of the chapters), Istvan Bodnár, and Michael Slate. The translation is accompanied by a series of notes. Some of the notes identify the ancient texts Simplicius refers to in his commentary, while others are primarily of philological interest. There is also a number of exegetical notes that are particularly useful in helping the reader understand the logic of Simplicius’ arguments and in elucidating the conceptual apparatus of his commentary. The volume also includes: A preface by Richard Sorabji, which explains the importance of the commentary for scholarship on the ancient commentators on Aristotle. An introduction by Michael Chase, which focuses on Simplicius’ polemic against Philoponus. A list of departures of the translation from Diels’ edition of Simplicius’ commentary. An English-Greek glossary. A Greek-English index. A subject index. A bibliography. The volume is clearly designed with the needs of the specialist scholar in mind and aims to become the primary reference text in English for the study of Simplicius’ commentary. Where does the importance of Simplicius’ commentary lie? It is instructive that both Sorabji, in his preface, and Chase, in his introduction, focus on its importance for the history of philosophy in late antiquity. First, it sheds light on an aspect of the philosophical and ideological debate between pagan and Christian thinkers at the end of antiquity concerning the intelligibility of the creation of the world. In Physics 8.1, Aristotle argues that time and motion are eternal. For any arbitrarily chosen moment in time or motion in space, one will always be able to identify a preceding and a subsequent moment or motion. This means that the world as a whole is eternal. Philoponus understood Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of the universe to pose problems for a creationist account of the world, as advocated by the Judeo-Christian religion. In his polemic Against Aristotle On the Eternity of the World, Philoponus undertakes the task of defending a creationist account of the world by attacking Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of motion and time. In his commentary, Simplicius attacks Philoponus, accusing him, among other things, of failing to understand and thus misrepresenting Aristotle’s position. A primary aim of his commentary on Physics 8.1 is, on the one hand, to identify and correct what he takes to be Philoponus’ distortions of Aristotle’s arguments and, on the other hand, to vindicate the cogency of Aristotle’s theory against Philoponus’ polemic. Simplicius makes no attempt to conceal his disdain for Philoponus’ scholarly abilities and intellectual integrity, describing his arguments as "garbage" and accusing him of being motivated by his "zeal for contradicting." In his introduction, Michael Chase clarifies that Simplicius’ attack is not restricted to issues concerning the proper interpretation of Aristotle’s theory but has a wider scope. It is meant as an attack on Philoponus’ Christian faith. In this attack, Simplicius occasionally reveals himself to be conversant with intricate Christian theological debates, such as the debate concerning the nature of Christ (i.e., whether Christ was begotten or made). Second, as Richard Sorabji mentions in his preface, Simplicius’ commentary reports and makes extensive use of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. On Sorabji’s view, Simplicius, on the whole, reports Alexander’s views accurately. Furthermore, despite occasional disagreements about the interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy, Simplicius shows respect for Alexander’s abilities as a commentator and values his intellectual integrity. Simplicius’ attitude towards Alexander is thus sharply contrasted with his attitude towards Philoponus. Scholars interested in the debate between pagan and Christian philosophers at the end of antiquity and in the history of the ancient commentators on Aristotle will welcome the translation into English of Simplicius’ commentary. They may also find much material in the notes to the translation to grapple with. The volume will also appeal to anyone interested in Aristotle’s natural philosophy and, more specifically, in Aristotle’s views about the eternity of the world and the prime mover. The detailed English-Greek glossary and the indices make the volume a significant research tool likely to become a reference point in relevant scholarship. In addition, the volume is nicely produced. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/um5b6staCmgDtbZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1014","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1014,"authors_free":[{"id":1530,"entry_id":1014,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":173,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hatzistavrou, Antony","free_first_name":"Antony","free_last_name":"Hatzistavrou","norm_person":{"id":173,"first_name":"Antony","last_name":"Hatzistavrou","full_name":"Hatzistavrou, Antony","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Book review: Simplicius on Aristotle Physics 8.1-5, written by Istvan Bodn\u00e1r, Michael Chase and Michael Share","main_title":{"title":"Book review: Simplicius on Aristotle Physics 8.1-5, written by Istvan Bodn\u00e1r, Michael Chase and Michael Share"},"abstract":"This is a fine addition to the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, which is under the general editorship of Richard Sorabji. The volume contains a translation of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the first five chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle\u2019s Physics. The translators are Michael Chase (who has been involved in the translation of most of the chapters), Istvan Bodn\u00e1r, and Michael Slate. The translation is accompanied by a series of notes. Some of the notes identify the ancient texts Simplicius refers to in his commentary, while others are primarily of philological interest. There is also a number of exegetical notes that are particularly useful in helping the reader understand the logic of Simplicius\u2019 arguments and in elucidating the conceptual apparatus of his commentary. The volume also includes:\r\n\r\n A preface by Richard Sorabji, which explains the importance of the commentary for scholarship on the ancient commentators on Aristotle.\r\n An introduction by Michael Chase, which focuses on Simplicius\u2019 polemic against Philoponus.\r\n A list of departures of the translation from Diels\u2019 edition of Simplicius\u2019 commentary.\r\n An English-Greek glossary.\r\n A Greek-English index.\r\n A subject index.\r\n A bibliography.\r\n\r\nThe volume is clearly designed with the needs of the specialist scholar in mind and aims to become the primary reference text in English for the study of Simplicius\u2019 commentary.\r\n\r\nWhere does the importance of Simplicius\u2019 commentary lie? It is instructive that both Sorabji, in his preface, and Chase, in his introduction, focus on its importance for the history of philosophy in late antiquity. First, it sheds light on an aspect of the philosophical and ideological debate between pagan and Christian thinkers at the end of antiquity concerning the intelligibility of the creation of the world. In Physics 8.1, Aristotle argues that time and motion are eternal. For any arbitrarily chosen moment in time or motion in space, one will always be able to identify a preceding and a subsequent moment or motion. This means that the world as a whole is eternal. Philoponus understood Aristotle\u2019s arguments for the eternity of the universe to pose problems for a creationist account of the world, as advocated by the Judeo-Christian religion. In his polemic Against Aristotle On the Eternity of the World, Philoponus undertakes the task of defending a creationist account of the world by attacking Aristotle\u2019s arguments for the eternity of motion and time.\r\n\r\nIn his commentary, Simplicius attacks Philoponus, accusing him, among other things, of failing to understand and thus misrepresenting Aristotle\u2019s position. A primary aim of his commentary on Physics 8.1 is, on the one hand, to identify and correct what he takes to be Philoponus\u2019 distortions of Aristotle\u2019s arguments and, on the other hand, to vindicate the cogency of Aristotle\u2019s theory against Philoponus\u2019 polemic. Simplicius makes no attempt to conceal his disdain for Philoponus\u2019 scholarly abilities and intellectual integrity, describing his arguments as \"garbage\" and accusing him of being motivated by his \"zeal for contradicting.\" In his introduction, Michael Chase clarifies that Simplicius\u2019 attack is not restricted to issues concerning the proper interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s theory but has a wider scope. It is meant as an attack on Philoponus\u2019 Christian faith. In this attack, Simplicius occasionally reveals himself to be conversant with intricate Christian theological debates, such as the debate concerning the nature of Christ (i.e., whether Christ was begotten or made).\r\n\r\nSecond, as Richard Sorabji mentions in his preface, Simplicius\u2019 commentary reports and makes extensive use of Alexander of Aphrodisias\u2019 lost commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics. On Sorabji\u2019s view, Simplicius, on the whole, reports Alexander\u2019s views accurately. Furthermore, despite occasional disagreements about the interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s philosophy, Simplicius shows respect for Alexander\u2019s abilities as a commentator and values his intellectual integrity. Simplicius\u2019 attitude towards Alexander is thus sharply contrasted with his attitude towards Philoponus.\r\n\r\nScholars interested in the debate between pagan and Christian philosophers at the end of antiquity and in the history of the ancient commentators on Aristotle will welcome the translation into English of Simplicius\u2019 commentary. They may also find much material in the notes to the translation to grapple with. The volume will also appeal to anyone interested in Aristotle\u2019s natural philosophy and, more specifically, in Aristotle\u2019s views about the eternity of the world and the prime mover. The detailed English-Greek glossary and the indices make the volume a significant research tool likely to become a reference point in relevant scholarship. In addition, the volume is nicely produced. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/um5b6staCmgDtbZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":173,"full_name":"Hatzistavrou, Antony","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1014,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"9","issue":"1","pages":"124 \u2013125"}},"sort":[2015]}
Title | Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, préface par Ph. Hoffmann |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 33 |
Pages | 115-128 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un résumé analytique du texte de Simplicius. À défaut d’une traduction complète (qui est annoncée aux éditions des Belles Lettres), il s’agit là d’un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses. Simplicius n’a ni le prestige d’un Proclus ni l’audace philosophique d’un Damascius. Sans doute son rôle de Commentateur d’Aristote est à la fois la cause de sa relégation et le cœur de son originalité. Contraint de suivre la logique d’un texte différent de celle du système qui lui sert de grille d’analyse, il tire de cette lecture systématique des éléments qu’il doit harmoniser avec l’orthodoxie néoplatonicienne. À cet égard, la question de l’infini est symptomatique de sa méthode, puisqu’elle montre de quelle façon se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristotélicien et de la toile de fond néoplatonicienne : Simplicius évince l’ἄπειρον du sensible, pour le réserver à l’intelligible, mais il retient un procès à l’infini, τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n’admet pas simplement un « bon » et un « mauvais » infini, l’un qui vaudrait dans l’intelligible, l’autre qui en serait l’image sensible et dégradée. Il pose plutôt une forme positive de l’infinité dans le sensible même. On peut dès lors remercier Ph. Soulier d’avoir fait la pleine lumière sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les dernières pages du néoplatonisme tardo-antique, c’est-à-dire d’avoir exposé avec une telle minutie comment l’analyse de la Physique permettait de déployer les propriétés de l’infini qui étaient caractéristiques du sensible, en accord avec la thèse néoplatonicienne la plus autorisée. [conclusion p. 127-128] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"406","_score":null,"_source":{"id":406,"authors_free":[{"id":2456,"entry_id":406,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann"},"abstract":"Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 analytique du texte de Simplicius. \u00c0 d\u00e9faut d\u2019une traduction compl\u00e8te (qui est annonc\u00e9e aux \u00e9ditions des Belles Lettres), il s\u2019agit l\u00e0 d\u2019un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses.\r\n\r\nSimplicius n\u2019a ni le prestige d\u2019un Proclus ni l\u2019audace philosophique d\u2019un Damascius. Sans doute son r\u00f4le de Commentateur d\u2019Aristote est \u00e0 la fois la cause de sa rel\u00e9gation et le c\u0153ur de son originalit\u00e9. Contraint de suivre la logique d\u2019un texte diff\u00e9rent de celle du syst\u00e8me qui lui sert de grille d\u2019analyse, il tire de cette lecture syst\u00e9matique des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qu\u2019il doit harmoniser avec l\u2019orthodoxie n\u00e9oplatonicienne.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la question de l\u2019infini est symptomatique de sa m\u00e9thode, puisqu\u2019elle montre de quelle fa\u00e7on se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristot\u00e9licien et de la toile de fond n\u00e9oplatonicienne : Simplicius \u00e9vince l\u2019\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd du sensible, pour le r\u00e9server \u00e0 l\u2019intelligible, mais il retient un proc\u00e8s \u00e0 l\u2019infini, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u1fbd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n\u2019admet pas simplement un \u00ab bon \u00bb et un \u00ab mauvais \u00bb infini, l\u2019un qui vaudrait dans l\u2019intelligible, l\u2019autre qui en serait l\u2019image sensible et d\u00e9grad\u00e9e. Il pose plut\u00f4t une forme positive de l\u2019infinit\u00e9 dans le sensible m\u00eame.\r\n\r\nOn peut d\u00e8s lors remercier Ph. Soulier d\u2019avoir fait la pleine lumi\u00e8re sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les derni\u00e8res pages du n\u00e9oplatonisme tardo-antique, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire d\u2019avoir expos\u00e9 avec une telle minutie comment l\u2019analyse de la Physique permettait de d\u00e9ployer les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s de l\u2019infini qui \u00e9taient caract\u00e9ristiques du sensible, en accord avec la th\u00e8se n\u00e9oplatonicienne la plus autoris\u00e9e.\r\n[conclusion p. 127-128]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":406,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"33","issue":"","pages":"115-128"}},"sort":[2015]}
Title | Simplicius on Predication |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 173-200 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hauer, Mareike |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper deals with Simplicius’ discussion of Aristotle’s account of predication in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Of particular interest is the relation between synonymous predication and essential predication. In Aristotle, as well as in Simplicius, both kinds of predication are closely connected. It has been argued in Aristotelian scholarship that, for Aristotle, synonymous predication yields essential predication. It has been equally argued that this assumption is compatible with Aristotle’s theoretical framework, but if applied to Plato, would pose a problem for Plato. Simplicius’ extensive discussion of both synonymous predication and essential predication suggests that he was aware of the deeper problem raised by the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication. In this paper, I will argue that Simplicius, by means of an original interpretation of the predicate, not only turns the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication into a supposition that is less problematic for Plato, but also creates a framework for a possible harmonization of Plato and Aristotle. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yxvHetwfUgsPb6f |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"407","_score":null,"_source":{"id":407,"authors_free":[{"id":545,"entry_id":407,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Predication","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Predication"},"abstract":"This paper deals with Simplicius\u2019 discussion of Aristotle\u2019s account of predication in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Of particular interest is the relation between synonymous predication and essential predication. In Aristotle, as well as in Simplicius, both kinds of predication are closely connected. It has been argued in Aristotelian scholarship that, for Aristotle, synonymous predication yields essential predication. It has been equally argued that this assumption is compatible with Aristotle\u2019s theoretical framework, but if applied to Plato, would pose a problem for Plato. Simplicius\u2019 extensive discussion of both synonymous predication and essential predication suggests that he was aware of the deeper problem raised by the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication. In this paper, I will argue that Simplicius, by means of an original interpretation of the predicate, not only turns the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication into a supposition that is less problematic for Plato, but also creates a framework for a possible harmonization of Plato and Aristotle. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yxvHetwfUgsPb6f","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":407,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"173-200"}},"sort":[2015]}
Title | Le σκοπός du traité aristotélicien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Exégèse, dialectique, théologie |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Studia graeco-arabica |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 27-51 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A six-page Prologue introduces the commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo written by Simplicius after 529 AD. As usual in the exegeses typical of the Neoplatonic schools of late Antiquity, this Prologue addresses a series of preliminary questions that are meant to steer the interpretation in its entirety, as well as to frame the text to be commented upon within the reading canon of the Aristotelian works, which were intended to provide the propaedeutics to the reading canon of Plato’s dialogues. Simplicius addresses the question of the scope of De Caelo, discussing the interpretations advanced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Iamblichus, and Syrianus. According to Alexander, this treatise deals with the universe as a whole, as well as with the five simple bodies contained in it. It was with Iamblichus, who advocated the idea that for each Platonic dialogue there was only one skopos, that the unity of a philosophical work was raised to the rank of a general rule. According to Iamblichus, the skopos of the De Caelo is the divine body of heaven. As a consequence, the primary elements that depend upon the heavens are included in the treatise. Syrianus deepens the theological tendency implied in Iamblichus’ interpretation: for him, the skopos of the De Caelo is primarily the divine body of heaven, and only secondarily the set of sublunar elements. Simplicius treasures the commentary by Alexander; nevertheless, he questions the skopos assigned by him: Alexander underestimated the importance of the unity of the treatise, even though his intention to account for each and every question raised by Aristotle was laudable. Contrarily, Syrianus was right in emphasizing the theological vein of the De Caelo, but focussed only on the section on the divine body of heaven, playing down books III and IV as if they were only ancillary, thus forgetting that the skopos must account for the whole of the treatise at hand. Between the two positions, Simplicius advocates the idea of a synthetical skopos, following in the footsteps of Iamblichus’ interpretation, but taking systematically into account the best of Alexander’s. The skopos of the De Caelo is the divine heaven, that “communicates” its perfections to the entire universe. Simplicius’ position is revealed to be very different with respect to that of other commentators like Ammonius and Philoponus, who both considered that the title was self-evident and required no special investigation. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IkThMj3dyL4pqPR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"581","_score":null,"_source":{"id":581,"authors_free":[{"id":824,"entry_id":581,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie","main_title":{"title":"Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie"},"abstract":"A six-page Prologue introduces the commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo written by Simplicius after 529 AD. As usual in the exegeses typical of the Neoplatonic schools of late Antiquity, this Prologue addresses a series of preliminary \r\nquestions that are meant to steer the interpretation in its entirety, as well as to frame the text to be commented upon within the reading canon of the Aristotelian works, which were intended to provide the propaedeutics to the reading canon of Plato\u2019s dialogues. Simplicius addresses the question of the scope of De Caelo, discussing the interpretations advanced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Iamblichus, and Syrianus. According to Alexander, this treatise deals with the universe as a whole, as well as with the five simple bodies contained in it. It was with Iamblichus, who advocated the idea that for each Platonic dialogue there was only one skopos, that the unity of a philosophical work was raised \r\nto the rank of a general rule. According to Iamblichus, the skopos of the De Caelo is the divine body of heaven. As a consequence, the primary elements that depend upon the heavens are included in the treatise. Syrianus deepens \r\nthe theological tendency implied in Iamblichus\u2019 interpretation: for him, the skopos of the De Caelo is primarily the divine body of heaven, and only secondarily the set of sublunar elements. Simplicius treasures the commentary by \r\nAlexander; nevertheless, he questions the skopos assigned by him: Alexander underestimated the importance of the unity of the treatise, even though his intention to account for each and every question raised by Aristotle was laudable. Contrarily, Syrianus was right in emphasizing the theological vein of the De Caelo, but focussed only on the section on the divine body of heaven, playing down books III and IV as if they were only ancillary, thus forgetting that the skopos must account for the whole of the treatise at hand. Between the two positions, Simplicius advocates the idea of a synthetical skopos, following in the footsteps of Iamblichus\u2019 interpretation, but taking systematically into account the best of Alexander\u2019s. The skopos of the De Caelo is the divine heaven, that \u201ccommunicates\u201d its perfections to the \r\nentire universe. Simplicius\u2019 position is revealed to be very different with respect to that of other commentators like Ammonius and Philoponus, who both considered that the title was self-evident and required no special investigation. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IkThMj3dyL4pqPR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":581,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"27-51"}},"sort":[2015]}
Title | Review of: I. Hadot, Le néoplatonicien Simplicius à la lumière des recherches contemporaines |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Studia graeco-arabica |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 385-388 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chemi, Germana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
L’A. présente en ce volume un bilan raisonné des recherches contemporaines concernant la vie et l’œuvre du néoplatonicien Simplicius, ainsi que des études sur sa réception dans le monde arabe. Le volume contient aussi deux contributions de Ph. Vallat portant respectivement sur la biographie de Simplicius (p. 102-129) et sur la réception arabe de son commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote (p. 241-264). La première section (Biographie, p. 13-134), qui fait suite à la préface (p. 11-12), concerne la biographie de Simplicius. Cette partie du volume aborde les sujets suivants : le nom de Simplicius (p. 13-14), son origine et sa formation (p. 14-16), le milieu culturel d’Alexandrie à l’époque de ses études avec Ammonius (p. 16-17), le départ d’Athènes (p. 17-19), l’exil en Perse (p. 23-24) et la question du lieu où Simplicius et ses collègues se seraient rendus après avoir quitté la cour de Chosroès Ier (p. 25-129). Cette section s’achève par un sommaire général (p. 130-133) et trois épigrammes que l’A. attribue à Simplicius (p. 133-134). La deuxième section (Les œuvres conservées sauf In Phys. et In De Caelo, p. 135-266) concerne les commentaires de Simplicius sur le Manuel d’Épictète (p. 148-181), sur le De Anima (p. 182-228) et sur les Catégories d’Aristote (p. 228-266). L’A. introduit son analyse de ces trois ouvrages par un aperçu général sur la datation des commentaires de Simplicius (p. 135-148) : conformément à la thèse déjà avancée dans ses travaux antérieurs, elle considère les commentaires de Simplicius comme ayant tous été écrits après l’exil en Perse. La troisième section (Les œuvres partiellement ou entièrement perdues, p. 267-283) a pour objet les textes suivants, que l’A. attribue à Simplicius : un commentaire aux Éléments d’Euclide, un commentaire sur le Phédon (p. 267-269), un épitomé de la Physique de Théophraste (p. 269), un commentaire sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote (p. 269-277), un commentaire sur La secte pythagoricienne de Jamblique (p. 277-278), un commentaire sur les Météorologiques d’Aristote (p. 279-280), un commentaire sur l’Ars oratoria d’Hermogène (p. 280-282) et un traité sur les syllogismes (p. 282). Suivent enfin un Épilogue (p. 285-288) et une bibliographie (p. 289-311). [introduction p. 385] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dB50Tmjq5TVAe1v |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1310","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1310,"authors_free":[{"id":1936,"entry_id":1310,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":99,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chemi, Germana","free_first_name":"Germana","free_last_name":"Chemi","norm_person":{"id":99,"first_name":"Germana","last_name":"Chemi","full_name":"Chemi, Germana","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: I. Hadot, Le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des recherches contemporaines","main_title":{"title":"Review of: I. Hadot, Le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des recherches contemporaines"},"abstract":"L\u2019A. pr\u00e9sente en ce volume un bilan raisonn\u00e9 des recherches contemporaines concernant la vie et l\u2019\u0153uvre du n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius, ainsi que des \u00e9tudes sur sa r\u00e9ception dans le monde arabe. Le volume contient aussi deux contributions de Ph. Vallat portant respectivement sur la biographie de Simplicius (p. 102-129) et sur la r\u00e9ception arabe de son commentaire aux Cat\u00e9gories d\u2019Aristote (p. 241-264).\r\n\r\nLa premi\u00e8re section (Biographie, p. 13-134), qui fait suite \u00e0 la pr\u00e9face (p. 11-12), concerne la biographie de Simplicius. Cette partie du volume aborde les sujets suivants : le nom de Simplicius (p. 13-14), son origine et sa formation (p. 14-16), le milieu culturel d\u2019Alexandrie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de ses \u00e9tudes avec Ammonius (p. 16-17), le d\u00e9part d\u2019Ath\u00e8nes (p. 17-19), l\u2019exil en Perse (p. 23-24) et la question du lieu o\u00f9 Simplicius et ses coll\u00e8gues se seraient rendus apr\u00e8s avoir quitt\u00e9 la cour de Chosro\u00e8s Ier (p. 25-129). Cette section s\u2019ach\u00e8ve par un sommaire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral (p. 130-133) et trois \u00e9pigrammes que l\u2019A. attribue \u00e0 Simplicius (p. 133-134).\r\n\r\nLa deuxi\u00e8me section (Les \u0153uvres conserv\u00e9es sauf In Phys. et In De Caelo, p. 135-266) concerne les commentaires de Simplicius sur le Manuel d\u2019\u00c9pict\u00e8te (p. 148-181), sur le De Anima (p. 182-228) et sur les Cat\u00e9gories d\u2019Aristote (p. 228-266). L\u2019A. introduit son analyse de ces trois ouvrages par un aper\u00e7u g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sur la datation des commentaires de Simplicius (p. 135-148) : conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la th\u00e8se d\u00e9j\u00e0 avanc\u00e9e dans ses travaux ant\u00e9rieurs, elle consid\u00e8re les commentaires de Simplicius comme ayant tous \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9crits apr\u00e8s l\u2019exil en Perse.\r\n\r\nLa troisi\u00e8me section (Les \u0153uvres partiellement ou enti\u00e8rement perdues, p. 267-283) a pour objet les textes suivants, que l\u2019A. attribue \u00e0 Simplicius : un commentaire aux \u00c9l\u00e9ments d\u2019Euclide, un commentaire sur le Ph\u00e9don (p. 267-269), un \u00e9pitom\u00e9 de la Physique de Th\u00e9ophraste (p. 269), un commentaire sur la M\u00e9taphysique d\u2019Aristote (p. 269-277), un commentaire sur La secte pythagoricienne de Jamblique (p. 277-278), un commentaire sur les M\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques d\u2019Aristote (p. 279-280), un commentaire sur l\u2019Ars oratoria d\u2019Hermog\u00e8ne (p. 280-282) et un trait\u00e9 sur les syllogismes (p. 282).\r\n\r\nSuivent enfin un \u00c9pilogue (p. 285-288) et une bibliographie (p. 289-311).\r\n[introduction p. 385]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dB50Tmjq5TVAe1v","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":99,"full_name":"Chemi, Germana","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1310,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"385-388"}},"sort":[2015]}
Title | On Simplicius’ Life and Works: A Response to Hadot |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Aestimatio |
Volume | 12 |
Pages | 56-82 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text is a response to Ilsetraut Hadot's book, "Le néoplatonicien Simplicius à la lumière des recherches contem¬poraines. Un bilan critique," which provides a critical overview of scholarly research on the Neoplatonist Simplicius. The author critiques Hadot's approach, arguing that her use of the Neoplatonic curriculum and medieval testimonies is an unsafe guide for assessing Simplicius' life and works. The article concludes by thanking Hadot for her previous work on Simplicius and acknowledging the value of her contributions to the field. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/iph5X72ry3ZiZ9P |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1322","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1322,"authors_free":[{"id":1956,"entry_id":1322,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On Simplicius\u2019 Life and Works: A Response to Hadot","main_title":{"title":"On Simplicius\u2019 Life and Works: A Response to Hadot"},"abstract":"This text is a response to Ilsetraut Hadot's book, \"Le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des recherches contem\u00acporaines. Un bilan critique,\" which provides a critical overview of scholarly research on the Neoplatonist Simplicius. The author critiques Hadot's approach, arguing that her use of the Neoplatonic curriculum and medieval testimonies is an unsafe guide for assessing Simplicius' life and works. The article concludes by thanking Hadot for her previous work on Simplicius and acknowledging the value of her contributions to the field. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/iph5X72ry3ZiZ9P","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1322,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Aestimatio","volume":"12","issue":"","pages":"56-82"}},"sort":[2015]}
Title | Collation but not contamination: On some textual problems of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Kappa 1065a 25sqq |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Revue d’histoire des textes, nouvelle série |
Volume | 10 |
Pages | 1-23 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
One of the less felicitous terms in textual criticism, despite its being amply used in modern scholarship, is the term « contamination » (Kontamination), which Paul Maas first coined in his famous Textkritik. By modern-day standards the term is supposed to account, roughly, for two phenomena : (1) the phenomenon of having variant readings in margine or inter lineas of a text, which is an obvious sign that, next to the principal model, at least one other manuscript has been at some point involved in the copying of the text ; (2) the more complicated phenomenon of detecting in the body of the text readings that are not expected to be found there. What we detect in (2) is in principle the result of what has happened in (1). Any scholar acquainted with Byzantine manuscripts produced from the ninth century down to the Fall of Constantinople should know that cases like those described above were frequent in Byzantium’s Buchwesen, provided that an adequately circulating text was concerned. As Byzantine scribes and scholars mostly worked and studied in significant libraries that owned several copies of the same text, the idea of comparing them in order to verify dubious readings and to produce a more satisfying text would naturally occur to their mind. Scribes and scholars in Byzantium were well aware that material damages and copyist errors could happen. And as we nowadays do, they tried to counter such textual problems by collating different manuscripts – not by contaminating them. If we leave aside copies made purely for commercial purposes, we can reasonably say that collation of at least two manuscripts before producing a new copy of a text was something of a rule in Byzantium. I shall henceforth call this rule « the principle of collation » ; it can be formulated like this : « Unless otherwise proved, each Byzantine copy of an adequately circulating text is the product of collation of at least two different manuscripts. » [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HitzMXpWqjAaGGB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1417","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1417,"authors_free":[{"id":2218,"entry_id":1417,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis ","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Collation but not contamination: On some textual problems of Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics Kappa 1065a 25sqq","main_title":{"title":"Collation but not contamination: On some textual problems of Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics Kappa 1065a 25sqq"},"abstract":"One of the less felicitous terms in textual criticism, despite its being amply used in modern scholarship, is the term \u00ab contamination \u00bb (Kontamination), which Paul Maas first coined in his famous Textkritik. By modern-day standards the term is supposed to account, roughly, for two phenomena : (1) the phenomenon of having variant readings in margine or inter lineas of a text, which is an obvious sign that, next to the principal model, at least one other manuscript has been at some point involved in the copying of the text ; (2) the more complicated phenomenon of detecting in the body of the text readings that are not expected to be found there. What we detect in (2) is in principle the result of what has happened in (1). Any scholar acquainted with Byzantine manuscripts produced from the ninth century down to the Fall of Constantinople should know that cases like those described above were frequent in Byzantium\u2019s Buchwesen, provided that an adequately circulating text was concerned. As Byzantine scribes and scholars mostly worked and studied in significant libraries that owned several copies of the same text, the idea of comparing them in order to verify dubious readings and to produce a more satisfying text would naturally occur to their mind. Scribes and scholars in Byzantium were well aware that material damages and copyist errors could happen. And as we nowadays do, they tried to counter such textual problems by collating different manuscripts \u2013 not by contaminating them. If we leave aside copies made purely for commercial purposes, we can reasonably say that collation of at least two manuscripts before producing a new copy of a text was something of a rule in Byzantium. I shall henceforth call this rule \u00ab the principle of collation \u00bb ; it can be formulated like this : \u00ab Unless otherwise proved, each Byzantine copy of an adequately circulating text is the product of \r\ncollation of at least two different manuscripts. \u00bb [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HitzMXpWqjAaGGB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1417,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue d\u2019histoire des textes, nouvelle s\u00e9rie","volume":"10","issue":"","pages":"1-23"}},"sort":[2015]}
Title | Simplikios: Wstęp do Komentarza do Encheiridionu Epikteta (wybór) |
Type | Article |
Language | Polish |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 3-4 |
Pages | 45-49 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Łapiński, Krzysztof |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The translation includes an introduction to the Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion. The author of the commentary explains to whom is the work of Epictetus addressed, what is the scope o f the Enchiridion, the meaning of the title and the literary genre to which it belongs. The supposed audience is the reader who wants to live in accordance with reason on the level of ethical and political virtues. Such a reader ought to internalize Epictetus’ teaching and appeal to it in the challenging moments of life. The Stoic content has been enriched with the Platonic teaching drawn from Alcibiades I about relationship between the soul and the body. The first Polish translation of Simplicius’ text has been based on the Ilsetraut Hadot’s edition. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PcngrYGo5jPGQtC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1138","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1138,"authors_free":[{"id":1712,"entry_id":1138,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":235,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski, Krzysztof","free_first_name":"Krzysztof","free_last_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski","norm_person":{"id":235,"first_name":"Krzysztof","last_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski","full_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski, Krzysztof","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1155501799","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplikios: Wst\u0119p do Komentarza do Encheiridionu Epikteta (wyb\u00f3r)","main_title":{"title":"Simplikios: Wst\u0119p do Komentarza do Encheiridionu Epikteta (wyb\u00f3r)"},"abstract":"The translation includes an introduction to the Simplicius\u2019 commentary \r\non Epictetus\u2019 Enchiridion. The author of the commentary explains to whom \r\nis the work of Epictetus addressed, what is the scope o f the Enchiridion, \r\nthe meaning of the title and the literary genre to which it belongs. \r\nThe supposed audience is the reader who wants to live in accordance \r\nwith reason on the level of ethical and political virtues. Such a reader \r\nought to internalize Epictetus\u2019 teaching and appeal to it in the challenging \r\nmoments of life. The Stoic content has been enriched with the Platonic \r\nteaching drawn from Alcibiades I about relationship between the soul \r\nand the body. The first Polish translation of Simplicius\u2019 text has been based \r\non the Ilsetraut Hadot\u2019s edition. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"Polish","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PcngrYGo5jPGQtC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":235,"full_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski, Krzysztof","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1138,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Przegl\u0105d Filozoficzno-Literacki","volume":"40","issue":"3-4","pages":"45-49"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | Simplikios, czytelnik Epikteta |
Type | Article |
Language | Polish |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 3-4 |
Pages | 35-43 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Łapiński, Krzysztof |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius, the Neoplatonic philosopher, and commentator from late antiquity, devoted one of his commentaries to Epictetus’ Enchiridion. In the article, the author posed the question about the place of the text by the Stoic writer within the whole Neoplatonic education system. In addition, he asked to what extent the act of commenting on Epictetus’ work could be conceived by Simplicius as a kind of spiritual exercise. In the second part of the article, the hypothesis by M. Tardieu and I. Hadot is presented, suggesting that the city of Harran could be regarded as the possible place of exile where the group of philosophers settled after the Platonic Academy had been closed. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/VGw8HfmmOi2CqbW |
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Title | El testimonio de Aristóteles sobre Zenòn de Elea como un detractor de "lo uno" |
Type | Article |
Language | Spanish |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte |
Volume | 23 |
Pages | 157-181 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gardella, Mariana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The aim of this paper is to discuss the traditional interpretation according to which the arguments of Zeno of Elea against multiplicity constitute a defense of monism. I will try to prove that Zeno’s objections on plurality suppose a previous critique to the existence of the one. Therefore Zeno is neither a monist nor a pluralist but a philosopher who criticizes metaphysical theories that consider being in numerical terms, i. e. as many or as one. I will focus on the analysis of the interpretation of Zeno’s philosophy developed by Aristotle. I will consider some passages from Physics, Sophistical Refutations and mainly Metaphysics Hi. 4. 1001b7-I3 (DK 29 A 21). I will also include some testimonies from Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, where he discusses the interpretations of Eudemus of Rhodes and Alexander of Aphrodisias that support the Aristotelian point of view on Zeno’s philosophy (In Ph. 99.7-18, DK 29 A 21; 138. 3-6, DK 29 A 22). [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YSCgmZjhBUMltzI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"621","_score":null,"_source":{"id":621,"authors_free":[{"id":877,"entry_id":621,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":124,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gardella, Mariana","free_first_name":"Mariana","free_last_name":"Gardella","norm_person":{"id":124,"first_name":"Mariana","last_name":"Gardella","full_name":"Gardella, Mariana","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"El testimonio de Arist\u00f3teles sobre Zen\u00f2n de Elea como un detractor de \"lo uno\"","main_title":{"title":"El testimonio de Arist\u00f3teles sobre Zen\u00f2n de Elea como un detractor de \"lo uno\""},"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to discuss the traditional interpretation according to which the arguments of Zeno of Elea against multiplicity constitute a defense of monism. I will try to prove that Zeno\u2019s objections on plurality suppose a previous critique to the existence of the one. Therefore Zeno is neither a monist nor a pluralist but a philosopher who criticizes metaphysical theories that consider being in numerical terms, i. e. as many or as one. I will focus on the analysis of the interpretation of Zeno\u2019s philosophy developed by Aristotle. I will consider some passages from Physics, Sophistical Re\u00adfutations and mainly Metaphysics Hi. 4. 1001b7-I3 (DK 29 A 21). I will also include some testimonies from Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics, where he discusses the interpretations of Eudemus of Rhodes and Alexander of Aphrodisias that support the Aristotelian point of view on Zeno\u2019s philosophy (In Ph. 99.7-18, DK 29 A 21; 138. 3-6, DK 29 A 22). [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"Spanish","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YSCgmZjhBUMltzI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":124,"full_name":"Gardella, Mariana","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":621,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Eidos: Revista de Filosof\u00eda de la Universidad del Norte","volume":"23","issue":"","pages":"157-181"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | Review of Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sellars, J. T. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This book is the first monograph in English (or any other language) devoted to the Late Platonic commentator Simplicius. Its focus is on Simplicius' methodology as a commentator. It deals at length with Simplicius' engagements with other ancient philosophers, from the earliest Presocratics, through the Peripatetic tradition (Theophrastus, Alexander), to contemporaries such as John Philoponus. Who was Simplicius? He was a Neoplatonist working in the first decades of the sixth century AD under whose name five commentaries have come down to us from antiquity. These commentaries are on Aristotle's Physics, Categories, De Caelo, and De Anima, and the Enchiridion of Epictetus, although his authorship of the commentary on the De Anima has been a subject of scholarly debate. In these often lengthy commentaries, Simplicius quotes from a wide range of philosophical texts where he thinks it relevant to his discussion of Aristotle's text and, in the process, preserves fragments from a number of otherwise lost works. Simplicius' chief claim to fame, then, is that he has become a vital source for our knowledge of Presocratic philosophy. Without Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, our knowledge of early Greek philosophy would be significantly reduced. This is the standard line. We should all be thankful to Simplicius for his habit of quoting texts in full rather than merely naming them in passing. We are thankful. But is there any more to him? Is Simplicius himself an interesting or significant philosopher? Is there anything more to him beyond his role as a doxographical source? Baltussen, in devoting a monograph to him, thinks there is, but he is conscious many will not share that view. Consequently, his book opens with an apologetic and slightly defensive introduction in which he tries to make the case for reading Simplicius as more than merely a quarry from which to extract quotations. Part of the task includes a defense of Late Platonism (Baltussen deliberately avoids the usual label "Neoplatonism"), to which Simplicius adhered. We are encouraged to put our reservations to one side and reassess Simplicius afresh. The opening chapter introduces Simplicius' method and practice as a commentator. His commentaries differ from many other examples from late antiquity to the extent that they don't seem to be straightforward records of oral lectures taken "from the voice of" (apo phônês) the author. Instead, they are extended written works, conceived as textbooks for pagan teachers explicitly designed to preserve as much as possible of the pagan philosophical tradition—hence the extensive quotations. In these often lengthy texts, Simplicius explicitly rejects originality, but Baltussen argues that we ought not to take this at face value and that these expressions of modesty are, in part, made out of respect for his teachers. The second chapter deals with Simplicius' role as a source for the Presocratics. Baltussen welcomes Catherine Osborne's approach of reading fragments of the Presocratics within their doxographical context, as this adds to Simplicius' potential significance. What is important, of course, is to gain a sense of the motive and agenda of the doxographer. According to Baltussen, Simplicius' aim is to locate all of the Presocratics within a Late Platonic framework that emphasizes unity within the pagan philosophical tradition conceived as "a single venerable and ancient message." This may be so up to a point, but to what extent would Simplicius welcome Democritus (or Epicurus) into this unified tradition? It would have been interesting to hear more about those thinkers who don't neatly fit within this syncretized history of philosophy, precisely because the points of disagreement might help to bring Simplicius' own position into sharper focus. Baltussen raises the question of whether Simplicius had access to the works of Presocratics directly or merely to collections of excerpts but doesn't draw any firm conclusions either way. The third chapter turns to Simplicius' use of early Peripatetics such as Theophrastus and Eudemus. Baltussen argues that Simplicius took the early Peripatetics—and especially Theophrastus—very seriously in his exegeses of Aristotle because Theophrastus would have known Aristotle personally, giving his glosses an added authority. This is a departure from the attitudes of previous Platonic commentators on Aristotle. Although Simplicius shares the wider Late Platonic desire to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, there is also a strong desire to get Aristotle right, and no one is more likely to help in that task than Theophrastus. Baltussen suggests that we conceive Theophrastus himself as part of the Platonic commentary tradition, given his own comments on the Timaeus, but philosophical engagement with a previous author is not quite the same thing as commentary. The Peripatetic theme continues in the fourth chapter, which is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Baltussen offers a detailed and slightly labored analysis of the motivations behind Simplicius' regular and extensive quotation from Alexander, but the question seems relatively straightforward. Why did Simplicius make use of Alexander's commentaries on Aristotle in his own commentaries on Aristotle? Because Alexander has lots of interesting things to say about Aristotle. The focus here again is on form rather than content, methodology rather than philosophy. The fifth chapter examines the Platonic commentary tradition before Simplicius and discusses Simplicius' use of Plotinus and the Post-Plotinian tradition of harmonizing commentaries from Porphyry onwards. Simplicius' immediate teacher Ammonius is discussed briefly but deserves more attention. For instance, we were told in the opening chapter that Simplicius' rejection of originality was mere self-deprecation, but presumably that claim could be tested to some degree via a comparison between his own views and those of his teacher. The same goes for his later mentor Damascius. The final chapter turns to the theme of polemic and focuses its attention on Simplicius' exchanges with his arch-rival John Philoponus, another Platonic commentator, but also a Christian. Baltussen prefaces his discussion with an account of the tensions and hostilities between Christians and pagans in late antiquity. Once again, Simplicius is presented as the defender of an embattled pagan philosophical tradition, taking Philoponus to task for his attacks against Proclus and Aristotle in De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Proclum. Baltussen highlights the rhetorical aspects of Simplicius' polemics rather than the content of the dispute, so once more methodology is the principal focus. The intensity of Simplicius' personal references to Philoponus ("raving swine") is contrasted with his sober and respectful references to Alexander. An epilogue sums up the proceedings. One of the central themes to emerge from the book as a whole is the claim that, in order to understand what Simplicius is doing in his commentaries, we must take into account his commitment to pagan religion as well as philosophy. We should see the commentaries not merely as "scholarly schoolbooks" but rather as steps on a long road toward a more existential transformation. This religious dimension of Late Platonism should not be overlooked, Baltussen argues, if we want to understand properly what Simplicius is trying to achieve. The commentaries are his attempt to preserve the entire pagan philosophical and religious tradition within an increasingly hostile Christian world. On this final point, as well as a number of others, Baltussen sketches a broad context within which to think about what Simplicius is doing but there is much less in the way of detailed analysis of what he actually did do, what he argued for, or what philosophical positions he himself held. This is in part simply a reflection of the sheer length of the commentaries themselves and no one could offer a detailed analysis of their contents within the covers of a single volume. I said at the outset that five commentaries have come down to us under the name of Simplicius. Baltussen discusses only three of them. He puts to one side the De Anima commentary and he may well be right to do so, but it would have been nice to have seen a fuller discussion of the text and the question of its authorship.[2] He also more or less ignores the commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Although it does get the occasional mention (e.g. p. 43) Baltussen proceeds as if it doesn't exist, at one point writing 'all three extant commentaries' (p. 34). In his interesting attempt to reconstruct 'the library of Simplicius' (pp. 211-15), neither Epictetus nor Arrian get a mention. This is a great shame for a number of reasons. The in Ench. is unique as the only surviving commentary on a Stoic text to come down to us. Moreover, it is a commentary by a Late Platonist, and as a rule Late Platonists only wrote commentaries on Plato and Aristotle.[3] The way in which Late Platonists brought Aristotle into their curriculum is a well-worn subject, but the desire to bring in a Stoic text is quite unusual. It complicates Simplicius' activity as a commentator in a number of interesting and significant ways. Presumably Baltussen would argue that this is part of Simplicius' desire to unite and then preserve the entire pagan philosophical tradition in an increasingly hostile Christian world, but if that is the case then the in Ench. would form a potentially significant piece of evidence for Baltussen's thesis, one that has sadly been left out of the account. There is much in Baltussen's book that is of interest, but I'm not sure how far it goes in fleshing out a more rounded portrait of Simplicius. The focus of the volume throughout is squarely on Simplicius' use of other authors—i.e., his quotations—rather than Simplicius as an author or a philosopher in his own right. Baltussen consciously avoids discussing Simplicius qua philosopher on the basis that this has been done by others elsewhere. This is true to an extent, but what would be nice is a more synthetic volume that brings these discussions together in order to give us a complete picture. This book doesn't do that, although, to be fair, it doesn't ever claim to be trying to. What remains a desideratum, then, is a monograph that might combine Baltussen's methodological researches with an account of what is philosophically valuable in Simplicius. Most of my critical comments above have been asking for more discussion on various points, and no author can do everything in just one volume. I certainly hope that this book will encourage further work on Simplicius by both Baltussen and others that will help us to gain a fuller portrait of this still relatively neglected philosopher. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MiDP9FxKLHavo2S |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"904","_score":null,"_source":{"id":904,"authors_free":[{"id":1335,"entry_id":904,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":299,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sellars, J. T.","free_first_name":"J. T.","free_last_name":"Sellars","norm_person":{"id":299,"first_name":"J. T.","last_name":"Sellars","full_name":"Sellars, J. T.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1011826046","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Review of Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator"},"abstract":"This book is the first monograph in English (or any other language) devoted to the Late Platonic commentator Simplicius. Its focus is on Simplicius' methodology as a commentator. It deals at length with Simplicius' engagements with other ancient philosophers, from the earliest Presocratics, through the Peripatetic tradition (Theophrastus, Alexander), to contemporaries such as John Philoponus.\r\n\r\nWho was Simplicius? He was a Neoplatonist working in the first decades of the sixth century AD under whose name five commentaries have come down to us from antiquity. These commentaries are on Aristotle's Physics, Categories, De Caelo, and De Anima, and the Enchiridion of Epictetus, although his authorship of the commentary on the De Anima has been a subject of scholarly debate. In these often lengthy commentaries, Simplicius quotes from a wide range of philosophical texts where he thinks it relevant to his discussion of Aristotle's text and, in the process, preserves fragments from a number of otherwise lost works.\r\n\r\nSimplicius' chief claim to fame, then, is that he has become a vital source for our knowledge of Presocratic philosophy. Without Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, our knowledge of early Greek philosophy would be significantly reduced.\r\n\r\nThis is the standard line. We should all be thankful to Simplicius for his habit of quoting texts in full rather than merely naming them in passing. We are thankful. But is there any more to him? Is Simplicius himself an interesting or significant philosopher? Is there anything more to him beyond his role as a doxographical source? Baltussen, in devoting a monograph to him, thinks there is, but he is conscious many will not share that view. Consequently, his book opens with an apologetic and slightly defensive introduction in which he tries to make the case for reading Simplicius as more than merely a quarry from which to extract quotations. Part of the task includes a defense of Late Platonism (Baltussen deliberately avoids the usual label \"Neoplatonism\"), to which Simplicius adhered. We are encouraged to put our reservations to one side and reassess Simplicius afresh.\r\n\r\nThe opening chapter introduces Simplicius' method and practice as a commentator. His commentaries differ from many other examples from late antiquity to the extent that they don't seem to be straightforward records of oral lectures taken \"from the voice of\" (apo ph\u00f4n\u00eas) the author. Instead, they are extended written works, conceived as textbooks for pagan teachers explicitly designed to preserve as much as possible of the pagan philosophical tradition\u2014hence the extensive quotations. In these often lengthy texts, Simplicius explicitly rejects originality, but Baltussen argues that we ought not to take this at face value and that these expressions of modesty are, in part, made out of respect for his teachers.\r\n\r\nThe second chapter deals with Simplicius' role as a source for the Presocratics. Baltussen welcomes Catherine Osborne's approach of reading fragments of the Presocratics within their doxographical context, as this adds to Simplicius' potential significance. What is important, of course, is to gain a sense of the motive and agenda of the doxographer. According to Baltussen, Simplicius' aim is to locate all of the Presocratics within a Late Platonic framework that emphasizes unity within the pagan philosophical tradition conceived as \"a single venerable and ancient message.\" This may be so up to a point, but to what extent would Simplicius welcome Democritus (or Epicurus) into this unified tradition? It would have been interesting to hear more about those thinkers who don't neatly fit within this syncretized history of philosophy, precisely because the points of disagreement might help to bring Simplicius' own position into sharper focus. Baltussen raises the question of whether Simplicius had access to the works of Presocratics directly or merely to collections of excerpts but doesn't draw any firm conclusions either way.\r\n\r\nThe third chapter turns to Simplicius' use of early Peripatetics such as Theophrastus and Eudemus. Baltussen argues that Simplicius took the early Peripatetics\u2014and especially Theophrastus\u2014very seriously in his exegeses of Aristotle because Theophrastus would have known Aristotle personally, giving his glosses an added authority. This is a departure from the attitudes of previous Platonic commentators on Aristotle. Although Simplicius shares the wider Late Platonic desire to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, there is also a strong desire to get Aristotle right, and no one is more likely to help in that task than Theophrastus. Baltussen suggests that we conceive Theophrastus himself as part of the Platonic commentary tradition, given his own comments on the Timaeus, but philosophical engagement with a previous author is not quite the same thing as commentary.\r\n\r\nThe Peripatetic theme continues in the fourth chapter, which is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Baltussen offers a detailed and slightly labored analysis of the motivations behind Simplicius' regular and extensive quotation from Alexander, but the question seems relatively straightforward. Why did Simplicius make use of Alexander's commentaries on Aristotle in his own commentaries on Aristotle? Because Alexander has lots of interesting things to say about Aristotle. The focus here again is on form rather than content, methodology rather than philosophy.\r\n\r\nThe fifth chapter examines the Platonic commentary tradition before Simplicius and discusses Simplicius' use of Plotinus and the Post-Plotinian tradition of harmonizing commentaries from Porphyry onwards. Simplicius' immediate teacher Ammonius is discussed briefly but deserves more attention. For instance, we were told in the opening chapter that Simplicius' rejection of originality was mere self-deprecation, but presumably that claim could be tested to some degree via a comparison between his own views and those of his teacher. The same goes for his later mentor Damascius.\r\n\r\nThe final chapter turns to the theme of polemic and focuses its attention on Simplicius' exchanges with his arch-rival John Philoponus, another Platonic commentator, but also a Christian. Baltussen prefaces his discussion with an account of the tensions and hostilities between Christians and pagans in late antiquity. Once again, Simplicius is presented as the defender of an embattled pagan philosophical tradition, taking Philoponus to task for his attacks against Proclus and Aristotle in De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Proclum. Baltussen highlights the rhetorical aspects of Simplicius' polemics rather than the content of the dispute, so once more methodology is the principal focus. The intensity of Simplicius' personal references to Philoponus (\"raving swine\") is contrasted with his sober and respectful references to Alexander.\r\n\r\nAn epilogue sums up the proceedings. One of the central themes to emerge from the book as a whole is the claim that, in order to understand what Simplicius is doing in his commentaries, we must take into account his commitment to pagan religion as well as philosophy. We should see the commentaries not merely as \"scholarly schoolbooks\" but rather as steps on a long road toward a more existential transformation. This religious dimension of Late Platonism should not be overlooked, Baltussen argues, if we want to understand properly what Simplicius is trying to achieve. The commentaries are his attempt to preserve the entire pagan philosophical and religious tradition within an increasingly hostile Christian world. On this final point, as well as a number of others, Baltussen sketches a broad context within which to think about what Simplicius is\r\ndoing but there is much less in the way of detailed analysis of what he actually did do, what he argued for, or what philosophical\r\npositions he himself held. This is in part simply a reflection of the sheer length of the commentaries themselves and no one could\r\noffer a detailed analysis of their contents within the covers of a single volume.\r\nI said at the outset that five commentaries have come down to us under the name of Simplicius. Baltussen discusses only three of\r\nthem. He puts to one side the De Anima commentary and he may well be right to do so, but it would have been nice to have seen a\r\nfuller discussion of the text and the question of its authorship.[2] He also more or less ignores the commentary on the Enchiridion of\r\nEpictetus. Although it does get the occasional mention (e.g. p. 43) Baltussen proceeds as if it doesn't exist, at one point writing 'all\r\nthree extant commentaries' (p. 34). In his interesting attempt to reconstruct 'the library of Simplicius' (pp. 211-15), neither\r\nEpictetus nor Arrian get a mention. This is a great shame for a number of reasons. The in Ench. is unique as the only surviving\r\ncommentary on a Stoic text to come down to us. Moreover, it is a commentary by a Late Platonist, and as a rule Late Platonists only\r\nwrote commentaries on Plato and Aristotle.[3] The way in which Late Platonists brought Aristotle into their curriculum is a\r\nwell-worn subject, but the desire to bring in a Stoic text is quite unusual. It complicates Simplicius' activity as a commentator in a\r\nnumber of interesting and significant ways. Presumably Baltussen would argue that this is part of Simplicius' desire to unite and\r\nthen preserve the entire pagan philosophical tradition in an increasingly hostile Christian world, but if that is the case then the in\r\nEnch. would form a potentially significant piece of evidence for Baltussen's thesis, one that has sadly been left out of the account. There is much in Baltussen's book that is of interest, but I'm not sure how far it goes in fleshing out a more rounded portrait of Simplicius. The focus of the volume throughout is squarely on Simplicius' use of other authors\u2014i.e., his quotations\u2014rather than Simplicius as an author or a philosopher in his own right. Baltussen consciously avoids discussing Simplicius qua philosopher on the basis that this has been done by others elsewhere. This is true to an extent, but what would be nice is a more synthetic volume that brings these discussions together in order to give us a complete picture. This book doesn't do that, although, to be fair, it doesn't ever claim to be trying to.\r\n\r\nWhat remains a desideratum, then, is a monograph that might combine Baltussen's methodological researches with an account of what is philosophically valuable in Simplicius. Most of my critical comments above have been asking for more discussion on various points, and no author can do everything in just one volume. I certainly hope that this book will encourage further work on Simplicius by both Baltussen and others that will help us to gain a fuller portrait of this still relatively neglected philosopher. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MiDP9FxKLHavo2S","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":299,"full_name":"Sellars, J. T.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":904,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews","volume":"","issue":"","pages":""}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle’s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
Volume | 4 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 99-112 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gabor, Gary |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Susanne Bobzien recently described “the volumes of the Greek commentators on Aristotle’s logical works” as “monumental” but “rarely creative.” While to a certain degree accurate, Bobzien’s assessment obscures the occasional flashes of innovation in these works. I intend to explore one such example here—the question of what justification, if any, late ancient philosophers gave for Aristotle’s ten categories. This topic would also animate later interpreters of Aristotle, sometimes with positive and sometimes more critical results. Kant, for instance, rejected Aristotle’s list for what he perceived as its capricious and arbitrary nature, arguing that Aristotle “had no principle” and merely “rounded them up as he stumbled upon them.” In fact, Kant was neither the first nor the last to perceive that Aristotle’s account of the categories needed some sort of justification. The existence of rival categorial schemes, in particular, demands it. In the ancient world, the Stoics provided a fourfold series of categories, and Plato provided a fivefold set of greatest kinds in the Sophist. More recently, E. J. Lowe has defended another fourfold Aristotelian-inspired ontology as fundamental. For Platonists of late antiquity, the question of justification for Aristotle’s categories had special force following Plotinus’s analysis and critique of them, along with the Stoic, Platonic, and other accounts in Enneads 6.1–2. Plotinus’s student Porphyry later defended and commented on Aristotle’s Categories, and Iamblichus reinterpreted and included the Categories in the philosophical curriculum that was to remain standard in the Neoplatonic schools for several centuries. For the Neoplatonic commentators working in these schools, one of the first questions raised in their commentaries was the justification that could be given to Aristotle’s tenfold scheme. I shall examine two such justifications: those given by Ammonius Hermiae, scholarch of the Platonist school in Alexandria, Egypt, during the second half of the fifth century AD, and his student Simplicius, the last great commentator in the Athenian Academy before its closure by Emperor Justinian in AD 529. Ammonius’s account of the categories is relatively simple, while Simplicius’s is more complex. Both, however, argue for a justification of the ten categories presented by Aristotle as in some sense a correct list. By comparing the two accounts, one can discern a distinct development in Neoplatonic justifications of Aristotle’s categories. [introduction p. 99-101] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mg1q6H4L6heepIU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"918","_score":null,"_source":{"id":918,"authors_free":[{"id":1357,"entry_id":918,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":106,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gabor, Gary","free_first_name":"Gary","free_last_name":"Gabor","norm_person":{"id":106,"first_name":"Gary","last_name":"Gabor ","full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle\u2019s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle\u2019s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius"},"abstract":"Susanne Bobzien recently described \u201cthe volumes of the Greek commentators on Aristotle\u2019s logical works\u201d as \u201cmonumental\u201d but \u201crarely creative.\u201d While to a certain degree accurate, Bobzien\u2019s assessment obscures the occasional flashes of innovation in these works. I intend to explore one such example here\u2014the question of what justification, if any, late ancient philosophers gave for Aristotle\u2019s ten categories.\r\n\r\nThis topic would also animate later interpreters of Aristotle, sometimes with positive and sometimes more critical results. Kant, for instance, rejected Aristotle\u2019s list for what he perceived as its capricious and arbitrary nature, arguing that Aristotle \u201chad no principle\u201d and merely \u201crounded them up as he stumbled upon them.\u201d In fact, Kant was neither the first nor the last to perceive that Aristotle\u2019s account of the categories needed some sort of justification. The existence of rival categorial schemes, in particular, demands it. In the ancient world, the Stoics provided a fourfold series of categories, and Plato provided a fivefold set of greatest kinds in the Sophist. More recently, E. J. Lowe has defended another fourfold Aristotelian-inspired ontology as fundamental.\r\n\r\nFor Platonists of late antiquity, the question of justification for Aristotle\u2019s categories had special force following Plotinus\u2019s analysis and critique of them, along with the Stoic, Platonic, and other accounts in Enneads 6.1\u20132. Plotinus\u2019s student Porphyry later defended and commented on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, and Iamblichus reinterpreted and included the Categories in the philosophical curriculum that was to remain standard in the Neoplatonic schools for several centuries.\r\n\r\nFor the Neoplatonic commentators working in these schools, one of the first questions raised in their commentaries was the justification that could be given to Aristotle\u2019s tenfold scheme. I shall examine two such justifications: those given by Ammonius Hermiae, scholarch of the Platonist school in Alexandria, Egypt, during the second half of the fifth century AD, and his student Simplicius, the last great commentator in the Athenian Academy before its closure by Emperor Justinian in AD 529.\r\n\r\nAmmonius\u2019s account of the categories is relatively simple, while Simplicius\u2019s is more complex. Both, however, argue for a justification of the ten categories presented by Aristotle as in some sense a correct list. By comparing the two accounts, one can discern a distinct development in Neoplatonic justifications of Aristotle\u2019s categories. [introduction p. 99-101]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mg1q6H4L6heepIU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":106,"full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":918,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"4","issue":"2","pages":"99-112"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | Pseudo-Simplicius (Review on Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13.) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 64 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 436-437 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Van Dusen, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Inferno IV, when Dante catches sight of him in a mild foyer to the spiraling pit of hell, Averroes is simply described as “he who made the great Comment.” But in Convivio IV, the only other place where Dante references him, Averroes is specifically “the Commentator on Aristotle’s De Anima III.” Dante wrote this in the first decade of the fourteenth century, when Averroes was still, in effect, the commentator on De Anima 3. But by the last decades of the fifteenth century, a Simplicius commentary on the De Anima was being circulated in Italy by émigrés from Constantinople. This commentary rapidly exerted an influence on figures like Pico della Mirandola and Agostino Nifo. It saw its first Greek edition in Venice in 1527, with a complete Latin translation appearing in 1543, also in Venice. As its first translator pointed out in his prefatory letter, Averroes now had a contender in this De Anima commentary. The title of a 1553 Latin translation left no doubt: Commentaria Simplicii Profundissimi & Acutissimi Philosophi in Tres Libros De Anima Aristotelis. By the end of the sixteenth century, this commentary had inspired a vocal coterie in Italy—the so-called sectatores Simplicii. Despite the fervor of these sectatores Simplicii, there is now a stable consensus that their De Anima commentary is pseudo-Simplician. S. has long been convinced that the work should be attributed to Priscian of Lydia; in this, he is preceded by Francesco Piccolomini, a sixteenth-century opponent of the simpliciani, who also put Priscian forward as the commentator. I. Hadot fiercely criticized this re-attribution in a 2002 article in Mnemosyne, “Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima”, and S. refers to the dispute in his introduction. He is sanguine: “As no other scholar apparently shares Hadot’s view, there is no need for further polemics” (p. 32 n. 6). Regardless of attribution, it is agreed that this De Anima commentary originated in Simplicius’ circles, that it represents “an original and personal engagement with Aristotle’s text” (p. 4), and that the commentator “uses various philological strategies to make sense of an obscure text” (p. 7). On this last point, S. is effusive: “Modern commentators could learn with profit from his attempts ‘to set right’ a difficult text ...without intervening with conjectures” (p. 7). The manuscript basis of S.’s translation is broader than that of M. Hayduck’s semi-critical Greek edition (1882), which has been faulted for collating only a single fourteenth-century manuscript (Laurentianus 85.21) and a single sixteenth-century edition of the commentary (Aldina). In preparing his translation, S. consulted another fourteenth-century manuscript (which shows emendations and annotations by Cardinal Bessarion) and a mid-fifteenth-century manuscript. Nevertheless, he is generous: “Hayduck was basically right: it is indeed possible to constitute a critical text with the Laurentianus and the Aldina” (p. 149). A concise list of S.’s proposed corrections to the Greek and reconstructions of outstanding lacunae is included at the back of the volume. S.’s is the final volume of the first-ever English translation of this De Anima commentary and gives us ps.-Simplicius on De Anima 3.6–13. The translation is nuanced and reliable, though at places the syntax could be smoothed out (“That also oysters have maturity and decline, all agree ...”, p. 101). The volume’s apparatus, credited to Arnis Ritups, is ample. And while ps.-Simplicius has never had English-speaking sectaries, his De Anima commentary was cited once by Bishop Berkeley and repeatedly by Lord Monboddo in the eighteenth century, while Thomas Taylor incorporated excerpts into the notes to his 1808 English translation of De Anima. In short, ps.-Simplicius’ Greek commentary has a place in the modern British reception of De Anima. The present translation should similarly inform contemporary work on De Anima and the Neoplatonists’ appropriation and transmission of Aristotle. Ps.-Simplicius’ text is, of course, too dense to reprise here, but there is much of interest in his negotiation of time-statements in the last pages of De Anima, since it is in these pages—not the last paragraphs of Physics 4—that Aristotle investigates the problematic link of “time” to the “soul.” (And when Plotinus takes up the question of time in Enneads 3.7, he—like contemporary philosophers—turns to Physics 4, not De Anima 3.) Those interested in Neoplatonic conceptions of time—and, more generally, in the concept of time in Late Antiquity—would do well to consult this commentary and the other surviving Greek commentaries on De Anima 3. There is a single, colorful passage that indicates how ps.-Simplicius’ commentary on the soul also opens onto the terrain of the body—sexuality, and so on—in Late Antiquity. In De Anima 3.9, Aristotle writes that “the heart” is moved when we think of menacing things, whereas “if the object is pleasant, some other part” is moved. It is a pleasure, then, to see ps.-Simplicius’ gloss: “The heart, for instance, may be set in movement among fearful things, and the generative organs (γεννητικὰ μόρια) upon the thought of sexual pleasure (ἀφροδισιαστικῶν ἡδονῶν)” (p. 102). This is doubtless the sense of Aristotle’s euphemistic text, and ps.-Simplicius sees the deeper import of sexual excitation with perfect clarity: “The intellect is not wholly master (οὐ τὸ ὅλον κύριος) of the movement of the living being” (p. 102). How far removed are we here from Augustine’s discussion of post-paradisiacal arousal in City of God against the Pagans? Or from Proclus’ refusal of a disciple who was “pursuing philosophy, but at the same time devoting his life to the pleasures below the belly (τὰς ὑπογαστρίους ἡδονάς),” as Damascius reports? The early modern sectatores Simplicii likely misattributed their De Anima commentary, but in this, they were correct: Averroes is not “the Commentator on Aristotle’s De Anima III.” Ps.-Simplicius’ reading of the book is still challenging and, at places, suddenly illuminating. And it is no small thing for us to now have access—in conscientious English and in full—to this methodical, lexically sensitive commentary on the soul from the immediate circle of the last representatives of a “Platonic succession” in Athens. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PvqFfr47EAUaMIW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1294","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1294,"authors_free":[{"id":1884,"entry_id":1294,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":74,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Van Dusen, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Van Dusen","norm_person":{"id":74,"first_name":"David ","last_name":"Van Dusen","full_name":"Van Dusen, David ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1066385637","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Pseudo-Simplicius (Review on Simplicius\u2019: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6\u201313.)","main_title":{"title":"Pseudo-Simplicius (Review on Simplicius\u2019: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6\u201313.)"},"abstract":"In Inferno IV, when Dante catches sight of him in a mild foyer to the spiraling pit of hell, Averroes is simply described as \u201che who made the great Comment.\u201d But in Convivio IV, the only other place where Dante references him, Averroes is specifically \u201cthe Commentator on Aristotle\u2019s De Anima III.\u201d Dante wrote this in the first decade of the fourteenth century, when Averroes was still, in effect, the commentator on De Anima 3. But by the last decades of the fifteenth century, a Simplicius commentary on the De Anima was being circulated in Italy by \u00e9migr\u00e9s from Constantinople. This commentary rapidly exerted an influence on figures like Pico della Mirandola and Agostino Nifo. It saw its first Greek edition in Venice in 1527, with a complete Latin translation appearing in 1543, also in Venice. As its first translator pointed out in his prefatory letter, Averroes now had a contender in this De Anima commentary. The title of a 1553 Latin translation left no doubt: Commentaria Simplicii Profundissimi & Acutissimi Philosophi in Tres Libros De Anima Aristotelis. By the end of the sixteenth century, this commentary had inspired a vocal coterie in Italy\u2014the so-called sectatores Simplicii.\r\n\r\nDespite the fervor of these sectatores Simplicii, there is now a stable consensus that their De Anima commentary is pseudo-Simplician. S. has long been convinced that the work should be attributed to Priscian of Lydia; in this, he is preceded by Francesco Piccolomini, a sixteenth-century opponent of the simpliciani, who also put Priscian forward as the commentator. I. Hadot fiercely criticized this re-attribution in a 2002 article in Mnemosyne, \u201cSimplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Anima\u201d, and S. refers to the dispute in his introduction. He is sanguine: \u201cAs no other scholar apparently shares Hadot\u2019s view, there is no need for further polemics\u201d (p. 32 n. 6). Regardless of attribution, it is agreed that this De Anima commentary originated in Simplicius\u2019 circles, that it represents \u201can original and personal engagement with Aristotle\u2019s text\u201d (p. 4), and that the commentator \u201cuses various philological strategies to make sense of an obscure text\u201d (p. 7). On this last point, S. is effusive: \u201cModern commentators could learn with profit from his attempts \u2018to set right\u2019 a difficult text ...without intervening with conjectures\u201d (p. 7).\r\n\r\nThe manuscript basis of S.\u2019s translation is broader than that of M. Hayduck\u2019s semi-critical Greek edition (1882), which has been faulted for collating only a single fourteenth-century manuscript (Laurentianus 85.21) and a single sixteenth-century edition of the commentary (Aldina). In preparing his translation, S. consulted another fourteenth-century manuscript (which shows emendations and annotations by Cardinal Bessarion) and a mid-fifteenth-century manuscript. Nevertheless, he is generous: \u201cHayduck was basically right: it is indeed possible to constitute a critical text with the Laurentianus and the Aldina\u201d (p. 149). A concise list of S.\u2019s proposed corrections to the Greek and reconstructions of outstanding lacunae is included at the back of the volume.\r\n\r\nS.\u2019s is the final volume of the first-ever English translation of this De Anima commentary and gives us ps.-Simplicius on De Anima 3.6\u201313. The translation is nuanced and reliable, though at places the syntax could be smoothed out (\u201cThat also oysters have maturity and decline, all agree ...\u201d, p. 101). The volume\u2019s apparatus, credited to Arnis Ritups, is ample. And while ps.-Simplicius has never had English-speaking sectaries, his De Anima commentary was cited once by Bishop Berkeley and repeatedly by Lord Monboddo in the eighteenth century, while Thomas Taylor incorporated excerpts into the notes to his 1808 English translation of De Anima. In short, ps.-Simplicius\u2019 Greek commentary has a place in the modern British reception of De Anima. The present translation should similarly inform contemporary work on De Anima and the Neoplatonists\u2019 appropriation and transmission of Aristotle.\r\n\r\nPs.-Simplicius\u2019 text is, of course, too dense to reprise here, but there is much of interest in his negotiation of time-statements in the last pages of De Anima, since it is in these pages\u2014not the last paragraphs of Physics 4\u2014that Aristotle investigates the problematic link of \u201ctime\u201d to the \u201csoul.\u201d (And when Plotinus takes up the question of time in Enneads 3.7, he\u2014like contemporary philosophers\u2014turns to Physics 4, not De Anima 3.) Those interested in Neoplatonic conceptions of time\u2014and, more generally, in the concept of time in Late Antiquity\u2014would do well to consult this commentary and the other surviving Greek commentaries on De Anima 3.\r\n\r\nThere is a single, colorful passage that indicates how ps.-Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the soul also opens onto the terrain of the body\u2014sexuality, and so on\u2014in Late Antiquity. In De Anima 3.9, Aristotle writes that \u201cthe heart\u201d is moved when we think of menacing things, whereas \u201cif the object is pleasant, some other part\u201d is moved. It is a pleasure, then, to see ps.-Simplicius\u2019 gloss: \u201cThe heart, for instance, may be set in movement among fearful things, and the generative organs (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1) upon the thought of sexual pleasure (\u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd)\u201d (p. 102). This is doubtless the sense of Aristotle\u2019s euphemistic text, and ps.-Simplicius sees the deeper import of sexual excitation with perfect clarity: \u201cThe intellect is not wholly master (\u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2) of the movement of the living being\u201d (p. 102). How far removed are we here from Augustine\u2019s discussion of post-paradisiacal arousal in City of God against the Pagans? Or from Proclus\u2019 refusal of a disciple who was \u201cpursuing philosophy, but at the same time devoting his life to the pleasures below the belly (\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2),\u201d as Damascius reports?\r\n\r\nThe early modern sectatores Simplicii likely misattributed their De Anima commentary, but in this, they were correct: Averroes is not \u201cthe Commentator on Aristotle\u2019s De Anima III.\u201d Ps.-Simplicius\u2019 reading of the book is still challenging and, at places, suddenly illuminating. And it is no small thing for us to now have access\u2014in conscientious English and in full\u2014to this methodical, lexically sensitive commentary on the soul from the immediate circle of the last representatives of a \u201cPlatonic succession\u201d in Athens. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PvqFfr47EAUaMIW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":74,"full_name":"Van Dusen, David ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1294,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"64","issue":"2","pages":"436-437"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | Categories and Subcategories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Anuario Filosófico |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 395-411 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tegtmeier, Erwin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Starting from the traditional distinction between the minimal and the maximal division, the role of subcategories in Aristotle, as well as that of the highest categories, is discussed. The need for categorial properties which determine categories is pointed out. It is argued that an existent cannot have two such essential properties and that only the lowest subcategories have simple categorial properties. Furthermore, it is emphasised that categories and subcategories must form a tree because they belong to a theory of categories which requires unity. By contrast, it is held that the hierarchy of all concepts need not form a tree. The difficulties Porphyrius and Simplicius find in Aristotle’s minimal and maximal division are analysed. Finally, Aristotle’s way of avoiding categorial properties by referring to an abstraction is criticised. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IN81x5WTB9e5jh5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"471","_score":null,"_source":{"id":471,"authors_free":[{"id":636,"entry_id":471,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":332,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tegtmeier, Erwin","free_first_name":"Erwin","free_last_name":"Tegtmeier","norm_person":{"id":332,"first_name":"Erwin","last_name":"Tegtmeier","full_name":"Tegtmeier, Erwin","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172413745","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Categories and Subcategories","main_title":{"title":"Categories and Subcategories"},"abstract":"Starting from the traditional distinction between the minimal and the maximal division, the role of subcategories in Aristotle, as well as that of the highest categories, is discussed. The need for categorial properties which determine categories is pointed out. It is argued that an existent cannot have two such essential properties and that only the lowest subcategories have simple categorial properties. Furthermore, it is emphasised that categories and subcategories must form a tree because they belong to a theory of categories which requires unity. By contrast, it is held that the hierarchy of all concepts need not form a tree. The difficulties Porphyrius and Simplicius find in Aristotle\u2019s minimal and maximal division are analysed. Finally, Aristotle\u2019s way of avoiding categorial properties by referring to an abstraction is criticised. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IN81x5WTB9e5jh5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":332,"full_name":"Tegtmeier, Erwin","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":471,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Anuario Filos\u00f3fico","volume":"47","issue":"2","pages":"395-411"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | ‘Simplicius’ (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 8 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 113-114 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fleet, Barrie |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
At the outset of Physics 1, Aristotle states that systematic knowledge of natural things and their changing character derives from a group of "principles (arkhai), causes (aitia), or elements (stoikheiai)." In this first book, he does not formally distinguish between these three terms, focusing instead on principles, although later commentators went to great lengths to formalize distinctions among them. Books 1 and 2 of Physics are devoted to seeking out the principles of change within the realm of natural science. Aristotle begins with commonly accepted propositions, “constantly appealing to what is ordinarily said or thought” (W. Charlton, Aristotle’s Physics I, II, Oxford, 1970, xi). Aristotle posits axiomatically that the principles of change in natural bodies are inherent in what comes into being from them, that they do not arise from one another or from external things, but that all things originate from these principles. He seeks to identify the rationally distinguishable factors inherent in the world of physical change. In chapters 1–4, he briefly reviews earlier theorists, such as Parmenides and Melissus, who posited a single principle and denied qualitative change, thereby placing themselves outside the scope of Aristotle’s inquiry. Aristotle concludes that principles must be multiple, either finite or infinite in number. The Neoplatonists, in general, prioritize Aristotle for questions of natural science and Plato for metaphysics. Book 1 of Physics straddles these two domains, and Simplicius, a 6th-century AD commentator, is eager throughout to demonstrate the harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius appeals particularly to Phaedo, Sophist, Philebus, Phaedrus, and Timaeus to suggest that many of Aristotle’s ideas were anticipated by Plato. In chapter 5, Aristotle asserts that everyone agrees the opposites (ta enantia) are principles, though there is considerable variation regarding what these opposites, as primary principles of physical change, are. Aristotle's approach differs from Plato’s Argument from Opposites in Phaedo. He reduces physical change to an underlying matter and, rather than a pair of opposites, considers the presence or absence of an opposite. The absence is redefined as "privation" (sterêsis) of a form, with a possible critique of John Philoponus—though this is contested by Sorabji (Introduction, pp. 4–7). Simplicius provides a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s arguments, distinguishing between primary and secondary principles, substance and contraries, per accidens and per se, and potential and actual—though M. suggests (n. 16) that at least once “Simplicius has no clue.” Simplicius draws parallels between Aristotelian matter and Plato’s Receptacle in Timaeus and the great-and-small in Philebus. He defines matter explicitly at 230,22 and finds congruence between Plato and Aristotle regarding the distinction between the first form, which is genuinely separate, and the natural form immanent in individual compound objects, which perishes with the compound. Simplicius uses Aristotle’s discussion of privation in chapters 7–9 to defend Plato against the charge of giving undue credence to Parmenides' unitary concept of Being. He extensively quotes Sophist to show that Plato recognized but did not emphasize privation, opting instead to discuss the presence or absence of form. Where Aristotle uses privation, Plato prefers the concept of "the other." Simplicius concludes that Plato and Aristotle are not in conflict regarding principles: Plato sought the per se causes of being that are elemental and inherent, while Aristotle sought causes of change, including privation as a per accidens cause. Simplicius frequently cites other commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, offering a dense and complex analysis that illuminates not only Aristotle’s text but also its reception by a Neoplatonist of the 6th century AD. This edition, translated by four contributors with glossaries by Sebastian Gertz and editorial notes by Richard Sorabji, provides accurate and fluent translations with minimal errors, despite being a collective effort. However, a more detailed note on logos, often left untranslated, would be valuable. Note 252 on p. 155 repeats paragraph 3 of the Introduction (p. 11). Overall, this translation is a significant contribution to Aristotelian studies. [The entire review p. 113-114] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nqkDsZcyl8kNw0V |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"594","_score":null,"_source":{"id":594,"authors_free":[{"id":845,"entry_id":594,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":117,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fleet, Barrie","free_first_name":"Barrie","free_last_name":"Fleet","norm_person":{"id":117,"first_name":"Barrie","last_name":"Fleet","full_name":"Fleet, Barrie","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172866235","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)","main_title":{"title":"\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)"},"abstract":"At the outset of Physics 1, Aristotle states that systematic knowledge of natural things and their changing character derives from a group of \"principles (arkhai), causes (aitia), or elements (stoikheiai).\" In this first book, he does not formally distinguish between these three terms, focusing instead on principles, although later commentators went to great lengths to formalize distinctions among them. Books 1 and 2 of Physics are devoted to seeking out the principles of change within the realm of natural science. Aristotle begins with commonly accepted propositions, \u201cconstantly appealing to what is ordinarily said or thought\u201d (W. Charlton, Aristotle\u2019s Physics I, II, Oxford, 1970, xi).\r\n\r\nAristotle posits axiomatically that the principles of change in natural bodies are inherent in what comes into being from them, that they do not arise from one another or from external things, but that all things originate from these principles. He seeks to identify the rationally distinguishable factors inherent in the world of physical change. In chapters 1\u20134, he briefly reviews earlier theorists, such as Parmenides and Melissus, who posited a single principle and denied qualitative change, thereby placing themselves outside the scope of Aristotle\u2019s inquiry. Aristotle concludes that principles must be multiple, either finite or infinite in number.\r\n\r\nThe Neoplatonists, in general, prioritize Aristotle for questions of natural science and Plato for metaphysics. Book 1 of Physics straddles these two domains, and Simplicius, a 6th-century AD commentator, is eager throughout to demonstrate the harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius appeals particularly to Phaedo, Sophist, Philebus, Phaedrus, and Timaeus to suggest that many of Aristotle\u2019s ideas were anticipated by Plato.\r\n\r\nIn chapter 5, Aristotle asserts that everyone agrees the opposites (ta enantia) are principles, though there is considerable variation regarding what these opposites, as primary principles of physical change, are. Aristotle's approach differs from Plato\u2019s Argument from Opposites in Phaedo. He reduces physical change to an underlying matter and, rather than a pair of opposites, considers the presence or absence of an opposite. The absence is redefined as \"privation\" (ster\u00easis) of a form, with a possible critique of John Philoponus\u2014though this is contested by Sorabji (Introduction, pp. 4\u20137). Simplicius provides a detailed analysis of Aristotle\u2019s arguments, distinguishing between primary and secondary principles, substance and contraries, per accidens and per se, and potential and actual\u2014though M. suggests (n. 16) that at least once \u201cSimplicius has no clue.\u201d\r\n\r\nSimplicius draws parallels between Aristotelian matter and Plato\u2019s Receptacle in Timaeus and the great-and-small in Philebus. He defines matter explicitly at 230,22 and finds congruence between Plato and Aristotle regarding the distinction between the first form, which is genuinely separate, and the natural form immanent in individual compound objects, which perishes with the compound.\r\n\r\nSimplicius uses Aristotle\u2019s discussion of privation in chapters 7\u20139 to defend Plato against the charge of giving undue credence to Parmenides' unitary concept of Being. He extensively quotes Sophist to show that Plato recognized but did not emphasize privation, opting instead to discuss the presence or absence of form. Where Aristotle uses privation, Plato prefers the concept of \"the other.\" Simplicius concludes that Plato and Aristotle are not in conflict regarding principles: Plato sought the per se causes of being that are elemental and inherent, while Aristotle sought causes of change, including privation as a per accidens cause.\r\n\r\nSimplicius frequently cites other commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, offering a dense and complex analysis that illuminates not only Aristotle\u2019s text but also its reception by a Neoplatonist of the 6th century AD.\r\n\r\nThis edition, translated by four contributors with glossaries by Sebastian Gertz and editorial notes by Richard Sorabji, provides accurate and fluent translations with minimal errors, despite being a collective effort. However, a more detailed note on logos, often left untranslated, would be valuable. Note 252 on p. 155 repeats paragraph 3 of the Introduction (p. 11). Overall, this translation is a significant contribution to Aristotelian studies. [The entire review p. 113-114]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nqkDsZcyl8kNw0V","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":117,"full_name":"Fleet, Barrie","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":594,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"8","issue":"1","pages":"113-114"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy: Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 85-98 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sotiria Triantari |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Was the Byzantine thinker Nicephorus Blemmydes directly influenced in his views about human “proairesis” by the Stoic Epictetus or did he take over his views from the Neoplatonic Simplicius? After exploring Blemmydes’ reception of Epictetus, one can say that Blemmydes drew elements in a brief treatise under the title “De virtute et ascesi” from the mainly Neoplatonic Simplicius, who commented on the handbook by the Stoic Epictetus. Blemmydes, following Simplicius identifies “φ’ μν” with “aftexousion” and he designates “proairesis” as an activity, which emanates from “aftexousion”. Blemmydes shows the moral power of “proairesis” as a transforming factor of human existence and the mediatory factor to the dialectical relation between man and God. For the completion of the study, the following sources have been used: Blemmydes’ De virtute et ascesi, Epictetus’ Handbook, and Neoplatonic Simplicius’ commentaries on the Handbook. I specifically focus on the views of Aristotle, Epictetus, and Neoplatonic Simplicius about “proairesis” and compare the views of Blemmydes to Simplicius’ ideas. I conclude that Blemmydes drew ideas from Simplicius, with regard to human “proairesis” and in the context of the practising and cultivating virtues in everyday life. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/L5aG4m1stEAka7L |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1596","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1596,"authors_free":[{"id":2796,"entry_id":1596,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sotiria Triantari","free_first_name":"Sotiria","free_last_name":"Triantari","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy: Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes","main_title":{"title":"Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy: Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes"},"abstract":"Was the Byzantine thinker Nicephorus Blemmydes directly influenced in his views about human \u201cproairesis\u201d by the Stoic Epictetus or did he take over his views from the Neoplatonic Simplicius? After exploring Blemmydes\u2019 reception of Epictetus, one can say that Blemmydes drew elements in a brief treatise under the title \u201cDe virtute et ascesi\u201d from the mainly Neoplatonic Simplicius, who commented on the handbook by the Stoic Epictetus. Blemmydes, following Simplicius identifies \u201c\u03c6\u2019 \u03bc\u03bd\u201d with \u201caftexousion\u201d and he designates \u201cproairesis\u201d as an activity, which emanates from \u201caftexousion\u201d. Blemmydes shows the moral power of \u201cproairesis\u201d as a transforming factor of human existence and the mediatory factor to the dialectical relation between man and God. For the completion of the study, the following sources have been used: Blemmydes\u2019 De virtute et ascesi, Epictetus\u2019 Handbook, and Neoplatonic Simplicius\u2019 commentaries on the Handbook. I specifically focus on the views of Aristotle, Epictetus, and Neoplatonic Simplicius about \u201cproairesis\u201d and compare the views of Blemmydes to Simplicius\u2019 ideas. I conclude that Blemmydes drew ideas from Simplicius, with regard to human \u201cproairesis\u201d and in the context of the practising and cultivating virtues in everyday life. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/L5aG4m1stEAka7L","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1596,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"17","issue":"1","pages":"85-98"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | Simplicius et le “lieu”. À propos d’une nouvelle édition du Corollarium de loco |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 127 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 119-175 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis , Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The digression labelled “Corollarium de loco” by Hermann Diels in his edition of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, IX, Berlin 1882) is a key text in the debate - often referred to by specialists as magna quaestio - generated by an apparent lack of consistency between Aristotle’s definition of ‘place’ (topos) as “the first unmoved boundary of the surrounding body” (Phys. IV, 4, 212 a 20-21) and his assertion that the Heaven moves in a circle while not being ‘somewhere’, since it is not surrounded by any body that would be exterior to it. Following the steps of his master Damascius, and at the end of a long discussion initiated by Neoplatonists after Plotinus (principally by Iamblichus, Proclus and Syrianus), Simplicius replaces Aristotle’s definition with a new definition of place as a “gathering (or uniting) measure” (metron sunagôgon), which is one of the four “measures” (number, size, place, time) or gathering powers that protect the intelligible and sensible entities against the dangers of the dispersion related to the procession of reality. This doctrine places physics in a decidedly theological perspective since, in last analysis, these uniting powers derive from the One or Good per se. Our understanding of this crucial text for our knowledge of the Neoplatonic philosophy of Nature will be improved thanks to a new critical edition (with French translation and notes), to be published soon in the collection “Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca and Byzantina” (by Walter de Gruyter) under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of Bcrlin-Brandenburg. The new edition is based not only on a fresh collation of the two manuscripts used by Diels (Marciani graeci 227 and 229) but also on a Moscow manuscript (Mosquensis Muz. 3649) unknown to the German scholar, since it belonged during the nineteenth century to a private Russian collection. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CopNdLIRs5QEoZb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1321","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1321,"authors_free":[{"id":1955,"entry_id":1321,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2378,"entry_id":1321,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius et le \u201clieu\u201d. \u00c0 propos d\u2019une nouvelle \u00e9dition du Corollarium de loco","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius et le \u201clieu\u201d. \u00c0 propos d\u2019une nouvelle \u00e9dition du Corollarium de loco"},"abstract":"The digression labelled \u201cCorollarium de loco\u201d by Hermann Diels in his edition of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, IX, Berlin 1882) is a key text in the debate - often referred to by specialists as magna quaestio - generated by an apparent lack of consistency between Aristotle\u2019s definition of \u2018place\u2019 (topos) as \u201cthe first unmoved boundary \r\nof the surrounding body\u201d (Phys. IV, 4, 212 a 20-21) and his assertion that the Heaven moves in a circle while not being \u2018somewhere\u2019, since it is not surrounded by any body that would be exterior to it. Following the steps of his master Damascius, and at the end of a long discussion initiated by Neoplatonists after Plotinus (principally by Iamblichus, Proclus and Syrianus), Simplicius replaces Aristotle\u2019s definition with a new definition of place as a \u201cgathering (or uniting) measure\u201d (metron sunag\u00f4gon), which is one of the four \u201cmeasures\u201d (number, size, place, time) or gathering powers that protect the intelligible and sensible \r\nentities against the dangers of the dispersion related to the procession of reality. This doctrine places physics in a decidedly theological perspective since, in last analysis, these uniting powers derive from the One or Good per se. Our under\u00adstanding of this crucial text for our knowledge of the Neoplatonic philosophy of \r\nNature will be improved thanks to a new critical edition (with French translation and notes), to be published soon in the collection \u201cCommentaria in Aristotelem Graeca and Byzantina\u201d (by Walter de Gruyter) under the auspices of the Academy \r\nof Sciences of Bcrlin-Brandenburg. The new edition is based not only on a fresh collation of the two manuscripts used by Diels (Marciani graeci 227 and 229) but also on a Moscow manuscript (Mosquensis Muz. 3649) unknown to the Ger\u00adman scholar, since it belonged during the nineteenth century to a private Russian \r\ncollection. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CopNdLIRs5QEoZb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1321,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques ","volume":"127","issue":"1","pages":"119-175"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | The text of Simplicius’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics and the question of supralinear omicron in Greek manuscripts |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Revue d’histoire des textes |
Volume | 9 |
Pages | 351-358 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarán, Leonardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper tries to establish that supralinear omicron is not, as most elementary introductions to Greek paleography have it, a simple abbreviation for the ending omicron-sigma. Rather, it was originally a symbol for suspension that later medieval scribes used also for other subordinated purposes which are impossible to classify. Some examples will be given in what follows. For a long time this interpretation had seemed so obvious to me that during a 1985 colloquium on Simplicius in Paris, it surprised me that some members of the audience objected that supralinear omicron is simply an abbreviation for omicron-sigma. As this occurred during my discussion of a passage of Simplicius’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, and as several of my examples come from that work, it is convenient to give a list of the manuscripts used by Diels and also of additional prim ary witnesses either rejected by, or not known to him. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/euNEGjD514bsBaT |
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Title | Aristotle’s Topics in the Greek Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | PEITHO / EXAMINA ANTIQUA |
Volume | 1 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 91-117 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Militello, Chiara |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper lists and examines the explicit references to Aristotle’s Topics in the Greek Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories. The references to the Topics by Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, Philoponus and David (Elias) are listed according the usual prolegomena to Aristotle’s works. In particular, the paper reconstructs David (Elias)’s original thesis about the proponents of the title Pre-Topics for the Categories and compares Ammonius’, Simplicius’ and Olympiodorus’ doxographies about the postpraedicamenta. Moreover, the study identifies two general trends. The first one is that all the commentators after Proclus share the same general view about: the authenticity of the Topics, Aristotle’s writing style in them, the part of philosophy to which they belong, their purpose, their usefulness and their place in the reading order. The second one is that whereas Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius use the Topics as an aid to understanding the Categories, Ammonius, Olympiodorus and David (Elias) do not. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/62qOZqwQ9rtCf7S |
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Title | Simplicius on Categories 1a16–17 and 1b25–27: An Examination of the Interests of Ancient and Modern Commentary on the Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
Volume | 4 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 73-99 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Almeida, Joseph |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
We may gather these observations into several points. First, Simplicius’s commentary on the Categories shows, not surprisingly, the influence of the great Neoplatonic spiritual odyssey of return to first principles. The final prayer offered at the termination of his commentary is a stunning testimony to the power which this spiritual program exerted on the ancient commentators: "I stop my discourse, invoking the Guardians of the Logoi to grant me a more accurate understanding of these matters and to favor me with this understanding as a viaticum toward higher contemplations and to provide me leisure from the distractions of life." For Simplicius, commentary on Aristotle could never be wholly separated from this overarching spiritual purpose. In at least one of the passages considered above, this influence manifested itself in an attempt to elucidate Aristotle’s text as the lesser mysteries on route to the higher. As this program and its consequences are central to the business of Neoplatonic commentary on the Categories, so it is, in its central impetus, irrelevant to the interests of the modern program of solving the problem of the Categories. Second, Simplicius was a happy heir of a long tradition, part of which conditioned commentators to see the Categories as a text for beginners in philosophy. Embracing this teaching, Simplicius does not hesitate to deflect certain difficulties presented by the text with appeal to the elementary nature of the Categories, content to leave a real solution to more advanced speculations elsewhere. When modern interest is focused on just such a problem, such a treatment is of little value. Third, the same tradition obligates Simplicius to harmonize Aristotle with Plato. At least in the example considered above, the reconciliation can involve certain abstruse points of Neoplatonic philosophy. Such commentary is no doubt of great value to students of Neoplatonism but will generally miss the mark set by the interests of modern inquiry. These three points appear relatively secure and of universal application to the body of ancient commentary on the Categories. There is, however, a fourth point, to be stated cautiously because of the limited data examined. When Simplicius spoke directly to the passages in question in Cat. 1a16–17 and 1b25–27, he did not seem to appreciate the issues which interested modern readers of the Categories—namely, that the doctrine of simple expressions presents a philosophical theory in need of expansion and illumination, a problem to be solved in relation to a theory of categories in general rather than a solution to be applied to questions concerning the identity and nature of the Aristotelian categories in particular. This is not to say that a modern reader will never find anywhere in Simplicius a discussion corresponding to his interest, but that in all likelihood it would be serendipitous and peripheral to Simplicius’s own primary interest in the Categories. These observations warrant the conclusion that there is indeed a separation between the interests of the ancient and modern commentators on the Categories. In its strong form, the conclusion is that the separation is absolute. This is in accord with Praechter’s position in his classic review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (i.e., that the commentaries will prove to be essentially of historic value): “[They will be] invaluable for the history of the Greek language, for the lexicon as well as for the grammar”; “[They will be invaluable] for understanding how ancient philosophy was able to fulfill the vast cultural mission which befell it in antiquity as sovereign in the realm of Weltanschauung, and in the Middle Ages as the ‘handmaiden of theology.’” Even Sorabji, who seems to regard the independent philosophical value of the commentaries more highly than Praechter, recommends them to students of Aristotle with a note of caution: “The distorting Neoplatonist context... does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The commentators... have minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus... Moreover, commentators are enjoined neither to accept nor to reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one’s attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences, and ideas in Aristotle which one could easily have passed over... The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would on his own.” Although this is a more positive view of the substantive content of the commentaries, the illumination of sentences and ideas still does not address the needs of the kind of modern inquiry exemplified in our discussion. Because the conclusion is drawn from limited data—namely, a close reading of about sixty pages of the Berlin text of Simplicius on the Categories—it must remain tentative and provisional. However, truth to be told, the tremendous effort involved in reading even cursorily just one of the ancient commentaries on the Categories, let alone with an eye to the intersection between Neoplatonic and modern interest, may leave the matter open for quite some time. [conclusion p. 97-99] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/OzmApALBY8ZdgnX |
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The final prayer offered at the termination of his commentary is a stunning testimony to the power which this spiritual program exerted on the ancient commentators:\r\n\r\n \"I stop my discourse, invoking the Guardians of the Logoi to grant me a more accurate understanding of these matters and to favor me with this understanding as a viaticum toward higher contemplations and to provide me leisure from the distractions of life.\"\r\n\r\nFor Simplicius, commentary on Aristotle could never be wholly separated from this overarching spiritual purpose. In at least one of the passages considered above, this influence manifested itself in an attempt to elucidate Aristotle\u2019s text as the lesser mysteries on route to the higher. As this program and its consequences are central to the business of Neoplatonic commentary on the Categories, so it is, in its central impetus, irrelevant to the interests of the modern program of solving the problem of the Categories.\r\n\r\nSecond, Simplicius was a happy heir of a long tradition, part of which conditioned commentators to see the Categories as a text for beginners in philosophy. Embracing this teaching, Simplicius does not hesitate to deflect certain difficulties presented by the text with appeal to the elementary nature of the Categories, content to leave a real solution to more advanced speculations elsewhere. When modern interest is focused on just such a problem, such a treatment is of little value.\r\n\r\nThird, the same tradition obligates Simplicius to harmonize Aristotle with Plato. At least in the example considered above, the reconciliation can involve certain abstruse points of Neoplatonic philosophy. Such commentary is no doubt of great value to students of Neoplatonism but will generally miss the mark set by the interests of modern inquiry.\r\n\r\nThese three points appear relatively secure and of universal application to the body of ancient commentary on the Categories. There is, however, a fourth point, to be stated cautiously because of the limited data examined. When Simplicius spoke directly to the passages in question in Cat. 1a16\u201317 and 1b25\u201327, he did not seem to appreciate the issues which interested modern readers of the Categories\u2014namely, that the doctrine of simple expressions presents a philosophical theory in need of expansion and illumination, a problem to be solved in relation to a theory of categories in general rather than a solution to be applied to questions concerning the identity and nature of the Aristotelian categories in particular.\r\n\r\nThis is not to say that a modern reader will never find anywhere in Simplicius a discussion corresponding to his interest, but that in all likelihood it would be serendipitous and peripheral to Simplicius\u2019s own primary interest in the Categories.\r\n\r\nThese observations warrant the conclusion that there is indeed a separation between the interests of the ancient and modern commentators on the Categories. In its strong form, the conclusion is that the separation is absolute. This is in accord with Praechter\u2019s position in his classic review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (i.e., that the commentaries will prove to be essentially of historic value):\r\n\r\n \u201c[They will be] invaluable for the history of the Greek language, for the lexicon as well as for the grammar\u201d;\r\n \u201c[They will be invaluable] for understanding how ancient philosophy was able to fulfill the vast cultural mission which befell it in antiquity as sovereign in the realm of Weltanschauung, and in the Middle Ages as the \u2018handmaiden of theology.\u2019\u201d\r\n\r\nEven Sorabji, who seems to regard the independent philosophical value of the commentaries more highly than Praechter, recommends them to students of Aristotle with a note of caution:\r\n\r\n \u201cThe distorting Neoplatonist context... does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The commentators... have minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus... Moreover, commentators are enjoined neither to accept nor to reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one\u2019s attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences, and ideas in Aristotle which one could easily have passed over... The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would on his own.\u201d\r\n\r\nAlthough this is a more positive view of the substantive content of the commentaries, the illumination of sentences and ideas still does not address the needs of the kind of modern inquiry exemplified in our discussion.\r\n\r\nBecause the conclusion is drawn from limited data\u2014namely, a close reading of about sixty pages of the Berlin text of Simplicius on the Categories\u2014it must remain tentative and provisional. However, truth to be told, the tremendous effort involved in reading even cursorily just one of the ancient commentaries on the Categories, let alone with an eye to the intersection between Neoplatonic and modern interest, may leave the matter open for quite some time.\r\n[conclusion p. 97-99]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/OzmApALBY8ZdgnX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":557,"full_name":"Almeida, Joseph","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1499,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"4","issue":"2","pages":"73-99"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
Volume | 2 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 7-23 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
All students of the history of philosophy are apt to be seduced by linearity. What I mean is this. Naturally, we read the texts of the history of philosophy in the chronological order in which they were written. So, for example, we read Aristotle after we read Plato. And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the “influence” of the earlier philosopher on the later or the “development” of the philosopher’s views. The employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment’s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect. Thus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another. Consider “development.” The perfectly anodyne sense of this term—namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought—is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato’s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought—apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none—you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change. I am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato’s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a “phase” after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful. The reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato. The reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an “objective and unbiased” account of the “development” of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called “the exegete of the Platonic revelation,” namely, Plotinus. Simplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy “in” the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle’s remark in Physics—that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature—puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides. Let us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato. As I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle’s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle’s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy. Instead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1510","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1510,"authors_free":[{"id":2623,"entry_id":1510,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism","main_title":{"title":"The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism"},"abstract":"All students of the history of philosophy are apt to be seduced by linearity. What I mean is this. Naturally, we read the texts of the history of philosophy in the chronological order in which they were written. So, for example, we read Aristotle after we read Plato. And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the \u201cinfluence\u201d of the earlier philosopher on the later or the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the philosopher\u2019s views.\r\n\r\nThe employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment\u2019s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect.\r\n\r\nThus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another.\r\n\r\nConsider \u201cdevelopment.\u201d The perfectly anodyne sense of this term\u2014namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought\u2014is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato\u2019s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought\u2014apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none\u2014you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change.\r\n\r\nI am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato\u2019s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a \u201cphase\u201d after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful.\r\n\r\nThe reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato.\r\n\r\nThe reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an \u201cobjective and unbiased\u201d account of the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called \u201cthe exegete of the Platonic revelation,\u201d namely, Plotinus.\r\n\r\nSimplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy \u201cin\u201d the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle\u2019s remark in Physics\u2014that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature\u2014puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides.\r\n\r\nLet us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato.\r\n\r\nAs I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy.\r\n\r\nInstead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1510,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"2","issue":"4","pages":"7-23"}},"sort":[2014]}
Title | Boéthos de Sidon sur les relatifs |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2013 |
Journal | Studia greaco-arabica |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 1-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Luna, Concetta |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The Peripatetic philosopher Boethus of Sidon (mid-first century BC), a pupil of Andronicus of Rhodes, is well-known for his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, whose fragments are transmitted by later commentators together with testimonia about it. In his exegesis of the Categories, Boethus especially focused on the category of relation (Cat. 7), on which he wrote a speci!c treatise, arguing against the Stoics for the unity of the category of relation. The present paper o"ers a translation and analysis of Boethus’ fragments on relation, all of which are preserved in Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9oljjSmWv94OJA7 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1114","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1114,"authors_free":[{"id":1683,"entry_id":1114,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":458,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Luna, Concetta","free_first_name":"Concetta","free_last_name":"Luna","norm_person":{"id":458,"first_name":"Concetta","last_name":"Luna","full_name":"Luna, Concetta","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1153489031","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Bo\u00e9thos de Sidon sur les relatifs","main_title":{"title":"Bo\u00e9thos de Sidon sur les relatifs"},"abstract":"The Peripatetic philosopher Boethus of Sidon (mid-first century BC), a pupil of Andronicus of Rhodes, is well-known for his commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, whose fragments are transmitted by later commentators together with testimonia about it. In his exegesis of the Categories, Boethus especially focused on the category of relation (Cat. 7), on which he wrote a speci!c treatise, arguing against the Stoics for the unity of the category of relation. The present paper o\"ers a translation and analysis of Boethus\u2019 fragments on relation, all of which are preserved in Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the Categories. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2013","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9oljjSmWv94OJA7","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":458,"full_name":"Luna, Concetta","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1114,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia greaco-arabica","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"1-35"}},"sort":[2013]}
Title | Un commentario alessandrino al «De caelo» di Aristotele |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2013 |
Journal | Athenaeum: Studi di letteratura e Storia dell'antichità |
Volume | 101 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 479-516 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rescigno, Andrea |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IR153pEdP84QTiX |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"810","_score":null,"_source":{"id":810,"authors_free":[{"id":1200,"entry_id":810,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":500,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rescigno, Andrea","free_first_name":"Andrea","free_last_name":"Rescigno","norm_person":{"id":500,"first_name":"Andrea","last_name":"Rescigno","full_name":"Rescigno, Andrea","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un commentario alessandrino al \u00abDe caelo\u00bb di Aristotele","main_title":{"title":"Un commentario alessandrino al \u00abDe caelo\u00bb di Aristotele"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"2013","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IR153pEdP84QTiX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":500,"full_name":"Rescigno, Andrea","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":810,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Athenaeum: Studi di letteratura e Storia dell'antichit\u00e0","volume":"101","issue":"2","pages":"479-516"}},"sort":[2013]}
Title | Which ‘Athenodorus’ commented on Aristotle's "Categories"? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2013 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 63 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 199-208 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Griffin, Michael J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The principate of Augustus coincided with a surge of interest in the short Aristotelian treatise which we now entitle Categories, contributing to its later installation at the outset of the philosophical curriculum and its traditional function as an introduction to logic. Thanks in part to remarks made by Plutarch (Sulla 26.1–2) and Porphyry (Vita Plotini 24.7), the origin of this interest has often been traced to Andronicus of Rhodes: his catalogue (πίνακες) and publication of the Aristotelian corpus began with the Categories and may have drawn fresh attention to a previously obscure treatise. But the later Neoplatonic sources name several other philosophers who also discussed the Categories and played an important role in crafting its interpretation during the first centuries of our era. For example, the Neoplatonist Simplicius discusses the views of Stoics and Platonists who questioned the Categories’ value as a treatment of grammar or ontology, while others defended its usefulness as an introduction to logic. These early debates, as these later sources suggest, exercised a lasting influence on the shape of subsequent philosophy and philosophical education within and beyond the Aristotelian tradition. In this note, I would like to revisit the identity of one of the Categories’ earliest critics, a Stoic identified only as ‘Athenodorus’ in the pages of Dexippus, Porphyry, and Simplicius. There is a strong consensus identifying this ‘Athenodorus’ with Athenodorus Calvus, a tutor of Octavian and correspondent of Cicero, roughly contemporary with Andronicus of Rhodes. I want to suggest several reasons for reconsidering this identification. In particular, I want to argue that a certain Athenodorus mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (7.68) is, on philosophical grounds, a compelling candidate for identification with the critic of the Categories, and that Diogenes’ Athenodorus is relatively unlikely to be Calvus. As an alternative to Calvus, I tentatively advance the possibility that our Athenodorus may belong to a generation of Stoic philosophers who conducted work on the Categories in the Hellenistic period, prior to the activity of Andronicus in the first century, and under the title Before the Topics (see Simpl. in Cat. 379.9, who observes that Andronicus of Rhodes was aware of this title and rejected it). Such a story runs counter to the older consensus, now considerably less certain, that Andronicus was the first philosopher to draw serious attention to the Categories after it had languished for centuries out of circulation. Instead, we might regard Andronicus’ relocation of the text to the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum under the new title Categories as a relatively late chapter in an ongoing tradition of commentary and polemic. In what follows, I suggest some possible motives for Andronicus’ relocation of the Categories, if it can be viewed as a response to earlier criticism. [introduction p. 199-200] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IbfU0uOFgfzLjDG |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"821","_score":null,"_source":{"id":821,"authors_free":[{"id":1222,"entry_id":821,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":148,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","free_first_name":"Michael J.","free_last_name":"Griffin","norm_person":{"id":148,"first_name":"Michael J.","last_name":"Griffin","full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1065676603","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Which \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 commented on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?","main_title":{"title":"Which \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 commented on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?"},"abstract":"The principate of Augustus coincided with a surge of interest in the short Aristotelian treatise which we now entitle Categories, contributing to its later installation at the outset of the philosophical curriculum and its traditional function as an introduction to logic. Thanks in part to remarks made by Plutarch (Sulla 26.1\u20132) and Porphyry (Vita Plotini 24.7), the origin of this interest has often been traced to Andronicus of Rhodes: his catalogue (\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c2) and publication of the Aristotelian corpus began with the Categories and may have drawn fresh attention to a previously obscure treatise. But the later Neoplatonic sources name several other philosophers who also discussed the Categories and played an important role in crafting its interpretation during the first centuries of our era. For example, the Neoplatonist Simplicius discusses the views of Stoics and Platonists who questioned the Categories\u2019 value as a treatment of grammar or ontology, while others defended its usefulness as an introduction to logic. These early debates, as these later sources suggest, exercised a lasting influence on the shape of subsequent philosophy and philosophical education within and beyond the Aristotelian tradition.\r\n\r\nIn this note, I would like to revisit the identity of one of the Categories\u2019 earliest critics, a Stoic identified only as \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 in the pages of Dexippus, Porphyry, and Simplicius. There is a strong consensus identifying this \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 with Athenodorus Calvus, a tutor of Octavian and correspondent of Cicero, roughly contemporary with Andronicus of Rhodes. I want to suggest several reasons for reconsidering this identification. In particular, I want to argue that a certain Athenodorus mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (7.68) is, on philosophical grounds, a compelling candidate for identification with the critic of the Categories, and that Diogenes\u2019 Athenodorus is relatively unlikely to be Calvus. As an alternative to Calvus, I tentatively advance the possibility that our Athenodorus may belong to a generation of Stoic philosophers who conducted work on the Categories in the Hellenistic period, prior to the activity of Andronicus in the first century, and under the title Before the Topics (see Simpl. in Cat. 379.9, who observes that Andronicus of Rhodes was aware of this title and rejected it).\r\n\r\nSuch a story runs counter to the older consensus, now considerably less certain, that Andronicus was the first philosopher to draw serious attention to the Categories after it had languished for centuries out of circulation. Instead, we might regard Andronicus\u2019 relocation of the text to the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum under the new title Categories as a relatively late chapter in an ongoing tradition of commentary and polemic. In what follows, I suggest some possible motives for Andronicus\u2019 relocation of the Categories, if it can be viewed as a response to earlier criticism. [introduction p. 199-200]","btype":3,"date":"2013","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IbfU0uOFgfzLjDG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":148,"full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":821,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"63","issue":"1","pages":"199-208"}},"sort":[2013]}
Title | Mathematical Explanation and the Philosphy of Nature in Late Ancient Philosophy: Astronomy and the Theory of the Elements |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 23 |
Pages | 65-106 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Opsomer, Jan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Late ancient Platonists discuss two theories in which geometric entities explain natural phenomena : the regular polyhedra of geometric atomism and the eccentrics and epicycles of astronomy. Simplicius explicitly compares the status of the first to the hypotheses of the astronomers. The point of comparison is the fallibility of both theories, not the (lack of) reality of the entities postulated. Simplicius has strong realist commitments as far as astronomy is concerned. Syrianus and Proclus too do not consider the polyhedra as devoid of physical reality. Proclus rejects epicycles and eccentrics, but accepts the reality of material homocentric spheres, moved by their own souls. The spheres move the astral objects contained in them, which, however, add motions caused by their own souls. The epicyclical and eccntric hypotheses are useful, as they help us to understand the complex motions resulting from the interplay of spherical motions and volitional motions of the planets. Yet astral souls do not think in accordance with human theoretical constructs, but rather grasp the complex patterns of their motions directly. Our understanding of astronomy depends upon our own cognition of intelligible patterns and their mathematical images. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NrliupadtaqUhIR |
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Title | What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the "Categories" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 69-108 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Griffin, Michael J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Through this sketch of the evidence, I hope to have suggested that there is, in any case, more to the bipartite theory than a compendious treatment or compression of the tripartite material by Porphyry, and that attention should be drawn to it as a separate and distinct layer of the tradition. I have also explored some of the ways in which both layers may be seen as predating Porphyry, while Porphyry’s approach to the Categories in the shorter commentary could be seen as building on an earlier source. As to our first mystery—the role of the Categories in the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, both first-century and Neoplatonic—I would like to offer a few concluding reflections on the theory itself. To be significant, a verbal expression must have an extension that qualifies as ὄν (Porph. In Cat. 90,30-91,12 – T17; as this passage shows, the extension might be infinite). If Busse is right to read ἕκαστον κατὰ ἀριθμὸν σημαίνει <ἕν> τῶν ὄντων (“each numerically distinct expression signifies one of the beings”) around 58,5-15 (T9), I think we are not merely dealing with the Stoic view that there are “somethings” that do not subsist—occasionally compared to Meinong's distinction of bestehen and existieren as represented by Bertrand Russell—but an even stronger view, akin to Owen’s positive reading of the Parmenidean maxim that “what can be spoken and thought must exist” (B2). That sort of intuition, though pre-Platonic, was always part of the Platonic tradition. Perhaps it is not so surprising, then, that we find friendly Platonist and Neopythagorean treatments in the earliest layer of the exegetical stratigraphy of the Categories, and that Porphyry should find it a suitable cornerstone around which to build later Neoplatonic ontology. The bipartite theory that I have described looks like an extensional theory of signification—as Porphyry’s language in T17 might seem to suggest, the meaning of a predicate F amounts to the set of objects said to be F. We might call this kind of view nominalist, and not very much in the spirit of Platonism as we usually conceive it. But there are also examples in the Arabic tradition that draw on the Posterior Analytics for a kind of Platonic view about the existence of eternal natures. For example (see Adamson, “Knowledge of Universals”), the tenth-century logician Ibn ʿAdī maintained that (1) terms in syllogisms directly refer (have some existing extension), (2) following the Post. An., demonstrative knowledge is never of the transient, unlimited particulars, and (3) nonetheless, demonstrative knowledge occurs; from these points, he was led to maintain that there are eternal, unchanging objects of reference. If this conclusion could be referred to as essential Platonism, then as Adamson puts it, “to some extent, Aristotle’s own words invited the Platonizing.” It seems to me compatible with Alexander’s view, if I understand his De anima rightly (especially around p. 90), that there are eternal natures that may or may not be predicated of many particulars, a view about which Sharples has also written. My suggestion here, then, is just that the interpretation of the Organon that facilitates this line of thinking goes back to a very early layer of commentary on the Categories. Modern philosophy arguably also provides examples of how a theory of direct reference can inspire different flavors of almost Platonic realism, especially when the observable infinity of particular objects of acquaintance is coupled with the observed feasibility of human knowledge. Bertrand Russell in 1945 criticized Porphyry’s work on the Categories (which he had, I suppose, indirectly) by wielding the same weapons that had served against his interpretation of Meinong in 1904. Russell credited Porphyry’s alleged misreading of Aristotle with the excessively “metaphysical” temper of subsequent logic (HWP 1945:472), including entrenched realism about genera and species and “endless bad metaphysics about unity” (198). But it was the early Russell himself who, in 1903, made every denoting phrase directly denote an existing entity and argued that “anything that can be mentioned is sure to be a term...” that has unity and in some sense exists (43). In fact, Russell was led by his pre-1905 account of denoting to frame the problem of knowledge in terms strikingly similar to our bipartite theory (see T27a): the “inmost secret of our power to deal with infinity” lies in the fact that “an infinitely complex object... can certainly not be manipulated by the human intelligence; but infinite collections, owing to the notion of denoting, can be manipulated.” Russell later eliminated (what he took to be) the Meinongian plurality of denoted beings implied by his own earlier logical realism, using his theory of descriptions as an instrument; thus the later Russell, who still maintained that “we could not acquire knowledge of absolute particulars,” came to hold that our words denote just adjectives or relations (T27b). Porphyry—and arguably many Peripatetics before him—took an analogous temperament in precisely the opposite direction. Both held, in their own way, that an ideal language would carve nature at the joints; and the semantic building blocks of Porphyry's ideal language, as I have suggested here, were rooted in a long tradition of Peripatetic thought about what Aristotle’s Categories categorize, and in particular how unity could be imposed on plurality to make sense of the world. But whereas Russell’s language ultimately aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, a Moorean world of common sense and acquaintance, Porphyry’s categorical language aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, the world of the Enneads and the existence of some eternal natures. Peripatetic and Porphyrian logicism was not Russell’s, and a similar interest in the ontological implications of their logical apparatus led to very different results at the dawn of analytic philosophy and at the dawn of Neoplatonism: by dispensing with several components of Aristotle’s theory of predication that Porphyry had held to be central, Russell had toppled the giant from whose shoulders Porphyry had spied (and at any rate hoped to teach his pupils to spy) Plotinus’s ontology. [conclusion p. 90-92] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/0V3z3uBVFDC712w |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1148","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1148,"authors_free":[{"id":1723,"entry_id":1148,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":148,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","free_first_name":"Michael J.","free_last_name":"Griffin","norm_person":{"id":148,"first_name":"Michael J.","last_name":"Griffin","full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1065676603","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\"","main_title":{"title":"What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\""},"abstract":"Through this sketch of the evidence, I hope to have suggested that there is, in any case, more to the bipartite theory than a compendious treatment or compression of the tripartite material by Porphyry, and that attention should be drawn to it as a separate and distinct layer of the tradition. I have also explored some of the ways in which both layers may be seen as predating Porphyry, while Porphyry\u2019s approach to the Categories in the shorter commentary could be seen as building on an earlier source.\r\nAs to our first mystery\u2014the role of the Categories in the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, both first-century and Neoplatonic\u2014I would like to offer a few concluding reflections on the theory itself. To be significant, a verbal expression must have an extension that qualifies as \u1f44\u03bd (Porph. In Cat. 90,30-91,12 \u2013 T17; as this passage shows, the extension might be infinite). If Busse is right to read \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 <\u1f15\u03bd> \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd (\u201ceach numerically distinct expression signifies one of the beings\u201d) around 58,5-15 (T9), I think we are not merely dealing with the Stoic view that there are \u201csomethings\u201d that do not subsist\u2014occasionally compared to Meinong's distinction of bestehen and existieren as represented by Bertrand Russell\u2014but an even stronger view, akin to Owen\u2019s positive reading of the Parmenidean maxim that \u201cwhat can be spoken and thought must exist\u201d (B2). That sort of intuition, though pre-Platonic, was always part of the Platonic tradition.\r\nPerhaps it is not so surprising, then, that we find friendly Platonist and Neopythagorean treatments in the earliest layer of the exegetical stratigraphy of the Categories, and that Porphyry should find it a suitable cornerstone around which to build later Neoplatonic ontology.\r\nThe bipartite theory that I have described looks like an extensional theory of signification\u2014as Porphyry\u2019s language in T17 might seem to suggest, the meaning of a predicate F amounts to the set of objects said to be F. We might call this kind of view nominalist, and not very much in the spirit of Platonism as we usually conceive it. But there are also examples in the Arabic tradition that draw on the Posterior Analytics for a kind of Platonic view about the existence of eternal natures.\r\nFor example (see Adamson, \u201cKnowledge of Universals\u201d), the tenth-century logician Ibn \u02bfAd\u012b maintained that (1) terms in syllogisms directly refer (have some existing extension), (2) following the Post. An., demonstrative knowledge is never of the transient, unlimited particulars, and (3) nonetheless, demonstrative knowledge occurs; from these points, he was led to maintain that there are eternal, unchanging objects of reference. If this conclusion could be referred to as essential Platonism, then as Adamson puts it, \u201cto some extent, Aristotle\u2019s own words invited the Platonizing.\u201d\r\nIt seems to me compatible with Alexander\u2019s view, if I understand his De anima rightly (especially around p. 90), that there are eternal natures that may or may not be predicated of many particulars, a view about which Sharples has also written. My suggestion here, then, is just that the interpretation of the Organon that facilitates this line of thinking goes back to a very early layer of commentary on the Categories.\r\nModern philosophy arguably also provides examples of how a theory of direct reference can inspire different flavors of almost Platonic realism, especially when the observable infinity of particular objects of acquaintance is coupled with the observed feasibility of human knowledge.\r\nBertrand Russell in 1945 criticized Porphyry\u2019s work on the Categories (which he had, I suppose, indirectly) by wielding the same weapons that had served against his interpretation of Meinong in 1904. Russell credited Porphyry\u2019s alleged misreading of Aristotle with the excessively \u201cmetaphysical\u201d temper of subsequent logic (HWP 1945:472), including entrenched realism about genera and species and \u201cendless bad metaphysics about unity\u201d (198).\r\nBut it was the early Russell himself who, in 1903, made every denoting phrase directly denote an existing entity and argued that \u201canything that can be mentioned is sure to be a term...\u201d that has unity and in some sense exists (43).\r\nIn fact, Russell was led by his pre-1905 account of denoting to frame the problem of knowledge in terms strikingly similar to our bipartite theory (see T27a): the \u201cinmost secret of our power to deal with infinity\u201d lies in the fact that \u201can infinitely complex object... can certainly not be manipulated by the human intelligence; but infinite collections, owing to the notion of denoting, can be manipulated.\u201d\r\nRussell later eliminated (what he took to be) the Meinongian plurality of denoted beings implied by his own earlier logical realism, using his theory of descriptions as an instrument; thus the later Russell, who still maintained that \u201cwe could not acquire knowledge of absolute particulars,\u201d came to hold that our words denote just adjectives or relations (T27b).\r\nPorphyry\u2014and arguably many Peripatetics before him\u2014took an analogous temperament in precisely the opposite direction. Both held, in their own way, that an ideal language would carve nature at the joints; and the semantic building blocks of Porphyry's ideal language, as I have suggested here, were rooted in a long tradition of Peripatetic thought about what Aristotle\u2019s Categories categorize, and in particular how unity could be imposed on plurality to make sense of the world.\r\nBut whereas Russell\u2019s language ultimately aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, a Moorean world of common sense and acquaintance, Porphyry\u2019s categorical language aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, the world of the Enneads and the existence of some eternal natures.\r\nPeripatetic and Porphyrian logicism was not Russell\u2019s, and a similar interest in the ontological implications of their logical apparatus led to very different results at the dawn of analytic philosophy and at the dawn of Neoplatonism: by dispensing with several components of Aristotle\u2019s theory of predication that Porphyry had held to be central, Russell had toppled the giant from whose shoulders Porphyry had spied (and at any rate hoped to teach his pupils to spy) Plotinus\u2019s ontology.\r\n [conclusion p. 90-92]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/0V3z3uBVFDC712w","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":148,"full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1148,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies","volume":"55","issue":"1","pages":"69-108"}},"sort":[2012]}
Title | Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 43 |
Pages | 366-375 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius’ view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Phiioponus' account of these proofs. Specifically. I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Phiioponus, he conceives of the argument that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato’s un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Phiioponus’ account of tekmeriodic proofs grants. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kTidRDQtummkQxv |
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Title | Alexander on Physics 2.9 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 19-30 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sharples, Robert W. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I want to draw your attention today to a report of Alexander in Simplicius’s Physics commentary which, as far as I can tell, has escaped the notice of everyone, myself included—and I have rather less excuse than most, for, as we shall see, the report connects directly with issues about which I have written in other contexts. That was concerned with On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away [hereafter GC] 2.11, with Philoponus’s commentary thereon, and with Alexander’s discussion in some of the Quaestiones; the present paper, with Simplicius’s help, extends the discussion to Physics 2.9. Alexander’s GC commentary and the relevant part of his Physics commentary are lost. The text that will chiefly concern us is (3) (2) in the appendix, where Simplicius says: "For my part, I do not understand why Alexander says that unqualified necessity excludes what is for the sake of something." Perhaps indeed he does understand why Alexander says this, and this is a disingenuous way of introducing a problem; but the problem may be real nonetheless. If my story has a moral, it is, I suppose, that those who have an interest in Alexander should be more proactive than I confess I have myself been in looking up the later commentaries on passages of Aristotle that are of interest in the context of Alexander, in order to see whether Alexander is recorded as having had interesting comments to make. Or, if that is a counsel of perfection, I think it shows that we need a collection of the reports of Alexander by name in later Greek commentaries on the Physics, rather like Andrea Rescigno’s recent edition of the fragments of the De Caelo commentary. We already have the fragments of the Physics commentary preserved in Arabic, and the fragments in Greek identified by Marwan Rashed; there may be scope, if copyright and other issues can be overcome, for a compendium assembling all this material in the order of the passages of Aristotle commented upon. This would indeed in a way be assistance for the lazy, making nothing available that individual scholars could not find for themselves in published sources, but it might be useful nonetheless. In Physics 2.9, Aristotle continues his polemic against those who explain nature in terms of necessitating material interactions, arguing that necessity is present in all things that have goal-directedness, if I may so translate “the for-the-sake-of-something,” but that the necessity of matter is not the cause or explanation of what comes about. There is, by the way, in my view a systematic ambiguity in the terminology commonly used here; necessity can be conditional either on a future goal or on some past event, but the custom has developed of using “conditional” or “hypothetical” necessity to indicate that which relates to the future, “absolute” to indicate that which is conditional on past events—presumably because there is no longer anything hypothetical about these. But, especially in the ancient Peripatetic context where, as Patzig pointed out, qualifications attach to predicates rather than to whole propositions, this could be misleading from the point of view of logical analysis. Building a house necessarily requires bricks; but the fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders’ merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. (It could be an explanation of why you have a brick house, or more strictly of why, given that you have a house, it is a brick one; but that is a different point.) To be sure, Aristotle’s argument in 2.9 is open to challenge in that he takes his examples from human goal-directed activity, and the extrapolation from these to natural processes is open to question. David Sedley well suggests that the self-building wall may be a parody of atomist cosmogony. A human being requires human flesh and human bones; but, Aristotle’s view would seem to imply, human flesh does not self-assemble into a human being—perhaps because it cannot even be human flesh, except homonymously, if it is not part of a human being. There are well-known problems here about how the final cause of embryonic development can also be the efficient cause, but I do not propose to pursue them now. For, more important in the present context, is a distinction indicated by the example I have just used. The fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders’ merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. Why not? Well, presumably, because sitting looking at the pile of bricks will not give you a house; you, or the builder, need to do something with them. Bricks not only do not explain the coming-to-be of a brick house (let us call this “thesis A”); they do not necessarily lead to it, either (let us call this “thesis B”). In more formal language, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions. For the Presocratic natural philosophers whom Aristotle is attacking, on the other hand, material interactions are both sufficient conditions for, and explanations of, natural phenomena. Normally, an explanation will be a sufficient condition, or at least that one of a number of jointly sufficient conditions that is relevant in the explanatory context. Consequently, to say that material actions may necessitate, i.e., may be sufficient for, but may not explain, some event, or in the contexts with which we are concerned the coming-to-be of something, is to raise the specter of over-determination. If natural comings-to-be are necessitated by matter and its interactions—what some call “absolute” necessity—is there any room left in which to argue that they are explained by the purposes or goals for which they are necessary means? [introduction p. 19-20] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RKYRiSGUGVV8cTg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1172","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1172,"authors_free":[{"id":1747,"entry_id":1172,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":42,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","free_first_name":"Robert W.","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":42,"first_name":"Robert W.","last_name":"Sharples","full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114269505","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Alexander on Physics 2.9","main_title":{"title":"Alexander on Physics 2.9"},"abstract":"I want to draw your attention today to a report of Alexander in Simplicius\u2019s Physics commentary which, as far as I can tell, has escaped the notice of everyone, myself included\u2014and I have rather less excuse than most, for, as we shall see, the report connects directly with issues about which I have written in other contexts. That was concerned with On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away [hereafter GC] 2.11, with Philoponus\u2019s commentary thereon, and with Alexander\u2019s discussion in some of the Quaestiones; the present paper, with Simplicius\u2019s help, extends the discussion to Physics 2.9. Alexander\u2019s GC commentary and the relevant part of his Physics commentary are lost. The text that will chiefly concern us is (3) (2) in the appendix, where Simplicius says:\r\n\r\n \"For my part, I do not understand why Alexander says that unqualified necessity excludes what is for the sake of something.\"\r\n\r\nPerhaps indeed he does understand why Alexander says this, and this is a disingenuous way of introducing a problem; but the problem may be real nonetheless.\r\n\r\nIf my story has a moral, it is, I suppose, that those who have an interest in Alexander should be more proactive than I confess I have myself been in looking up the later commentaries on passages of Aristotle that are of interest in the context of Alexander, in order to see whether Alexander is recorded as having had interesting comments to make. Or, if that is a counsel of perfection, I think it shows that we need a collection of the reports of Alexander by name in later Greek commentaries on the Physics, rather like Andrea Rescigno\u2019s recent edition of the fragments of the De Caelo commentary. We already have the fragments of the Physics commentary preserved in Arabic, and the fragments in Greek identified by Marwan Rashed; there may be scope, if copyright and other issues can be overcome, for a compendium assembling all this material in the order of the passages of Aristotle commented upon. This would indeed in a way be assistance for the lazy, making nothing available that individual scholars could not find for themselves in published sources, but it might be useful nonetheless.\r\n\r\nIn Physics 2.9, Aristotle continues his polemic against those who explain nature in terms of necessitating material interactions, arguing that necessity is present in all things that have goal-directedness, if I may so translate \u201cthe for-the-sake-of-something,\u201d but that the necessity of matter is not the cause or explanation of what comes about. There is, by the way, in my view a systematic ambiguity in the terminology commonly used here; necessity can be conditional either on a future goal or on some past event, but the custom has developed of using \u201cconditional\u201d or \u201chypothetical\u201d necessity to indicate that which relates to the future, \u201cabsolute\u201d to indicate that which is conditional on past events\u2014presumably because there is no longer anything hypothetical about these. But, especially in the ancient Peripatetic context where, as Patzig pointed out, qualifications attach to predicates rather than to whole propositions, this could be misleading from the point of view of logical analysis.\r\n\r\nBuilding a house necessarily requires bricks; but the fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders\u2019 merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. (It could be an explanation of why you have a brick house, or more strictly of why, given that you have a house, it is a brick one; but that is a different point.) To be sure, Aristotle\u2019s argument in 2.9 is open to challenge in that he takes his examples from human goal-directed activity, and the extrapolation from these to natural processes is open to question. David Sedley well suggests that the self-building wall may be a parody of atomist cosmogony. A human being requires human flesh and human bones; but, Aristotle\u2019s view would seem to imply, human flesh does not self-assemble into a human being\u2014perhaps because it cannot even be human flesh, except homonymously, if it is not part of a human being. There are well-known problems here about how the final cause of embryonic development can also be the efficient cause, but I do not propose to pursue them now.\r\n\r\nFor, more important in the present context, is a distinction indicated by the example I have just used. The fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders\u2019 merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. Why not? Well, presumably, because sitting looking at the pile of bricks will not give you a house; you, or the builder, need to do something with them. Bricks not only do not explain the coming-to-be of a brick house (let us call this \u201cthesis A\u201d); they do not necessarily lead to it, either (let us call this \u201cthesis B\u201d). In more formal language, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions. For the Presocratic natural philosophers whom Aristotle is attacking, on the other hand, material interactions are both sufficient conditions for, and explanations of, natural phenomena.\r\n\r\nNormally, an explanation will be a sufficient condition, or at least that one of a number of jointly sufficient conditions that is relevant in the explanatory context. Consequently, to say that material actions may necessitate, i.e., may be sufficient for, but may not explain, some event, or in the contexts with which we are concerned the coming-to-be of something, is to raise the specter of over-determination. If natural comings-to-be are necessitated by matter and its interactions\u2014what some call \u201cabsolute\u201d necessity\u2014is there any room left in which to argue that they are explained by the purposes or goals for which they are necessary means?\r\n[introduction p. 19-20]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RKYRiSGUGVV8cTg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":42,"full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1172,"section_of":1171,"pages":"19-30","is_catalog":null,"book":null},"article":{"id":1172,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies","volume":"55","issue":"1","pages":"19-30"}},"sort":[2012]}
Title | Intelligibles = Sinnliches? Simplikios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 155 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 389-412 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Drews, Friedemann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplikios nimmt Parmenides sowohl vor dem potentiellen Vorwurf, er würde nicht hinreichend zwischen Intelligiblem und Sinnlichem unterscheiden, in Schutz als auch integriert er Aristoteles' Kritik im Sinne einer potentiellen Missverständnissen vor beugenden Vorsichtsmaßnahme in seine neuplatonische Parmeni des-Interpretation und weist ihr so einen berechtigten Platz zu. Simplikios' Gründe dafür erscheinen vor dem Hintergrund seines neuplatonischen Denkens plausibel. Ob seine Parmenides-Interpretation als solche dem Eleaten gerecht wird, ist eine andere Frage; zumindest würde Simplikios gegenüber einer Deutung des parmenideischen Seins-Begriffs in dem Sinne, dass „jeder Gegenstand, den wir untersuchen, existieren muß", wohl einwenden wollen, dass dies einer Reduktion von Parmenides' το έόν auf ein abstraktes Erkenntniskriterium gleichkäme, dessen eigene, nur für das νοεΐν erkennbare Seinsfülle dann aus dem Blick geraten wäre. Auch erschiene es in dieser Perspektive fraglich, warum zum Erschließen eines allgemeinen Existenz-Postulats ein Weg „fernab der Menschen" eingeschlagen werden musste oder gar eine göttliche Offenbarung des „unerschütterlichen Herzens der wohlüberzeugenden Wahrheit", von der Parmenides schreibt, nötig war. [conclusion, p. 410-411] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ICo5GC7IUBJgLkS |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"623","_score":null,"_source":{"id":623,"authors_free":[{"id":879,"entry_id":623,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":71,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Drews, Friedemann","free_first_name":"Friedemann","free_last_name":"Drews","norm_person":{"id":71,"first_name":"Friedemann","last_name":"Drews","full_name":"Drews, Friedemann","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142475742","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Intelligibles = Sinnliches? Simplikios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik","main_title":{"title":"Intelligibles = Sinnliches? Simplikios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik"},"abstract":"Simplikios nimmt Parmenides sowohl vor dem potentiellen Vorwurf, er w\u00fcrde nicht hinreichend zwischen Intelligiblem und Sinnlichem unterscheiden, in Schutz als auch integriert er Aristoteles' Kritik im Sinne einer potentiellen Missverst\u00e4ndnissen vor beugenden Vorsichtsma\u00dfnahme in seine neuplatonische Parmeni des-Interpretation und weist ihr so einen berechtigten Platz zu. Simplikios' Gr\u00fcnde daf\u00fcr erscheinen vor dem Hintergrund seines neuplatonischen Denkens plausibel. Ob seine Parmenides-Interpretation als solche dem Eleaten gerecht wird, ist eine andere Frage; zumindest w\u00fcrde Simplikios gegen\u00fcber einer Deutung des parmenideischen Seins-Begriffs in dem Sinne, dass \u201ejeder Gegenstand, den wir untersuchen, existieren mu\u00df\", wohl einwenden wollen, dass dies einer Reduktion von Parmenides' \u03c4\u03bf \u03ad\u03cc\u03bd auf ein abstraktes Erkenntniskriterium gleichk\u00e4me, dessen eigene, nur f\u00fcr das \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u0390\u03bd erkennbare Seinsf\u00fclle dann aus dem Blick geraten w\u00e4re. Auch erschiene es in dieser Perspektive fraglich, warum zum Erschlie\u00dfen eines allgemeinen Existenz-Postulats ein Weg \u201efernab der Menschen\" eingeschlagen werden musste oder gar eine g\u00f6ttliche Offenbarung des \u201eunersch\u00fctterlichen Herzens der wohl\u00fcberzeugenden Wahrheit\", von der Parmenides schreibt, n\u00f6tig war. [conclusion, p. 410-411]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ICo5GC7IUBJgLkS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":71,"full_name":"Drews, Friedemann","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":623,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"155","issue":"3\/4","pages":"389-412"}},"sort":[2012]}
Title | Self-motion according to Iamblichus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 259-290 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Opsomer, Jan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the “changing self”. Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1Kioea09D5a6jXo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1093","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1093,"authors_free":[{"id":1651,"entry_id":1093,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":211,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Opsomer, Jan","free_first_name":"Jan","free_last_name":"Opsomer","norm_person":{"id":211,"first_name":"Jan","last_name":"Opsomer","full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1120966310","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Self-motion according to Iamblichus","main_title":{"title":"Self-motion according to Iamblichus"},"abstract":"Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the \u201cchanging self\u201d. Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1Kioea09D5a6jXo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":211,"full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1093,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"259-290"}},"sort":[2012]}
Title | Megaric Metaphysics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Ancient philosophy |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 303-321 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bailey, Dominic |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I have attempted to show that, with some imaginative reconstruction, there is a good deal more to Megaricism than meets the eye. While the position is doubtless false, there are nevertheless reasons for being sympathetic to its conjuncts, especially if one has, as some philosophers still do, a fetish for the actual and a perplexity about the indefinite, whether the indefiniteness of the modal or that of the non-particular. I have shown how anti-Platonism about common nouns of the kind evinced by Stilpo makes M2 seem better considered than at first. And I have shown how skepticism about possibility without actuality, from which later logicians such as Diodorus and Philo felt they could not stray too far (see Bobzien 1993, 1998), makes M1 seem better considered than at first. Moreover, I have demonstrated the impressive coherence of Megaricism, insofar as its conjuncts, as I interpret them, are both mutually entailing and, each in their ways, both Parmenidean and Protagorean. Megaricism is wrong, but sufficiently intriguing and well-integrated to make it worthy of serious consideration. [conclusion p. 320] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YNcy1URcz4PUK83 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"826","_score":null,"_source":{"id":826,"authors_free":[{"id":1227,"entry_id":826,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":529,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bailey, Dominic","free_first_name":"Dominic","free_last_name":"Bailey","norm_person":{"id":529,"first_name":"Dominic","last_name":"Bailey","full_name":"Bailey, Dominic","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Megaric Metaphysics","main_title":{"title":"Megaric Metaphysics"},"abstract":"I have attempted to show that, with some imaginative reconstruction, there is a good deal more to Megaricism than meets the eye. While the position is doubtless false, there are nevertheless reasons for being sympathetic to its conjuncts, especially if one has, as some philosophers still do, a fetish for the actual and a perplexity about the indefinite, whether the indefiniteness of the modal or that of the non-particular. I have shown how anti-Platonism about common nouns of the kind evinced by Stilpo makes M2 seem better considered than at first. And I have shown how skepticism about possibility without actuality, from which later logicians such as Diodorus and Philo felt they could not stray too far (see Bobzien 1993, 1998), makes M1 seem better considered than at first.\r\n\r\nMoreover, I have demonstrated the impressive coherence of Megaricism, insofar as its conjuncts, as I interpret them, are both mutually entailing and, each in their ways, both Parmenidean and Protagorean. Megaricism is wrong, but sufficiently intriguing and well-integrated to make it worthy of serious consideration. [conclusion p. 320]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YNcy1URcz4PUK83","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":529,"full_name":"Bailey, Dominic","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":826,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ancient philosophy","volume":"32","issue":"2","pages":"303-321"}},"sort":[2012]}
Title | Un philosophe plus poète (Simplicius, "Com. in Ar. Phys." 24, 20 / DK 12 A 9) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 3-22 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Santoro, Fernando |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper is about the meaning and implications for Presocratics' modern exegesis of a comment made by Simplicius about the vocabulary of a passage from Anaximander, which he has just quoted. Simplicius says that Anaximander wrote his sentence about the nature of beings in more poetic terms: ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτά λέγων. In their remarks on the passage, Nietzsche and Heidegger not only drew attention to the words and thought of Anaximander but also made us look at that simple comment, that "hiccup" of thought in Simplicius. What is it for a philosopher to speak in a more poetic way? We propose to understand that it does not imply the use of images or allegories but a very original way of interacting and thinking in universal terms. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CVvGQIdFa7rcFRB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"856","_score":null,"_source":{"id":856,"authors_free":[{"id":1260,"entry_id":856,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":310,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Santoro, Fernando","free_first_name":"Fernando","free_last_name":"Santoro","norm_person":{"id":310,"first_name":"Fernando","last_name":"Santoro","full_name":"Santoro, Fernando","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1060236362","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un philosophe plus po\u00e8te (Simplicius, \"Com. in Ar. Phys.\" 24, 20 \/ DK 12 A 9)","main_title":{"title":"Un philosophe plus po\u00e8te (Simplicius, \"Com. in Ar. Phys.\" 24, 20 \/ DK 12 A 9)"},"abstract":"This paper is about the meaning and implications for Presocratics' modern exegesis of a comment made by Simplicius about the vocabulary of a passage from Anaximander, which he has just quoted. Simplicius says that Anaximander wrote his sentence about the nature of beings in more poetic terms: \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd.\r\n\r\nIn their remarks on the passage, Nietzsche and Heidegger not only drew attention to the words and thought of Anaximander but also made us look at that simple comment, that \"hiccup\" of thought in Simplicius.\r\n\r\nWhat is it for a philosopher to speak in a more poetic way? We propose to understand that it does not imply the use of images or allegories but a very original way of interacting and thinking in universal terms. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CVvGQIdFa7rcFRB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":310,"full_name":"Santoro, Fernando","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":856,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"30","issue":"1","pages":"3-22"}},"sort":[2012]}
Title | What Has Aristotelian Dialectic to Offer a Neoplatonist? A Possible Sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius on the Categories 12,10-13,12 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 6 |
Pages | 173-185 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Griffin, Michael J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius in Cat. 12,10-13,12 presents an interesting justifijication for the study of Aristotle’s Categories, based in Neoplatonic psychology and metaphysics. I suggest that this passage could be regarded as a testimonium to Iamblichus’ reasons for endorsing Porphyry’s selection of the Categories as an introductory text of Platonic philosophy. These Iamblichean arguments, richly grounded in Neoplatonic metaphysics and psychology, may have exercised an influence comparable to Porphyry’s. [authors abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FkVb1TMzAG6AZ5E |
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Title | “Creatio ex nihilo”: A genuinely philosophical insight derived from Plato and Aristotle? Some notes on the treatise on the Harmony between the two sages |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Arabic Sciences and Philosophy |
Volume | 22 |
Pages | 91-117 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gleede, Benjamin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The article aims at demonstrating that in attributing the creatio ex nihilo to both Plato and Aristotle as their unanimous philosophical conviction the Treatise on the Harmony between the Two Sages deeply depends upon the Neoplatonic reading of those two philosophers. The main obstacles for such a view in the works of the two sages are Plato’s assumption of a precosmic chaos in the Timaeus and Aristotle’s denial of any efficient causality to the unmoved mover in the Metaphysics. Both of these points had been, however, done away with by the Neoplatonist commentators already, especially by Ammonius in his lost treatise on efficient and final causality in Aristotle the use of which in the Harmony is shown by a comparison with Simplicius. Christian and Muslim readers just had to transfer those arguments and hermeneutical techniques into an anti-eternalist context in order to make the two philosophers agree with one of the basic tenents of their face, a hermeneutical technique considerably different from the one employed by al-Fārābī in his exposition of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy which is compared to the Harmony in a briefly sketched concluding section. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Q6zkHx0QhaNpLZ6 |
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Title | Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 62 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 465-467 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Thanks to the Ancient Commentators project, almost all of Simplicius' commentaries are now translated. This volume completes the gigantic On Aristotle's Physics. Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides). In Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements. In Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition. This volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately. As to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues. T. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments). The translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios). Now for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither "mental" nor "intellectual" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai hênôtai kata Anaxagoran ta eidê kai amphô dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms. H. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou mê ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1). One could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit. Finally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Postérité de l'Être. Simplicius interprète de Parménide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Empédocle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here. With its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG |
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Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides).\r\nIn Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements.\r\nIn Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition.\r\nThis volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately.\r\nAs to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues.\r\nT. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments).\r\nThe translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios).\r\nNow for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither \"mental\" nor \"intellectual\" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai h\u00ean\u00f4tai kata Anaxagoran ta eid\u00ea kai amph\u00f4 dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms.\r\nH. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou m\u00ea ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1).\r\nOne could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit.\r\nFinally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00catre. Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here.\r\nWith its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels.\r\n[author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1465,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"62","issue":"2","pages":"465-467"}},"sort":[2012]}
Title | Zu Aristoteles’ Rezeption der vorsokratischen Prinzipienlehren (Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26). Teil 2 (Themistios, Philoponos, Simplikios) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | EOS |
Volume | 99 |
Pages | 67-89 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Marcinkowska-Rosół, Maria |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper presents an examination of the Aristotelian classification of the natural philosophers in Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26. It focuses on the exgesis of this passage found in the commentarys on the Physics by Themsitios (In Ph. 5,2. 13. 9-28), Philoponus (In Ph. 86. 19-94. 16) and Simplicius (In Ph. 148. 25-161. 20). The ancient interpretations are discussed, evaluated and compared with the modern readings of the Aristotelian text. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pSayJ4y8SwOz6eb |
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Title | Doctrine, Anecdote, and Action: Reconsidering the Social History of the Last Platonists (c. 430–c. 550 C.E.) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | Classical Philology |
Volume | 106 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 226-244 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Watts, Edward Jay |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Two Parallel narratives have tended to dominate modern recon- structions of the final century and a half of Platonism’s long ancient history. The first ties the dramatic intersection of pagan-Christian conflict, imperial policy, and philosophical principles to the end of Platonic teaching in the Eastern Roman Empire. 1 A second, distinct narrative analyzes Latin philosophical writings and traces the gradual unraveling of the ties that bound Latin philosophical culture and its Greek counterpart. 2 Each of these narratives has its own unique way of viewing and understanding Platonism. The first story culminates with the emperor Justinian’s closing of the Athe- nian Platonic school. It tends to present the affected philosophers as a small, isolated group of pagan intellectuals whose conflict with an increasingly as- sertive Christian political order pushed them to the empire’s margins. The second narrative ends with Boethius and Cassiodorus and stresses how their philosophical efforts both underlined Graeco-Latin philosophical separation and planted the seeds of medieval scholasticism. It sees Platonism primarily as a movement held together by scholastic practices and doctrinal continuities in which Latin writers participated only at some remove. This paper proposes a different, more expansive way to think about late antique philosophical life. Ancient philosophical culture was not defined ex- clusively by religious concerns and doctrinal ties. Beginning with the Old Academy of Xenocrates, Platonists shaped themselves into an intellectual community held together by doctrinal commonalities, a shared history, and defined personal relationships. 3 As the Hellenistic world developed and Platonism spread beyond its Athenian center, doctrine, history, and social ties stopped being conterminous. Platonists remained connected by a shared intellectual genealogy, but Platonism’s social and doctrinal aspects became decentralized as individual schools with their own interests grew up in vari- ous cities. 4 Although no direct institutional connection joined them to the Academy, late antique Platonists saw themselves as part of an old philosophi- cal lineage that reached back to Plato. 5 In their schools, the history of an individual circle’s past mingled with that of the larger intellectual tradition it claimed to have inherited. This amalgamated tradition was handed down from teachers to students in personal conversations that had a number of important, community-building effects. They attracted students to Platonic philosophy, encouraged them to identify with the movement’s past leaders, and influ- enced their ideas and actions once they joined a specific group. As this paper will show, the Platonic circles that these men and women formed were then defined as much by the relationships they formed and by the behaviors they exhibited as by the doctrines they espoused. [introduction p. 226-227] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/rilfF7I9t8ywGlp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"443","_score":null,"_source":{"id":443,"authors_free":[{"id":595,"entry_id":443,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":357,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","free_first_name":"Edward Jay","free_last_name":"Watts","norm_person":{"id":357,"first_name":"Edward Jay","last_name":"Watts","full_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131826530","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Doctrine, Anecdote, and Action: Reconsidering the Social History of the Last Platonists (c. 430\u2013c. 550 C.E.)","main_title":{"title":"Doctrine, Anecdote, and Action: Reconsidering the Social History of the Last Platonists (c. 430\u2013c. 550 C.E.)"},"abstract":"Two Parallel narratives have tended to dominate modern recon-\r\nstructions of the final century and a half of Platonism\u2019s long ancient \r\nhistory. The first ties the dramatic intersection of pagan-Christian \r\nconflict, imperial policy, and philosophical principles to the end of Platonic \r\nteaching in the Eastern Roman Empire. 1 A second, distinct narrative analyzes \r\nLatin philosophical writings and traces the gradual unraveling of the ties that \r\nbound Latin philosophical culture and its Greek counterpart. 2 Each of these \r\nnarratives has its own unique way of viewing and understanding Platonism. \r\nThe first story culminates with the emperor Justinian\u2019s closing of the Athe-\r\nnian Platonic school. It tends to present the affected philosophers as a small, \r\nisolated group of pagan intellectuals whose conflict with an increasingly as-\r\nsertive Christian political order pushed them to the empire\u2019s margins. The \r\nsecond narrative ends with Boethius and Cassiodorus and stresses how their \r\nphilosophical efforts both underlined Graeco-Latin philosophical separation \r\nand planted the seeds of medieval scholasticism. It sees Platonism primarily \r\nas a movement held together by scholastic practices and doctrinal continuities \r\nin which Latin writers participated only at some remove.\r\nThis paper proposes a different, more expansive way to think about late \r\nantique philosophical life. Ancient philosophical culture was not defined ex-\r\nclusively by religious concerns and doctrinal ties. Beginning with the Old \r\n\r\nAcademy of Xenocrates, Platonists shaped themselves into an intellectual \r\ncommunity held together by doctrinal commonalities, a shared history, and \r\ndefined personal relationships. 3 As the Hellenistic world developed and \r\nPlatonism spread beyond its Athenian center, doctrine, history, and social \r\nties stopped being conterminous. Platonists remained connected by a shared \r\nintellectual genealogy, but Platonism\u2019s social and doctrinal aspects became decentralized as individual schools with their own interests grew up in vari-\r\nous cities. 4 Although no direct institutional connection joined them to the \r\nAcademy, late antique Platonists saw themselves as part of an old philosophi-\r\ncal lineage that reached back to Plato. 5 In their schools, the history of an \r\nindividual circle\u2019s past mingled with that of the larger intellectual tradition it \r\nclaimed to have inherited. This amalgamated tradition was handed down from \r\nteachers to students in personal conversations that had a number of important, \r\ncommunity-building effects. They attracted students to Platonic philosophy, \r\nencouraged them to identify with the movement\u2019s past leaders, and influ-\r\nenced their ideas and actions once they joined a specific group. As this paper \r\nwill show, the Platonic circles that these men and women formed were then \r\ndefined as much by the relationships they formed and by the behaviors they \r\nexhibited as by the doctrines they espoused. [introduction p. 226-227]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/rilfF7I9t8ywGlp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":357,"full_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":443,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Philology","volume":"106","issue":"3","pages":"226-244"}},"sort":[2011]}
Title | OMOΣE XΩΡEIN: Simplicius, Corollarium de loco 601.26–8 (Diels) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 61 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 722-730 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gregoric, Pavel , Helmig, Christoph |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The upshot of this article is that the treatment of the phrase ὁμόσε χωρεῖν in LSJ can be supplemented as far as later (Neoplatonic) authors are concerned. We have seen that the translation ‘to come to issue’ for the metaphorical meaning of the phrase is ambiguous and needs to be qualified according to the context. While the expression usually betrays an adversative connotation – to counter or refute an argument – later (Neoplatonic) authors also used it in a more neutral sense (‘to come to grips with an argument’). More to the point, the phrase can also have a concessive connotation, implying a concession or acceptance. It is precisely this latter connotation that we find in Simplicius’ Corollary on Place 601.26–8. [conclusion, p. 730] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8hDZ2Sqz5SgPL6n |
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Title | Confronter les Idées. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | Études platoniciennes |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 145-160 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dans ce lemme, Simplicius n’emploie pas la méthode à laquelle il recourt habituellement pour concilier des doctrines. Entre Aristote et Platon, le problème ne provient pas d’une différence d'expression (lexis), derrière laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d’un problème semblable en des termes différents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d’une question différente mais en recourant à des termes similaires. Sans être formulée ici par Simplicius de façon explicite, la divergence apparaît à la première lecture : lorsqu’Aristote s’en prend à la doctrine des Idées, il ne peut pas, d’une certaine façon, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier à la soutenir. D’emblée, Simplicius élude le problème en redirigeant l’attaque contre d’autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d’abord la véritable cible de l’objection, avant qu’il devienne possible d’en mesurer l’apport à l’égard de la doctrine générale des Idées. La conciliation des doctrines au cœur de l’exégèse d’Aristote suit un parcours précis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture littérale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de façon surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d’Aristote contre elle-même : en faire non plus un adversaire de la théorie des Idées séparées, mais l’auteur d’un critère de validité de la séparation. Dans un deuxième temps, notre exégète s’emploie à montrer la teneur authentiquement aristotélicienne de cette doctrine des Idées séparées. Il isole d’abord les caractères reconnus aux Idées, avant de démontrer qu’ils sont admis au sein même de la pensée d’Aristote. De plus, étant donné que l’enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste à trouver chez Aristote la double caractérisation des Idées que leur attribuent leurs partisans – être à la fois des causes et des modèles semblables pour les réalités naturelles –, il répertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et insère des éléments provenant de la tradition néoplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les réalités qui admettent des Formes séparées et celles qui n’en admettent pas. Comme souvent chez Simplicius, l’examen aboutit à l’énoncé d’un critère net et précis. Il doit permettre ici de démarquer l’homonymie vulgaire des Idées de l’éponymie légitime. La première résulte d’un dépouillement de la forme en dehors de la matière, mais qui continue à raisonner à partir d’ici-bas : elle cherche des Idées séparées pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais être complètement abstraites de la matière à laquelle elles sont liées. La seconde reconnaît que certains noms sont propres aux composés ici-bas et, par conséquent, ne correspondent à aucune réalité là-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Idées, à la fois causes et modèles des composés ici-bas, qui possèdent une subsistance séparée. Si le travail exégétique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son génie philosophique, il s’emploie à chercher des solutions à certains des problèmes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu’il propose, en dépit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, lève la difficulté d’une façon nette et précise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une leçon à méditer. [conclusion p. 159-160] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1313","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1313,"authors_free":[{"id":1947,"entry_id":1313,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius"},"abstract":"Dans ce lemme, Simplicius n\u2019emploie pas la m\u00e9thode \u00e0 laquelle il recourt habituellement pour concilier des doctrines. Entre Aristote et Platon, le probl\u00e8me ne provient pas d\u2019une diff\u00e9rence d'expression (lexis), derri\u00e8re laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d\u2019un probl\u00e8me semblable en des termes diff\u00e9rents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d\u2019une question diff\u00e9rente mais en recourant \u00e0 des termes similaires. Sans \u00eatre formul\u00e9e ici par Simplicius de fa\u00e7on explicite, la divergence appara\u00eet \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re lecture : lorsqu\u2019Aristote s\u2019en prend \u00e0 la doctrine des Id\u00e9es, il ne peut pas, d\u2019une certaine fa\u00e7on, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier \u00e0 la soutenir. D\u2019embl\u00e9e, Simplicius \u00e9lude le probl\u00e8me en redirigeant l\u2019attaque contre d\u2019autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d\u2019abord la v\u00e9ritable cible de l\u2019objection, avant qu\u2019il devienne possible d\u2019en mesurer l\u2019apport \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de la doctrine g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Id\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nLa conciliation des doctrines au c\u0153ur de l\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se d\u2019Aristote suit un parcours pr\u00e9cis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture litt\u00e9rale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de fa\u00e7on surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d\u2019Aristote contre elle-m\u00eame : en faire non plus un adversaire de la th\u00e9orie des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es, mais l\u2019auteur d\u2019un crit\u00e8re de validit\u00e9 de la s\u00e9paration. Dans un deuxi\u00e8me temps, notre ex\u00e9g\u00e8te s\u2019emploie \u00e0 montrer la teneur authentiquement aristot\u00e9licienne de cette doctrine des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es. Il isole d\u2019abord les caract\u00e8res reconnus aux Id\u00e9es, avant de d\u00e9montrer qu\u2019ils sont admis au sein m\u00eame de la pens\u00e9e d\u2019Aristote. De plus, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 que l\u2019enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste \u00e0 trouver chez Aristote la double caract\u00e9risation des Id\u00e9es que leur attribuent leurs partisans \u2013 \u00eatre \u00e0 la fois des causes et des mod\u00e8les semblables pour les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s naturelles \u2013, il r\u00e9pertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et ins\u00e8re des \u00e9l\u00e9ments provenant de la tradition n\u00e9oplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui admettent des Formes s\u00e9par\u00e9es et celles qui n\u2019en admettent pas.\r\n\r\nComme souvent chez Simplicius, l\u2019examen aboutit \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9nonc\u00e9 d\u2019un crit\u00e8re net et pr\u00e9cis. Il doit permettre ici de d\u00e9marquer l\u2019homonymie vulgaire des Id\u00e9es de l\u2019\u00e9ponymie l\u00e9gitime. La premi\u00e8re r\u00e9sulte d\u2019un d\u00e9pouillement de la forme en dehors de la mati\u00e8re, mais qui continue \u00e0 raisonner \u00e0 partir d\u2019ici-bas : elle cherche des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais \u00eatre compl\u00e8tement abstraites de la mati\u00e8re \u00e0 laquelle elles sont li\u00e9es. La seconde reconna\u00eet que certains noms sont propres aux compos\u00e9s ici-bas et, par cons\u00e9quent, ne correspondent \u00e0 aucune r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l\u00e0-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Id\u00e9es, \u00e0 la fois causes et mod\u00e8les des compos\u00e9s ici-bas, qui poss\u00e8dent une subsistance s\u00e9par\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nSi le travail ex\u00e9g\u00e9tique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son g\u00e9nie philosophique, il s\u2019emploie \u00e0 chercher des solutions \u00e0 certains des probl\u00e8mes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu\u2019il propose, en d\u00e9pit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, l\u00e8ve la difficult\u00e9 d\u2019une fa\u00e7on nette et pr\u00e9cise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une le\u00e7on \u00e0 m\u00e9diter. [conclusion p. 159-160]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1313,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"\u00c9tudes platoniciennes","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"145-160"}},"sort":[2011]}
Title | Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 85-158 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Intent upon harmonizing doctrines of their predecessors, some Neoplatonic com-mentators are faced with a problem of resolving doctrinal discrepancies so as to restore the συμφωνία in the history of philosophy. This article considers a parti-cular example of this attempt ats harmonization: how Simplicius reconciles Aris-totle’s Categories with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the Pseudo-Archytas. The chronological inversion introduced by the counterfeiter produces remarkable effects on the late Platonic doctrine about general terms, to the extent that a commentator such as Simplicius works to reduce the dissonance between Archytas’ and Aristotle’s words. This paper has three aims: to restore the general grid that Simplicius uses for reading and commenting on Archytas through Aristotle; to identify the exegeti-cal strategies aimed at a doctrinal reconciliation; to consider a specific case, pro-vided by the doctrine of weight, which engenders a new physical theory by Simplicius. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CcW2PJaT6w7pONA |
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Title | Discussions on the Eternity of the world in Late Antiquity |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 111-173 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article studies the debate between the Neoplatonist philosophers Simplicius and John Philoponus on the question of the eternity of the world. The first part consists in a historical introduction situating their debate within the context of the conflict between Christians and Pa- gan in the Byzantine Empire of the first half of the sixth century. Particular attention is paid to the attitudes of these two thinkers to Aristotle's attempted proofs of the eternity of motion and time in Physics 8.1. The second part traces the origins, structure and function of a particular argument used by Philoponus to argue for the world's creation within time. Philoponus takes advantage of a tension inherent in Aristotle's theory of motion, between his standard view that all motion and change is continuous and takes place in time, and his occasional admission that at least some kinds of motion and change are instantaneous. For Philoponus, God's creation of the world is precisely such an instantaneous change: it is not a motion on the part of the Creator, but is analo- gous to the activation of a state (hexis), which is timeless and implies no change on the part of the agent. The various transformations of this doctrine at the hands of Peripatetic, Neoplatonic, and Islamic commentators are studied (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, al-Kindi, al-Farabi), as is Philoponus' use of it in his debate against Proclus. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ufpZP6w4wwJDnXs |
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Title | Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford’s Fragment |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-14 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | McKirahan, Richard D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Having established the attributes of τὸ ἐόν in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that ‘you cannot know what is not...nor can you declare it’ (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8. He begins by stating (B8.34) that ‘what is to be thought of is the same as that on account of which the thought is’ and goes on to give an argument for that claim (B8.35-38a). He then (B8.38b-41) states as a consequence of the claim, that ‘it (that is, τὸ ἐόν) has been named all things that mortals, persuaded that they are real, have posited both to be generated and to perish, both to be and not, and to change place and alter bright color’. His treatment of these issues, which concern the relations among reality, thought, and language, is one of the most philosophically important parts of his work; it is arguably the very heart of his philosophy. It is also one of the most obscure. The philosophical difficulties are compounded by the facts that the Greek text is uncertain and its grammatical structure is hard to make out. One of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato’s Theaetetus and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line—a misquotation of the true version, or an altogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently. The first step towards understanding the passage is to establish the text of B8.38. Ideally such a text would have substantial support in the ancient sources, it would be a line of the dactylic hexameter verse in which Parmenides wrote, it would make grammatical sense, it would give a good philosophical sense in the place where it occurs, it would suit Parmenides’ manner of presenting his ideas and arguments, and it would make sense in relation to the rest of his philosophy. In part I, I survey the evidence for B8.38 and argue that if the version reported by Plato and his commentator is accepted as a separate fragment, then one of the metrically acceptable versions of the line preserved in the manuscripts of Simplicius is more strongly supported than has previously been thought and, in fact, from this point of view it becomes the leading candidate. In part II, I argue that this version can be read in a way that is philologically unobjectionable, and I propose a way of reading it that fits well with its context, is characteristic of Parmenides’ philosophical style, and gives at least as good philosophical sense as previous construals do. I also defend my interpretation against recent claims by Kingsley, Vlastos, and Mourelatos. Finally, in part III, I take up the question of Cornford’s fragment (as the line quoted by Plato and his commentator is known). I boost the alleged fragment’s claim to authenticity by proposing a new way to understand the text that makes the line metrically and philologically unobjectionable and presenting two ways of construing it that make philosophical sense and make claims that do not repeat what Parmenides says elsewhere but accord well with his views. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/SqC5oF6JPgbuN3v |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"989","_score":null,"_source":{"id":989,"authors_free":[{"id":1490,"entry_id":989,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":253,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","free_first_name":"Richard D.","free_last_name":"McKirahan","norm_person":{"id":253,"first_name":"Richard D.","last_name":"McKirahan","full_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131702254","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment","main_title":{"title":"Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment"},"abstract":"Having established the attributes of \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that \u2018you cannot know what is not...nor can you declare it\u2019 (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8. He begins by stating (B8.34) that \u2018what is to be thought of is the same as that on account of which the thought is\u2019 and goes on to give an argument for that claim (B8.35-38a). He then (B8.38b-41) states as a consequence of the claim, that \u2018it (that is, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd) has been named all things that mortals, persuaded that they are real, have posited both to be generated and to perish, both to be and not, and to change place and alter bright color\u2019. His treatment of these issues, which concern the relations among reality, thought, and language, is one of the most philosophically important parts of his work; it is arguably the very heart of his philosophy. It is also one of the most obscure. The philosophical difficulties are compounded by the facts that the Greek text is uncertain and its grammatical structure is hard to make out.\r\n\r\nOne of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato\u2019s Theaetetus and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line\u2014a misquotation of the true version, or an altogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently.\r\n\r\nThe first step towards understanding the passage is to establish the text of B8.38. Ideally such a text would have substantial support in the ancient sources, it would be a line of the dactylic hexameter verse in which Parmenides wrote, it would make grammatical sense, it would give a good philosophical sense in the place where it occurs, it would suit Parmenides\u2019 manner of presenting his ideas and arguments, and it would make sense in relation to the rest of his philosophy.\r\n\r\nIn part I, I survey the evidence for B8.38 and argue that if the version reported by Plato and his commentator is accepted as a separate fragment, then one of the metrically acceptable versions of the line preserved in the manuscripts of Simplicius is more strongly supported than has previously been thought and, in fact, from this point of view it becomes the leading candidate. In part II, I argue that this version can be read in a way that is philologically unobjectionable, and I propose a way of reading it that fits well with its context, is characteristic of Parmenides\u2019 philosophical style, and gives at least as good philosophical sense as previous construals do. I also defend my interpretation against recent claims by Kingsley, Vlastos, and Mourelatos.\r\n\r\nFinally, in part III, I take up the question of Cornford\u2019s fragment (as the line quoted by Plato and his commentator is known). I boost the alleged fragment\u2019s claim to authenticity by proposing a new way to understand the text that makes the line metrically and philologically unobjectionable and presenting two ways of construing it that make philosophical sense and make claims that do not repeat what Parmenides says elsewhere but accord well with his views. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/SqC5oF6JPgbuN3v","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":253,"full_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":989,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"30","issue":"1","pages":"1-14"}},"sort":[2010]}
Title | Cosmología, cosmogonía y teogonía en el poema de Parménides |
Type | Article |
Language | Spanish |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Emerita: Revista de Lingüística y Filología Clasíca |
Volume | 78 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 275-297 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bredlow, Luis-Andrés |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The aim of this paper is to offer a fresh reconstruction of Parmenides’ system of the physical world, duly distinguishing the cosmological, cosmogonic and theogonic moments of the theory, whose confusion has been a main source of misunderstanding in earlier interpretations. In particular, the system of wreaths or bands of B 12 and A 37 does not represent the present order of the universe, but the general structure of matter, as well as the initial stage of the cosmogony (section 1), as can be substantiated also from Simplicius’ reading of the fragments (section 2). This distinction will allow a tentative reconstruction of Parmenides’ cosmogony (section 3) and cosmology, whose most striking feature is the position of the fixed stars below the sun and the moon, paralleled in Anaximander and – as I will try to show – in the cosmology of the orphic Derveni Papyrus (section 4). [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IstgO7KI8zaKM84 |
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Title | I "Cadaveri" di Eraclito (Fr. 96 D.-K.) e la Polemica Neoplatonica di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 127-137 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Saudelli, Lucia |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article focuses on an unpublished allusion to Heraclitus' fragment 96 D.-K. After an analytic study of the ancient preserved testimonia, I have presented the evidence of the Neoplatonist Simplicius, who uses Heraclitus' dictum about corpses in his personal polemic against Christianity. Then I have tried to explain the probable original signification of Heraclitus' fragment in comparison with other Presocratic texts and according to the Ionian philosophical and religious background of the 5th century B.C. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H7VTl0R3s0lDL6j |
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Title | Did Theophrastus Reject Aristotle's Account of Place? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 68-103 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Morison, Benjamin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is commonly held that Theophrastus criticized or rejected Aristotle's account of place. The evidence that scholars put forward for this view, from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, comes in two parts: (1) Simplicius reports some aporiai that Theophras tus found for Aristotle's account; (2) Simplicius cites a passage of Theophrastus which is said to 'bear witness' to the theory of place which Simplicius himself adopts (that of his teacher Damascius) - a theory which is utterly different from Aristotle's. But the aporiai have relatively straightforward solutions, and we have no reason to suppose that Theophras tus didn't avail himself of them (and some reason to think that he did). Moreover, the text which Simplicius cites as bearing witness to Damascius' view on closer inspection does not seem to be inconsistent with Aristotle's account of place or natural motion. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GbvOxzvRrwDkAHd |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"954","_score":null,"_source":{"id":954,"authors_free":[{"id":1433,"entry_id":954,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":265,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Morison, Benjamin","free_first_name":"Benjamin","free_last_name":"Morison","norm_person":{"id":265,"first_name":"Benjamin","last_name":"Morison","full_name":"Morison, Benjamin","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1221826255","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Did Theophrastus Reject Aristotle's Account of Place?","main_title":{"title":"Did Theophrastus Reject Aristotle's Account of Place?"},"abstract":"It is commonly held that Theophrastus criticized or rejected Aristotle's account of place. The evidence that scholars put forward for this view, from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, comes in two parts: (1) Simplicius reports some aporiai that Theophras tus found for Aristotle's account; (2) Simplicius cites a passage of Theophrastus which is said to 'bear witness' to the theory of place which Simplicius himself adopts (that of his teacher Damascius) - a theory which is utterly different from Aristotle's. But the aporiai have relatively straightforward solutions, and we have no reason to suppose that Theophras tus didn't avail himself of them (and some reason to think that he did). Moreover, the text which Simplicius cites as bearing witness to Damascius' view on closer inspection does not seem to be inconsistent with Aristotle's account of place or natural motion. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GbvOxzvRrwDkAHd","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":265,"full_name":"Morison, Benjamin","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":954,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"55","issue":"1","pages":"68-103"}},"sort":[2010]}
Title | Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Antiquorum Philosophial |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 121-136 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper, I have made the case for the position that Simplicius is more independent as a philosophical writer than modern scholarship has allowed. As soon as he became used as a source for Presocratic philosophy, attention was deflected from his own contributions to the philosophical debate. In broad terms, Simplicius remains loyal to his teachers, but it would be wrong to see him as a mindless copyist or a slavish collector of doxai. This means that there is room for changing our view of him. Late Platonism may have formed a united front, but this does not preclude critical reading and assessment of previous views and disagreements among themselves. I have attempted to illustrate the extent to which Simplicius found fault with and criticized his fellow Platonists and other commentators. That this was not always done by head-on confrontation may be explained by the historical situation he found himself in: firstly, he had to cope with an immensely learned and copious tradition, a task which he took on with considerable courage and resourcefulness; secondly, he was forced to choose a defensive line of argument with respect to the presentation of pagan philosophy in a world that had been taken over by Christianity. This circumstance contributed importantly to his predicament and the ensuing strategy. As I concluded in my summing up of his methodology: "In trying to defend the Platonist point of view in contradistinction to the Christian outlook, he uses polemic to persuade and refute, and comprehensive exegesis to clarify and proselytize." The extent to which he is seen to dissent would need further confirmation, but the preliminary evidence suggests that it is in proportion to the difficult balancing act forced upon him by his historical position. Philosophically, he is a seventh-generation Platonist since Plotinus taught his new doctrine, and ideologically, he finds himself "surrounded" by an increasingly hostile world. Given the sheer amount of material canvassed and processed, it is a miracle he managed to express a personal view at all. As the works stand, he does so cautiously and judiciously. In his modus operandi, he comes close to the ideal commentator outlined in In Cat. 7.23–32, with the added bonus that he offers quotations to support his arguments. A partial explanation for his "cautious" comments, offered as muted disagreement, could be that criticizing fellow Platonists too strongly might weaken one’s overall position. A final peculiarity also hints at his ability to take a more objective stance: Simplicius occasionally adopts a detached view of the Platonists, referring to them as "the Platonists do this or that," as if he were not to be counted among them. This coincides with his unusually comprehensive scope of source analysis, an approach which was bound to produce tensions and hence difficulties in presenting a unified picture of the philosophical tradition, whether it was meant to be Greek (a wide perspective) or Platonist (a narrow perspective). It can be concluded, therefore, that respect for authority can go hand in hand with criticism and dissent in Simplicius, without jeopardizing the fundamental tenets of Platonism. [conclusion p. 133] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YpEQGyC0xI7815g |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"966","_score":null,"_source":{"id":966,"authors_free":[{"id":1451,"entry_id":966,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority"},"abstract":"In this paper, I have made the case for the position that Simplicius is more independent as a philosophical writer than modern scholarship has allowed. As soon as he became used as a source for Presocratic philosophy, attention was deflected from his own contributions to the philosophical debate. In broad terms, Simplicius remains loyal to his teachers, but it would be wrong to see him as a mindless copyist or a slavish collector of doxai. This means that there is room for changing our view of him. Late Platonism may have formed a united front, but this does not preclude critical reading and assessment of previous views and disagreements among themselves. I have attempted to illustrate the extent to which Simplicius found fault with and criticized his fellow Platonists and other commentators.\r\n\r\nThat this was not always done by head-on confrontation may be explained by the historical situation he found himself in: firstly, he had to cope with an immensely learned and copious tradition, a task which he took on with considerable courage and resourcefulness; secondly, he was forced to choose a defensive line of argument with respect to the presentation of pagan philosophy in a world that had been taken over by Christianity. This circumstance contributed importantly to his predicament and the ensuing strategy. As I concluded in my summing up of his methodology: \"In trying to defend the Platonist point of view in contradistinction to the Christian outlook, he uses polemic to persuade and refute, and comprehensive exegesis to clarify and proselytize.\"\r\n\r\nThe extent to which he is seen to dissent would need further confirmation, but the preliminary evidence suggests that it is in proportion to the difficult balancing act forced upon him by his historical position. Philosophically, he is a seventh-generation Platonist since Plotinus taught his new doctrine, and ideologically, he finds himself \"surrounded\" by an increasingly hostile world. Given the sheer amount of material canvassed and processed, it is a miracle he managed to express a personal view at all. As the works stand, he does so cautiously and judiciously. In his modus operandi, he comes close to the ideal commentator outlined in In Cat. 7.23\u201332, with the added bonus that he offers quotations to support his arguments.\r\n\r\nA partial explanation for his \"cautious\" comments, offered as muted disagreement, could be that criticizing fellow Platonists too strongly might weaken one\u2019s overall position. A final peculiarity also hints at his ability to take a more objective stance: Simplicius occasionally adopts a detached view of the Platonists, referring to them as \"the Platonists do this or that,\" as if he were not to be counted among them. This coincides with his unusually comprehensive scope of source analysis, an approach which was bound to produce tensions and hence difficulties in presenting a unified picture of the philosophical tradition, whether it was meant to be Greek (a wide perspective) or Platonist (a narrow perspective).\r\n\r\nIt can be concluded, therefore, that respect for authority can go hand in hand with criticism and dissent in Simplicius, without jeopardizing the fundamental tenets of Platonism. [conclusion p. 133]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YpEQGyC0xI7815g","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":966,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Antiquorum Philosophial","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"121-136"}},"sort":[2010]}
Title | Simplicius on the "Theaetetus" ("In Physica" 17,38-18,23 Diels) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 255-270 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Menn, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle in Physics 1,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate "cognition according to the definition and through the elements," and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is ἐπιστήμη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for ἐπιστήμη and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to recon struct Simplicius' reading of "Socrates' Dream," its place in the Theaetetus larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dEWYys9PQqr0WtF |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"977","_score":null,"_source":{"id":977,"authors_free":[{"id":1476,"entry_id":977,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)"},"abstract":"Aristotle in Physics 1,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate \"cognition according to the definition and through the elements,\" and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to recon struct Simplicius' reading of \"Socrates' Dream,\" its place in the Theaetetus larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dEWYys9PQqr0WtF","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":977,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"55","issue":"3","pages":"255-270"}},"sort":[2010]}
Title | Review of: Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | The Classical World |
Volume | 104 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 117-118 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Menn, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Most people who have heard of Simplicius know two things about him: he was a very learned man who included many quotations and reports of others' views in his writing, thus becoming one of our main sources for the pre-Socratics; but, unfortunately, he was a Neoplatonist, and his testimony is therefore to some degree suspect. So Simplicius has been studied more for the sake of assessing testimony about earlier philosophers than for his own sake; this is the first full-scale monograph on Simplicius in English, although virtually simultaneous with Pantelis Golitsis' Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d'Aristote: tradition et innovation (Berlin, 2008). Simplicius, however, is not so neglected or undervalued as this might suggest: his projects of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle (and sometimes other philosophers), and of defending pagan philosophy against Christian attacks (leading to his polemics against Philoponus), have been much studied both by Anglophone scholars around Richard Sorabji and by Francophone scholars around Ilsetraut Hadot and Philippe Hoffmann. "Neoplatonist" is no longer an insult, and it now seems normal that in later antiquity reading and commenting on Plato and Aristotle should also be a way of doing philosophy. If Simplicius' religious and harmonistic aims, and his scholarly methods, are not ours, we are interested in alternatives to our own way of doing things. But we have lacked a systematic study of Simplicius' methods in his commentaries, and of his strategies for using authors besides Plato and Aristotle (not just the pre-Socratics, but also Theophrastus and Eudemus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and Proclus and his school, whom Baltussen discusses in turn). Baltussen's aims are laudable, but his book is not a safe guide; Golitsis, while not comprehensive, is much better. Baltussen pursues some good questions: why does Simplicius quote so much (just to save the texts from the wave of Christian barbarism?), what are his sources, and how does he handle so much information? (Actually, Simplicius discusses no more writers than Proclus, but he cites verbatim much more, and tries to go beyond secondary sources.) Baltussen needlessly defends Simplicius against the bizarre idea that he knew the pre-Socratics only through Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, it is true that Simplicius sometimes uses secondary sources, and also that Alexander was very important for him. Baltussen says that "overall Simplicius considered [Alexander a] reliable guide and interpreter... Disagreement is expressed in muted form and head-on confrontation is rare" (192). This both understates and overstates Simplicius' relation to Alexander and misses his method as a commentator. Simplicius' Physics and De Caelo commentaries are in effect metacommentaries on Alexander's lost commentaries (his Categories commentary starts instead from Porphyry and Iamblichus). One important hermeneutic principle for Simplicius is that each treatise must have a single primary object (skopos), such that everything else it discusses is discussed on account of some relation to that object. Baltussen discusses this principle but misleadingly. On p. 117, he has Simplicius attribute to Alexander (top of the page) the view that the skopos of the De Caelo is the world, and (lower down) the view that it is the four elements; attribute to Iamblichus the view that it is the universe; and Simplicius himself endorse the view that it is "both the universe... and the four elements." In fact, Simplicius attributes to Iamblichus the view that it is only the fifth (heavenly) body, and to Alexander the view that it is both the world and the five simple bodies. Simplicius himself says that the skopos is just the five simple bodies. The mistake is particularly serious because Baltussen suggests that Simplicius does not really make up his mind and opts for plural skopoi, when Simplicius emphatically insists that each treatise must have a single skopos and criticizes Alexander for breaking that rule. (On p. 36, Baltussen seems to suggest that Simplicius took the single-skopos rule from Alexander, but in the passage he cites Simplicius is criticizing Alexander.) On p. 23 and 158, Syrianus (died ca. 437 A.D.) is listed among Simplicius' teachers. On p. 81, the inset translation of In Physica 161.23-162.2 turns the text into nonsense, taking proéchthēsan (from proagō) as if it were from a compound of achthomai ("am grieved") and misunderstanding Simplicius' term proéchthēsan ("charitable interpretation"). (Baltussen doesn't usually quote the Greek, so the reader must be on guard.) On p. 190 (and 175), he turns Simplicius' comments on constructing an equilateral triangle into a discussion of the first postulate, to draw a straight line. He notes skeptically that Simplicius "mentions a work 'On Prayer' by Aristotle... in which he claims that Aristotle knew of a transcendent intellect" (182), but On Prayer is well-attested, and of course Aristotle believed in a transcendent intellect; Simplicius' audacious claim in this passage is that Aristotle, like Plato, believed in a divine first principle above intellect and being. Baltussen's discussions of Philoponus and Christianity are particularly misleading. On p. 185, he cites Leslie MacCoull as putting some of Philoponus' arguments in the context of "the theological debate among Arrianists [sic]", but Philoponus was a Monophysite, the Arians had nothing to do with it, and MacCoull does not say they did. Baltussen also speaks here of Philoponus' aims in his "polemic with Simplicius," but there seems to be no evidence that Philoponus knew of Simplicius' existence. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nycXB8DgJkcMbQt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"978","_score":null,"_source":{"id":978,"authors_free":[{"id":1477,"entry_id":978,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator"},"abstract":"Most people who have heard of Simplicius know two things about him: he was a very learned man who included many quotations and reports of others' views in his writing, thus becoming one of our main sources for the pre-Socratics; but, unfortunately, he was a Neoplatonist, and his testimony is therefore to some degree suspect. So Simplicius has been studied more for the sake of assessing testimony about earlier philosophers than for his own sake; this is the first full-scale monograph on Simplicius in English, although virtually simultaneous with Pantelis Golitsis' Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon \u00e0 la \"Physique\" d'Aristote: tradition et innovation (Berlin, 2008).\r\n\r\nSimplicius, however, is not so neglected or undervalued as this might suggest: his projects of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle (and sometimes other philosophers), and of defending pagan philosophy against Christian attacks (leading to his polemics against Philoponus), have been much studied both by Anglophone scholars around Richard Sorabji and by Francophone scholars around Ilsetraut Hadot and Philippe Hoffmann. \"Neoplatonist\" is no longer an insult, and it now seems normal that in later antiquity reading and commenting on Plato and Aristotle should also be a way of doing philosophy. If Simplicius' religious and harmonistic aims, and his scholarly methods, are not ours, we are interested in alternatives to our own way of doing things. But we have lacked a systematic study of Simplicius' methods in his commentaries, and of his strategies for using authors besides Plato and Aristotle (not just the pre-Socratics, but also Theophrastus and Eudemus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and Proclus and his school, whom Baltussen discusses in turn).\r\n\r\nBaltussen's aims are laudable, but his book is not a safe guide; Golitsis, while not comprehensive, is much better. Baltussen pursues some good questions: why does Simplicius quote so much (just to save the texts from the wave of Christian barbarism?), what are his sources, and how does he handle so much information? (Actually, Simplicius discusses no more writers than Proclus, but he cites verbatim much more, and tries to go beyond secondary sources.) Baltussen needlessly defends Simplicius against the bizarre idea that he knew the pre-Socratics only through Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, it is true that Simplicius sometimes uses secondary sources, and also that Alexander was very important for him. Baltussen says that \"overall Simplicius considered [Alexander a] reliable guide and interpreter... Disagreement is expressed in muted form and head-on confrontation is rare\" (192). This both understates and overstates Simplicius' relation to Alexander and misses his method as a commentator.\r\n\r\nSimplicius' Physics and De Caelo commentaries are in effect metacommentaries on Alexander's lost commentaries (his Categories commentary starts instead from Porphyry and Iamblichus). One important hermeneutic principle for Simplicius is that each treatise must have a single primary object (skopos), such that everything else it discusses is discussed on account of some relation to that object. Baltussen discusses this principle but misleadingly. On p. 117, he has Simplicius attribute to Alexander (top of the page) the view that the skopos of the De Caelo is the world, and (lower down) the view that it is the four elements; attribute to Iamblichus the view that it is the universe; and Simplicius himself endorse the view that it is \"both the universe... and the four elements.\"\r\n\r\nIn fact, Simplicius attributes to Iamblichus the view that it is only the fifth (heavenly) body, and to Alexander the view that it is both the world and the five simple bodies. Simplicius himself says that the skopos is just the five simple bodies. The mistake is particularly serious because Baltussen suggests that Simplicius does not really make up his mind and opts for plural skopoi, when Simplicius emphatically insists that each treatise must have a single skopos and criticizes Alexander for breaking that rule. (On p. 36, Baltussen seems to suggest that Simplicius took the single-skopos rule from Alexander, but in the passage he cites Simplicius is criticizing Alexander.)\r\n\r\nOn p. 23 and 158, Syrianus (died ca. 437 A.D.) is listed among Simplicius' teachers. On p. 81, the inset translation of In Physica 161.23-162.2 turns the text into nonsense, taking pro\u00e9chth\u0113san (from proag\u014d) as if it were from a compound of achthomai (\"am grieved\") and misunderstanding Simplicius' term pro\u00e9chth\u0113san (\"charitable interpretation\"). (Baltussen doesn't usually quote the Greek, so the reader must be on guard.)\r\n\r\nOn p. 190 (and 175), he turns Simplicius' comments on constructing an equilateral triangle into a discussion of the first postulate, to draw a straight line. He notes skeptically that Simplicius \"mentions a work 'On Prayer' by Aristotle... in which he claims that Aristotle knew of a transcendent intellect\" (182), but On Prayer is well-attested, and of course Aristotle believed in a transcendent intellect; Simplicius' audacious claim in this passage is that Aristotle, like Plato, believed in a divine first principle above intellect and being.\r\n\r\nBaltussen's discussions of Philoponus and Christianity are particularly misleading. On p. 185, he cites Leslie MacCoull as putting some of Philoponus' arguments in the context of \"the theological debate among Arrianists [sic]\", but Philoponus was a Monophysite, the Arians had nothing to do with it, and MacCoull does not say they did. Baltussen also speaks here of Philoponus' aims in his \"polemic with Simplicius,\" but there seems to be no evidence that Philoponus knew of Simplicius' existence. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nycXB8DgJkcMbQt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":978,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical World","volume":"104","issue":"1","pages":"117-118"}},"sort":[2010]}
Title | Nous and Two Kinds of Epistêmê in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 228-254 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zeev Perelmuter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate “cognition according to the definition and through the elements,” and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is πιστήμη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for πιστήμη and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius' reading of “Socrates' Dream,” its place in the Theaetetus ' larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IHkwn4udUD0QWHq |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1593","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1593,"authors_free":[{"id":2793,"entry_id":1593,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Zeev Perelmuter","free_first_name":"Zeev","free_last_name":"Perelmuter","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Nous and Two Kinds of Epist\u00eam\u00ea in Aristotle\u2019s Posterior Analytics","main_title":{"title":"Nous and Two Kinds of Epist\u00eam\u00ea in Aristotle\u2019s Posterior Analytics"},"abstract":"Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate \u201ccognition according to the definition and through the elements,\u201d and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius' reading of \u201cSocrates' Dream,\u201d its place in the Theaetetus ' larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract] ","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IHkwn4udUD0QWHq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1593,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis ","volume":"55","issue":"3","pages":"228-254"}},"sort":[2010]}
Title | Review of: Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. London, Duckworth, 2008 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 72 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 193 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Janssens, Jules L. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius van Silicia (ong. 480-540 n.Chr.) is de laatste der antieke 'commentatoren'. Zijn oeuvre wordt vooral (om niet te zeggen haast uitsluitend) gewaardeerd als bron voor de kennis van vroegere Griekse denkers (van wie de werken niet zelden verloren gegaan zijn en enkel Simplicius getuigenis aflegt). Dit wekt de indruk dat Simplicius geen echt filosofisch project had. Op magistrale wijze toont Baltussen aan dat dit geenszins zo is. Het belang van Simplicius' commentaren overschrijdt ruim de functie van kennisgeving van het vroegere Griekse denken. Zij getuigen immers van een speciale exegetische en didactische werkwijze. Bovendien vertegenwoordigen zij een bijzondere fase in de interpretatie van Plato en Aristoteles. Ook vormen zij de overgang van de oudheid naar de middeleeuwen. Deze basiskenmerken worden grondig uitgewerkt in het boek. Een goed idee van de uitzonderlijke rijkdom aan geciteerde bronnen in Simplicius' diverse werken krijgt de lezer dankzij een overzichtstabel (p. 30). De vijf beginselen van Simplicius' exegetische methode (zoals door hemzelf verwoord in zijn commentaar op de Categorieën) worden nader toegelicht (met onder meer aandacht voor het kritisch vergelijken van handschriften en voor de diverse wijzen van citeren). In Simplicius' opvatting is de studie van Aristoteles duidelijk propedeutisch aan die van Plato (enkel deze laatste laat toe de goddelijke waarheid te bereiken). Tot slot verschijnt Simplicius als de laatste verwoorder van een heidense theologie; in die zin is zijn verwerping van Philoponus niet zozeer het resultaat van een polemische ingesteldheid, maar veeleer de uitdrukking van een godsdienstige motivatie. Van groot belang is ook dat Simplicius' werken losstaan van enige onderwijsopdracht en dat de synthese tussen de verschillende bronnen die hij opstelt, gevoerd wordt in propria voce, niet apo phonis. Deze grondideeën worden rijkelijk geïllustreerd via een overzicht van Simplicius' interpretatie van de Griekse filosofie vóór hem (hoofdstukken 2-5). Achtereenvolgens worden de presocratici, de peripatetici, Alexander van Afrodisias en de platonische commentatoren behandeld. Van de vele belangwekkende gedachten die Baltussen formuleert, vermeld ik graag de volgende: het Griekse denken wordt volgens Simplicius gekenmerkt door één grote eenheid (betekenisvol hiervoor is zijn karakterisering van de presocratici als platonici avant la lettre); Simplicius vertoont duidelijk syncretistische neigingen; Alexander van Afrodisias is een belangrijke externe stem voor het uitdiepen van het harmonisatieproces tussen Aristoteles' en Plato's denken, dat zo kenmerkend is voor het latere platonisme; filosoferen betekent voor Simplicius geen zoektocht naar originaliteit, maar het beantwoorden van teksten, waaraan een autoriteitswaarde werd toegekend; de mogelijkheid dat Simplicius rechtstreeks toegang had tot Plotinus' Enneaden, maar waarschijnlijk niet tot Syrianus' werk. Het lijdt geen twijfel dat Baltussen met zijn studie baanbrekend werk heeft geleverd. Hij toont op overtuigende wijze aan dat Simplicius meer was dan een 'archivaris'. Hij was daadwerkelijk een 'filosoof met een project'. De grote lijnen hiervan worden in dit boek meesterlijk uitgetekend. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/xYsHY65rt8Xj8n3 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1360","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1360,"authors_free":[{"id":2036,"entry_id":1360,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":205,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Janssens, Jules L.","free_first_name":"Jules L.","free_last_name":"Janssens","norm_person":{"id":205,"first_name":"Jules L.","last_name":"Janssens","full_name":"Janssens, Jules L.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139312471","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. London, Duckworth, 2008","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. London, Duckworth, 2008"},"abstract":"Simplicius van Silicia (ong. 480-540 n.Chr.) is de laatste der antieke 'commentatoren'. Zijn oeuvre wordt vooral (om niet te zeggen haast uitsluitend) gewaardeerd als bron voor de kennis van vroegere Griekse denkers (van wie de werken niet zelden verloren gegaan zijn en enkel Simplicius getuigenis aflegt). Dit wekt de indruk dat Simplicius geen echt filosofisch project had. Op magistrale wijze toont Baltussen aan dat dit geenszins zo is. Het belang van Simplicius' commentaren overschrijdt ruim de functie van kennisgeving van het vroegere Griekse denken. Zij getuigen immers van een speciale exegetische en didactische werkwijze. Bovendien vertegenwoordigen zij een bijzondere fase in de interpretatie van Plato en Aristoteles. Ook vormen zij de overgang van de oudheid naar de middeleeuwen.\r\n\r\nDeze basiskenmerken worden grondig uitgewerkt in het boek. Een goed idee van de uitzonderlijke rijkdom aan geciteerde bronnen in Simplicius' diverse werken krijgt de lezer dankzij een overzichtstabel (p. 30). De vijf beginselen van Simplicius' exegetische methode (zoals door hemzelf verwoord in zijn commentaar op de Categorie\u00ebn) worden nader toegelicht (met onder meer aandacht voor het kritisch vergelijken van handschriften en voor de diverse wijzen van citeren). In Simplicius' opvatting is de studie van Aristoteles duidelijk propedeutisch aan die van Plato (enkel deze laatste laat toe de goddelijke waarheid te bereiken). Tot slot verschijnt Simplicius als de laatste verwoorder van een heidense theologie; in die zin is zijn verwerping van Philoponus niet zozeer het resultaat van een polemische ingesteldheid, maar veeleer de uitdrukking van een godsdienstige motivatie. Van groot belang is ook dat Simplicius' werken losstaan van enige onderwijsopdracht en dat de synthese tussen de verschillende bronnen die hij opstelt, gevoerd wordt in propria voce, niet apo phonis.\r\n\r\nDeze grondidee\u00ebn worden rijkelijk ge\u00efllustreerd via een overzicht van Simplicius' interpretatie van de Griekse filosofie v\u00f3\u00f3r hem (hoofdstukken 2-5). Achtereenvolgens worden de presocratici, de peripatetici, Alexander van Afrodisias en de platonische commentatoren behandeld. Van de vele belangwekkende gedachten die Baltussen formuleert, vermeld ik graag de volgende: het Griekse denken wordt volgens Simplicius gekenmerkt door \u00e9\u00e9n grote eenheid (betekenisvol hiervoor is zijn karakterisering van de presocratici als platonici avant la lettre); Simplicius vertoont duidelijk syncretistische neigingen; Alexander van Afrodisias is een belangrijke externe stem voor het uitdiepen van het harmonisatieproces tussen Aristoteles' en Plato's denken, dat zo kenmerkend is voor het latere platonisme; filosoferen betekent voor Simplicius geen zoektocht naar originaliteit, maar het beantwoorden van teksten, waaraan een autoriteitswaarde werd toegekend; de mogelijkheid dat Simplicius rechtstreeks toegang had tot Plotinus' Enneaden, maar waarschijnlijk niet tot Syrianus' werk.\r\n\r\nHet lijdt geen twijfel dat Baltussen met zijn studie baanbrekend werk heeft geleverd. Hij toont op overtuigende wijze aan dat Simplicius meer was dan een 'archivaris'. Hij was daadwerkelijk een 'filosoof met een project'. De grote lijnen hiervan worden in dit boek meesterlijk uitgetekend.\r\n[the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xYsHY65rt8Xj8n3","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":205,"full_name":"Janssens, Jules L.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1360,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"72","issue":"1","pages":"193"}},"sort":[2010]}
Title | The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 54 |
Issue | 4/5 |
Pages | 371-389 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Eunyoung Ju, Anna |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Scholars have long recognised the interest of the Stoics' thought on geometrical limits, both as a specific topic in their physics and within the context of the school's ontological taxonomy. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct their discussion fully. The sources we do have on Stoic geometrical themes are highly polemical, tending to reveal a disagreement as to whether limit is to be understood as a mere concept, as a body or as an incorporeal. In my view, this disagreement held among the historical Stoics, rather than simply reflecting a doxographical divergence in transmission. This apparently Stoic disagreement has generated extensive debate, in which there is still no consensus as to a standard Stoic doctrine of limit. The evidence is thin, and little of it refers in detail to specific texts, especially from the school's founders. But in its overall features the evidence suggests that Posidonius and Cleomedes differed from their Stoic precursors on this topic. There are also grounds for believing that some degree of disagreement obtained between the early Stoics over the metaphysical status of shape. Assuming the Stoics did so disagree, the principal question in the scholarship on Stoic ontology is whether there were actually positions that might be called "standard" within Stoicism on the topic of limit. In attempting to answer this question, my discussion initially sets out to illuminate certain features of early Stoic thinking about limit, and then takes stock of the views offered by late Stoics, notably Posidonius and Cleomedes. Attention to Stoic arguments suggests that the school's founders developed two accounts of shape: on the one hand, as a thought-construct, and, on the other, as a body. In an attempt to resolve the crux bequeathed to them, the school's successors suggested that limits are incorporeal. While the authorship of this last notion cannot be securely identified on account of the absence of direct evidence, it may be traced back to Posidonius, and it went on to have subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, namely in Cleomedes' astronomy. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H3kH3u3PbGnOPyE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"750","_score":null,"_source":{"id":750,"authors_free":[{"id":1115,"entry_id":750,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":83,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Eunyoung Ju, Anna","free_first_name":"Anna","free_last_name":"Eunyoung Ju","norm_person":{"id":83,"first_name":"Anna","last_name":"Eunyoung Ju","full_name":"Eunyoung Ju, Anna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits","main_title":{"title":"The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits"},"abstract":"Scholars have long recognised the interest of the Stoics' thought on geometrical limits, both \r\nas a specific topic in their physics and within the context of the school's ontological \r\ntaxonomy. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct their \r\ndiscussion fully. The sources we do have on Stoic geometrical themes are highly polemical, \r\ntending to reveal a disagreement as to whether limit is to be understood as a mere concept, \r\nas a body or as an incorporeal. In my view, this disagreement held among the historical \r\nStoics, rather than simply reflecting a doxographical divergence in transmission. This \r\napparently Stoic disagreement has generated extensive debate, in which there is still no \r\nconsensus as to a standard Stoic doctrine of limit. The evidence is thin, and little of it refers \r\nin detail to specific texts, especially from the school's founders. But in its overall features the \r\nevidence suggests that Posidonius and Cleomedes differed from their Stoic precursors on \r\nthis topic. There are also grounds for believing that some degree of disagreement obtained \r\nbetween the early Stoics over the metaphysical status of shape. Assuming the Stoics did so \r\ndisagree, the principal question in the scholarship on Stoic ontology is whether there were \r\nactually positions that might be called \"standard\" within Stoicism on the topic of limit. In \r\nattempting to answer this question, my discussion initially sets out to illuminate certain \r\nfeatures of early Stoic thinking about limit, and then takes stock of the views offered by late \r\nStoics, notably Posidonius and Cleomedes. Attention to Stoic arguments suggests that the \r\nschool's founders developed two accounts of shape: on the one hand, as a thought-construct, \r\nand, on the other, as a body. In an attempt to resolve the crux bequeathed to them, the \r\nschool's successors suggested that limits are incorporeal. While the authorship of this last \r\nnotion cannot be securely identified on account of the absence of direct evidence, it may be \r\ntraced back to Posidonius, and it went on to have subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, \r\nnamely in Cleomedes' astronomy. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H3kH3u3PbGnOPyE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":83,"full_name":"Eunyoung Ju, Anna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":750,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"54","issue":"4\/5","pages":"371-389"}},"sort":[2009]}
Title | Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Antiquorum Philosophia |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 101-119 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Barney, Rachel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I have tried to make the case for two claims. First, we can do better than to speak of Simplicius as simply being committed to "the" Neoplatonic project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius’ project is a very distinctive one, and, properly speaking, it is not to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Nor, on the other hand, is it to harmonize the whole of pagan wisdom, or even the whole of Greek philosophy. Rather, it is to vindicate the unity of a certain dominant, broadly Platonic philosophical tradition, which importantly includes Aristotle, the Presocratics, and, to a lesser extent, the Stoics, in order to better defend that tradition against Christian attack. The scope, methods, and spirit of this project are all modeled on Aristotle’s own treatment of his predecessors, including an expansive but not unreasonable version of the principle of charity. Second, I have tried to bring out that projects of harmonization in philosophy have a perennial attraction for philosophers and interpreters alike, and not only for those who are antecedently committed to a canon of conflicting authorities. Projects of harmonization come in many guises and range across a spectrum from the primarily philosophical to the purely exegetical. Simplicius comes close to the latter extreme: his persona and methods are, in fact, strikingly close to those of a familiar sort of modern scholar, notwithstanding the strong philosophical commitments that inform his project. Finally, I would suggest that this self-appointed role as exegete is, more than anything else, an expression of Simplicius’ self-conscious belatedness. With a few exceptions, such as the residual puzzles about place and time addressed in the Corollaries, Simplicius’ work shows us what it is like to do philosophy after all the philosophical problems have been solved. All that remains open to him is the essentially interpretive work of showing how the correct solutions fit together. [conclusion p. 117-118] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bBLV4U0YGAzXs7u |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"825","_score":null,"_source":{"id":825,"authors_free":[{"id":1226,"entry_id":825,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":418,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Barney, Rachel","free_first_name":"Rachel","free_last_name":"Barney","norm_person":{"id":418,"first_name":"Rachel","last_name":"Barney","full_name":"Barney, Rachel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/17355959X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority"},"abstract":"I have tried to make the case for two claims. First, we can do better than to speak of Simplicius as simply being committed to \"the\" Neoplatonic project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius\u2019 project is a very distinctive one, and, properly speaking, it is not to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Nor, on the other hand, is it to harmonize the whole of pagan wisdom, or even the whole of Greek philosophy. Rather, it is to vindicate the unity of a certain dominant, broadly Platonic philosophical tradition, which importantly includes Aristotle, the Presocratics, and, to a lesser extent, the Stoics, in order to better defend that tradition against Christian attack. The scope, methods, and spirit of this project are all modeled on Aristotle\u2019s own treatment of his predecessors, including an expansive but not unreasonable version of the principle of charity.\r\n\r\nSecond, I have tried to bring out that projects of harmonization in philosophy have a perennial attraction for philosophers and interpreters alike, and not only for those who are antecedently committed to a canon of conflicting authorities. Projects of harmonization come in many guises and range across a spectrum from the primarily philosophical to the purely exegetical. Simplicius comes close to the latter extreme: his persona and methods are, in fact, strikingly close to those of a familiar sort of modern scholar, notwithstanding the strong philosophical commitments that inform his project. Finally, I would suggest that this self-appointed role as exegete is, more than anything else, an expression of Simplicius\u2019 self-conscious belatedness. With a few exceptions, such as the residual puzzles about place and time addressed in the Corollaries, Simplicius\u2019 work shows us what it is like to do philosophy after all the philosophical problems have been solved. All that remains open to him is the essentially interpretive work of showing how the correct solutions fit together. [conclusion p. 117-118]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bBLV4U0YGAzXs7u","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":418,"full_name":"Barney, Rachel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":825,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Antiquorum Philosophia","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"101-119"}},"sort":[2009]}
Title | Plotin und Simplikios über die Kategorie des Wo |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 51 |
Pages | 7-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Strobel, Benedikt |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wir haben im vorhergehenden drei semantische Interpretationen von Lokativen – als Ortsbezeichnungen, als Bezeichnungen von einem in einem anderen und als Ausdrücke von Relationen – kennengelernt, mit denen Plotin in VI 1 [42] 14 gegen die aristotelische Annahme der Kategorie des Wo (πού) argumentiert und die drei verschiedene Bestimmungen des Wo einschließen: als Ort (τόπος), als eines in einem anderen (ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ) und als Beziehung zu einem Ort (σχέσις πρὸς τόπον). Dabei hat sich unter anderem gezeigt: (i) Weder diese Interpretationen noch die auf ihnen beruhenden Argumente überzeugen völlig, und Simplikios' Verteidigung der aristotelischen Annahme der Kategorie des Wo ist weitgehend erfolgreich, weist jedoch mit der These, dass Lokative nicht-reziproke Relationen ausdrücken, eine Schwachstelle auf. (ii) Plotins drittes, auf der Interpretation von Lokativen als Ausdrücke von Relationen beruhendes Argument überzeugt zwar letztlich nicht, weist jedoch auf ein ernsthaftes Problem für Aristoteles hin. (iii) Die in der antiken Philosophie weitverbreitete Auffassung, an einem Ort zu sein bedeute, von einem Körper umfasst zu werden, gründet in einem bestimmten Verständnis von Lokativen der Form ἐν τινι (z. B. ἐν Λύκειον und ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ). Dies bestätigt die zu Beginn aufgestellte These, dass die semantische Analyse von Lokativen Konsequenzen hat für die Wahl der Antwort darauf, was es heißt, an einem Ort zu sein, und was es heißt, der Ort von etwas zu sein. [introduction p. 30-31] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/aD2ORfI4GVXZhsH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"844","_score":null,"_source":{"id":844,"authors_free":[{"id":1248,"entry_id":844,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":326,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Strobel, Benedikt","free_first_name":"Benedikt","free_last_name":"Strobel","norm_person":{"id":326,"first_name":" Benedikt","last_name":"Strobel,","full_name":"Strobel, Benedikt","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/173882056","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Plotin und Simplikios \u00fcber die Kategorie des Wo","main_title":{"title":"Plotin und Simplikios \u00fcber die Kategorie des Wo"},"abstract":"Wir haben im vorhergehenden drei semantische Interpretationen von Lokativen \u2013 als Ortsbezeichnungen, als Bezeichnungen von einem in einem anderen und als Ausdr\u00fccke von Relationen \u2013 kennengelernt, mit denen Plotin in VI 1 [42] 14 gegen die aristotelische Annahme der Kategorie des Wo (\u03c0\u03bf\u03cd) argumentiert und die drei verschiedene Bestimmungen des Wo einschlie\u00dfen: als Ort (\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2), als eines in einem anderen (\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u1f10\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff3) und als Beziehung zu einem Ort (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd).\r\n\r\nDabei hat sich unter anderem gezeigt:\r\n(i) Weder diese Interpretationen noch die auf ihnen beruhenden Argumente \u00fcberzeugen v\u00f6llig, und Simplikios' Verteidigung der aristotelischen Annahme der Kategorie des Wo ist weitgehend erfolgreich, weist jedoch mit der These, dass Lokative nicht-reziproke Relationen ausdr\u00fccken, eine Schwachstelle auf.\r\n(ii) Plotins drittes, auf der Interpretation von Lokativen als Ausdr\u00fccke von Relationen beruhendes Argument \u00fcberzeugt zwar letztlich nicht, weist jedoch auf ein ernsthaftes Problem f\u00fcr Aristoteles hin.\r\n(iii) Die in der antiken Philosophie weitverbreitete Auffassung, an einem Ort zu sein bedeute, von einem K\u00f6rper umfasst zu werden, gr\u00fcndet in einem bestimmten Verst\u00e4ndnis von Lokativen der Form \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9 (z. B. \u1f10\u03bd \u039b\u03cd\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd und \u1f10\u03bd \u1f08\u03ba\u03b1\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3). Dies best\u00e4tigt die zu Beginn aufgestellte These, dass die semantische Analyse von Lokativen Konsequenzen hat f\u00fcr die Wahl der Antwort darauf, was es hei\u00dft, an einem Ort zu sein, und was es hei\u00dft, der Ort von etwas zu sein.\r\n[introduction p. 30-31]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/aD2ORfI4GVXZhsH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":326,"full_name":"Strobel, Benedikt","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":844,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"51","issue":"","pages":"7-33"}},"sort":[2009]}
Title | Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Vivarium |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 24-53 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Côté, Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities (epitedeioteis ) in his commen- tary on Aristotles Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristode, James s doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinián and Boethian convictions. Central to Jamess procedure is his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that "everything that is moved is moved by another". James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/B1zH6E24s1mChA1 |
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Title | Review of Baltussen 2008: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 3 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 158 –160 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dillon, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This is a most welcome book, by a scholar who has had much to do with Simplicius over the last decade or so, as part of the great Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project, initiated by Richard Sorabji (indeed it is to Sorabji that the book is dedicated). The fruits of this experience are evidenced on more or less every page. As B. remarks, it has not been customary hitherto to focus on the personality or methods of Simplicius himself, as opposed to his value as a source for previous figures, both commentators and original authors, such as the Presocratics—such would have been the attitude of the great Hermann Diels, for example, who edited the Physics Commentary, as well as making so much use of him for his Fragmente der Vorsokratiker and Doxographi Graeci. But undoubtedly, Simplicius merits some attention for himself. The book consists of six chapters, with an introduction and an epilogue. The introduction sets out the parameters of the problem: what should one expect in the way of philosophical attitudes from a late antique Platonist such as Simplicius, and how B. himself proposes to proceed in evaluating him. He emphasises that there are many ways in which this is something of a "work in progress," but he certainly provides enough material to give us a good idea of what Simplicius is up to. Above all, learned though he is, and copiously though he quotes his predecessors, we should not expect Simplicius to be in any anachronistic way an "objective" scholar. He is a Platonist, and his purpose is to assimilate Aristotle (and indeed the Presocratic philosophers) into the Platonist system. Ch. 1, ‘The Scholar and his Books’, introduces us to what is known of Simplicius’ life and education (with Ammonius in Alexandria and Damascius in Athens, in the early decades of the sixth century) and addresses the major problem of the location and circumstances in which he composed his vast commentaries—necessarily after the official closing of the Academy in 529, and the return of the philosophers, of whom he was one, from Persia in 531. The Harran hypothesis of Tardieu runs into the great problem of the availability of source materials in such a relatively outlying place, and B. is inclined to reject it. The alternative is a return to Athens, or possibly Alexandria, where at least there were good libraries. For one salient aspect of Simplicius’ work is his extraordinary range of reading, and his willingness to provide us with verbatim quotations from this, extending from Presocratics such as Parmenides, Melissus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, through immediate followers of Aristotle, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus, and then the great second-century A.D. Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, down to his Neoplatonic predecessors Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and his own teacher Damascius. B. devotes separate chapters to each of these categories of predecessor. Ch. 2, ‘Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom’, looks at his use of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras in particular, and makes various suggestions about his overall purposes in this. It is certainly notable that Simplicius favours verbatim quotation even of prose authors—in contrast, for example, to such a figure as Proclus, who prefers to paraphrase prose authors at least—but I think that I would rest content with Simplicius’ own explanation (and apologies for over-quotation!), that he was concerned to preserve as much as he could of sources that were becoming increasingly rare in his day. It does not mean that he is not prepared to distort their meaning in a Neoplatonic direction. Ch. 3, ‘Towards a Canon: The Early Peripatetics’, turns to a study of Theophrastus and Eudemus, and in particular their comments on, and adaptations of, Aristotle’s Physics. It is here, I fear, that one begins to realise that this is the sort of book that is best appreciated if one has the original works it is discussing at one’s elbow, as one generally does not—in this case, chiefly Simplicius’ vast Commentary on the Physics. However, B. undoubtedly gives a good account of how Simplicius uses Theophrastus, and particularly Eudemus, whom he actually refers to far more (132 references as against 37!), for the clarification of Aristotle’s doctrine. Ch. 4, ‘Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias’, deals with Alexander, who is indeed Simplicius’ chief authority—quoted or mentioned in all fully 1200 times, of which around 700 are in the Physics Commentary. Alexander is, for Simplicius, simply "the commentator," and is of basic importance to him. After giving a useful account of Alexander's own exegetical achievements, B. tries to draw up something of a typology of ways in which he is used by Simplicius (4.3): first, he can be used as simply a helpful source for understanding Aristotle; secondly, he can be quoted and criticised, on a matter of interpretation or doctrine; thirdly, he can be quoted in connection with a variant in the manuscript tradition. Of all these, he gives examples, emphasising how central Alexander is to the whole commentary tradition. Ch. 5, ‘Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration’, takes us through the later Platonist tradition of commentary, with a glance at the Middle Platonists, but focusing chiefly on Porphyry and Iamblichus, and the establishing of the "harmonising" interpretation of Aristotle of which Simplicius is the heir. The use of these Platonist predecessors is particularly notable in the case of the Categories Commentary, but it affects the others as well. Lastly, in Ch. 6, ‘Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology’, he deals with Simplicius’ fierce controversy with his Christian contemporary John Philoponus, as well as with his more civil criticisms of Alexander. The bitterness of his assaults on Philoponus does, as B. argues, bring home to us how far Simplicius is a heroic and tragic figure, trying to preserve and synthesise the whole of the Hellenic (I do wish we could give up the term "pagan"!) philosophical tradition in face of the ever more insistent Christian challenge, and composing his vast commentaries for a now largely imaginary coterie of students. An Epilogue resumes all these findings, and B. appends some useful appendices, including one listing the probable contents of Simplicius’ library, which certainly brings it home to us that these great works of his could not have been composed while wandering about the Syrian desert on the back of a camel. He really must have been back in Athens, with some access to the library of the Platonic School. At any rate, with this study, B. at last gives Simplicius something of his due as a scholar as well as a commentator. [the entire review p. 158-160] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/p1cPjdejj6J9LSt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"601","_score":null,"_source":{"id":601,"authors_free":[{"id":852,"entry_id":601,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":97,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dillon, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Dillon","norm_person":{"id":97,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Dillon","full_name":"Dillon, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123498058","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Baltussen 2008: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Review of Baltussen 2008: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator"},"abstract":"This is a most welcome book, by a scholar who has had much to do with Simplicius over the last decade or so, as part of the great Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project, initiated by Richard Sorabji (indeed it is to Sorabji that the book is dedicated). The fruits of this experience are evidenced on more or less every page. As B. remarks, it has not been customary hitherto to focus on the personality or methods of Simplicius himself, as opposed to his value as a source for previous figures, both commentators and original authors, such as the Presocratics\u2014such would have been the attitude of the great Hermann Diels, for example, who edited the Physics Commentary, as well as making so much use of him for his Fragmente der Vorsokratiker and Doxographi Graeci. But undoubtedly, Simplicius merits some attention for himself.\r\n\r\nThe book consists of six chapters, with an introduction and an epilogue. The introduction sets out the parameters of the problem: what should one expect in the way of philosophical attitudes from a late antique Platonist such as Simplicius, and how B. himself proposes to proceed in evaluating him. He emphasises that there are many ways in which this is something of a \"work in progress,\" but he certainly provides enough material to give us a good idea of what Simplicius is up to. Above all, learned though he is, and copiously though he quotes his predecessors, we should not expect Simplicius to be in any anachronistic way an \"objective\" scholar. He is a Platonist, and his purpose is to assimilate Aristotle (and indeed the Presocratic philosophers) into the Platonist system.\r\n\r\nCh. 1, \u2018The Scholar and his Books\u2019, introduces us to what is known of Simplicius\u2019 life and education (with Ammonius in Alexandria and Damascius in Athens, in the early decades of the sixth century) and addresses the major problem of the location and circumstances in which he composed his vast commentaries\u2014necessarily after the official closing of the Academy in 529, and the return of the philosophers, of whom he was one, from Persia in 531. The Harran hypothesis of Tardieu runs into the great problem of the availability of source materials in such a relatively outlying place, and B. is inclined to reject it. The alternative is a return to Athens, or possibly Alexandria, where at least there were good libraries.\r\n\r\nFor one salient aspect of Simplicius\u2019 work is his extraordinary range of reading, and his willingness to provide us with verbatim quotations from this, extending from Presocratics such as Parmenides, Melissus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, through immediate followers of Aristotle, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus, and then the great second-century A.D. Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, down to his Neoplatonic predecessors Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and his own teacher Damascius. B. devotes separate chapters to each of these categories of predecessor.\r\n\r\nCh. 2, \u2018Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom\u2019, looks at his use of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras in particular, and makes various suggestions about his overall purposes in this. It is certainly notable that Simplicius favours verbatim quotation even of prose authors\u2014in contrast, for example, to such a figure as Proclus, who prefers to paraphrase prose authors at least\u2014but I think that I would rest content with Simplicius\u2019 own explanation (and apologies for over-quotation!), that he was concerned to preserve as much as he could of sources that were becoming increasingly rare in his day. It does not mean that he is not prepared to distort their meaning in a Neoplatonic direction.\r\n\r\nCh. 3, \u2018Towards a Canon: The Early Peripatetics\u2019, turns to a study of Theophrastus and Eudemus, and in particular their comments on, and adaptations of, Aristotle\u2019s Physics. It is here, I fear, that one begins to realise that this is the sort of book that is best appreciated if one has the original works it is discussing at one\u2019s elbow, as one generally does not\u2014in this case, chiefly Simplicius\u2019 vast Commentary on the Physics. However, B. undoubtedly gives a good account of how Simplicius uses Theophrastus, and particularly Eudemus, whom he actually refers to far more (132 references as against 37!), for the clarification of Aristotle\u2019s doctrine.\r\n\r\nCh. 4, \u2018Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias\u2019, deals with Alexander, who is indeed Simplicius\u2019 chief authority\u2014quoted or mentioned in all fully 1200 times, of which around 700 are in the Physics Commentary. Alexander is, for Simplicius, simply \"the commentator,\" and is of basic importance to him. After giving a useful account of Alexander's own exegetical achievements, B. tries to draw up something of a typology of ways in which he is used by Simplicius (4.3): first, he can be used as simply a helpful source for understanding Aristotle; secondly, he can be quoted and criticised, on a matter of interpretation or doctrine; thirdly, he can be quoted in connection with a variant in the manuscript tradition. Of all these, he gives examples, emphasising how central Alexander is to the whole commentary tradition.\r\n\r\nCh. 5, \u2018Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration\u2019, takes us through the later Platonist tradition of commentary, with a glance at the Middle Platonists, but focusing chiefly on Porphyry and Iamblichus, and the establishing of the \"harmonising\" interpretation of Aristotle of which Simplicius is the heir. The use of these Platonist predecessors is particularly notable in the case of the Categories Commentary, but it affects the others as well.\r\n\r\nLastly, in Ch. 6, \u2018Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology\u2019, he deals with Simplicius\u2019 fierce controversy with his Christian contemporary John Philoponus, as well as with his more civil criticisms of Alexander. The bitterness of his assaults on Philoponus does, as B. argues, bring home to us how far Simplicius is a heroic and tragic figure, trying to preserve and synthesise the whole of the Hellenic (I do wish we could give up the term \"pagan\"!) philosophical tradition in face of the ever more insistent Christian challenge, and composing his vast commentaries for a now largely imaginary coterie of students.\r\n\r\nAn Epilogue resumes all these findings, and B. appends some useful appendices, including one listing the probable contents of Simplicius\u2019 library, which certainly brings it home to us that these great works of his could not have been composed while wandering about the Syrian desert on the back of a camel. He really must have been back in Athens, with some access to the library of the Platonic School.\r\n\r\nAt any rate, with this study, B. at last gives Simplicius something of his due as a scholar as well as a commentator. [the entire review p. 158-160]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/p1cPjdejj6J9LSt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":97,"full_name":"Dillon, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":601,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"3","issue":"2","pages":"158 \u2013160"}},"sort":[2009]}
Title | Defending Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Age of the Counter-Reformation: Iacopo Zabarella on the Mortality of the Soul according to Aristotle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 91 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 330-354 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Branko Mitrovic |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The work of the Paduan Aristotelian philosopher Iacopo Zabarella (1533– 1589) has attracted the attention of historians of philosophy mainly for his contributions to logic, scientific methodology and because of his possible influence on Galileo. At the same time, Zabarella’s views on Aristotelian psychology have been little studied so far; even those historians of Renaissance philosophy who have discussed them, have based their analysis mainly on the psychological essays included in Zabarella’s De rebus naturalibus, but have avoided Zabarella’s commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. This has led to an inaccurate, but widespread, understanding of Zabarella’s views. The intention of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of Zabarella’s arguments about the (im)mortality of the soul in the context of Aristotelian psychology. Zabarella’s view that the soul is mortal according to Aristotle is remarkable for his time, while his elaboration of this position is far more comprehensive than that of Pietro Pomponazzi, the other significant Renaissance thinker who shared the same view. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yApKXKo5NhAKVkF |
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Title | Albert le Grand sur la dérivation des formes géométriques: Un témoignage de l'influence de Simplicius par le biais des Arabes? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2008 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Faisons donc le bilan de ce parcours qui nous a menés du IVe siècle av. J.-C. au Moyen Âge latin. L'argumentation présentée par Albert dans son De quinque universalibus provient d'une ambiance intellectuelle qui baignait dans des influences de la philosophie arabe : al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī, Averroès, mais surtout Avicenne. Elle est marquée par l'utilisation du schéma de la dérivation des formes géométriques élémentaires — point, ligne, surface, corps — à partir du mouvement en flux générateur de chacun de ces éléments. Or, ce schéma de dérivation géométrique joue un rôle assez important dans la pensée d'Albert, qui l'attribue à Platon. Cette attribution ne semble pas si farfelue que cela, même si la dérivation des formes géométriques à partir du flux du point semble provenir de Speusippe plutôt que de son oncle Platon. Il n'en reste pas moins que, du moins selon l'interprétation de l'École de Tübingen, le schéma de dérivation point/nombre-ligne-surface-corps est d'une importance tout à fait fondamentale pour l'ontologie ésotérique de Platon. Sans accès aux Dialogues de Platon, Albert le Grand finit donc, quelles qu'aient été ses sources prochaines et lointaines pour les doctrines platoniciennes, par défendre une image de Platon qui correspond, dans une large mesure, à celle de l'École de Tübingen. Quant à la question de ses sources et de la voie de transmission de ces doctrines, Albert a pu trouver chez la plus importante d'entre elles — la pensée d'Avicenne — de quoi nourrir une réflexion approfondie sur cette question de la dérivation des formes géométriques. Cependant, le commentaire d'Albert aux Éléments d'Euclide montre qu'à cette influence avicennienne est venue s'ajouter une autre, indépendante : la doctrine géométrique de Simplicius, véhiculée par la traduction latine du commentaire euclidien d'al-Nairīzī. Qu'en est-il de la relation entre Simplicius et Avicenne ? Nous avons vu que certains éléments du schéma simplicien de la dérivation des formes géométriques se retrouvent déjà dans l'École de Bagdad, autour de Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī. G. Freudenthal, pour sa part, avait conclu de son étude de la géométrie d'al-Fārābī qu'« il est fort probable qu'al-Fārābī connaissait soit les ouvrages de Simplicius auxquels an-Nairīzī avait accès, soit seulement la brève citation [p. 2, 19-23 Curze] contenue dans le commentaire d'an-Nairīzī ». Quoi qu'il en soit, il semble difficile d'éviter la conclusion qu'Avicenne connaissait bien la doctrine géométrique de Simplicius, du moins telle que transmise par le commentaire d'al-Nairīzī, soit par l'intermédiaire de l'École de Bagdad, soit par ses lectures propres. De Platon à Speusippe, en passant par des sources hellénistiques telles que Sextus Empiricus, la doctrine de la dérivation des formes géométriques a fini, au VIe siècle apr. J.-C., par faire partie intégrante du bagage intellectuel des derniers néoplatoniciens tels que Philopon et Simplicius. C'est, semble-t-il, la pensée géométrique de ce dernier qui, traduite en arabe et préservée dans le commentaire euclidien d'al-Nairīzī, contribue à former la pensée d'Avicenne au premier quart du XIe siècle, avant d'arriver, quelque deux siècles plus tard, sous les yeux de ce lecteur omnivore qu'était Albert le Grand. Pour expliquer cet itinéraire de la pensée, il n'est sans doute pas nécessaire de postuler que, comme le soutient Mme Hadot, Simplicius ait rédigé son Commentaire d'Euclide à Harran. Mais rien n'exclut cette hypothèse non plus, et quand on pense aux éléments de preuve rassemblés par Mme Hadot et d'autres concernant l'importance du legs de l'École mathématique de Simplicius dans le monde arabe, on peut estimer que le cas du schéma de la dérivation des formes géométriques à partir du point ne fait qu'ajouter une brique de plus à l'édifice des preuves témoignant en faveur de l'hypothèse de l'« École néoplatonicienne de Harran ». [conclusion p. 28-29] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mVjTC4EIjO2Aggg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1259","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1259,"authors_free":[{"id":1838,"entry_id":1259,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":25,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chase, Michael ","free_first_name":"Michael","free_last_name":"Chase","norm_person":{"id":25,"first_name":"Michael ","last_name":"Chase","full_name":"Chase, Michael ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1031917152","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Albert le Grand sur la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques: Un t\u00e9moignage de l'influence de Simplicius par le biais des Arabes?","main_title":{"title":"Albert le Grand sur la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques: Un t\u00e9moignage de l'influence de Simplicius par le biais des Arabes?"},"abstract":"Faisons donc le bilan de ce parcours qui nous a men\u00e9s du IVe si\u00e8cle av. J.-C. au Moyen \u00c2ge latin. L'argumentation pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par Albert dans son De quinque universalibus provient d'une ambiance intellectuelle qui baignait dans des influences de la philosophie arabe : al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b, al-Ghaz\u0101l\u012b, Averro\u00e8s, mais surtout Avicenne. Elle est marqu\u00e9e par l'utilisation du sch\u00e9ma de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques \u00e9l\u00e9mentaires \u2014 point, ligne, surface, corps \u2014 \u00e0 partir du mouvement en flux g\u00e9n\u00e9rateur de chacun de ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments.\r\n\r\nOr, ce sch\u00e9ma de d\u00e9rivation g\u00e9om\u00e9trique joue un r\u00f4le assez important dans la pens\u00e9e d'Albert, qui l'attribue \u00e0 Platon. Cette attribution ne semble pas si farfelue que cela, m\u00eame si la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques \u00e0 partir du flux du point semble provenir de Speusippe plut\u00f4t que de son oncle Platon. Il n'en reste pas moins que, du moins selon l'interpr\u00e9tation de l'\u00c9cole de T\u00fcbingen, le sch\u00e9ma de d\u00e9rivation point\/nombre-ligne-surface-corps est d'une importance tout \u00e0 fait fondamentale pour l'ontologie \u00e9sot\u00e9rique de Platon.\r\n\r\nSans acc\u00e8s aux Dialogues de Platon, Albert le Grand finit donc, quelles qu'aient \u00e9t\u00e9 ses sources prochaines et lointaines pour les doctrines platoniciennes, par d\u00e9fendre une image de Platon qui correspond, dans une large mesure, \u00e0 celle de l'\u00c9cole de T\u00fcbingen.\r\n\r\nQuant \u00e0 la question de ses sources et de la voie de transmission de ces doctrines, Albert a pu trouver chez la plus importante d'entre elles \u2014 la pens\u00e9e d'Avicenne \u2014 de quoi nourrir une r\u00e9flexion approfondie sur cette question de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques. Cependant, le commentaire d'Albert aux \u00c9l\u00e9ments d'Euclide montre qu'\u00e0 cette influence avicennienne est venue s'ajouter une autre, ind\u00e9pendante : la doctrine g\u00e9om\u00e9trique de Simplicius, v\u00e9hicul\u00e9e par la traduction latine du commentaire euclidien d'al-Nair\u012bz\u012b.\r\n\r\nQu'en est-il de la relation entre Simplicius et Avicenne ? Nous avons vu que certains \u00e9l\u00e9ments du sch\u00e9ma simplicien de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques se retrouvent d\u00e9j\u00e0 dans l'\u00c9cole de Bagdad, autour de Ya\u1e25y\u0101 ibn \u2018Ad\u012b. G. Freudenthal, pour sa part, avait conclu de son \u00e9tude de la g\u00e9om\u00e9trie d'al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b qu'\u00ab il est fort probable qu'al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b connaissait soit les ouvrages de Simplicius auxquels an-Nair\u012bz\u012b avait acc\u00e8s, soit seulement la br\u00e8ve citation [p. 2, 19-23 Curze] contenue dans le commentaire d'an-Nair\u012bz\u012b \u00bb.\r\n\r\nQuoi qu'il en soit, il semble difficile d'\u00e9viter la conclusion qu'Avicenne connaissait bien la doctrine g\u00e9om\u00e9trique de Simplicius, du moins telle que transmise par le commentaire d'al-Nair\u012bz\u012b, soit par l'interm\u00e9diaire de l'\u00c9cole de Bagdad, soit par ses lectures propres.\r\n\r\nDe Platon \u00e0 Speusippe, en passant par des sources hell\u00e9nistiques telles que Sextus Empiricus, la doctrine de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques a fini, au VIe si\u00e8cle apr. J.-C., par faire partie int\u00e9grante du bagage intellectuel des derniers n\u00e9oplatoniciens tels que Philopon et Simplicius.\r\n\r\nC'est, semble-t-il, la pens\u00e9e g\u00e9om\u00e9trique de ce dernier qui, traduite en arabe et pr\u00e9serv\u00e9e dans le commentaire euclidien d'al-Nair\u012bz\u012b, contribue \u00e0 former la pens\u00e9e d'Avicenne au premier quart du XIe si\u00e8cle, avant d'arriver, quelque deux si\u00e8cles plus tard, sous les yeux de ce lecteur omnivore qu'\u00e9tait Albert le Grand.\r\n\r\nPour expliquer cet itin\u00e9raire de la pens\u00e9e, il n'est sans doute pas n\u00e9cessaire de postuler que, comme le soutient Mme Hadot, Simplicius ait r\u00e9dig\u00e9 son Commentaire d'Euclide \u00e0 Harran. Mais rien n'exclut cette hypoth\u00e8se non plus, et quand on pense aux \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve rassembl\u00e9s par Mme Hadot et d'autres concernant l'importance du legs de l'\u00c9cole math\u00e9matique de Simplicius dans le monde arabe, on peut estimer que le cas du sch\u00e9ma de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques \u00e0 partir du point ne fait qu'ajouter une brique de plus \u00e0 l'\u00e9difice des preuves t\u00e9moignant en faveur de l'hypoth\u00e8se de l'\u00ab \u00c9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne de Harran \u00bb. [conclusion p. 28-29]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mVjTC4EIjO2Aggg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":25,"full_name":"Chase, Michael ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":[2008]}
Title | Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle’s Categories in the First Century BC |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Acta Antiqua |
Volume | 48 |
Issue | 1-2 |
Pages | 273-287 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sharples, Robert W. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A re-examination of the question of why, during the revival of interest in Aristotle’s esoteric works in the first century BC, the Categories played such a prominent role. The answers suggested are that the work aroused interest precisely because it did not easily fit into the standard Hellenistic divisions of philosophy and their usual agendas, and that, more than Aristotle’s other works—with the possible exception of the Metaphysics—it revealed aspects of Aristotle’s thought that had become unfamiliar during the Hellenistic period. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9elANNxfsrgxsis |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1023","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1023,"authors_free":[{"id":1542,"entry_id":1023,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":42,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","free_first_name":"Robert W.","free_last_name":"Sharples","norm_person":{"id":42,"first_name":"Robert W.","last_name":"Sharples","full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114269505","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the First Century BC","main_title":{"title":"Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the First Century BC"},"abstract":"A re-examination of the question of why, during the revival of interest in Aristotle\u2019s esoteric works in the first century BC, the Categories played such a prominent role. The answers suggested are that the work aroused interest precisely because it did not easily fit into the standard Hellenistic divisions of philosophy and their usual agendas, and that, more than Aristotle\u2019s other works\u2014with the possible exception of the Metaphysics\u2014it revealed aspects of Aristotle\u2019s thought that had become unfamiliar during the Hellenistic period. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9elANNxfsrgxsis","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":42,"full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1023,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Acta Antiqua","volume":"48","issue":"1-2","pages":"273-287"}},"sort":[2008]}
Title | Empedokleův sfairos v pohledech antických interpretů |
Type | Article |
Language | Czech |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Listy filologické / Folia philologica |
Volume | 131 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 379-439 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hladký, Vojtech |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Tento text si klade za cíl prozkoumat způsob, jakým recipují a reinterpretují Empedokleovu koncepci či spíše představu Sfairu pozdější antičtí autoři. Navazuje přitom na naši předchozí práci, ve které jsme se pokusili – především na základě textů Empedoklea samého – tento moment Empedokleova rozvrhu světa rekonstruovat.² V něm, jak známo, čtyři základní a věčné prvky-živly (oheň, vzduch, vodu, zemi) přetvářejí, navzájem slučují a rozlučují dvě formující síly – Láska a Svár. Působením Lásky tak z původně jednoduchých prvků vznikají vyšší a složitější organismy a vůbec všechny věci, naproti tomu působením Sváru dochází k jejich rozkladu a návratu prvků do jejich původní čisté podoby. Podle závěru našeho předchozího článku je Sfairos, vzniklý v okamžiku největšího vzepětí Lásky, ve skutečnosti jakýsi obrovský organismus, zahrnující do sebe všechny předtím vzniklé věci. Ty se dohromady spojí buď tak, že doslova fyzicky srostou, či přinejmenším dohromady vytvoří harmonický svět, v němž Láska zaručuje mírumilovné soužití a soubytí všeho, co předtím ze základních prvků vytvořila. Navíc je snad možné ztotožnit Sfairos se „svatou a nadlidskou myslí (φρην ιερή και άθέσφατος)“, o níž tento autor mluví ve svém zlomku B 134. Jsme si přitom vědomi, že tato interpretace Empedokleova Sfairu je dosti neobvyklá. Vzhledem k tomu, že se nám báseň velkého Akragantťana nezachovala v úplnosti a její přesné filozofické sdělení bylo na mnoha místech ne zcela jasné patrně již pro antického čtenáře, musíme se bohužel o mnoha aspektech nauky, kterou hlásá, pouze dohadovat. V předchozí práci jsme se pokusili rekonstruovat Sfairos na základě rozboru zachovaného Empedokleova textu doplněného o starověká svědectví. Snažíme-li se nyní provést rozbor výkladů Sfairu, které podávají Empedokleovi filozofičtí následovníci, činíme tak rovněž proto, abychom naši poněkud nezvyklou interpretaci dále nepřímo podpořili a zároveň poukázali na vliv, jaký Empedoklés – zejména pak v případě Platónových dialogů Tímaia, Politika a Symposia – mohl mít. Projdeme-li v detailu ohlasy Empedoklea u pozdějších autorů, které jsou možná někdy poněkud překvapivé, můžeme si pak na konci našeho zkoumání znovu položit otázku, zda by nemohly vrhnout nové světlo na jeho bohužel jen velmi torzovitě zachované dílo. [introduction p. 379-381] Übersetzung: Dieser Text zielt darauf ab, die Art und Weise zu untersuchen, wie spätere antike Autoren Empedokles’ Konzept oder eher die Vorstellung des Sphairos aufnehmen und reinterpretieren. Dabei knüpft er an unsere vorherige Arbeit an, in der wir versucht haben – vor allem auf der Grundlage von Empedokles’ eigenen Texten – diesen Aspekt von Empedokles’ Weltentwurf zu rekonstruieren.² Darin, wie bekannt, formen, verbinden und trennen sich die vier grundlegenden und ewigen Elemente (Feuer, Luft, Wasser, Erde) durch das Wirken von zwei gestaltenden Kräften – Liebe und Streit. Durch die Wirkung der Liebe entstehen aus den ursprünglich einfachen Elementen höhere und komplexere Organismen und überhaupt alle Dinge, während durch die Wirkung des Streits deren Zerfall und die Rückkehr der Elemente in ihre ursprüngliche reine Form erfolgt. Laut dem Schluss unserer vorherigen Arbeit ist der Sphairos, der im Moment des höchsten Wirkens der Liebe entsteht, tatsächlich eine Art riesiger Organismus, der alle zuvor entstandenen Dinge in sich vereint. Diese verbinden sich entweder dadurch, dass sie buchstäblich physisch miteinander verschmelzen, oder zumindest gemeinsam eine harmonische Welt schaffen, in der die Liebe ein friedliches Zusammenleben und Mitsein all dessen garantiert, was zuvor aus den grundlegenden Elementen erschaffen wurde. Darüber hinaus ist es vielleicht möglich, den Sphairos mit dem „heiligen und übermenschlichen Geist (φρην ιερή και άθέσφατος)“ zu identifizieren, von dem dieser Autor in seinem Fragment B 134 spricht. Wir sind uns dabei bewusst, dass diese Interpretation des Sphairos von Empedokles recht ungewöhnlich ist. Da das Gedicht des großen Akragantinischen Dichters nicht vollständig erhalten ist und seine genaue philosophische Aussage wohl schon für die antiken Leser an vielen Stellen nicht völlig klar war, müssen wir uns leider in vielen Aspekten der Lehre, die er verkündet, nur auf Vermutungen stützen. In der vorherigen Arbeit haben wir versucht, den Sphairos auf der Grundlage der Analyse des erhaltenen Textes von Empedokles, ergänzt durch antike Zeugnisse, zu rekonstruieren. Wenn wir nun versuchen, die Auslegungen des Sphairos zu analysieren, die von den philosophischen Nachfolgern des Empedokles gegeben wurden, tun wir dies auch, um unsere etwas ungewöhnliche Interpretation indirekt weiter zu stützen und zugleich auf den Einfluss hinzuweisen, den Empedokles – insbesondere im Fall der platonischen Dialoge Timaios, Politikos und Symposion – möglicherweise hatte. Wenn wir die Rezeptionen von Empedokles bei späteren Autoren im Detail durchgehen, die manchmal vielleicht etwas überraschend sind, können wir uns am Ende unserer Untersuchung erneut die Frage stellen, ob diese nicht ein neues Licht auf sein leider nur sehr fragmentarisch erhaltenes Werk werfen könnten. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DoW1OJgnzqLFDXs |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"778","_score":null,"_source":{"id":778,"authors_free":[{"id":1142,"entry_id":778,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":180,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hladk\u00fd, Vojtech ","free_first_name":"Vojtech","free_last_name":"Hladk\u00fd","norm_person":{"id":180,"first_name":"Vojt\u011bch","last_name":"Hladk\u00fd","full_name":"Hladk\u00fd, Vojt\u011bch","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedokle\u016fv sfairos v pohledech antick\u00fdch interpret\u016f","main_title":{"title":"Empedokle\u016fv sfairos v pohledech antick\u00fdch interpret\u016f"},"abstract":"Tento text si klade za c\u00edl prozkoumat zp\u016fsob, jak\u00fdm recipuj\u00ed a reinterpretuj\u00ed Empedokleovu koncepci \u010di sp\u00ed\u0161e p\u0159edstavu Sfairu pozd\u011bj\u0161\u00ed anti\u010dt\u00ed auto\u0159i. Navazuje p\u0159itom na na\u0161i p\u0159edchoz\u00ed pr\u00e1ci, ve kter\u00e9 jsme se pokusili \u2013 p\u0159edev\u0161\u00edm na z\u00e1klad\u011b text\u016f Empedoklea sam\u00e9ho \u2013 tento moment Empedokleova rozvrhu sv\u011bta rekonstruovat.\u00b2 V n\u011bm, jak zn\u00e1mo, \u010dty\u0159i z\u00e1kladn\u00ed a v\u011b\u010dn\u00e9 prvky-\u017eivly (ohe\u0148, vzduch, vodu, zemi) p\u0159etv\u00e1\u0159ej\u00ed, navz\u00e1jem slu\u010duj\u00ed a rozlu\u010duj\u00ed dv\u011b formuj\u00edc\u00ed s\u00edly \u2013 L\u00e1ska a Sv\u00e1r. P\u016fsoben\u00edm L\u00e1sky tak z p\u016fvodn\u011b jednoduch\u00fdch prvk\u016f vznikaj\u00ed vy\u0161\u0161\u00ed a slo\u017eit\u011bj\u0161\u00ed organismy a v\u016fbec v\u0161echny v\u011bci, naproti tomu p\u016fsoben\u00edm Sv\u00e1ru doch\u00e1z\u00ed k jejich rozkladu a n\u00e1vratu prvk\u016f do jejich p\u016fvodn\u00ed \u010dist\u00e9 podoby.\r\n\r\nPodle z\u00e1v\u011bru na\u0161eho p\u0159edchoz\u00edho \u010dl\u00e1nku je Sfairos, vznikl\u00fd v okam\u017eiku nejv\u011bt\u0161\u00edho vzep\u011bt\u00ed L\u00e1sky, ve skute\u010dnosti jak\u00fdsi obrovsk\u00fd organismus, zahrnuj\u00edc\u00ed do sebe v\u0161echny p\u0159edt\u00edm vznikl\u00e9 v\u011bci. Ty se dohromady spoj\u00ed bu\u010f tak, \u017ee doslova fyzicky srostou, \u010di p\u0159inejmen\u0161\u00edm dohromady vytvo\u0159\u00ed harmonick\u00fd sv\u011bt, v n\u011bm\u017e L\u00e1ska zaru\u010duje m\u00edrumilovn\u00e9 sou\u017eit\u00ed a soubyt\u00ed v\u0161eho, co p\u0159edt\u00edm ze z\u00e1kladn\u00edch prvk\u016f vytvo\u0159ila. Nav\u00edc je snad mo\u017en\u00e9 ztoto\u017enit Sfairos se \u201esvatou a nadlidskou mysl\u00ed (\u03c6\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd \u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ac\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\u201c, o n\u00ed\u017e tento autor mluv\u00ed ve sv\u00e9m zlomku B 134.\r\n\r\nJsme si p\u0159itom v\u011bdomi, \u017ee tato interpretace Empedokleova Sfairu je dosti neobvykl\u00e1. Vzhledem k tomu, \u017ee se n\u00e1m b\u00e1se\u0148 velk\u00e9ho Akragant\u0165ana nezachovala v \u00faplnosti a jej\u00ed p\u0159esn\u00e9 filozofick\u00e9 sd\u011blen\u00ed bylo na mnoha m\u00edstech ne zcela jasn\u00e9 patrn\u011b ji\u017e pro antick\u00e9ho \u010dten\u00e1\u0159e, mus\u00edme se bohu\u017eel o mnoha aspektech nauky, kterou hl\u00e1s\u00e1, pouze dohadovat. V p\u0159edchoz\u00ed pr\u00e1ci jsme se pokusili rekonstruovat Sfairos na z\u00e1klad\u011b rozboru zachovan\u00e9ho Empedokleova textu dopln\u011bn\u00e9ho o starov\u011bk\u00e1 sv\u011bdectv\u00ed.\r\n\r\nSna\u017e\u00edme-li se nyn\u00ed prov\u00e9st rozbor v\u00fdklad\u016f Sfairu, kter\u00e9 pod\u00e1vaj\u00ed Empedokleovi filozofi\u010dt\u00ed n\u00e1sledovn\u00edci, \u010din\u00edme tak rovn\u011b\u017e proto, abychom na\u0161i pon\u011bkud nezvyklou interpretaci d\u00e1le nep\u0159\u00edmo podpo\u0159ili a z\u00e1rove\u0148 pouk\u00e1zali na vliv, jak\u00fd Empedokl\u00e9s \u2013 zejm\u00e9na pak v p\u0159\u00edpad\u011b Plat\u00f3nov\u00fdch dialog\u016f T\u00edmaia, Politika a Symposia \u2013 mohl m\u00edt. Projdeme-li v detailu ohlasy Empedoklea u pozd\u011bj\u0161\u00edch autor\u016f, kter\u00e9 jsou mo\u017en\u00e1 n\u011bkdy pon\u011bkud p\u0159ekvapiv\u00e9, m\u016f\u017eeme si pak na konci na\u0161eho zkoum\u00e1n\u00ed znovu polo\u017eit ot\u00e1zku, zda by nemohly vrhnout nov\u00e9 sv\u011btlo na jeho bohu\u017eel jen velmi torzovit\u011b zachovan\u00e9 d\u00edlo. [introduction p. 379-381] \u00dcbersetzung: Dieser Text zielt darauf ab, die Art und Weise zu untersuchen, wie sp\u00e4tere antike Autoren Empedokles\u2019 Konzept oder eher die Vorstellung des Sphairos aufnehmen und reinterpretieren. Dabei kn\u00fcpft er an unsere vorherige Arbeit an, in der wir versucht haben \u2013 vor allem auf der Grundlage von Empedokles\u2019 eigenen Texten \u2013 diesen Aspekt von Empedokles\u2019 Weltentwurf zu rekonstruieren.\u00b2 Darin, wie bekannt, formen, verbinden und trennen sich die vier grundlegenden und ewigen Elemente (Feuer, Luft, Wasser, Erde) durch das Wirken von zwei gestaltenden Kr\u00e4ften \u2013 Liebe und Streit. Durch die Wirkung der Liebe entstehen aus den urspr\u00fcnglich einfachen Elementen h\u00f6here und komplexere Organismen und \u00fcberhaupt alle Dinge, w\u00e4hrend durch die Wirkung des Streits deren Zerfall und die R\u00fcckkehr der Elemente in ihre urspr\u00fcngliche reine Form erfolgt.\r\n\r\nLaut dem Schluss unserer vorherigen Arbeit ist der Sphairos, der im Moment des h\u00f6chsten Wirkens der Liebe entsteht, tats\u00e4chlich eine Art riesiger Organismus, der alle zuvor entstandenen Dinge in sich vereint. Diese verbinden sich entweder dadurch, dass sie buchst\u00e4blich physisch miteinander verschmelzen, oder zumindest gemeinsam eine harmonische Welt schaffen, in der die Liebe ein friedliches Zusammenleben und Mitsein all dessen garantiert, was zuvor aus den grundlegenden Elementen erschaffen wurde. Dar\u00fcber hinaus ist es vielleicht m\u00f6glich, den Sphairos mit dem \u201eheiligen und \u00fcbermenschlichen Geist (\u03c6\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd \u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ac\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\u201c zu identifizieren, von dem dieser Autor in seinem Fragment B 134 spricht.\r\n\r\nWir sind uns dabei bewusst, dass diese Interpretation des Sphairos von Empedokles recht ungew\u00f6hnlich ist. Da das Gedicht des gro\u00dfen Akragantinischen Dichters nicht vollst\u00e4ndig erhalten ist und seine genaue philosophische Aussage wohl schon f\u00fcr die antiken Leser an vielen Stellen nicht v\u00f6llig klar war, m\u00fcssen wir uns leider in vielen Aspekten der Lehre, die er verk\u00fcndet, nur auf Vermutungen st\u00fctzen. In der vorherigen Arbeit haben wir versucht, den Sphairos auf der Grundlage der Analyse des erhaltenen Textes von Empedokles, erg\u00e4nzt durch antike Zeugnisse, zu rekonstruieren.\r\n\r\nWenn wir nun versuchen, die Auslegungen des Sphairos zu analysieren, die von den philosophischen Nachfolgern des Empedokles gegeben wurden, tun wir dies auch, um unsere etwas ungew\u00f6hnliche Interpretation indirekt weiter zu st\u00fctzen und zugleich auf den Einfluss hinzuweisen, den Empedokles \u2013 insbesondere im Fall der platonischen Dialoge Timaios, Politikos und Symposion \u2013 m\u00f6glicherweise hatte. Wenn wir die Rezeptionen von Empedokles bei sp\u00e4teren Autoren im Detail durchgehen, die manchmal vielleicht etwas \u00fcberraschend sind, k\u00f6nnen wir uns am Ende unserer Untersuchung erneut die Frage stellen, ob diese nicht ein neues Licht auf sein leider nur sehr fragmentarisch erhaltenes Werk werfen k\u00f6nnten.","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"Czech","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DoW1OJgnzqLFDXs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":180,"full_name":"Hladk\u00fd, Vojt\u011bch","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":778,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Listy filologick\u00e9 \/ Folia philologica","volume":"131","issue":"3\/4","pages":"379-439"}},"sort":[2008]}
Title | Methods in examining sense-perception: John Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Laval théologique et philosophique |
Volume | 64 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 651-661 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper discusses the methods applied by Philoponus and Pseudo-Simplicius in commenting on Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception, and indicates their differences. Philoponus frequently employs medical theories and empirical material, mostly taken from Aristotle, to highlight not only the activities of the particular senses, but also a certain kind of awareness and the way we experience our inner states. By contrast, his Athenian contemporary Pseudo-Simplicius disregards such aspects altogether. His method is deductive: He relies on some general thesis, partly taken from Iamblichus, from which to derive theses on sense-perception. The emphasis falls on Philoponus’ doctrine since his reliance on medical views leads to an interesting blend of Platonic and medical/empirical theories. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Hp3HmG57KFdbOQW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"820","_score":null,"_source":{"id":820,"authors_free":[{"id":1221,"entry_id":820,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":236,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lautner, Peter","free_first_name":"Peter","free_last_name":"Lautner","norm_person":{"id":236,"first_name":"Peter","last_name":"Lautner","full_name":"Lautner, Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157740766","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Methods in examining sense-perception: John Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Methods in examining sense-perception: John Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius"},"abstract":"The paper discusses the methods applied by Philoponus and Pseudo-Simplicius in commenting on Aristotle\u2019s theory of sense-perception, and indicates their differences. Philoponus frequently employs medical theories and empirical material, mostly taken from Aristotle, to highlight not only the activities of the particular senses, but also a certain kind of awareness and the way we experience our inner states. By contrast, his Athenian contemporary Pseudo-Simplicius disregards such aspects altogether. His method is deductive: He relies on some general thesis, partly taken from Iamblichus, from which to derive theses on sense-perception. The emphasis falls on Philoponus\u2019 doctrine since his reliance on medical views leads to an interesting blend of Platonic and medical\/empirical theories. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Hp3HmG57KFdbOQW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":236,"full_name":"Lautner, Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":820,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Laval th\u00e9ologique et philosophique","volume":"64","issue":"3","pages":"651-661"}},"sort":[2008]}
Title | Nicolas, l'auteur du Sommaire de la philosophie d'Aristote : doutes sur son identité, sa datation, son origine |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 121 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 99-126 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fazzo, Silvia |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper discusses the attribution of the compendium De Philosophia Aristotelis to Nicolaus of Damascus the general historian (fl.: end 1st c. BC). By contrast, there are reasons to believe that the work was written by a Peripatetic Nicolaus between the 3rd and the 6th century, most likely from Syria in the 4th c. AD. Among the consequences: one piece of evidence for interest in a wide range of Aristotle's works already in the 1st century BC-lst century AD is removed; the supposedly earliest evidence for Metaphysics as the title of Aristotle's work is moved to a later date; the idea that Peripatetic activity more or less ceased with Alexander, Thémistius being the only exception, is weakened by another counter-example. On the contrary, a distinctively Peripatetic culture must have been still alive in Themistius' and Nicolas' time, when special tools were produced both for teaching activity and for the transmission of Aristotle's philosophy to later eras. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jxgfqFdijkuOVZK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"822","_score":null,"_source":{"id":822,"authors_free":[{"id":1223,"entry_id":822,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":77,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fazzo, Silvia","free_first_name":"Silvia","free_last_name":"Fazzo","norm_person":{"id":77,"first_name":"Silvia","last_name":"Fazzo","full_name":"Fazzo, Silvia","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nicolas, l'auteur du Sommaire de la philosophie d'Aristote : doutes sur son identit\u00e9, sa datation, son origine","main_title":{"title":"Nicolas, l'auteur du Sommaire de la philosophie d'Aristote : doutes sur son identit\u00e9, sa datation, son origine"},"abstract":"The paper discusses the attribution of the compendium De Philosophia Aristotelis to Nicolaus of Damascus the general historian (fl.: end 1st c. BC). By contrast, there are reasons to believe that the work was written by a Peripatetic Nicolaus between the 3rd and the 6th century, most likely from Syria in the 4th c. AD. Among the consequences: one piece of evidence for interest in a wide range of Aristotle's works already in the 1st century BC-lst century AD is removed; the supposedly earliest evidence for Metaphysics as the title of Aristotle's work is moved to a later date; the idea that Peripatetic activity more or less ceased with Alexander, Th\u00e9mistius being the only exception, is weakened by another counter-example. On the contrary, a distinctively Peripatetic culture must have been still alive in Themistius' and Nicolas' time, when special tools were produced both for teaching activity and for the transmission of Aristotle's philosophy to later eras. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxgfqFdijkuOVZK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":77,"full_name":"Fazzo, Silvia","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":822,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques ","volume":"121","issue":"1","pages":"99-126"}},"sort":[2008]}
Title | Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories. Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius’ Commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Categorias 4 [CAG 8, 75,6 Kalbfleisch] and In Categorias 8 [291,2 K.]) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 150-165 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bechtle, Gerald |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die aristotelische Kategorienschrift im Neuplatonismus zur Deutung der ersten Prinzipien genutzt und dadurch selbst als Teil metaphysischer Überlegungen etabliert wurde. Dadurch stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Verbindung mit der Rezeption von Platons Parmenides besteht, der für die Deutung der höchsten Prinzipien grundlegend war. Dies wird exemplarisch an Simplicius und dessen Kategorienkommentar untersucht. In diesem geht Simplicius an zwei Stellen explizit auf Platons Parmenides ein. Beide Stellen werden analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Simplicius die Terminologie der Kategorien durchaus auf Gott, das Gute oder das Eine anwendet, auch wenn an der weit verbreiteten Ansicht, die Kategorien könnten sich nur auf sprachlich ausdrückbare, also wahrnehmbare Dinge beziehen, nicht gerüttelt wird. Hiervon ist jedoch die Position des Iamblichus zu unterscheiden, der die Kategorien auch für den noetischen Bereich annehmen konnte. In eine ähnliche Richtung weist die zweite explizite Bezugnahme auf Platons Parmenides in Simplicius’ Kategorienkommentar, die sich mit dem Ausschluss von Mehr-Weniger beschäftigt. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8GUIq8DJVD3GuiA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"824","_score":null,"_source":{"id":824,"authors_free":[{"id":1225,"entry_id":824,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":420,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bechtle, Gerald","free_first_name":"Gerald","free_last_name":"Bechtle","norm_person":{"id":420,"first_name":"Gerald","last_name":"Bechtle","full_name":"Bechtle, Gerald","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120560038","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories. Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Categorias 4 [CAG 8, 75,6 Kalbfleisch] and In Categorias 8 [291,2 K.])","main_title":{"title":"Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories. Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Categorias 4 [CAG 8, 75,6 Kalbfleisch] and In Categorias 8 [291,2 K.])"},"abstract":"Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die aristotelische Kategorienschrift im Neuplatonismus zur Deutung der ersten Prinzipien genutzt und dadurch selbst als Teil metaphysischer \u00dcberlegungen etabliert wurde. Dadurch stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Verbindung mit der Rezeption von Platons Parmenides besteht, der f\u00fcr die Deutung der h\u00f6chsten Prinzipien grundlegend war. Dies wird exemplarisch an Simplicius und dessen Kategorienkommentar untersucht. In diesem geht Simplicius an zwei Stellen explizit auf Platons Parmenides ein. Beide Stellen werden analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Simplicius die Terminologie der Kategorien durchaus auf Gott, das Gute oder das Eine anwendet, auch wenn an der weit verbreiteten Ansicht, die Kategorien k\u00f6nnten sich nur auf sprachlich ausdr\u00fcckbare, also wahrnehmbare Dinge beziehen, nicht ger\u00fcttelt wird.\r\n\r\nHiervon ist jedoch die Position des Iamblichus zu unterscheiden, der die Kategorien auch f\u00fcr den noetischen Bereich annehmen konnte. In eine \u00e4hnliche Richtung weist die zweite explizite Bezugnahme auf Platons Parmenides in Simplicius\u2019 Kategorienkommentar, die sich mit dem Ausschluss von Mehr-Weniger besch\u00e4ftigt. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8GUIq8DJVD3GuiA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":420,"full_name":"Bechtle, Gerald","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":824,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Antikes Christentum","volume":"12","issue":"1","pages":"150-165"}},"sort":[2008]}
Title | La Brillance de Nestis (Empédocle, fr. 96) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 26 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 75-100 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Picot, Jean-Claude |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dans le De l'âme, Aristote illustre l'importance de la proportion (λόγος) et de la combinaison (σύνθεσις) des éléments entre eux par rapport à ce que sont les éléments ; pour ce faire, il rapporte trois vers d'Empédocle (410 a 4-6) relatifs à la composition de l'os. Simplicius rapporte les mêmes vers et en ajoute un sur l'action d'Harmonie ; il précise avoir tiré sa citation du premier livre de la Physique d'Empédocle. Ce sont ces quatre vers que Diels a recueillis sous le fr. 96 : ἤ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι τώ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης, τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ' ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο Ἁρμονίης κόλληισιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηισιν. Traduction : Et la terre serviable en ses creusets bien façonnés Reçut deux parts sur huit de la brillance de Nestis, Et quatre d'Héphaïstos ; et ces choses-là devinrent les os blancs, Tenus ensemble par les colles divines d'Harmonie. L'os serait composé de deux parts de la « brillance de Nestis » (δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων [...] Νήστιδος αἴγλης) – où l'on s'accorde à reconnaître l'eau sous le nom de Nestis –, de quatre parts de feu – puisque Héphaïstos désigne traditionnellement le feu (τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο) – et de deux parts de terre (ἤ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος) pour parvenir à huit parts au total. Dans le présent article, je voudrais analyser le texte du fr. 96 pour prendre position sur la question suivante : quel est le sens à donner à l'expression Νήστιδος αἴγλης, c’est-à-dire « la brillance de Nestis » ? La brillance de Nestis désigne-t-elle l'eau, ou bien un mélange d'air et d'eau ? Certaines questions divisent les commentateurs actuels d'Empédocle, mais la question de la brillance de Nestis n'en fait pas partie. En effet, tout le monde ou presque s'accorde pour dire que la brillance de Nestis désigne l'eau et rien d'autre. Pourquoi alors s'interroger sur quelque chose qui ne divise point ? Parce que le consensus est parfois trompeur. Il peut se fixer sur la solution simple, celle qui ne nécessite presque pas ou peu d'explication. Mais à l'analyse, l'objet peut se révéler complexe, et le consensus sur le simple avoir fait fausse route. J'espère parvenir à montrer au fil de cet article que la brillance de Nestis est un mélange d'air et d'eau, et non pas simplement de l'eau. Si Empédocle n'avait pas introduit la brillance (αἴγλη), aucun doute n'aurait été permis pour comprendre que τῶ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων [...] Νήστιδος signifie deux parts sur huit d'eau. Mais la brillance pose problème. Elle pose d'autant plus problème que la tournure τῶ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων [...] Νήστιδος αἴγλης insiste sur le fait que les deux parts en question sont des parts de la brillance et non pas directement des parts de Nestis. Peut-on spontanément dire que pour Empédocle, Nestis apparaît brillante, tout comme Apollon est brillant (αἰγλήτης), tout comme Artémis et Hécate sont dispensatrices de lumière (φωσφόρος) ? Si la brillance n'ajoutait rien à la compréhension de Nestis, la « brillance de Nestis » se réduirait à une façon poétique de dire Nestis. Si, au contraire, la brillance ajoutait quelque chose à Nestis, l'élément qui n'est pas nommé dans le fr. 96, à savoir l'air, pourrait être sous-entendu dans la brillance de Nestis. Nous avons formulé une interprétation en faveur de l'air dans la composition de l'os. La conclusion n'en serait que renforcée si nous pouvions nous appuyer sur un témoignage ancien, différent de celui du Pseudo-Simplicius, voire de Philopon, qu'il est facile de mettre en doute. Ce témoignage existe. Il a été jusqu'ici traité avec indifférence et parfois dévalorisé. C'est celui de Théophraste. Théophraste, critiquant Empédocle, dit que chez cet auteur les os et les poils devraient avoir des sensations puisqu'ils sont formés de tous les éléments (De sensibus, ΧΧΙΠ = A86.23). En d'autres termes, selon Théophraste, les os sont formés des quatre éléments, et les poils de même. Les modernes n'ont pas jugé bon de partir de Théophraste pour contredire Aétius et pour affirmer que l'os doit être composé des quatre éléments. Il n'y a guère de doute que pour Empédocle, il existe des mélanges qui ne comportent pas les quatre éléments. Prenons quelques exemples : le bronze produit par l'alliage de l'étain et du cuivre (fr. 92), le vin mélangé à de l'eau (fr. 91), les couleurs résultant d'un mélange des couleurs de base (fr. 23), la pâte servant à faire le pain (fr. 34), la boue ou la pâte de poterie (fr. 73), l'eau salée de la mer (fr. 55, 56), etc. Mais quand il s'agit des êtres vivant sur terre, il est permis de penser que Philotès fait chaque mélange sans exclure aucun élément, à l'instar du sang et des chairs (fr. 98). En effet, l'œuvre de l'Amour réalisée dans ces êtres éphémères semble préfigurer le grand vivant, composé des quatre éléments, qu'est le Sphairos. Pour les êtres vivants et éphémères, les parts pourraient être inégales dans chaque organe, mais tous les éléments être néanmoins présents. Tout cela, certes, n'est que pure hypothèse. Aucun texte n'affirme que pour Empédocle, toutes les parties des vivants sont un mélange des quatre éléments. Une certitude demeure : on ne peut déconsidérer la parole de Théophraste sur l'os, ce même Théophraste qui disait que pour Empédocle, l'eau est noire. [introduction p. 75-77/conclusion p. 99-100] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Kn8BmLiIsvQZnjb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"863","_score":null,"_source":{"id":863,"authors_free":[{"id":1267,"entry_id":863,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":291,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Picot, Jean-Claude","free_first_name":"Jean-Claude","free_last_name":"Picot","norm_person":{"id":291,"first_name":"Jean-Claude","last_name":"Picot","full_name":"Picot, Jean-Claude","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La Brillance de Nestis (Emp\u00e9docle, fr. 96)","main_title":{"title":"La Brillance de Nestis (Emp\u00e9docle, fr. 96)"},"abstract":"Dans le De l'\u00e2me, Aristote illustre l'importance de la proportion (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) et de la combinaison (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) des \u00e9l\u00e9ments entre eux par rapport \u00e0 ce que sont les \u00e9l\u00e9ments ; pour ce faire, il rapporte trois vers d'Emp\u00e9docle (410 a 4-6) relatifs \u00e0 la composition de l'os. Simplicius rapporte les m\u00eames vers et en ajoute un sur l'action d'Harmonie ; il pr\u00e9cise avoir tir\u00e9 sa citation du premier livre de la Physique d'Emp\u00e9docle. Ce sont ces quatre vers que Diels a recueillis sous le fr. 96 :\r\n\r\n \u1f24 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03b8\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03cd\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03bf\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\r\n \u03c4\u03ce \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b5 \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2,\r\n \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4' \u1f29\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4' \u1f40\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1f70 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\r\n \u1f09\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b7\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b7\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\r\n\r\nTraduction :\r\n\r\n Et la terre serviable en ses creusets bien fa\u00e7onn\u00e9s\r\n Re\u00e7ut deux parts sur huit de la brillance de Nestis,\r\n Et quatre d'H\u00e9pha\u00efstos ; et ces choses-l\u00e0 devinrent les os blancs,\r\n Tenus ensemble par les colles divines d'Harmonie.\r\n\r\nL'os serait compos\u00e9 de deux parts de la \u00ab brillance de Nestis \u00bb (\u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd [...] \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2) \u2013 o\u00f9 l'on s'accorde \u00e0 reconna\u00eetre l'eau sous le nom de Nestis \u2013, de quatre parts de feu \u2013 puisque H\u00e9pha\u00efstos d\u00e9signe traditionnellement le feu (\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4' \u1f29\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf) \u2013 et de deux parts de terre (\u1f24 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03b8\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2) pour parvenir \u00e0 huit parts au total.\r\n\r\nDans le pr\u00e9sent article, je voudrais analyser le texte du fr. 96 pour prendre position sur la question suivante : quel est le sens \u00e0 donner \u00e0 l'expression \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire \u00ab la brillance de Nestis \u00bb ? La brillance de Nestis d\u00e9signe-t-elle l'eau, ou bien un m\u00e9lange d'air et d'eau ?\r\n\r\nCertaines questions divisent les commentateurs actuels d'Emp\u00e9docle, mais la question de la brillance de Nestis n'en fait pas partie. En effet, tout le monde ou presque s'accorde pour dire que la brillance de Nestis d\u00e9signe l'eau et rien d'autre. Pourquoi alors s'interroger sur quelque chose qui ne divise point ? Parce que le consensus est parfois trompeur. Il peut se fixer sur la solution simple, celle qui ne n\u00e9cessite presque pas ou peu d'explication. Mais \u00e0 l'analyse, l'objet peut se r\u00e9v\u00e9ler complexe, et le consensus sur le simple avoir fait fausse route.\r\n\r\nJ'esp\u00e8re parvenir \u00e0 montrer au fil de cet article que la brillance de Nestis est un m\u00e9lange d'air et d'eau, et non pas simplement de l'eau.\r\n\r\nSi Emp\u00e9docle n'avait pas introduit la brillance (\u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7), aucun doute n'aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 permis pour comprendre que \u03c4\u1ff6 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd [...] \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 signifie deux parts sur huit d'eau. Mais la brillance pose probl\u00e8me. Elle pose d'autant plus probl\u00e8me que la tournure \u03c4\u1ff6 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd [...] \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 insiste sur le fait que les deux parts en question sont des parts de la brillance et non pas directement des parts de Nestis. Peut-on spontan\u00e9ment dire que pour Emp\u00e9docle, Nestis appara\u00eet brillante, tout comme Apollon est brillant (\u03b1\u1f30\u03b3\u03bb\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2), tout comme Art\u00e9mis et H\u00e9cate sont dispensatrices de lumi\u00e8re (\u03c6\u03c9\u03c3\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2) ?\r\n\r\nSi la brillance n'ajoutait rien \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension de Nestis, la \u00ab brillance de Nestis \u00bb se r\u00e9duirait \u00e0 une fa\u00e7on po\u00e9tique de dire Nestis. Si, au contraire, la brillance ajoutait quelque chose \u00e0 Nestis, l'\u00e9l\u00e9ment qui n'est pas nomm\u00e9 dans le fr. 96, \u00e0 savoir l'air, pourrait \u00eatre sous-entendu dans la brillance de Nestis.\r\n\r\nNous avons formul\u00e9 une interpr\u00e9tation en faveur de l'air dans la composition de l'os. La conclusion n'en serait que renforc\u00e9e si nous pouvions nous appuyer sur un t\u00e9moignage ancien, diff\u00e9rent de celui du Pseudo-Simplicius, voire de Philopon, qu'il est facile de mettre en doute. Ce t\u00e9moignage existe. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 jusqu'ici trait\u00e9 avec indiff\u00e9rence et parfois d\u00e9valoris\u00e9. C'est celui de Th\u00e9ophraste.\r\n\r\nTh\u00e9ophraste, critiquant Emp\u00e9docle, dit que chez cet auteur les os et les poils devraient avoir des sensations puisqu'ils sont form\u00e9s de tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments (De sensibus, \u03a7\u03a7\u0399\u03a0 = A86.23). En d'autres termes, selon Th\u00e9ophraste, les os sont form\u00e9s des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments, et les poils de m\u00eame. Les modernes n'ont pas jug\u00e9 bon de partir de Th\u00e9ophraste pour contredire A\u00e9tius et pour affirmer que l'os doit \u00eatre compos\u00e9 des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments.\r\n\r\nIl n'y a gu\u00e8re de doute que pour Emp\u00e9docle, il existe des m\u00e9langes qui ne comportent pas les quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments. Prenons quelques exemples : le bronze produit par l'alliage de l'\u00e9tain et du cuivre (fr. 92), le vin m\u00e9lang\u00e9 \u00e0 de l'eau (fr. 91), les couleurs r\u00e9sultant d'un m\u00e9lange des couleurs de base (fr. 23), la p\u00e2te servant \u00e0 faire le pain (fr. 34), la boue ou la p\u00e2te de poterie (fr. 73), l'eau sal\u00e9e de la mer (fr. 55, 56), etc.\r\n\r\nMais quand il s'agit des \u00eatres vivant sur terre, il est permis de penser que Philot\u00e8s fait chaque m\u00e9lange sans exclure aucun \u00e9l\u00e9ment, \u00e0 l'instar du sang et des chairs (fr. 98). En effet, l'\u0153uvre de l'Amour r\u00e9alis\u00e9e dans ces \u00eatres \u00e9ph\u00e9m\u00e8res semble pr\u00e9figurer le grand vivant, compos\u00e9 des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments, qu'est le Sphairos. Pour les \u00eatres vivants et \u00e9ph\u00e9m\u00e8res, les parts pourraient \u00eatre in\u00e9gales dans chaque organe, mais tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments \u00eatre n\u00e9anmoins pr\u00e9sents.\r\n\r\nTout cela, certes, n'est que pure hypoth\u00e8se. Aucun texte n'affirme que pour Emp\u00e9docle, toutes les parties des vivants sont un m\u00e9lange des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments. Une certitude demeure : on ne peut d\u00e9consid\u00e9rer la parole de Th\u00e9ophraste sur l'os, ce m\u00eame Th\u00e9ophraste qui disait que pour Emp\u00e9docle, l'eau est noire.\r\n[introduction p. 75-77\/conclusion p. 99-100]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Kn8BmLiIsvQZnjb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":291,"full_name":"Picot, Jean-Claude","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":863,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"26","issue":"1","pages":"75-100"}},"sort":[2008]}
Title | Review of Baltussen, Han: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Aestimatio |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 210–224 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, Robert B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Philosophy and Exegesis in Simpliciusf a preparatory study for a history of the ancient philosophical commentary [224nnl0, 13], Han Baltussen addresses the ‘methodology’ of pagan antiquity’s last ma jor Platonist and its greatest philosophical scholar, Simplicius of Cili cia (AD ca 480- ca 540). What ‘methodology’ means can be best appreciated if the book’s general conclusions are first summarized. [introduction p. 210] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/oXKF0eqANW36ItV |
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Title | Eudorus and the Early Platonist Interpretation of the "Categories" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Laval théologique et philosophique |
Volume | 64 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 583-595 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarrant, Harold |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The hermeneutic tradition concerning Aristotle’s Categories goes back to Eudorus and his contemporaries in the first century BC. Initially a perplexing text, it forces the Platonist to consider a variety of new dialectical questions. The criticisms of Eudorus demonstrate the desire for orderly arrangements, and pose questions that the hermeneutic tradition, culminating in the magnificent commentary of Simplicius, would try to answer. His pursuit of a critical agenda does not warrant the label “anti-Aristotelian” or “polemical”, but it does show why he preferred to be known as an Academic than as a Peripatetic. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/wSO0JNPufdqhWkk |
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Title | Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 2 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences |
Volume | 9 |
Pages | 25-131 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bowen, Alan C. , Simplicius |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This completes my translation of the narrowly astronomical sections of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo, which first appeared in SCIAMVS 4 (2003), 23–58. Its aim, as before, is to provide the reader with a suitably annotated rendering of Simplicius’ text that will facilitate addressing critical questions regarding the nature, construction, and historical value of Simplicius’ commentary, especially as it pertains to the history of earlier Greek astronomical theorizing. In completing this project, I have relied strictly on modern editions of Aristotle’s De caelo in presenting the lemmata in full and have relegated comments about any differences with Simplicius’ abbreviated lemmata to footnotes. After all, given that we have only Simplicius’ lemmata and not the full text of the De caelo that he used, there seems little sense in presenting Aristotle’s text in full while combining it with readings from Simplicius’ text, thereby implying a text that does not exist. At the same time, I have preserved the fact that the text quoted or paraphrased in the commentary proper sometimes differs from the text found in the lemmata. Thus, the lemmata presented here differ from those offered by Ian Mueller (2005), since he revises the received text of the De caelo in light of Simplicius’ text and removes any differences between Simplicius’ lemmata and his quotations and paraphrases. For the modern text of Aristotle’s De caelo, my primary source is Paul Moraux’s edition, as it makes extensive use of the indirect tradition in establishing Aristotle’s text. Moreover, as before, I have used Heiberg’s 1894 edition for the text of Simplicius’ commentary. However, caveat lector: this edition has recently been criticized for its reliance on the 1540 edition of the Latin translation of In De caelo made by William of Moerbeke in the 13th century. Additionally, arguments have been made for the importance of the recently discovered translation of De caelo 2 and related passages from Simplicius by Robert Grosseteste in establishing Simplicius’ text. Regrettably, there is only a proper edition thus far of Moerbeke’s translation of Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 1; and, though it has certainly proved useful, we must all await the publication of the edition of Moerbeke’s version of Simplicius’ In De caelo 2. This forthcoming edition, as I understand, will account for both of Moerbeke’s translations of Simplicius’ astronomical digression in his commentary on 2.12. As for Grosseteste’s translation, though there is apparently a typescript edition by the late Fernand Bossier, it seems to be privately circulated, and so far, I have been unable to obtain a copy. Next, in interpreting the syntax and meaning of Simplicius’ Greek, I have used terminology that remains faithful to our ancient sources while also being familiar to historians of science, ensuring an accurate rendering of the technical language that Simplicius employs (and sometimes misuses) in the course of his philosophical and astronomical interpretations. As before, the line numbers in the margins of the translation indicate the line in which the first word of the corresponding line in Heiberg’s text appears. The result is not exact in terms of the actual line count, but it should suffice to allow readers to move between my translation and Simplicius’ text if they so wish. Finally, I have supplied extensive footnotes and comments to explicate the many issues that readers should understand in order to assess the nature of Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 2.12. Readers may well disagree with my claims and arguments; however, I trust that this annotation will at least help them avoid missteps—mine included. What I have not done, however, is address the voluminous literature offering reconstructions of the system of homocentric spheres that Simplicius describes in the great astronomical digression concluding his commentary on 2.12. As in Part 1, my overriding aim is to provide only such annotation as allows readers to engage with Simplicius’ testimony directly, without obscuring it beneath layers of learned interpretation and speculation. My hope is that this approach will encourage readers to assess such reconstructions critically. Admittedly, this aim aligns with my own conclusion that such reconstructions, which trace back to Schiaparelli in the 19th century and were largely codified by Heath (1913), must today be seen as an egregious example of how scholars and their communities project their own perspectives onto the past. Moreover, this approach fits with my conviction that Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 2.10–12 is historically significant in its own right as a witness to concerns in late antiquity about the nature and foundations of astronomical knowledge. Accordingly, I have limited my remarks on these reconstructions to instances where proponents make claims about the meaning of Simplicius’ Greek or critique his interpretations. For the most part, I have set aside alternative reconstructions proposed by Maula (1974), Heglmeier (1996), Mendell (1998, 2000), and Yavetz (1998, 2001, 2003). For further details on the principles underlying this translation and the format of its presentation, I urge the reader to consult Part 1, especially pages 25–26. [introduction p. 25-27] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bK5nxtsNqCbstdI |
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","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140052720","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2600,"entry_id":1480,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":62,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Simplicius","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":62,"first_name":"Cilicius","last_name":"Simplicius ","full_name":"Simplicius Cilicius","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118642421","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 2","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 2"},"abstract":"This completes my translation of the narrowly astronomical sections of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De caelo, which first appeared in SCIAMVS 4 (2003), 23\u201358. Its aim, as before, is to provide the reader with a suitably annotated rendering of Simplicius\u2019 text that will facilitate addressing critical questions regarding the nature, construction, and historical value of Simplicius\u2019 commentary, especially as it pertains to the history of earlier Greek astronomical theorizing.\r\n\r\nIn completing this project, I have relied strictly on modern editions of Aristotle\u2019s De caelo in presenting the lemmata in full and have relegated comments about any differences with Simplicius\u2019 abbreviated lemmata to footnotes. After all, given that we have only Simplicius\u2019 lemmata and not the full text of the De caelo that he used, there seems little sense in presenting Aristotle\u2019s text in full while combining it with readings from Simplicius\u2019 text, thereby implying a text that does not exist. At the same time, I have preserved the fact that the text quoted or paraphrased in the commentary proper sometimes differs from the text found in the lemmata. Thus, the lemmata presented here differ from those offered by Ian Mueller (2005), since he revises the received text of the De caelo in light of Simplicius\u2019 text and removes any differences between Simplicius\u2019 lemmata and his quotations and paraphrases.\r\n\r\nFor the modern text of Aristotle\u2019s De caelo, my primary source is Paul Moraux\u2019s edition, as it makes extensive use of the indirect tradition in establishing Aristotle\u2019s text. Moreover, as before, I have used Heiberg\u2019s 1894 edition for the text of Simplicius\u2019 commentary. However, caveat lector: this edition has recently been criticized for its reliance on the 1540 edition of the Latin translation of In De caelo made by William of Moerbeke in the 13th century. Additionally, arguments have been made for the importance of the recently discovered translation of De caelo 2 and related passages from Simplicius by Robert Grosseteste in establishing Simplicius\u2019 text. Regrettably, there is only a proper edition thus far of Moerbeke\u2019s translation of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 1; and, though it has certainly proved useful, we must all await the publication of the edition of Moerbeke\u2019s version of Simplicius\u2019 In De caelo 2. This forthcoming edition, as I understand, will account for both of Moerbeke\u2019s translations of Simplicius\u2019 astronomical digression in his commentary on 2.12.\r\n\r\nAs for Grosseteste\u2019s translation, though there is apparently a typescript edition by the late Fernand Bossier, it seems to be privately circulated, and so far, I have been unable to obtain a copy.\r\n\r\nNext, in interpreting the syntax and meaning of Simplicius\u2019 Greek, I have used terminology that remains faithful to our ancient sources while also being familiar to historians of science, ensuring an accurate rendering of the technical language that Simplicius employs (and sometimes misuses) in the course of his philosophical and astronomical interpretations. As before, the line numbers in the margins of the translation indicate the line in which the first word of the corresponding line in Heiberg\u2019s text appears. The result is not exact in terms of the actual line count, but it should suffice to allow readers to move between my translation and Simplicius\u2019 text if they so wish.\r\n\r\nFinally, I have supplied extensive footnotes and comments to explicate the many issues that readers should understand in order to assess the nature of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 2.12. Readers may well disagree with my claims and arguments; however, I trust that this annotation will at least help them avoid missteps\u2014mine included. What I have not done, however, is address the voluminous literature offering reconstructions of the system of homocentric spheres that Simplicius describes in the great astronomical digression concluding his commentary on 2.12.\r\n\r\nAs in Part 1, my overriding aim is to provide only such annotation as allows readers to engage with Simplicius\u2019 testimony directly, without obscuring it beneath layers of learned interpretation and speculation. My hope is that this approach will encourage readers to assess such reconstructions critically. Admittedly, this aim aligns with my own conclusion that such reconstructions, which trace back to Schiaparelli in the 19th century and were largely codified by Heath (1913), must today be seen as an egregious example of how scholars and their communities project their own perspectives onto the past.\r\n\r\nMoreover, this approach fits with my conviction that Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 2.10\u201312 is historically significant in its own right as a witness to concerns in late antiquity about the nature and foundations of astronomical knowledge. Accordingly, I have limited my remarks on these reconstructions to instances where proponents make claims about the meaning of Simplicius\u2019 Greek or critique his interpretations. For the most part, I have set aside alternative reconstructions proposed by Maula (1974), Heglmeier (1996), Mendell (1998, 2000), and Yavetz (1998, 2001, 2003).\r\n\r\nFor further details on the principles underlying this translation and the format of its presentation, I urge the reader to consult Part 1, especially pages 25\u201326. [introduction p. 25-27]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bK5nxtsNqCbstdI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":16,"full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":62,"full_name":"Simplicius Cilicius","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1480,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences","volume":"9","issue":"","pages":"25-131"}},"sort":[2008]}
Title | Remarque complémentaire à mon article “Dans quel lieu le néoplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fondé son école de mathémathiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen?” |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 263-269 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Concerning the book by R. Arnzen Abū l-‘Abbās an-Nayrīzīs Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?) Simplicius’ Kommentar zu den Definitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I, the present paper off ers a survey of the way the late Neoplatonists used to conceive and compose their commentaries. Far from trying to be original, each commentary is largely based on the works of predecessors. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MJR57V7OQzq7spB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1179","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1179,"authors_free":[{"id":1753,"entry_id":1179,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Remarque compl\u00e9mentaire \u00e0 mon article \u201cDans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9mathiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?\u201d","main_title":{"title":"Remarque compl\u00e9mentaire \u00e0 mon article \u201cDans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9mathiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?\u201d"},"abstract":"Concerning the book by R. Arnzen Ab\u016b l-\u2018Abb\u0101s an-Nayr\u012bz\u012bs Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?) Simplicius\u2019 Kommentar zu den Definitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I, the present paper off ers a survey of the way the late Neoplatonists used to conceive and compose their commentaries. Far from trying to be original, each commentary is largely based on the works of predecessors. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MJR57V7OQzq7spB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1179,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"263-269"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | Aperçu de la réception de la doctrine stoïcienne du mélange total dans le néoplatonisme après Plotin |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 25 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 67-100 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cohen, Daniel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aux niveaux les plus inférieurs, où prédomine la multiplicité et la division, le mélange peut se manifester selon deux modes : Ou bien les composants d'une totalité préservent leur identité au détriment de l'unité du produit du mélange (il ne s'agit alors pas à proprement parler d'un mélange mais plutôt d'un « assemblage » dans lequel les éléments sont simplement juxtaposés : il s'agit plutôt de la παράθεσις stoïcienne ou de la σύνθεσις d'Aristote). Ou bien le produit du mélange forme une véritable totalité unifiée, mais alors cette unité est réalisée au détriment de l'identité des composantes, qui s'altèrent et se confondent pour former une entité nouvelle (il s'agit alors de la σύγχυσις stoïcienne ou du véritable mélange au sens aristotélicien). Au niveau des réalités immatérielles, c'est sur le modèle stoïcien du mélange total que les Néoplatoniciens envisagent cette paradoxale « fusion sans confusion » qui unifie toute multiplicité sur le mode de la totalité antérieure à la dispersion de ses parties au sein de la matière. Dans la mesure où les jugements que les Néoplatoniciens portent sur l'héritage philosophique des doctrines anciennes se présentent la plupart du temps comme une confrontation avec la perspective qui est supposée être celle de Platon, on peut dire que la réception néoplatonicienne des physiques du mélange d'Aristote et des Stoïciens aboutit à la conclusion suivante : Les Stoïciens se trompent parce qu'ils rendent les causes immanentes et donc mélangées à la matière. Aristote a raison, mais il se limite à rendre compte des phénomènes sensibles. Aristote et les Stoïciens font partie de ce que Proclus qualifiera de « crème des disputeurs qui, pour avoir observé quelque petite portion de la nature, pensent pouvoir déchirer Platon ». Ce n'est donc pas le moindre des paradoxes si les représentants du Néoplatonisme, après avoir rejeté les lois de la physique aristotélicienne comme n'ayant de validité qu'au seul niveau sensible, et après avoir vigoureusement critiqué le matérialisme stoïcien, ont transposé la donnée la plus fondamentale de la physique stoïcienne — celle qui permettait aux Stoïciens de justifier l'immanence intégrale de la causalité divine (et donc le matérialisme corporaliste le plus radical) — aux niveaux les plus élevés, comme régissant les relations entre les réalités immatérielles et incorporelles. Comme l'a bien montré Pierre Hadot, cette transfiguration doctrinale, qui deviendra typique de la démarche néoplatonicienne, a été amorcée dans le cadre de la synthèse réalisée par Porphyre. En ce sens, écrivait-il, « c'est précisément une des caractéristiques de la doctrine porphyrienne (...) de montrer que le Stoïcisme n'est vrai que dans la transposition néoplatonicienne, la physique stoïcienne devenant ainsi une métaphysique », de sorte que « la théorie des mélanges élaborée par les Stoïciens ne découvre sa vérité que sur le plan intelligible ». Nous avons vu cependant que cette vérité se découvre avant même d'envisager le mélange proprement noétique, Porphyre lui-même ayant déjà fait intervenir la krasis stoïcienne dans le contexte d'un exposé sur l'embryologie, et les Néoplatoniciens ultérieurs dans cet ordre intermédiaire, négligé par Plotin, où se tiennent les « corps immatériels » non qualifiés. La conception stoïcienne du mélange total s'est finalement imposée au sein de la métaphysique néoplatonicienne au prix d'un double réaménagement doctrinal, ayant eu pour résultat : La synthèse de la doctrine stoïcienne de l'interpénétration totale sans confusion avec les élaborations aristotéliciennes de l'acte et de la puissance. La transposition du domaine des réalités matérielles à celui des réalités corporelles non encore engagées dans la matière première. [conclusion p. 99-100] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T9kWS2QRZ2oeq7V |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1273","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1273,"authors_free":[{"id":1863,"entry_id":1273,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":51,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cohen, Daniel","free_first_name":"Daniel","free_last_name":"Cohen","norm_person":{"id":51,"first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Cohen","full_name":"Cohen, Daniel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1024876659","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aper\u00e7u de la r\u00e9ception de la doctrine sto\u00efcienne du m\u00e9lange total dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme apr\u00e8s Plotin","main_title":{"title":"Aper\u00e7u de la r\u00e9ception de la doctrine sto\u00efcienne du m\u00e9lange total dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme apr\u00e8s Plotin"},"abstract":"Aux niveaux les plus inf\u00e9rieurs, o\u00f9 pr\u00e9domine la multiplicit\u00e9 et la division, le m\u00e9lange peut se manifester selon deux modes :\r\n\r\n Ou bien les composants d'une totalit\u00e9 pr\u00e9servent leur identit\u00e9 au d\u00e9triment de l'unit\u00e9 du produit du m\u00e9lange (il ne s'agit alors pas \u00e0 proprement parler d'un m\u00e9lange mais plut\u00f4t d'un \u00ab assemblage \u00bb dans lequel les \u00e9l\u00e9ments sont simplement juxtapos\u00e9s : il s'agit plut\u00f4t de la \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 sto\u00efcienne ou de la \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 d'Aristote).\r\n Ou bien le produit du m\u00e9lange forme une v\u00e9ritable totalit\u00e9 unifi\u00e9e, mais alors cette unit\u00e9 est r\u00e9alis\u00e9e au d\u00e9triment de l'identit\u00e9 des composantes, qui s'alt\u00e8rent et se confondent pour former une entit\u00e9 nouvelle (il s'agit alors de la \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 sto\u00efcienne ou du v\u00e9ritable m\u00e9lange au sens aristot\u00e9licien).\r\n\r\nAu niveau des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s immat\u00e9rielles, c'est sur le mod\u00e8le sto\u00efcien du m\u00e9lange total que les N\u00e9oplatoniciens envisagent cette paradoxale \u00ab fusion sans confusion \u00bb qui unifie toute multiplicit\u00e9 sur le mode de la totalit\u00e9 ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 la dispersion de ses parties au sein de la mati\u00e8re.\r\n\r\nDans la mesure o\u00f9 les jugements que les N\u00e9oplatoniciens portent sur l'h\u00e9ritage philosophique des doctrines anciennes se pr\u00e9sentent la plupart du temps comme une confrontation avec la perspective qui est suppos\u00e9e \u00eatre celle de Platon, on peut dire que la r\u00e9ception n\u00e9oplatonicienne des physiques du m\u00e9lange d'Aristote et des Sto\u00efciens aboutit \u00e0 la conclusion suivante :\r\n\r\n Les Sto\u00efciens se trompent parce qu'ils rendent les causes immanentes et donc m\u00e9lang\u00e9es \u00e0 la mati\u00e8re.\r\n Aristote a raison, mais il se limite \u00e0 rendre compte des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes sensibles.\r\n\r\nAristote et les Sto\u00efciens font partie de ce que Proclus qualifiera de \u00ab cr\u00e8me des disputeurs qui, pour avoir observ\u00e9 quelque petite portion de la nature, pensent pouvoir d\u00e9chirer Platon \u00bb.\r\n\r\nCe n'est donc pas le moindre des paradoxes si les repr\u00e9sentants du N\u00e9oplatonisme, apr\u00e8s avoir rejet\u00e9 les lois de la physique aristot\u00e9licienne comme n'ayant de validit\u00e9 qu'au seul niveau sensible, et apr\u00e8s avoir vigoureusement critiqu\u00e9 le mat\u00e9rialisme sto\u00efcien, ont transpos\u00e9 la donn\u00e9e la plus fondamentale de la physique sto\u00efcienne \u2014 celle qui permettait aux Sto\u00efciens de justifier l'immanence int\u00e9grale de la causalit\u00e9 divine (et donc le mat\u00e9rialisme corporaliste le plus radical) \u2014 aux niveaux les plus \u00e9lev\u00e9s, comme r\u00e9gissant les relations entre les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s immat\u00e9rielles et incorporelles.\r\n\r\nComme l'a bien montr\u00e9 Pierre Hadot, cette transfiguration doctrinale, qui deviendra typique de la d\u00e9marche n\u00e9oplatonicienne, a \u00e9t\u00e9 amorc\u00e9e dans le cadre de la synth\u00e8se r\u00e9alis\u00e9e par Porphyre. En ce sens, \u00e9crivait-il, \u00ab c'est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment une des caract\u00e9ristiques de la doctrine porphyrienne (...) de montrer que le Sto\u00efcisme n'est vrai que dans la transposition n\u00e9oplatonicienne, la physique sto\u00efcienne devenant ainsi une m\u00e9taphysique \u00bb, de sorte que \u00ab la th\u00e9orie des m\u00e9langes \u00e9labor\u00e9e par les Sto\u00efciens ne d\u00e9couvre sa v\u00e9rit\u00e9 que sur le plan intelligible \u00bb.\r\n\r\nNous avons vu cependant que cette v\u00e9rit\u00e9 se d\u00e9couvre avant m\u00eame d'envisager le m\u00e9lange proprement no\u00e9tique, Porphyre lui-m\u00eame ayant d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait intervenir la krasis sto\u00efcienne dans le contexte d'un expos\u00e9 sur l'embryologie, et les N\u00e9oplatoniciens ult\u00e9rieurs dans cet ordre interm\u00e9diaire, n\u00e9glig\u00e9 par Plotin, o\u00f9 se tiennent les \u00ab corps immat\u00e9riels \u00bb non qualifi\u00e9s.\r\n\r\nLa conception sto\u00efcienne du m\u00e9lange total s'est finalement impos\u00e9e au sein de la m\u00e9taphysique n\u00e9oplatonicienne au prix d'un double r\u00e9am\u00e9nagement doctrinal, ayant eu pour r\u00e9sultat :\r\n\r\n La synth\u00e8se de la doctrine sto\u00efcienne de l'interp\u00e9n\u00e9tration totale sans confusion avec les \u00e9laborations aristot\u00e9liciennes de l'acte et de la puissance.\r\n La transposition du domaine des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s mat\u00e9rielles \u00e0 celui des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s corporelles non encore engag\u00e9es dans la mati\u00e8re premi\u00e8re. [conclusion p. 99-100]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T9kWS2QRZ2oeq7V","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":51,"full_name":"Cohen, Daniel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1273,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"25 ","issue":"2","pages":"67-100"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | Die philosophischen Kommentare aus der Antike. Ein Überblick mit ausgewählten Literaturangaben |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 51-79 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Perkams, Matthias |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ein typisches Beispiel für einen systematisch anspruchsvoll argumentierenden Kommentar, auf den viele der hier genannten Merkmale zutreffen, ist der De anima-Kommentar des Neuplatonikers Priskian von Lydien, eines Zeitgenossen und Bekannten des Damaskios und Simplikios um 530. Der Autor setzt es sich zu Beginn seines Kommentars ausdrücklich zum Ziel, sich bei der Auslegung des aristotelischen Textes und der Klärung der hierbei bestehenden Zweifel nach Möglichkeit an die sachliche Wahrheit (alētheia tōn pragmatōn) zu halten. Dabei will er diese nicht einfach aus dem Text ableiten, sondern orientiert sich bewusst an der Seelenlehre Jamblichs (3. Jh.), des eigentlichen Begründers des spätneuplatonischen Systems (1, 18–20). Diese Zugangsweise stellt den Kommentator freilich vor schwierige inhaltliche Probleme: Zum einen gilt es, Aristoteles’ Seelenlehre richtig zu verstehen, die davon ausgeht, dass die Seele schlichtweg das Lebensprinzip des menschlichen Körpers und eben dadurch definiert ist. Andererseits muss Priskian den Intentionen Jamblichs gerecht werden, dessen Neuplatonismus der Transzendenz auch des menschlichen Geistes und damit einer Art Leib-Seele-Dualismus verpflichtet bleibt. Um beiden Ansprüchen genügen zu können, entwickelt der Kommentator eine komplexe Theorie der menschlichen Seele, die das neuplatonische Menschenbild nicht unwesentlich variiert und verfeinert: Erstens führt Priskian in den für Aristoteles’ Seelenlehre zentralen Begriff der Entelechie bzw. Formursache eine Unterscheidung zwischen einer Formursächlichkeit als Gestaltprinzip des leib-seelischen Wesens und einer Formursächlichkeit als dessen Bewegungsprinzip ein (4,12–5,5). Das letztere Prinzip findet Priskian in Aristoteles’ Aussage, der Geist könne möglicherweise auch so im Körper sein wie ein Schiffer auf einem Schiff (De anima II 1, 413a 6–9). Für Priskian gibt es die Unterschiedenheit zwischen formender und bewegender Entelechie jedoch nicht nur (und nicht in erster Linie, wie noch deutlich werden wird) auf der Ebene der rationalen Seele bzw. des menschlichen Nous, sondern auch auf den Seelenstufen des Vegetativen und des Sensitiven, wobei beim Vegetativen der formende Charakter stark überwiegt. Für die Ebene des Nous reicht diese Differenzierung jedoch nicht aus; denn auch ein Bewegungsprinzip ist nach neuplatonischer Vorstellung als solches notwendig mit dem Körper verbunden, während es für den aristotelischen Nous ganz unangemessen ist, dass er überhaupt in irgendeiner notwendigen Verbindung zum Körper steht (227,6–32). Priskian antwortet mit einer feingliedrigen Differenzierung des Nous-Begriffs, wobei die Einheit und Vielheit der verschiedenen unterschiedenen Stufen mit Hilfe der neuplatonischen Idee einer triadischen Dynamik des Geistigen verstanden werden muss. Grundlegend ist der Gedanke, dass der Nous im Menschen, verstanden als sein alltägliches, gleichsam empirisches Selbst, sich entweder ganz von der Verbindung mit Körperlichem lösen und sich dem bloßen Denken zuwenden oder aber durch die eingegangene Verbindung mit dem Körper nur potentiell zu einem derartigen Denken befähigt sein kann. Priskian schildert diesen Gegensatz jedoch nicht nur, wie andere Neuplatoniker, als eine bloße Wahlmöglichkeit der rationalen Seele zwischen einer Wendung nach oben – zum Geistigen – oder nach unten – zum Körperlichen –, sondern er stellt ihn als eine Zuwendung der Seele zu ihrem eigentlichen, idealen Selbst dar, das als transzendentales Subjekt ihres Denkens zu gelten hat und damit das Denken eigentlich erst „bewirkt“ (das ist seine Interpretation des aristotelischen aktiven Geistes). Dieses ideale Selbst ist aber nicht, wie Plotin annimmt, völlig konstant, sondern es entwickelt und verändert sich zusammen mit der Ebene unseres alltäglichen Denkens, das erst durch eine Rückwendung zum Geistigen auch eine volle Wiederherstellung seines transzendentalen Selbst bewirken kann (220,2–25; 240,2–241,26). Unser Geist ist daher „von sich selbst entfremdet“ (allotriōthen heautou; 223,26), und unser Leben eine dauerhafte Suche nach der Wiedergewinnung der Einheit von empirischem und idealem Selbst. Diese kann erreicht werden durch eine Selbsterkenntnis, bei der sich das empirische Selbst als sein ideales Selbst erkennt und zu diesem wird; um diesen Prozess zu erklären, wendet Priskian die neuplatonische Idee einer geistigen Bewegung aus Bleiben, Hervorgehen und Zurückkehren (monē, prohodos, epistrophē) auf den menschlichen Geist an, was hier nicht im Detail nachvollzogen werden kann. Dieser sehr grobe Überblick über einen ebenso scharfsinnigen wie schwierigen und voraussetzungsreichen Text zeigt in besonders extremer Form, mit welchen systematischen Interessen nicht wenige Kommentatoren an ihre Texte herantraten; häufig lässt sich im kommentierten Text allenfalls der Anlass erkennen, der den Kommentator dazu führt, seine eigenen systematischen Fragen am autoritativ verstandenen Vorlagetext abzuhandeln, was entweder zu einem besseren Verständnis des Textes oder – wie im gerade diskutierten Fall – zu einer Bereicherung der zeitgenössischen Diskussion führt, von der auch der heutige Leser profitieren kann, wenn er bereit ist, den häufig mühsamen Weg zum Verständnis eines Kommentators zu gehen. [introduction p. 52-53] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pSf0FMkBh5xKMAw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1085","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1085,"authors_free":[{"id":1641,"entry_id":1085,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":283,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Perkams, Matthias","free_first_name":"Matthias","free_last_name":"Perkams","norm_person":{"id":283,"first_name":"Matthias","last_name":"Perkams","full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123439760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die philosophischen Kommentare aus der Antike. Ein \u00dcberblick mit ausgew\u00e4hlten Literaturangaben","main_title":{"title":"Die philosophischen Kommentare aus der Antike. Ein \u00dcberblick mit ausgew\u00e4hlten Literaturangaben"},"abstract":"Ein typisches Beispiel f\u00fcr einen systematisch anspruchsvoll argumentierenden Kommentar, auf den viele der hier genannten Merkmale zutreffen, ist der De anima-Kommentar des Neuplatonikers Priskian von Lydien, eines Zeitgenossen und Bekannten des Damaskios und Simplikios um 530. Der Autor setzt es sich zu Beginn seines Kommentars ausdr\u00fccklich zum Ziel, sich bei der Auslegung des aristotelischen Textes und der Kl\u00e4rung der hierbei bestehenden Zweifel nach M\u00f6glichkeit an die sachliche Wahrheit (al\u0113theia t\u014dn pragmat\u014dn) zu halten. Dabei will er diese nicht einfach aus dem Text ableiten, sondern orientiert sich bewusst an der Seelenlehre Jamblichs (3. Jh.), des eigentlichen Begr\u00fcnders des sp\u00e4tneuplatonischen Systems (1, 18\u201320).\r\n\r\nDiese Zugangsweise stellt den Kommentator freilich vor schwierige inhaltliche Probleme: Zum einen gilt es, Aristoteles\u2019 Seelenlehre richtig zu verstehen, die davon ausgeht, dass die Seele schlichtweg das Lebensprinzip des menschlichen K\u00f6rpers und eben dadurch definiert ist. Andererseits muss Priskian den Intentionen Jamblichs gerecht werden, dessen Neuplatonismus der Transzendenz auch des menschlichen Geistes und damit einer Art Leib-Seele-Dualismus verpflichtet bleibt.\r\n\r\nUm beiden Anspr\u00fcchen gen\u00fcgen zu k\u00f6nnen, entwickelt der Kommentator eine komplexe Theorie der menschlichen Seele, die das neuplatonische Menschenbild nicht unwesentlich variiert und verfeinert: Erstens f\u00fchrt Priskian in den f\u00fcr Aristoteles\u2019 Seelenlehre zentralen Begriff der Entelechie bzw. Formursache eine Unterscheidung zwischen einer Formurs\u00e4chlichkeit als Gestaltprinzip des leib-seelischen Wesens und einer Formurs\u00e4chlichkeit als dessen Bewegungsprinzip ein (4,12\u20135,5). Das letztere Prinzip findet Priskian in Aristoteles\u2019 Aussage, der Geist k\u00f6nne m\u00f6glicherweise auch so im K\u00f6rper sein wie ein Schiffer auf einem Schiff (De anima II 1, 413a 6\u20139).\r\n\r\nF\u00fcr Priskian gibt es die Unterschiedenheit zwischen formender und bewegender Entelechie jedoch nicht nur (und nicht in erster Linie, wie noch deutlich werden wird) auf der Ebene der rationalen Seele bzw. des menschlichen Nous, sondern auch auf den Seelenstufen des Vegetativen und des Sensitiven, wobei beim Vegetativen der formende Charakter stark \u00fcberwiegt.\r\n\r\nF\u00fcr die Ebene des Nous reicht diese Differenzierung jedoch nicht aus; denn auch ein Bewegungsprinzip ist nach neuplatonischer Vorstellung als solches notwendig mit dem K\u00f6rper verbunden, w\u00e4hrend es f\u00fcr den aristotelischen Nous ganz unangemessen ist, dass er \u00fcberhaupt in irgendeiner notwendigen Verbindung zum K\u00f6rper steht (227,6\u201332). Priskian antwortet mit einer feingliedrigen Differenzierung des Nous-Begriffs, wobei die Einheit und Vielheit der verschiedenen unterschiedenen Stufen mit Hilfe der neuplatonischen Idee einer triadischen Dynamik des Geistigen verstanden werden muss.\r\n\r\nGrundlegend ist der Gedanke, dass der Nous im Menschen, verstanden als sein allt\u00e4gliches, gleichsam empirisches Selbst, sich entweder ganz von der Verbindung mit K\u00f6rperlichem l\u00f6sen und sich dem blo\u00dfen Denken zuwenden oder aber durch die eingegangene Verbindung mit dem K\u00f6rper nur potentiell zu einem derartigen Denken bef\u00e4higt sein kann. Priskian schildert diesen Gegensatz jedoch nicht nur, wie andere Neuplatoniker, als eine blo\u00dfe Wahlm\u00f6glichkeit der rationalen Seele zwischen einer Wendung nach oben \u2013 zum Geistigen \u2013 oder nach unten \u2013 zum K\u00f6rperlichen \u2013, sondern er stellt ihn als eine Zuwendung der Seele zu ihrem eigentlichen, idealen Selbst dar, das als transzendentales Subjekt ihres Denkens zu gelten hat und damit das Denken eigentlich erst \u201ebewirkt\u201c (das ist seine Interpretation des aristotelischen aktiven Geistes).\r\n\r\nDieses ideale Selbst ist aber nicht, wie Plotin annimmt, v\u00f6llig konstant, sondern es entwickelt und ver\u00e4ndert sich zusammen mit der Ebene unseres allt\u00e4glichen Denkens, das erst durch eine R\u00fcckwendung zum Geistigen auch eine volle Wiederherstellung seines transzendentalen Selbst bewirken kann (220,2\u201325; 240,2\u2013241,26). Unser Geist ist daher \u201evon sich selbst entfremdet\u201c (allotri\u014dthen heautou; 223,26), und unser Leben eine dauerhafte Suche nach der Wiedergewinnung der Einheit von empirischem und idealem Selbst.\r\n\r\nDiese kann erreicht werden durch eine Selbsterkenntnis, bei der sich das empirische Selbst als sein ideales Selbst erkennt und zu diesem wird; um diesen Prozess zu erkl\u00e4ren, wendet Priskian die neuplatonische Idee einer geistigen Bewegung aus Bleiben, Hervorgehen und Zur\u00fcckkehren (mon\u0113, prohodos, epistroph\u0113) auf den menschlichen Geist an, was hier nicht im Detail nachvollzogen werden kann.\r\n\r\nDieser sehr grobe \u00dcberblick \u00fcber einen ebenso scharfsinnigen wie schwierigen und voraussetzungsreichen Text zeigt in besonders extremer Form, mit welchen systematischen Interessen nicht wenige Kommentatoren an ihre Texte herantraten; h\u00e4ufig l\u00e4sst sich im kommentierten Text allenfalls der Anlass erkennen, der den Kommentator dazu f\u00fchrt, seine eigenen systematischen Fragen am autoritativ verstandenen Vorlagetext abzuhandeln, was entweder zu einem besseren Verst\u00e4ndnis des Textes oder \u2013 wie im gerade diskutierten Fall \u2013 zu einer Bereicherung der zeitgen\u00f6ssischen Diskussion f\u00fchrt, von der auch der heutige Leser profitieren kann, wenn er bereit ist, den h\u00e4ufig m\u00fchsamen Weg zum Verst\u00e4ndnis eines Kommentators zu gehen. [introduction p. 52-53]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pSf0FMkBh5xKMAw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":283,"full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1085,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Allgemeine Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie","volume":"32","issue":"1","pages":"51-79"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | Semence, vertu formatrice et intellect agent chez Nicolò Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-latine et la renaissance des commentateurs grecs |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Early Science and Medicine |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 134-165 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hiro, Harai |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The treatise On Formative Power (Venice, 1506) of Ferrara's emblematic medical humanist, Nicolo Leoniceno (1428-1524), is the one of the first embryological monographs of the Renaissance. It shows, at the same time, the continuity of medi eval Arabo-Latin tradition and the new elements brought by Renaissance medical humanism, namely through the use of the ancient Greek commentators of Aristotle like Simplicius. Thus this treatise stands at the crossroad of these two currents. The present study analyses the range of Leoniceno's philosophical discussion, determines its exact sources and brings to light premises for the early modern development of the concept of formative force, which will end up in the theory of "plastic nature" at the heart of the Scientific Revolution. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Bqb94gvDLPcl42S |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"806","_score":null,"_source":{"id":806,"authors_free":[{"id":1193,"entry_id":806,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":179,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hiro, Harai","free_first_name":"Harai","free_last_name":"Hiro","norm_person":{"id":179,"first_name":"Harai","last_name":"Hiro","full_name":"Hiro, Harai","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078284075","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Semence, vertu formatrice et intellect agent chez Nicol\u00f2 Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-latine et la renaissance des commentateurs grecs","main_title":{"title":"Semence, vertu formatrice et intellect agent chez Nicol\u00f2 Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-latine et la renaissance des commentateurs grecs"},"abstract":"The treatise On Formative Power (Venice, 1506) of Ferrara's emblematic medical humanist, Nicolo Leoniceno (1428-1524), is the one of the first embryological monographs of the Renaissance. It shows, at the same time, the continuity of medi eval Arabo-Latin tradition and the new elements brought by Renaissance medical humanism, namely through the use of the ancient Greek commentators of Aristotle like Simplicius. Thus this treatise stands at the crossroad of these two currents. The present study analyses the range of Leoniceno's philosophical discussion, determines its exact sources and brings to light premises for the early modern development of the concept of formative force, which will end up in the theory of \"plastic nature\" at the heart of the Scientific Revolution. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Bqb94gvDLPcl42S","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":179,"full_name":"Hiro, Harai","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":806,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Early Science and Medicine","volume":"12","issue":"2","pages":"134-165"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Poetics Today |
Volume | 28 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 247–281 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Commentary was an important vehicle for philosophical debate in late antiquity. Its antecedents lie in the rise of rational argumentation, polemical rivalry, literacy, and the canonization of texts. This essay aims to give a historical and typological outline of philosophical exegesis in antiquity, from the earliest allegorizing readings of Homer to the full-blown “running commentary” in the Platonic tradition (fourth to sixth centuries CE). Running commentaries are mostly on authoritative thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. Yet they are never mere scholarly enterprises but, rather, springboards for syncretistic clarification, elaboration, and creative interpretation. Two case studies (Galen 129-219 CE, Simplicius ca. 530 CE) will illustrate the range of exegetical tools available at the end of a long tradition in medical science and in reading Aristotle through Neoplatonic eyes, respectively. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9evl1bXvfOTYX0r |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"968","_score":null,"_source":{"id":968,"authors_free":[{"id":1455,"entry_id":968,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary","main_title":{"title":"From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary"},"abstract":"Commentary was an important vehicle for philosophical debate in late antiquity. Its antecedents lie in the rise of rational argumentation, polemical rivalry, literacy, and the canonization of texts. This essay aims to give a historical and typological outline of philosophical exegesis in antiquity, from the earliest alle\u00adgorizing readings of Homer to the full-blown \u201crunning commentary\u201d in the Pla\u00adtonic tradition (fourth to sixth centuries CE). Running commentaries are mostly on authoritative thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. Yet they are never mere scholarly enterprises but, rather, springboards for syncretistic clarification, elaboration, and creative interpretation. Two case studies (Galen 129-219 CE, Simplicius ca. 530 CE) will illustrate the range of exegetical tools available at the end of a long tradition in medical science and in reading Aristotle through Neoplatonic eyes, respectively. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9evl1bXvfOTYX0r","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":968,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Poetics Today","volume":"28","issue":"2","pages":"247\u2013281"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 18 |
Pages | 123-140 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chiaradonna, Riccardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Porphyry’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theories of genus and substantial predication is based on two related assumptions: That a clear separation exists between logic and metaphysics (= doctrine of transcendent realities). That there is a close relation between logic and physics. Since Porphyry’s physics is part of his ontology, logic and ontology (i.e., the logic and the ontology of the physical world) stand in close relation with each other. Porphyry only makes very partial references to metaphysics in his logical works. What I have argued is that Porphyry’s conception of genus in the Isagoge reflects the Platonic theory of the hierarchy of beings, since Porphyry presents his genus as an aph’ henos hierarchical relation. This, on the other hand, does not imply that Porphyry’s treatment of genus in the Isagoge refers to transcendent ante rem principles. Porphyry carefully introduces a doctrine in the Isagoge, the complete significance of which emerges in a different context: the ‘Porphyrean tree’ is thus a mere analogon of the Platonic hierarchy of beings. The presence of physical doctrines is far more essential to Porphyry’s views of universals and predication. Physical entities such as bodiless immanent forms provide real correlates for Porphyry’s universal predicates: Aristotle’s substantial predication ‘mirrors’ the relation between a particular and its immanent form. Physical forms are not outside the scope of logic; rather, they provide the ‘real’ foundation for Porphyry’s views on predication. Such a foundation is presented in an introductory way in Porphyry’s logical writings and is only made explicit in his more ‘systematic’ works. Iamblichus’ attitude is different in that his Platonizing of Aristotle’s logic is more direct and pervasive. Consequently, Iamblichus offers a Platonizing reading of the Aristotelian theory of substantial predication, which refers to ante rem genera and to the metaphysical relation of participation. Iamblichus is well aware that an ante rem form cannot be a universal synonymous predicate of its particular instantiations, and he conceives of substantial predication as a paronymous relation. Neither Porphyry nor Iamblichus believe that an ante rem form can be predicated synonymously of corporeal individuals. [conclusion p. 17-18] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/sra714DdTLHJIcS |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1289","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1289,"authors_free":[{"id":1878,"entry_id":1289,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":49,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","free_first_name":"Riccardo ","free_last_name":"Chiaradonna","norm_person":{"id":49,"first_name":"Riccardo ","last_name":"Chiaradonna","full_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1142403548","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication","main_title":{"title":"Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication"},"abstract":"Porphyry\u2019s interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s theories of genus and substantial predication is based on two related assumptions:\r\n\r\n That a clear separation exists between logic and metaphysics (= doctrine of transcendent realities).\r\n That there is a close relation between logic and physics.\r\n\r\nSince Porphyry\u2019s physics is part of his ontology, logic and ontology (i.e., the logic and the ontology of the physical world) stand in close relation with each other. Porphyry only makes very partial references to metaphysics in his logical works. What I have argued is that Porphyry\u2019s conception of genus in the Isagoge reflects the Platonic theory of the hierarchy of beings, since Porphyry presents his genus as an aph\u2019 henos hierarchical relation. This, on the other hand, does not imply that Porphyry\u2019s treatment of genus in the Isagoge refers to transcendent ante rem principles. Porphyry carefully introduces a doctrine in the Isagoge, the complete significance of which emerges in a different context: the \u2018Porphyrean tree\u2019 is thus a mere analogon of the Platonic hierarchy of beings.\r\n\r\nThe presence of physical doctrines is far more essential to Porphyry\u2019s views of universals and predication. Physical entities such as bodiless immanent forms provide real correlates for Porphyry\u2019s universal predicates: Aristotle\u2019s substantial predication \u2018mirrors\u2019 the relation between a particular and its immanent form. Physical forms are not outside the scope of logic; rather, they provide the \u2018real\u2019 foundation for Porphyry\u2019s views on predication. Such a foundation is presented in an introductory way in Porphyry\u2019s logical writings and is only made explicit in his more \u2018systematic\u2019 works.\r\n\r\nIamblichus\u2019 attitude is different in that his Platonizing of Aristotle\u2019s logic is more direct and pervasive. Consequently, Iamblichus offers a Platonizing reading of the Aristotelian theory of substantial predication, which refers to ante rem genera and to the metaphysical relation of participation. Iamblichus is well aware that an ante rem form cannot be a universal synonymous predicate of its particular instantiations, and he conceives of substantial predication as a paronymous relation. Neither Porphyry nor Iamblichus believe that an ante rem form can be predicated synonymously of corporeal individuals.\r\n[conclusion p. 17-18]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/sra714DdTLHJIcS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":49,"full_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1289,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"18","issue":"","pages":"123-140"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Criticism of Aristotle's Logic |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Vivarum |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 113-124 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Deitz, Luc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Francesco Patrizi da Chersos Discussiones peripateticae (1581) are one of the most com- prehensive analyses of the whole of Aristotelian philosophy to be published before Werner Jaeger s Aristoteles . The main thrust of the argument in the Discussiones is that whatever Aristotle had said that was true was not new, and that whatever he had said that was new was not true. The article shows how Patrizi proves this with respect to the Organon , and deals with the implications for the history of ancient philosophy in general implied by his stance. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jBaQdPWRsyt3XGo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1299","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1299,"authors_free":[{"id":1892,"entry_id":1299,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":88,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Deitz, Luc","free_first_name":"Luc","free_last_name":"Deitz","norm_person":{"id":88,"first_name":"Luc","last_name":"Deitz","full_name":"Deitz, Luc","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/113154011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Criticism of Aristotle's Logic","main_title":{"title":"Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Criticism of Aristotle's Logic"},"abstract":"Francesco Patrizi da Chersos Discussiones peripateticae (1581) are one of the most com- prehensive analyses of the whole of Aristotelian philosophy to be published before Werner Jaeger s Aristoteles . The main thrust of the argument in the Discussiones is that whatever Aristotle had said that was true was not new, and that whatever he had said that was new was not true. The article shows how Patrizi proves this with respect to the Organon , and deals with the implications for the history of ancient philosophy in general implied by his stance. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jBaQdPWRsyt3XGo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":88,"full_name":"Deitz, Luc","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1299,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Vivarum","volume":"45","issue":"1","pages":"113-124"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | Un commentaire perpétuel de Georges Pachymère à la Physique d'Aristote, faussement attribué à Michel Psellos |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Byzantinische Zeitschrift |
Volume | 100 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 637-676 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Récapitulons l'essentiel des raisonnements philologiques qui nous ont permis de restituer le véritable auteur du commentaire, qui dorénavant doit être attribué à Georges Pachymère. Nous avons vu que l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite qui attribue le commentaire à Psellos descend d'un ancêtre commun, l'Ambrosianus H 44 sup., écrit à la fin du XIVᵉ siècle. Celui-ci remonte pourtant à un archétype, écrit vers l'an 1300 et aujourd'hui perdu (l'Escorialensis D. IV. 24), dans lequel le commentaire figurait sous le nom de Pachymère, ainsi que nous avons pu le montrer grâce au Vindobonensis phil. gr. 248 et à des témoignages du XVIᵉ siècle. Cet archétype de l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite du commentaire a été copié sur le Laurentianus plut. 87,5, autographe stricto sensu de Pachymère, dont il se servait pour assurer son enseignement de la Physique. [Conclusion, p. 676] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/VvESFt1BJvfvNnQ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"536","_score":null,"_source":{"id":536,"authors_free":[{"id":758,"entry_id":536,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un commentaire perp\u00e9tuel de Georges Pachym\u00e8re \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote, faussement attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 Michel Psellos","main_title":{"title":"Un commentaire perp\u00e9tuel de Georges Pachym\u00e8re \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote, faussement attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 Michel Psellos"},"abstract":"R\u00e9capitulons l'essentiel des raisonnements philologiques qui nous ont permis de restituer le v\u00e9ritable auteur du commentaire, qui dor\u00e9navant doit \u00eatre attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 Georges Pachym\u00e8re.\r\n\r\nNous avons vu que l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite qui attribue le commentaire \u00e0 Psellos descend d'un anc\u00eatre commun, l'Ambrosianus H 44 sup., \u00e9crit \u00e0 la fin du XIV\u1d49 si\u00e8cle. Celui-ci remonte pourtant \u00e0 un arch\u00e9type, \u00e9crit vers l'an 1300 et aujourd'hui perdu (l'Escorialensis D. IV. 24), dans lequel le commentaire figurait sous le nom de Pachym\u00e8re, ainsi que nous avons pu le montrer gr\u00e2ce au Vindobonensis phil. gr. 248 et \u00e0 des t\u00e9moignages du XVI\u1d49 si\u00e8cle.\r\n\r\nCet arch\u00e9type de l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite du commentaire a \u00e9t\u00e9 copi\u00e9 sur le Laurentianus plut. 87,5, autographe stricto sensu de Pachym\u00e8re, dont il se servait pour assurer son enseignement de la Physique.\r\n\r\n[Conclusion, p. 676]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/VvESFt1BJvfvNnQ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":536,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Byzantinische Zeitschrift ","volume":"100","issue":"2","pages":"637-676"}},"sort":[2007]}
Title | Addenda Eudemea |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Leeds International Classical Studies |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-28 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper presents 16 fragments of the Peripatetic philosopher Eudemus (c. 350-290 BC), which were not printed in the (still) standard edition of Wehrli (1955; revised 1969), but which had been signalled in passing by De Lacy (1957) and Gottschalk (1973). The aim is to provide a text with translation and brief annotation, to be included in a future edition, and to argue that context can add to our understanding of these passages. Their importance lies in bringing greater comprehensiveness to the collection, offering at least five additional (near) quotations, and illustrating the new trend in fragment studies to contextualize fragments on several levels in order to gain further insight into their value and reception. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HRE0ldIrfqIxrEE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1119","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1119,"authors_free":[{"id":1692,"entry_id":1119,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Addenda Eudemea","main_title":{"title":"Addenda Eudemea"},"abstract":"This paper presents 16 fragments of the Peripatetic philosopher Eudemus (c. 350-290 BC), which were not printed in the (still) standard edition of Wehrli (1955; revised 1969), but which had been signalled in passing by De Lacy (1957) and Gottschalk (1973). The aim is to provide a text with translation and brief annotation, to be included in a future edition, and to argue that context can add to our understanding of these passages. Their importance lies in bringing greater comprehensiveness to the collection, offering at least five additional (near) quotations, and illustrating the new trend in fragment studies to contextualize fragments on several levels in order to gain further insight into their value and reception. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HRE0ldIrfqIxrEE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1119,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Leeds International Classical Studies","volume":"5","issue":"1","pages":"1-28"}},"sort":[2006]}
Title | Il De caelo di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averroè e Pietro d'Alvernia |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Quaestio |
Volume | 6 |
Pages | 524–549 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Musatti, Cesare Alberto |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In aggiunta a questi va almeno ricordata l’edizione della traduzione latina dello pseudo-avicenniano Liber de caelo et mundo, parafrasi di alcune parti dei primi due libri del De caelo, tradotta in latino da Domenico Gundissalino e Giovanni di Spagna nel terzo quarto del XII secolo. Inizialmente confuso con lo stesso De caelo di Aristotele, il testo nel XIII secolo (all’incirca dal 1240 in poi) è stato attribuito quasi sempre ad Avicenna. Oggi invece, in virtù soprattutto della testimonianza del Catalogo (Kitāb al-Fihrist) di Ibn al-Nadīm, viene fatto il nome del celebre medico e traduttore Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn come suo possibile autore. In merito a questa attribuzione bisogna tuttavia tenere presenti le osservazioni di Gutman (pp. XIII-XVII dell’introduzione all’edizione), il quale ha editato il testo sotto il nome dello Pseudo-Avicenna. Per quanto riguarda il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo, nel Medioevo si sono avute due traduzioni latine: una parziale (II libro e prologo del III) ad opera di Roberto Grossatesta, che Bossier data tra il 1235 e il 1253, e una completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke, conclusa nel 1271. La traduzione di Grossatesta ci è conservata in un solo manoscritto (Oxford, Balliol College 99), e non sembra avere avuto un’ampia diffusione, mentre della traduzione completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke attualmente sono conosciuti con certezza sei manoscritti. Se sembra da escludere qualsiasi ipotesi di una revisione da parte di Moerbeke della traduzione di Grossatesta del commento di Simplicio, ancora non definitivamente risolta è invece la questione se la traduzione moerbekana del De caelo di Aristotele sia o meno una revisione di quella incompleta del Grossatesta (II libro e prologo del III) che è presente in forma di lemmi nello stesso manoscritto che contiene il commento di Simplicio. Bossier considera «plus probable» l’opinione di D. J. Allan, secondo cui la traduzione di Moerbeke è indipendente da quella del Grossatesta, mentre Lacombe e Franceschini hanno ritenuto trattarsi di una revisione. L’esistenza di un manoscritto (Vat. lat. 2088) nel quale la traduzione del De caelo di Moerbeke risulta contaminata con quella di Grossatesta anche per alcune parti del primo libro lascia supporre che il Lincolniensis abbia tradotto anche quest’ultimo libro, e non solo il II e l’inizio del III. È stato infine ipotizzato che Grossatesta abbia tradotto anche il primo libro del commento di Simplicio. La traduzione del vescovo di Lincoln del II libro del De caelo è ora consultabile nell’Aristoteles Latinus Database, così come il testo della seconda recensione della traduzione di Guglielmo di Moerbeke al De caelo di Aristotele. Di quest’ultima traduzione esistono infatti tre recensioni differenti, di cui la seconda è la cosiddetta recensio vulgata. Il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo è stato scritto probabilmente intorno al 540. Prima di lui almeno due altri autori avevano dedicato un commento al testo aristotelico: Alessandro di Afrodisia e Temistio. Il commento di Alessandro di Afrodisia è andato perduto sia nel testo greco che nella traduzione araba di Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus. Molte notizie le possiamo trarre però dal commento di Simplicio, di cui il testo di Alessandro costituisce la fonte principale. Il commento di Alessandro viene citato anche nella parafrasi sul De caelo scritta da Temistio. Come per Alessandro di Afrodisia, il testo di Temistio è anch’esso andato perduto sia nell’originale greco che nella traduzione araba di Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī. Si è salvato soltanto nella traduzione ebraica di quest’ultima compiuta nel 1284 da Zerahyah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel Gracian, e nella successiva versione latina del testo ebraico ad opera di Mosé Alatino nel 1574. È opportuno ricordare che, a differenza dei commenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia e di Temistio, il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo non è stato conosciuto dal mondo arabo. [introduction p. 525-526] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vE3O8oovZ2S3BG7 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"617","_score":null,"_source":{"id":617,"authors_free":[{"id":873,"entry_id":617,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":274,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Musatti, Cesare Alberto","free_first_name":"Cesare Alberto","free_last_name":"Musatti","norm_person":{"id":274,"first_name":"Cesare Alberto","last_name":"Musatti","full_name":"Musatti, Cesare Alberto","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Il De caelo di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averro\u00e8 e Pietro d'Alvernia","main_title":{"title":"Il De caelo di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averro\u00e8 e Pietro d'Alvernia"},"abstract":"In aggiunta a questi va almeno ricordata l\u2019edizione della traduzione latina dello pseudo-avicenniano Liber de caelo et mundo, parafrasi di alcune parti dei primi due libri del De caelo, tradotta in latino da Domenico Gundissalino e Giovanni di Spagna nel terzo quarto del XII secolo. Inizialmente confuso con lo stesso De caelo di Aristotele, il testo nel XIII secolo (all\u2019incirca dal 1240 in poi) \u00e8 stato attribuito quasi sempre ad Avicenna. Oggi invece, in virt\u00f9 soprattutto della testimonianza del Catalogo (Kit\u0101b al-Fihrist) di Ibn al-Nad\u012bm, viene fatto il nome del celebre medico e traduttore Is\u1e25\u0101q ibn \u1e24unayn come suo possibile autore.\r\n\r\nIn merito a questa attribuzione bisogna tuttavia tenere presenti le osservazioni di Gutman (pp. XIII-XVII dell\u2019introduzione all\u2019edizione), il quale ha editato il testo sotto il nome dello Pseudo-Avicenna.\r\n\r\nPer quanto riguarda il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo, nel Medioevo si sono avute due traduzioni latine: una parziale (II libro e prologo del III) ad opera di Roberto Grossatesta, che Bossier data tra il 1235 e il 1253, e una completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke, conclusa nel 1271.\r\n\r\nLa traduzione di Grossatesta ci \u00e8 conservata in un solo manoscritto (Oxford, Balliol College 99), e non sembra avere avuto un\u2019ampia diffusione, mentre della traduzione completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke attualmente sono conosciuti con certezza sei manoscritti.\r\n\r\nSe sembra da escludere qualsiasi ipotesi di una revisione da parte di Moerbeke della traduzione di Grossatesta del commento di Simplicio, ancora non definitivamente risolta \u00e8 invece la questione se la traduzione moerbekana del De caelo di Aristotele sia o meno una revisione di quella incompleta del Grossatesta (II libro e prologo del III) che \u00e8 presente in forma di lemmi nello stesso manoscritto che contiene il commento di Simplicio.\r\n\r\nBossier considera \u00abplus probable\u00bb l\u2019opinione di D. J. Allan, secondo cui la traduzione di Moerbeke \u00e8 indipendente da quella del Grossatesta, mentre Lacombe e Franceschini hanno ritenuto trattarsi di una revisione.\r\n\r\nL\u2019esistenza di un manoscritto (Vat. lat. 2088) nel quale la traduzione del De caelo di Moerbeke risulta contaminata con quella di Grossatesta anche per alcune parti del primo libro lascia supporre che il Lincolniensis abbia tradotto anche quest\u2019ultimo libro, e non solo il II e l\u2019inizio del III. \u00c8 stato infine ipotizzato che Grossatesta abbia tradotto anche il primo libro del commento di Simplicio.\r\n\r\nLa traduzione del vescovo di Lincoln del II libro del De caelo \u00e8 ora consultabile nell\u2019Aristoteles Latinus Database, cos\u00ec come il testo della seconda recensione della traduzione di Guglielmo di Moerbeke al De caelo di Aristotele. Di quest\u2019ultima traduzione esistono infatti tre recensioni differenti, di cui la seconda \u00e8 la cosiddetta recensio vulgata.\r\n\r\nIl commento di Simplicio sul De caelo \u00e8 stato scritto probabilmente intorno al 540. Prima di lui almeno due altri autori avevano dedicato un commento al testo aristotelico: Alessandro di Afrodisia e Temistio.\r\n\r\nIl commento di Alessandro di Afrodisia \u00e8 andato perduto sia nel testo greco che nella traduzione araba di Ab\u016b Bishr Matt\u0101 ibn Y\u016bnus. Molte notizie le possiamo trarre per\u00f2 dal commento di Simplicio, di cui il testo di Alessandro costituisce la fonte principale.\r\n\r\nIl commento di Alessandro viene citato anche nella parafrasi sul De caelo scritta da Temistio. Come per Alessandro di Afrodisia, il testo di Temistio \u00e8 anch\u2019esso andato perduto sia nell\u2019originale greco che nella traduzione araba di Ya\u1e25y\u0101 ibn \u02bfAd\u012b. Si \u00e8 salvato soltanto nella traduzione ebraica di quest\u2019ultima compiuta nel 1284 da Zerahyah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel Gracian, e nella successiva versione latina del testo ebraico ad opera di Mos\u00e9 Alatino nel 1574.\r\n\r\n\u00c8 opportuno ricordare che, a differenza dei commenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia e di Temistio, il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo non \u00e8 stato conosciuto dal mondo arabo. [introduction p. 525-526]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vE3O8oovZ2S3BG7","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":274,"full_name":"Musatti, Cesare Alberto","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":617,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestio","volume":"6","issue":"","pages":"524\u2013549"}},"sort":[2006]}
Title | Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 51 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 140-161 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | McGinnis, Jon |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controversy among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel intro- duction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EODvwNwP7DcvnBH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"729","_score":null,"_source":{"id":729,"authors_free":[{"id":1092,"entry_id":729,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":252,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McGinnis, Jon","free_first_name":"Jon","free_last_name":"McGinnis","norm_person":{"id":252,"first_name":"Jon","last_name":"McGinnis","full_name":"McGinnis, Jon","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/141369248","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian","main_title":{"title":"Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian"},"abstract":"Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controversy among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel intro- duction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EODvwNwP7DcvnBH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":252,"full_name":"McGinnis, Jon","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":729,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"51","issue":"2","pages":"140-161"}},"sort":[2006]}
Title | Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter ("Physics" IV:2, 209 B 17–32) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 48 |
Pages | 45-63 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fritsche, Johannes |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Physics IV.2, Aristotle argues for private Space of a body as its form (209 b 1-6) and as its matter (209 b 6-11) to conclude that Plato maintains that χώρα, matter, and space are the same (209 b 11-17). Subsequently, he réfutés both possibilities of conceiving Space (209 b 17-28). In a paper on 209 b 6-17,1 have tried to show that his view of Plato is right.1 In this paper, I would like to show that in his réfutation of both possibilities Aristotle argues dialectically in the proper sense; that is, he does not use any assumption that is peculiar to his own theory and not shared by his Opponent. For this purpose I présent (I.) Aristotle's différent usages of (ού) χωρίζεται/χωριστός (»[not] separated/separable«) and (II.) the three différent interprétations of 209 b 22-28 in Philoponus, Simplicius, and Sorabji, and I rule out Sorabji's interprétation. Thereafter, I will give three reasons for Simplicius's interprétation. The first relates to (III.) the issue of prin ciples as the main topic of the Physics in général. Secondly, (IV.) Philoponus's interprétation of 209 b 22-28 contradicts Aristotle's own définition of Space. Thirdly, (V.) only in Simplicius's interprétation is the argument dialectically va lid. Thereafter, I will show (VI.) that the argument in Simplicius's interprétation is conclusive against Plato's reasoning in the Timaeus to finish with (VII.) some général remarks on this paper and the paper on 209 b 1-17. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/We3uupXlF3bVzh0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"592","_score":null,"_source":{"id":592,"authors_free":[{"id":843,"entry_id":592,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":102,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fritsche, Johannes ","free_first_name":"Johannes","free_last_name":"Fritsche","norm_person":{"id":102,"first_name":"Johannes ","last_name":"Fritsche","full_name":"Fritsche, Johannes ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1204083266","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter (\"Physics\" IV:2, 209 B 17\u201332)","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter (\"Physics\" IV:2, 209 B 17\u201332)"},"abstract":"In Physics IV.2, Aristotle argues for private Space of a body as its form (209 b 1-6) and as its matter (209 b 6-11) to conclude that Plato maintains that \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1, matter, and space are the same (209 b 11-17). Subsequently, he r\u00e9fut\u00e9s both possibilities of conceiving Space (209 b 17-28). In a paper on 209 b 6-17,1 have tried to show that his view of Plato is right.1 In this paper, I would like to show that in his r\u00e9futation of both possibilities Aristotle argues dialectically in the proper sense; that is, he does not use any assumption that is peculiar to his own theory and not shared by his Opponent. For this purpose I pr\u00e9sent (I.) Aristotle's diff\u00e9rent usages of (\u03bf\u03cd) \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\/\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 (\u00bb[not] separated\/separable\u00ab) and (II.) the three diff\u00e9rent interpr\u00e9tations of 209 b 22-28 in Philoponus, Simplicius, and Sorabji, and I rule out Sorabji's interpr\u00e9tation. Thereafter, I will give three reasons for Simplicius's interpr\u00e9tation. The first relates to (III.) the issue of prin ciples as the main topic of the Physics in g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Secondly, (IV.) Philoponus's interpr\u00e9tation of 209 b 22-28 contradicts Aristotle's own d\u00e9finition of Space. Thirdly, (V.) only in Simplicius's interpr\u00e9tation is the argument dialectically va lid. Thereafter, I will show (VI.) that the argument in Simplicius's interpr\u00e9tation is conclusive against Plato's reasoning in the Timaeus to finish with (VII.) some g\u00e9n\u00e9ral remarks on this paper and the paper on 209 b 1-17. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/We3uupXlF3bVzh0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":102,"full_name":"Fritsche, Johannes ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":592,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"48","issue":"","pages":"45-63"}},"sort":[2006]}
Title | The Presocratics in the doxographical tradition. Sources, controversies, and current research |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Studia Humaniora Tartuensia |
Volume | 6 |
Issue | 6 |
Pages | 1-26 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I present a synthetic overview of recent and ongoing research in the field of doxography, that is, the study of the nature, transmission and interrelations of sources for ancient Greek philosophy. The latest revisions of the theory of Hermann Diels (Doxographi Graeci 1879) regarding the historiography ought to be known more widely, as they still influence our understanding of the Presocratics and their reception. The scholarly study on the compilations of Greek philosophical views from Hellenistic and later periods has received a major boost by the first of a projected three-volume study by Mansfeld and Runia (1997). Taking their work as a firm basis I also describe my own work in this area and how it can be related to, and fitted into, this trend by outlining how two important sources for the historiography of Greek philosophy, Theo-phrastus (4th–3rd c. BCE) and Simplicius (early 6th c. AD) stand in a special relation to each other and form an important strand in the doxographical tradition. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/OYlxoMJYDjcTIPa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1201","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1201,"authors_free":[{"id":1774,"entry_id":1201,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Presocratics in the doxographical tradition. Sources, controversies, and current research","main_title":{"title":"The Presocratics in the doxographical tradition. Sources, controversies, and current research"},"abstract":"In this paper I present a synthetic overview of recent and ongoing research in the field of doxography, that is, the study of the nature, transmission and interrelations of sources for ancient Greek philosophy. The latest revisions of the theory of Hermann Diels (Doxographi Graeci 1879) regarding the historiography ought to be known more widely, as they still influence our understanding of the Presocratics and their reception. The scholarly study on the compilations of Greek philosophical views from Hellenistic and later periods has received a major boost by the first of a projected three-volume study by Mansfeld and Runia (1997). Taking their work as a firm basis I also describe my own work in this area and how it can be related to, and fitted into, this trend by outlining how two important sources for the historiography of Greek philosophy, Theo-phrastus (4th\u20133rd c. BCE) and Simplicius (early 6th c. AD) stand in a special relation to each other and form an important strand in the doxographical tradition. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/OYlxoMJYDjcTIPa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1201,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia Humaniora Tartuensia","volume":"6","issue":"6","pages":"1-26"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes |
Volume | 68 |
Pages | 157-211 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Knox, Dilwyn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
What do these ideas tell us about Copernicus the philosopher? He drew on Stoic and, perhaps unknowingly at times, Platonic doctrines of the elements, but he avoided their metaphysical implications. There would have been little point, even if he had been so inclined, in compromising his heliocentric hypothesis, contentious as he knew it was, with suspect doctrines of, say, spiritus and cosmic animation. For three centuries, scholastic theologians and philosophers, despite Aristotle's statements to the contrary, had done their best to de-animate the heavens. Nor, for the same reason, should we think that Neoplatonic sun symbolism was important to him. His brief references to sun symbolism and Hermes Trismegistus take up no more than five or so lines and derive mostly from standard classical sources, including Pliny in a passage immediately following the latter's discussion of gravity. The main problem facing Copernicus was to make the earth move, not to explain why the sun stood at the center. He also consulted doxographical works explaining the many and divergent views of ancient thinkers, for instance, pseudo-Plutarch's Placita philosophorum, Bessarion's In calumniatorem Platonis, and Giorgio Valla's De expetendis. He consulted classical Latin authors like Pliny and Cicero, who, through the endeavors of Renaissance humanists and the agency of the printing press, had become better known during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His extensive use of Pliny's Natural History, Book II, exemplifies the way in which the latter became a popular source for alternatives to Aristotelian or scholastic natural philosophy during the sixteenth century. The greatest debt, in other words, that Copernicus the cosmologist owed was not to Renaissance Platonism or a revamped Aristotelianism. It was rather to the variety of ancient learning promoted by Renaissance humanists during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. To them he owed not just the wherewithal and encouragement to consult a much wider library of classical authors than his scholastic predecessors were wont to do but also the intellectual flexibility to regard his sources as no more than that—sources for ideas rather than authorities. In this, Copernicus was typical of many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century "scientific" thinkers, Galileo included. But Renaissance humanism left its mark in another important respect. Copernicus set himself the task of learning Greek, and this provided him, if the evidence above is to be trusted, with one of his most important cosmological doctrines. [conclusion p. 210-211] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/x8JGitPSYOT3L0a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"736","_score":null,"_source":{"id":736,"authors_free":[{"id":1099,"entry_id":736,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":217,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Knox, Dilwyn","free_first_name":"Dilwyn","free_last_name":"Knox","norm_person":{"id":217,"first_name":"Dilwyn","last_name":"Knox","full_name":"Knox, Dilwyn","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1048420108","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements","main_title":{"title":"Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements"},"abstract":"What do these ideas tell us about Copernicus the philosopher? He drew on Stoic and, perhaps unknowingly at times, Platonic doctrines of the elements, but he avoided their metaphysical implications. There would have been little point, even if he had been so inclined, in compromising his heliocentric hypothesis, contentious as he knew it was, with suspect doctrines of, say, spiritus and cosmic animation. For three centuries, scholastic theologians and philosophers, despite Aristotle's statements to the contrary, had done their best to de-animate the heavens.\r\n\r\nNor, for the same reason, should we think that Neoplatonic sun symbolism was important to him. His brief references to sun symbolism and Hermes Trismegistus take up no more than five or so lines and derive mostly from standard classical sources, including Pliny in a passage immediately following the latter's discussion of gravity. The main problem facing Copernicus was to make the earth move, not to explain why the sun stood at the center.\r\n\r\nHe also consulted doxographical works explaining the many and divergent views of ancient thinkers, for instance, pseudo-Plutarch's Placita philosophorum, Bessarion's In calumniatorem Platonis, and Giorgio Valla's De expetendis. He consulted classical Latin authors like Pliny and Cicero, who, through the endeavors of Renaissance humanists and the agency of the printing press, had become better known during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His extensive use of Pliny's Natural History, Book II, exemplifies the way in which the latter became a popular source for alternatives to Aristotelian or scholastic natural philosophy during the sixteenth century.\r\n\r\nThe greatest debt, in other words, that Copernicus the cosmologist owed was not to Renaissance Platonism or a revamped Aristotelianism. It was rather to the variety of ancient learning promoted by Renaissance humanists during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. To them he owed not just the wherewithal and encouragement to consult a much wider library of classical authors than his scholastic predecessors were wont to do but also the intellectual flexibility to regard his sources as no more than that\u2014sources for ideas rather than authorities.\r\n\r\nIn this, Copernicus was typical of many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century \"scientific\" thinkers, Galileo included. But Renaissance humanism left its mark in another important respect. Copernicus set himself the task of learning Greek, and this provided him, if the evidence above is to be trusted, with one of his most important cosmological doctrines. [conclusion p. 210-211]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/x8JGitPSYOT3L0a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":217,"full_name":"Knox, Dilwyn","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":736,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes","volume":"68","issue":"","pages":"157-211"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Time, Perpetuity and Eternity in Late Antique Platonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | KronoScope |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 213-235 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Siniossoglou, Nikētas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper focuses on the late antique conception of time, eternity and perpetual duration and examines the relation between these concepts and Plato’s cosmology. By exploring the controversy between pagan philosophers (Proclus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus) and Christian writers (Aeneas of Gaza, Zacharias of Mytilene, Philoponus) in respect to the interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus, I argue that the Neoplatonic doctrine of the perpetuity (ἀïδιότης) of the world derives from a) the intellectual paradigm presupposed by the conceptual framework of late antiquity and b) the commentators’ principal concern for a coherent conception of Platonic cosmology essentially free from internal contradictions. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/a8bG1lq3yiz1Bl1 |
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Title | Unbeachtete Zitate und doxographische Nachrichten in der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 148 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 202-219 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Scholten, Clemens |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi (aetm.) des Johannes Philoponos aus der Zeit bald nach 529 n. Chr. gibt es, über eine Reihe von bereits näher beleuchteten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten hinaus, eine größere Anzahl von bisher unbeachteten doxographischen Materialien, Paraphrasen und/oder Zitaten aus verlorenen Schriften antiker Autoren. Unter quellenkritischen und doxographischen Gesichtspunkten im engeren Sinn ist aetm. noch nicht eigens untersucht worden. Das wird sicherlich damit zu tun haben, dass die Erforschung der doxographischen Überlieferung vor gut hundert Jahren ihren Schwerpunkt auf die vorplatonische Tradition setzte und unter diesem Gesichtspunkt aetm. offenbar zu vernachlässigen glaubte, zumal H. Rabe als Herausgeber von aetm. in seinen Fußnoten die Textnachweise aus den großen Dichtern und Philosophen wie Homer, Platon, Aristoteles, Plotin usw., soweit möglich, zuverlässig geführt hat. Möglicherweise ist daran auch die Einschätzung des letzten Rezensenten der Rabeschen Edition aus dem Jahre 1901 nicht unbeteiligt, der aetm. für unergiebig im Hinblick auf verlorene Quellen hielt und meinte, aetm. habe lediglich bekanntes Material zu bieten. Aber es gab damals schon andere Stimmen. Bemerkenswerterweise hatte ein Jahr zuvor Wendland in seiner Rezension anders geurteilt. Ebenso forderte Gudeman in seinem RE-Artikel „Johannes Philoponos“ aus dem Jahre 1915 die Aufarbeitung der Quellenfrage. Bei diesem Desiderat ist es allerdings bis heute geblieben. In größerem Umfang sind lediglich die Teile des Quellenmaterials aus aetm. behandelt worden, die für die Timaios-Kommentierung in der Zeit vor Proklos von Belang sind. Es handelt sich besonders um Texte aus den Timaios-Kommentaren des Calvisios Tauros und Porphyrios, die im Rahmen der Sichtung der erhaltenen Stücke aus dem Timaios-Kommentar des Porphyrios zusammengestellt wurden oder bei der Untersuchung der Weltentstehungslehren, wie sie im Rahmen der Exegese des Timaios entwickelt wurden, behandelt worden sind. Auf Proklos-Texte hat Beutler in seinem RE-Artikel hingewiesen, allerdings einiges übersehen. Bereits verifiziert sind ein Zitat aus dem fünften Buch des Timaios-Kommentars des Proklos in aetm. 9,11 (364,5–365,3), die von Johannes Philoponos häufig erwähnte, paraphrasierte oder zitierte Schrift des Proklos Untersuchung der Einwände des Aristoteles gegen den platonischen Timaios (Ἐπἱσκέψις τῶν πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀντιρρηθέντων oder Ὁ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τιμαίου πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην λόγος), die Proklos in seinem Timaios-Kommentar selbst erwähnt und die daher älter als der Kommentar sein dürfte, sowie die Proklos-Schrift Zehn Aporien hinsichtlich der Vorsehung, die Beutler als erster kurz vorgestellt hat und die Boese, Dornseiff und Feldbusch zu größeren Teilen in Texten späterer Autoren wiedergefunden haben. Ein längeres Zitat aus Galens Schrift Über den Beweis ist schon zwei Jahre, bevor Rabe aetm. ediert hat, notiert worden. Eine vollständige Sichtung und Zusammenstellung aller in aetm. benutzten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten gibt es bis jetzt nicht. Die unbeachteten Quellenstücke und doxographischen Nachrichten, die bei der Arbeit an der Übersetzung von aetm. auffielen, sollen im Folgenden vorgestellt werden. [introduction p. 202-204] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9laXIov8GbXAA3T |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1034","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1034,"authors_free":[{"id":1565,"entry_id":1034,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":286,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Scholten, Clemens","free_first_name":"Clemens","free_last_name":"Scholten","norm_person":{"id":286,"first_name":"Clemens","last_name":"Scholten","full_name":"Scholten, Clemens","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/115572538","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Unbeachtete Zitate und doxographische Nachrichten in der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos","main_title":{"title":"Unbeachtete Zitate und doxographische Nachrichten in der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos"},"abstract":"In der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi (aetm.) des Johannes Philoponos aus der Zeit bald nach 529 n. Chr. gibt es, \u00fcber eine Reihe von bereits n\u00e4her beleuchteten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten hinaus, eine gr\u00f6\u00dfere Anzahl von bisher unbeachteten doxographischen Materialien, Paraphrasen und\/oder Zitaten aus verlorenen Schriften antiker Autoren. Unter quellenkritischen und doxographischen Gesichtspunkten im engeren Sinn ist aetm. noch nicht eigens untersucht worden. Das wird sicherlich damit zu tun haben, dass die Erforschung der doxographischen \u00dcberlieferung vor gut hundert Jahren ihren Schwerpunkt auf die vorplatonische Tradition setzte und unter diesem Gesichtspunkt aetm. offenbar zu vernachl\u00e4ssigen glaubte, zumal H. Rabe als Herausgeber von aetm. in seinen Fu\u00dfnoten die Textnachweise aus den gro\u00dfen Dichtern und Philosophen wie Homer, Platon, Aristoteles, Plotin usw., soweit m\u00f6glich, zuverl\u00e4ssig gef\u00fchrt hat.\r\n\r\nM\u00f6glicherweise ist daran auch die Einsch\u00e4tzung des letzten Rezensenten der Rabeschen Edition aus dem Jahre 1901 nicht unbeteiligt, der aetm. f\u00fcr unergiebig im Hinblick auf verlorene Quellen hielt und meinte, aetm. habe lediglich bekanntes Material zu bieten.\r\n\r\nAber es gab damals schon andere Stimmen. Bemerkenswerterweise hatte ein Jahr zuvor Wendland in seiner Rezension anders geurteilt. Ebenso forderte Gudeman in seinem RE-Artikel \u201eJohannes Philoponos\u201c aus dem Jahre 1915 die Aufarbeitung der Quellenfrage. Bei diesem Desiderat ist es allerdings bis heute geblieben.\r\n\r\nIn gr\u00f6\u00dferem Umfang sind lediglich die Teile des Quellenmaterials aus aetm. behandelt worden, die f\u00fcr die Timaios-Kommentierung in der Zeit vor Proklos von Belang sind. Es handelt sich besonders um Texte aus den Timaios-Kommentaren des Calvisios Tauros und Porphyrios, die im Rahmen der Sichtung der erhaltenen St\u00fccke aus dem Timaios-Kommentar des Porphyrios zusammengestellt wurden oder bei der Untersuchung der Weltentstehungslehren, wie sie im Rahmen der Exegese des Timaios entwickelt wurden, behandelt worden sind.\r\n\r\nAuf Proklos-Texte hat Beutler in seinem RE-Artikel hingewiesen, allerdings einiges \u00fcbersehen. Bereits verifiziert sind ein Zitat aus dem f\u00fcnften Buch des Timaios-Kommentars des Proklos in aetm. 9,11 (364,5\u2013365,3), die von Johannes Philoponos h\u00e4ufig erw\u00e4hnte, paraphrasierte oder zitierte Schrift des Proklos Untersuchung der Einw\u00e4nde des Aristoteles gegen den platonischen Timaios (\u1f18\u03c0\u1f31\u03c3\u03ba\u03ad\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd oder \u1f49 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), die Proklos in seinem Timaios-Kommentar selbst erw\u00e4hnt und die daher \u00e4lter als der Kommentar sein d\u00fcrfte, sowie die Proklos-Schrift Zehn Aporien hinsichtlich der Vorsehung, die Beutler als erster kurz vorgestellt hat und die Boese, Dornseiff und Feldbusch zu gr\u00f6\u00dferen Teilen in Texten sp\u00e4terer Autoren wiedergefunden haben.\r\n\r\nEin l\u00e4ngeres Zitat aus Galens Schrift \u00dcber den Beweis ist schon zwei Jahre, bevor Rabe aetm. ediert hat, notiert worden. Eine vollst\u00e4ndige Sichtung und Zusammenstellung aller in aetm. benutzten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten gibt es bis jetzt nicht.\r\n\r\nDie unbeachteten Quellenst\u00fccke und doxographischen Nachrichten, die bei der Arbeit an der \u00dcbersetzung von aetm. auffielen, sollen im Folgenden vorgestellt werden. [introduction p. 202-204]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9laXIov8GbXAA3T","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":286,"full_name":"Scholten, Clemens","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1034,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"148","issue":"2","pages":"202-219"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the "de Anima" in the Tradition of Iamblichus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 58 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 510-530 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Perkams, Matthias |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It has been argued that Priscian of Lydia (around 530), to whom the manuscripts ascribe only two short treatises, is the author of an extended com- mentary on the De anima, which is transmitted under the name of Simplicius. Our analysis confirms this: Priscian's Metaphrase of Theophrastus' Physics is the text which the commentator mentions as his own work. Consequently, its author, Priscian, also wrote the De anima commentary. The parallels between both texts show that the commentator sometimes does not quote Iamblichus directly, but borrowed Iamblichean formulations from the Metaphrase. As for the dating of his works, a comparison with Damascius' writings makes it probable that his On principks is a terminus post quem for the De anima commentary and a terminus ante quern for the Metaphrase. It is likely that both works were composed before 529. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BTWKXjso1hvwiLb |
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Title | L'écriture et les Présocratiques: Analyse de l'interprétation de Eric Havelock |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 23 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 75-92 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Palù, Chiara |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
L'interprétation de Havelock situe les penseurs présocratiques, ou plutôt pré-platoniciens, dans un milieu qu'il définit comme étant antérieur à la diffusion de l'écriture (pre-literacy). Cette interprétation provient de sa thèse générale, qui concerne la question du passage entre l'oralité et l'écriture en Grèce ancienne. Si l'introduction de l'alphabet phénicien, à l'époque archaïque, entraîne l'abandon des systèmes de communication orale, fondés sur l'écoute et la mémorisation, au profit de nouveaux systèmes fondés sur la circulation et la lecture individuelle de textes écrits, ce passage ne s'effectue cependant pas d'un seul coup. En dépit de l'introduction de l'écriture, continuent de subsister, pendant presque toute l'époque archaïque, des mécanismes de performance orale, tandis que l'écriture, à son début, n'avait qu'une seule fonction, celle de fixer la parole. Havelock, pour soutenir sa thèse, s'appuie initialement sur le Phèdre de Platon. La réflexion de Platon, qui, du reste, n'est pas isolée, est perçue comme une sorte de prise de conscience de problématiques préexistantes, au terme d'un processus de mutation culturelle dans lequel l'écriture joue un rôle déterminant. La critique de l'écriture, en effet, peut être définie comme une dernière défense de la parole orale à une époque où l'écrit prédomine désormais. C'est en un second temps que Havelock s'est tourné vers les textes des présocratiques eux-mêmes. Il est vrai que dans la tradition pré-platonicienne, il n'existe pas de texte comme le Phèdre, qui thématise la question de l'écriture, mais, d'après Havelock, on peut repérer, dans les textes des présocratiques, les traces des structures orales qui avaient caractérisé la phase précédant la réintroduction de l'écriture. Havelock souligne surtout l'adoption de la métrique et du rythme dans les poèmes d'Empédocle, Xénophane et Parménide, et le recours à une prose poétique dans le discours d'Héraclite, en tant qu'éléments qui devaient faciliter la mémorisation pour un public d'auditeurs. Mais l'approche de Havelock n'est pas seulement stylistique. La diffusion progressive, à l'époque archaïque, de la literacy aux dépens de l'oralité requiert l'adoption d'un nouveau langage, qui prend ses distances par rapport au langage mythique et détermine ainsi l'émergence de la philosophie elle-même. Selon Havelock, c'est justement cette relation que Platon n'a pas vue, et c'est de là que provient le caractère contradictoire de sa critique à l'égard de l'écriture. La thèse de Havelock n'a pas manqué de susciter des réactions parmi les interprètes, en produisant, ces dernières années, une quantité remarquable d'études consacrées à ce sujet. En général, les interprètes ont analysé surtout la relation supposée entre le langage des présocratiques et l'écriture, d'une part, et celle entre l'écriture et l'émergence de la philosophie, d'autre part. La réflexion sur le langage devrait, en effet, renforcer la thèse de Havelock à l'égard de la permanence de structures orales dans les textes des présocratiques, et cette permanence devrait, à son tour, renforcer le rapport reconstitué par Havelock entre écriture et émergence de la philosophie. Mais l'analyse stylistique, à elle seule, ne permet pas de conclure à la permanence de structures orales, et ces dernières sont tout aussi peu concluantes en tant qu'arguments à l'appui du rapport supposé entre écriture et émergence de la philosophie. [introduction p. 75-77] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qlp5mJ4QSDQl1a0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1091","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1091,"authors_free":[{"id":1649,"entry_id":1091,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":281,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","free_first_name":"Chiara","free_last_name":"Pal\u00f9","norm_person":{"id":281,"first_name":"Chiara","last_name":"Pal\u00f9","full_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock","main_title":{"title":"L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock"},"abstract":"L'interpr\u00e9tation de Havelock situe les penseurs pr\u00e9socratiques, ou plut\u00f4t pr\u00e9-platoniciens, dans un milieu qu'il d\u00e9finit comme \u00e9tant ant\u00e9rieur \u00e0 la diffusion de l'\u00e9criture (pre-literacy). Cette interpr\u00e9tation provient de sa th\u00e8se g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, qui concerne la question du passage entre l'oralit\u00e9 et l'\u00e9criture en Gr\u00e8ce ancienne.\r\n\r\nSi l'introduction de l'alphabet ph\u00e9nicien, \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque archa\u00efque, entra\u00eene l'abandon des syst\u00e8mes de communication orale, fond\u00e9s sur l'\u00e9coute et la m\u00e9morisation, au profit de nouveaux syst\u00e8mes fond\u00e9s sur la circulation et la lecture individuelle de textes \u00e9crits, ce passage ne s'effectue cependant pas d'un seul coup. En d\u00e9pit de l'introduction de l'\u00e9criture, continuent de subsister, pendant presque toute l'\u00e9poque archa\u00efque, des m\u00e9canismes de performance orale, tandis que l'\u00e9criture, \u00e0 son d\u00e9but, n'avait qu'une seule fonction, celle de fixer la parole.\r\n\r\nHavelock, pour soutenir sa th\u00e8se, s'appuie initialement sur le Ph\u00e8dre de Platon. La r\u00e9flexion de Platon, qui, du reste, n'est pas isol\u00e9e, est per\u00e7ue comme une sorte de prise de conscience de probl\u00e9matiques pr\u00e9existantes, au terme d'un processus de mutation culturelle dans lequel l'\u00e9criture joue un r\u00f4le d\u00e9terminant. La critique de l'\u00e9criture, en effet, peut \u00eatre d\u00e9finie comme une derni\u00e8re d\u00e9fense de la parole orale \u00e0 une \u00e9poque o\u00f9 l'\u00e9crit pr\u00e9domine d\u00e9sormais.\r\n\r\nC'est en un second temps que Havelock s'est tourn\u00e9 vers les textes des pr\u00e9socratiques eux-m\u00eames. Il est vrai que dans la tradition pr\u00e9-platonicienne, il n'existe pas de texte comme le Ph\u00e8dre, qui th\u00e9matise la question de l'\u00e9criture, mais, d'apr\u00e8s Havelock, on peut rep\u00e9rer, dans les textes des pr\u00e9socratiques, les traces des structures orales qui avaient caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 la phase pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant la r\u00e9introduction de l'\u00e9criture.\r\n\r\nHavelock souligne surtout l'adoption de la m\u00e9trique et du rythme dans les po\u00e8mes d'Emp\u00e9docle, X\u00e9nophane et Parm\u00e9nide, et le recours \u00e0 une prose po\u00e9tique dans le discours d'H\u00e9raclite, en tant qu'\u00e9l\u00e9ments qui devaient faciliter la m\u00e9morisation pour un public d'auditeurs. Mais l'approche de Havelock n'est pas seulement stylistique.\r\n\r\nLa diffusion progressive, \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque archa\u00efque, de la literacy aux d\u00e9pens de l'oralit\u00e9 requiert l'adoption d'un nouveau langage, qui prend ses distances par rapport au langage mythique et d\u00e9termine ainsi l'\u00e9mergence de la philosophie elle-m\u00eame. Selon Havelock, c'est justement cette relation que Platon n'a pas vue, et c'est de l\u00e0 que provient le caract\u00e8re contradictoire de sa critique \u00e0 l'\u00e9gard de l'\u00e9criture.\r\n\r\nLa th\u00e8se de Havelock n'a pas manqu\u00e9 de susciter des r\u00e9actions parmi les interpr\u00e8tes, en produisant, ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, une quantit\u00e9 remarquable d'\u00e9tudes consacr\u00e9es \u00e0 ce sujet.\r\n\r\nEn g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, les interpr\u00e8tes ont analys\u00e9 surtout la relation suppos\u00e9e entre le langage des pr\u00e9socratiques et l'\u00e9criture, d'une part, et celle entre l'\u00e9criture et l'\u00e9mergence de la philosophie, d'autre part. La r\u00e9flexion sur le langage devrait, en effet, renforcer la th\u00e8se de Havelock \u00e0 l'\u00e9gard de la permanence de structures orales dans les textes des pr\u00e9socratiques, et cette permanence devrait, \u00e0 son tour, renforcer le rapport reconstitu\u00e9 par Havelock entre \u00e9criture et \u00e9mergence de la philosophie.\r\n\r\nMais l'analyse stylistique, \u00e0 elle seule, ne permet pas de conclure \u00e0 la permanence de structures orales, et ces derni\u00e8res sont tout aussi peu concluantes en tant qu'arguments \u00e0 l'appui du rapport suppos\u00e9 entre \u00e9criture et \u00e9mergence de la philosophie. [introduction p. 75-77]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qlp5mJ4QSDQl1a0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":281,"full_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1091,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"23","issue":"2","pages":"75-92"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Échelle de la nature et division des mouvements chez Aristote et les stoïciens |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale |
Volume | 4 |
Pages | 537-556 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bénatoui͏̈l, Thomas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The stoic scala naturae was based, among other things, on a division of natural movements, which this paper studies in order to understand the way in which stoicism approached Nature and its empirical diversity. First, I argue against David Hahm's interpretation that movement «through» (dia) oneself is not on a par with the other natural movements: far from being specific to stones or elements, it designates the movement which is specifically produced by the nature of a thing or being. The aristotelian and stoic analysis of self-movement are then shown to share their basic principles but to lead to diverging approaches of Nature: whereas Aristotle looks for the origin and causes of natural movements, the Stoics offer a taxonomy of visible movements. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FNx2a2OooxZH2YG |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"832","_score":null,"_source":{"id":832,"authors_free":[{"id":1236,"entry_id":832,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":414,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l, Thomas","free_first_name":"Thomas","free_last_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l","norm_person":{"id":414,"first_name":"Thomas","last_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l","full_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l, Thomas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/143798405","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u00c9chelle de la nature et division des mouvements chez Aristote et les sto\u00efciens","main_title":{"title":"\u00c9chelle de la nature et division des mouvements chez Aristote et les sto\u00efciens"},"abstract":"The stoic scala naturae was based, among other things, on a division of natural movements, which this paper studies in order to understand the way in which stoicism approached Nature and its empirical diversity. First, I argue against David Hahm's interpretation that movement \u00abthrough\u00bb (dia) oneself is not on a par with the other natural movements: far from being specific to stones or elements, it designates the movement which is specifically produced by the nature of a thing or being. The aristotelian and stoic analysis of self-movement are then shown to share their basic principles but to lead to diverging approaches of Nature: whereas Aristotle looks for the origin and causes of natural movements, the Stoics offer a taxonomy of visible movements. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FNx2a2OooxZH2YG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":414,"full_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l, Thomas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":832,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale","volume":"4","issue":"","pages":"537-556"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of the Changer to the Changed |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 55 (New Series) |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 447–454 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wilberding, James |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As we have seen above, Plotinus' hesitation with respect to (1) probably derived from his theory of double activity, and so Simplicius' willingness to agree to (1) suggests that he did not adopt this theory. Indeed, I suspect this was the case. It is true that the structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics that one encounters in Simplicius bears many similarities to that of Plotinus, including much of the language of procession. Both, for example, speak of lower substances "proceeding (προιέναι)" from and "enjoying" (ἀπολαμβάνειν) "radiation" (ἀπαύγασις or περιλάμπσις) from their priors. But nowhere, I claim, does Simplicius explain procession by means of Plotinus' theory of double activity. There is, of course, no great proof stone for such negative claims. Nevertheless, this claim can be partially verified by checking to see what Simplicius has to say about Plotinus' favourite examples of double activity—light, heat, and the images in mirrors—as well as by searching the Simplician corpus to see if he uses the designations for internal and external activity that Plotinus uses. Investigation shows that Simplicius does not make use of Plotinus' designations. The closest we get is a passage in his commentary on the Physics where he provides a long quotation of Damascius in which the theory seems to appear. Otherwise, we find only some discussion of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality. But Simplicius does not distinguish the activity τῆς οὐσίας from that ἐκ (or ἀπὸ) τῆς οὐσίας, nor that πρὸς τὸ ἄνω from that πρὸς τὸ κάτω, nor that ἐν αὐτῇ (or αὐτῇ) from that ἐξ (or παρ’) αὐτῆς. Moreover, we can see that none of Plotinus' three examples is employed by Simplicius to explain double activity. Regarding the nature of light, Simplicius is even rather non-committal at times. As for heat, even when Simplicius discusses the distinction between the heat that is proper to fire (that is, the internal activity) and the heat that fire produces in another thing (that is, the external activity), he does so without using the language of the double activity theory. And Simplicius simply does not make much use of mirrors. All of this, I believe, points to the conclusion that Simplicius does not employ Plotinus' distinction between internal and external activity. If this is right, it perhaps does not imply that Simplicius' views on the metaphysics of procession are all that different from Plotinus', but at the very least, it would show that there is sometimes a considerable difference in the way he goes about describing those views. [conclusion p. 453-454] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/2vgk7grGxbqIV3p |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"431","_score":null,"_source":{"id":431,"authors_free":[{"id":582,"entry_id":431,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":257,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wilberding, James","free_first_name":"James","free_last_name":"Wilberding","norm_person":{"id":257,"first_name":"James","last_name":"Wilberding","full_name":"Wilberding, James","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/143517465","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of the Changer to the Changed","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of the Changer to the Changed"},"abstract":"As we have seen above, Plotinus' hesitation with respect to (1) probably derived from his theory of double activity, and so Simplicius' willingness to agree to (1) suggests that he did not adopt this theory. Indeed, I suspect this was the case. It is true that the structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics that one encounters in Simplicius bears many similarities to that of Plotinus, including much of the language of procession. Both, for example, speak of lower substances \"proceeding (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9)\" from and \"enjoying\" (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd) \"radiation\" (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03cd\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bb\u03ac\u03bc\u03c0\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) from their priors. But nowhere, I claim, does Simplicius explain procession by means of Plotinus' theory of double activity.\r\n\r\nThere is, of course, no great proof stone for such negative claims. Nevertheless, this claim can be partially verified by checking to see what Simplicius has to say about Plotinus' favourite examples of double activity\u2014light, heat, and the images in mirrors\u2014as well as by searching the Simplician corpus to see if he uses the designations for internal and external activity that Plotinus uses. Investigation shows that Simplicius does not make use of Plotinus' designations. The closest we get is a passage in his commentary on the Physics where he provides a long quotation of Damascius in which the theory seems to appear. Otherwise, we find only some discussion of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality. But Simplicius does not distinguish the activity \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 from that \u1f10\u03ba (or \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78) \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, nor that \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 from that \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9, nor that \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 (or \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7) from that \u1f10\u03be (or \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019) \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2.\r\n\r\nMoreover, we can see that none of Plotinus' three examples is employed by Simplicius to explain double activity. Regarding the nature of light, Simplicius is even rather non-committal at times. As for heat, even when Simplicius discusses the distinction between the heat that is proper to fire (that is, the internal activity) and the heat that fire produces in another thing (that is, the external activity), he does so without using the language of the double activity theory. And Simplicius simply does not make much use of mirrors. All of this, I believe, points to the conclusion that Simplicius does not employ Plotinus' distinction between internal and external activity.\r\n\r\nIf this is right, it perhaps does not imply that Simplicius' views on the metaphysics of procession are all that different from Plotinus', but at the very least, it would show that there is sometimes a considerable difference in the way he goes about describing those views. [conclusion p. 453-454]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/2vgk7grGxbqIV3p","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":257,"full_name":"Wilberding, James","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":431,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"55 (New Series)","issue":"2","pages":"447\u2013454"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Where to Live the Philosophical Life in the Sixth Century? Damascius, Simplicius, and the Return from Persia |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 285-315 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Watts, Edward Jay |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The closing of the Neoplatonic school in Athens by Justinian in 532 was not the end of classical philosophy, for when they returned to the Empire from Persia two years later the philosophers did not need to reconstitute the school at Harran or at any particular city in order to continue their philosophical activities. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EoZ3BSOdBPuEnet |
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Title | Review of Rescigno, A. 2004: Alessandro di Afrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del Primo Libro |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Bryn Mawr Classical Review |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 38 |
Pages | 750 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, Robert B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is a sure sign that a field in classical studies is maturing when the fragments of its authors come in for close scrutiny. Where the Greek Aristotelian commentators are concerned, the way was pointed, in this as in so many other areas, by the late Paul Moraux, who in his early and epochal study of Alexander of Aphrodisias's psychological works included an appendix of selected fragments of this commentator's lost exegesis of Aristotle's De animaJ Later he reconstructed thefragments of the same philosopher's treatment of the Posterior Analytics.2 More recently, Arabists in particular have worked on fragments of Alexander's commentaries on the Physics and De generatione et corruptione, while Moraux in the posthumously published third volume of his Aristotelismus surveyed the fragments of several of the lost commentaries.3 One of these was the commentary on the De caelo, the first part of which Andrea Rescigno, in the first of two projected volumes, has now treated exhaustively in his edition of the fragments of the commentary on Book 1. [introduction p. 1] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4vzysjSHY0mmOvC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"462","_score":null,"_source":{"id":462,"authors_free":[{"id":619,"entry_id":462,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":340,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Todd, Robert B.","free_first_name":"Robert B.","free_last_name":"Todd","norm_person":{"id":340,"first_name":"Robert B.","last_name":"Todd","full_name":"Todd, Robert B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/129460788","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Rescigno, A. 2004: Alessandro di Afrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del Primo Libro","main_title":{"title":"Review of Rescigno, A. 2004: Alessandro di Afrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del Primo Libro"},"abstract":"It is a sure sign that a field in classical studies is maturing when the fragments of its \r\nauthors come in for close scrutiny. Where the Greek Aristotelian commentators are \r\nconcerned, the way was pointed, in this as in so many other areas, by the late Paul \r\nMoraux, who in his early and epochal study of Alexander of Aphrodisias's \r\npsychological works included an appendix of selected fragments of this \r\ncommentator's lost exegesis of Aristotle's De animaJ Later he reconstructed thefragments of the same philosopher's treatment of the Posterior Analytics.2 More \r\nrecently, Arabists in particular have worked on fragments of Alexander's \r\ncommentaries on the Physics and De generatione et corruptione, while Moraux in \r\nthe posthumously published third volume of his Aristotelismus surveyed the \r\nfragments of several of the lost commentaries.3 One of these was the commentary \r\non the De caelo, the first part of which Andrea Rescigno, in the first of two \r\nprojected volumes, has now treated exhaustively in his edition of the fragments of \r\nthe commentary on Book 1. [introduction p. 1]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4vzysjSHY0mmOvC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":340,"full_name":"Todd, Robert B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":462,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bryn Mawr Classical Review","volume":"10","issue":"38","pages":"750"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 50 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-42 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Henry, Devin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Historically embryogenesis has been among the most philosophically intriguing phenomena. In this paper I focus on one aspect of biological development that was particularly perplexing to the ancients: self-organisation. For many ancients, the fact that an organism determines the important features of its own development required a special model for understanding how this was possible. This was especially true for Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius, who all looked to contemporary technology to supply that model. However, they did not all agree on what kind of device should be used. In this paper I explore the way these ancients made use of technology as a model for the developing embryo. I argue that their different choices of device reveal fundamental differences in the way each thinker understood the nature of biological development itself. In the final section of the paper I challenge the traditional view (dating back to Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle) that the use of automata in GA can simply be read off from their use in the de motu. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1E80hY0xXEIYf7e |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"512","_score":null,"_source":{"id":512,"authors_free":[{"id":711,"entry_id":512,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":1,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Henry, Devin","free_first_name":"Devin","free_last_name":"Henry","norm_person":{"id":1,"first_name":"Devin ","last_name":"Henry","full_name":"Henry, Devin ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1071377922","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy"},"abstract":"Historically embryogenesis has been among the most philosophically intriguing phenomena. In this paper I focus on one aspect of biological development that was particularly perplexing to the ancients: self-organisation. For many ancients, the fact that an organism determines the important features of its own develop\u00adment required a special model for understanding how this was possible. This was especially true for Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius, who all looked to con\u00adtemporary technology to supply that model. However, they did not all agree on what kind of device should be used. In this paper I explore the way these ancients made use of technology as a model for the developing embryo. I argue that their different choices of device reveal fundamental differences in the way each thinker understood the nature of biological development itself. In the final section of the paper I challenge the traditional view (dating back to Alexander\u2019s interpretation of Aristotle) that the use of automata in GA can simply be read off from their use in the de motu. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1E80hY0xXEIYf7e","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":1,"full_name":"Henry, Devin ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":512,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"50","issue":"1","pages":"1-42"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | What is Platonism? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Journal of the History of Philosophy |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 253-276 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of “top-downism.” So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there are at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be similarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1317","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1317,"authors_free":[{"id":1951,"entry_id":1317,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What is Platonism?","main_title":{"title":"What is Platonism?"},"abstract":"My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of \u201ctop-downism.\u201d So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there\r\nare at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be\r\nsimilarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1317,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the History of Philosophy","volume":"43","issue":"3","pages":"253-276"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | The Review of Metaphysics |
Volume | 59 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 287-311 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hubler, J. Noel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle's brief consideration of self-perception engaged in an extensive discussion of the problem, offering various interpretations of apperception from the second to sixth century. The commentators modeled their explanation of self-awareness in perception on their understanding of the nature of knowledge in general and their notion of what the core meaning of truth was. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XGXaGpEPq3YahVv |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1354","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1354,"authors_free":[{"id":2028,"entry_id":1354,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":199,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hubler, J. Noel","free_first_name":"J. Noel","free_last_name":"Hubler","norm_person":{"id":199,"first_name":"J. Noel","last_name":"Hubler","full_name":"Hubler, J. Noel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/188463461","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle","main_title":{"title":"The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle"},"abstract":"The ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle's brief consideration of self-perception engaged in an extensive discussion of the problem, offering various interpretations of apperception from the second to sixth century. The commentators modeled their explanation of self-awareness in perception on their understanding of the nature of knowledge in general and their notion of what the core meaning of truth was. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/XGXaGpEPq3YahVv","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":199,"full_name":"Hubler, J. Noel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1354,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"59","issue":"2","pages":"287-311"}},"sort":[2005]}
Title | Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: An Important Contribution to the History of the Ancient |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2004 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 147 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 408-420 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In the first place, the survey of the commentaries on the Categories with which Simplicius provides us, as well as the examination undertaken by J. M. Dillon of the fragments of Iamblichus’ commentaries on Plato’s dialogues, show as clearly as possible that the form of the continuous commentary was utilized by the Neoplatonists right from the start, and that it therefore was not introduced by Syrianus. Secondly, an attentive comparison between those Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories that have come down to us proves that a genuine doctrinal continuity existed from Porphyry to Simplicius. In addition, I consider it likely that an analogous continuity with regard to the tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle also existed in the Neoplatonic commentaries on the Metaphysics, of which only that of Syrianus (partial), and that of Asclepius-Ammonius (partial) have come down to us, whereas those of Porphyry and Iamblichus are lost, but attested, and that Syrianus’ attitude, which he manifests in the introduction to his commentary on book My the Metaphysics, is therefore no more original than his use of the form of the continuous commentary. In conclusion, Syrianus was certainly a great philosopher, but, as far as the precise points dealt with in this article are concerned, he was not the innovator he has been made out to be. [conclusion, p. 419-420] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/iOqb6gj8D2LqZxB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"638","_score":null,"_source":{"id":638,"authors_free":[{"id":904,"entry_id":638,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: An Important Contribution to the History of the Ancient","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: An Important Contribution to the History of the Ancient"},"abstract":"In the first place, the survey of the commentaries on the Categories with which Simplicius provides us, as well as the examination undertaken by J. M. Dillon of the fragments of Iamblichus\u2019 commentaries on Plato\u2019s dialogues, show as clearly as possible that the form of the continuous commentary was utilized by the Neoplatonists right from the start, and that it therefore was not introduced by Syrianus. Secondly, an attentive comparison between those Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories that have come down to us proves that a genuine doctrinal continuity existed from Porphyry to Simplicius. In addition, I consider it likely that an analogous continuity with regard to the tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle also existed in the Neoplatonic commentaries on the Metaphysics, of which only that of Syrianus (partial), and that of Asclepius-Ammonius (partial) have come down to us, whereas those of Porphyry and Iamblichus are lost, but attested, and that Syrianus\u2019 attitude, which he manifests in the introduction to his commentary on book My the Metaphysics, is therefore no more original than his use of the form of the continuous commentary. In conclusion, Syrianus was certainly a great philosopher, but, as far as the precise points dealt with in this article are concerned, he was not the innovator he has been made out to be. [conclusion, p. 419-420]","btype":3,"date":"2004","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/iOqb6gj8D2LqZxB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":638,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"147","issue":"3\/4","pages":"408-420"}},"sort":[2004]}
Title | La pensée s'exprime «grâce» à l'être (Parménide, fr. 8.35) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2004 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 194 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 5-13 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cordero, Néstor-Luis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Peu de temps après la mort de son père spirituel, Platon n'hésite pas à rendre un hommage appuyé au « vénérable et redoutable » Parménide ; mais, en même temps, il ne peut pas s'empêcher d'avouer : étant donné sa profondeur (bathos), « je crains tout à la fois que ses paroles, nous ne les comprenions pas, et que ce qu'il pensait en les prononçant nous dépasse beaucoup plus ». Mais ce que Platon ne dit pas, c'est que cette difficulté l'a poussé à essayer de déchiffrer le logos parménidien. Vingt-cinq siècles après, Marcel Conche en a fait autant, et c'est sur le chemin de Parménide que j'ai eu la chance et le grand honneur de faire sa connaissance. Et je peux témoigner que Platon avait raison : la pensée de Parménide nous a tellement dépassés qu'elle a pu être à l'origine d'interprétations très diverses et, même si l'Éléate était surpris d'apprendre qu'il était à la fois un et multiple, il faut admettre que le chemin de recherche qu'il a inauguré reste ouvert, car sa richesse est inépuisable. Le dialogue que je voudrais entamer avec Marcel Conche concerne l'un des passages les plus controversés du Poème, l'énigmatique vers 8.35. Nous nous sommes occupés de ce texte dans notre travail Les deux chemins de Parménide, et Marcel Conche a commenté avec perspicacité notre interprétation, mais il n'a pas été convaincu par le texte que nous proposons de suivre à la place du texte traditionnel. Je voudrais renforcer les arguments donnés il y a quelques années dans le travail cité ci-dessus, car les échos de la lecture (il ne s'agit pas d'une conjecture) que nous proposons n'ont été que très restreints, malgré les points obscurs que notre solution permet d'éclairer. Regardons donc le contexte de ce passage. [introduction p. 5-6] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GrJltxCHr2iNGon |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1279","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1279,"authors_free":[{"id":1868,"entry_id":1279,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":54,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":{"id":54,"first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","last_name":"Cordero","full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1055808973","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)","main_title":{"title":"La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)"},"abstract":"Peu de temps apr\u00e8s la mort de son p\u00e8re spirituel, Platon n'h\u00e9site pas \u00e0 rendre un hommage appuy\u00e9 au \u00ab v\u00e9n\u00e9rable et redoutable \u00bb Parm\u00e9nide ; mais, en m\u00eame temps, il ne peut pas s'emp\u00eacher d'avouer : \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 sa profondeur (bathos), \u00ab je crains tout \u00e0 la fois que ses paroles, nous ne les comprenions pas, et que ce qu'il pensait en les pronon\u00e7ant nous d\u00e9passe beaucoup plus \u00bb. Mais ce que Platon ne dit pas, c'est que cette difficult\u00e9 l'a pouss\u00e9 \u00e0 essayer de d\u00e9chiffrer le logos parm\u00e9nidien. Vingt-cinq si\u00e8cles apr\u00e8s, Marcel Conche en a fait autant, et c'est sur le chemin de Parm\u00e9nide que j'ai eu la chance et le grand honneur de faire sa connaissance. Et je peux t\u00e9moigner que Platon avait raison : la pens\u00e9e de Parm\u00e9nide nous a tellement d\u00e9pass\u00e9s qu'elle a pu \u00eatre \u00e0 l'origine d'interpr\u00e9tations tr\u00e8s diverses et, m\u00eame si l'\u00c9l\u00e9ate \u00e9tait surpris d'apprendre qu'il \u00e9tait \u00e0 la fois un et multiple, il faut admettre que le chemin de recherche qu'il a inaugur\u00e9 reste ouvert, car sa richesse est in\u00e9puisable.\r\n\r\nLe dialogue que je voudrais entamer avec Marcel Conche concerne l'un des passages les plus controvers\u00e9s du Po\u00e8me, l'\u00e9nigmatique vers 8.35. Nous nous sommes occup\u00e9s de ce texte dans notre travail Les deux chemins de Parm\u00e9nide, et Marcel Conche a comment\u00e9 avec perspicacit\u00e9 notre interpr\u00e9tation, mais il n'a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 convaincu par le texte que nous proposons de suivre \u00e0 la place du texte traditionnel. Je voudrais renforcer les arguments donn\u00e9s il y a quelques ann\u00e9es dans le travail cit\u00e9 ci-dessus, car les \u00e9chos de la lecture (il ne s'agit pas d'une conjecture) que nous proposons n'ont \u00e9t\u00e9 que tr\u00e8s restreints, malgr\u00e9 les points obscurs que notre solution permet d'\u00e9clairer. Regardons donc le contexte de ce passage. [introduction p. 5-6]","btype":3,"date":"2004","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GrJltxCHr2iNGon","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":54,"full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1279,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"194","issue":"1","pages":"5-13"}},"sort":[2004]}
Title | Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2004 |
Journal | Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie |
Volume | 29 |
Pages | 225-247 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Steel, Carlos , Helmig, Christoph |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dieser Artikel berichtete über weniger als zehn Jahre Forschung im Bereich des Neuplatonismus. Und doch ist es erfreulich festzustellen, wie viel seit Mitte der 90er Jahre zustande gekommen ist, auch wenn es für die Zukunft noch viel zu tun gibt. Die Aufgabe stellt sich in doppelter Hinsicht: philologisch und philosophisch. In erster Linie ist es notwendig, das so rasant angewachsene Interesse für die neuplatonische Philosophie dahingehend zu nutzen, dass die Editionen und kommentierten Übersetzungen wichtiger Texte weitergeführt werden. Das ist eine intensive, mühevolle und oft undankbare Arbeit, weil so etwas im heutigen „Forschungsklima“ nicht immer in ausreichendem Maße gewürdigt wird. Und dennoch bleibt es eine der drängendsten Aufgaben, und das umso mehr, weil wir befürchten müssen, dass die Kenntnis der alten Sprachen immer weiter zurückgeht. Wie im Mittelalter die antike Philosophie nur überleben und neuen Einfluss gewinnen konnte durch massive Übersetzungsaktivitäten (ins Arabische und Lateinische), so werden in diesem Jahrhundert – ob man es nun bedauert oder nicht – viele neuplatonische Autoren nur noch in Reihen wie „The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle“ oder in anderen Übersetzungen gelesen werden. Darum ist es wichtig, dass die Übersetzungen zuverlässig sind und auf guten Editionen fußen. Es wäre daher wünschenswert, dass gerade auch in Deutschland vermehrt zentrale Texte aus dem späteren Neuplatonismus übersetzt und kommentiert würden. Aber neben dieser Editions- und Übersetzungsarbeit sollte das eigentliche Ziel der Forschung eine philosophische Annäherung sein an diese große Tradition der Geistesgeschichte mit ihren vielfachen kulturellen Verzweigungen im Mittelalter (von Syrien über den Irak und Andalusien bis nach Köln), in der Renaissance und in der Neuzeit. Dabei müssen wir uns aber davor hüten, den Neuplatonismus allzu leicht mit Schwärmerei oder einer Art von Esoterik in Verbindung zu bringen. Er ist und bleibt vor allem eine Philosophie, auch wenn er eine Philosophie ist, die rational die Grenzen der Rationalität einsieht. Gerade in der deutschsprachigen Forschung haben wir schöne Beispiele für ein fruchtbares Zusammengehen von philologischer akribeia und philosophischer Annäherung. Ein Paradigma einer solchen Forschung am Neuplatonismus bleiben für uns die zahlreichen philosophisch anregenden Arbeiten von Werner Beierwaltes. [p. 246-247] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/J1gdFPhAmlKlP6l |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"481","_score":null,"_source":{"id":481,"authors_free":[{"id":651,"entry_id":481,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":652,"entry_id":481,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":146,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Helmig, Christoph","free_first_name":"Christoph","free_last_name":"Helmig","norm_person":{"id":146,"first_name":"Christoph","last_name":"Helmig","full_name":"Helmig, Christoph","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1107028760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II","main_title":{"title":"Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II"},"abstract":"Dieser Artikel berichtete \u00fcber weniger als zehn Jahre Forschung im Bereich des Neuplatonismus. Und doch ist es erfreulich festzustellen, wie viel seit Mitte der 90er Jahre zustande gekommen ist, auch wenn es f\u00fcr die Zukunft noch viel zu tun gibt. Die Aufgabe stellt sich in doppelter Hinsicht: philologisch und philosophisch.\r\n\r\nIn erster Linie ist es notwendig, das so rasant angewachsene Interesse f\u00fcr die neuplatonische Philosophie dahingehend zu nutzen, dass die Editionen und kommentierten \u00dcbersetzungen wichtiger Texte weitergef\u00fchrt werden. Das ist eine intensive, m\u00fchevolle und oft undankbare Arbeit, weil so etwas im heutigen \u201eForschungsklima\u201c nicht immer in ausreichendem Ma\u00dfe gew\u00fcrdigt wird. Und dennoch bleibt es eine der dr\u00e4ngendsten Aufgaben, und das umso mehr, weil wir bef\u00fcrchten m\u00fcssen, dass die Kenntnis der alten Sprachen immer weiter zur\u00fcckgeht.\r\n\r\nWie im Mittelalter die antike Philosophie nur \u00fcberleben und neuen Einfluss gewinnen konnte durch massive \u00dcbersetzungsaktivit\u00e4ten (ins Arabische und Lateinische), so werden in diesem Jahrhundert \u2013 ob man es nun bedauert oder nicht \u2013 viele neuplatonische Autoren nur noch in Reihen wie \u201eThe Ancient Commentators on Aristotle\u201c oder in anderen \u00dcbersetzungen gelesen werden. Darum ist es wichtig, dass die \u00dcbersetzungen zuverl\u00e4ssig sind und auf guten Editionen fu\u00dfen.\r\n\r\nEs w\u00e4re daher w\u00fcnschenswert, dass gerade auch in Deutschland vermehrt zentrale Texte aus dem sp\u00e4teren Neuplatonismus \u00fcbersetzt und kommentiert w\u00fcrden. Aber neben dieser Editions- und \u00dcbersetzungsarbeit sollte das eigentliche Ziel der Forschung eine philosophische Ann\u00e4herung sein an diese gro\u00dfe Tradition der Geistesgeschichte mit ihren vielfachen kulturellen Verzweigungen im Mittelalter (von Syrien \u00fcber den Irak und Andalusien bis nach K\u00f6ln), in der Renaissance und in der Neuzeit.\r\n\r\nDabei m\u00fcssen wir uns aber davor h\u00fcten, den Neuplatonismus allzu leicht mit Schw\u00e4rmerei oder einer Art von Esoterik in Verbindung zu bringen. Er ist und bleibt vor allem eine Philosophie, auch wenn er eine Philosophie ist, die rational die Grenzen der Rationalit\u00e4t einsieht.\r\n\r\nGerade in der deutschsprachigen Forschung haben wir sch\u00f6ne Beispiele f\u00fcr ein fruchtbares Zusammengehen von philologischer akribeia und philosophischer Ann\u00e4herung. Ein Paradigma einer solchen Forschung am Neuplatonismus bleiben f\u00fcr uns die zahlreichen philosophisch anregenden Arbeiten von Werner Beierwaltes. [p. 246-247]","btype":3,"date":"2004","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/J1gdFPhAmlKlP6l","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":146,"full_name":"Helmig, Christoph","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":481,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Allgemeine Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie","volume":"29","issue":"","pages":"225-247"}},"sort":[2004]}
Title | Quelques exemples de scholies dans la tradition arabe des "Éléments" d'Euclide |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Revue d'histoire des sciences |
Volume | 56 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 293-321 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Djebbar, Ahmed |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
After describing two important sources of scholia, the manuscripts Teherán Malik 3586 and Leiden Or. 399/1, this article analyzes the different kinds of scholia found in these texts as well as in other mathematical writings of the Arab tradition of Euclid's Elements. The second part of the article provides a modern edition and French translation of some of these previously unpublished scholia. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Gv7BthgX2p0VabW |
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Title | Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 146 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 328-345 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kouremenos, Theokritos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Cael. 3.1 Aristotle argues against those who posit that all bodies are generated because they are made from, and dissolve into, planes, namely Plato and perhaps other members of the Academy who subscribed to the Timaeus physics (cf. Simplicius, In Cael. 561,8-11 [Heiberg]). In his Timaeus Plato assigns to each of the traditional Empedoclean elements a regular polyhedron: the tetrahedron or pyramid to fire, the cube to earth, the octahedron to air, and the icosahedron to water. Each regular polyhedron can be anachronistically called a molecule of the element in question, and, as is suggested by the analogy between the regular solids and molecules, Plato also posits that the regular polyhedra are made from 'atoms': the faces of the tetrahedron, octahedron, and icosahedron are made from scalene right-angled triangles, whose hypotenuses are double the length of the smaller sides, whereas the faces of the cube consist of isosceles right-angled triangles. Since fire, air, and water consist of polyhedral molecules whose elementary constituents are of the same type, they can freely change into one another. Any of these three elements turns into another when its molecules break down into their elementary constituents, and these building blocks recombine into molecules of another element. Aristotle has in mind the reshuffling of elementary triangles when he refers to all bodies being made from, and dissolving into, planes. His first objection to this fundamental assumption in Plato's element theory is set out in Cael. 299a2-6: as is easily seen, constructing bodies from planes runs counter to mathematics whose 'hypotheses' should be accepted, unless one comes up with something more convincing. Contrary to Aristotle's claim, it is not easy to see why Plato's element theory runs counter to mathematics because it constructs the polyhedral molecules from the triangular planes in the faces of these molecules. Aristotle presumably implies that this violates some mathematical 'hypotheses' which should be better left as they stand but does not explain what the 'hypotheses' in question are. Nor is it any clearer whether Plato commits himself to the rejection of these 'hypotheses' or some aspect of Plato's element theory entails their rejection by Aristotle's own lights. I will attempt to answer these questions after a critique of Simplicius who identifies the hypotheses in Cael. 299a2-6 with the Euclidean definitions of point, line, and plane but also thinks that Aristotle sets out further mathematical objections to Plato's element theory in Cael. 299a6-11: contrary to the commentator, there is only one such objection in Cael. 299a6-11, namely that Plato's element theory introduces indivisible lines, and, as is suggested by an allusion to Cael. 299a2-6 in the treatise On Indivisible Lines, the same objection is also implicit in Cael. 299a2-6. That in this passage Plato's element theory is said to conflict with mathematics because it entails the existence of indivisible lines is borne out not only by Cael. 299a6-11 but also by 299a13-17. After interpreting the 'hypotheses' in Cael. 299a2-6 consistently with this fact, I will show that, when Aristotle charges Plato with introducing various sorts of indivisibles in his element theory, he actually brings out the untenability of this theory by arguing that Plato ought to introduce such entities which are, though, ruled out by mathematics. Aristotle's implicit objection in Cael. 299a2-6 follows from a similar argument which I will attempt to reconstruct in the final sections of this paper. [introduction p. 328-329] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9EHiPSWuW9oh0c4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"984","_score":null,"_source":{"id":984,"authors_free":[{"id":1485,"entry_id":984,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":219,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","free_first_name":"Theokritos","free_last_name":"Kouremenos","norm_person":{"id":219,"first_name":"Theokritos","last_name":"Kouremenos","full_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/113872224","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?","main_title":{"title":"Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?"},"abstract":"In Cael. 3.1 Aristotle argues against those who posit that all bodies are generated because they are made from, and dissolve into, planes, namely Plato and perhaps other members of the Academy who subscribed to the Timaeus physics (cf. Simplicius, In Cael. 561,8-11 [Heiberg]). In his Timaeus Plato assigns to each of the traditional Empedoclean elements a regular polyhedron: the tetrahedron or pyramid to fire, the cube to earth, the octahedron to air, and the icosahedron to water. Each regular polyhedron can be anachronistically called a molecule of the element in question, and, as is suggested by the analogy between the regular solids and molecules, Plato also posits that the regular polyhedra are made from 'atoms': the faces of the tetrahedron, octahedron, and icosahedron are made from scalene right-angled triangles, whose hypotenuses are double the length of the smaller sides, whereas the faces of the cube consist of isosceles right-angled triangles.\r\n\r\nSince fire, air, and water consist of polyhedral molecules whose elementary constituents are of the same type, they can freely change into one another. Any of these three elements turns into another when its molecules break down into their elementary constituents, and these building blocks recombine into molecules of another element. Aristotle has in mind the reshuffling of elementary triangles when he refers to all bodies being made from, and dissolving into, planes. His first objection to this fundamental assumption in Plato's element theory is set out in Cael. 299a2-6: as is easily seen, constructing bodies from planes runs counter to mathematics whose 'hypotheses' should be accepted, unless one comes up with something more convincing.\r\n\r\nContrary to Aristotle's claim, it is not easy to see why Plato's element theory runs counter to mathematics because it constructs the polyhedral molecules from the triangular planes in the faces of these molecules. Aristotle presumably implies that this violates some mathematical 'hypotheses' which should be better left as they stand but does not explain what the 'hypotheses' in question are. Nor is it any clearer whether Plato commits himself to the rejection of these 'hypotheses' or some aspect of Plato's element theory entails their rejection by Aristotle's own lights. I will attempt to answer these questions after a critique of Simplicius who identifies the hypotheses in Cael. 299a2-6 with the Euclidean definitions of point, line, and plane but also thinks that Aristotle sets out further mathematical objections to Plato's element theory in Cael. 299a6-11: contrary to the commentator, there is only one such objection in Cael. 299a6-11, namely that Plato's element theory introduces indivisible lines, and, as is suggested by an allusion to Cael. 299a2-6 in the treatise On Indivisible Lines, the same objection is also implicit in Cael. 299a2-6.\r\n\r\nThat in this passage Plato's element theory is said to conflict with mathematics because it entails the existence of indivisible lines is borne out not only by Cael. 299a6-11 but also by 299a13-17. After interpreting the 'hypotheses' in Cael. 299a2-6 consistently with this fact, I will show that, when Aristotle charges Plato with introducing various sorts of indivisibles in his element theory, he actually brings out the untenability of this theory by arguing that Plato ought to introduce such entities which are, though, ruled out by mathematics. Aristotle's implicit objection in Cael. 299a2-6 follows from a similar argument which I will attempt to reconstruct in the final sections of this paper. [introduction p. 328-329]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9EHiPSWuW9oh0c4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":219,"full_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":984,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"146","issue":"3\/4","pages":"328-345"}},"sort":[2003]}
Title | Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschenbild in “Simplikios”’ Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ De anima |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 57-91 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Perkams, Matthias |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Durchgang durch „Simplikios’“ Text hat gezeigt, dass dieser Kommentator mit seiner Theorie der doppelten Formursächlichkeit der Seele bzw. ihres doppelten entelecheia-Seins die funktionale Beziehung der Seele zum Körper in ihren verschiedenen Stufen nach einem einheitlichen Schema erklärt. Immer ist es ein seelisch definiertes Organ, zu dem die Seele in Beziehung tritt. Das anthropologische Ergebnis ist kein Dreischritt Körper-Leib-Seele, sondern eine systematisch durchdachte Definition des Verhältnisses zwischen Körper und Seele: Auf der einen Seite steht nicht ein Stück Materie, sondern ein Lebewesen in der Art eines belebten Körpers, bei dessen Formung Körperliches und Seelisches bereits eine Einheit eingegangen sind, auf der anderen Seite eine Seele, die als die, die sie ist, wesentlich auf die Benutzung dieses Leibes ausgerichtet ist. Dabei ist der Leib von der bloßen Materie ebenso verschieden wie die bewegende Seele vom transzendenten nous, in dem sie ursprünglich wurzelt. Erst im Tod gewinnen nous und Materie wieder ihre Selbständigkeit zurück. Diese Darstellung zeigt, wie „Simplikios“ systematisch mit Aristoteles umgeht: Die Terminologie des Stagiriten integriert er nicht nur in seine eigene philosophische Konzeption, sondern er kann mithilfe dieser Terminologie eine logisch und sachlich konsistente und gut nachvollziehbare Fassung der neuplatonischen Seelenlehre entwickeln. Damit erweist sich die Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles für den neuplatonischen Autor als fruchtbar, ohne dass er sachlich die Grenzen des Neuplatonismus überschreitet. Im neuplatonischen Kontext ist es besonders interessant, dass „Simplikios“ in den beiden Formen von entelecheia durchgehende Charakteristika des Seelischen in der Art sieht, dass jede einzelne Seelenart den Leib in der genannten doppelten Weise verwirklicht. Denn mit der Annahme zweier Arten der Einwirkung der Seele auf den Körper entspricht er einer Struktur, die sich bereits bei Plotin entfaltet findet: Der Leib, mit dem sich die Seele vereinigt, ist bereits durch eine Spur oder ein Bild der Seele auf deren Aufnahme vorbereitet. Bei der Interpretation dieser Stellen wird meistens angenommen, dass dieses „Bild“ der vegetativen Seele entspricht, die von der höheren Seele verschieden ist. Diese Identifizierung wurde jüngst von Ch. Tornau unter Verweis auf Enn. IV 4, 20, 22–5; VI 4, 15, 15 in Zweifel gezogen. Bei „Simplikios“ zeigt sich nun klar, dass dieses Seelenbild ebenso wie die bewegende Formursache, die eigentliche Seele, in jeder einzelnen Seelenart vorhanden ist. Damit wird Tornaus Vermutung zumindest für einen neuplatonischen Autor bestätigt. An diesem Punkt, der für die Systematik des neuplatonischen Menschenbildes überhaupt von Bedeutung ist, ist weitere Forschung nötig, um zu mehr Klarheit über die im Neuplatonismus übliche Lehre und die Abweichungen davon zu gelangen. Das von „Simplikios“ entworfene Bild zeigt, dass die menschliche Seele im späten Neuplatonismus nicht als unsystematische Nebeneinanderstellung verschiedener, mehr oder weniger zwanghaft triadisch geordneter Schichten zu verstehen ist, sondern dass die Philosophen dieser Zeit im Rahmen der Voraussetzungen, die sie für selbstverständlich hielten, ein klares Bild der gegenseitigen Bezogenheit von Seele und Leib entwickeln konnten. Die Einheit zwischen Körper und Seele, wie „Simplikios“ sie schildert, ist keineswegs so locker, wie es manche Überblickswerke zum Neuplatonismus nahelegen: Die Seele, die in der materiellen Welt wirkt und erkennt, ist wesentlich mit dem Körper verbunden und kann ohne diese Verbindung nicht existieren. [conclusion p. 90-91] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/egqTFHmjZlWVg7v |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1087","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1087,"authors_free":[{"id":1643,"entry_id":1087,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":283,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Perkams, Matthias","free_first_name":"Matthias","free_last_name":"Perkams","norm_person":{"id":283,"first_name":"Matthias","last_name":"Perkams","full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123439760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschen\u00adbild in \u201cSimplikios\u201d\u2019 Kommentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 De anima","main_title":{"title":"Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschen\u00adbild in \u201cSimplikios\u201d\u2019 Kommentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 De anima"},"abstract":"Der Durchgang durch \u201eSimplikios\u2019\u201c Text hat gezeigt, dass dieser Kommentator mit seiner Theorie der doppelten Formurs\u00e4chlichkeit der Seele bzw. ihres doppelten entelecheia-Seins die funktionale Beziehung der Seele zum K\u00f6rper in ihren verschiedenen Stufen nach einem einheitlichen Schema erkl\u00e4rt. Immer ist es ein seelisch definiertes Organ, zu dem die Seele in Beziehung tritt. Das anthropologische Ergebnis ist kein Dreischritt K\u00f6rper-Leib-Seele, sondern eine systematisch durchdachte Definition des Verh\u00e4ltnisses zwischen K\u00f6rper und Seele:\r\n\r\nAuf der einen Seite steht nicht ein St\u00fcck Materie, sondern ein Lebewesen in der Art eines belebten K\u00f6rpers, bei dessen Formung K\u00f6rperliches und Seelisches bereits eine Einheit eingegangen sind, auf der anderen Seite eine Seele, die als die, die sie ist, wesentlich auf die Benutzung dieses Leibes ausgerichtet ist. Dabei ist der Leib von der blo\u00dfen Materie ebenso verschieden wie die bewegende Seele vom transzendenten nous, in dem sie urspr\u00fcnglich wurzelt. Erst im Tod gewinnen nous und Materie wieder ihre Selbst\u00e4ndigkeit zur\u00fcck.\r\n\r\nDiese Darstellung zeigt, wie \u201eSimplikios\u201c systematisch mit Aristoteles umgeht: Die Terminologie des Stagiriten integriert er nicht nur in seine eigene philosophische Konzeption, sondern er kann mithilfe dieser Terminologie eine logisch und sachlich konsistente und gut nachvollziehbare Fassung der neuplatonischen Seelenlehre entwickeln. Damit erweist sich die Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles f\u00fcr den neuplatonischen Autor als fruchtbar, ohne dass er sachlich die Grenzen des Neuplatonismus \u00fcberschreitet.\r\n\r\nIm neuplatonischen Kontext ist es besonders interessant, dass \u201eSimplikios\u201c in den beiden Formen von entelecheia durchgehende Charakteristika des Seelischen in der Art sieht, dass jede einzelne Seelenart den Leib in der genannten doppelten Weise verwirklicht. Denn mit der Annahme zweier Arten der Einwirkung der Seele auf den K\u00f6rper entspricht er einer Struktur, die sich bereits bei Plotin entfaltet findet:\r\n\r\nDer Leib, mit dem sich die Seele vereinigt, ist bereits durch eine Spur oder ein Bild der Seele auf deren Aufnahme vorbereitet. Bei der Interpretation dieser Stellen wird meistens angenommen, dass dieses \u201eBild\u201c der vegetativen Seele entspricht, die von der h\u00f6heren Seele verschieden ist. Diese Identifizierung wurde j\u00fcngst von Ch. Tornau unter Verweis auf Enn. IV 4, 20, 22\u20135; VI 4, 15, 15 in Zweifel gezogen.\r\n\r\nBei \u201eSimplikios\u201c zeigt sich nun klar, dass dieses Seelenbild ebenso wie die bewegende Formursache, die eigentliche Seele, in jeder einzelnen Seelenart vorhanden ist. Damit wird Tornaus Vermutung zumindest f\u00fcr einen neuplatonischen Autor best\u00e4tigt. An diesem Punkt, der f\u00fcr die Systematik des neuplatonischen Menschenbildes \u00fcberhaupt von Bedeutung ist, ist weitere Forschung n\u00f6tig, um zu mehr Klarheit \u00fcber die im Neuplatonismus \u00fcbliche Lehre und die Abweichungen davon zu gelangen.\r\n\r\nDas von \u201eSimplikios\u201c entworfene Bild zeigt, dass die menschliche Seele im sp\u00e4ten Neuplatonismus nicht als unsystematische Nebeneinanderstellung verschiedener, mehr oder weniger zwanghaft triadisch geordneter Schichten zu verstehen ist, sondern dass die Philosophen dieser Zeit im Rahmen der Voraussetzungen, die sie f\u00fcr selbstverst\u00e4ndlich hielten, ein klares Bild der gegenseitigen Bezogenheit von Seele und Leib entwickeln konnten.\r\n\r\nDie Einheit zwischen K\u00f6rper und Seele, wie \u201eSimplikios\u201c sie schildert, ist keineswegs so locker, wie es manche \u00dcberblickswerke zum Neuplatonismus nahelegen: Die Seele, die in der materiellen Welt wirkt und erkennt, ist wesentlich mit dem K\u00f6rper verbunden und kann ohne diese Verbindung nicht existieren. [conclusion p. 90-91]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/egqTFHmjZlWVg7v","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":283,"full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1087,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"57-91"}},"sort":[2003]}
Title | Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der römischen Kaiserzeit |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Rhein. Museum |
Volume | 146 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 49–71 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Text beschreibt den Zustand des philosophischen Unterrichts während der römischen Kaiserzeit. Obwohl die bekannten Philosophenschulen in Athen nicht mehr existierten, hatten die vier philosophischen Richtungen des Hellenismus dennoch Verbreitung gefunden und wurden in privaten Schulen unterrichtet. Diese Schulen waren jedoch meist kurzlebig und hingen vom Erfolg des Lehrers ab. Philosophie wurde an den griechischen Gymnasien nicht gelehrt, stattdessen konzentrierte man sich auf Grammatik und Rhetorik. Im lateinischen Bereich führten enge Beziehungen führender Römer zu stoischen Philosophen zur Verbreitung der Lehren. Der Philosophieunterricht begann meist erst nach der Pubertät, und das Alter spielte eine wichtige Rolle bei der Seelenleitung. Das Greisenalter wurde als optimal angesehen, da der körperliche Verfall der freien Betätigung des Geistes entgegenkomme. Das Bild des philosophischen Unterrichtsbetriebes in der Kaiserzeit war somit sehr komplex. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bCAQ9Hlrduneobp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1334","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1334,"authors_free":[{"id":1967,"entry_id":1334,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit","main_title":{"title":"Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit"},"abstract":"Der Text beschreibt den Zustand des philosophischen Unterrichts w\u00e4hrend der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit. Obwohl die bekannten Philosophenschulen in Athen nicht mehr existierten, hatten die vier philosophischen Richtungen des Hellenismus dennoch Verbreitung gefunden und wurden in privaten Schulen unterrichtet. Diese Schulen waren jedoch meist kurzlebig und hingen vom Erfolg des Lehrers ab. Philosophie wurde an den griechischen Gymnasien nicht gelehrt, stattdessen konzentrierte man sich auf Grammatik und Rhetorik. Im lateinischen Bereich f\u00fchrten enge Beziehungen f\u00fchrender R\u00f6mer zu stoischen Philosophen zur Verbreitung der Lehren. Der Philosophieunterricht begann meist erst nach der Pubert\u00e4t, und das Alter spielte eine wichtige Rolle bei der Seelenleitung. Das Greisenalter wurde als optimal angesehen, da der k\u00f6rperliche Verfall der freien Bet\u00e4tigung des Geistes entgegenkomme. Das Bild des philosophischen Unterrichtsbetriebes in der Kaiserzeit war somit sehr komplex. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bCAQ9Hlrduneobp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1334,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rhein. Museum","volume":"146","issue":"1","pages":"49\u201371"}},"sort":[2003]}
Title | Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 1 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences |
Volume | 4 |
Pages | 23-58 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bowen, Alan C. , Simplicius |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
If there is a single text that has proven to be the bedrock for the modern understanding of early Greek astronomy, it is Simplicius’ commentary on Book 2, Chapter 12 of Aristotle’s treatise De caelo. Simplicius’ remarks, which are effectively an elaboration of what he supposes Aristotle to mean in Metaphysics Λ 8, are almost always accepted as gospel in their broad outlines. Take any recent history of early Greek astronomy you please, and you will find that its author immediately turns to Simplicius as the source clarifying what Aristotle writes in this chapter of his Metaphysics. Indeed, the main challenge scholars perceive in Simplicius’ commentary is to tease out and reconstruct the underlying mathematical theory that would make it all ‘true.’ Such naïveté is breathtaking. Few who read Simplicius and understand his historiographical project—a search for a truth that Aristotle’s text is supposed to embody rather than a study of the text itself on its own terms—would elevate him to a position of such unquestioned authority. And those who have reflected on the often intractable problems in assessing the truth of ancient reports or testimonia in the sciences will quite naturally decline to take Simplicius at his word in this matter. I recognize, of course, that it is customary to detect errors in Simplicius’ account and to attribute them either to Aristotle or to Simplicius; but this, I fear, typically amounts to little more than a demonstration that we moderns can be speciously clever while taking what Simplicius writes for granted. I have written at length elsewhere that Simplicius’ comments on De caelo 2.12 do not constitute an account of what Aristotle meant in Metaphysics Λ 8 that we should accept today as properly historical. There is, after all, no extant Greek or Latin text written before the late second century BCE that shows any knowledge of the planetary phenomena of station and retrogradation, which are so central to Simplicius’ commentary. There are also ample signs that Simplicius’ remarks about the history of early astronomy are not a report but a reconstruction occasioned by what Aristotle writes in Metaphysics Λ 8 and the need to explain why the homocentric planetary theory outlined there was later abandoned by Aristotelians. Moreover, Metaphysics Λ 8 is itself underdetermined so far as its presentation of this homocentric theory goes. Indeed, there are other interpretations of this presentation that fit far better than Simplicius’ with what we can find elsewhere in Aristotle’s writings and in documents by other writers of the fourth century. That scholars today persist in reading Metaphysics Λ 8 and other early texts as indicating knowledge of the planetary stations and retrogradations is a puzzle. One only wishes, when these scholars have elaborated their interpretations of Metaphysics Λ 8 and of the other related texts written before the late second century that concern planetary motions, that they would not stop here as if their work as historians were done. Obviously, it will not be enough if they simply adduce relevant testimonia by later ancient writers. Not only are these testimonia few in number and dated to a time after the characteristic planetary motions were duly understood, they typically prove on critical examination to be either ambiguous or anachronistic in the same way as Simplicius’ account is. Consequently, any appeal to such testimonia without critical argument in defense of their historical validity is pointless. Indeed, the burden must fall on these scholars to demonstrate that Metaphysics Λ 8 and the other early texts must be read in this way. For, absent such proof, all one has is the fallacy of imputing to a writer the perceived consequences of what he writes. Of course, making such a proof will be hard work. Even those sharing the general view that the Greeks of the fourth century were aware of planetary stations and retrogradations do not agree about how these phenomena were understood or explained. In addition, there are my own arguments not only that these texts may be read without supposing such knowledge but also that they should be read without such a supposition, given the contemporaneous evidence of astronomical theory. And finally, there is the largely unrecognized problem that, even if Simplicius’ history of astronomy in Aristotle’s time is anachronistic, it has a simpler interpretation than the one first propounded in the 19th century by Schiaparelli and elaborated to this day. Granted, these scholars may wish to excuse themselves from the charge of wrongly imputing to Simplicius what they perceive as the real meaning of his text, by claiming that Simplicius is preserving material from earlier sources that he does not understand. But should historians today assent to reading an ancient commentary in a way that makes the commentator irrelevant, and should they do this in the expectation that the interpretation offered reflects the thought of some putative source from whom nothing survives for confirmation? My own view is that compounding such a misreading of an ancient literary genre with such untestable faith—or, if you will, unassailable credulity—may have numerous outcomes, but historical knowledge will not be one of them. Few modern historians have examined what Simplicius actually writes—the great tendency is to rely on some learned summary such as that supplied by Heath, who makes accessible in English the pioneering work of Schiaparelli. Accordingly, I here present Simplicius’ account of Metaphysics Λ 8 so that readers may begin to get their own sense of what is at issue. To this end, I have translated Heiberg’s edition of Simplicius’ commentary on the three narrowly astronomical chapters of the De caelo and have supplied my translation with annotation intended primarily to clarify the technical, scientific meaning. Given the exigencies of publication, this annotated translation will come in two parts. The first, presented here, is devoted to Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 2.10–11. These chapters in the De caelo raise stock issues in astronomy; and it is valuable, I think, for readers interested in Simplicius’ account of planetary theory in 2.12 to see and assess just how he deals with them. Indeed, not only does Simplicius’ commentary on 2.10–11 show him drawing on a tradition of technical writing for novices and philosophers that goes back to Geminus and Cleomedes, it also shows him going astray on fundamental points in elementary mathematics. And this is surely important for our interpretation of his commentary on 2.12. The annotation itself is, as I have said, intended to assist the reader with information that may be needed to make sense of the text. My main aim is to allow access to Simplicius that is as little encumbered by my interpretative intrusion as is feasible, since my hope in this publication is that the reader will confront Simplicius for himself, by himself, so far as this is possible in a translation. Thus, I do not engage in the details of the interpretations offered by those who assume that the early Greeks were aware of the planetary phenomena so central to Simplicius’ account of Metaphysics Λ 8. Still, there is a question about just how much annotation is needed by readers of this journal, and I hope that I have not erred too much in following my natural disposition to say less. Simplicius’ Greek is typical of scholastic commentary: elliptical, crabbed, and technical. I have tried to deal with this by supplying in square brackets what is missing whenever this seemed necessary or likely to make the meaning easier for the reader to grasp. At the same time, I have tried, so far as is reasonable and within my ability, to capture Simplicius’ technical vocabulary and to preserve the logical structure of his sentences. This translation has benefited greatly from the generous criticism of earlier versions offered by Bernard R. Goldstein and Robert B. Todd: they have saved me from numerous mistakes and infelicities, and I am most pleased to acknowledge this. Finally, I am very pleased to record my gratitude to Ken Saito, the Managing Editor of SCIAMVS, for his unflagging interest in this project and his encouragement as I pursued it. That my annotated translation appears in SCIAMVS is ample proof of his very kind support and his patience with a historian whose sense of time seems limited to the past. [introduction p. 23-26] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/skKbEWtOO6LigIs |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1479","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1479,"authors_free":[{"id":2560,"entry_id":1479,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":16,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bowen, Alan C.","free_first_name":"Alan C.","free_last_name":"Bowen","norm_person":{"id":16,"first_name":"Bowen C.","last_name":"Bowen","full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140052720","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2601,"entry_id":1479,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":62,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Simplicius","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":62,"first_name":"Cilicius","last_name":"Simplicius ","full_name":"Simplicius Cilicius","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118642421","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 1","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 1"},"abstract":"If there is a single text that has proven to be the bedrock for the modern understanding of early Greek astronomy, it is Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Book 2, Chapter 12 of Aristotle\u2019s treatise De caelo. Simplicius\u2019 remarks, which are effectively an elaboration of what he supposes Aristotle to mean in Metaphysics \u039b 8, are almost always accepted as gospel in their broad outlines. Take any recent history of early Greek astronomy you please, and you will find that its author immediately turns to Simplicius as the source clarifying what Aristotle writes in this chapter of his Metaphysics.\r\n\r\nIndeed, the main challenge scholars perceive in Simplicius\u2019 commentary is to tease out and reconstruct the underlying mathematical theory that would make it all \u2018true.\u2019 Such na\u00efvet\u00e9 is breathtaking. Few who read Simplicius and understand his historiographical project\u2014a search for a truth that Aristotle\u2019s text is supposed to embody rather than a study of the text itself on its own terms\u2014would elevate him to a position of such unquestioned authority. And those who have reflected on the often intractable problems in assessing the truth of ancient reports or testimonia in the sciences will quite naturally decline to take Simplicius at his word in this matter.\r\n\r\nI recognize, of course, that it is customary to detect errors in Simplicius\u2019 account and to attribute them either to Aristotle or to Simplicius; but this, I fear, typically amounts to little more than a demonstration that we moderns can be speciously clever while taking what Simplicius writes for granted.\r\n\r\nI have written at length elsewhere that Simplicius\u2019 comments on De caelo 2.12 do not constitute an account of what Aristotle meant in Metaphysics \u039b 8 that we should accept today as properly historical. There is, after all, no extant Greek or Latin text written before the late second century BCE that shows any knowledge of the planetary phenomena of station and retrogradation, which are so central to Simplicius\u2019 commentary. There are also ample signs that Simplicius\u2019 remarks about the history of early astronomy are not a report but a reconstruction occasioned by what Aristotle writes in Metaphysics \u039b 8 and the need to explain why the homocentric planetary theory outlined there was later abandoned by Aristotelians. Moreover, Metaphysics \u039b 8 is itself underdetermined so far as its presentation of this homocentric theory goes. Indeed, there are other interpretations of this presentation that fit far better than Simplicius\u2019 with what we can find elsewhere in Aristotle\u2019s writings and in documents by other writers of the fourth century.\r\n\r\nThat scholars today persist in reading Metaphysics \u039b 8 and other early texts as indicating knowledge of the planetary stations and retrogradations is a puzzle. One only wishes, when these scholars have elaborated their interpretations of Metaphysics \u039b 8 and of the other related texts written before the late second century that concern planetary motions, that they would not stop here as if their work as historians were done. Obviously, it will not be enough if they simply adduce relevant testimonia by later ancient writers. Not only are these testimonia few in number and dated to a time after the characteristic planetary motions were duly understood, they typically prove on critical examination to be either ambiguous or anachronistic in the same way as Simplicius\u2019 account is. Consequently, any appeal to such testimonia without critical argument in defense of their historical validity is pointless.\r\n\r\nIndeed, the burden must fall on these scholars to demonstrate that Metaphysics \u039b 8 and the other early texts must be read in this way. For, absent such proof, all one has is the fallacy of imputing to a writer the perceived consequences of what he writes. Of course, making such a proof will be hard work. Even those sharing the general view that the Greeks of the fourth century were aware of planetary stations and retrogradations do not agree about how these phenomena were understood or explained. In addition, there are my own arguments not only that these texts may be read without supposing such knowledge but also that they should be read without such a supposition, given the contemporaneous evidence of astronomical theory.\r\n\r\nAnd finally, there is the largely unrecognized problem that, even if Simplicius\u2019 history of astronomy in Aristotle\u2019s time is anachronistic, it has a simpler interpretation than the one first propounded in the 19th century by Schiaparelli and elaborated to this day. Granted, these scholars may wish to excuse themselves from the charge of wrongly imputing to Simplicius what they perceive as the real meaning of his text, by claiming that Simplicius is preserving material from earlier sources that he does not understand. But should historians today assent to reading an ancient commentary in a way that makes the commentator irrelevant, and should they do this in the expectation that the interpretation offered reflects the thought of some putative source from whom nothing survives for confirmation?\r\n\r\nMy own view is that compounding such a misreading of an ancient literary genre with such untestable faith\u2014or, if you will, unassailable credulity\u2014may have numerous outcomes, but historical knowledge will not be one of them.\r\n\r\nFew modern historians have examined what Simplicius actually writes\u2014the great tendency is to rely on some learned summary such as that supplied by Heath, who makes accessible in English the pioneering work of Schiaparelli. Accordingly, I here present Simplicius\u2019 account of Metaphysics \u039b 8 so that readers may begin to get their own sense of what is at issue.\r\n\r\nTo this end, I have translated Heiberg\u2019s edition of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the three narrowly astronomical chapters of the De caelo and have supplied my translation with annotation intended primarily to clarify the technical, scientific meaning.\r\n\r\nGiven the exigencies of publication, this annotated translation will come in two parts. The first, presented here, is devoted to Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 2.10\u201311. These chapters in the De caelo raise stock issues in astronomy; and it is valuable, I think, for readers interested in Simplicius\u2019 account of planetary theory in 2.12 to see and assess just how he deals with them. Indeed, not only does Simplicius\u2019 commentary on 2.10\u201311 show him drawing on a tradition of technical writing for novices and philosophers that goes back to Geminus and Cleomedes, it also shows him going astray on fundamental points in elementary mathematics. And this is surely important for our interpretation of his commentary on 2.12.\r\n\r\nThe annotation itself is, as I have said, intended to assist the reader with information that may be needed to make sense of the text. My main aim is to allow access to Simplicius that is as little encumbered by my interpretative intrusion as is feasible, since my hope in this publication is that the reader will confront Simplicius for himself, by himself, so far as this is possible in a translation.\r\n\r\nThus, I do not engage in the details of the interpretations offered by those who assume that the early Greeks were aware of the planetary phenomena so central to Simplicius\u2019 account of Metaphysics \u039b 8. Still, there is a question about just how much annotation is needed by readers of this journal, and I hope that I have not erred too much in following my natural disposition to say less.\r\n\r\nSimplicius\u2019 Greek is typical of scholastic commentary: elliptical, crabbed, and technical. I have tried to deal with this by supplying in square brackets what is missing whenever this seemed necessary or likely to make the meaning easier for the reader to grasp. At the same time, I have tried, so far as is reasonable and within my ability, to capture Simplicius\u2019 technical vocabulary and to preserve the logical structure of his sentences.\r\n\r\nThis translation has benefited greatly from the generous criticism of earlier versions offered by Bernard R. Goldstein and Robert B. Todd: they have saved me from numerous mistakes and infelicities, and I am most pleased to acknowledge this.\r\n\r\nFinally, I am very pleased to record my gratitude to Ken Saito, the Managing Editor of SCIAMVS, for his unflagging interest in this project and his encouragement as I pursued it. That my annotated translation appears in SCIAMVS is ample proof of his very kind support and his patience with a historian whose sense of time seems limited to the past. [introduction p. 23-26]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/skKbEWtOO6LigIs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":16,"full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":62,"full_name":"Simplicius Cilicius","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1479,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences","volume":"4","issue":"","pages":"23-58"}},"sort":[2003]}
Title | The Ṣābians of Ḥarrān and the Classical Tradition |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | International Journal of the Classical Tradition |
Volume | 9 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 8-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Pingree, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article addresses questions concerning the characteristics of the paganism of Harran, its eclectic sources, and its development by examining the relationships - real, possible, and fictitious - of various personalities with the city of Harran from Assyrian times till the Mongol attack in 1271. It is suggested that the Sabians used Neoplatonism, which, if Tardieu's analysis is correct, they originally learned from Simplicius, to develop, explain, and justify their practice of astral magic, and that their interest in the Greek astronomy and astrology that astral magic required served to maintain the study and to preserve the texts of these sciences during the centuries in which they were ignored in Byzantium. It is further shown that the Greek philosophical and scientific material available to them was mingled with elements from ancient Mesopotamia, India, Iran, Judaism, and Egypt to form a syncretic system of belief that they could claim to be mankind's original and authentic religion. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Jdb3AO475p5h4e0 |
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Title | Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima" (CAG XI) : A Methodological Study |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 159–199 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article represents a new contribution to the author's debate with C. Steel as to the authenticity of the Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, attributed by the manuscripts to the 6th-century A.D. Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius. On the basis of what he claims are stylistic and doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries, Steel has argued that the In DA cannot be by Simplicius, but is instead to be attributed to his contemporary Priscian of Lydia. In the present article, it is argued (1) that the alleged stylistic differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries can be explained by other considerations: in particular, the vocabulary and style of the Neoplatonist commentators is largely determined by the text commented upon, as well as the level of studies of the audience for whom each commentary is intended. (2) The alleged doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other com- mentaries simply do not exist. Careful examination of Steel's arguments shows that they suffer from serious methodological flaws, including the failure to take into consideration Simplicius' Commentary on the Manual of Epictetus, and the ambiguity of Neoplatonic philosophical terminology. It is concluded that in the whole of Steel's argumentation, there is not one decisive argument which would allow us to conclude that the commentary on the De Anima, attributed by direct and indirect tradition to Simplicius, is inauthentic. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BFVk6vhtz2ul08p |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"692","_score":null,"_source":{"id":692,"authors_free":[{"id":1030,"entry_id":692,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's \"De Anima\" (CAG XI) : A Methodological Study","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's \"De Anima\" (CAG XI) : A Methodological Study"},"abstract":"This article represents a new contribution to the author's debate with C. Steel as to the authenticity of the Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, attributed by the manuscripts to the 6th-century A.D. Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius. On the basis of what he claims are stylistic and doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries, Steel has argued that the In DA cannot be by Simplicius, but is instead to be attributed to his contemporary Priscian of Lydia. In the present article, it is argued (1) that the alleged stylistic differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries can be explained by other considerations: in particular, the vocabulary and style of the Neoplatonist commentators is largely determined by the text commented upon, as well as the level of studies of the audience for whom each commentary is intended. (2) The alleged doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other com- mentaries simply do not exist. Careful examination of Steel's arguments shows that they suffer from serious methodological flaws, including the failure to take into consideration Simplicius' Commentary on the Manual of Epictetus, and the ambiguity of Neoplatonic philosophical terminology. It is concluded that in the whole of Steel's argumentation, there is not one decisive argument which would allow us to conclude that the commentary on the De Anima, attributed by direct and indirect tradition to Simplicius, is inauthentic. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/BFVk6vhtz2ul08p","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":692,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"55","issue":"2","pages":"159\u2013199"}},"sort":[2002]}
Title | Alternatives to Alternatives: Approaches to Aristotle's Arguments per impossibile |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Vivarium |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 137-173 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kukkonen, Taneli |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
When arguing from impossible premises, what was Aristotle's rationale? Is there a way to salvage all of these purported arguments "through the impossible"? In this article, I wish to examine some of the answers offered by commentators on Aristotle ranging from Alexander to Buridan. We shall see that within the discussion, a more systematic picture of Aristotle's intentions slowly emerged. Whether this picture accurately represents Aristotle is arguable. Because the cited examples arose in connection with some of Aristotle's universally held natural principles, the discussion was seen to tie in with cosmological issues of central importance. The various solutions put forward therefore serve to reveal what the discussants took to be the limits to the world's conceptualization. It is not quite a case of assessing "possible worlds"; this systematic notion only enters the discussion in the early 14th century. Rather, what is at stake is what the possible features of the one and only world are. [p. 141] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/j1e9HSV2wsOobQn |
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Title | Review of Hadot, I.: Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète, Tome I |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | The Classical Review, New Series |
Volume | 52 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 377-378 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In 1996, Ilsetraut Hadot published the first-ever full critical edition of the Greek text of Simplicius' commentary on Epictetus' Encheiridion (I. Hadot, Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epictète [Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1996]). The volume reviewed here is the first half of an editio minor of that text. It also contains a largely new introduction, written for a more general audience than the detailed scholarly introduction of the editio maior, and a translation equipped with notes. These notes follow the format of recent Budé editions of Neoplatonic texts, offering much helpful explanation with useful references to parallel passages in other Neoplatonic authors but inconveniently divided between the bottom of the page and the end of the volume. All Neoplatonic commentaries are discursive, and those of Simplicius are among the most discursive. It takes 130 pages of this volume for Simplicius to reach Chapter 20 of Epictetus' short work. However, as with many Neoplatonic commentaries, the interest of this one does not lie in what it tells us about Epictetus—whose philosophy Simplicius misunderstood in some important respects, as Hadot points out in her introduction (pp. ci–cxvii). Rather, it is worth reading for what it tells us about Simplicius' own philosophical views. It is unusual among Neoplatonic commentaries in dealing with an ethical text, and the discussions of τὰ Ἐφ' ἡμῖν (what is within our power) and the spiritual exercises recommended by Epictetus are of considerable interest. Hadot's introduction offers an updated version of her views on Simplicius' life, work, and philosophical system; a chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching; an account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines; and a short history of the text. Finally, there is an appendix on Fate, Providence, and human freedom in Neoplatonism, which covers Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus, as well as Simplicius. Of these, the account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines and the appendix are entirely new, while the chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching is an updated and lightly revised version of a chapter from her book, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris, 1978). The first two chapters of the introduction repeat, in a clear and accessible form, views she has already published elsewhere and is well known for. She reiterates her now largely accepted demonstration that Simplicius' philosophical system is essentially the same as that of Damascius—not, as Praechter thought, a simplified Alexandrian system—and, more controversially, continues to maintain, with Tardieu, that his commentaries were written in Harran after 532. The chapter on the history of the text abbreviates the longer account in the editio maior and explains the principles of the editio minor, acknowledging the help of Concetta Luna in simplifying the apparatus. A small number of readings that differ from those of the editio maior are indicated in a footnote on p. cxxvi. Hadot's translation is divided into sections with helpful headings and subheadings, and, together with her full notes, provides a great deal of assistance in understanding Simplicius' text. This volume deserves a warm welcome as a further installment in the enormous contribution Hadot has made to the understanding of Simplicius over many years. It is to be hoped that it will not be too long before the second volume appears to complement it. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lwxAqvhdfMDm8ss |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1020","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1020,"authors_free":[{"id":1536,"entry_id":1020,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":43,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","free_first_name":"Anne D.","free_last_name":"Sheppard","norm_person":{"id":43,"first_name":"Anne D.","last_name":"Sheppard","full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158024592","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Hadot, I.: Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te, Tome I","main_title":{"title":"Review of Hadot, I.: Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te, Tome I"},"abstract":"In 1996, Ilsetraut Hadot published the first-ever full critical edition of the Greek text of Simplicius' commentary on Epictetus' Encheiridion (I. Hadot, Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epict\u00e8te [Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1996]). The volume reviewed here is the first half of an editio minor of that text. It also contains a largely new introduction, written for a more general audience than the detailed scholarly introduction of the editio maior, and a translation equipped with notes. These notes follow the format of recent Bud\u00e9 editions of Neoplatonic texts, offering much helpful explanation with useful references to parallel passages in other Neoplatonic authors but inconveniently divided between the bottom of the page and the end of the volume.\r\n\r\nAll Neoplatonic commentaries are discursive, and those of Simplicius are among the most discursive. It takes 130 pages of this volume for Simplicius to reach Chapter 20 of Epictetus' short work. However, as with many Neoplatonic commentaries, the interest of this one does not lie in what it tells us about Epictetus\u2014whose philosophy Simplicius misunderstood in some important respects, as Hadot points out in her introduction (pp. ci\u2013cxvii). Rather, it is worth reading for what it tells us about Simplicius' own philosophical views. It is unusual among Neoplatonic commentaries in dealing with an ethical text, and the discussions of \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f18\u03c6' \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd (what is within our power) and the spiritual exercises recommended by Epictetus are of considerable interest.\r\n\r\nHadot's introduction offers an updated version of her views on Simplicius' life, work, and philosophical system; a chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching; an account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines; and a short history of the text. Finally, there is an appendix on Fate, Providence, and human freedom in Neoplatonism, which covers Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus, as well as Simplicius. Of these, the account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines and the appendix are entirely new, while the chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching is an updated and lightly revised version of a chapter from her book, Le probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9oplatonisme alexandrin. Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius (Paris, 1978).\r\n\r\nThe first two chapters of the introduction repeat, in a clear and accessible form, views she has already published elsewhere and is well known for. She reiterates her now largely accepted demonstration that Simplicius' philosophical system is essentially the same as that of Damascius\u2014not, as Praechter thought, a simplified Alexandrian system\u2014and, more controversially, continues to maintain, with Tardieu, that his commentaries were written in Harran after 532. The chapter on the history of the text abbreviates the longer account in the editio maior and explains the principles of the editio minor, acknowledging the help of Concetta Luna in simplifying the apparatus. A small number of readings that differ from those of the editio maior are indicated in a footnote on p. cxxvi.\r\n\r\nHadot's translation is divided into sections with helpful headings and subheadings, and, together with her full notes, provides a great deal of assistance in understanding Simplicius' text. This volume deserves a warm welcome as a further installment in the enormous contribution Hadot has made to the understanding of Simplicius over many years. It is to be hoped that it will not be too long before the second volume appears to complement it. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lwxAqvhdfMDm8ss","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":43,"full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1020,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review, New Series","volume":"52","issue":"2","pages":"377-378"}},"sort":[2002]}
Title | Leucippus, Democritus and the οὐ μᾶλλον Principle: An Examination of Theophrastus Phys.Op. Fr. 8 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 253–263 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schofield, Malcom |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper is a piece of detective work. Starting from an obvious excrescence inthe transmitted text of Simplicius's treatment of the foundations of Presocraticatomism near the beginning of his Physicscommentary, it excavates a Theophrasteancorrection to Aristotle's tendency to lump Leucippus and Democritus together: Theophrastus made application of the οὐ μᾶλλον principle in the sphere of ontol-ogy an innovation by Democritus. Along the way it shows Simplicius reorderinghis Theophrastean source in his efforts to nd material which will strengthen thecontrast between Leucippus's atomism and Eleatic metaphysics. And it arguesthat in doing so he all but obliterates TheophrastusÕs attempt to point up theDemocritean credentials of the οὐ μᾶλλον principle. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Zo6uxvsH3eJYKMj |
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Title | Much Ado About 'Nothing': μηδέν and τὸ μὴ ἐόν in Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Apeiron |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 87–104 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sanders, Katie R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is, to my knowledge, a universally accepted assumption among contemporary commentators that μηδέν, 'nothing,' and το μη ἔον, 'what-is-not,' function as synonyms in Parmenides' poem. In this paper, I focus primarily on the central role this supposed semantic equivalence plays in arguments supporting an emendation in line 12 of fragment B8. Despite this scholarly unanimity regarding the synonymy of these two Greek terms and the popularity of the emendation, I contend that we can make the best sense of Parmenides' argument in this and the surrounding lines precisely by retaining the manuscript reading and recognizing the difference in meaning between 'nothing' and 'what-is-not.' This claim, of course, also has broader implications for the interpretation of Parmenides' poem generally. [introduction p. 87-88] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/TyAsS6APM6xvpAp |
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Title | La fin du Néoplatonisme Hellénique. Mise au point sur la question |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 20 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 83-110 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Saihi, Sofian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
À ce stade de notre exposé, il est temps de dresser un bilan récapitulatif des travaux de M. Tardieu. Pour ce dernier, après avoir quitté Athènes, nos philosophes néoplatoniciens se sont rendus à Harrân. Cette cité nous est plus familière sous sa dénomination latine : Carrhae. Il s'agit d'une ville romaine de langue gréco-syriaque, toute proche de la frontière perse, à trente kilomètres au sud-est d'Édesse. Si nous avons dit qu'elle nous est familière, en voici la raison : en 53 avant notre ère, Crassus, membre du premier triumvirat avec Pompée et César, dirige une expédition en Perse. Richissime mais sans gloire militaire, il part à la recherche d'un exploit contre les Parthes. Or, ces derniers le mettent en déroute à Carrhae, où il se fait assassiner. C'est dans cette même ville que, quatre siècles plus tard, l'empereur Julien a effectué ses dernières dévotions avant de tomber sous les coups de Sâbuhr II. D'après M. Tardieu, donc, c'est également là que Simplicius, son maître Damascius, et les autres auraient définitivement élu domicile. Accueillis au sein, ou à l'origine eux-mêmes, d'une école néoplatonicienne, ils auraient continué à vivre, travailler et enseigner ensemble à Harrân. Ils auraient été, en somme, chez eux parmi des populations encore attachées au paganisme. Ils s'y seraient sentis bien et auraient décidé d'y rester. Au vu de ses propres déductions, Ilsetraut Hadot n'a pu rester indifférente aux résultats des travaux de Michel Tardieu. Elle le suit et le soutient ardemment. Et des chercheurs comme Pierre Chuvin, Lambros Couloubaritsis ou Alain de Libéra se sont rangés de leur côté. Par ailleurs, peu de critiques sont venues réfuter ses travaux. Certes, Luc Brisson, Paul Foulkes et, plus sérieusement, Simone Van Riet les ont mis en question. Mais Ilsetraut Hadot a su dissiper leurs doutes sans trop de difficulté. Par conséquent, bien que l'hypothèse de Michel Tardieu reste encore à asseoir plus solidement, si nous admettons avec lui que Damascius et ses compagnons ont emporté les pénates du néoplatonisme à Harrân, nous devrions retrouver les vestiges d'un tel foyer. Nous insinuons par là que si ces lieux ont bel et bien abrité une école néoplatonicienne, il doit nécessairement en subsister des traces tangibles. Une empreinte que nous pourrions peut-être relever dans la pensée philosophique musulmane et dont il faudrait établir les rapports avec la doctrine des Sâbiens. À cette fin, il semble primordial de se pencher sur la première philosophie en terre d'Islam. Par une telle élucidation, nous serions alors en mesure de dégager les structures profondes du néoplatonisme qui y subsistent et, pourquoi pas, déterminer par quelle voie oblique cette doctrine a bien pu cheminer entre l'Antiquité tardive et le Moyen Âge. [conclusion p. 108-110] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dUsC8Irj8dUfNHy |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1052","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1052,"authors_free":[{"id":1597,"entry_id":1052,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":307,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Saihi, Sofian","free_first_name":"Sofian","free_last_name":"Saihi","norm_person":{"id":307,"first_name":"Sofian","last_name":"Saihi","full_name":"Saihi, Sofian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La fin du N\u00e9oplatonisme Hell\u00e9nique. Mise au point sur la question","main_title":{"title":"La fin du N\u00e9oplatonisme Hell\u00e9nique. Mise au point sur la question"},"abstract":"\u00c0 ce stade de notre expos\u00e9, il est temps de dresser un bilan r\u00e9capitulatif des travaux de M. Tardieu. Pour ce dernier, apr\u00e8s avoir quitt\u00e9 Ath\u00e8nes, nos philosophes n\u00e9oplatoniciens se sont rendus \u00e0 Harr\u00e2n. Cette cit\u00e9 nous est plus famili\u00e8re sous sa d\u00e9nomination latine : Carrhae. Il s'agit d'une ville romaine de langue gr\u00e9co-syriaque, toute proche de la fronti\u00e8re perse, \u00e0 trente kilom\u00e8tres au sud-est d'\u00c9desse. Si nous avons dit qu'elle nous est famili\u00e8re, en voici la raison : en 53 avant notre \u00e8re, Crassus, membre du premier triumvirat avec Pomp\u00e9e et C\u00e9sar, dirige une exp\u00e9dition en Perse. Richissime mais sans gloire militaire, il part \u00e0 la recherche d'un exploit contre les Parthes. Or, ces derniers le mettent en d\u00e9route \u00e0 Carrhae, o\u00f9 il se fait assassiner. C'est dans cette m\u00eame ville que, quatre si\u00e8cles plus tard, l'empereur Julien a effectu\u00e9 ses derni\u00e8res d\u00e9votions avant de tomber sous les coups de S\u00e2buhr II.\r\n\r\nD'apr\u00e8s M. Tardieu, donc, c'est \u00e9galement l\u00e0 que Simplicius, son ma\u00eetre Damascius, et les autres auraient d\u00e9finitivement \u00e9lu domicile. Accueillis au sein, ou \u00e0 l'origine eux-m\u00eames, d'une \u00e9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne, ils auraient continu\u00e9 \u00e0 vivre, travailler et enseigner ensemble \u00e0 Harr\u00e2n. Ils auraient \u00e9t\u00e9, en somme, chez eux parmi des populations encore attach\u00e9es au paganisme. Ils s'y seraient sentis bien et auraient d\u00e9cid\u00e9 d'y rester.\r\n\r\nAu vu de ses propres d\u00e9ductions, Ilsetraut Hadot n'a pu rester indiff\u00e9rente aux r\u00e9sultats des travaux de Michel Tardieu. Elle le suit et le soutient ardemment. Et des chercheurs comme Pierre Chuvin, Lambros Couloubaritsis ou Alain de Lib\u00e9ra se sont rang\u00e9s de leur c\u00f4t\u00e9. Par ailleurs, peu de critiques sont venues r\u00e9futer ses travaux. Certes, Luc Brisson, Paul Foulkes et, plus s\u00e9rieusement, Simone Van Riet les ont mis en question. Mais Ilsetraut Hadot a su dissiper leurs doutes sans trop de difficult\u00e9.\r\n\r\nPar cons\u00e9quent, bien que l'hypoth\u00e8se de Michel Tardieu reste encore \u00e0 asseoir plus solidement, si nous admettons avec lui que Damascius et ses compagnons ont emport\u00e9 les p\u00e9nates du n\u00e9oplatonisme \u00e0 Harr\u00e2n, nous devrions retrouver les vestiges d'un tel foyer. Nous insinuons par l\u00e0 que si ces lieux ont bel et bien abrit\u00e9 une \u00e9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne, il doit n\u00e9cessairement en subsister des traces tangibles. Une empreinte que nous pourrions peut-\u00eatre relever dans la pens\u00e9e philosophique musulmane et dont il faudrait \u00e9tablir les rapports avec la doctrine des S\u00e2biens. \u00c0 cette fin, il semble primordial de se pencher sur la premi\u00e8re philosophie en terre d'Islam. Par une telle \u00e9lucidation, nous serions alors en mesure de d\u00e9gager les structures profondes du n\u00e9oplatonisme qui y subsistent et, pourquoi pas, d\u00e9terminer par quelle voie oblique cette doctrine a bien pu cheminer entre l'Antiquit\u00e9 tardive et le Moyen \u00c2ge. [conclusion p. 108-110]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dUsC8Irj8dUfNHy","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":307,"full_name":"Saihi, Sofian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1052,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"20","issue":"2","pages":"83-110"}},"sort":[2002]}
Title | Simplicius and the Early History of Greek Planetary Theory |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Perspectives on Science |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 155–167 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bowen, Alan C. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In earlier work, Bernard R. Goldstein and the present author have intro- duced a procedural rule for historical inquiry, which requires that one take pains to establish the credibility of any citation of ancient thought by later writers in antiquity through a process of veriªcation. In this paper, I shall apply what I call the Rule of Ancient Citations to Simplicius’ interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks in Meta . 8, which is the primary point of departure for the modern understanding of Greek planetary theory. I ªrst sketch several lines of argument that lead me to conclude that Simplicius’ interpretation should not be accepted because it assumes a concern with planetary phenomena unknown to the Greeks before the late 2nd and early 1st centuries bc. Then, after showing that there is a fairly well deªned range of readings of Aris- totle’s remarks more in keeping with what we actually know of astronomy in the 5th and 4th centuries bc, I conclude that neither Aristotle’s report about the Eudoxan and Callippan accounts of the celestial motions nor Simplicius’ interpretation of this report is a good starting point for our understanding of early Greek planetary theory. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nWG5h8vz9dCXgZc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1073","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1073,"authors_free":[{"id":1627,"entry_id":1073,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":16,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","free_first_name":"Alan C. ","free_last_name":"Bowen","norm_person":{"id":16,"first_name":"Bowen C.","last_name":"Bowen","full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140052720","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius and the Early History of Greek Planetary Theory ","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius and the Early History of Greek Planetary Theory "},"abstract":"In earlier work, Bernard R. Goldstein and the present author have intro-\r\nduced a procedural rule for historical inquiry, which requires that one take\r\npains to establish the credibility of any citation of ancient thought by later\r\nwriters in antiquity through a process of veri\u00aacation. In this paper, I shall\r\napply what I call the Rule of Ancient Citations to Simplicius\u2019 interpretation\r\nof Aristotle\u2019s remarks in Meta \u0001. 8, which is the primary point of departure\r\nfor the modern understanding of Greek planetary theory. I \u00aarst sketch several\r\nlines of argument that lead me to conclude that Simplicius\u2019 interpretation\r\nshould not be accepted because it assumes a concern with planetary phenomena\r\nunknown to the Greeks before the late 2nd and early 1st centuries bc. Then,\r\nafter showing that there is a fairly well de\u00aaned range of readings of Aris-\r\ntotle\u2019s remarks more in keeping with what we actually know of astronomy in\r\nthe 5th and 4th centuries bc, I conclude that neither Aristotle\u2019s report about\r\nthe Eudoxan and Callippan accounts of the celestial motions nor Simplicius\u2019\r\ninterpretation of this report is a good starting point for our understanding of\r\nearly Greek planetary theory. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nWG5h8vz9dCXgZc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":16,"full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1073,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Perspectives on Science","volume":"10","issue":"2","pages":"155\u2013167"}},"sort":[2002]}
Title | Note sulla chiusura della Scuola neoplatonica di Atene |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Schede Medievali |
Volume | 42 |
Pages | 53-95 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Napoli, Valerio |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Secondo la lettura di Alain De Libera, l’“esilio” dei filosofi in Persia non segna la chiusura del conflitto tra l’ellenismo e il cristianesimo né la fine della filosofia («la filosofia è tutt'altro che morta a quest’epoca»), ma, al contrario, rappresenta l’evento che dà avvio a un movimento di trasferimento o di transfert della scienza – una traslazione degli studi o dei centri di studio – che durerà fino alla fine del Medioevo. L’esilio in questione, con cui la filosofia emigra – o pensa di emigrare – dall’Impero bizantino all’Impero sassanide per poi ritornare nell’Impero bizantino (in una translatio da Atene in Persia e dalla Persia a Harràn), costituisce una delle varie translations studiorum che si verificano tra l’antichità e il Medioevo e segna il perdurare, nella città di Harràn, in territorio bizantino, della filosofia pagana. In ogni caso, è possibile notare che, con i filosofi menzionati da Agazia (e forse con altri della stessa epoca non coinvolti nell’avventura persiana), ci troviamo di fronte all’ultima generazione di spicco dei filosofi pagani. Qualunque sia stata l’attività filosofica svolta dai neoplatonici dopo il loro ritorno dalla Persia, a Harràn o in qualche altra località, si può comunque constatare che Damascio (il quale probabilmente scrisse le sue opere prima del 529) e, se si vuole, qualche altro pensatore contemporaneo costituiscono gli ultimi filosofi pagani di rilievo. «[...] De fait – dichiara con decisione Henri Dominique Saffrey – après l’époque de Justinien, il n’y a plus eu de philosophes païens. Simplicius et les quelques-uns de la génération qui le suit, furent les derniers». Il pensiero pagano continuerà a vivere – al di là della possibile attività della comunità neoplatonica harraniana – in Oriente e in Occidente, in una complessa e intricata trama di ricezioni, influssi, fruizioni, letture, trasformazioni e suggestioni, nell’ambito del pensiero successivo nelle sue articolazioni arabo-islamica, greco-bizantina, latino-occidentale e altre. [conclusion p. 94-95] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/UFh3Gu1utmqf1sN |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"949","_score":null,"_source":{"id":949,"authors_free":[{"id":1425,"entry_id":949,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":522,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Napoli, Valerio","free_first_name":"Valerio","free_last_name":"Napoli","norm_person":{"id":522,"first_name":"Valerio","last_name":"Napoli","full_name":"Napoli, Valerio","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Note sulla chiusura della Scuola neoplatonica di Atene","main_title":{"title":"Note sulla chiusura della Scuola neoplatonica di Atene"},"abstract":"Secondo la lettura di Alain De Libera, l\u2019\u201cesilio\u201d dei filosofi in Persia non segna la chiusura del conflitto tra l\u2019ellenismo e il cristianesimo n\u00e9 la fine della filosofia (\u00abla filosofia \u00e8 tutt'altro che morta a quest\u2019epoca\u00bb), ma, al contrario, rappresenta l\u2019evento che d\u00e0 avvio a un movimento di trasferimento o di transfert della scienza \u2013 una traslazione degli studi o dei centri di studio \u2013 che durer\u00e0 fino alla fine del Medioevo.\r\n\r\nL\u2019esilio in questione, con cui la filosofia emigra \u2013 o pensa di emigrare \u2013 dall\u2019Impero bizantino all\u2019Impero sassanide per poi ritornare nell\u2019Impero bizantino (in una translatio da Atene in Persia e dalla Persia a Harr\u00e0n), costituisce una delle varie translations studiorum che si verificano tra l\u2019antichit\u00e0 e il Medioevo e segna il perdurare, nella citt\u00e0 di Harr\u00e0n, in territorio bizantino, della filosofia pagana.\r\n\r\nIn ogni caso, \u00e8 possibile notare che, con i filosofi menzionati da Agazia (e forse con altri della stessa epoca non coinvolti nell\u2019avventura persiana), ci troviamo di fronte all\u2019ultima generazione di spicco dei filosofi pagani. Qualunque sia stata l\u2019attivit\u00e0 filosofica svolta dai neoplatonici dopo il loro ritorno dalla Persia, a Harr\u00e0n o in qualche altra localit\u00e0, si pu\u00f2 comunque constatare che Damascio (il quale probabilmente scrisse le sue opere prima del 529) e, se si vuole, qualche altro pensatore contemporaneo costituiscono gli ultimi filosofi pagani di rilievo.\r\n\r\n\u00ab[...] De fait \u2013 dichiara con decisione Henri Dominique Saffrey \u2013 apr\u00e8s l\u2019\u00e9poque de Justinien, il n\u2019y a plus eu de philosophes pa\u00efens. Simplicius et les quelques-uns de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui le suit, furent les derniers\u00bb. Il pensiero pagano continuer\u00e0 a vivere \u2013 al di l\u00e0 della possibile attivit\u00e0 della comunit\u00e0 neoplatonica harraniana \u2013 in Oriente e in Occidente, in una complessa e intricata trama di ricezioni, influssi, fruizioni, letture, trasformazioni e suggestioni, nell\u2019ambito del pensiero successivo nelle sue articolazioni arabo-islamica, greco-bizantina, latino-occidentale e altre. [conclusion p. 94-95]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/UFh3Gu1utmqf1sN","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":522,"full_name":"Napoli, Valerio","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":949,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Schede Medievali","volume":"42","issue":"","pages":"53-95"}},"sort":[2002]}
Title | What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 80 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 261-287 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltzly, Dirk |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper, I consider Proclus’ arguments against Aristotle on the composition of the heavens from the fifth element, the aether. Proclus argues for the Platonic view (Timaeus 40a) that the heavenly bodies are composed of all four elements, with fire predominating. I think that his discussion exhibits all the methodological features that we find admirable in Aristotle’s largely a priori proto-science. Proclus’ treatment of the question in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus also provides the fullest statement of a neoplatonic alternative to the Aristotelian theory of the elements. As such, it forms a significant part of a still largely underappreciated neoplatonic legacy to the history of science. [authors abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tOMemjPbvEoCytl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"962","_score":null,"_source":{"id":962,"authors_free":[{"id":1444,"entry_id":962,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":107,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltzly, Dirk","free_first_name":"Dirk","free_last_name":"Baltzly","norm_person":{"id":107,"first_name":"Dirk","last_name":"Baltzly","full_name":"Baltzly, Dirk","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1150414960","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element","main_title":{"title":"What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element"},"abstract":"In this paper, I consider Proclus\u2019 arguments against Aristotle on the composition of the \r\nheavens from the fifth element, the aether. Proclus argues for the Platonic view (Timaeus \r\n40a) that the heavenly bodies are composed of all four elements, with fire predominating. \r\nI think that his discussion exhibits all the methodological features that we find admirable \r\nin Aristotle\u2019s largely a priori proto-science. Proclus\u2019 treatment of the question in his \r\ncommentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus also provides the fullest statement of a neoplatonic \r\nalternative to the Aristotelian theory of the elements. As such, it forms a significant part of \r\na still largely underappreciated neoplatonic legacy to the history of science. [authors abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tOMemjPbvEoCytl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":107,"full_name":"Baltzly, Dirk","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":962,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Australasian Journal of Philosophy","volume":"80","issue":"3","pages":"261-287"}},"sort":[2002]}
Title | The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Ancient World |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 45–69 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Walker, Joel Thomas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As a series of recent retrospectives makes clear, the study of late antiquity has witnessed dramatic growth during the past twenty years, with increasing signs of formal recognition during the 1990s. This rapid expansion has been accompanied by an implicit debate over the most useful chronological and geographical boundaries for the emergent field. Although the "world of late antiquity" ostensibly includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East, the current shape of the field, as defined especially by conferences and publications, remains heavily weighted towards the Mediterranean world of the Roman Empire and its successor states in western Europe. Many recent discussions of the "late antique world" are, in fact, studies of late Roman history that make little attempt to incorporate regions east of the Euphrates. Integrating the Sasanian Empire into the study of late antiquity will be a difficult task. A variety of obstacles, outlined in section II above, beset the study of Sasanian history, and substantial linguistic barriers limit access to the Sasanian world for scholars trained in the Greco-Roman sources. Modern political geography has also proved to be a major barrier for historians and archaeologists interested in regions "east of Byzantium." In the current gap between Sasanian and late Roman history, however, lies also much potential for future research. To develop a more interdisciplinary vision of late antiquity, scholars will need to explore more closely the connections and contrasts between the worlds of Byzantium and Sasanian Iran. Some progress in this direction has been made in the fields of military, diplomatic, and economic history; far more work needs to be done in the areas of cultural and intellectual history, not least the history of philosophy. The recent collapse of the Soviet Union during the late 1980s has reminded us how quickly changes in contemporary geography can lead to comparable shifts in the conceptualization of historical geography. The world of late antiquity may also look very different, if and when more scholars have greater access to travel, teach, and again conduct archaeological fieldwork in Iraq, Iran, and neighboring countries. The emergence of the field of late antiquity represents a major opportunity for Sasanian history, precisely because it invites us to look across the traditional disciplinary division between Mediterranean and Near Eastern history. Modern interpretations of the philosophers’ journey to the court of Khosrow Anoshirvan in 531/532 C.E. reveal how often this disciplinary division has obscured the richness of intellectual life at the late Sasanian court, as well as the intensity of its contacts with Greek and Syrian intellectuals. From Gibbon through Bury and down to Alan Cameron’s influential article on the "Closing of the Academy," there has been a strong tendency among Greco-Roman historians to give too much credence to Agathias’ hostile depiction of Sasanian philhellenism. Near Eastern historians, such as Rawlinson and Christensen, and the occasional Byzantinist such as Jean-François Duneau, have offered more optimistic readings of Khosrow’s philosophical patronage, but without sufficient attention to the tensions involved in the Sasanian encounter with Hellenism. The task that lies ahead, building on the work of Michel Tardieu, is to explain the precise quality of Sasanian Hellenism, its social and political context, cultural milieu, and intellectual legacy. The career of Uranius, and the modern debate over the peregrinations of Damascius, prove that this investigation must include not only Athens, Alexandria, and Constantinople, but also Ctesiphon, Harran, and Gondishapur. Khosrow’s patronage of Greek philosophers thus reveals the advantages, indeed the necessity, of a world of late antiquity that includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East. [conclusion p. 67-69] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AVLAM9PVkGxCgRz |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"446","_score":null,"_source":{"id":446,"authors_free":[{"id":598,"entry_id":446,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":355,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Walker, Joel Thomas","free_first_name":"Joel Thomas","free_last_name":"Walker","norm_person":{"id":355,"first_name":"Joel Thomas","last_name":"Walker","full_name":"Walker, Joel Thomas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131718118","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran","main_title":{"title":"The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran"},"abstract":"As a series of recent retrospectives makes clear, the study of late antiquity has witnessed dramatic growth during the past twenty years, with increasing signs of formal recognition during the 1990s. This rapid expansion has been accompanied by an implicit debate over the most useful chronological and geographical boundaries for the emergent field. Although the \"world of late antiquity\" ostensibly includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East, the current shape of the field, as defined especially by conferences and publications, remains heavily weighted towards the Mediterranean world of the Roman Empire and its successor states in western Europe. Many recent discussions of the \"late antique world\" are, in fact, studies of late Roman history that make little attempt to incorporate regions east of the Euphrates.\r\n\r\nIntegrating the Sasanian Empire into the study of late antiquity will be a difficult task. A variety of obstacles, outlined in section II above, beset the study of Sasanian history, and substantial linguistic barriers limit access to the Sasanian world for scholars trained in the Greco-Roman sources. Modern political geography has also proved to be a major barrier for historians and archaeologists interested in regions \"east of Byzantium.\" In the current gap between Sasanian and late Roman history, however, lies also much potential for future research. To develop a more interdisciplinary vision of late antiquity, scholars will need to explore more closely the connections and contrasts between the worlds of Byzantium and Sasanian Iran. Some progress in this direction has been made in the fields of military, diplomatic, and economic history; far more work needs to be done in the areas of cultural and intellectual history, not least the history of philosophy. The recent collapse of the Soviet Union during the late 1980s has reminded us how quickly changes in contemporary geography can lead to comparable shifts in the conceptualization of historical geography. The world of late antiquity may also look very different, if and when more scholars have greater access to travel, teach, and again conduct archaeological fieldwork in Iraq, Iran, and neighboring countries.\r\n\r\nThe emergence of the field of late antiquity represents a major opportunity for Sasanian history, precisely because it invites us to look across the traditional disciplinary division between Mediterranean and Near Eastern history. Modern interpretations of the philosophers\u2019 journey to the court of Khosrow Anoshirvan in 531\/532 C.E. reveal how often this disciplinary division has obscured the richness of intellectual life at the late Sasanian court, as well as the intensity of its contacts with Greek and Syrian intellectuals. From Gibbon through Bury and down to Alan Cameron\u2019s influential article on the \"Closing of the Academy,\" there has been a strong tendency among Greco-Roman historians to give too much credence to Agathias\u2019 hostile depiction of Sasanian philhellenism. Near Eastern historians, such as Rawlinson and Christensen, and the occasional Byzantinist such as Jean-Fran\u00e7ois Duneau, have offered more optimistic readings of Khosrow\u2019s philosophical patronage, but without sufficient attention to the tensions involved in the Sasanian encounter with Hellenism. The task that lies ahead, building on the work of Michel Tardieu, is to explain the precise quality of Sasanian Hellenism, its social and political context, cultural milieu, and intellectual legacy. The career of Uranius, and the modern debate over the peregrinations of Damascius, prove that this investigation must include not only Athens, Alexandria, and Constantinople, but also Ctesiphon, Harran, and Gondishapur. Khosrow\u2019s patronage of Greek philosophers thus reveals the advantages, indeed the necessity, of a world of late antiquity that includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East. [conclusion p. 67-69]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AVLAM9PVkGxCgRz","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":355,"full_name":"Walker, Joel Thomas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":446,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ancient World","volume":"33","issue":"1","pages":"45\u201369"}},"sort":[2002]}
Title | Xenarchus, Alexander, and Simplicius on Simple Motions, Bodies and Magnitudes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies |
Volume | 46 |
Pages | 19-42 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hankinson, Robert J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle accounted for the fundamental dynamics of the cosmos in terms of the tendencies of the various elements to distinct types of natural motions, and (in the case of the sublunary elements) to rest in their natural places. In so doing, he introduced a fifth element, the ether, with a natural and unceasing tendency to revolve, as the matter for the heavenly bodies. This paper deals with some of the objections raised to this model, and to its conceptual underpinnings, raised by Xenarchus of Seleuceia, an unorthodox Peripatetic of the 1 st century BC, and of the attempts of later philosophers to rebut them. In so doing it casts light on a little-known, but historically important and interesting, episode in the development of physical dynamics. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CTZqeCQH7oDhwXB |
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Title | Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories: His following of Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Dionysius |
Volume | 20 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hankey, Wayne J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Following Simplicius, Thomas set up the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical viae as complementary oppositions each of which contributed to the truth. Thomas also followed Simplicius in discerning differences between the hermeneutic methods of the two great schools. He reproduced the history of philosophy of Simplicius as soon as he had his commentaries, agreed with many of his conciliating judgments, and used the same reconciling logical figures. He does not identify himself as a Peripatetic or as a Platonist. However, when he agrees that Aristotle’s way of reasoning, per viam motus, to the existence of separate substances is manifestior et certior, he is sitting in judgment with, not against, Simplicius. For both the sixth and the thirteenth century commentators, Plato and Aristotle are assimilated to each other in various ways, and the real possibility of any beginning except that from the sensible is excluded. Thomas’ hermeneutic is that of the Platonic tradition in late Antiquity – Thomas certainly thought that the truth was veiled under poetic and symbolic language and judged this to be essential for revealing the truth to humans. Consistently with this approach, in the exposition of the De Caelo, Aquinas goes so far with Simplicius as to find “something divine (fabula aliquid divinum continet)” in the myth that Atlas holds up the heavens.106 He would seem, thus, to be on his way to the reconciliation of religious as well as of philosophical traditions. If this should, in fact, be his intent, Thomas would be following Simplicius and his Neoplatonic predecessors in their deepest purposes. This Christian priest, friar, and saint would have placed himself with the “divine” Proclus among the successors of Plato. [Conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YjEdDURMoq0kV8j |
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Title | Review of: Thiel 1999: Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Mnemosyne |
Volume | 54 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 482–500 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Luna, Concetta |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This is an extensive review of R. Thiel’s monograph Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen. The author of the review, C. Luna, reproduces the book’s discussion of the location where Neoplatonic philosophers settled after leaving Athens due to the ban on pagan philosophy in 529 AD. They went to Persia and later returned to the Byzantine Empire after the peace treaty was signed. The only known historical account of their location is from Agathias, who states that they were attracted to the wisdom of King Chosroes and stayed at his court. However, they eventually left and, using a clause in the peace treaty, returned to the Byzantine Empire without having to renounce their philosophical or religious beliefs. The text examines two hypotheses as to where they went: Athens or Alexandria, but a new hypothesis is presented based on Simplicius' texts that the philosophers settled in Harran, a city close to the Persian border. The text also discusses the possibility of Simplicius returning to Athens, Alexandria, or Harran. Thiel, believes it is unlikely the philosophers went to Alexandria because the patriarch of the city would not have allowed them to continue their philosophical and anti-Christian activities. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MDj448FZ9whVcZN |
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Title | Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle's "Categories"? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 492-526 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Haas, Frans A. J. de |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I propose a reading of Plotinus Enneads VI.1-3 [41-43] On the genera of being which regards this treatise as a coherent whole in which Aristotle's Categories is explored in a way that turns it into a decisive contribution to Plotinus' Platonic ontology. In addition, I claim that Porphyry's Isagoge and commentaries on the Categories start by adopting Plotinus' point of view, including his notion of genus, and proceed by explaining its consequences for a more detailed reading of the Categories. After Plotinus' integration of the Categories into the Platonic frame of thought Porphyry saw the possibilities of exploiting the Peripatetic tradition both as a means to support the Platonic interpretation of the Categories and as a source for solutions to traditional questions. His allegiance to a division of being into ten, and his emphasis on semantics rather than ontology can be explained from this orientation. In the light of our investigation the alleged disagreement between Plotinus and Porphyry on the Categories changes its appearance completely. There are differences, but these can be best explained as confirmation and extension of Plotinus' perspective on the Categories and its role in Platonism. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yjxJiXgPDTM8LDJ |
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Title | Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions – A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | New Blackfriars |
Volume | 82 |
Issue | 968 |
Pages | 467-478 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Boland, Vivian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
One of the areas on which Fergus Kerr has kept a wise eye and to which he has made valued contributions over many years is moral philosophy. In fact, he had the task of teaching moral theology in the early years of his career but quickly moved on. He was quite relieved to do so, he told me once, not least because he found Shakespeare more relevant to morality than the geography of the fallopian tubes. Leaving behind moral theology in that sense did not mean his leaving behind a concern with moral questions. On the contrary, he has maintained great interest in developments in fundamental moral theory and in the centrality of morality for all theology. In this, he is faithful to Aquinas who, as Leonard Boyle has argued, envisaged Summa Theologiae as a work in which the moral is central. If, as Kerr himself has been arguing recently, beatitudo is a key to the unity of the Summa, then this is further support for what Boyle argued on historical and palaeographical grounds. This is not to claim that what Aquinas had in mind was anything like what moral theology came to describe later on, when a strict distinction and even separation of dogma and moral came to prevail, especially in seminary training. Aquinas belongs to an earlier world, from which contemporary moral philosophers continue to learn, in which these later distinctions did not apply. The inherent difficulty in separating them is clear if one tries to answer the question of whether the theology of grace belongs to dogma or to moral. One of the key areas in which Aquinas continues to contribute to debates in moral philosophy is in relation to virtue-theory. Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy has contributed with distinction to the revival of interest in the notion of virtue, as mentioning the names Anscombe, Foot, and MacIntyre is enough to show. A crucial building block in Aquinas's moral theory is the notion of habitus or disposition since, for him, following Aristotle, a virtue is a kind of disposition. But this more philosophical part of his account of virtue has received little enough direct attention in recent times for reasons that may become clearer as we proceed. What I want to do in this paper is to look again at those questions in the Summa where Aquinas explains this notion of habitus or disposition. It is important for his understanding of the human being as a moral agent as well as for his account of grace, and in particular of those gifts of faith, hope, and what Christian tradition calls theological virtues. It is a text whose examination will lead us into a number of central and current questions about the nature of Aquinas's theological synthesis and about whether or not we may consider any of his work as purely philosophical, i.e., philosophical as distinct from theological. [introduction p. 467-468] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zuaVu4YEsILwhuu |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1081","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1081,"authors_free":[{"id":1636,"entry_id":1081,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":9,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Boland, Vivian","free_first_name":"Vivian","free_last_name":"Boland","norm_person":{"id":9,"first_name":"Vivian","last_name":"Boland","full_name":"Boland, Vivian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/94637645X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions \u2013 A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory","main_title":{"title":"Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions \u2013 A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory"},"abstract":"One of the areas on which Fergus Kerr has kept a wise eye and to which he has made valued contributions over many years is moral philosophy. In fact, he had the task of teaching moral theology in the early years of his career but quickly moved on. He was quite relieved to do so, he told me once, not least because he found Shakespeare more relevant to morality than the geography of the fallopian tubes.\r\n\r\nLeaving behind moral theology in that sense did not mean his leaving behind a concern with moral questions. On the contrary, he has maintained great interest in developments in fundamental moral theory and in the centrality of morality for all theology. In this, he is faithful to Aquinas who, as Leonard Boyle has argued, envisaged Summa Theologiae as a work in which the moral is central. If, as Kerr himself has been arguing recently, beatitudo is a key to the unity of the Summa, then this is further support for what Boyle argued on historical and palaeographical grounds.\r\n\r\nThis is not to claim that what Aquinas had in mind was anything like what moral theology came to describe later on, when a strict distinction and even separation of dogma and moral came to prevail, especially in seminary training. Aquinas belongs to an earlier world, from which contemporary moral philosophers continue to learn, in which these later distinctions did not apply. The inherent difficulty in separating them is clear if one tries to answer the question of whether the theology of grace belongs to dogma or to moral.\r\n\r\nOne of the key areas in which Aquinas continues to contribute to debates in moral philosophy is in relation to virtue-theory. Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy has contributed with distinction to the revival of interest in the notion of virtue, as mentioning the names Anscombe, Foot, and MacIntyre is enough to show. A crucial building block in Aquinas's moral theory is the notion of habitus or disposition since, for him, following Aristotle, a virtue is a kind of disposition.\r\n\r\nBut this more philosophical part of his account of virtue has received little enough direct attention in recent times for reasons that may become clearer as we proceed. What I want to do in this paper is to look again at those questions in the Summa where Aquinas explains this notion of habitus or disposition. It is important for his understanding of the human being as a moral agent as well as for his account of grace, and in particular of those gifts of faith, hope, and what Christian tradition calls theological virtues.\r\n\r\nIt is a text whose examination will lead us into a number of central and current questions about the nature of Aquinas's theological synthesis and about whether or not we may consider any of his work as purely philosophical, i.e., philosophical as distinct from theological. [introduction p. 467-468]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zuaVu4YEsILwhuu","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":9,"full_name":"Boland, Vivian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1081,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"New Blackfriars","volume":"82","issue":"968","pages":"467-478"}},"sort":[2001]}
Title | Three Thêtas in the "Empédocle de Strasbourg" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 54 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 78-84 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Algra, Keimpe A. , Mansfeld, Jaap |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
We conclude that we cannot, merely on the basis of the Strasbourg fragments, confidently assign to the physical poem the gruesome fragment (now plus its new context) Stein and Diels assigned to the Purifications. Until further evidence turns up, only a non liquet is feasible, and we should keep open the possibility that we are dealing with "Zwei Empedocle de Strasbourg." The 6s in the papyrus fragments discussed above are simply wrong. The slightly bizarre interpretation based on them may be abandoned. [conclusion p. 81] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/K3k0s0RXMbEYW6J |
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Title | A New Role for the Hippopede of Eudoxus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Archive for History of Exact Sciences |
Volume | 56 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 69-93 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Yavetz, Ido |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The geometry of the alternative reconstruction of Eudoxan planetary theory is studied. It is shown that in this framework the hippopede acquires an analytical role, consolidating the theory's geometrical underpinnings. This removes the main point of incompatibility between the alternative reconstruction and Simplicius's account of Eudoxan planetary astronomy. The analysis also suggests a compass and straight-edge procedure for drawing a point by point outline of the retrograde loop created by any given arrangement of the three inner spheres. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AL92XR05kicTihW |
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Title | Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter ("De mal. subs." 30-7) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 154-188 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Opsomer, Jan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In De malorum subsistentia chapters 30–37, Proclus criticizes the view that evil is to be identified with matter. His main target is Plotinus' account in Enn. 1.8 [51]. Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul, and that it is evil or a principle of evil. According to Proclus, matter is good because it is produced by the One. Plotinus' doctrine of matter as evil is the result of a different conception of emanation, according to which matter does not revert to its principle. Proclus claims that positing a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dualism or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus does not seem to escape the latter consequence if he is to remain committed to the Neoplatonic conception of causation. Plotinus equated matter with privation and said it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance, thus violating fundamental Aristotelian principles. Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy, as does Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories. It is possible that Iamblichus was the source of both Proclus and Simplicius, and that he was the originator of the parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Hey5Ym2eaERyB7G |
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Title | Augustin, «Confessions» 4, 16, 28-29, «Soliloques» 2, 20, 34-36 et les «Commentaires des catégories» |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica |
Volume | 93 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 372-392 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Doucet, Dominique |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Au terme de cette étude montrant les points de consonance entre les thèmes développés dans les derniers paragraphes des Soliloques et les problématiques mises en œuvre dans les commentaires des Catégories, deux conclusions principales se présentent. Premièrement, l'antériorité des écrits d'Augustin sur la rédaction de la plus grande partie des commentaires des Catégories oblige à considérer un seul et même auteur ou une seule et même source, tant pour Augustin que pour les auteurs des commentaires ultérieurs. La place que reçoit le commentaire de Porphyre dans les autres commentaires et l'importance de cet auteur dans l'élaboration des schémas de pensée augustiniens conduisent naturellement à la conclusion que c'est dans une œuvre porphyrienne qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer l'essentiel de cette argumentation. Il reste alors à tenter de déterminer laquelle. Le peu d'intérêt qu'Augustin accorde aux lectures des magistri eruditissimi qu'il évoque dans les Confessions semble écarter l'hypothèse qu'il garderait un vif souvenir des conversations de son adolescence. Autrement, il n'aurait pas oublié à ce point d'en mentionner l'importance, comme il le fait pour sa lecture de l'Hortensius et pour celle des libri platonicorum, qui eurent une influence déterminante sur l'évolution de sa pensée. Il semble alors plus probable de considérer qu'Augustin a rencontré une argumentation identique à celle qui se trouve dans les commentaires ultérieurs des Catégories, celle de Porphyre en son propre commentaire, qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer soit dans un texte du dossier des libri platonicorum, soit inséré dans un autre écrit comme le De regressu animae ou encore le Zêtêma sur l'immortalité de l'âme, dont nous savons qu'il prit connaissance. Il serait même tentant de considérer que la progression même des Soliloques suit en parallèle l'essentiel de la progression qui pourrait être celle du De regressu. Cette hypothèse nous amène directement au second volet de cette conclusion. Si Augustin emprunte un certain nombre de thèmes à l'univers néoplatonicien et porphyrien, il ne manque pas de les transformer profondément. Nous avons déjà signalé, dans une lecture de Sol. 2, 18, 32, la manière dont Augustin reprend les degrés de la hiérarchie des êtres du néoplatonisme et la transforme en une hiérarchie des degrés du vrai. En effet, la hiérarchie de Marius Victorinus (uere sunt, quae sunt, non uere non sunt, uere non sunt) se retrouve en partie chez Augustin sous la forme : uere uerum (ueritas), uerum, tendit esse et non est. Cette transformation de la hiérarchie des êtres en une hiérarchie des degrés du vrai s'explique assez bien par le projet même des Soliloques : connaître Dieu et l'âme, et par la démonstration de l'immortalité de l'âme qui s'y trouve. C'est par la présence en l'âme de l'immortelle Vérité que l'âme est assurée de son immortalité, et cette preuve, dans l'esprit d'Augustin, est supérieure à celle, classique, de l'auto-motricité de l'âme. Dans les paragraphes 34 à 36 de la fin des Soliloques, c'est une semblable hiérarchie des degrés du vrai que nous rencontrons. Il est donc nécessaire sur ce point de conclure que tout en s'inspirant des thèmes néoplatoniciens et en particulier porphyriens, Augustin leur fait subir un déplacement notable et développe, plutôt qu'une ontologie, une métaphysique du vrai qui lui permet de connaître son âme, d'accéder à la certitude de son immortalité, et de progresser dans sa recherche de Dieu, recherche dont il résumera l'essentiel de la progression dans les Confessions et dont il dressera les harmoniques dans le De Trinitate. [conclusion p 390-392] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ilXNYhEQOhMEPLW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"600","_score":null,"_source":{"id":600,"authors_free":[{"id":851,"entry_id":600,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":70,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Doucet, Dominique ","free_first_name":"Dominique","free_last_name":"Doucet","norm_person":{"id":70,"first_name":"Dominique ","last_name":"Doucet","full_name":"Doucet, Dominique ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/105244430X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Augustin, \u00abConfessions\u00bb 4, 16, 28-29, \u00abSoliloques\u00bb 2, 20, 34-36 et les \u00abCommentaires des cat\u00e9gories\u00bb","main_title":{"title":"Augustin, \u00abConfessions\u00bb 4, 16, 28-29, \u00abSoliloques\u00bb 2, 20, 34-36 et les \u00abCommentaires des cat\u00e9gories\u00bb"},"abstract":"Au terme de cette \u00e9tude montrant les points de consonance entre les th\u00e8mes d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s dans les derniers paragraphes des Soliloques et les probl\u00e9matiques mises en \u0153uvre dans les commentaires des Cat\u00e9gories, deux conclusions principales se pr\u00e9sentent. Premi\u00e8rement, l'ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 des \u00e9crits d'Augustin sur la r\u00e9daction de la plus grande partie des commentaires des Cat\u00e9gories oblige \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer un seul et m\u00eame auteur ou une seule et m\u00eame source, tant pour Augustin que pour les auteurs des commentaires ult\u00e9rieurs. La place que re\u00e7oit le commentaire de Porphyre dans les autres commentaires et l'importance de cet auteur dans l'\u00e9laboration des sch\u00e9mas de pens\u00e9e augustiniens conduisent naturellement \u00e0 la conclusion que c'est dans une \u0153uvre porphyrienne qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer l'essentiel de cette argumentation.\r\n\r\nIl reste alors \u00e0 tenter de d\u00e9terminer laquelle. Le peu d'int\u00e9r\u00eat qu'Augustin accorde aux lectures des magistri eruditissimi qu'il \u00e9voque dans les Confessions semble \u00e9carter l'hypoth\u00e8se qu'il garderait un vif souvenir des conversations de son adolescence. Autrement, il n'aurait pas oubli\u00e9 \u00e0 ce point d'en mentionner l'importance, comme il le fait pour sa lecture de l'Hortensius et pour celle des libri platonicorum, qui eurent une influence d\u00e9terminante sur l'\u00e9volution de sa pens\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nIl semble alors plus probable de consid\u00e9rer qu'Augustin a rencontr\u00e9 une argumentation identique \u00e0 celle qui se trouve dans les commentaires ult\u00e9rieurs des Cat\u00e9gories, celle de Porphyre en son propre commentaire, qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer soit dans un texte du dossier des libri platonicorum, soit ins\u00e9r\u00e9 dans un autre \u00e9crit comme le De regressu animae ou encore le Z\u00eat\u00eama sur l'immortalit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me, dont nous savons qu'il prit connaissance.\r\n\r\nIl serait m\u00eame tentant de consid\u00e9rer que la progression m\u00eame des Soliloques suit en parall\u00e8le l'essentiel de la progression qui pourrait \u00eatre celle du De regressu.\r\n\r\nCette hypoth\u00e8se nous am\u00e8ne directement au second volet de cette conclusion. Si Augustin emprunte un certain nombre de th\u00e8mes \u00e0 l'univers n\u00e9oplatonicien et porphyrien, il ne manque pas de les transformer profond\u00e9ment. Nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9, dans une lecture de Sol. 2, 18, 32, la mani\u00e8re dont Augustin reprend les degr\u00e9s de la hi\u00e9rarchie des \u00eatres du n\u00e9oplatonisme et la transforme en une hi\u00e9rarchie des degr\u00e9s du vrai. En effet, la hi\u00e9rarchie de Marius Victorinus (uere sunt, quae sunt, non uere non sunt, uere non sunt) se retrouve en partie chez Augustin sous la forme : uere uerum (ueritas), uerum, tendit esse et non est.\r\n\r\nCette transformation de la hi\u00e9rarchie des \u00eatres en une hi\u00e9rarchie des degr\u00e9s du vrai s'explique assez bien par le projet m\u00eame des Soliloques : conna\u00eetre Dieu et l'\u00e2me, et par la d\u00e9monstration de l'immortalit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me qui s'y trouve. C'est par la pr\u00e9sence en l'\u00e2me de l'immortelle V\u00e9rit\u00e9 que l'\u00e2me est assur\u00e9e de son immortalit\u00e9, et cette preuve, dans l'esprit d'Augustin, est sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle, classique, de l'auto-motricit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me.\r\n\r\nDans les paragraphes 34 \u00e0 36 de la fin des Soliloques, c'est une semblable hi\u00e9rarchie des degr\u00e9s du vrai que nous rencontrons. Il est donc n\u00e9cessaire sur ce point de conclure que tout en s'inspirant des th\u00e8mes n\u00e9oplatoniciens et en particulier porphyriens, Augustin leur fait subir un d\u00e9placement notable et d\u00e9veloppe, plut\u00f4t qu'une ontologie, une m\u00e9taphysique du vrai qui lui permet de conna\u00eetre son \u00e2me, d'acc\u00e9der \u00e0 la certitude de son immortalit\u00e9, et de progresser dans sa recherche de Dieu, recherche dont il r\u00e9sumera l'essentiel de la progression dans les Confessions et dont il dressera les harmoniques dans le De Trinitate. [conclusion p 390-392]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ilXNYhEQOhMEPLW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":70,"full_name":"Doucet, Dominique ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":600,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica","volume":"93","issue":"3","pages":"372-392"}},"sort":[2001]}
Title | Zeno of Elea's Argument from Bisection: Newly Discovered Evidence in a Hebrew Translation of Averroes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Aleph |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 285-293 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Glasner, Ruth |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To conclude, in the Hebrew version of Averroes' long commentary on the Physics, comment 1.30, we find what seems to be Alexander's version of Zeno's argument ek tes dichotomias against plurality. Averroes interprets Zeno's argument as contradicting Parmenides', thus drawing attention to a problem that is latent in Simplicius' commentary. [conclusion, p. 293] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vuPTw5sFrUNAd8H |
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Title | Review of: Dorotheus, Guilelmus (trans.), Simplicius Commentarium in decem Categorias Aristotelis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Versiones Latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum, Bd. 8) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 262-263 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Summerell, Orrin Finn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lxHRful4FTiSy2L |
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Title | Mathematik und Phänomene. Eine Polemik über naturwissenschaftliche Methode bei Simplikios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption |
Volume | 10 |
Pages | 107–129 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Haas, Frans A. J. de |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Im Hinblick auf die grundlegende Verschiedenheit zwischen der platonischen und aristotelischen Wertung der Mathematik und der Phänomene kann man erwarten, daß es genau im Kontext der platonischen Deutung der aristotelischen Schriften zu einer interessanten Auseinandersetzung kommen mußte. Ein gutes Beispiel ist der Kommentar des Neuplatonikers Simplikios (tätig nach 530 n.Chr.) zur aristotelischen Schrift Über den Himmel. Wie bekannt, hat uns Simplikios in diesem Kommentar wichtige Informationen über die Astronomie und die einschlägige Wissenschaftstheorie bis auf seine Zeit, das 6. Jahrhundert nach Christus, überliefert. Hier werde ich mich mit zwei wichtigen methodischen Fragen befassen, die von Simplikios erörtert werden. Erstens: Was ist die Erklärungskraft der mathematischen Prinzipien im physischen Bereich? und zweitens: Was ist die erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung der Phänomene? In einem letzten Abschnitt werde ich mich kurz dem Einfluß der neuplatonischen Aristotelesdeutung auf das moderne Verstehen der aristotelischen Methodologie zuwenden. [from the introduction, p. 110] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/omuK2yp1p7YceKI |
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Title | L' «absurdum ἀκρόαμα» de Copernic |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance |
Volume | 62 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 7-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hallyn, Fernand |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Une présentation du De Revolutionibus en tant qu'« absurdum » est, en un sens, une présentation « silénique », si l'on pense à la signification symbolique qu'Érasme et d'autres donnaient aux célèbres Silènes d'Alcibiade : ces statuettes symbolisaient, selon les Adages, « un objet qui, en apparence – ou, comme on dit, de prime abord – semble vil et ridicule, mais qui est en réalité admirable quand on l'examine de plus près et plus profondément ». « Absurde » : telle pouvait, en effet, apparaître de prime abord une défense jugée obscure et vaine d'un système aussi contraire au sens commun que l'héliocentrisme ; mais elle devenait admirable et profonde si on en étudiait de près les intentions et les implications « acroamatiques ». Les sens du mot ἀκρόασις (acroasis) qui viennent d'être évoqués sont en grande partie des sens cachés, que seule la prise en compte de la nécessité d'une double lecture, ironique et sérieuse, fait apparaître. La signification du mot, réunissant l'apparence d'une qualification péjorative et la profondeur d'une définition appropriée, participe du secret qu'il désigne. Le cas illustre que, pour l'humaniste dans le savant, qui était aussi un lecteur, certains mots n'étaient pas des termes transparents, simples moyens de communication, mais des prismes pouvant réfracter des significations et des connotations variées. Et si Copernic prétend n'écrire que pour des mathématiciens, les composantes sémantiques de son langage supposent aussi que ces mathématiciens soient capables d'apprécier, dans le choix des mots, des significations et des valeurs qui rattachent l'entreprise scientifique à la culture de l'humanisme. [conclusion p. 24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Qo7eOBq3Eph4Ku9 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"741","_score":null,"_source":{"id":741,"authors_free":[{"id":1104,"entry_id":741,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":166,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hallyn, Fernand","free_first_name":"Fernand","free_last_name":"Hallyn","norm_person":{"id":166,"first_name":"Fernand","last_name":"Hallyn","full_name":"Hallyn, Fernand","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142036323","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L' \u00ababsurdum \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u00bb de Copernic","main_title":{"title":"L' \u00ababsurdum \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u00bb de Copernic"},"abstract":"Une pr\u00e9sentation du De Revolutionibus en tant qu'\u00ab absurdum \u00bb est, en un sens, une pr\u00e9sentation \u00ab sil\u00e9nique \u00bb, si l'on pense \u00e0 la signification symbolique qu'\u00c9rasme et d'autres donnaient aux c\u00e9l\u00e8bres Sil\u00e8nes d'Alcibiade : ces statuettes symbolisaient, selon les Adages, \u00ab un objet qui, en apparence \u2013 ou, comme on dit, de prime abord \u2013 semble vil et ridicule, mais qui est en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 admirable quand on l'examine de plus pr\u00e8s et plus profond\u00e9ment \u00bb.\r\n\r\n\u00ab Absurde \u00bb : telle pouvait, en effet, appara\u00eetre de prime abord une d\u00e9fense jug\u00e9e obscure et vaine d'un syst\u00e8me aussi contraire au sens commun que l'h\u00e9liocentrisme ; mais elle devenait admirable et profonde si on en \u00e9tudiait de pr\u00e8s les intentions et les implications \u00ab acroamatiques \u00bb. Les sens du mot \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (acroasis) qui viennent d'\u00eatre \u00e9voqu\u00e9s sont en grande partie des sens cach\u00e9s, que seule la prise en compte de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d'une double lecture, ironique et s\u00e9rieuse, fait appara\u00eetre.\r\n\r\nLa signification du mot, r\u00e9unissant l'apparence d'une qualification p\u00e9jorative et la profondeur d'une d\u00e9finition appropri\u00e9e, participe du secret qu'il d\u00e9signe. Le cas illustre que, pour l'humaniste dans le savant, qui \u00e9tait aussi un lecteur, certains mots n'\u00e9taient pas des termes transparents, simples moyens de communication, mais des prismes pouvant r\u00e9fracter des significations et des connotations vari\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nEt si Copernic pr\u00e9tend n'\u00e9crire que pour des math\u00e9maticiens, les composantes s\u00e9mantiques de son langage supposent aussi que ces math\u00e9maticiens soient capables d'appr\u00e9cier, dans le choix des mots, des significations et des valeurs qui rattachent l'entreprise scientifique \u00e0 la culture de l'humanisme. [conclusion p. 24]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Qo7eOBq3Eph4Ku9","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":166,"full_name":"Hallyn, Fernand","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":741,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Biblioth\u00e8que d'Humanisme et Renaissance","volume":"62","issue":"1","pages":"7-24"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | Traces d’un commentaire de Simplicius sur la Métaphysique à Byzance? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques |
Volume | 84 |
Pages | 275–284 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rashed, Marwan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Concluons. Étant donné que : la mention de Simplicius dans le Parisinus graecus 1853 est unique, son argument contredit les théories aristotéliciennes, son argument contredit l’interprétation qu’en donne Simplicius, son argument contredit les théories de Damascius et de Jamblique, sa conclusion est renfermée dans une paraphrase connue de In Phys., nous sommes contraints de rejeter l’idée, pourtant assez séduisante, qu’il pouvait y avoir des traces d’un commentaire de Simplicius à la Métaphysique dans le monde byzantin. Les érudits savaient tout au plus que l’auteur du commentaire au De anima, qu’ils pensaient être Simplicius, en avait écrit un. [conclusion p. 284] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ckn1Q6xi6bdiKcz |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1060","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1060,"authors_free":[{"id":1609,"entry_id":1060,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"Marwan","free_last_name":"Rashed","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Traces d\u2019un commentaire de Simplicius sur la M\u00e9taphysique \u00e0 Byzance?","main_title":{"title":"Traces d\u2019un commentaire de Simplicius sur la M\u00e9taphysique \u00e0 Byzance?"},"abstract":"Concluons. \u00c9tant donn\u00e9 que :\r\n\r\n la mention de Simplicius dans le Parisinus graecus 1853 est unique,\r\n son argument contredit les th\u00e9ories aristot\u00e9liciennes,\r\n son argument contredit l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation qu\u2019en donne Simplicius,\r\n son argument contredit les th\u00e9ories de Damascius et de Jamblique,\r\n sa conclusion est renferm\u00e9e dans une paraphrase connue de In Phys.,\r\n\r\nnous sommes contraints de rejeter l\u2019id\u00e9e, pourtant assez s\u00e9duisante, qu\u2019il pouvait y avoir des traces d\u2019un commentaire de Simplicius \u00e0 la M\u00e9taphysique dans le monde byzantin. Les \u00e9rudits savaient tout au plus que l\u2019auteur du commentaire au De anima, qu\u2019ils pensaient \u00eatre Simplicius, en avait \u00e9crit un. [conclusion p. 284]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ckn1Q6xi6bdiKcz","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1060,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de sciences philosophiques et th\u00e9ologiques","volume":"84","issue":"","pages":"275\u2013284"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | Iamblichus' Transformation of the Aristotelian “katharsis”, its Middle-Platonic Antecedents and Proclus' and Simplicius' Response to it |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae |
Volume | 40 |
Pages | 263–282 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle bequeathed his followers certain notions that were to be of great importance to posterity. Some of them were taken up and discussed at length in Hellenistic schools, but others escaped notice; katharsis belongs to the latter group. This is all the more surprising since the Stoics made considerable effort to demonstrate that passions (pathê) can be tamed by reason. The Stoic ideal of freedom from passions, which implies the conversion of each passion into eupatheia, may at first sight have some affinity with the interpretation of katharsis that focuses on the ethical importance of emotions for Aristotle. But a closer look at the peculiar character of the Stoics’ overall conception of the soul reveals that any similarity is but mere appearance. It is only among some of the later Neoplatonists that Aristotle’s concept regains the significance it once had. By that time, it gains a strong ethical emphasis. As far as our evidence allows us to say, the development started in the early imperial age. My aim is to follow the renascence of this notion in Iamblichus, its antecedents among the Platonists of the early empire, and the way Proclus and Simplicius reacted to Iamblichus’ attempt. I hope that Professor Ritook will consider this an appropriate subject with which to honor him. His latest contribution to explaining the problem of how desire and cognitive activities are interlocked in Aristotle’s concept of poetry will serve as an excellent point of reference for this investigation. We can now see that the discussion of how desires are involved in, and formed by, the watching of tragedies is intimately tied to the account of how understanding and the desire to understand contribute to katharsis. [introduction p. 263] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DphH8s3zrklDFAe |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"879","_score":null,"_source":{"id":879,"authors_free":[{"id":1290,"entry_id":879,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":236,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lautner, Peter","free_first_name":"Peter","free_last_name":"Lautner","norm_person":{"id":236,"first_name":"Peter","last_name":"Lautner","full_name":"Lautner, Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157740766","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Iamblichus' Transformation of the Aristotelian \u201ckatharsis\u201d, its Middle-Platonic Antecedents and Proclus' and Simplicius' Response to it","main_title":{"title":"Iamblichus' Transformation of the Aristotelian \u201ckatharsis\u201d, its Middle-Platonic Antecedents and Proclus' and Simplicius' Response to it"},"abstract":"Aristotle bequeathed his followers certain notions that were to be of great importance to posterity. Some of them were taken up and discussed at length in Hellenistic schools, but others escaped notice; katharsis belongs to the latter group. This is all the more surprising since the Stoics made considerable effort to demonstrate that passions (path\u00ea) can be tamed by reason. The Stoic ideal of freedom from passions, which implies the conversion of each passion into eupatheia, may at first sight have some affinity with the interpretation of katharsis that focuses on the ethical importance of emotions for Aristotle.\r\n\r\nBut a closer look at the peculiar character of the Stoics\u2019 overall conception of the soul reveals that any similarity is but mere appearance. It is only among some of the later Neoplatonists that Aristotle\u2019s concept regains the significance it once had. By that time, it gains a strong ethical emphasis. As far as our evidence allows us to say, the development started in the early imperial age.\r\n\r\nMy aim is to follow the renascence of this notion in Iamblichus, its antecedents among the Platonists of the early empire, and the way Proclus and Simplicius reacted to Iamblichus\u2019 attempt. I hope that Professor Ritook will consider this an appropriate subject with which to honor him. His latest contribution to explaining the problem of how desire and cognitive activities are interlocked in Aristotle\u2019s concept of poetry will serve as an excellent point of reference for this investigation.\r\n\r\nWe can now see that the discussion of how desires are involved in, and formed by, the watching of tragedies is intimately tied to the account of how understanding and the desire to understand contribute to katharsis. [introduction p. 263]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DphH8s3zrklDFAe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":236,"full_name":"Lautner, Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":879,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae","volume":"40","issue":"","pages":"263\u2013282"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | ΕΝΝΟHΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ und ΟΥΣΙΩΔΗΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ als exegetisches Begriffspaar |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Philologus |
Volume | 144 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 45-61 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist es, ausgehend von zwei Texten, der Herkunft und Funktion des Begriffspaares "ennoésmatikos" und "ousiódés logos" nachzugehen, das gebraucht wird, um zwei grundsätzliche Definitionsarten zu charakterisieren [authors abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H34bvyQPUF08vgR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"886","_score":null,"_source":{"id":886,"authors_free":[{"id":1305,"entry_id":886,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":218,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve","free_first_name":"Paraskeve","free_last_name":"Kotzia-Panteli","norm_person":{"id":218,"first_name":"Paraskeve","last_name":"Kotzia-Panteli","full_name":"Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1171363621","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u0395\u039d\u039d\u039fH\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0399\u039a\u039f\u03a3 und \u039f\u03a5\u03a3\u0399\u03a9\u0394\u0397\u03a3 \u039b\u039f\u0393\u039f\u03a3 als exegetisches Begriffspaar","main_title":{"title":"\u0395\u039d\u039d\u039fH\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0399\u039a\u039f\u03a3 und \u039f\u03a5\u03a3\u0399\u03a9\u0394\u0397\u03a3 \u039b\u039f\u0393\u039f\u03a3 als exegetisches Begriffspaar"},"abstract":"Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist es, ausgehend von zwei Texten, der Herkunft und Funktion des Begriffspaares \"enno\u00e9smatikos\" und \"ousi\u00f3d\u00e9s logos\" nachzugehen, das gebraucht wird, um zwei grunds\u00e4tzliche Definitionsarten zu charakterisieren [authors abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H34bvyQPUF08vgR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":218,"full_name":"Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":886,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Philologus","volume":"144","issue":"1","pages":"45-61"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 18 |
Pages | 320-356 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QrDNAw4eAA3LZ35 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"414","_score":null,"_source":{"id":414,"authors_free":[{"id":555,"entry_id":414,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":280,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Osborne, Catherine","free_first_name":"Catherine","free_last_name":"Osborne","norm_person":{"id":280,"first_name":"Catherine","last_name":"Rowett","full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142220116","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg","main_title":{"title":"Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg"},"abstract":"Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi\u2019s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 \r\nthat a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the \r\nauspices of the Biblioth\u00e8que Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless\u2014-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication\u20141 propose \r\nto begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among \r\nthe undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QrDNAw4eAA3LZ35","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":280,"full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":414,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"18","issue":"","pages":"320-356"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | La Communauté de l'être (Parménide, fragment B 5) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 3-13 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Destrée, Pierre |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses different interpretations of the methodological significance of the fragment D.K. B 5 of Parmenides' poem, which states "It is indifferent to me where I begin, for I shall come back again to this point" (Trad. M. Conche). The main question is what the statement refers to and its place in the order of fragments. Two main trends of interpretation are identified, one proposing to place the fragment before D.K. B 8 and the other suggesting to read it either before or after D.K. B 2. The author argues that the circularity of Parmenides' philosophy is centered around the concept of being and the experience of the community of being. The world of Parmenides is a world of trust and confidence in being, where even absent things find a real presence and firm consistency. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/y9Q3j9lUXfO31vz |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1303","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1303,"authors_free":[{"id":1926,"entry_id":1303,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":90,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Destr\u00e9e, Pierre","free_first_name":"Pierre","free_last_name":"Destr\u00e9e","norm_person":{"id":90,"first_name":"Pierre ","last_name":"Destr\u00e9e","full_name":"Destr\u00e9e, Pierre ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1085171485","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La Communaut\u00e9 de l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fragment B 5)","main_title":{"title":"La Communaut\u00e9 de l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fragment B 5)"},"abstract":"This text discusses different interpretations of the methodological significance of the fragment D.K. B 5 of Parmenides' poem, which states \"It is indifferent to me where I begin, for I shall come back again to this point\" (Trad. M. Conche). The main question is what the statement refers to and its place in the order of fragments. Two main trends of interpretation are identified, one proposing to place the fragment before D.K. B 8 and the other suggesting to read it either before or after D.K. B 2. The author argues that the circularity of Parmenides' philosophy is centered around the concept of being and the experience of the community of being. The world of Parmenides is a world of trust and confidence in being, where even absent things find a real presence and firm consistency.\r\n[introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/y9Q3j9lUXfO31vz","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":90,"full_name":"Destr\u00e9e, Pierre ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1303,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"18","issue":"1","pages":"3-13"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios in Ph. 230,34-231,24 Diels |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 143 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 197-220 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tornau, Christian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dieser Text untersucht Simplicius' Kommentar zum Doxographen Moderatos von Gades in seinem Kommentar zu Porphyrios' Werk "Über die Materie". Der doxographische Bericht besteht aus zwei Teilen, wobei der erste eine hierarchische Systematik von drei Entitäten präsentiert - dem transzendenten Einen, der Welt der erkennbaren Formen und dem Bereich der Seele - und der zweite die Herkunft der Materie gemäß einem metaphysischen Modell erläutert. Die Analyse dieser Doxographie verdeutlicht ihre Bedeutung für das Verständnis platonischer Einflüsse auf spätere Denker. E.R. Dodds und Matthias Baltes haben das Verhältnis zwischen Moderatos' Hierarchie und Platons Parmenides aufgedeckt und die Rolle des Logos in der Schöpfung der Wesen sowie die Verbindung der ycopa mit der Seele als "seelischer Raum" (psychischer Raum) identifiziert, der es der Seele ermöglicht, den Weltkörper zu umfassen. Obwohl Baltes überzeugende Interpretationen liefert, bleiben einige Fragen und Herausforderungen hinsichtlich der Identifizierung der "Seienden", der Beziehung zwischen dem Logos und den drei Entitäten, um sinnliche Objekte zu beschreiben. Trotz offener Fragen trägt der Text zu den laufenden Diskussionen über die neupythagoreische Interpretation des Platonismus und ihren Einfluss auf spätere philosophische Gedanken bei. Er betont die Bedeutung einer detaillierten und historisch fundierten Untersuchung der Doxographie, um die Komplexität und Implikationen von Moderatos' philosophischem System und dessen Verbindungen zu platonischen Lehren vollständig zu erfassen. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/rTQ3u49mTZLsZxs |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"460","_score":null,"_source":{"id":460,"authors_free":[{"id":617,"entry_id":460,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":341,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tornau, Christian","free_first_name":"Christian","free_last_name":"Tornau","norm_person":{"id":341,"first_name":"Christian","last_name":"Tornau","full_name":"Tornau, Christian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120176394","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios in Ph. 230,34-231,24 Diels","main_title":{"title":"Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios in Ph. 230,34-231,24 Diels"},"abstract":"Dieser Text untersucht Simplicius' Kommentar zum Doxographen Moderatos von Gades in seinem Kommentar zu Porphyrios' Werk \"\u00dcber die Materie\". Der doxographische Bericht besteht aus zwei Teilen, wobei der erste eine hierarchische Systematik von drei Entit\u00e4ten pr\u00e4sentiert - dem transzendenten Einen, der Welt der erkennbaren Formen und dem Bereich der Seele - und der zweite die Herkunft der Materie gem\u00e4\u00df einem metaphysischen Modell erl\u00e4utert. Die Analyse dieser Doxographie verdeutlicht ihre Bedeutung f\u00fcr das Verst\u00e4ndnis platonischer Einfl\u00fcsse auf sp\u00e4tere Denker. E.R. Dodds und Matthias Baltes haben das Verh\u00e4ltnis zwischen Moderatos' Hierarchie und Platons Parmenides aufgedeckt und die Rolle des Logos in der Sch\u00f6pfung der Wesen sowie die Verbindung der ycopa mit der Seele als \"seelischer Raum\" (psychischer Raum) identifiziert, der es der Seele erm\u00f6glicht, den Weltk\u00f6rper zu umfassen. Obwohl Baltes \u00fcberzeugende Interpretationen liefert, bleiben einige Fragen und Herausforderungen hinsichtlich der Identifizierung der \"Seienden\", der Beziehung zwischen dem Logos und den drei Entit\u00e4ten, um sinnliche Objekte zu beschreiben. Trotz offener Fragen tr\u00e4gt der Text zu den laufenden Diskussionen \u00fcber die neupythagoreische Interpretation des Platonismus und ihren Einfluss auf sp\u00e4tere philosophische Gedanken bei. Er betont die Bedeutung einer detaillierten und historisch fundierten Untersuchung der Doxographie, um die Komplexit\u00e4t und Implikationen von Moderatos' philosophischem System und dessen Verbindungen zu platonischen Lehren vollst\u00e4ndig zu erfassen. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/rTQ3u49mTZLsZxs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":341,"full_name":"Tornau, Christian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":460,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"143","issue":"2","pages":"197-220"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | Review of: Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8. Translated by David Blank. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 5. Translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de Louvain Année |
Volume | 98 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 358-359 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solère, Jean-Luc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
À la collection dirigée par R. Sorabji, sont venus s'ajouter les trois volumes ici signalés. Comme le remarque un des traducteurs, Simplicius n'est pas toujours plus clair qu'Aristote. Mais ces textes sont d'inépuisables mines d'information pour l'étude de la philosophie antique, et ces traductions accompagnées de notes sont de précieux instruments. On remarquera spécialement, dans le commentaire du livre II de la Physique, les discussions sur la différence entre nature et âme, sur l'intelligence des animaux ; dans le commentaire du livre V, celle sur le changement dans les catégories autres que substance, qualité, quantité et lieu. Quant à Ammonius, nous possédons nombre de reflets de son enseignement oral (apo phônês) dans les transcriptions effectuées par ses élèves des explications d'autres ouvrages d'Aristote, mais celle du Péri Hermeneias est le seul des commentaires du maître alexandrin, à nous parvenu, qui soit de sa propre main. Il n'a donc pas les caractères un peu mécaniques de la lecture scolaire (skholia), mais possède une élaboration littéraire plus poussée (celle qui convient aux hupomnêmata). Cependant, Ammonius, fils d'Hermeias, doit sans doute le fond de son interprétation à l'enseignement qu'il a reçu à Athènes de son propre professeur, Proclus, dont il aurait rédigé les leçons comme feront ses disciples pour les siennes. Cette transmission scolaire était aussi une affaire de famille, car la mère d'Ammonius, Aedesia, était une parente de Syrianus, le maître de Proclus et d'Hermeias. Cela n'empêche pas une distance critique, puisque les vues de Syrianus sur la négation indéterminée sont réfutées. Néanmoins, son commentaire est directement utile pour l'explication du chapitre 14, généralement omis parce que considéré comme inauthentique, au moins depuis Porphyre. Le commentaire de ce dernier, justement, a joué aussi un grand rôle dans l'exégèse des néoplatoniciens tardifs. Bien que perdu, des passages peuvent être reconstitués par recoupement avec le commentaire de Boèce, qui en dépend aussi. Étant donné que Porphyre citait non seulement des interprètes d'Aristote comme Alexandre d'Aphrodise, mais aussi des traités stoïciens, l'entreprise est d'importance pour l'histoire de la sémantique et de la logique. Le commentaire d'Ammonius est conduit du point de vue néoplatonicien, qui postule une harmonie entre les philosophies d'Aristote et de Platon. C'est ici aussi une gageure, puisque pour le Stagirite les noms sont imposés par convention, alors que d'après le Cratyle, le fondement de leur signification est naturel. Conformément aux règles de la collection, on trouve dans chaque volume des glossaires grec-anglais et anglais-grec, un index des passages cités et un index verborum. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CoYcyNe9f3pbpI7 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1478","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1478,"authors_free":[{"id":2559,"entry_id":1478,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":547,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sol\u00e8re, Jean-Luc","free_first_name":"Jean-Luc","free_last_name":"Sol\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":547,"first_name":"Jean-Luc","last_name":"Sol\u00e8re","full_name":"Sol\u00e8re, Jean-Luc","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/103699290X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8. Translated by David Blank. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 5. Translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8. Translated by David Blank. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 5. Translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner"},"abstract":"\u00c0 la collection dirig\u00e9e par R. Sorabji, sont venus s'ajouter les trois volumes ici signal\u00e9s. Comme le remarque un des traducteurs, Simplicius n'est pas toujours plus clair qu'Aristote. Mais ces textes sont d'in\u00e9puisables mines d'information pour l'\u00e9tude de la philosophie antique, et ces traductions accompagn\u00e9es de notes sont de pr\u00e9cieux instruments.\r\n\r\nOn remarquera sp\u00e9cialement, dans le commentaire du livre II de la Physique, les discussions sur la diff\u00e9rence entre nature et \u00e2me, sur l'intelligence des animaux ; dans le commentaire du livre V, celle sur le changement dans les cat\u00e9gories autres que substance, qualit\u00e9, quantit\u00e9 et lieu.\r\n\r\nQuant \u00e0 Ammonius, nous poss\u00e9dons nombre de reflets de son enseignement oral (apo ph\u00f4n\u00eas) dans les transcriptions effectu\u00e9es par ses \u00e9l\u00e8ves des explications d'autres ouvrages d'Aristote, mais celle du P\u00e9ri Hermeneias est le seul des commentaires du ma\u00eetre alexandrin, \u00e0 nous parvenu, qui soit de sa propre main. Il n'a donc pas les caract\u00e8res un peu m\u00e9caniques de la lecture scolaire (skholia), mais poss\u00e8de une \u00e9laboration litt\u00e9raire plus pouss\u00e9e (celle qui convient aux hupomn\u00eamata).\r\n\r\nCependant, Ammonius, fils d'Hermeias, doit sans doute le fond de son interpr\u00e9tation \u00e0 l'enseignement qu'il a re\u00e7u \u00e0 Ath\u00e8nes de son propre professeur, Proclus, dont il aurait r\u00e9dig\u00e9 les le\u00e7ons comme feront ses disciples pour les siennes. Cette transmission scolaire \u00e9tait aussi une affaire de famille, car la m\u00e8re d'Ammonius, Aedesia, \u00e9tait une parente de Syrianus, le ma\u00eetre de Proclus et d'Hermeias. Cela n'emp\u00eache pas une distance critique, puisque les vues de Syrianus sur la n\u00e9gation ind\u00e9termin\u00e9e sont r\u00e9fut\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nN\u00e9anmoins, son commentaire est directement utile pour l'explication du chapitre 14, g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement omis parce que consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme inauthentique, au moins depuis Porphyre. Le commentaire de ce dernier, justement, a jou\u00e9 aussi un grand r\u00f4le dans l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se des n\u00e9oplatoniciens tardifs. Bien que perdu, des passages peuvent \u00eatre reconstitu\u00e9s par recoupement avec le commentaire de Bo\u00e8ce, qui en d\u00e9pend aussi.\r\n\r\n\u00c9tant donn\u00e9 que Porphyre citait non seulement des interpr\u00e8tes d'Aristote comme Alexandre d'Aphrodise, mais aussi des trait\u00e9s sto\u00efciens, l'entreprise est d'importance pour l'histoire de la s\u00e9mantique et de la logique. Le commentaire d'Ammonius est conduit du point de vue n\u00e9oplatonicien, qui postule une harmonie entre les philosophies d'Aristote et de Platon. C'est ici aussi une gageure, puisque pour le Stagirite les noms sont impos\u00e9s par convention, alors que d'apr\u00e8s le Cratyle, le fondement de leur signification est naturel.\r\n\r\nConform\u00e9ment aux r\u00e8gles de la collection, on trouve dans chaque volume des glossaires grec-anglais et anglais-grec, un index des passages cit\u00e9s et un index verborum. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CoYcyNe9f3pbpI7","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":547,"full_name":"Sol\u00e8re, Jean-Luc","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1478,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de Louvain Ann\u00e9e","volume":"98","issue":"2","pages":"358-359"}},"sort":[2000]}
Title | All Voids Large and Small, Being a Discussion of Place and Void in Strato of Lampsacus's Matter Theory |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Apeiron. A journal for ancient philosophy and science |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1–36 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lehoux, Daryn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Strato of Lampsacus, third head of Aristotle's school at Athens, who was known as 'the Physicist' in antiquity, is a problematic character. Like many other Greek philosophers, none of his books have survived to the present day. There are, to be sure, a few quotes scattered here and there in the philosophical and technical literature of antiquity, but these serve to give us only a flavor of his thinking and his physical theories, from which several reconstructions have been attempted in the last century. Based on this handful of fragments, Hermann Diels published an argument in 1893 which claimed to have fleshed out Strato's physical theory of matter and tried to show that 'the Physicist' held that all matter was interspersed with small pockets of void (similar to the way a sponge is full of little pockets of air), and that if a larger void than these natural minute 'microvoids' was artificially produced, then the surrounding contiguous matter would rush in to fill the gap. This theory would explain suction splendidly, and Diels argued that Erasistratus the physician and Hero of Alexandria had both used Strato's matter theory in their own works. Indeed, Diels even showed (a conclusion unchallenged to this day) that part of Hero's introduction to the Pneumatics was taken almost verbatim from a book by Strato. In his collection of Strato's fragments, Fritz Wehrli more or less followed Diels, and H.B. Gottschalk took Diels's argument even further, presenting almost the whole of Hero's introduction as a fragment of Strato. Since then, however, a number of writers have contested different parts of Diels's reconstruction. In 1985, David Furley argued that, while the microvoid theory seems plausible enough, we cannot attribute to Strato the theory of horror vacui. And in a recent paper, Sylvia Berryman rejected the idea that we can demonstrate that Erasistratus held a matter theory involving either microvoids or the theoretical prohibition of larger extended voids. Berryman's argument hinges on a careful distinction between the idea of the horror vacui as an explanation for why matter rushes in to fill the void, and the simple observation that matter does simply fill the space being emptied by suction. That is: when a Greek writer refers to the "following-in to what-is-being-emptied," is he referring to some theoretical mechanism by which void spaces are filled (i.e., what has been called the horror vacui), or is he simply saying that when we empty a vessel of one substance, some other substance always follows in to fill the space being emptied? To draw an analogy: in answer to the question "Why does a dropped ball hit the ground?" is the Greek τὸ πρὸς τὸ κενουμένου ἀκολουθεῖν analogous to the answer (a) "because of gravity" (implying a theory about the forces acting on matter) or (b) "because it falls" (implying only an observation that this always happens when you drop something)? Berryman thinks that Erasistratus used the "following-in to what-is-being-emptied" in this latter sense, that is, as an explanandum rather than as an explanans. Another problem, related to this question of voids, revolves around Strato's theory of 'place' (τόπος). The two writers (Simplicius and Stobaeus) who tell us of Strato's definition of place do not agree with each other, and one of them (Simplicius) may even seem at first to be self-contradictory. Through an analysis of the extant testimonia, I shall attempt to establish Strato's theory of place, ultimately favoring Simplicius's account over that of Stobaeus. The arguments and issues involved, however, will take us through a wide variety of the possible sources for Strato and an analysis of their ideas and objectives in providing their evidence. I argue, contra Furley and Berryman, that there is good reason to suppose that Strato held a theory of horror vacui qua explanans, possibly having borrowed it from some earlier source, and that he did in fact create the microvoid theory. These separate strands tie together into a coherent system that is attributable to Strato based on evidence that is sometimes direct and sometimes circumstantial. Thus, Strato will be seen to be breaking away (to a certain extent) from a strictly Aristotelian position, perhaps following Theophrastus's lead. While much of this work is directed at doubts about Strato's theory expressed by Furley and Berryman, I do not wish to overemphasize the amount of certainty we can attain when looking at Strato. We cannot ascertain beyond doubt that the theory I present here is in fact Strato's. But I think the evidence points fairly clearly at Strato as the originator of a physical theory which incorporates both microvoids and horror vacui, and which was adopted into medicine by Erasistratus and into mechanics by Philo or possibly Ctesibius. [introduction p. 1-3] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/uZqo1P8OJqOJxd5 |
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Like many other Greek philosophers, none of his books have survived to the present day. There are, to be sure, a few quotes scattered here and there in the philosophical and technical literature of antiquity, but these serve to give us only a flavor of his thinking and his physical theories, from which several reconstructions have been attempted in the last century. Based on this handful of fragments, Hermann Diels published an argument in 1893 which claimed to have fleshed out Strato's physical theory of matter and tried to show that 'the Physicist' held that all matter was interspersed with small pockets of void (similar to the way a sponge is full of little pockets of air), and that if a larger void than these natural minute 'microvoids' was artificially produced, then the surrounding contiguous matter would rush in to fill the gap. This theory would explain suction splendidly, and Diels argued that Erasistratus the physician and Hero of Alexandria had both used Strato's matter theory in their own works. Indeed, Diels even showed (a conclusion unchallenged to this day) that part of Hero's introduction to the Pneumatics was taken almost verbatim from a book by Strato.\r\n\r\nIn his collection of Strato's fragments, Fritz Wehrli more or less followed Diels, and H.B. Gottschalk took Diels's argument even further, presenting almost the whole of Hero's introduction as a fragment of Strato. Since then, however, a number of writers have contested different parts of Diels's reconstruction. In 1985, David Furley argued that, while the microvoid theory seems plausible enough, we cannot attribute to Strato the theory of horror vacui. And in a recent paper, Sylvia Berryman rejected the idea that we can demonstrate that Erasistratus held a matter theory involving either microvoids or the theoretical prohibition of larger extended voids.\r\n\r\nBerryman's argument hinges on a careful distinction between the idea of the horror vacui as an explanation for why matter rushes in to fill the void, and the simple observation that matter does simply fill the space being emptied by suction. That is: when a Greek writer refers to the \"following-in to what-is-being-emptied,\" is he referring to some theoretical mechanism by which void spaces are filled (i.e., what has been called the horror vacui), or is he simply saying that when we empty a vessel of one substance, some other substance always follows in to fill the space being emptied? To draw an analogy: in answer to the question \"Why does a dropped ball hit the ground?\" is the Greek \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd analogous to the answer (a) \"because of gravity\" (implying a theory about the forces acting on matter) or (b) \"because it falls\" (implying only an observation that this always happens when you drop something)? Berryman thinks that Erasistratus used the \"following-in to what-is-being-emptied\" in this latter sense, that is, as an explanandum rather than as an explanans.\r\n\r\nAnother problem, related to this question of voids, revolves around Strato's theory of 'place' (\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2). The two writers (Simplicius and Stobaeus) who tell us of Strato's definition of place do not agree with each other, and one of them (Simplicius) may even seem at first to be self-contradictory. Through an analysis of the extant testimonia, I shall attempt to establish Strato's theory of place, ultimately favoring Simplicius's account over that of Stobaeus. The arguments and issues involved, however, will take us through a wide variety of the possible sources for Strato and an analysis of their ideas and objectives in providing their evidence. I argue, contra Furley and Berryman, that there is good reason to suppose that Strato held a theory of horror vacui qua explanans, possibly having borrowed it from some earlier source, and that he did in fact create the microvoid theory. These separate strands tie together into a coherent system that is attributable to Strato based on evidence that is sometimes direct and sometimes circumstantial. Thus, Strato will be seen to be breaking away (to a certain extent) from a strictly Aristotelian position, perhaps following Theophrastus's lead.\r\n\r\nWhile much of this work is directed at doubts about Strato's theory expressed by Furley and Berryman, I do not wish to overemphasize the amount of certainty we can attain when looking at Strato. We cannot ascertain beyond doubt that the theory I present here is in fact Strato's. But I think the evidence points fairly clearly at Strato as the originator of a physical theory which incorporates both microvoids and horror vacui, and which was adopted into medicine by Erasistratus and into mechanics by Philo or possibly Ctesibius. [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":3,"date":"1999","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/uZqo1P8OJqOJxd5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":244,"full_name":"Lehoux, Daryn","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1118,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Apeiron. A journal for ancient philosophy and science","volume":"32","issue":"1","pages":"1\u201336"}},"sort":[1999]}
Title | Impetus Theory and the Hermeneutics of Science in Simplicius and Philoponus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Hyperboreus |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 107–124 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wildberg, Christian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Let me come to a conclusion: In the first part of this paper I claimed that historians o f science do and should inquire into the context o f origin of past philosophical theories, not only into the context of the validity (1). Three different attempts to explain the innovative character o f John Philoponus' philosophy were discussed; all were flawed by the fact that they sought an explanation by means o f external historiography: in religion, biography and economic circumstances (II). In the main part o f this paper attention was drawn to the striking difference between the presuppositions at work in Simplicius’ and Philoponus' respective hermeneutics o f science (111). I have argued that Philoponus was able to liberate his mind in an unprecedented way from the constraints of the Neoplatonists' commitment to harmony, authority and salvation through philosophy. Philoponus’ alternative heuristic method, termed constructive criticism, was then identified as perhaps the most im portant driving force behind his scientific innovations (IV). I should like to conclude with the general recommendation that anyone who is interested in elucidating the origin o f philosophical-scientific ideas and controversies, be it o f the sixth century or at any other time, might find it more fruitful to study carefully the methodological presuppositions involved, be they hermeneutic, empirical, or speculative, rather than to gesture all too readily to external parameters like religion, anecdotes, or the socio-economics of the market place. [conclusion p. 123-124] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H1d8bA0zFyyKAUN |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"429","_score":null,"_source":{"id":429,"authors_free":[{"id":579,"entry_id":429,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":360,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wildberg, Christian","free_first_name":"Christian","free_last_name":"Wildberg","norm_person":{"id":360,"first_name":"Christian","last_name":"Wildberg","full_name":"Wildberg, Christian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139018964","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Impetus Theory and the Hermeneutics of Science in Simplicius and Philoponus","main_title":{"title":"Impetus Theory and the Hermeneutics of Science in Simplicius and Philoponus"},"abstract":"Let me come to a conclusion: In the first part of this paper I claimed that \r\nhistorians o f science do and should inquire into the context o f origin of past \r\nphilosophical theories, not only into the context of the validity (1). Three \r\ndifferent attempts to explain the innovative character o f John Philoponus' \r\nphilosophy were discussed; all were flawed by the fact that they sought an \r\nexplanation by means o f external historiography: in religion, biography and \r\neconomic circumstances (II). In the main part o f this paper attention was drawn to the striking difference between the presuppositions at work in \r\nSimplicius\u2019 and Philoponus' respective hermeneutics o f science (111). I have \r\nargued that Philoponus was able to liberate his mind in an unprecedented way \r\nfrom the constraints of the Neoplatonists' commitment to harmony, authority \r\nand salvation through philosophy. Philoponus\u2019 alternative heuristic method, \r\ntermed constructive criticism, was then identified as perhaps the most im\u00ad\r\nportant driving force behind his scientific innovations (IV). I should like to \r\nconclude with the general recommendation that anyone who is interested in \r\nelucidating the origin o f philosophical-scientific ideas and controversies, be \r\nit o f the sixth century or at any other time, might find it more fruitful to study \r\ncarefully the methodological presuppositions involved, be they hermeneutic, \r\nempirical, or speculative, rather than to gesture all too readily to external \r\nparameters like religion, anecdotes, or the socio-economics of the market \r\nplace. [conclusion p. 123-124]","btype":3,"date":"1999","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H1d8bA0zFyyKAUN","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":360,"full_name":"Wildberg, Christian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":429,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hyperboreus","volume":"5","issue":"1","pages":"107\u2013124"}},"sort":[1999]}
Title | The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles: Some Preliminary Remarks |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 52 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 525-544 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | van der Ben, Nicolaas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It will have become clear, I hope, that the amount of work that has yet to be done on this newly published papyrus is enormous. Surely it is early days to draw any conclusions. The work in terms of a scholarly debate has not even started yet. However, some remarks may perhaps be made. (1) The text in the physical sense of the word is in a poor state, obviously. (2) The text in the abstract sense, too, is of poor quality; and all the signs are that no proper edition was ever made of Empedocles' text. (3) As far as we are able to discern the contents of the lines discussed, it must be said that they do not appear to be particularly revealing. They start with 8 lines which seem to be somewhat repetitive and of a transitionary nature. Next, there are 16 lines which somehow deal with the Sphairos; although, of course, they constitute a welcome addition to fr. 35DK (quoted by Simplicius), the latter passage is still the more informative one. Finally, there are 10 lines in which the pupil is urged to see for himself the great explanatory force of the theory, which is restated in pregnant form. To put it differently and more poignantly, these 34 lines do not offer us the treatment of any one particular subject. Just think how much our understanding of Empedocles would have been enhanced if we had been able to read, say, his cosmology, or physiology of the sense-organs, or of the intellectual functions; or a detailed description of the assimilation of food and growth, or of fertilization! A similar disappointment surrounds the other ensembles: b partly coincides with 76DK, c with 20DK, and d with (a repeat of) fr. 139DK: welcome and interesting though the additional information provided by them often is, here, too, there is no treatment of a particular subject matter unknown, or insufficiently known, to us previously. To return to ensemble a, it should be noted that most of it, viz. ?(i)6-?(ii)29, 33 lines in all, was omitted by Simplicius, who quoted very extensively from this section of the poem. The reason why he refrained from copying these 33 lines may well have been, I think, that he deemed them to contain little that had not been said equally well or even better in the other extensive passages he had copied from Empedocles. Are there no saving graces? Yes, of course, there are. The first is that we have a better perspective on the transmission of Empedocles' text, tantalizingly blurred though it is bound to remain. It may now be suspected that many of the corruptions in our text are not due to errors made by medieval scribes, but had already entered the text in antiquity itself. I am referring particularly to the deep corruptions which seem due to extensive tampering and appear to exhibit a certain pattern. And since corruptions of this kind appear well-represented even in Aristotle's quotations, their source must date back to a very early time indeed. The second gain, finally, is, I think, the most important of all, viz. the fact that we now know line 300; and, by simple calculation, that the 35 lines of fr. 17DK extend from line 232 through 266. So the absolute position of the 69 lines 232 through 300 is now known. The value of this piece of information can hardly be overestimated. It will have a beneficial effect on literally all the fragments. After all, the average size of Empedocles' fragments is a mere three lines, hardly enough, in many cases, to arrive at any compelling interpretation. Starting from the text of lines 232-300, one will be able to establish the relative positions of many fragments with a large degree of certainty (decreasing, of course, as the distance to 232 or 300 increases). The result will be that many fragments will draw closer together and constitute one another's context, so to speak. Our interpretations will be based on much firmer foundations. [conclusion p. 543-544] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BcAsTrl3xWnFgU9 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"453","_score":null,"_source":{"id":453,"authors_free":[{"id":609,"entry_id":453,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":422,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","free_first_name":"Nicolaas","free_last_name":"van der Ben","norm_person":{"id":422,"first_name":"Nicolaas","last_name":"van der Ben","full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles: Some Preliminary Remarks","main_title":{"title":"The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles: Some Preliminary Remarks"},"abstract":"It will have become clear, I hope, that the amount of work that has yet to be done on this newly published papyrus is enormous. Surely it is early days to draw any conclusions. The work in terms of a scholarly debate has not even started yet. However, some remarks may perhaps be made. (1) The text in the physical sense of the word is in a poor state, obviously. (2) The text in the abstract sense, too, is of poor quality; and all the signs are that no proper edition was ever made of Empedocles' text. (3) As far as we are able to discern the contents of the lines discussed, it must be said that they do not appear to be particularly revealing. They start with 8 lines which seem to be somewhat repetitive and of a transitionary nature. Next, there are 16 lines which somehow deal with the Sphairos; although, of course, they constitute a welcome addition to fr. 35DK (quoted by Simplicius), the latter passage is still the more informative one. Finally, there are 10 lines in which the pupil is urged to see for himself the great explanatory force of the theory, which is restated in pregnant form.\r\n\r\nTo put it differently and more poignantly, these 34 lines do not offer us the treatment of any one particular subject. Just think how much our understanding of Empedocles would have been enhanced if we had been able to read, say, his cosmology, or physiology of the sense-organs, or of the intellectual functions; or a detailed description of the assimilation of food and growth, or of fertilization! A similar disappointment surrounds the other ensembles: b partly coincides with 76DK, c with 20DK, and d with (a repeat of) fr. 139DK: welcome and interesting though the additional information provided by them often is, here, too, there is no treatment of a particular subject matter unknown, or insufficiently known, to us previously.\r\n\r\nTo return to ensemble a, it should be noted that most of it, viz. ?(i)6-?(ii)29, 33 lines in all, was omitted by Simplicius, who quoted very extensively from this section of the poem. The reason why he refrained from copying these 33 lines may well have been, I think, that he deemed them to contain little that had not been said equally well or even better in the other extensive passages he had copied from Empedocles.\r\n\r\nAre there no saving graces? Yes, of course, there are. The first is that we have a better perspective on the transmission of Empedocles' text, tantalizingly blurred though it is bound to remain. It may now be suspected that many of the corruptions in our text are not due to errors made by medieval scribes, but had already entered the text in antiquity itself. I am referring particularly to the deep corruptions which seem due to extensive tampering and appear to exhibit a certain pattern. And since corruptions of this kind appear well-represented even in Aristotle's quotations, their source must date back to a very early time indeed.\r\n\r\nThe second gain, finally, is, I think, the most important of all, viz. the fact that we now know line 300; and, by simple calculation, that the 35 lines of fr. 17DK extend from line 232 through 266. So the absolute position of the 69 lines 232 through 300 is now known. The value of this piece of information can hardly be overestimated. It will have a beneficial effect on literally all the fragments. After all, the average size of Empedocles' fragments is a mere three lines, hardly enough, in many cases, to arrive at any compelling interpretation. Starting from the text of lines 232-300, one will be able to establish the relative positions of many fragments with a large degree of certainty (decreasing, of course, as the distance to 232 or 300 increases). The result will be that many fragments will draw closer together and constitute one another's context, so to speak. Our interpretations will be based on much firmer foundations. [conclusion p. 543-544]","btype":3,"date":"1999","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/BcAsTrl3xWnFgU9","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":422,"full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":453,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"52","issue":"5","pages":"525-544"}},"sort":[1999]}
Title | The Synonymy of Homonyms |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 81 |
Pages | 268–289 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Flannery, Kevin L. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Is the homonym-synonym paradox important enough to force this emendation? I think that it is. If considering the two definitions in conjunction -the definition of homonyms and that of synonyms - it turns out that homonyms qua homonyms are not homonyms and, therefore, that only qua not homonyms are homonyms homonyms, that is a problem. We can resolve the paradox by breaking the conjunction - i. e., by severing the interdependence between the two definitions by eliminating tas ouisas from the first. Would Aristotle have anticipated the paradox and set out his definitions so as to avoid it? We do not have to go so far. We need only believe that, when initially conceiving Cat. i, he had a consistent set of ideas in mind. That is, we need only believe that he had in mind a position that would not lead to the type of problems that typically arise when two definitions are interdependent. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7UMy6i0NWqhhPbZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"547","_score":null,"_source":{"id":547,"authors_free":[{"id":771,"entry_id":547,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":114,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Flannery, Kevin L.","free_first_name":"Kevin L.","free_last_name":"Flannery","norm_person":{"id":114,"first_name":"Kevin L.","last_name":"Flannery","full_name":"Flannery, Kevin L.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/104462485X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Synonymy of Homonyms","main_title":{"title":"The Synonymy of Homonyms"},"abstract":"Is the homonym-synonym paradox important enough to force this emen\u00addation? I think that it is. If considering the two definitions in conjunction -the definition of homonyms and that of synonyms - it turns out that homo\u00adnyms qua homonyms are not homonyms and, therefore, that only qua not homonyms are homonyms homonyms, that is a problem. We can resolve the paradox by breaking the conjunction - i. e., by severing the interdepen\u00addence between the two definitions by eliminating tas ouisas from the first. Would Aristotle have anticipated the paradox and set out his definitions so as to avoid it? We do not have to go so far. We need only believe that, when initially conceiving Cat. i, he had a consistent set of ideas in mind. That is, we need only believe that he had in mind a position that would not lead to the type of problems that typically arise when two definitions are interdependent. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1999","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7UMy6i0NWqhhPbZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":114,"full_name":"Flannery, Kevin L.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":547,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"81","issue":"","pages":"268\u2013289"}},"sort":[1999]}
Title | Plato as "Architect of Science" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 211-244 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zhmud, Leonid |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The figure of the cordial host of the Academy, who invited the most gifted mathematicians and cultivated pure research, whose keen intellect was able, if not to solve the particular problem, then at least to show the method for its solution: this figure is quite familiar to students of Greek science. But was the Academy as such a center of scientific research, and did Plato really set for mathematicians and astronomers the problems they should study and methods they should use? Our sources tell about Plato's friendship or at least acquaintance with many brilliant mathematicians of his day (Theodorus, Archytas, Theaetetus), but they were never his pupils; rather, vice versa—he learned much from them and actively used this knowledge in developing his philosophy. There is no reliable evidence that Eudoxus, Menaechmus, Dinostratus, Theudius, and others, whom many scholars unite into the group of so-called "Academic mathematicians," ever were his pupils or close associates. Our analysis of the relevant passages (Eratosthenes' Platonicus, Sosigenes ap. Simplicius, Proclus' Catalogue of geometers, and Philodemus' History of the Academy, etc.) shows that the very tendency of portraying Plato as the architect of science goes back to the early Academy and is born out of interpretations of his dialogues. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/eZULGOyXyPzCdqW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"837","_score":null,"_source":{"id":837,"authors_free":[{"id":1241,"entry_id":837,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":368,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Zhmud, Leonid","free_first_name":"Leonid","free_last_name":"Zhmud","norm_person":{"id":368,"first_name":"Leonid","last_name":"Zhmud","full_name":"Zhmud, Leonid","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1028558643","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Plato as \"Architect of Science\"","main_title":{"title":"Plato as \"Architect of Science\""},"abstract":"The figure of the cordial host of the Academy, who invited the most gifted mathematicians and cultivated pure research, whose keen intellect was able, if not to solve the particular problem, then at least to show the method for its solution: this figure is quite familiar to students of Greek science. But was the Academy as such a center of scientific research, and did Plato really set for mathematicians and astronomers the problems they should study and methods they should use? Our sources tell about Plato's friendship or at least acquaintance with many brilliant mathematicians of his day (Theodorus, Archytas, Theaetetus), but they were never his pupils; rather, vice versa\u2014he learned much from them and actively used this knowledge in developing his philosophy.\r\n\r\nThere is no reliable evidence that Eudoxus, Menaechmus, Dinostratus, Theudius, and others, whom many scholars unite into the group of so-called \"Academic mathematicians,\" ever were his pupils or close associates. Our analysis of the relevant passages (Eratosthenes' Platonicus, Sosigenes ap. Simplicius, Proclus' Catalogue of geometers, and Philodemus' History of the Academy, etc.) shows that the very tendency of portraying Plato as the architect of science goes back to the early Academy and is born out of interpretations of his dialogues. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/eZULGOyXyPzCdqW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":368,"full_name":"Zhmud, Leonid","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":837,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"43","issue":"3","pages":"211-244"}},"sort":[1998]}
Title | On the Homocentric Spheres of Eudoxus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Archive for History of Exact Sciences |
Volume | 52 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 221-278 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Yavetz, Ido |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In 1877, Schiaparelli published a classic essay on the homocentric spheres of Eu- doxus. In the years that followed, it became the standard, definitive historical reconstruc- tion of Eudoxian planetary theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that the two texts on which Schiaparelli based his reconstruction do not lead in an unequivocal way to this interpretation, and that they actually accommodate alternative and equally plausible interpretations that possess a clear astronomical superiority compared to Schiaparelli's. One should not mistake all of this for a call to reject Schiaparelli's interpretation in favor of the new one. In particular, the alternative interpretation does not recommend itself as a historically more plausible basis for reconstructing Eudoxus's and Callippus's planetary theories merely because of its astronomical advantages. It does, however, suggest that the exclusivity traditionally awarded to Schiaparelli's reconstruction can no longer be maintained, and that the little historical evidence we do possess does not enable us to make a justifiable choice between the available alternatives. [Introduction, p. 221] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yDxuUa8nKX7GLiW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"838","_score":null,"_source":{"id":838,"authors_free":[{"id":1242,"entry_id":838,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":366,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Yavetz, Ido","free_first_name":"Ido","free_last_name":"Yavetz","norm_person":{"id":366,"first_name":" Ido","last_name":"Yavetz","full_name":"Yavetz, Ido","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1156978416","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On the Homocentric Spheres of Eudoxus","main_title":{"title":"On the Homocentric Spheres of Eudoxus"},"abstract":"In 1877, Schiaparelli published a classic essay on the homocentric spheres of Eu- \r\ndoxus. In the years that followed, it became the standard, definitive historical reconstruc- \r\ntion of Eudoxian planetary theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that the two texts \r\non which Schiaparelli based his reconstruction do not lead in an unequivocal way to \r\nthis interpretation, and that they actually accommodate alternative and equally plausible \r\ninterpretations that possess a clear astronomical superiority compared to Schiaparelli's. One should not mistake all of this for a call to reject Schiaparelli's interpretation in favor \r\nof the new one. In particular, the alternative interpretation does not recommend itself as a \r\nhistorically more plausible basis for reconstructing Eudoxus's and Callippus's planetary theories merely because of its astronomical advantages. It does, however, suggest that \r\nthe exclusivity traditionally awarded to Schiaparelli's reconstruction can no longer be \r\nmaintained, and that the little historical evidence we do possess does not enable us to \r\nmake a justifiable choice between the available alternatives. [Introduction, p. 221]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yDxuUa8nKX7GLiW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":366,"full_name":"Yavetz, Ido","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":838,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archive for History of Exact Sciences","volume":"52","issue":"3","pages":"221-278"}},"sort":[1998]}
Title | The Reception of Parmenides' Poetry in Antiquity |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Studii Clasice |
Volume | 34-36 |
Pages | 5-27 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Popa, Tiberiu M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3N33QXJQ7geQuqf |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"409","_score":null,"_source":{"id":409,"authors_free":[{"id":547,"entry_id":409,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":510,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Popa, Tiberiu M.","free_first_name":"Tiberiu M.","free_last_name":"Popa","norm_person":{"id":510,"first_name":"Tiberiu M.","last_name":"Popa","full_name":"Popa, Tiberiu M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/135018498","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Reception of Parmenides' Poetry in Antiquity","main_title":{"title":"The Reception of Parmenides' Poetry in Antiquity"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3N33QXJQ7geQuqf","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":510,"full_name":"Popa, Tiberiu M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":409,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studii Clasice","volume":"34-36","issue":"","pages":"5-27"}},"sort":[1998]}
Title | La saisie des principes physiques chez Aristote. Simplicius contre Alexandre d'Aphrodise |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Oriens-Occidens |
Volume | 2 |
Pages | 77-94 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dalimier, Catherine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The article discusses Aristotle's treatment of knowledge of the principles of natural beings in his Physics, focusing on the process of induction and the contradictions in his approach. The author argues that the discovery of principles through analysis and empirical generalization is based on sensory data, and suggests that the autonomy of physical discourse was a contested issue among commentators. The article highlights divergences in interpretation regarding the existence of physical principles and discusses variations in the manuscript tradition. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hlMzWTGqkFNEImc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1287","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1287,"authors_free":[{"id":1876,"entry_id":1287,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":61,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dalimier, Catherine","free_first_name":"Catherine","free_last_name":"Dalimier","norm_person":{"id":61,"first_name":"Catherine","last_name":"Dalimier","full_name":"Dalimier, Catherine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La saisie des principes physiques chez Aristote. Simplicius contre Alexandre d'Aphrodise","main_title":{"title":"La saisie des principes physiques chez Aristote. Simplicius contre Alexandre d'Aphrodise"},"abstract":"The article discusses Aristotle's treatment of knowledge of the principles of natural beings in his Physics, focusing on the process of induction and the contradictions in his approach. The author argues that the discovery of principles through analysis and empirical generalization is based on sensory data, and suggests that the autonomy of physical discourse was a contested issue among commentators. The article highlights divergences in interpretation regarding the existence of physical principles and discusses variations in the manuscript tradition. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hlMzWTGqkFNEImc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":61,"full_name":"Dalimier, Catherine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1287,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oriens-Occidens","volume":"2","issue":"","pages":"77-94"}},"sort":[1998]}
Title | Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on "In Cat." 396,30-397,28 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 42–62 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gaskin, Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
At Categories 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as "Socrates is sitting," as what later writers were to call com- plexe significabilia, i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting. Simplicius' dis- cussion of this passage in his commentary on the Categories clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a complexe significabile in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the Categories text with the first chapter of De Interpretatione. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kZ57g1oWG2ekeHe |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"541","_score":null,"_source":{"id":541,"authors_free":[{"id":765,"entry_id":541,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":132,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gaskin, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Gaskin","norm_person":{"id":132,"first_name":"Richard ","last_name":"Gaskin","full_name":"Gaskin, Richard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1049853571","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28"},"abstract":"At Categories 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as \"Socrates is sitting,\" as what later writers were to call com- plexe significabilia, i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting. Simplicius' dis- cussion of this passage in his commentary on the Categories clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a complexe significabile in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the Categories text with the first chapter of De Interpretatione. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kZ57g1oWG2ekeHe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":132,"full_name":"Gaskin, Richard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":541,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"43","issue":"1","pages":"42\u201362"}},"sort":[1998]}
Title | Review of: Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5, translated by J.O.Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Bryn Mawr Classical Review |
Volume | 3 |
Issue | 19 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hankey, Wayne J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This welcome volume is yet another in the important series The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Edited by Richard Sorabji, about 30 volumes have now been published (they are not numbered). As in all the volumes, Sorabji’s General Introduction is reprinted as an appendix (pp. 151-160), though its accompanying lists, both of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, in the Berlin edition of Hermann Diels, and of English translations of the ancient commentators, are found only in the first of the translations: Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (1987). Uniformly with the series, there are, as well as the translation (here in 110 pages), a short introduction (here in two parts: one by Peter Lautner, who did the notes, and the other by J.O. Urmson, who translated the text), a list of textual emendations, extensive notes (305 in fact, compensating for the shortness of the introduction), an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and indices of names and subjects. Other compensations for the regrettable shortness of the introduction are the affiliated publications from the Cornell University Press: Sorabji's Time, Creation and the Continuum (1983), his Matter, Space and Motion (1988), and the collections of articles Sorabji has edited: Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (1987), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (1990). These are indispensable for negotiating Lautner’s notes. Also useful on the Aristotelian tradition and the place of Simplicius in it is a new collection of articles edited by Sorabji but published by the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London in 1997: Aristotle and After. Understanding the character and significance of what Simplicius is doing here, especially of his very consequential modifications of Aristotle, requires consultation with excellent but inconvenient endnotes and with their references to this and other, less accessible, literature. As a result, In Physics 5 and its companion volumes are for well-formed scholars with first-class university libraries at their disposal. With this volume, we near the completion within this series of the translation of Simplicius' enormous commentary on the Physics. It joins, of Simplicius, the Corollaries on Place and Time, On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, and On Aristotle's Physics 2, 4, 6, 7; all of which have appeared since 1989. They manifest in the English-speaking world a renewed scholarly and philosophical interest in Simplicius, which has produced translations, editions, and research by American, Belgian, English, French, German, and Italian scholars. Their work and projects were collected in Simplicius: sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie (1987), edited by Ilsetraut Hadot. Indeed, a contributor to that collection, Leonardo Tarán, promises us a new edition of the Greek text of the commentary on the Physics as well as another translation of it. Another contributor, Philippe Hoffmann, is reediting the commentary on the De Caelo. The renewed labor on the commentaries is justified by those who undertake it. The first place to find this is in Sorabji's General Introduction, which, beyond indicating the influence of the Neoplatonic commentaries, calls them "incomparable guides to Aristotle" (p. 159). A claim he supports by reference to the "minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus" possessed and conveyed by the commentators. In his article for the French colloque, Tarán maintained that Simplicius' commentary on the Physics remains the best commentary on that work "even today" (p. 247). Since her Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (1978), Ilsetraut Hadot has defended Simplicius and the commentators of the Athenian Neoplatonic school from denigrating comparisons with the production of the Alexandrines. She demonstrates that Praechter was wrong in supposing the Alexandrian commentaries to have been more devoted to the vrai sens of Aristotle in contrast to their own Neoplatonic philosophical projects. In fact, the commentaries of both schools were produced within a tradition initiated by Porphyry and were required by the essential role Aristotle's writings played in teaching. The value of the commentary may be diminished by the service given to such Neoplatonic scholastic projects as the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle, but Hadot’s demonstrations elevate Simplicius by diminishing the preeminence given to the Alexandrines. In a review in this journal (BMCR 97.9.24), Richard Todd produced good reasons for choosing, as the place to begin among the older scholarship on Aristotle, the Renaissance commentaries of Jacobus Zabarella or Julius Pacius, but still, he would have these Renaissance humanists bring readers back to Simplicius. By the Renaissance, his commentaries, lost to the Latins until the 13th century, were well known and highly respected. So none will deny the enormous importance of Simplicius' commentary. Beyond its illumination of Aristotle, its application and defense of the Neoplatonic interpretative framework is skillful and creative. Moreover, it is the great treasury for our knowledge of previous Greek physics from the Pre-Socratics onward and of the commentaries before his own. Both of these he preserves by quotation, often at greater length than his argument requires, as if Simplicius, like Boethius, saw himself preserving a disappearing heritage in a darkening age. Much of In Physics 5 is a dialogue with Alexander of Aphrodisias, and enormous passages of his commentary are reproduced. They remind us of one of the essential tasks of scholarship that has only begun and will be assisted by this translation. Since so much of what we know about natural philosophy before Simplicius is dependent on him, we need to deepen our understanding of his thinking to consider how his selection and reproduction shape our knowledge of ancient philosophy. The conservative labor was successful; evidently, the commentary of Simplicius survived and carried his past with it. In consequence, another reason for the great importance of this work is its influence. His understanding of Aristotle constituted an essential element in the thinking of the Arabic Neoplatonists and, from the 13th century on, his comments were communicated to the Latin West in their treatises and in their own commentaries on Aristotle's texts, as well as through direct translations from the Greek by Latins like William of Moerbeke. Thus, he reached the scholastics of the medieval West. The conscientious continuation by Simplicius of the great Neoplatonic enterprise of reconciling Plato and Aristotle helped determine the Latin understanding of Aristotle. Moreover, ideas of his own, developed in that context, became fruitful again as Aristotelian physics was transformed in the construction of modern natural philosophies. Simplicius was with Damascius and the other pagan philosophers who headed east after Justinian closed the Academy in Athens. He probably composed this, and his other Aristotelian commentaries, in the remote city of Harran (Carrhae). Whatever the activity of the philosophers gathered there, as distinct from his predecessors like Themistius or contemporaries like Philoponus the Christian, Simplicius' commentaries no longer show characteristics marking them as having been developed as lectures. Evidence points to composition after 538, and Peter Lautner shows that at least part of the commentary on the Physics was written before the commentary on the Categories. Simplicius assiduously carries forward the reconciliation of Aristotle with Plato. Whether, with Sorabji, we call this project "perfectly crazy" (p. 156), we will agree it stimulates Simplicius to his greatest creativity. Here the philosophical commentator is moved by his religion. Since Porphyry, and fervently with Iamblichus, Proclus, and their successors, piety in respect to the old gods demanded that the unity of that by which they revealed themselves and their cosmos be exhibited. Further, defending the Hellenic spiritual tradition against its critics and effectively marshaling its forces against the Christian enemy required this unification. Simplicius helps work through completely what the Neoplatonic reconciliations and unifications require. He assists with its momentous move from substance to subjectivity. For what it furthers and transmits in this greatest of Western transformations, his commentary is philosophically important. Those who have made it more accessible are to be thanked. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/gUxdRzi2BGcl9jH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1347","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1347,"authors_free":[{"id":2002,"entry_id":1347,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":167,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","free_first_name":"Wayne J.","free_last_name":"Hankey","norm_person":{"id":167,"first_name":" Wayne J.","last_name":"Hankey","full_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054015821","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5, translated by J.O.Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5, translated by J.O.Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle"},"abstract":"This welcome volume is yet another in the important series The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Edited by Richard Sorabji, about 30 volumes have now been published (they are not numbered). As in all the volumes, Sorabji\u2019s General Introduction is reprinted as an appendix (pp. 151-160), though its accompanying lists, both of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, in the Berlin edition of Hermann Diels, and of English translations of the ancient commentators, are found only in the first of the translations: Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (1987).\r\n\r\nUniformly with the series, there are, as well as the translation (here in 110 pages), a short introduction (here in two parts: one by Peter Lautner, who did the notes, and the other by J.O. Urmson, who translated the text), a list of textual emendations, extensive notes (305 in fact, compensating for the shortness of the introduction), an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and indices of names and subjects.\r\n\r\nOther compensations for the regrettable shortness of the introduction are the affiliated publications from the Cornell University Press: Sorabji's Time, Creation and the Continuum (1983), his Matter, Space and Motion (1988), and the collections of articles Sorabji has edited: Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (1987), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (1990). These are indispensable for negotiating Lautner\u2019s notes. Also useful on the Aristotelian tradition and the place of Simplicius in it is a new collection of articles edited by Sorabji but published by the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London in 1997: Aristotle and After.\r\n\r\nUnderstanding the character and significance of what Simplicius is doing here, especially of his very consequential modifications of Aristotle, requires consultation with excellent but inconvenient endnotes and with their references to this and other, less accessible, literature. As a result, In Physics 5 and its companion volumes are for well-formed scholars with first-class university libraries at their disposal.\r\n\r\nWith this volume, we near the completion within this series of the translation of Simplicius' enormous commentary on the Physics. It joins, of Simplicius, the Corollaries on Place and Time, On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, and On Aristotle's Physics 2, 4, 6, 7; all of which have appeared since 1989. They manifest in the English-speaking world a renewed scholarly and philosophical interest in Simplicius, which has produced translations, editions, and research by American, Belgian, English, French, German, and Italian scholars. Their work and projects were collected in Simplicius: sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa survie (1987), edited by Ilsetraut Hadot. Indeed, a contributor to that collection, Leonardo Tar\u00e1n, promises us a new edition of the Greek text of the commentary on the Physics as well as another translation of it. Another contributor, Philippe Hoffmann, is reediting the commentary on the De Caelo.\r\n\r\nThe renewed labor on the commentaries is justified by those who undertake it. The first place to find this is in Sorabji's General Introduction, which, beyond indicating the influence of the Neoplatonic commentaries, calls them \"incomparable guides to Aristotle\" (p. 159). A claim he supports by reference to the \"minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus\" possessed and conveyed by the commentators.\r\n\r\nIn his article for the French colloque, Tar\u00e1n maintained that Simplicius' commentary on the Physics remains the best commentary on that work \"even today\" (p. 247). Since her Le Probl\u00e8me du N\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin: Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius (1978), Ilsetraut Hadot has defended Simplicius and the commentators of the Athenian Neoplatonic school from denigrating comparisons with the production of the Alexandrines. She demonstrates that Praechter was wrong in supposing the Alexandrian commentaries to have been more devoted to the vrai sens of Aristotle in contrast to their own Neoplatonic philosophical projects. In fact, the commentaries of both schools were produced within a tradition initiated by Porphyry and were required by the essential role Aristotle's writings played in teaching. The value of the commentary may be diminished by the service given to such Neoplatonic scholastic projects as the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle, but Hadot\u2019s demonstrations elevate Simplicius by diminishing the preeminence given to the Alexandrines.\r\n\r\nIn a review in this journal (BMCR 97.9.24), Richard Todd produced good reasons for choosing, as the place to begin among the older scholarship on Aristotle, the Renaissance commentaries of Jacobus Zabarella or Julius Pacius, but still, he would have these Renaissance humanists bring readers back to Simplicius. By the Renaissance, his commentaries, lost to the Latins until the 13th century, were well known and highly respected.\r\n\r\nSo none will deny the enormous importance of Simplicius' commentary. Beyond its illumination of Aristotle, its application and defense of the Neoplatonic interpretative framework is skillful and creative. Moreover, it is the great treasury for our knowledge of previous Greek physics from the Pre-Socratics onward and of the commentaries before his own. Both of these he preserves by quotation, often at greater length than his argument requires, as if Simplicius, like Boethius, saw himself preserving a disappearing heritage in a darkening age. Much of In Physics 5 is a dialogue with Alexander of Aphrodisias, and enormous passages of his commentary are reproduced. They remind us of one of the essential tasks of scholarship that has only begun and will be assisted by this translation. Since so much of what we know about natural philosophy before Simplicius is dependent on him, we need to deepen our understanding of his thinking to consider how his selection and reproduction shape our knowledge of ancient philosophy.\r\n\r\nThe conservative labor was successful; evidently, the commentary of Simplicius survived and carried his past with it. In consequence, another reason for the great importance of this work is its influence. His understanding of Aristotle constituted an essential element in the thinking of the Arabic Neoplatonists and, from the 13th century on, his comments were communicated to the Latin West in their treatises and in their own commentaries on Aristotle's texts, as well as through direct translations from the Greek by Latins like William of Moerbeke. Thus, he reached the scholastics of the medieval West.\r\n\r\nThe conscientious continuation by Simplicius of the great Neoplatonic enterprise of reconciling Plato and Aristotle helped determine the Latin understanding of Aristotle. Moreover, ideas of his own, developed in that context, became fruitful again as Aristotelian physics was transformed in the construction of modern natural philosophies.\r\n\r\nSimplicius was with Damascius and the other pagan philosophers who headed east after Justinian closed the Academy in Athens. He probably composed this, and his other Aristotelian commentaries, in the remote city of Harran (Carrhae). Whatever the activity of the philosophers gathered there, as distinct from his predecessors like Themistius or contemporaries like Philoponus the Christian, Simplicius' commentaries no longer show characteristics marking them as having been developed as lectures. Evidence points to composition after 538, and Peter Lautner shows that at least part of the commentary on the Physics was written before the commentary on the Categories.\r\n\r\nSimplicius assiduously carries forward the reconciliation of Aristotle with Plato. Whether, with Sorabji, we call this project \"perfectly crazy\" (p. 156), we will agree it stimulates Simplicius to his greatest creativity. Here the philosophical commentator is moved by his religion. Since Porphyry, and fervently with Iamblichus, Proclus, and their successors, piety in respect to the old gods demanded that the unity of that by which they revealed themselves and their cosmos be exhibited. Further, defending the Hellenic spiritual tradition against its critics and effectively marshaling its forces against the Christian enemy required this unification.\r\n\r\nSimplicius helps work through completely what the Neoplatonic reconciliations and unifications require. He assists with its momentous move from substance to subjectivity. For what it furthers and transmits in this greatest of Western transformations, his commentary is philosophically important. Those who have made it more accessible are to be thanked. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/gUxdRzi2BGcl9jH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":167,"full_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1347,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bryn Mawr Classical Review","volume":"3","issue":"19","pages":""}},"sort":[1998]}
Title | Iamblichus’ Νοερὰ Θεωρία of Aristotle’s Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Syllecta Classica |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 65-77 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dillon, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses Iamblichus' commentary on Porphyry's large commentary on Aristotle's Categories. Porphyry is credited with the setting out and responses to all the aporiai that were concocted by critics of the Categories in the Middle Platonic period, as well as with references to Stoic doctrines in the commentary. Iamblichus added certain criticisms, modifications of Porphyry, relevant passages of Archytas, and some "higher criticism" or intellectual interpretation of nearly all sections of the work. Iamblichus' contribution was to apply his techniques of allegorical exegesis to Aristotle's Categories, where he was able to apply much the same method as he did with Plato's dialogues. Iamblichus' method of commentary is discussed in detail, including his definition of the skopos, or essential subject matter, of the treatise, which concerned all three possible subject matters for the Categories: words, things, and concepts. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Oti0shwXiKiyZ4B |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1147","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1147,"authors_free":[{"id":1722,"entry_id":1147,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":97,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dillon, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Dillon","norm_person":{"id":97,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Dillon","full_name":"Dillon, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123498058","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Iamblichus\u2019 \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u0398\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 of Aristotle\u2019s Categories","main_title":{"title":"Iamblichus\u2019 \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u0398\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 of Aristotle\u2019s Categories"},"abstract":"This text discusses Iamblichus' commentary on Porphyry's large commentary on Aristotle's Categories. Porphyry is credited with the setting out and responses to all the aporiai that were concocted by critics of the Categories in the Middle Platonic period, as well as with references to Stoic doctrines in the commentary. Iamblichus added certain criticisms, modifications of Porphyry, relevant passages of Archytas, and some \"higher criticism\" or intellectual interpretation of nearly all sections of the work. Iamblichus' contribution was to apply his techniques of allegorical exegesis to Aristotle's Categories, where he was able to apply much the same method as he did with Plato's dialogues. Iamblichus' method of commentary is discussed in detail, including his definition of the skopos, or essential subject matter, of the treatise, which concerned all three possible subject matters for the Categories: words, things, and concepts. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Oti0shwXiKiyZ4B","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":97,"full_name":"Dillon, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1147,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Syllecta Classica","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"65-77"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens : sensation (αἴσθησις), sensation commune (κοινὴ αἴσθησις), sensibles communs (κοινὰ αἰσθητά) et conscience de soi (συναίσθησις) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 33–85 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Je résume : en ce qui concerne la possibilité pour les sensations d'avoir conscience de leur activité, Pseudo-Philopon se distingue aussi bien de Priscien que de Simplicius, puisqu’il n'attribue plus le moindre rôle à la sensation commune, mais accorde ce privilège à une faculté de l'âme raisonnable, à la faculté d'attention. [conclusion p. 85] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/N9wzp13Ul2KftSa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"643","_score":null,"_source":{"id":643,"authors_free":[{"id":918,"entry_id":643,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aspects de la th\u00e9orie de la perception chez les n\u00e9oplatoniciens : sensation (\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensation commune (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensibles communs (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac) et conscience de soi (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)","main_title":{"title":"Aspects de la th\u00e9orie de la perception chez les n\u00e9oplatoniciens : sensation (\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensation commune (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensibles communs (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac) et conscience de soi (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)"},"abstract":"Je r\u00e9sume : en ce qui concerne la possibilit\u00e9 pour les sensations d'avoir conscience de leur activit\u00e9, Pseudo-Philopon se distingue aussi bien de Priscien que de Simplicius, puisqu\u2019il n'attribue plus le moindre r\u00f4le \u00e0 la sensation commune, mais accorde ce privil\u00e8ge \u00e0 une facult\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me raisonnable, \u00e0 la facult\u00e9 d'attention. [conclusion p. 85]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/N9wzp13Ul2KftSa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":643,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"33\u201385"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l’Antiquité |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | AnTard (Antiquité Tardive. Revue internationale d’histoire et d’archéolog) |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 169–176 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Opening with an overview of the historical development of the continuous philosophical commentary, this study aims to bring out the profound differences between modem philosophicalcommentaries and the Late Antique commentaries on Plato and Aristotle. The modem commentariesare concerned to explain the texts for an audience which is not defined. By contrast, the ancient commentaries belonged to a precise programme of reading the texts concerned, a programme which corresponded both to levels of knowledge and levels of spiritual progression. They were therefore addressed, depending on the type of text, to beginners, to intermediate or to very advanced students; and their content and method varied greatly according to the level of the intended readership. Furthermore, explaining the text was never an end in itself; the commentary was intended not so much to expand knowledge as to assist in the acquisition of a particular ethical attitude, leading to a particular way of life. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bNInszbNd3YEzTp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"695","_score":null,"_source":{"id":695,"authors_free":[{"id":1034,"entry_id":695,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9","main_title":{"title":"Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9"},"abstract":"Opening with an overview of the historical development of the continuous philosophical commentary, this study aims to bring out the profound differences between modem philosophicalcommentaries and the Late Antique commentaries on Plato and Aristotle. The modem commentariesare concerned to explain the texts for an audience which is not defined. By contrast, the ancient commentaries belonged to a precise programme of reading the texts concerned, a programme which corresponded both to levels of knowledge and levels of spiritual progression. They were therefore addressed, depending on the type of text, to beginners, to intermediate or to very advanced students; and their content and method varied greatly according to the level of the intended readership. Furthermore, explaining the text was never an end in itself; the commentary was intended not so much to expand knowledge as to assist in the acquisition of a particular ethical attitude, leading to a particular way of life. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bNInszbNd3YEzTp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":695,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"AnTard (Antiquit\u00e9 Tardive. Revue internationale d\u2019histoire et d\u2019arch\u00e9olog)","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"169\u2013176"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Dans quel lieu le néoplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fondé son école de mathématiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 42–107 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The historian Agathias (Hist. II 30.3-31.4) relates that under the Emperor Justinian seven philosophers (Damascius, Simplicius, Eulamius, Priscianus, Hermeias, Diogenes, and Isidorus) sought refuge in Persia because of their own country’s anti-pagan laws but that they ultimately returned in 532 to the Roman Empire. There have been many hypotheses about the fate of these philosophers after their return. Most recently M. Tardieu has argued that these philosophers went to Harran, a town that was located on the Persian frontier and that remained mostly pagan until the tenth century. This hypothesis, which M. Tardieu had backed with a number of arguments, has found many echoes, both positive and negative, in subsequent secondary literature. Yet the complexity of the issue has never really been faced by Tardieu’s critics. For example, the fact that, according to Arab sources, Simplicius could found a famous school of mathematics has been completely neglected, as has the fact that details of the dogmas of Manicheanism, which he obtained through his encounter with a member of that sect, enable one to envision a Mesopotamian locale for this encounter. The present study aims at taking stock of the elements of this controversy, beginning with a detailed article by D. Watts and a review by C. Luna. Watts mostly bases his criticisms of M. Tardieu and me on Luna’s summary. In the conclusion (pages 58-59), I summarize the main points that seem to me to confirm M. Tardieu’s hypothesis. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/WI7RiFFpXjaRVSX |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"698","_score":null,"_source":{"id":698,"authors_free":[{"id":1038,"entry_id":698,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Dans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9matiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?","main_title":{"title":"Dans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9matiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?"},"abstract":"The historian Agathias (Hist. II 30.3-31.4) relates that under the Emperor Justinian seven philosophers (Damascius, Simplicius, Eulamius, Priscianus, Hermeias, Diogenes, and Isidorus) sought refuge in Persia because of their own country\u2019s anti-pagan laws but that they ultimately returned in 532 to the Roman Empire. There have been many hypotheses about the fate of these philosophers after their return. Most recently M. Tardieu has argued that these philosophers went to Harran, a town that was located on the Persian frontier and that remained mostly pagan until the tenth century. This hypothesis, which M. Tardieu had backed with a number of arguments, has found many echoes, both positive and negative, in subsequent secondary literature. Yet the complexity of the issue has never really been faced by Tardieu\u2019s critics. For example, the fact that, according to Arab sources, Simplicius could found a famous school of mathematics has been completely neglected, as has the fact that details of the dogmas of Manicheanism, which he obtained through his encounter with a member of that sect, enable one to envision a Mesopotamian locale for this encounter. The present study aims at taking stock of the elements of this controversy, beginning with a detailed article by D. Watts and a review by C. Luna. Watts mostly bases his criticisms of M. Tardieu and me on Luna\u2019s summary. In the conclusion (pages 58-59), I summarize the main points that seem to me to confirm M. Tardieu\u2019s hypothesis. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/WI7RiFFpXjaRVSX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":698,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"42\u2013107"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Aristote, «Physique», IV, 2 |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques. Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 377-387 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Brisson, Luc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Le texte, qui se veut une lecture commentée du chapitre 2 du livre IV de la Physique d'Aristote, se présente comme un travail de recherche qui ne prétend pas parvenir à des conclusions définitives. En effet, il a pour but de soulever un certain nombre de questions sur des sujets trop vastes pour être traités en quelques pages. L'idée force ici développée est la suivante : Aristote traduit en des termes soigneusement définis, dans le cadre de sa philosophie, des termes utilisés de façon peu rigoureuse par Platon dans le Timée. Ce faisant, Aristote change le sens même des termes utilisés par Platon. Le mécanisme de cette « traduction », qui équivaut à une distorsion dont les conséquences sont particulièrement importantes, parce que le vocabulaire aristotélicien a longtemps prévalu dans le domaine de la physique, sera ici minutieusement décrit, afin d’en montrer les conséquences philosophiques. [introduction p. 377] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NoOjnCvmvbsUPXt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"768","_score":null,"_source":{"id":768,"authors_free":[{"id":1132,"entry_id":768,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":18,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Brisson, Luc ","free_first_name":"Luc","free_last_name":"Brisson","norm_person":{"id":18,"first_name":"Luc","last_name":"Brisson","full_name":"Brisson, Luc ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114433259","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristote, \u00abPhysique\u00bb, IV, 2","main_title":{"title":"Aristote, \u00abPhysique\u00bb, IV, 2"},"abstract":"Le texte, qui se veut une lecture comment\u00e9e du chapitre 2 du livre IV de la Physique d'Aristote, se pr\u00e9sente comme un travail de recherche qui ne pr\u00e9tend pas parvenir \u00e0 des conclusions d\u00e9finitives. En effet, il a pour but de soulever un certain nombre de questions sur des sujets trop vastes pour \u00eatre trait\u00e9s en quelques pages.\r\n\r\nL'id\u00e9e force ici d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e est la suivante : Aristote traduit en des termes soigneusement d\u00e9finis, dans le cadre de sa philosophie, des termes utilis\u00e9s de fa\u00e7on peu rigoureuse par Platon dans le Tim\u00e9e. Ce faisant, Aristote change le sens m\u00eame des termes utilis\u00e9s par Platon.\r\n\r\nLe m\u00e9canisme de cette \u00ab traduction \u00bb, qui \u00e9quivaut \u00e0 une distorsion dont les cons\u00e9quences sont particuli\u00e8rement importantes, parce que le vocabulaire aristot\u00e9licien a longtemps pr\u00e9valu dans le domaine de la physique, sera ici minutieusement d\u00e9crit, afin d\u2019en montrer les cons\u00e9quences philosophiques. [introduction p. 377]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/NoOjnCvmvbsUPXt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":18,"full_name":"Brisson, Luc ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":768,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques. Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"377-387"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Alexander of Aphrodisias on Celestial Motions |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 190-205 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bodnár, István M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A number of features of the doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias on heavenly motions are beyond reasonable doubt. First and foremost of these is that he identified the nature of the heavenly spheres with their soul, thereby he could entirely collapse natural motion with voluntary motion into one in their case. Moreover the celestial element, which Alexander tends to call theion sôma, divine body is removed from the components of the everchanging sublunary world to the extent that it can be a legitimate question whether the substrate of celestial bodies can be called matter, and Alexander can refer to perishable entities as evIua, material in contrast to this sublime element. After identifying the contribution of the nature of the celestial spheres with that of their soul, Alexander follows Aristotle in setting out a celestial hierarchy, on top of which there is or there are the separate unmoved mover(s), which move(s) by being object(s) of striving and desire for the less perfect entities of the heavens. This much seems to be firmly settled. A number of further issues, however, call for detailed examination. In this paper first I set out to clarify the contributions of the striving of the different celestial spheres, then I turn to describing the interaction between the various motions of the celestial system, and I discuss whether the theory Alexander propounded could have been a fundamental revision, or rather an alternative exposition of the original, Aristotelian celestial theory deploying homocentric spheres. [Introduction, p. 190-191] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FT5oXWdKEJGehLA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1082","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1082,"authors_free":[{"id":1637,"entry_id":1082,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":6,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bodn\u00e1r, Istv\u00e1n M. ","free_first_name":"Istv\u00e1n M. ","free_last_name":"Bodn\u00e1r","norm_person":{"id":6,"first_name":"Istv\u00e1n M.","last_name":"Bodn\u00e1r","full_name":"Bodn\u00e1r, Istv\u00e1n M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1031829717","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Alexander of Aphrodisias on Celestial Motions","main_title":{"title":"Alexander of Aphrodisias on Celestial Motions"},"abstract":"A number of features of the doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias on heavenly motions are beyond reasonable doubt. First and foremost of these is \r\nthat he identified the nature of the heavenly spheres with their soul, thereby he could entirely collapse natural motion with voluntary motion into one in their case. Moreover the celestial element, which Alexander tends to call theion s\u00f4ma, divine body is removed from the components of \r\nthe everchanging sublunary world to the extent that it can be a legitimate question whether the substrate of celestial bodies can be called matter, and Alexander can refer to perishable entities as evIua, material in contrast to this sublime element. After identifying the contribution of the nature of the celestial spheres with that of their soul, Alexander follows \r\nAristotle in setting out a celestial hierarchy, on top of which there is or there are the separate unmoved mover(s), which move(s) by being object(s) of striving and desire for the less perfect entities of the heavens. This much seems to be firmly settled. A number of further issues, however, call for detailed examination. In this paper first I set out to clarify the contributions of the striving of the different celestial spheres, then I turn to describing the interaction between the various motions of the celestial system, and I discuss whether the theory Alexander propounded could have been a fundamental revision, or rather an alternative exposition of the original, Aristotelian celestial theory deploying homocentric spheres. [Introduction, p. 190-191]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FT5oXWdKEJGehLA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":6,"full_name":"Bodn\u00e1r, Istv\u00e1n M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1082,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"42","issue":"2","pages":"190-205"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Were Aristotle's Intentions in writing the De Anima Forgotten in Late Antiquity? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 143–157 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In general we have to conclude that while the whole "Philoponus” commentary may include a number of explicit references to the biological writings, and while the real Philoponus may often refer to medical and scientific issues, there is no systematic bias towards explaining the contents of the De anima in terms of them. There is, however, just as in the Ps-Simplicius commentary, enough said about such matters, and enough reference made to other parts of the biological corpus, to show that the commentators were still aware of the original intentions of the work — or, at the very least, behaved as if they were — even if they did not always feel bound by them. That awareness was to survive into the Middle Ages as well. [Conclusion, p. 157] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IJsW8b6iPwteKXr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"893","_score":null,"_source":{"id":893,"authors_free":[{"id":1316,"entry_id":893,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Were Aristotle's Intentions in writing the De Anima Forgotten in Late Antiquity?","main_title":{"title":"Were Aristotle's Intentions in writing the De Anima Forgotten in Late Antiquity?"},"abstract":"In general we have to conclude that while the whole \"Philoponus\u201d commentary may include a number of explicit references to the biological writings, and while the real Philoponus may often refer to medical and scientific issues, there is no systematic bias towards explaining the contents of the De anima in terms of them. There is, however, just as in the Ps-Simplicius commentary, enough said about such matters, and \r\nenough reference made to other parts of the biological corpus, to show that the commentators were still aware of the original intentions of the work \u2014 or, at the very least, behaved as if they were \u2014 even if they did not always feel bound by them. That awareness was to survive into the Middle Ages as well. [Conclusion, p. 157]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IJsW8b6iPwteKXr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":893,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"143\u2013157"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Iamblichus as a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Syllecta Classica |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 1–13 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Twenty-two years ago, when that growth in interest in Neoplatonism, which is a culmination of this conference, was only just getting underway, two large books appeared that will be familiar to all who are interested in Iamblichus. I am referring, of course, to J.M. Dillon's collection of the fragmentary remains of Iamblichus' commentaries on Plato's dialogues, supplied with an ample commentary to boot, and B. Dalsgaard Larsen's Jamblique de Chalcis: Exégète et Philosophe, of which some 240 pages are devoted to his role as an exegete; a collection of exegetical fragments appeared as a 130-page appendix. Larsen's book covered the interpretation of both Plato and Aristotle and pre-empted a second volume of Dillon's, which was to deal with Aristotle. I mention these books because we are, inter alia, taking stock, and it is remarkable that not much attention has been paid since then to Iamblichus' role as a commentator. Perhaps they have had the same effect on the study of this aspect of Iamblichus as Proclus' work had on the interpretation of Plato at Alexandria. Be that as it may, I intend to look, not very originally, at Iamblichus' activities as a commentator on philosophical works—and so I shall say nothing about the twenty-eight books or more of his lost commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles—and also to say something, in the manner of core samples, about how his expositions compare with those of the later commentators. Though the process can be traced back in part to Porphyry, I think it is safe to say that Iamblichus was the first Neoplatonist, at least of those about whom we are reasonably well informed, to set out systematically to write commentaries on the major works of both Plato and—in Iamblichus' case to a lesser extent—Aristotle too. The fact that he did both is noteworthy, since most of his successors seem to have specialized, more or less, in one or the other in their published works, if not in their lecture courses. We are, as ever in this area, faced with difficulties about deciding who wrote what, which often amounts to making difficult decisions about the implications of the usual imprecise references that are commonplace in ancient commentary. The best we have are those references which Simplicius, in his Physics commentary, gives to specific books or even chapters of Iamblichus' Timaeus and Categories commentaries (cf. In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria 639.23–24; in the second chapter of book 5 of the commentary on the Timaeus 786.11–12; in the first book of the commentary on the Categories). But that Iamblichus did write commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle can be regarded as firmly established. It is tempting to think, though there is no text which allows us to demonstrate this, that his doing so was connected with the fact that it seems to have been he who set up the thereafter traditional course in which certain works of Aristotle were read as propaedeutic to a selection of twelve—or rather ten plus two—Platonic dialogues, which culminated in the study of the Timaeus and Parmenides.[introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3m984P11hlUhV1x |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"895","_score":null,"_source":{"id":895,"authors_free":[{"id":1321,"entry_id":895,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Iamblichus as a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Iamblichus as a Commentator"},"abstract":"Twenty-two years ago, when that growth in interest in Neoplatonism, which is a culmination of this conference, was only just getting underway, two large books appeared that will be familiar to all who are interested in Iamblichus. I am referring, of course, to J.M. Dillon's collection of the fragmentary remains of Iamblichus' commentaries on Plato's dialogues, supplied with an ample commentary to boot, and B. Dalsgaard Larsen's Jamblique de Chalcis: Ex\u00e9g\u00e8te et Philosophe, of which some 240 pages are devoted to his role as an exegete; a collection of exegetical fragments appeared as a 130-page appendix.\r\n\r\nLarsen's book covered the interpretation of both Plato and Aristotle and pre-empted a second volume of Dillon's, which was to deal with Aristotle. I mention these books because we are, inter alia, taking stock, and it is remarkable that not much attention has been paid since then to Iamblichus' role as a commentator. Perhaps they have had the same effect on the study of this aspect of Iamblichus as Proclus' work had on the interpretation of Plato at Alexandria.\r\n\r\nBe that as it may, I intend to look, not very originally, at Iamblichus' activities as a commentator on philosophical works\u2014and so I shall say nothing about the twenty-eight books or more of his lost commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles\u2014and also to say something, in the manner of core samples, about how his expositions compare with those of the later commentators.\r\n\r\nThough the process can be traced back in part to Porphyry, I think it is safe to say that Iamblichus was the first Neoplatonist, at least of those about whom we are reasonably well informed, to set out systematically to write commentaries on the major works of both Plato and\u2014in Iamblichus' case to a lesser extent\u2014Aristotle too.\r\n\r\nThe fact that he did both is noteworthy, since most of his successors seem to have specialized, more or less, in one or the other in their published works, if not in their lecture courses. We are, as ever in this area, faced with difficulties about deciding who wrote what, which often amounts to making difficult decisions about the implications of the usual imprecise references that are commonplace in ancient commentary.\r\n\r\nThe best we have are those references which Simplicius, in his Physics commentary, gives to specific books or even chapters of Iamblichus' Timaeus and Categories commentaries (cf. In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria 639.23\u201324; in the second chapter of book 5 of the commentary on the Timaeus 786.11\u201312; in the first book of the commentary on the Categories). But that Iamblichus did write commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle can be regarded as firmly established.\r\n\r\nIt is tempting to think, though there is no text which allows us to demonstrate this, that his doing so was connected with the fact that it seems to have been he who set up the thereafter traditional course in which certain works of Aristotle were read as propaedeutic to a selection of twelve\u2014or rather ten plus two\u2014Platonic dialogues, which culminated in the study of the Timaeus and Parmenides.[introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3m984P11hlUhV1x","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":895,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Syllecta \tClassica","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"1\u201313"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | La Νοερὰ θεωρία di Giamblico, come Chiave di Lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Syllecta Classica |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 79-94 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cardullo, R. Loredana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A conclusione di questa parziale indagine sull’esegesi giamblichea delle Categorie, possiamo affermare come proprio questo approccio più intellettivo, più noetico, che Simplicio definisce noera theoria, sia ciò che ci consente di contraddistinguere in modo emblematico l’interpretazione di Giamblico da quelle di altri commentatori. I contesti da noi esaminati ci hanno dato l’opportunità di confrontare, sia pure per sommi capi, alcuni parametri esegetici propri di Giamblico con alcune interpretazioni di Porfirio, da un lato, e di Siriano dall’altro. Certamente, un esame più completo della fonte simpliciana ci permetterebbe di formulare giudizi più precisi in proposito. Tuttavia, già dai contesti qui analizzati è emersa con evidenza l’assoluta diversità dell’esegesi giamblichea rispetto a quella porfiriana delle Categorie. Porfirio, infatti, esamina con particolare cura i lemmi del trattato commentato, sottoponendo ogni singola espressione, ogni singola parola, a un esame che è prima di tutto filologico, poi filosofico, ma sempre circoscritto all’ambito logico-linguistico nel quale esso si trova e rientra. L’esegesi di Giamblico, invece, mira a collegare in maniera inscindibile l’ambito della speculazione logico-linguistica a quello della riflessione metafisica, trasponendo i principi e le leggi dell’uno nell’altro dominio, e viceversa, al fine di rendere chiara l’analogia e la partecipazione vigente tra i vari livelli della realtà, considerati platonicamente come ordinati in senso gerarchico e strettamente collegati secondo un rapporto di immagine e modello, o di principio e principìato. Ma l’esegesi di Giamblico si distingue anche da quella di un suo successore e per molti versi seguace, Siriano di Atene, la cui esegesi si colloca comunque in larga misura sulla stessa falsariga dell’interpretazione metafisica del maestro di Siria. Nonostante i diversi punti di contatto tra Giamblico e Siriano, emerge infatti una differenza sostanziale tra i due esegeti, che dipende in larga misura dal diverso atteggiamento che ciascuno di essi manifesta nei confronti di Aristotele. Siriano, infatti, appare meno preoccupato di Giamblico dall’esigenza di conciliare aristotelismo e platonismo, e ciò lo porta a dare probabilmente un’interpretazione più obiettiva—e perciò stesso più critica e spesso polemica—delle teorie logiche di Aristotele. Giamblico, invece, utilizza espressioni e concezioni aristoteliche in chiave neoplatonica, per dimostrare in ultima analisi come l’aristotelismo, se correttamente interpretato, possa accordarsi col platonismo, anche nelle sue concezioni metafisiche. Ed è anche a questo scopo che Giamblico dà del primo trattato dell’Organon, classicamente inteso come il più antiplatonico dello Stagirita, un’esegesi più speculativa, atta a dimostrare come anche le teorie aristoteliche più squisitamente logiche possano trovare applicazione nella metafisica platonica e rappresentare per essa degli strumenti argomentativi e dimostrativi di importanza e validità fondamentali. [conclusion p. 93-94] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5dwv2YbmwwJB7OE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"938","_score":null,"_source":{"id":938,"authors_free":[{"id":1391,"entry_id":938,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":24,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","free_first_name":"R. Loredana ","free_last_name":"Cardullo","norm_person":{"id":24,"first_name":"R. Loredana ","last_name":"Cardullo","full_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139800220","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 di Giamblico, come Chiave di Lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi","main_title":{"title":"La \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 di Giamblico, come Chiave di Lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi"},"abstract":"A conclusione di questa parziale indagine sull\u2019esegesi giamblichea delle Categorie, possiamo affermare come proprio questo approccio pi\u00f9 intellettivo, pi\u00f9 noetico, che Simplicio definisce noera theoria, sia ci\u00f2 che ci consente di contraddistinguere in modo emblematico l\u2019interpretazione di Giamblico da quelle di altri commentatori. I contesti da noi esaminati ci hanno dato l\u2019opportunit\u00e0 di confrontare, sia pure per sommi capi, alcuni parametri esegetici propri di Giamblico con alcune interpretazioni di Porfirio, da un lato, e di Siriano dall\u2019altro. Certamente, un esame pi\u00f9 completo della fonte simpliciana ci permetterebbe di formulare giudizi pi\u00f9 precisi in proposito. Tuttavia, gi\u00e0 dai contesti qui analizzati \u00e8 emersa con evidenza l\u2019assoluta diversit\u00e0 dell\u2019esegesi giamblichea rispetto a quella porfiriana delle Categorie.\r\n\r\nPorfirio, infatti, esamina con particolare cura i lemmi del trattato commentato, sottoponendo ogni singola espressione, ogni singola parola, a un esame che \u00e8 prima di tutto filologico, poi filosofico, ma sempre circoscritto all\u2019ambito logico-linguistico nel quale esso si trova e rientra. L\u2019esegesi di Giamblico, invece, mira a collegare in maniera inscindibile l\u2019ambito della speculazione logico-linguistica a quello della riflessione metafisica, trasponendo i principi e le leggi dell\u2019uno nell\u2019altro dominio, e viceversa, al fine di rendere chiara l\u2019analogia e la partecipazione vigente tra i vari livelli della realt\u00e0, considerati platonicamente come ordinati in senso gerarchico e strettamente collegati secondo un rapporto di immagine e modello, o di principio e princip\u00ecato.\r\n\r\nMa l\u2019esegesi di Giamblico si distingue anche da quella di un suo successore e per molti versi seguace, Siriano di Atene, la cui esegesi si colloca comunque in larga misura sulla stessa falsariga dell\u2019interpretazione metafisica del maestro di Siria. Nonostante i diversi punti di contatto tra Giamblico e Siriano, emerge infatti una differenza sostanziale tra i due esegeti, che dipende in larga misura dal diverso atteggiamento che ciascuno di essi manifesta nei confronti di Aristotele. Siriano, infatti, appare meno preoccupato di Giamblico dall\u2019esigenza di conciliare aristotelismo e platonismo, e ci\u00f2 lo porta a dare probabilmente un\u2019interpretazione pi\u00f9 obiettiva\u2014e perci\u00f2 stesso pi\u00f9 critica e spesso polemica\u2014delle teorie logiche di Aristotele. Giamblico, invece, utilizza espressioni e concezioni aristoteliche in chiave neoplatonica, per dimostrare in ultima analisi come l\u2019aristotelismo, se correttamente interpretato, possa accordarsi col platonismo, anche nelle sue concezioni metafisiche.\r\n\r\nEd \u00e8 anche a questo scopo che Giamblico d\u00e0 del primo trattato dell\u2019Organon, classicamente inteso come il pi\u00f9 antiplatonico dello Stagirita, un\u2019esegesi pi\u00f9 speculativa, atta a dimostrare come anche le teorie aristoteliche pi\u00f9 squisitamente logiche possano trovare applicazione nella metafisica platonica e rappresentare per essa degli strumenti argomentativi e dimostrativi di importanza e validit\u00e0 fondamentali. [conclusion p. 93-94]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5dwv2YbmwwJB7OE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":24,"full_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":938,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Syllecta Classica","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"79-94"}},"sort":[1997]}
Title | Matière et résolution : Anaxagore et ses interprètes |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1996 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 186 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 31-54 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lefebvre, René |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Anaxagore est, dit-on, le plus difficile des présocratiques. La doctrine de la matière exerce une fascination toute particulière, ne serait-ce que pour cause d'état lacunaire des textes et sans doute de généralité de l'esquisse ; puis, par un effet d'entraînement, l'ampleur, la diversité et la qualité des réactions herméneutiques elles-mêmes génèrent un commentaire sans cesse recommencé. On entend identifier, résoudre, dissoudre des problèmes, ou des pseudo-problèmes projetés par la tradition sur une œuvre qui n'en peut mais. Anaxagore surtout fascine par la tension qu'engendrent certaines options doctrinales, l'essentiel étant sur ce point le conflit entre une conception réputée homéomérique de la matière et le principe de τὸ ὁμοῦ πάντα. La succession des interprétations a amélioré notre compréhension de la philosophie du Clazoménien ; cependant, nous ne savons plus toujours ni ce qu'il faut imputer à cette dernière, ni même ce que nous n'y comprenons pas, et il nous arrive de confondre des questions différentes : la division spatiale n'est pas la discrimination qualitative, tout élémentarisme n'est peut-être pas corpusculariste, tout corpuscularisme n'est pas nécessairement atomistique. Les réflexions qui suivent se développent sur trois niveaux : la première partie consiste en une présentation minimale de la doctrine ; les notes entendent en faire ressortir les aspects problématiques, en indiquant les principales options herméneutiques. Soucieuse de ne masquer ni les apories ni les paradoxes, la deuxième partie propose des clarifications et des distinctions qu'il faut prendre moins comme des indications matérielles sur la doctrine que comme des suggestions formelles à destination du commentaire ultérieur. La notion de résolution m'a paru la plus apte à englober dans un cadre commun les discussions sur les puissances, les parties, les semences, les homéomères, l'infiniment petit, etc. [introduction p. 31-32] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/X6EflTJBUsEaivP |
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Title | Aristotle's Categories in the Greek and Latin medieval exegetical tradition. The case of the argument for the non-simultaneity of relatives |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1996 |
Journal | Cima (Cahiers de l'institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin, Université de Copenhague) |
Volume | 66 |
Pages | 117-134 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Demetracopoulos, John A. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To conclude: even if we are eager to say that in the case of Anselm’s use of the Aristotelian passage 7b38-39 we notice a medieval misconcep tion of the text of the great ancient philosopher, first we should not hasten to infer from this that the medievals couldn’t understand Aristotle or generally ancient writers; and second, we should not be at all surprised. Commentators and users of Aristotle’s works have often been exceptional men, but not super-human. Complaining about the texts’ lan guage and so implicitly apologizing for the value of his interpretive work, one commentator notes that the interpretation of many Aristotelian texts presupposes something like oracular powers of divination (Sophonias, CAG XXIII,2, 2, 8-13). Such modesty on the part of one of the Greek commentators of Aristotle ought to shake any confidence we might have in definitive interpretations of certain difficult or ambiguous Aristotelian passages, which, as often as we insist on examining them intensely, con stantly answer our exegetical anxiety with a spiteful silence. [conclusion, p. 133] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/G5FnskmvoZU1kyI |
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Title | Empedocles' Fragment 20 DK: Some Suggestions |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1996 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 49 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 298-320 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | van der Ben, Nicolaas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It may be assumed that the way in which Empedocles' fragment 20.1 DK was edited by Diels has left many a reader dissatisfied (cf. notes 8, 9, 10, and 11). However, thanks to the discovery of 53 papyrus fragments of an Empedocles text by Professor A. Martin in the University Library of Strasbourg, some light may be dawning. The collection was acquired by the library as long ago as 1905 but had gone unnoticed. Alain Martin made his find public in a lecture given at Strasbourg on April 14th, 1994. I understand that the publication of all 53 fragments will not take place before the spring of 1996. But photographs of two tiny fragments were circulated by Martin, printed on the invitation to his lecture, one of which contains remnants of 20 DK. Another line was made available in the handout distributed to his audience on that memorable occasion. Hopefully, these two texts will help solve one or two textual problems in Empedocles and shed a ray of light on the Empedocles text used by Simplicius. [introduction p. 298] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bkukUWj7zxxEZPo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"454","_score":null,"_source":{"id":454,"authors_free":[{"id":610,"entry_id":454,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":422,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","free_first_name":"Nicolaas","free_last_name":"van der Ben","norm_person":{"id":422,"first_name":"Nicolaas","last_name":"van der Ben","full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles' Fragment 20 DK: Some Suggestions","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles' Fragment 20 DK: Some Suggestions"},"abstract":"It may be assumed that the way in which Empedocles' fragment 20.1 DK was edited by Diels has left many a reader dissatisfied (cf. notes 8, 9, 10, and 11). However, thanks to the discovery of 53 papyrus fragments of an Empedocles text by Professor A. Martin in the University Library of Strasbourg, some light may be dawning. The collection was acquired by the library as long ago as 1905 but had gone unnoticed. Alain Martin made his find public in a lecture given at Strasbourg on April 14th, 1994. I understand that the publication of all 53 fragments will not take place before the spring of 1996. But photographs of two tiny fragments were circulated by Martin, printed on the invitation to his lecture, one of which contains remnants of 20 DK. Another line was made available in the handout distributed to his audience on that memorable occasion. Hopefully, these two texts will help solve one or two textual problems in Empedocles and shed a ray of light on the Empedocles text used by Simplicius. [introduction p. 298]","btype":3,"date":"1996","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bkukUWj7zxxEZPo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":422,"full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":454,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"49","issue":"3","pages":"298-320"}},"sort":[1996]}
Title | Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la « magna quaestio ». Rôle et indépendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristotélicien |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1995 |
Journal | Les Études Classiques |
Volume | 63 |
Pages | 295–351 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rashed, Marwan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Sur le problème du lieu du Tout et de la sphère des fixes, on assiste ainsi, au sein même de la tradition aristotélicienne, à un débat qui, d’Eudème à Ibn Ruschd, en passant, comme on pense l’avoir découvert, par les premiers commentateurs péripatéticiens, puis Alexandre et ses successeurs grecs et arabes, fut le premier à révéler l’antagonisme, voire la contradiction, entre cosmologie et physique aristotéliciennes. Il est peu d’apories, dans l’histoire de l’aristotélisme, qui aient autant mis à mal le système du Maître. Elle n’est cependant pas la seule, et bien d’autres points nous demanderont une étude attentive et difficile ; aussi, au terme de ce travail, voudrions-nous souligner l’importance du chemin restant à parcourir : les résultats acquis devront être discutés, affinés et, surtout, interprétés à la lumière d’études ponctuelles et précises sur la tradition aristotélicienne en général et alexandrine en particulier. Si l’on a choisi de traiter d'un cas restreint et bien déterminé, le problème cosmologique du lieu aristotélicien interprété par Alexandre, c’était autant pour éclairer la profonde originalité de pensée de l’Exégète et l’importance capitale, dans l’histoire de l’aristotélisme, de son commentaire partiellement retrouvé à la Physique, que pour montrer qu’il n’y a pas, en la matière, d’histoire partielle : l’aristotélisme fit plus que se survivre au contact des doctrines stoïciennes, et l’hellénisme arabe eut tôt fait d’atteindre et de dépasser les horizons de sa jeunesse attique. Est-il dès lors besoin d’insister sur l’idée de tradition aristotélicienne qui semble se dégager ? Celle-ci ne se reconnaît pas à l’acceptation servile de la lettre du Maître, mais à une façon commune de questionner l'ensemble de son œuvre. Interprétée par cette lignée, la véracité d’Aristote dépasse l’immédiateté de son texte pour devenir, limite et condition de la philosophie, l’assurance d’un sens « où tous les sens s’accordent ». [conclusion p. 350-351] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/m86rWMBz7g2Vnfn |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1062","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1062,"authors_free":[{"id":1612,"entry_id":1062,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"Marwan","free_last_name":"Rashed","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la \u00ab magna quaestio \u00bb. R\u00f4le et ind\u00e9pendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristot\u00e9licien","main_title":{"title":"Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la \u00ab magna quaestio \u00bb. R\u00f4le et ind\u00e9pendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristot\u00e9licien"},"abstract":"Sur le probl\u00e8me du lieu du Tout et de la sph\u00e8re des fixes, on assiste ainsi, au sein m\u00eame de la tradition aristot\u00e9licienne, \u00e0 un d\u00e9bat qui, d\u2019Eud\u00e8me \u00e0 Ibn Ruschd, en passant, comme on pense l\u2019avoir d\u00e9couvert, par les premiers commentateurs p\u00e9ripat\u00e9ticiens, puis Alexandre et ses successeurs grecs et arabes, fut le premier \u00e0 r\u00e9v\u00e9ler l\u2019antagonisme, voire la contradiction, entre cosmologie et physique aristot\u00e9liciennes.\r\n\r\nIl est peu d\u2019apories, dans l\u2019histoire de l\u2019aristot\u00e9lisme, qui aient autant mis \u00e0 mal le syst\u00e8me du Ma\u00eetre. Elle n\u2019est cependant pas la seule, et bien d\u2019autres points nous demanderont une \u00e9tude attentive et difficile ; aussi, au terme de ce travail, voudrions-nous souligner l\u2019importance du chemin restant \u00e0 parcourir : les r\u00e9sultats acquis devront \u00eatre discut\u00e9s, affin\u00e9s et, surtout, interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re d\u2019\u00e9tudes ponctuelles et pr\u00e9cises sur la tradition aristot\u00e9licienne en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et alexandrine en particulier.\r\n\r\nSi l\u2019on a choisi de traiter d'un cas restreint et bien d\u00e9termin\u00e9, le probl\u00e8me cosmologique du lieu aristot\u00e9licien interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 par Alexandre, c\u2019\u00e9tait autant pour \u00e9clairer la profonde originalit\u00e9 de pens\u00e9e de l\u2019Ex\u00e9g\u00e8te et l\u2019importance capitale, dans l\u2019histoire de l\u2019aristot\u00e9lisme, de son commentaire partiellement retrouv\u00e9 \u00e0 la Physique, que pour montrer qu\u2019il n\u2019y a pas, en la mati\u00e8re, d\u2019histoire partielle : l\u2019aristot\u00e9lisme fit plus que se survivre au contact des doctrines sto\u00efciennes, et l\u2019hell\u00e9nisme arabe eut t\u00f4t fait d\u2019atteindre et de d\u00e9passer les horizons de sa jeunesse attique.\r\n\r\nEst-il d\u00e8s lors besoin d\u2019insister sur l\u2019id\u00e9e de tradition aristot\u00e9licienne qui semble se d\u00e9gager ? Celle-ci ne se reconna\u00eet pas \u00e0 l\u2019acceptation servile de la lettre du Ma\u00eetre, mais \u00e0 une fa\u00e7on commune de questionner l'ensemble de son \u0153uvre. Interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e par cette lign\u00e9e, la v\u00e9racit\u00e9 d\u2019Aristote d\u00e9passe l\u2019imm\u00e9diatet\u00e9 de son texte pour devenir, limite et condition de la philosophie, l\u2019assurance d\u2019un sens \u00ab o\u00f9 tous les sens s\u2019accordent \u00bb. [conclusion p. 350-351]","btype":3,"date":"1995","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/m86rWMBz7g2Vnfn","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1062,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes Classiques","volume":"63","issue":"","pages":"295\u2013351"}},"sort":[1995]}
Title | Review of Hagen, C. (tr.): Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 7 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1995 |
Journal | The Classical Review, New Series |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 464-465 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Smith, Andrew |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The seventh book of Aristotle's Physics was as problematic in antiquity as it is today. Modern scholars have found its place and role in the Physics as a whole difficult to define. Its content seems to be superseded by the apparently more cogent arguments of Book Eight for an unmoved mover. Eudemus seems to have rejected it as spurious, as his version of the Physics omitted this book, and Themistius omits the first chapter and skims over the rest. Alexander thought the arguments were rather formal, while Simplicius finds them weak. The latter, to whom we are indebted for much of our information about ancient attitudes toward the book, thought it was written earlier than Book Eight, which then replaced it. None of this is simplified by the existence of two versions for at least the first three chapters. Nevertheless, Simplicius took the book seriously enough to write an 85-page commentary on it. Simplicius, in fact, frequently suggests the important contribution of the arguments in Book Seven to their continuation in Book Eight (cf. H., p. 103 n. 16, who also notes how Simplicius elsewhere refers to Book Seven rather than to Book Eight for the important theme of the mover). In this, Simplicius anticipates, in a way, the important recent work of Robert Wardy (The Chain of Change: A Study of Aristotle's Physics VII, Cambridge, 1990), who has reinstated the independent value of Book Seven as a preparation for the later book and not infrequently alludes to Simplicius. Not the least merit of H.'s notes is the full use he makes of Wardy's work. H.'s translation is marked by the care and clarity we have come to expect from this series. There are frequent pointers in the text to clarify the occurrence of Greek technical terms. This is aided by a full English-Greek glossary and a Greek-English index, in addition to a 16-page subject index. The notes, which are gathered in some 30 pages at the end rather than printed at the foot of the page as in earlier volumes, seem more extensive, while the new format allows for longer individual notes. Space is not squandered, and much useful material and insightful commentary can be found in these pages. In addition to helping relate Simplicius' interpretations to the text of Aristotle, H. is also attentive to Simplicius' Neoplatonic concerns. Simplicius, for example, is clearly puzzled as to what entities in the Neoplatonic world Aristotle's concepts might apply. Initially, he interprets Aristotle's analysis of "internal movement" as soul moving body, where something is seen to move but we cannot point to the mover (1038, 1f.). Later, he restricts this to the soul alone, citing Phaedrus 245c8, but finally decides to use the common Neoplatonic strategy of restricting Aristotle's analysis to the sublunar world. In fact, Simplicius is groping toward an understanding of the contribution of the argument in Book Seven to the unmoved mover of Book Eight. He points to the connection by narrowing the meaning of Aristotle's "first moved mover" to "something first imparting motion which is no longer being moved itself by another" (1047, 15). (Aristotle's first mover in Book Seven, though not moved by another, is nevertheless in motion.) At the same time, Simplicius is quite clear that Aristotle is not referring to a cosmic mover here. Thus, at 1048, 15f., he distinguishes "the very first, unmoved cause of motion" and the "proximate mover," which he thinks Aristotle is referring to in Book Seven. H.'s notes not only clarify Simplicius' interpretation of the Aristotelian text but also aid our understanding of Simplicius' creative philosophical concerns. This translation, therefore, will be of use to those with Neoplatonic as well as Aristotelian interests. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qOElwVrkx2iCYIO |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"847","_score":null,"_source":{"id":847,"authors_free":[{"id":1251,"entry_id":847,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":232,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Smith, Andrew","free_first_name":"Andrew","free_last_name":"Smith","norm_person":{"id":232,"first_name":"Andrew","last_name":"Smith","full_name":"Smith, Andrew","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122322606","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Hagen, C. (tr.): Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 7","main_title":{"title":"Review of Hagen, C. (tr.): Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 7"},"abstract":"The seventh book of Aristotle's Physics was as problematic in antiquity as it is today. Modern scholars have found its place and role in the Physics as a whole difficult to define. Its content seems to be superseded by the apparently more cogent arguments of Book Eight for an unmoved mover. Eudemus seems to have rejected it as spurious, as his version of the Physics omitted this book, and Themistius omits the first chapter and skims over the rest. Alexander thought the arguments were rather formal, while Simplicius finds them weak. The latter, to whom we are indebted for much of our information about ancient attitudes toward the book, thought it was written earlier than Book Eight, which then replaced it.\r\n\r\nNone of this is simplified by the existence of two versions for at least the first three chapters. Nevertheless, Simplicius took the book seriously enough to write an 85-page commentary on it. Simplicius, in fact, frequently suggests the important contribution of the arguments in Book Seven to their continuation in Book Eight (cf. H., p. 103 n. 16, who also notes how Simplicius elsewhere refers to Book Seven rather than to Book Eight for the important theme of the mover). In this, Simplicius anticipates, in a way, the important recent work of Robert Wardy (The Chain of Change: A Study of Aristotle's Physics VII, Cambridge, 1990), who has reinstated the independent value of Book Seven as a preparation for the later book and not infrequently alludes to Simplicius.\r\n\r\nNot the least merit of H.'s notes is the full use he makes of Wardy's work. H.'s translation is marked by the care and clarity we have come to expect from this series. There are frequent pointers in the text to clarify the occurrence of Greek technical terms. This is aided by a full English-Greek glossary and a Greek-English index, in addition to a 16-page subject index. The notes, which are gathered in some 30 pages at the end rather than printed at the foot of the page as in earlier volumes, seem more extensive, while the new format allows for longer individual notes. Space is not squandered, and much useful material and insightful commentary can be found in these pages.\r\n\r\nIn addition to helping relate Simplicius' interpretations to the text of Aristotle, H. is also attentive to Simplicius' Neoplatonic concerns. Simplicius, for example, is clearly puzzled as to what entities in the Neoplatonic world Aristotle's concepts might apply. Initially, he interprets Aristotle's analysis of \"internal movement\" as soul moving body, where something is seen to move but we cannot point to the mover (1038, 1f.). Later, he restricts this to the soul alone, citing Phaedrus 245c8, but finally decides to use the common Neoplatonic strategy of restricting Aristotle's analysis to the sublunar world.\r\n\r\nIn fact, Simplicius is groping toward an understanding of the contribution of the argument in Book Seven to the unmoved mover of Book Eight. He points to the connection by narrowing the meaning of Aristotle's \"first moved mover\" to \"something first imparting motion which is no longer being moved itself by another\" (1047, 15). (Aristotle's first mover in Book Seven, though not moved by another, is nevertheless in motion.) At the same time, Simplicius is quite clear that Aristotle is not referring to a cosmic mover here. Thus, at 1048, 15f., he distinguishes \"the very first, unmoved cause of motion\" and the \"proximate mover,\" which he thinks Aristotle is referring to in Book Seven.\r\n\r\nH.'s notes not only clarify Simplicius' interpretation of the Aristotelian text but also aid our understanding of Simplicius' creative philosophical concerns. This translation, therefore, will be of use to those with Neoplatonic as well as Aristotelian interests. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1995","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qOElwVrkx2iCYIO","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":232,"full_name":"Smith, Andrew","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":847,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review, New Series","volume":"45","issue":"2","pages":"464-465"}},"sort":[1995]}
Title | Quotation in Greco-Roman contexts |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1995 |
Journal | Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident |
Volume | 17 |
Pages | 141-153 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lloyd, Geoffrey |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The papers in this collection raise a variety of important issues and illustrate the complexity of the phenomena that "quotation" may cover. But for anyone attempting to bring to bear some of the ancient Greek and Latin data on this topic, one immediate problem must be confronted at the outset, namely the difference that different degrees of orality and literacy may make. The idea that there is a polar opposition between oral and literate societies (as a whole) has long ago been exploded (Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge 1977). Rather, there is a wide spectrum of degrees of orality and literacy. But in the comparative absence of writing and of written texts, what passes as a quotation, and the manner in which quotations are used, may well differ very markedly from the norms and uses practiced within communities of listeners and readers who are in a position to refer to written records. The myth of the Bagre, as Goody explained, is represented by the LoDagaa themselves as invariant: it is always, they insist, the same. Yet actual performances vary widely, as Goody's own transcriptions, carried out over a period of several decades and using different methods, prove conclusively. The most recent versions of the myth have been known to incorporate references to Goody and his tape recorder themselves. The development of literacy in ancient Greece is as controversial as the question of the role of oral performance in or behind the creation of the Homeric epics. The work of Milman Parry and A. B. Lord, comparing Greek and oral Balkan epic, accepted as orthodoxy in the 1960s, is nowadays problematized as often as it is cited as authoritative. For every Greek scholar who accepts that Homeric formulae have a mnemonic function in oral performance, there is another who insists not just on the literary, but the literate, craftsmanship of the Homeric use of repetition. Again, just how literate were those who lived at Athens in the 5th or 4th centuries BCE—the male citizens, their wives, let alone their slaves? Learning to read and write was represented, often with some pride, it seems, as part of the traditional education of well-born children, but how fluent in those two skills they were expected to become, or normally became, is another matter. The institution of ostracism seemingly implies the assumption that all citizens could write the name of the person they wanted to send into exile. But not everyone "wrote" their own ostrakon, as we can tell from the archaeological record, for some were evidently "mass-produced" for others' use. Yet while these and other issues are no closer to resolution now than they were when the literacy debate began in earnest, one feature of classical Greek culture that is generally agreed upon, and that is important for our purposes, is that, even when written texts were available for consultation, the usual mode of communication was oral. In Plato's Parmenides 127c-e, when Socrates meets Parmenides and Zeno on a visit to Athens and hears that Zeno has brought his book with him, Socrates asks him not to lend him the text but to read it out. The relevance of this to quotation is twofold. First, the criteria of accuracy in quotation are affected, and secondly, following on from that, we have to question whether what may look like a report of what someone "says" is indeed that, or merely, at most, an attribution of an idea or an opinion. Thus, when we find Plato "misquoting" Homer, there may be no fewer than four (by no means all mutually exclusive) reasons for this, over and above the possibility that our text of Plato is "corrupt": (1) Plato has misremembered: he is quoting from memory, but that is at fault. (2) He is deliberately misquoting and expects his readers/listeners to spot this immediately and to catch his drift—to understand the game that he, Plato, is playing with Homer. (3) He is deliberately misquoting but does not expect that to be picked up: he does not expect to be "caught out." I shall return to this third possibility later with the example of Galen. (4) He has a different text of Homer from ours. [introduction p. 141-142] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nlUVMDS4ArBBIez |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1369","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1369,"authors_free":[{"id":2062,"entry_id":1369,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":234,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lloyd, Geoffrey","free_first_name":"Geoffrey","free_last_name":"Lloyd","norm_person":{"id":234,"first_name":"Geoffrey","last_name":"Lloyd","full_name":"Lloyd, Geoffrey","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/12380504X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Quotation in Greco-Roman contexts","main_title":{"title":"Quotation in Greco-Roman contexts"},"abstract":"The papers in this collection raise a variety of important issues and illustrate the complexity of the phenomena that \"quotation\" may cover. But for anyone attempting to bring to bear some of the ancient Greek and Latin data on this topic, one immediate problem must be confronted at the outset, namely the difference that different degrees of orality and literacy may make.\r\n\r\nThe idea that there is a polar opposition between oral and literate societies (as a whole) has long ago been exploded (Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge 1977). Rather, there is a wide spectrum of degrees of orality and literacy. But in the comparative absence of writing and of written texts, what passes as a quotation, and the manner in which quotations are used, may well differ very markedly from the norms and uses practiced within communities of listeners and readers who are in a position to refer to written records. The myth of the Bagre, as Goody explained, is represented by the LoDagaa themselves as invariant: it is always, they insist, the same. Yet actual performances vary widely, as Goody's own transcriptions, carried out over a period of several decades and using different methods, prove conclusively. The most recent versions of the myth have been known to incorporate references to Goody and his tape recorder themselves.\r\n\r\nThe development of literacy in ancient Greece is as controversial as the question of the role of oral performance in or behind the creation of the Homeric epics. The work of Milman Parry and A. B. Lord, comparing Greek and oral Balkan epic, accepted as orthodoxy in the 1960s, is nowadays problematized as often as it is cited as authoritative. For every Greek scholar who accepts that Homeric formulae have a mnemonic function in oral performance, there is another who insists not just on the literary, but the literate, craftsmanship of the Homeric use of repetition.\r\n\r\nAgain, just how literate were those who lived at Athens in the 5th or 4th centuries BCE\u2014the male citizens, their wives, let alone their slaves? Learning to read and write was represented, often with some pride, it seems, as part of the traditional education of well-born children, but how fluent in those two skills they were expected to become, or normally became, is another matter. The institution of ostracism seemingly implies the assumption that all citizens could write the name of the person they wanted to send into exile. But not everyone \"wrote\" their own ostrakon, as we can tell from the archaeological record, for some were evidently \"mass-produced\" for others' use.\r\n\r\nYet while these and other issues are no closer to resolution now than they were when the literacy debate began in earnest, one feature of classical Greek culture that is generally agreed upon, and that is important for our purposes, is that, even when written texts were available for consultation, the usual mode of communication was oral. In Plato's Parmenides 127c-e, when Socrates meets Parmenides and Zeno on a visit to Athens and hears that Zeno has brought his book with him, Socrates asks him not to lend him the text but to read it out.\r\n\r\nThe relevance of this to quotation is twofold. First, the criteria of accuracy in quotation are affected, and secondly, following on from that, we have to question whether what may look like a report of what someone \"says\" is indeed that, or merely, at most, an attribution of an idea or an opinion.\r\n\r\nThus, when we find Plato \"misquoting\" Homer, there may be no fewer than four (by no means all mutually exclusive) reasons for this, over and above the possibility that our text of Plato is \"corrupt\":\r\n(1) Plato has misremembered: he is quoting from memory, but that is at fault.\r\n(2) He is deliberately misquoting and expects his readers\/listeners to spot this immediately and to catch his drift\u2014to understand the game that he, Plato, is playing with Homer.\r\n(3) He is deliberately misquoting but does not expect that to be picked up: he does not expect to be \"caught out.\" I shall return to this third possibility later with the example of Galen.\r\n(4) He has a different text of Homer from ours. [introduction p. 141-142]","btype":3,"date":"1995","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nlUVMDS4ArBBIez","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":234,"full_name":"Lloyd, Geoffrey","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1369,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Extr\u00eame-Orient Extr\u00eame-Occident","volume":"17","issue":"","pages":"141-153"}},"sort":[1995]}
Title | Sur les pas d'un pèlerin païen à travers la Syrie chrétienne: À propos du livre de Michel Tardieu |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1994 |
Journal | Syria |
Volume | 71 |
Issue | 1/2 |
Pages | 217-226 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bauzou, Thomas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This à propos to the book Les paysages reliques. Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore à Simplicius by Michel Tardieu discusses how Tardieu's book collects and comments on previously unknown fragments by Damascius and Simplicius, the last pagan intellectuals of a region that was in the process of complete Christianisation. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tBLkmMKD3Nol362 |
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Title | Proclus on Corporeal Space |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1994 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 76 |
Pages | 151 –167 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schrenk, Lawrence P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In his survey of ancient theories of space1 the Aristotelian commen- tator Simplicius considers the rather peculiar account offered by the Neoplatonic philosopher, Proclus.2 This philosopher's analysis of space3 is unique in that it contains the unusual claim that space is corporeal.4 In this paper, I shall explore this claim and argue that it is by no means as absurd as might at first appear. It results from a rea- soned attempt to develop a theory of space which meets the needs of Proclus' ontology of emanation. We shall begin by seeking a precise understanding of the assertion that space is a body (through an analysis of two detailed proofs Proclus offers in its support5) and then investi- gate the philosophical motives compelling him to make the claim by inquiring about the function of space in his comprehensive ontology. [Introduction, p. 151-152] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/es6VRskBGAHA2p5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1033","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1033,"authors_free":[{"id":1564,"entry_id":1033,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":287,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schrenk, Lawrence P.","free_first_name":"Lawrence P.","free_last_name":"Schrenk","norm_person":{"id":287,"first_name":"Lawrence P.","last_name":"Schrenk","full_name":"Schrenk, Lawrence P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114719551X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Proclus on Corporeal Space","main_title":{"title":"Proclus on Corporeal Space"},"abstract":"In his survey of ancient theories of space1 the Aristotelian commen-\r\ntator Simplicius considers the rather peculiar account offered by the\r\nNeoplatonic philosopher, Proclus.2 This philosopher's analysis of\r\nspace3 is unique in that it contains the unusual claim that space is corporeal.4 In this paper, I shall explore this claim and argue that it is\r\nby no means as absurd as might at first appear. It results from a rea-\r\nsoned attempt to develop a theory of space which meets the needs of\r\nProclus' ontology of emanation. We shall begin by seeking a precise\r\nunderstanding of the assertion that space is a body (through an analysis\r\nof two detailed proofs Proclus offers in its support5) and then investi-\r\ngate the philosophical motives compelling him to make the claim by\r\ninquiring about the function of space in his comprehensive ontology. [Introduction, p. 151-152]","btype":3,"date":"1994","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/es6VRskBGAHA2p5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":287,"full_name":"Schrenk, Lawrence P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1033,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"76","issue":"","pages":"151 \u2013167"}},"sort":[1994]}
Title | Plural Worlds in Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1994 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 115 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 485-506 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The ancients ascribed to Anaximander a belief in plural worlds, but the state of the evidence does not make it immediately clear whether these worlds are coexistent or successive. Zeller argued that they could not be coexistent, but his view was challenged by Burnet; yet Cornford, as Kirk puts it, "demonstrated that Burnet's argument . . . rested on a false assessment of the doxographic evidence on this point, as well as on the misinterpretation of several later Presocratics." So far so good, but Kirk goes further and contends not only that coexis- tent worlds have been wrongly assigned to Anaximander, as Zeller and Cornford have shown, but that successive worlds are also a doxo- graphic error; a similar view is argued by Kahn. In this essay I propose to scrutinize our evidence on Anaximander's plural worlds and to exam- ine, systematically and exhaustively, Kirk's and Kahn's criticism of this evidence-both as against the doxographic testimony and on its own merits. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kNyOiUMQDhQWBYi |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"596","_score":null,"_source":{"id":596,"authors_free":[{"id":847,"entry_id":596,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Plural Worlds in Anaximander","main_title":{"title":"Plural Worlds in Anaximander"},"abstract":"The ancients ascribed to Anaximander a belief in plural worlds, but the state of the evidence does not make it immediately clear whether these worlds are coexistent or successive. Zeller argued that they could not be coexistent, but his view was challenged by Burnet; yet Cornford, as Kirk puts it, \"demonstrated that Burnet's argument . . . rested on a false assessment of the doxographic evidence on this point, as well as on the misinterpretation of several later Presocratics.\" So far so good, but Kirk goes further and contends not only that coexis- tent worlds have been wrongly assigned to Anaximander, as Zeller and Cornford have shown, but that successive worlds are also a doxo- graphic error; a similar view is argued by Kahn. In this essay I propose to scrutinize our evidence on Anaximander's plural worlds and to exam- ine, systematically and exhaustively, Kirk's and Kahn's criticism of this evidence-both as against the doxographic testimony and on its own merits. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1994","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kNyOiUMQDhQWBYi","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":596,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"115","issue":"4","pages":"485-506"}},"sort":[1994]}
Title | Review of: Place, Void, and Eternity. Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void. Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World. By Philoponus and Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | The Philosophical Review |
Volume | 102 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 89-91 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ide, Harry A. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This volume is one of a series of translations of later ancient philosophy, edited by Richard Sorabji. These works have never been translated into modern European languages, although there are Renaissance Latin editions of many of them. Earlier volumes in the series include other works by Simplicius and Philoponus, as well as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Dexippus. These names are not now household names among philosophers, but work prompted and generated by this series will probably result in their receiving the increased attention and respect they deserve. John Philoponus, a sixth-century Christian, may be the best known of these authors among the general philosophical community. For more than a century, historians of science have known that he was an important influence on Galileo. This volume makes some of his important texts available in English. The first part comprises two selections from Philoponus's commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which are self-contained essays on place and void. The second part consists of selections from an attack against Philoponus by Simplicius, a non-Christian Neoplatonist contemporary with Philoponus. In these selections, Simplicius reports and responds to Philoponus's arguments that the world can perish. Simplicius took these arguments from a treatise of Philoponus's that no longer exists. The volume includes the extensive subject and word indices that are standard in this series, and brief introductions to each of the parts. In Physics 4, Aristotle argues that a body's place cannot be the three-dimensional extension within its boundaries, but must be the two-dimensional boundaries. Philoponus argues against Aristotle that place must be three-dimensional. He argues, for example, from wine's bursting a wineskin when it ferments: if there were no three-dimensional extension, it would not need a larger one. This is connected to the existence of void, since Aristotle argues against void because it relies on three-dimensional place. Philoponus correspondingly claims that void is in some sense possible (although it can't occur). His Corollary on Void attempts to prove against Aristotle that motion is possible even if there is a void, and that motion in fact requires void. Aristotle suggests that an object moving in a void would move instantaneously, which is impossible. Philoponus responds that bodies' speed is determined not only by external resistance, but also by their internal impetus. Even in an actually existing vacuum, the internal impetus would still cause only a finite speed. And void is required for motion, since bodies can move only if they have a three-dimensional extension to move into. So, although a three-dimensional extension without any body never actually occurs, there must be a three-dimensional extension separate from body. In the arguments of Simplicius translated in the second part, Philoponus is represented as first arguing for the Aristotelian conclusion that no finite body has an infinite capacity (dunamis), and then inferring that no finite body, including the universe, can exist forever. Simplicius responds that Philoponus overlooks an option—the universe might be able to be moved forever without having an infinite capacity to move itself—and that Philoponus wrongly assumes that something must have an infinite capacity to be infinite, while infinity simply involves a never-ending series of finite steps. In a further series of arguments, Simplicius has Philoponus argue that the capacity of the world must be finite in its own nature, although God apparently could keep the world in existence forever. Sorabji argues in his introduction that Simplicius misses the point of the qualification and thereby misdirects his criticisms. Philoponus, Sorabji suggests, rightly insists that the world's own nature would still be finite. This volume is well translated and well produced. It contains material that is historically important. Anyone interested in the history of science or the development of our understanding of place, void, and eternity will find it interesting and useful. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6Z4EGDinHRCTNE1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"740","_score":null,"_source":{"id":740,"authors_free":[{"id":1103,"entry_id":740,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":230,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ide, Harry A.","free_first_name":"Harry A.","free_last_name":"Ide","norm_person":{"id":230,"first_name":"Harry A.","last_name":"Ide","full_name":"Ide, Harry A.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Place, Void, and Eternity. Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void. Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World. By Philoponus and Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Place, Void, and Eternity. Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void. Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World. By Philoponus and Simplicius"},"abstract":"This volume is one of a series of translations of later ancient philosophy, edited by Richard Sorabji. These works have never been translated into modern European languages, although there are Renaissance Latin editions of many of them. Earlier volumes in the series include other works by Simplicius and Philoponus, as well as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Dexippus. These names are not now household names among philosophers, but work prompted and generated by this series will probably result in their receiving the increased attention and respect they deserve.\r\n\r\nJohn Philoponus, a sixth-century Christian, may be the best known of these authors among the general philosophical community. For more than a century, historians of science have known that he was an important influence on Galileo. This volume makes some of his important texts available in English.\r\n\r\nThe first part comprises two selections from Philoponus's commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which are self-contained essays on place and void. The second part consists of selections from an attack against Philoponus by Simplicius, a non-Christian Neoplatonist contemporary with Philoponus. In these selections, Simplicius reports and responds to Philoponus's arguments that the world can perish. Simplicius took these arguments from a treatise of Philoponus's that no longer exists. The volume includes the extensive subject and word indices that are standard in this series, and brief introductions to each of the parts.\r\n\r\nIn Physics 4, Aristotle argues that a body's place cannot be the three-dimensional extension within its boundaries, but must be the two-dimensional boundaries. Philoponus argues against Aristotle that place must be three-dimensional. He argues, for example, from wine's bursting a wineskin when it ferments: if there were no three-dimensional extension, it would not need a larger one. This is connected to the existence of void, since Aristotle argues against void because it relies on three-dimensional place. Philoponus correspondingly claims that void is in some sense possible (although it can't occur). His Corollary on Void attempts to prove against Aristotle that motion is possible even if there is a void, and that motion in fact requires void. Aristotle suggests that an object moving in a void would move instantaneously, which is impossible. Philoponus responds that bodies' speed is determined not only by external resistance, but also by their internal impetus. Even in an actually existing vacuum, the internal impetus would still cause only a finite speed. And void is required for motion, since bodies can move only if they have a three-dimensional extension to move into. So, although a three-dimensional extension without any body never actually occurs, there must be a three-dimensional extension separate from body.\r\n\r\nIn the arguments of Simplicius translated in the second part, Philoponus is represented as first arguing for the Aristotelian conclusion that no finite body has an infinite capacity (dunamis), and then inferring that no finite body, including the universe, can exist forever. Simplicius responds that Philoponus overlooks an option\u2014the universe might be able to be moved forever without having an infinite capacity to move itself\u2014and that Philoponus wrongly assumes that something must have an infinite capacity to be infinite, while infinity simply involves a never-ending series of finite steps.\r\n\r\nIn a further series of arguments, Simplicius has Philoponus argue that the capacity of the world must be finite in its own nature, although God apparently could keep the world in existence forever. Sorabji argues in his introduction that Simplicius misses the point of the qualification and thereby misdirects his criticisms. Philoponus, Sorabji suggests, rightly insists that the world's own nature would still be finite.\r\n\r\nThis volume is well translated and well produced. It contains material that is historically important. Anyone interested in the history of science or the development of our understanding of place, void, and eternity will find it interesting and useful. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6Z4EGDinHRCTNE1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":230,"full_name":"Ide, Harry A.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":740,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Philosophical Review","volume":"102","issue":"1","pages":"89-91"}},"sort":[1993]}
Title | Anaximander's Conception of the "Apeiron" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 38 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 229-256 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Anaximander's Apeiron is perhaps the most obscure notion in Greek philosophy. Aristotle was puzzled by it, suggesting various and greatly differing interpretations of the concept. But while Aristotle's construals were, in a sense, predominantly ad hoc and exempli gratia, Theophrastus committed himself, at least in the expository sections of his Physical Opinions, to a concise presentation—with attention to their authentic setting and idiom—of the teachings of the earlier thinkers. Theophrastus' statement concerning the Apeiron has come down to us in the following three versions: Simpl. Phys. 24, 13 (DK 12 A 9): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element of existing things was the Apeiron... and he says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other infinite nature... Diog. ii 1 (DK 12 A 1): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element is the Apeiron, not determining whether it is air or water or something else. Aet. 1 3, 3 (DK 12 A 14): Anaximander... says that the arche of existing things is the Apeiron... but he errs in that he does not say what the Apeiron is, whether it is air, or water, or earth, or some other body. The question of whether Simplicius or Diogenes and Aetius are true to Theophrastus' genuine wording is not of purely philological interest. As Barnes notes, "the view that Anaximander's principle was qualitatively indeterminate loses in plausibility if he did not positively distinguish it from the elements." Kahn adds, "here again the words of Simplicius must closely reflect the text of Theophrastus. The parallels [in Aetius and Diogenes] prove this, even if they are not precise enough to establish the original wording." However, Barnes also admits that "we cannot tell whether Simplicius or Diogenes better represents Theophrastus' judgment." A decisive answer, however, has already been provided by Hölscher, who assessed Simplicius' words as "clearly a distortion; the correct phrase is in Diogenes, ob ὀρθῶς," and this not merely because Simplicius is in a minority, but for the simple reason that "otherwise there could have been no discussion about it [i.e., the Apeiron] at all." Thus, what Theophrastus actually said is that Anaximander did not determine his arche and element in respect of qualities. It is one thing to say that Anaximander did not determine his arche qualitatively and quite another to say that he posited a qualitatively indeterminate body as the arche; concluding from the former to the latter is not an inference that logicians would approve. That being said, it is not to imply that Anaximander provided his arche with no qualification at all—he called it to Apeiron. The Greek word may mean "boundless, infinite, countless" or "endless" in the sense of "circular" (see LSJ, s.v.). However, the third meaning—"without outlet"—is surely irrelevant to Anaximander. Gottschalk correctly pointed out that the widely accepted idea that under to Apeiron Anaximander meant "that which is without internal boundaries or distinctions," effectively "qualitatively indeterminate," has no linguistic justification. In calling his principle to Apeiron, Anaximander may have meant to specify it as spatially infinite (or, more plausibly historically, indefinitely large), temporally infinite (i.e., eternal), or most probably both; he may even have intended to denote it as spherical. However, qualitative indefiniteness was certainly not what he intended to express by this term. The scholarly belief that Anaximander posited a qualitatively indefinite body as the principle is thus, at best, a speculative conjecture and, at worst, a confusion which has neither doxographical nor linguistic support and, moreover, strictly speaking, goes against our evidence. [introduction p. 229-231] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KFH07EnbKOSrtwC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"749","_score":null,"_source":{"id":749,"authors_free":[{"id":1114,"entry_id":749,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander's Conception of the \"Apeiron\"","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander's Conception of the \"Apeiron\""},"abstract":"Anaximander's Apeiron is perhaps the most obscure notion in Greek philosophy. Aristotle was puzzled by it, suggesting various and greatly differing interpretations of the concept. But while Aristotle's construals were, in a sense, predominantly ad hoc and exempli gratia, Theophrastus committed himself, at least in the expository sections of his Physical Opinions, to a concise presentation\u2014with attention to their authentic setting and idiom\u2014of the teachings of the earlier thinkers. Theophrastus' statement concerning the Apeiron has come down to us in the following three versions:\r\n\r\n Simpl. Phys. 24, 13 (DK 12 A 9): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element of existing things was the Apeiron... and he says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other infinite nature...\r\n Diog. ii 1 (DK 12 A 1): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element is the Apeiron, not determining whether it is air or water or something else.\r\n Aet. 1 3, 3 (DK 12 A 14): Anaximander... says that the arche of existing things is the Apeiron... but he errs in that he does not say what the Apeiron is, whether it is air, or water, or earth, or some other body.\r\n\r\nThe question of whether Simplicius or Diogenes and Aetius are true to Theophrastus' genuine wording is not of purely philological interest. As Barnes notes, \"the view that Anaximander's principle was qualitatively indeterminate loses in plausibility if he did not positively distinguish it from the elements.\" Kahn adds, \"here again the words of Simplicius must closely reflect the text of Theophrastus. The parallels [in Aetius and Diogenes] prove this, even if they are not precise enough to establish the original wording.\" However, Barnes also admits that \"we cannot tell whether Simplicius or Diogenes better represents Theophrastus' judgment.\"\r\n\r\nA decisive answer, however, has already been provided by H\u00f6lscher, who assessed Simplicius' words as \"clearly a distortion; the correct phrase is in Diogenes, ob \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2,\" and this not merely because Simplicius is in a minority, but for the simple reason that \"otherwise there could have been no discussion about it [i.e., the Apeiron] at all.\" Thus, what Theophrastus actually said is that Anaximander did not determine his arche and element in respect of qualities.\r\n\r\nIt is one thing to say that Anaximander did not determine his arche qualitatively and quite another to say that he posited a qualitatively indeterminate body as the arche; concluding from the former to the latter is not an inference that logicians would approve.\r\n\r\nThat being said, it is not to imply that Anaximander provided his arche with no qualification at all\u2014he called it to Apeiron. The Greek word may mean \"boundless, infinite, countless\" or \"endless\" in the sense of \"circular\" (see LSJ, s.v.). However, the third meaning\u2014\"without outlet\"\u2014is surely irrelevant to Anaximander. Gottschalk correctly pointed out that the widely accepted idea that under to Apeiron Anaximander meant \"that which is without internal boundaries or distinctions,\" effectively \"qualitatively indeterminate,\" has no linguistic justification.\r\n\r\nIn calling his principle to Apeiron, Anaximander may have meant to specify it as spatially infinite (or, more plausibly historically, indefinitely large), temporally infinite (i.e., eternal), or most probably both; he may even have intended to denote it as spherical. However, qualitative indefiniteness was certainly not what he intended to express by this term.\r\n\r\nThe scholarly belief that Anaximander posited a qualitatively indefinite body as the principle is thus, at best, a speculative conjecture and, at worst, a confusion which has neither doxographical nor linguistic support and, moreover, strictly speaking, goes against our evidence. [introduction p. 229-231]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KFH07EnbKOSrtwC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":749,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"38","issue":"3","pages":"229-256"}},"sort":[1993]}
Title | Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 113 |
Pages | 1-29 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Athanasiadē, Polymnia Nik. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The theme of this paper is intolerance: its manifestation in late antiquity towards the pagans of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the immediate reactions and long-term attitudes that it provoked in them. The reasons why, in spite of copious evidence, the persecution of the traditional cults and their adepts in the Roman Empire has never been viewed as such are obvious: on the one hand, no pagan church emerged out of the turmoil to canonize its dead and expound a theology of martyrdom, and on the other, whatever their conscious religious beliefs, late antique scholars, in their overwhelming majority, were formed in societies whose ethical foundations and logic are irreversibly Christian. Admittedly, a few facets of this complex subject, such as the closing of the Athenian Academy and the demolition of temples or their conversion into churches, have occasionally been touched upon; but pagan persecution in itself, in all its physical, artistic, social, political, intellectual, and psychological dimensions, has not yet formed the object of scholarly research. To illustrate the pressures wrought by intolerance upon late antique society, I have chosen a period of one hundred years spanning the life, testimony, and initiatives of Damascius. In the 460s, Neoplatonism, as a fairly standardized expression of pagan piety, still formed—despite occasional persecution—a generally accepted way of thinking and living in the Eastern Mediterranean; moreover, as epitomized by Proclus and Athens, it was a recognizably Greek way. By 560, on the other hand, as a result of Justinian's decree prohibiting the official propagation of the doctrine in Athens, its exponents, after various vicissitudes, had ended up in a frontier town, where their philosophy had become contaminated by local forms of thought and worship and was on the way to losing its Graeco-Roman relevance. The interaction and the resulting changes in late antiquity of a sociological force—intolerance—and of a Weltanschauung—Neoplatonism—is a complex phenomenon in which causes and effects are never clearly defined. In an attempt at clarifying this development (which lies at the heart of the transformation of the ancient into the medieval world), I have in what follows set the focus of the action against two contrasting backgrounds. The first consists of a selective study of violence in Alexandria between the fourth and the sixth centuries; the second is represented by an equally impressionistic account of the evolution of Neoplatonism at Harran between the sixth and the tenth centuries and its increasing relevance to the world. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mXGv9inyCKfn393 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1002","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1002,"authors_free":[{"id":1507,"entry_id":1002,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":520,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Athanasiad\u0113, Polymnia Nik.","free_first_name":"Polymnia Nik.","free_last_name":"Athanasiad\u0113","norm_person":{"id":520,"first_name":"Polymnia Nik.","last_name":"Athanasiad\u0113","full_name":"Athanasiad\u0113, Polymnia Nik.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131721933","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius","main_title":{"title":"Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius"},"abstract":"The theme of this paper is intolerance: its manifestation in late antiquity towards the pagans of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the immediate reactions and long-term attitudes that it provoked in them. The reasons why, in spite of copious evidence, the persecution of the traditional cults and their adepts in the Roman Empire has never been viewed as such are obvious: on the one hand, no pagan church emerged out of the turmoil to canonize its dead and expound a theology of martyrdom, and on the other, whatever their conscious religious beliefs, late antique scholars, in their overwhelming majority, were formed in societies whose ethical foundations and logic are irreversibly Christian. Admittedly, a few facets of this complex subject, such as the closing of the Athenian Academy and the demolition of temples or their conversion into churches, have occasionally been touched upon; but pagan persecution in itself, in all its physical, artistic, social, political, intellectual, and psychological dimensions, has not yet formed the object of scholarly research.\r\n\r\nTo illustrate the pressures wrought by intolerance upon late antique society, I have chosen a period of one hundred years spanning the life, testimony, and initiatives of Damascius. In the 460s, Neoplatonism, as a fairly standardized expression of pagan piety, still formed\u2014despite occasional persecution\u2014a generally accepted way of thinking and living in the Eastern Mediterranean; moreover, as epitomized by Proclus and Athens, it was a recognizably Greek way. By 560, on the other hand, as a result of Justinian's decree prohibiting the official propagation of the doctrine in Athens, its exponents, after various vicissitudes, had ended up in a frontier town, where their philosophy had become contaminated by local forms of thought and worship and was on the way to losing its Graeco-Roman relevance. The interaction and the resulting changes in late antiquity of a sociological force\u2014intolerance\u2014and of a Weltanschauung\u2014Neoplatonism\u2014is a complex phenomenon in which causes and effects are never clearly defined.\r\n\r\nIn an attempt at clarifying this development (which lies at the heart of the transformation of the ancient into the medieval world), I have in what follows set the focus of the action against two contrasting backgrounds. The first consists of a selective study of violence in Alexandria between the fourth and the sixth centuries; the second is represented by an equally impressionistic account of the evolution of Neoplatonism at Harran between the sixth and the tenth centuries and its increasing relevance to the world. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mXGv9inyCKfn393","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":520,"full_name":"Athanasiad\u0113, Polymnia Nik.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1002,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"113","issue":"","pages":"1-29"}},"sort":[1993]}
Title | Review of: Tardieu 1990: Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore à Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Mnemosyne |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 572–575 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mansfeld, Jaap |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A learned book that reads like a novel. It contains fascinating new information on the late Neoplatonists. "Paysages reliques" refers to exceptionally rare landscapes or, rather, sites in an otherwise overwhelmingly Christianized world where pagan divinities are still present. In the first chapter, T. reconstructs the pilgrimage of Isidorus and Damascius to Bostra, and from Bostra to a site in Syria east of Gadara, where they believed the waters of Styx could be seen. These waters were still venerated by the local population in the old pagan way. Commenting on the fragments of Damascius' Life of Isidorus pertaining to this trip, T., among other things, shows in what ways the description of the numinous site was idealized and how it echoes descriptions in Homer, Plato, and others of similar entrances to the netherworld. In the second chapter, T. offers a marvelous history of navigation on the Tigris, from Assyrian times until just before World War II, by means of the so-called kālek, a wooden construction kept afloat by inflated animal skins (e.g., sheep skins). He does so because an absolutely unique reference to this means of transport is found in Simplicius’ In De Caelo 525.10–3 Heiberg, who, explaining a point made by Aristotle, tells us that inflated skins are capable of supporting heavy loads (... ?? ?pe?????? ?a? ??? ?at? t?? ????a? p?ta???). This is the Habur, a tributary of the Euphrates. In chapter 3, T. attempts to ferret out the implications of this statement. Several of the numerous sources of this river, mentioned by the elder Pliny and Aelianus, were believed to be sacred to the Syrian goddess and venerated by the local population; the Syrian goddess, in turn, was supposed to be the equivalent of Hera. T. also reproduces descriptions of these sites by later visitors who wrote in Arabic. In antiquity, travel on the Habur was possible by means of small kāleks. T. hypothesizes (without direct evidence) that Simplicius visited these sources for religious and philosophical reasons and that, in fact, his trip was a pilgrimage comparable to that of Isidorus and Damascius one century earlier. After his visit to the sources, Simplicius could have traveled downstream by kālek himself. T. argues (pp. 130 ff.) that this journey has nothing to do with the famous story of the sojourn of the seven philosophers in Persia after the closing of the Academy by Julian. He assumes that not the whole group of seven philosophers mentioned by Agathias (Hist. II c. 30–31 Keydell), but only Damascius, "métaphysicien globe-trotter au service du paganisme," went to Persia in 531, was received by the king of kings, and secured the inclusion of the famous clause in the peace treaty permitting pagan philosophers to live according to their own ways. T.’s argument seems to be that Agathias (our only source, however) was biased and that Simplicius would have mentioned the kāleks of the Tigris if he had made the journey downriver to the Persian capital himself. The sources of the Habur are three days by foot to the east of Harran (better known to classicists as Carrhae), an important city near the Persian frontier and perhaps the last stronghold of paganism in the Greco-Roman world. In a paper published in 1986, T. convincingly argued that the so-called Sabians of Harran, who were visited by al-Mas‘udi around 940 and whose main doctrine is described in a fragment of al-Kindi, were (Neo-)Platonists. He assumed that Harran was the safe haven granted to the philosophers after the treaty of 532 and that it was there, not in Athens, that Simplicius wrote his great commentaries on Aristotle. In a second paper published the following year, T. proved that of the four calendars mentioned in Simpl. In Phys. 875.19 ff. Diels, three were actually used simultaneously in Harran and only there, whereas the first listed (the Athenian) must have been observed in the Platonic school. In chapter 4 of the present book ("D'un commentaire à l'autre"), T. is able to add to the circumstantial evidence supporting the hypothesis that Simplicius lived and wrote in Harran after 532. First, at In Phys. 684.35 ff., he points out that many people crossed rivers using inflated animal skins, as indeed they did in the regions of the Habur and the Tigris (typically one skin per person). Secondly, at In Cat. 358.12 ff. Busse, his examples of compound nouns with a single meaning are Hierapolis and Agathodaimon; these are unparalleled elsewhere. T. plausibly argues (pp. 153 ff.) that the city in question is Hierapolis in Syria, two days by foot west of Harran. Agathodaimon is Hermes' divine teacher in the Corpus Hermeticum. T. points out (pp. 158 ff.) that the pagans of Harran, according to a fragment of al-Kindi, possessed Hermetic writings. Al-Sarahsi, who transmits this information, adds that they venerated Agathodaimon. Thirdly, a passage at In Phys. 641.33 ff. allows T. to argue that Simplicius refers here to a Hermetic identification of the Syrian goddess Atargatis with Isis. T.'s main argument, presented with admirable clarity, is on the whole convincing. That we are now much better informed about the ways in which Greek philosophy reached the Arabs is a major step forward. Yet one should keep in mind that nothing so far is known of a Neoplatonist school or tradition at Harran before Simplicius, and that there is a considerable gap between him and the Platonists visited by al-Mas‘udi several centuries later. Though continuity is plausible, evidence is lacking. Perhaps T. could have said more about Hermetism at Harran, which was presumably incorporated into Neoplatonism. M. Grignaschi has argued that what he calls a late Greek "epistolary novel" (5th century), containing an exchange of letters between Alexander and Aristotle, was amplified and revised by what he terms (on what appears to be thin evidence) a follower of Hermes who wrote in Arabic in the 7th–8th century at Harran. An investigation by a qualified Orientalist (why not T. himself?) into the relation between the traditions studied by Grignaschi and the facts unearthed by T. may produce surprising results—or so one surmises. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fu8N5kakur5o7NI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1010","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1010,"authors_free":[{"id":1524,"entry_id":1010,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":29,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","free_first_name":"Jaap","free_last_name":"Mansfeld","norm_person":{"id":29,"first_name":"Jaap","last_name":"Mansfeld","full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119383217","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Tardieu 1990: Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore \u00e0 Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Tardieu 1990: Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore \u00e0 Simplicius"},"abstract":"A learned book that reads like a novel. It contains fascinating new information on the late Neoplatonists. \"Paysages reliques\" refers to exceptionally rare landscapes or, rather, sites in an otherwise overwhelmingly Christianized world where pagan divinities are still present. In the first chapter, T. reconstructs the pilgrimage of Isidorus and Damascius to Bostra, and from Bostra to a site in Syria east of Gadara, where they believed the waters of Styx could be seen. These waters were still venerated by the local population in the old pagan way. Commenting on the fragments of Damascius' Life of Isidorus pertaining to this trip, T., among other things, shows in what ways the description of the numinous site was idealized and how it echoes descriptions in Homer, Plato, and others of similar entrances to the netherworld.\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter, T. offers a marvelous history of navigation on the Tigris, from Assyrian times until just before World War II, by means of the so-called k\u0101lek, a wooden construction kept afloat by inflated animal skins (e.g., sheep skins). He does so because an absolutely unique reference to this means of transport is found in Simplicius\u2019 In De Caelo 525.10\u20133 Heiberg, who, explaining a point made by Aristotle, tells us that inflated skins are capable of supporting heavy loads (... ?? ?pe?????? ?a? ??? ?at? t?? ????a? p?ta???). This is the Habur, a tributary of the Euphrates. In chapter 3, T. attempts to ferret out the implications of this statement. Several of the numerous sources of this river, mentioned by the elder Pliny and Aelianus, were believed to be sacred to the Syrian goddess and venerated by the local population; the Syrian goddess, in turn, was supposed to be the equivalent of Hera. T. also reproduces descriptions of these sites by later visitors who wrote in Arabic. In antiquity, travel on the Habur was possible by means of small k\u0101leks. T. hypothesizes (without direct evidence) that Simplicius visited these sources for religious and philosophical reasons and that, in fact, his trip was a pilgrimage comparable to that of Isidorus and Damascius one century earlier. After his visit to the sources, Simplicius could have traveled downstream by k\u0101lek himself.\r\n\r\nT. argues (pp. 130 ff.) that this journey has nothing to do with the famous story of the sojourn of the seven philosophers in Persia after the closing of the Academy by Julian. He assumes that not the whole group of seven philosophers mentioned by Agathias (Hist. II c. 30\u201331 Keydell), but only Damascius, \"m\u00e9taphysicien globe-trotter au service du paganisme,\" went to Persia in 531, was received by the king of kings, and secured the inclusion of the famous clause in the peace treaty permitting pagan philosophers to live according to their own ways. T.\u2019s argument seems to be that Agathias (our only source, however) was biased and that Simplicius would have mentioned the k\u0101leks of the Tigris if he had made the journey downriver to the Persian capital himself.\r\n\r\nThe sources of the Habur are three days by foot to the east of Harran (better known to classicists as Carrhae), an important city near the Persian frontier and perhaps the last stronghold of paganism in the Greco-Roman world. In a paper published in 1986, T. convincingly argued that the so-called Sabians of Harran, who were visited by al-Mas\u2018udi around 940 and whose main doctrine is described in a fragment of al-Kindi, were (Neo-)Platonists. He assumed that Harran was the safe haven granted to the philosophers after the treaty of 532 and that it was there, not in Athens, that Simplicius wrote his great commentaries on Aristotle. In a second paper published the following year, T. proved that of the four calendars mentioned in Simpl. In Phys. 875.19 ff. Diels, three were actually used simultaneously in Harran and only there, whereas the first listed (the Athenian) must have been observed in the Platonic school.\r\n\r\nIn chapter 4 of the present book (\"D'un commentaire \u00e0 l'autre\"), T. is able to add to the circumstantial evidence supporting the hypothesis that Simplicius lived and wrote in Harran after 532. First, at In Phys. 684.35 ff., he points out that many people crossed rivers using inflated animal skins, as indeed they did in the regions of the Habur and the Tigris (typically one skin per person). Secondly, at In Cat. 358.12 ff. Busse, his examples of compound nouns with a single meaning are Hierapolis and Agathodaimon; these are unparalleled elsewhere. T. plausibly argues (pp. 153 ff.) that the city in question is Hierapolis in Syria, two days by foot west of Harran. Agathodaimon is Hermes' divine teacher in the Corpus Hermeticum. T. points out (pp. 158 ff.) that the pagans of Harran, according to a fragment of al-Kindi, possessed Hermetic writings. Al-Sarahsi, who transmits this information, adds that they venerated Agathodaimon. Thirdly, a passage at In Phys. 641.33 ff. allows T. to argue that Simplicius refers here to a Hermetic identification of the Syrian goddess Atargatis with Isis.\r\n\r\nT.'s main argument, presented with admirable clarity, is on the whole convincing. That we are now much better informed about the ways in which Greek philosophy reached the Arabs is a major step forward. Yet one should keep in mind that nothing so far is known of a Neoplatonist school or tradition at Harran before Simplicius, and that there is a considerable gap between him and the Platonists visited by al-Mas\u2018udi several centuries later. Though continuity is plausible, evidence is lacking. Perhaps T. could have said more about Hermetism at Harran, which was presumably incorporated into Neoplatonism. M. Grignaschi has argued that what he calls a late Greek \"epistolary novel\" (5th century), containing an exchange of letters between Alexander and Aristotle, was amplified and revised by what he terms (on what appears to be thin evidence) a follower of Hermes who wrote in Arabic in the 7th\u20138th century at Harran. An investigation by a qualified Orientalist (why not T. himself?) into the relation between the traditions studied by Grignaschi and the facts unearthed by T. may produce surprising results\u2014or so one surmises. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fu8N5kakur5o7NI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":29,"full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1010,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne","volume":"46","issue":"4","pages":"572\u2013575"}},"sort":[1993]}
Title | Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Harvard Studies in Classical Philology |
Volume | 95 |
Pages | 367-407 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Asztalos, Monika |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Gradually, Boethius has been disrobed and divested of many titles to fame in the history of philosophy. It all began with Bidez, a great admirer of Porphyry, who judged Boethius severely: Boethius took almost everything in the Commentarii Categorias (CC) from Porphyry, and Porphyry gained nothing in the process. Shiel showed that Porphyry was by no means the only Greek commentator who had left his imprint on the CC, but this did not help much, since he also claimed that Boethius had not read a complete Greek commentary, not even the short Kleine Prolegomena (K.p.). Finally, the interpretations of two passages in De Interpretatione 2 given by Shiel and Chadwick respectively led John Dillon to conclude that Boethius tried to cover up his lack of familiarity with the primary sources. This made Boethius not only unoriginal and ill-read but, on top of it, dishonest. I am not trying to do the impossible—namely, present Boethius as an expert on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. And I am not in a position to judge whether or not Boethius displays real originality in his later, more mature works. But I think it would be unfair to expect novel interpretations in commentaries like the Isagoge 1 and CC, which, if my assumptions in the first sections of this paper are correct, are not only the earliest of Boethius' works on Greek philosophy but also the context in which he first encountered Aristotle. He seems to have come quite unprepared to both the Isagoge and the Categories, unarmed with proper translations and unfamiliar with the work he was commenting on. Boethius is indeed an epitome of the expression docendo discimus ("we learn by teaching"). [conclusion p. 405-407] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qf1EQ49UxPsJC4F |
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Title | Alexandria as a Center of Greek Philosophy in Later Classical Antiquity |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Illinois Classical Studies |
Volume | 18 |
Pages | 307-325 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Any discussion of Greek Alexandria may properly take its starting point from the work of P. M. Fraser, even if only to dissent from it. In the preface to Ptolemaic Alexandria Fraser observes that philosophy was one of the “items” that “were not effectively transplanted to Alexandria.”1 In his chapter on philosophy, talking of the establishment of the main philosophical schools at Athens, Fraser writes that it “remained the centre of philosophical studies down to the closing of the schools by Justinian in A.D. 563.”2 The first of these statements is near enough the truth, since the Alexandria of the Ptolemies was not distinguished in philosophy as ifwas in literature or science, though even then some important things happened during that period too. But the implication that this situation continued during the Roman and early Byzantine periods is misleading, and by the end of the period simply false.3 The purpose of this paper is to examine some aspects of the considerable contribution that Alexandria made to the philosophical tradition that continued into the Islamic and Christian middle ages and beyond, and to show that it may lay claim to have been at least equal to that of Athens itself. [Introduction, p. 307] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MGb8ujHWfXvghPD |
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Title | Review: Urmson, trans. Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5,10-14 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Canadian Philosophical Reviews |
Volume | 13 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 277-279 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Keyser, Paul T. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
J. O. Urmson, trans. Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5, 10-14. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992. Pp. 225,US $47.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2817-3).This latest addition to the series of translations of Late Antique philosophy edited by Sorabji is a companion to Urmson’s translation of Simplicius’ Corollaries on Place and Time and so includes only Simplicius on Aristotle on Place and Time. Thus, an important gap, Simplicius on Aristotle’s Physics 4.6-9 (the void), which one hopes will soon be filled. Urmson departs rarely and moderately from the text of H. Diels CAG 9 (1882) and supplies few notes (some by Sorabji), in keeping with the aim of the series to make the philoso phy accessible in a modem language (191-200). A brief bibliography (188-90) is provided, an English-Greek glossary (201-3), and a more useful Greek-Eng- lish glossary and index (204-220), though unfonmately the Greek is tran scribed. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/98eQM267fD6P4f9 |
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Title | Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique néoplatonicien : les préfaces descommentaires sur les Catégories |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | Revue de théologie et de philosophie |
Volume | 124 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 407–425 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Cet article représente une contribution de plus à ma critique générale des thèses de Praechter selon lesquelles l'école néoplatonicienne dite «d'Alexandrie» se distinguerait, non seulement par le lieu de son enseignement, de celle dite «d'Athènes», mais encore et surtout par ses doctrines philosophiques et par son attitude envers T œuvre d'Aristote. La comparaison entre elles des préfaces des cinq commentaires néoplatoniciens des Catégories d'Aristote. dont l'un, celui de Simplicius, appartiendrait, selon Praechter, à l'école d'Athènes, et ceux des quatre autres à l'école d'Alexandrie, fait apparaître la concordance fondamentale de la philosophie néoplatonicienne qui était enseignée à Athènes avec celle qui était enseignée à Alexandrie: toutes deux interprètent la philosophie d'Aristote dans la même perspective néoplatonicienne et la même volonté d'harmoniser Platon et Aristote. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7tyvPpwgQ6rj4sJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"668","_score":null,"_source":{"id":668,"authors_free":[{"id":979,"entry_id":668,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique n\u00e9oplatonicien : les pr\u00e9faces descommentaires sur les Cat\u00e9gories","main_title":{"title":"Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique n\u00e9oplatonicien : les pr\u00e9faces descommentaires sur les Cat\u00e9gories"},"abstract":"Cet article repr\u00e9sente une contribution de plus \u00e0 ma critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des th\u00e8ses de Praechter selon lesquelles l'\u00e9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne dite \u00abd'Alexandrie\u00bb se distinguerait, non seulement par le lieu de son enseignement, de celle dite \u00abd'Ath\u00e8nes\u00bb, mais encore et surtout par ses\r\ndoctrines philosophiques et par son attitude envers T \u0153uvre d'Aristote. La comparaison entre elles des pr\u00e9faces des cinq commentaires n\u00e9oplatoniciens des Cat\u00e9gories d'Aristote. dont l'un, celui de Simplicius, appartiendrait, selon Praechter, \u00e0 l'\u00e9cole d'Ath\u00e8nes, et ceux des quatre autres \u00e0 l'\u00e9cole d'Alexandrie, fait appara\u00eetre la concordance fondamentale de la philosophie n\u00e9oplatonicienne qui \u00e9tait enseign\u00e9e \u00e0 Ath\u00e8nes avec celle qui \u00e9tait enseign\u00e9e \u00e0 Alexandrie: toutes deux interpr\u00e8tent la philosophie d'Aristote dans la m\u00eame perspective n\u00e9oplatonicienne et la m\u00eame volont\u00e9 d'harmoniser Platon et Aristote. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7tyvPpwgQ6rj4sJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":668,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de th\u00e9ologie et de philosophie","volume":"124","issue":"4","pages":"407\u2013425"}},"sort":[1992]}
Title | Epictetus, "Encheiridion" 27 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 473-481 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Boter, Gerard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
"Obscuras et dubius locus," is Wolf's comment on chapter 27 of Epictetus' Encheiridion, and rightly so. The comparison employed by Epictetus in this chapter has been interpreted in several different ways, none of which, however, is entirely or even approximately satisfactory. The statement made by Epictetus is rather plain in itself: evil has no autonomous natural existence in the world, and one can hardly doubt that Simplicius is correct in his contention that good is a ὑπόστασις, whereas evil is a παρυπόστασις, i.e., something which exists only as a counterpart of good but has no independent existence of its own. The problem lies in the comparison: in which way can the statement σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται be applied to the notion that ἡ φύσις κακοῦ does not exist in the cosmos? Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the part of the Diatribes from which Arrianus took Ench. 27 is not extant, so that we cannot tell whether Epictetus gave a fuller exposition of the comparison. Before discussing a number of interpretations proposed by commentators, ancient and modern, I would like to stress that in principle, preference should be given to an interpretation that stays as close to the text as possible (i.e., one that does not have to adduce notions which are not expressed explicitly), and in which the parallelism between image and application is seen most directly. [introduction p. 473-474] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/eKcNERBrRo5RK9q |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1074","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1074,"authors_free":[{"id":1628,"entry_id":1074,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":15,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Boter, Gerard","free_first_name":"Gerard","free_last_name":"Boter","norm_person":{"id":15,"first_name":"Gerard ","last_name":"Boter","full_name":"Boter, Gerard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1089766114","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Epictetus, \"Encheiridion\" 27","main_title":{"title":"Epictetus, \"Encheiridion\" 27"},"abstract":"\"Obscuras et dubius locus,\" is Wolf's comment on chapter 27 of Epictetus' Encheiridion, and rightly so. The comparison employed by Epictetus in this chapter has been interpreted in several different ways, none of which, however, is entirely or even approximately satisfactory. The statement made by Epictetus is rather plain in itself: evil has no autonomous natural existence in the world, and one can hardly doubt that Simplicius is correct in his contention that good is a \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, whereas evil is a \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c5\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, i.e., something which exists only as a counterpart of good but has no independent existence of its own.\r\n\r\nThe problem lies in the comparison: in which way can the statement \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 be applied to the notion that \u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 does not exist in the cosmos? Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the part of the Diatribes from which Arrianus took Ench. 27 is not extant, so that we cannot tell whether Epictetus gave a fuller exposition of the comparison.\r\n\r\nBefore discussing a number of interpretations proposed by commentators, ancient and modern, I would like to stress that in principle, preference should be given to an interpretation that stays as close to the text as possible (i.e., one that does not have to adduce notions which are not expressed explicitly), and in which the parallelism between image and application is seen most directly. [introduction p. 473-474]","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/eKcNERBrRo5RK9q","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":15,"full_name":"Boter, Gerard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1074,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"45","issue":"4","pages":"473-481"}},"sort":[1992]}
Title | Where was Simplicius? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 112 |
Pages | 143 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Foulkes, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987, reviewed in JHS cx [1990] 244–45), the editor, Mme I. Hadot, in the first part of the biographical introduction, cites Agathias Hist. ii 31.4. This is usually taken to show that the Neoplatonists, who had fled to the Persian court when Justinian closed down the Academy in 529, went back to Athens after 532. That view, she holds, rests on a misreading of the text. However, she herself misconstrues kath’ heautous as "selon leur choix": that is, on returning from exile to their own accustomed places, these men should henceforth live without fear as they might choose. To yield that version, the Greek would have to be kath’ autous. The actual expression means "amongst themselves": they might philosophize, but not in public.
That a touch of private heterodoxy amongst the learned few is harmless if it does not stir up the ignorant many was well understood, indeed explicitly so later, in Islam and medieval Christianity.
Where, then, did the returned exiles settle? We do not know. That the Persian king sought to ensure protection for them in their previous habitat neither shows nor refutes that they went back there or to any other nameable place.
Mme Hadot certainly cannot well enlist M. Tardieu’s inference, in the second part of the introduction, from Simplicius on the four calendars (Comm. in Arist. Graeca x 875.19–22). Simplicius there states that "we |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YllEyDkwMYgJ7Wa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"901","_score":null,"_source":{"id":901,"authors_free":[{"id":1330,"entry_id":901,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":121,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Foulkes, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Foulkes","norm_person":{"id":121,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Foulkes","full_name":"Foulkes, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/127222294","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Where was Simplicius?","main_title":{"title":"Where was Simplicius?"},"abstract":"In Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987, reviewed in JHS cx [1990] 244\u201345), the editor, Mme I. Hadot, in the first part of the biographical introduction, cites Agathias Hist. ii 31.4. This is usually taken to show that the Neoplatonists, who had fled to the Persian court when Justinian closed down the Academy in 529, went back to Athens after 532. That view, she holds, rests on a misreading of the text. However, she herself misconstrues kath\u2019 heautous as \"selon leur choix\": that is, on returning from exile to their own accustomed places, these men should henceforth live without fear as they might choose. To yield that version, the Greek would have to be kath\u2019 autous. The actual expression means \"amongst themselves\": they might philosophize, but not in public.\r\n\r\nThat a touch of private heterodoxy amongst the learned few is harmless if it does not stir up the ignorant many was well understood, indeed explicitly so later, in Islam and medieval Christianity.\r\n\r\nWhere, then, did the returned exiles settle? We do not know. That the Persian king sought to ensure protection for them in their previous habitat neither shows nor refutes that they went back there or to any other nameable place.\r\n\r\nMme Hadot certainly cannot well enlist M. Tardieu\u2019s inference, in the second part of the introduction, from Simplicius on the four calendars (Comm. in Arist. Graeca x 875.19\u201322). Simplicius there states that \"we <humans> posit the beginning of the year\" (h\u00eameis de h\u00eameras poioumetha arch\u00eas eniautou) to fall at four times, namely the summer solstice, as at Athens; the autumnal equinox, as in the then province of Asia; the winter solstice, as with the Romans; or the vernal equinox, as with the Arabs and Damascenes.\r\n\r\nIn context, Simplicius here contrasts beginnings that are natural (physei) and imposed (thesei). Adding the sentence before and after the one on the four types of year, the passage runs thus: \"As regards time, flow, or becoming, the natural beginning comes first. We ourselves put the beginning of the year at (1) or (2) or (3) or (4). Likewise, those who say that a month begins at full moon or new moon will be imposing this.\" The passage figures in his comments on Arist. Ph. 226b34\u2013227a10, on consecutiveness.\r\n\r\nSimplicius never says that all four types of year were in use at one place, nor does his text imply it. Of the two solstitial years, Academics would use the summer one from tradition, while the winter one is Roman imperial. The equinoctial years were used in the areas stated.\r\n\r\nIf the equinoctial and Roman calendars existed together in some place where the Neoplatonists did settle, then in that place there must have been four calendars. Clearly, though, the reverse inference is invalid: that the four calendars co-existed does not prove the presence of Neoplatonists. The Athenian calendar may have existed there for other reasons: its being there is necessary, but not sufficient, for the Neoplatonists\u2019 presence.\r\n\r\nAs to Harran (Carrhae), which Tardieu argues is where Simplicius settled, Arab sources confirm that the equinoctial calendars and the Roman one did exist there. We have no independent evidence that the Athenian one did. We have only Simplicius\u2019 statement, if he was at Harran. That, however, is precisely what must be established. To cite the four-calendar passage as proof that he was, begs the question and ignores the context.\r\n\r\nWhere Simplicius wrote his commentaries thus remains unclear, for lack of evidence. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YllEyDkwMYgJ7Wa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":121,"full_name":"Foulkes, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":901,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"112","issue":"","pages":"143"}},"sort":[1992]}
Title | Review of Stevens: Postérité de l'être: Simplicius interprète de Parménide |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 454 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wright, M.R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The Review: Stevens sets out to clarify Parmenides' philosophy with an analysis of Simplicius' presentation of his fragments and the related contextual exposition. This is a complex task, for twelve centuries separate Simplicius from the Presocratics, and, although generous beyond his needs in the length of Eleatic quotation, Simplicius is only too ready to enlist Parmenides as an earlier witness to the Platonic and Neoplatonic interpretations that pervade his commentary on Aristotelian texts. A further complication is that the order imposed by Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo is at variance with the sequence of Eleatic argument. S.'s cahier is much too brief for the subject matter involved. He has one chapter each on Parmenides' Aletheia and Doxa, sandwiched between a brief introduction and conclusion. There is an Appendix, more than half the length of what has preceded, which consists of a translation into French (without the Greek text but with some annotation) of relevant sections from Simplicius' Phys. 28-180, 243-244, and DC 556-560. An Index of the fragments of Parmenides cited in these two works is added, along with a short bibliography. Interspersed in the text are tables giving Greek words from Simplicius, their French translation, and a brief justification. The point of these is obscure, and, since they are hard to follow in the absence of a continuous text, the result may appear arbitrary, e.g., τελέον at Phys. 29.10 as "parfait," τέλος in the next line as "accomplissement," but τέλειον further down as "fin." Translation of Eleatic texts in general looks easier in French than English, with "il" conveniently ambiguous for Greek masculine, neuter, or impersonal subjects, and "l’Etant" and "l’être" (with and without capitals) for ontological terminology. The main problem with S.'s study is the level of scholarship involved and consequently the readership targeted. There are a number of ways of tackling the subject, none of which S. holds to consistently. One is a straightforward introduction to reading Parmenides' lines in their Simplicius context, and sometimes S. is writing in this way. The first chapter, for example, starts with a straightforward narrative of the "signs" for the Aletheia, and the second with the usual listing of different views on the status of the Doxa. Simplicius' position on both these topics is given, but without any explanation of the Neoplatonic terms (like "Étante-Un") that are used. Secondly, there is a scholarly monograph struggling to emerge. The reader can suddenly be involved in a sophisticated comparison of Parmenides' concept of τελέον with ἄπειρον in Melissus, or in textual exegesis, or in studying the relevance of the first two hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides, or the exact meaning of ἀπατήλων in B 8.52. But thirdly, what is needed, as S. indicates in the subtitle, is a full and detailed discussion of Simplicius as an interpreter of Parmenides. This could usefully tackle Simplicius' reasons for finding Parmenides compatible with both Plato and Aristotle, the particular readings (or re-readings) of all four ancient authors that might be involved in the exercise, what traps might thereby be set in the path of those who are tracking the original Parmenides, and what implications would then arise for Simplicius' treatment of other Presocratics. All this is yet to be done. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6R2tnf8PGMB9Dbj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"421","_score":null,"_source":{"id":421,"authors_free":[{"id":564,"entry_id":421,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":365,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wright, M.R.","free_first_name":"M.R.","free_last_name":"Wright","norm_person":{"id":365,"first_name":"M. R.","last_name":"Wright","full_name":"Wright, M. R.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174111304","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00eatre: Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide","main_title":{"title":"Review of Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00eatre: Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide"},"abstract":"The Review: Stevens sets out to clarify Parmenides' philosophy with an analysis of Simplicius' presentation of his fragments and the related contextual exposition. This is a complex task, for twelve centuries separate Simplicius from the Presocratics, and, although generous beyond his needs in the length of Eleatic quotation, Simplicius is only too ready to enlist Parmenides as an earlier witness to the Platonic and Neoplatonic interpretations that pervade his commentary on Aristotelian texts.\r\n\r\nA further complication is that the order imposed by Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo is at variance with the sequence of Eleatic argument. S.'s cahier is much too brief for the subject matter involved. He has one chapter each on Parmenides' Aletheia and Doxa, sandwiched between a brief introduction and conclusion. There is an Appendix, more than half the length of what has preceded, which consists of a translation into French (without the Greek text but with some annotation) of relevant sections from Simplicius' Phys. 28-180, 243-244, and DC 556-560. An Index of the fragments of Parmenides cited in these two works is added, along with a short bibliography. Interspersed in the text are tables giving Greek words from Simplicius, their French translation, and a brief justification. The point of these is obscure, and, since they are hard to follow in the absence of a continuous text, the result may appear arbitrary, e.g., \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd at Phys. 29.10 as \"parfait,\" \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 in the next line as \"accomplissement,\" but \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd further down as \"fin.\"\r\n\r\nTranslation of Eleatic texts in general looks easier in French than English, with \"il\" conveniently ambiguous for Greek masculine, neuter, or impersonal subjects, and \"l\u2019Etant\" and \"l\u2019\u00eatre\" (with and without capitals) for ontological terminology.\r\n\r\nThe main problem with S.'s study is the level of scholarship involved and consequently the readership targeted. There are a number of ways of tackling the subject, none of which S. holds to consistently. One is a straightforward introduction to reading Parmenides' lines in their Simplicius context, and sometimes S. is writing in this way. The first chapter, for example, starts with a straightforward narrative of the \"signs\" for the Aletheia, and the second with the usual listing of different views on the status of the Doxa. Simplicius' position on both these topics is given, but without any explanation of the Neoplatonic terms (like \"\u00c9tante-Un\") that are used.\r\n\r\nSecondly, there is a scholarly monograph struggling to emerge. The reader can suddenly be involved in a sophisticated comparison of Parmenides' concept of \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd with \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd in Melissus, or in textual exegesis, or in studying the relevance of the first two hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides, or the exact meaning of \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd in B 8.52. But thirdly, what is needed, as S. indicates in the subtitle, is a full and detailed discussion of Simplicius as an interpreter of Parmenides. This could usefully tackle Simplicius' reasons for finding Parmenides compatible with both Plato and Aristotle, the particular readings (or re-readings) of all four ancient authors that might be involved in the exercise, what traps might thereby be set in the path of those who are tracking the original Parmenides, and what implications would then arise for Simplicius' treatment of other Presocratics. All this is yet to be done.","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6R2tnf8PGMB9Dbj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":365,"full_name":"Wright, M. R.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":421,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"42","issue":"2","pages":"454"}},"sort":[1992]}
Title | Simplicio, Isnardi, la logica e il contesto |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Rivista di storia della filosofia |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 737-751 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mignucci, Mario |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Mi sia consentita un’ultima osservazione prima di concludere. M.I.P. ritiene che non ci sia ombra di dubbio sul fatto che i dogmatici menzionati nel passo di Sesto siano gli Stoici. Nel mio lavoro ero molto più cauto e devo dire che lo sono ancora, dato che l’argomento terminologico addotto da M.I.P. in favore dell’identificazione è tutt’altro che convincente. Dalla semplice presenza di espressioni quali pros ti pôs echonta e hyparxis non si può inferire che il contenuto delle proposizioni in cui compaiono sia da attribuire agli Stoici. Ciò non tanto perché non è escluso che queste espressioni si trovassero già nella letteratura precedente, ma perché ai tempi di Sesto esse erano probabilmente entrate nella koine terminologica delle scuole e costituivano un patrimonio comune del linguaggio della filosofia. In effetti, Sesto non esita in [a] ad usare la contrapposizione stoica mentale-esistente per esprimere la sua tesi sulla natura della dimostrazione, una tesi che nessuno Stoico avrebbe potuto condividere. La stessa definizione di relativo attribuita da Sesto ai dogmatici potrebbe essere stata una versione della definizione peripatetica più o meno accettata da tutti. Quello che forse fa pensare che i dogmatici siano gli Stoici è che l’argomentazione di Sesto contro la dimostrazione di cui il passo che stiamo discutendo è una parte sembra essere prevalentemente diretta contro questa scuola. Ma anche se riconosciamo che i dogmatici in questione sono gli Stoici, ben poco si può ricavare dal testo di Sesto e non certo tutto quello che M.I.P. crede di scorgervi. Che cosa devo dire a conclusione? M.I.P. è una seria e profonda studiosa della filosofia antica. Dai suoi libri ho imparato moltissimo e le sono sinceramente grato per quei tesori di sapere che ella vi ha profuso e dei quali io e molti altri abbiamo potuto approfittare. Come tutti gli studiosi che lavorano e si impegnano attivamente nella ricerca, ella commette talvolta errori interpretativi. Perché si ostina a difenderli quando sono insostenibili? [conclusion p. 750-751] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YEvGYWS60aSUdHT |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"619","_score":null,"_source":{"id":619,"authors_free":[{"id":875,"entry_id":619,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":259,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mignucci, Mario","free_first_name":"Mario","free_last_name":"Mignucci","norm_person":{"id":259,"first_name":"Mignucci","last_name":"Mario","full_name":"Mignucci, Mario","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1194188885","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicio, Isnardi, la logica e il contesto","main_title":{"title":"Simplicio, Isnardi, la logica e il contesto"},"abstract":"Mi sia consentita un\u2019ultima osservazione prima di concludere. M.I.P. ritiene che non ci sia ombra di dubbio sul fatto che i dogmatici menzionati nel passo di Sesto siano gli Stoici. Nel mio lavoro ero molto pi\u00f9 cauto e devo dire che lo sono ancora, dato che l\u2019argomento terminologico addotto da M.I.P. in favore dell\u2019identificazione \u00e8 tutt\u2019altro che convincente.\r\n\r\nDalla semplice presenza di espressioni quali pros ti p\u00f4s echonta e hyparxis non si pu\u00f2 inferire che il contenuto delle proposizioni in cui compaiono sia da attribuire agli Stoici. Ci\u00f2 non tanto perch\u00e9 non \u00e8 escluso che queste espressioni si trovassero gi\u00e0 nella letteratura precedente, ma perch\u00e9 ai tempi di Sesto esse erano probabilmente entrate nella koine terminologica delle scuole e costituivano un patrimonio comune del linguaggio della filosofia.\r\n\r\nIn effetti, Sesto non esita in [a] ad usare la contrapposizione stoica mentale-esistente per esprimere la sua tesi sulla natura della dimostrazione, una tesi che nessuno Stoico avrebbe potuto condividere. La stessa definizione di relativo attribuita da Sesto ai dogmatici potrebbe essere stata una versione della definizione peripatetica pi\u00f9 o meno accettata da tutti.\r\n\r\nQuello che forse fa pensare che i dogmatici siano gli Stoici \u00e8 che l\u2019argomentazione di Sesto contro la dimostrazione di cui il passo che stiamo discutendo \u00e8 una parte sembra essere prevalentemente diretta contro questa scuola. Ma anche se riconosciamo che i dogmatici in questione sono gli Stoici, ben poco si pu\u00f2 ricavare dal testo di Sesto e non certo tutto quello che M.I.P. crede di scorgervi.\r\n\r\nChe cosa devo dire a conclusione? M.I.P. \u00e8 una seria e profonda studiosa della filosofia antica. Dai suoi libri ho imparato moltissimo e le sono sinceramente grato per quei tesori di sapere che ella vi ha profuso e dei quali io e molti altri abbiamo potuto approfittare. Come tutti gli studiosi che lavorano e si impegnano attivamente nella ricerca, ella commette talvolta errori interpretativi. Perch\u00e9 si ostina a difenderli quando sono insostenibili? [conclusion p. 750-751]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YEvGYWS60aSUdHT","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":259,"full_name":"Mignucci, Mario","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":619,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista di storia della filosofia","volume":"46","issue":"4","pages":"737-751"}},"sort":[1991]}
Title | Platon et Plotin sur la doctrine des parties de l'autre |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 181 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 501-512 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
La matière est-elle identique à V alterile ? » Plotin se pose cette question au commencement du dernier chapitre de son traité Sur la matière (Enn., II 4 [12] 16). « Plutôt non », répond-il. « Elle est en revanche identique à cette partie de Valtérité qui s'oppose aux êtres proprement dits. » En s'exprimant de la sorte, Plotin fait allusion à un passage du Sophiste (258 E 2-3). Son allusion suppose pourtant l'existence d'un texte qui n'est pas attesté dans les manuscrits. Cette différence textuelle implique un changement fonda- mental de doctrine, dont les éditeurs modernes ne se sont pas avisés. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pBX2hcvJiK520pk |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"418","_score":null,"_source":{"id":418,"authors_free":[{"id":558,"entry_id":418,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Platon et Plotin sur la doctrine des parties de l'autre","main_title":{"title":"Platon et Plotin sur la doctrine des parties de l'autre"},"abstract":"La mati\u00e8re est-elle identique \u00e0 V alterile ? \u00bb Plotin se pose cette question au commencement du dernier chapitre de son trait\u00e9 Sur la mati\u00e8re (Enn., II 4 [12] 16). \u00ab Plut\u00f4t non \u00bb, r\u00e9pond-il. \u00ab Elle est en revanche identique \u00e0 cette partie de Valt\u00e9rit\u00e9 qui s'oppose aux \u00eatres proprement dits. \u00bb En s'exprimant de la sorte, Plotin fait allusion \u00e0 un passage du Sophiste (258 E 2-3). Son allusion suppose pourtant l'existence d'un texte qui n'est pas attest\u00e9 dans les manuscrits. Cette diff\u00e9rence textuelle implique un changement fonda- mental de doctrine, dont les \u00e9diteurs modernes ne se sont pas avis\u00e9s. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pBX2hcvJiK520pk","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":418,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"181","issue":"4","pages":"501-512"}},"sort":[1991]}
Title | A propos de la biographie de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Revue philosophique de Louvain |
Volume | 83 |
Pages | 506-514 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Van Riet, Simone |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Known for his adherence to the Neoplatonic School of Athens, Simplicius represents the intellectual lineage that blended Plotinus' metaphysics with oriental mysteries and rites, tracing its roots back to the ancient Platonic Academy. His journey also intersects with the evolution of philosophy in Alexandria, known for its leanings towards natural studies and empirical sciences. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, Simplicius lacks a dedicated biographer, necessitating careful historical reconstruction of his life. A notable event in his life was the closure of the Neoplatonic School of Athens in 529, pushing Simplicius and others to Persia, only to face disappointment and eventual return due to a peace treaty. While his commentaries on Aristotle's treatises form the main body of his works, this study argues for a deeper recognition of Simplicius and his fellow Aristotelian commentators as distinctive thinkers in the history of philosophy, whose biographies merit thorough exploration. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8nsFoCQv5aHc85J |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"452","_score":null,"_source":{"id":452,"authors_free":[{"id":608,"entry_id":452,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":382,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Van Riet, Simone","free_first_name":"Simone","free_last_name":"Van Riet","norm_person":{"id":382,"first_name":"Simone","last_name":"Van Riet","full_name":"Van Riet, Simone","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119525887","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A propos de la biographie de Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"A propos de la biographie de Simplicius"},"abstract":"Known for his adherence to the Neoplatonic School of Athens, Simplicius represents the intellectual lineage that blended Plotinus' metaphysics with oriental mysteries and rites, tracing its roots back to the ancient Platonic Academy. His journey also intersects with the evolution of philosophy in Alexandria, known for its leanings towards natural studies and empirical sciences. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, Simplicius lacks a dedicated biographer, necessitating careful historical reconstruction of his life. A notable event in his life was the closure of the Neoplatonic School of Athens in 529, pushing Simplicius and others to Persia, only to face disappointment and eventual return due to a peace treaty. While his commentaries on Aristotle's treatises form the main body of his works, this study argues for a deeper recognition of Simplicius and his fellow Aristotelian commentators as distinctive thinkers in the history of philosophy, whose biographies merit thorough exploration. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8nsFoCQv5aHc85J","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":382,"full_name":"Van Riet, Simone","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":452,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue philosophique de Louvain","volume":"83","issue":"","pages":"506-514"}},"sort":[1991]}
Title | Den Autoren über die Schulter geschaut. Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik |
Volume | 87 |
Pages | 11–33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dorandi, Tiziano |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Fassen wir die Ergebnisse unserer Überlegungen noch einmal zusammen: Man darf annehmen, dass die Abfassung eines antiken literarischen Werkes zumindest zwei Phasen durchlief (von denen die erste komplexer und nicht immer bei allen Autoren gleichartig war). 1a. Die erste Phase konnte in der Ausarbeitung von Konzepten bestehen, denen eine Sammlung von Exzerpten vorausgegangen sein mochte, welche aus kurzen Notizen bestanden, die wahrscheinlich auf Wachs- bzw. Holztäfelchen (pugillares) geschrieben waren. 1b. Sie konnte auch in der Anfertigung von ὑπομνηματικά (hypomnêmatika) bestehen, der provisorischen Fassung eines Buches, wobei das Rohmaterial größtenteils überarbeitet und geordnet war, aber noch nicht die letzte stilistische Verfeinerung erhalten hatte. Es folgte die endgültige Redaktion, die Reinschrift des Werkes (ὑπόμνημα (hypomnêma), σύνταγμα (syntagma) usw.), welche meist die tatsächliche ἔκδοσις (ekdosis) einleitete. Unter ἔκδοσις (ekdosis) verstehe ich, im Anschluss an van Groningen, die Ausarbeitung eines Werkes, die ein Schriftsteller als abgeschlossen ansah und mit allen Risiken herausgab (ἐκδιδόναι (ekdidonai)), die eine Veröffentlichung mit sich brachte, da die antike Gesellschaft ja kein Urheberrecht im modernen Sinne kannte. Die von mir untersuchten und angeführten Zeugnisse bezogen sich vor allem auf Prosaschriften enzyklopädischen (Plinius) oder philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen Charakters (Philodem, die Aristoteleskommentatoren, Galen); freilich scheinen im Bereich der Dichtung das Beispiel des Vergil und des Horaz sowie die Papyri eine ähnliche Arbeitsweise zu bestätigen. Meine Beobachtungen können und dürfen nicht verallgemeinert werden: Es läge meinen Absichten fern, ein und dieselbe, allen Autoren und literarischen Gattungen gemeinsame, in der gesamten Geschichte der griechischen und lateinischen Literatur gleichartige Arbeitsweise zu postulieren.[conclusion p. 32-33] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/gaYJZl79ZT9HzlR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"472","_score":null,"_source":{"id":472,"authors_free":[{"id":637,"entry_id":472,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":66,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dorandi, Tiziano ","free_first_name":"Tiziano ","free_last_name":"Dorandi","norm_person":{"id":66,"first_name":"Tiziano ","last_name":"Dorandi","full_name":"Dorandi, Tiziano ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139071954","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Den Autoren \u00fcber die Schulter geschaut. Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern","main_title":{"title":"Den Autoren \u00fcber die Schulter geschaut. Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern"},"abstract":"Fassen wir die Ergebnisse unserer \u00dcberlegungen noch einmal zusammen: Man darf annehmen, dass die Abfassung eines antiken literarischen Werkes zumindest zwei Phasen durchlief (von denen die erste komplexer und nicht immer bei allen Autoren gleichartig war).\r\n\r\n1a. Die erste Phase konnte in der Ausarbeitung von Konzepten bestehen, denen eine Sammlung von Exzerpten vorausgegangen sein mochte, welche aus kurzen Notizen bestanden, die wahrscheinlich auf Wachs- bzw. Holzt\u00e4felchen (pugillares) geschrieben waren.\r\n\r\n1b. Sie konnte auch in der Anfertigung von \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac (hypomn\u00eamatika) bestehen, der provisorischen Fassung eines Buches, wobei das Rohmaterial gr\u00f6\u00dftenteils \u00fcberarbeitet und geordnet war, aber noch nicht die letzte stilistische Verfeinerung erhalten hatte.\r\n\r\n Es folgte die endg\u00fcltige Redaktion, die Reinschrift des Werkes (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 (hypomn\u00eama), \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 (syntagma) usw.), welche meist die tats\u00e4chliche \u1f14\u03ba\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (ekdosis) einleitete. Unter \u1f14\u03ba\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (ekdosis) verstehe ich, im Anschluss an van Groningen, die Ausarbeitung eines Werkes, die ein Schriftsteller als abgeschlossen ansah und mit allen Risiken herausgab (\u1f10\u03ba\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 (ekdidonai)), die eine Ver\u00f6ffentlichung mit sich brachte, da die antike Gesellschaft ja kein Urheberrecht im modernen Sinne kannte.\r\n\r\nDie von mir untersuchten und angef\u00fchrten Zeugnisse bezogen sich vor allem auf Prosaschriften enzyklop\u00e4dischen (Plinius) oder philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen Charakters (Philodem, die Aristoteleskommentatoren, Galen); freilich scheinen im Bereich der Dichtung das Beispiel des Vergil und des Horaz sowie die Papyri eine \u00e4hnliche Arbeitsweise zu best\u00e4tigen. Meine Beobachtungen k\u00f6nnen und d\u00fcrfen nicht verallgemeinert werden: Es l\u00e4ge meinen Absichten fern, ein und dieselbe, allen Autoren und literarischen Gattungen gemeinsame, in der gesamten Geschichte der griechischen und lateinischen Literatur gleichartige Arbeitsweise zu postulieren.[conclusion p. 32-33]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/gaYJZl79ZT9HzlR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":66,"full_name":"Dorandi, Tiziano ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":472,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Papyrologie und Epigraphik","volume":"87","issue":"","pages":"11\u201333"}},"sort":[1991]}
Title | Cosmic Justice in Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 36 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-25 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Engmann, Joyce |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In what may be our oldest surviving fragment of Greek literary prose, Anaximander refers to the redress of injustice among parties alternately injured and injuring. Since the parties in question are impersonal entities, and the redress is a cosmic process, Simplicius, probably repeating a remark of Theophrastus, comments on Anaximander's mode of expression as "rather poetical." What, in plain terms, was the meaning of the metaphor? In this paper, I wish to look again at what Vlastos has described as the most controversial text in Presocratic philosophy. The preceding clause in Simplicius indicates that the process of redress is one of perishing or passing away, phthora: not absolute phthora, but phthora "into" something. Two main views have been taken of this process. It has often been thought that that into which perishing took place was the infinite, and that that which perished was what Simplicius referred to as ta onta, existing things—in effect, the world, or a world (the difference is immaterial for present purposes). Thus, the, or a, world perished as a totality into the infinite. The view which prevails today is that both that into which perishing takes place and that which perishes are the opposites or elements, which Simplicius refers to as ta stoicheia. I believe there are difficulties in this view which have not been fully recognised. In the reports of Anaximander in our sources, there are several pointers to a third possibility, which is, in a sense, an amalgam of the two just mentioned: that into which perishing takes place is the infinite, as on the first view, while, as on the second view, the process of perishing is not a sudden but an ongoing process, and, again, that which perishes is the opposites or elements. The hypothesis of ongoing material interaction between the world and the infinite at least seems to merit more consideration than it has received. It has been mooted in one line and rejected in two by Kirk; dismissed in a short footnote by Vlastos; and only taken seriously by Heidel, who, however, does not apply it to the interpretation of the fragment. I believe that it supplies the key to the understanding of the fragment, and shall argue that it provides a way of reconciling Simplicius' report on Anaximander with two supplementary categories of evidence, the value of which is often discounted: Simplicius' isolated statements about Anaximander elsewhere, and the parallel reports of Aetius and pseudo-Plutarch. I shall conclude by suggesting that equality did not play the role in Anaximander's conception of justice that is commonly thought, and that for him the natural world mirrored an aristocratic rather than a democratic society. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4jIf0maBjgUseow |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"598","_score":null,"_source":{"id":598,"authors_free":[{"id":849,"entry_id":598,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":82,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Engmann, Joyce","free_first_name":"Joyce","free_last_name":"Engmann","norm_person":{"id":82,"first_name":"Joyce","last_name":"Engmann","full_name":"Engmann, Joyce","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Cosmic Justice in Anaximander ","main_title":{"title":"Cosmic Justice in Anaximander "},"abstract":"In what may be our oldest surviving fragment of Greek literary prose, Anaximander refers to the redress of injustice among parties alternately injured and injuring. Since the parties in question are impersonal entities, and the redress is a cosmic process, Simplicius, probably repeating a remark of Theophrastus, comments on Anaximander's mode of expression as \"rather poetical.\" What, in plain terms, was the meaning of the metaphor? In this paper, I wish to look again at what Vlastos has described as the most controversial text in Presocratic philosophy.\r\n\r\nThe preceding clause in Simplicius indicates that the process of redress is one of perishing or passing away, phthora: not absolute phthora, but phthora \"into\" something. Two main views have been taken of this process. It has often been thought that that into which perishing took place was the infinite, and that that which perished was what Simplicius referred to as ta onta, existing things\u2014in effect, the world, or a world (the difference is immaterial for present purposes). Thus, the, or a, world perished as a totality into the infinite.\r\n\r\nThe view which prevails today is that both that into which perishing takes place and that which perishes are the opposites or elements, which Simplicius refers to as ta stoicheia. I believe there are difficulties in this view which have not been fully recognised.\r\n\r\nIn the reports of Anaximander in our sources, there are several pointers to a third possibility, which is, in a sense, an amalgam of the two just mentioned: that into which perishing takes place is the infinite, as on the first view, while, as on the second view, the process of perishing is not a sudden but an ongoing process, and, again, that which perishes is the opposites or elements. The hypothesis of ongoing material interaction between the world and the infinite at least seems to merit more consideration than it has received.\r\n\r\nIt has been mooted in one line and rejected in two by Kirk; dismissed in a short footnote by Vlastos; and only taken seriously by Heidel, who, however, does not apply it to the interpretation of the fragment. I believe that it supplies the key to the understanding of the fragment, and shall argue that it provides a way of reconciling Simplicius' report on Anaximander with two supplementary categories of evidence, the value of which is often discounted: Simplicius' isolated statements about Anaximander elsewhere, and the parallel reports of Aetius and pseudo-Plutarch.\r\n\r\nI shall conclude by suggesting that equality did not play the role in Anaximander's conception of justice that is commonly thought, and that for him the natural world mirrored an aristocratic rather than a democratic society. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4jIf0maBjgUseow","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":82,"full_name":"Engmann, Joyce","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":598,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"36","issue":"1","pages":"1-25"}},"sort":[1991]}
Title | Y a-t-Il des catégories stoïciennes? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Revue Internationale de Philosophie |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 178 (3) |
Pages | 220-244 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Duhot, Jean-Joël |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Il n'y a donc pas de catégories stoïciennes. Le substrat, le tel, l'étant en quelque manière et l'étant en quelque manière relatif tracent une sorte de vecteur ontologique qui traverse chaque être. Ces quatre concepts n'indiquent pas des états ou des niveaux d'être, ils permettent d'articuler, à des niveaux différents, l'unité et la multiplicité, l'identité et la différence, le corps et l'incorporel, à l'intérieur ou à propos de chaque être. Ils ne visent pas à décrire de façon exhaustive les niveaux possibles de l'être, auquel cas ils auraient été plus nombreux. Ils constituent donc non pas une description, un tableau, mais un outil : ce sont des concepts opératoires grâce auxquels se résolvent les problèmes de l'un et du multiple. Ils sont au service d'une ontologie qui relie chaque être à l'essence unique que constitue la matière première. C'est sans doute leur caractère opératoire et non descriptif qui explique que les genres stoïciens ne soient pas aussi nombreux que les niveaux de cette échelle de l'être qu'on peut en déduire. L'objet du Portique n'était pas de dresser un inventaire ontologique mais de disposer des outils nécessaires au fonctionnement de l'ontologie, c'est-à-dire permettant de rattacher toute multiplicité à une unité et tout être à une essence, en l'occurrence l'Essence qu'est ὑποστασία, et ces outils, qui sont les quatre genres, n'ont pas à être plus nombreux en vertu d'un simple principe d'économie. Ici encore par conséquent la comparaison avec les catégories aristotéliciennes est trompeuse : les catégories visent à l'exhaustivité dans le cadre d'une ontologie descriptive horizontale, les genres stoïciens, qui apparaissent évidemment sur ce plan très lacunaires, ne sont pas moins exhaustifs, mais comme instruments d'une ontologie opératoire verticale. Et en tant qu'instruments d'une ontologie, il était logique qu'ils fussent aussi peu nombreux que possible, d'où découle leur polyvalence, ou, si on préfère, leur ambiguïté. [conclusion p. 243-244] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KbIXmexaLDoeiRj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"599","_score":null,"_source":{"id":599,"authors_free":[{"id":850,"entry_id":599,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":72,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Duhot, Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","free_first_name":"Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","free_last_name":"Duhot","norm_person":{"id":72,"first_name":"Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","last_name":"Duhot","full_name":"Duhot, Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1048420493","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Y a-t-Il des cat\u00e9gories sto\u00efciennes?","main_title":{"title":"Y a-t-Il des cat\u00e9gories sto\u00efciennes?"},"abstract":"Il n'y a donc pas de cat\u00e9gories sto\u00efciennes. Le substrat, le tel, l'\u00e9tant en quelque mani\u00e8re et l'\u00e9tant en quelque mani\u00e8re relatif tracent une sorte de vecteur ontologique qui traverse chaque \u00eatre. Ces quatre concepts n'indiquent pas des \u00e9tats ou des niveaux d'\u00eatre, ils permettent d'articuler, \u00e0 des niveaux diff\u00e9rents, l'unit\u00e9 et la multiplicit\u00e9, l'identit\u00e9 et la diff\u00e9rence, le corps et l'incorporel, \u00e0 l'int\u00e9rieur ou \u00e0 propos de chaque \u00eatre. Ils ne visent pas \u00e0 d\u00e9crire de fa\u00e7on exhaustive les niveaux possibles de l'\u00eatre, auquel cas ils auraient \u00e9t\u00e9 plus nombreux.\r\n\r\nIls constituent donc non pas une description, un tableau, mais un outil : ce sont des concepts op\u00e9ratoires gr\u00e2ce auxquels se r\u00e9solvent les probl\u00e8mes de l'un et du multiple. Ils sont au service d'une ontologie qui relie chaque \u00eatre \u00e0 l'essence unique que constitue la mati\u00e8re premi\u00e8re.\r\n\r\nC'est sans doute leur caract\u00e8re op\u00e9ratoire et non descriptif qui explique que les genres sto\u00efciens ne soient pas aussi nombreux que les niveaux de cette \u00e9chelle de l'\u00eatre qu'on peut en d\u00e9duire. L'objet du Portique n'\u00e9tait pas de dresser un inventaire ontologique mais de disposer des outils n\u00e9cessaires au fonctionnement de l'ontologie, c'est-\u00e0-dire permettant de rattacher toute multiplicit\u00e9 \u00e0 une unit\u00e9 et tout \u00eatre \u00e0 une essence, en l'occurrence l'Essence qu'est \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, et ces outils, qui sont les quatre genres, n'ont pas \u00e0 \u00eatre plus nombreux en vertu d'un simple principe d'\u00e9conomie.\r\n\r\nIci encore par cons\u00e9quent la comparaison avec les cat\u00e9gories aristot\u00e9liciennes est trompeuse : les cat\u00e9gories visent \u00e0 l'exhaustivit\u00e9 dans le cadre d'une ontologie descriptive horizontale, les genres sto\u00efciens, qui apparaissent \u00e9videmment sur ce plan tr\u00e8s lacunaires, ne sont pas moins exhaustifs, mais comme instruments d'une ontologie op\u00e9ratoire verticale. Et en tant qu'instruments d'une ontologie, il \u00e9tait logique qu'ils fussent aussi peu nombreux que possible, d'o\u00f9 d\u00e9coule leur polyvalence, ou, si on pr\u00e9f\u00e8re, leur ambigu\u00eft\u00e9. [conclusion p. 243-244]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KbIXmexaLDoeiRj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":72,"full_name":"Duhot, Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":599,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Internationale de Philosophie","volume":"45","issue":"178 (3)","pages":"220-244"}},"sort":[1991]}
Title | Ancora su Simplicio e le Categorie |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Rivista di Storia della Filosofia |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 723-732 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Isnardi Parente, Margherita |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
La storia del concetto di relativo ha già precedenti che sarebbe troppo lungo ricordare. Basti accennare qui a due essenziali limitazioni che i relativi hanno già subito nella storia della tradizione platonico-aristotelica: la negazione di un modello ideale per la relazione (i modelli ideali esistono per le realtà poste in relazione, non per la relazione stessa o per ciò che è solo in funzione della relazione); la definizione di paraphyas per il relativo, definizione che va da Aristotele (EN I, 1096 a 21) ad Andronico ed oltre: paraphyas, cioè ciò che si pone accanto alla vera phýsis, come una sorta di natura aggiunta e secondaria. Gli stoici hanno una loro parte nella storia di questa riduzione della relazione a fatto di ordine mentale o soggettivo. I pros ti pôs echonta sono una nuova forma di incorporeo che viene ad aggiungersi alle altre, anche se nessuna lista riveduta ci è fornita dalla tradizione. E di questa nuova importanza dell'incorporeità in rapporto con la teoria dei generi dell'essere, passi come quello di Simplicio o come questo di Sesto offrono una attestazione fondamentale. [conclusion p. 731-732] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RIxIO3H5yPGRKEc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"620","_score":null,"_source":{"id":620,"authors_free":[{"id":876,"entry_id":620,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":282,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","free_first_name":"Margherita","free_last_name":"Parente","norm_person":{"id":282,"first_name":"Margherita","last_name":"Isnardi Parente","full_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1023256045","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ancora su Simplicio e le Categorie","main_title":{"title":"Ancora su Simplicio e le Categorie"},"abstract":"La storia del concetto di relativo ha gi\u00e0 precedenti che sarebbe troppo lungo ricordare. Basti accennare qui a due essenziali limitazioni che i relativi hanno gi\u00e0 subito nella storia della tradizione platonico-aristotelica: la negazione di un modello ideale per la relazione (i modelli ideali esistono per le realt\u00e0 poste in relazione, non per la relazione stessa o per ci\u00f2 che \u00e8 solo in funzione della relazione); la definizione di paraphyas per il relativo, definizione che va da Aristotele (EN I, 1096 a 21) ad Andronico ed oltre: paraphyas, cio\u00e8 ci\u00f2 che si pone accanto alla vera ph\u00fdsis, come una sorta di natura aggiunta e secondaria.\r\n\r\nGli stoici hanno una loro parte nella storia di questa riduzione della relazione a fatto di ordine mentale o soggettivo. I pros ti p\u00f4s echonta sono una nuova forma di incorporeo che viene ad aggiungersi alle altre, anche se nessuna lista riveduta ci \u00e8 fornita dalla tradizione. E di questa nuova importanza dell'incorporeit\u00e0 in rapporto con la teoria dei generi dell'essere, passi come quello di Simplicio o come questo di Sesto offrono una attestazione fondamentale. [conclusion p. 731-732]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RIxIO3H5yPGRKEc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":282,"full_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":620,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista di Storia della Filosofia","volume":"45","issue":"4","pages":"723-732"}},"sort":[1990]}
Title | Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 110 |
Pages | 244–245 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dillon, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius is a man who might seem destined forever to be used simply as a source for other thinkers, without being given much credit for thinking himself. After all, his surviving works are overtly commentaries on one work or another (overwhelmingly of Aristotle)—though, in fact, small bits of more original work are embedded in these, such as the Corollaries on Space and Time in the Physics commentary. He is also a man of exemplary modesty about his own contributions, always making clear his debts to previous authorities, quoting his sources to an extent unusual in Neoplatonist circles (or indeed in the ancient world in general). It was therefore a happy idea of Mme. Hadot to call together a conference of distinguished Neoplatonists to honor Simplicius and to produce this impressive volume as a result. The work is divided into four (unequal) parts: A biographical introduction A series of essays on doctrinal and methodological questions A shorter section on textual problems A pair of essays on Simplicius' Nachleben All are of interest and importance. First, we have an essay by Ilsetraut Hadot herself (depending in one important respect on the essay of Michel Tardieu, which follows it) on the chronology of Simplicius' life and works. Tardieu, by a fine piece of detective work (Simplicius et les calendriers de Harran), argues with at least great probability that when Simplicius returned with the other philosophers from Persia in 532, it was not to Athens or any other major center but rather to the town of Harran (Carrhae) in Osrhoene. There, a tradition of non-conformist Christianity was tolerant of philosophy, and it is likely where he composed most, if not all, of his commentaries. Certain remarks Simplicius makes in In Phys. 874.23 ff., about the four different calendars "we" use, seem to require his presence at the only known place where four calendars were simultaneously in use, as we know from later Arab sources. The central part of the collection comprises six essays on aspects of doctrine: Two by Philippe Hoffmann (Categories et langage selon Simplicius: on the purpose (skopos) of Aristotle's Categories and an analysis of Simplicius’ invective against John Philoponus) One by Henry Blumenthal on the doctrine of the De Anima commentary of Simplicius (if it is indeed by Simplicius) One by Concetta Luna on Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary One by Richard Sorabji on Simplicius: Prime Matter as Extension One by Nestor-Luis Cordero on Simplicius et l'école éléate Hoffmann's studies frame this central portion of the work. His first examines Simplicius' account of the skopos of Aristotle's Categories, showing how Simplicius, following Porphyry, views the Categories as addressing "utterances" (phonai), "things" (pragmata, onta), "concepts" (noemata), or all of these. Simplicius interprets the study of language, particularly its primary constituents, as a preparation for the soul’s ascent to the noetic world—a higher interpretation inherited from Iamblichus. In his second study, Hoffmann examines Simplicius' strategies of polemic and invective against Philoponus, particularly in the De Caelo, and Simplicius' view of the higher purpose of studying celestial matters. For Simplicius, even prosaic texts like the Categories could become an elevating and prayerful experience. Sorabji, in an elegant contribution, shows how Simplicius solves a problem bequeathed by Aristotle by identifying prime matter with extension, which Aristotle did not do. Cordero challenges the idea of an Eleatic "school" while listing Simplicius’ quotations of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. Blumenthal discusses Simplicius’ doctrine of the soul, though his uncertainty about the authorship of the De Anima commentary (potentially by Priscian) limits the analysis. Luna traces Iamblichean roots in Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary. The final sections include discussions of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius, with contributions by Ilsetraut Hadot, Leonardo Taran, and Dieter Harlfinger. Taran critiques Diels’ edition of Simplicius' Physics commentary, showing its deficiencies due to reliance on unreliable collations and limited understanding of Neoplatonic doctrine. Harlfinger analyzes contamination in the manuscript tradition of the commentary on Books I-IV. The collection concludes with two papers on Simplicius’ influence in the medieval West, one by Fernand Boissier on Latin translations and the influence of the In De Caelo commentary and another by Pierre Hadot on the survival of the Manuel d'Épictète commentary in the 15th to 17th centuries. Overall, this collection has given Simplicius much of his due as a major commentator and preserver of earlier Greek philosophy. While only three papers—those by Blumenthal, Luna, and Sorabji—discuss any distinctive doctrines of Simplicius, this is perhaps reasonable given that he does not claim originality. Most of what seems distinctive likely goes back to Iamblichus or Syrianus/Proclus. Yet, it might one day be possible to produce a focused volume on his doctrinal innovations. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hje0CYeAY915LhU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"708","_score":null,"_source":{"id":708,"authors_free":[{"id":1056,"entry_id":708,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":97,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dillon, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Dillon","norm_person":{"id":97,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Dillon","full_name":"Dillon, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123498058","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa \tsurvie","main_title":{"title":"Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa \tsurvie"},"abstract":"Simplicius is a man who might seem destined forever to be used simply as a source for other thinkers, without being given much credit for thinking himself. After all, his surviving works are overtly commentaries on one work or another (overwhelmingly of Aristotle)\u2014though, in fact, small bits of more original work are embedded in these, such as the Corollaries on Space and Time in the Physics commentary. He is also a man of exemplary modesty about his own contributions, always making clear his debts to previous authorities, quoting his sources to an extent unusual in Neoplatonist circles (or indeed in the ancient world in general).\r\n\r\nIt was therefore a happy idea of Mme. Hadot to call together a conference of distinguished Neoplatonists to honor Simplicius and to produce this impressive volume as a result. The work is divided into four (unequal) parts:\r\n\r\n A biographical introduction\r\n A series of essays on doctrinal and methodological questions\r\n A shorter section on textual problems\r\n A pair of essays on Simplicius' Nachleben\r\n\r\nAll are of interest and importance.\r\n\r\nFirst, we have an essay by Ilsetraut Hadot herself (depending in one important respect on the essay of Michel Tardieu, which follows it) on the chronology of Simplicius' life and works. Tardieu, by a fine piece of detective work (Simplicius et les calendriers de Harran), argues with at least great probability that when Simplicius returned with the other philosophers from Persia in 532, it was not to Athens or any other major center but rather to the town of Harran (Carrhae) in Osrhoene. There, a tradition of non-conformist Christianity was tolerant of philosophy, and it is likely where he composed most, if not all, of his commentaries. Certain remarks Simplicius makes in In Phys. 874.23 ff., about the four different calendars \"we\" use, seem to require his presence at the only known place where four calendars were simultaneously in use, as we know from later Arab sources.\r\n\r\nThe central part of the collection comprises six essays on aspects of doctrine:\r\n\r\n Two by Philippe Hoffmann (Categories et langage selon Simplicius: on the purpose (skopos) of Aristotle's Categories and an analysis of Simplicius\u2019 invective against John Philoponus)\r\n One by Henry Blumenthal on the doctrine of the De Anima commentary of Simplicius (if it is indeed by Simplicius)\r\n One by Concetta Luna on Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary\r\n One by Richard Sorabji on Simplicius: Prime Matter as Extension\r\n One by Nestor-Luis Cordero on Simplicius et l'\u00e9cole \u00e9l\u00e9ate\r\n\r\nHoffmann's studies frame this central portion of the work. His first examines Simplicius' account of the skopos of Aristotle's Categories, showing how Simplicius, following Porphyry, views the Categories as addressing \"utterances\" (phonai), \"things\" (pragmata, onta), \"concepts\" (noemata), or all of these. Simplicius interprets the study of language, particularly its primary constituents, as a preparation for the soul\u2019s ascent to the noetic world\u2014a higher interpretation inherited from Iamblichus. In his second study, Hoffmann examines Simplicius' strategies of polemic and invective against Philoponus, particularly in the De Caelo, and Simplicius' view of the higher purpose of studying celestial matters. For Simplicius, even prosaic texts like the Categories could become an elevating and prayerful experience.\r\n\r\nSorabji, in an elegant contribution, shows how Simplicius solves a problem bequeathed by Aristotle by identifying prime matter with extension, which Aristotle did not do. Cordero challenges the idea of an Eleatic \"school\" while listing Simplicius\u2019 quotations of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. Blumenthal discusses Simplicius\u2019 doctrine of the soul, though his uncertainty about the authorship of the De Anima commentary (potentially by Priscian) limits the analysis. Luna traces Iamblichean roots in Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary.\r\n\r\nThe final sections include discussions of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius, with contributions by Ilsetraut Hadot, Leonardo Taran, and Dieter Harlfinger. Taran critiques Diels\u2019 edition of Simplicius' Physics commentary, showing its deficiencies due to reliance on unreliable collations and limited understanding of Neoplatonic doctrine. Harlfinger analyzes contamination in the manuscript tradition of the commentary on Books I-IV.\r\n\r\nThe collection concludes with two papers on Simplicius\u2019 influence in the medieval West, one by Fernand Boissier on Latin translations and the influence of the In De Caelo commentary and another by Pierre Hadot on the survival of the Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te commentary in the 15th to 17th centuries.\r\n\r\nOverall, this collection has given Simplicius much of his due as a major commentator and preserver of earlier Greek philosophy. While only three papers\u2014those by Blumenthal, Luna, and Sorabji\u2014discuss any distinctive doctrines of Simplicius, this is perhaps reasonable given that he does not claim originality. Most of what seems distinctive likely goes back to Iamblichus or Syrianus\/Proclus. Yet, it might one day be possible to produce a focused volume on his doctrinal innovations. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hje0CYeAY915LhU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":97,"full_name":"Dillon, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":708,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"110","issue":"","pages":"244\u2013245"}},"sort":[1990]}
Title | Studies in Xenophanes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Harvard Studies in Classical Philology |
Volume | 93 |
Pages | 103-167 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Here, our reconstruction of Theophrastus' account can be regarded as complete: we have determined his general approach to Xenophanes' twofold teaching and dwelt on the main points of his report on Xenophanes' monistic doctrine. The examination of Xenophanes' cosmological conception, however interesting and desirable, is a separate task which should be left for another opportunity. After such a lengthy discussion, one should perhaps briefly recapitulate the results arrived at, and the best way to do this seems to be to present the Theophrastean account in the form of the ordered series of statements reconstructed above. In this list, the sources from which a given statement is excerpted or on the basis of which it is formulated are referred to by the name of the author and the page and line(s) of the Diels-Kranz edition. Statements and parts of statements that are purely conjectural are italicized. [Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18] Xenophanes of Colophon, who pursued a certain way of his own different from [that of] all those spoken of beforehand [i.e., the Milesians], allows neither coming-to-be nor destruction but says that the whole is eternally selfsame. [Simpl.; 121.28] He says that this One and Whole is God, saying thus (fr. 23). [Simpl.; 121.27-28] The mention of this Xenophanean opinion rather belongs to a study other than that concerned with natural philosophy [that is, in that concerned with first philosophy]. He says that God is ungenerated and eternal, which he proves as follows: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.18-20] had it [the Whole or God] come to be, it is necessary for it not to be before this; but not being, it can never come to be: neither nought can produce anything nor can anything come to be by the agency of nought. That God is one, he proves so: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.23-24] among gods, there can be no supremacy, for it does not suit the divine holiness that God should be under lordship; but were there many gods, there would be lords and subjects among them (perhaps also: or all of them would be lords of each other). [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.24-25; 122.3-6] He does not say whether God is finite or infinite. Nor does he say [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.25; 122.3-6] whether he is moved or unmoved. But [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.6-9] actually, he conceives of God as unmoved, for he calls him eternally selfsame and says (fr. 26). He says that God is thoroughly seeing, hearing, and thinking (fr. 24). He demonstrates this in the following way: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.25-26] God is altogether free from any want; but had he seen, heard, and thought only in one part of him, he would be in want of these in another part; hence he sees, hears, and thinks wholly and not in one or another part of himself. [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.13-14] And he says that God governs all things by his mind, saying (fr. 25). [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.20-21; Aristocles; 126.6-8] Thus he throws out sense-perceptions while trusting logos alone. [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18; Theophr. ap. Alex.; 219.31-33] The other way, that of accounting for the coming-to-be of existing things, he dismisses, declaring such accounts to be no more than opinion deprived of any certainty, saying this in such words (fr. 34). Nevertheless, he proposes some such opinion which he himself seems to adjudge plausible, as his own words show (fr. 35). [Theophr. ap. Alex; 219.31-33] But Parmenides, who came after him, took both ways [i.e., that of Xenophanes and that of the Milesians, cf. (1)]. For indeed, he both says that the whole is eternal and tries to account for the coming-to-be of existing things, not however thinking about both [ways] alike, but according to truth assuming the whole to be one, ungenerated, and spherical, while according to the opinion of the many, accounting for the coming-to-be of perceptible things by positing two principles: fire and earth, etc. This reconstructed account represents that of the first book of the Physical Opinions. Indeed, (1) is the counterpart of (14), which is explicitly related by Alexander to the first book. (2)–(10) also belong there, for they either come from Simplicius' report or correct and complement it where it is wrong or incomplete, while this report itself comes from the first book of the Physical Opinions. If Theophrastus' account was as I suggest, it seems to have been of great accuracy. True, it misrepresents Xenophanes' position in that his epistemic approach is interpreted in terms of the contrast logos:aistheseis, but this is the only major misinterpretation I can find in the account. On the whole, this is a precise report that moreover does not show any tendency to assimilate Xenophanes' teaching to that of Parmenides. Yet it would be hard to point out even one important Parmenidean doctrine which is not, in one way or another, rooted in Xenophanes' teaching. Such is, first and foremost, the Parmenidean idea of the intelligible unity of the sensible manifold, which in Xenophanes himself was, as we have suggested, the development of one of the facets of Anaximander's Apeiron. This is the view of unity as one of two aspects—true, the most essential, significant, and sublime—but nevertheless one aspect only of reality, complementary to its other aspect, that of the manifold. [conclusion p. 163-167] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H8YttvfJXlsVkrJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"748","_score":null,"_source":{"id":748,"authors_free":[{"id":1113,"entry_id":748,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Studies in Xenophanes","main_title":{"title":"Studies in Xenophanes"},"abstract":"Here, our reconstruction of Theophrastus' account can be regarded as complete: we have determined his general approach to Xenophanes' twofold teaching and dwelt on the main points of his report on Xenophanes' monistic doctrine. The examination of Xenophanes' cosmological conception, however interesting and desirable, is a separate task which should be left for another opportunity. After such a lengthy discussion, one should perhaps briefly recapitulate the results arrived at, and the best way to do this seems to be to present the Theophrastean account in the form of the ordered series of statements reconstructed above. In this list, the sources from which a given statement is excerpted or on the basis of which it is formulated are referred to by the name of the author and the page and line(s) of the Diels-Kranz edition. Statements and parts of statements that are purely conjectural are italicized.\r\n\r\n [Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18] Xenophanes of Colophon, who pursued a certain way of his own different from [that of] all those spoken of beforehand [i.e., the Milesians], allows neither coming-to-be nor destruction but says that the whole is eternally selfsame.\r\n [Simpl.; 121.28] He says that this One and Whole is God, saying thus (fr. 23).\r\n [Simpl.; 121.27-28] The mention of this Xenophanean opinion rather belongs to a study other than that concerned with natural philosophy [that is, in that concerned with first philosophy].\r\n He says that God is ungenerated and eternal, which he proves as follows: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.18-20] had it [the Whole or God] come to be, it is necessary for it not to be before this; but not being, it can never come to be: neither nought can produce anything nor can anything come to be by the agency of nought.\r\n That God is one, he proves so: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.23-24] among gods, there can be no supremacy, for it does not suit the divine holiness that God should be under lordship; but were there many gods, there would be lords and subjects among them (perhaps also: or all of them would be lords of each other).\r\n [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.24-25; 122.3-6] He does not say whether God is finite or infinite.\r\n Nor does he say [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.25; 122.3-6] whether he is moved or unmoved.\r\n But [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.6-9] actually, he conceives of God as unmoved, for he calls him eternally selfsame and says (fr. 26).\r\n He says that God is thoroughly seeing, hearing, and thinking (fr. 24). He demonstrates this in the following way: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.25-26] God is altogether free from any want; but had he seen, heard, and thought only in one part of him, he would be in want of these in another part; hence he sees, hears, and thinks wholly and not in one or another part of himself.\r\n [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.13-14] And he says that God governs all things by his mind, saying (fr. 25).\r\n [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.20-21; Aristocles; 126.6-8] Thus he throws out sense-perceptions while trusting logos alone.\r\n [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18; Theophr. ap. Alex.; 219.31-33] The other way, that of accounting for the coming-to-be of existing things, he dismisses, declaring such accounts to be no more than opinion deprived of any certainty, saying this in such words (fr. 34).\r\n Nevertheless, he proposes some such opinion which he himself seems to adjudge plausible, as his own words show (fr. 35).\r\n [Theophr. ap. Alex; 219.31-33] But Parmenides, who came after him, took both ways [i.e., that of Xenophanes and that of the Milesians, cf. (1)]. For indeed, he both says that the whole is eternal and tries to account for the coming-to-be of existing things, not however thinking about both [ways] alike, but according to truth assuming the whole to be one, ungenerated, and spherical, while according to the opinion of the many, accounting for the coming-to-be of perceptible things by positing two principles: fire and earth, etc.\r\n\r\nThis reconstructed account represents that of the first book of the Physical Opinions. Indeed, (1) is the counterpart of (14), which is explicitly related by Alexander to the first book. (2)\u2013(10) also belong there, for they either come from Simplicius' report or correct and complement it where it is wrong or incomplete, while this report itself comes from the first book of the Physical Opinions.\r\n\r\nIf Theophrastus' account was as I suggest, it seems to have been of great accuracy. True, it misrepresents Xenophanes' position in that his epistemic approach is interpreted in terms of the contrast logos:aistheseis, but this is the only major misinterpretation I can find in the account. On the whole, this is a precise report that moreover does not show any tendency to assimilate Xenophanes' teaching to that of Parmenides.\r\n\r\nYet it would be hard to point out even one important Parmenidean doctrine which is not, in one way or another, rooted in Xenophanes' teaching. Such is, first and foremost, the Parmenidean idea of the intelligible unity of the sensible manifold, which in Xenophanes himself was, as we have suggested, the development of one of the facets of Anaximander's Apeiron. This is the view of unity as one of two aspects\u2014true, the most essential, significant, and sublime\u2014but nevertheless one aspect only of reality, complementary to its other aspect, that of the manifold.\r\n[conclusion p. 163-167]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H8YttvfJXlsVkrJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":748,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Harvard Studies in Classical Philology","volume":"93","issue":"","pages":"103-167"}},"sort":[1990]}
Title | The Trouble with Fragrance |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 290-302 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ellis, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
By 'in a subject' I mean what (a) is in something, not as a part, and (b) cannot exist separately from what it is in. (Aristotle, Categories 1a24-5) These lines have been extensively discussed in recent years. The crux of the debate is whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties. On the "traditional" interpretation, a property is in an individual thing as in a subject, say, Socrates, only if it cannot exist apart from Socrates. This implies that the properties of an individual thing are peculiar to it or non-sharable, in the sense that they cannot be in any other thing. The particular white in Socrates, for example, ceases to exist when he gets a tan. It does not move on to inhere in Callias or any other subject, nor is the white in Callias numerically the same white as the white in Socrates. Although both are white, perhaps even the same shade of white, nonetheless, they are numerically distinct particulars inhering in different individual things. Many recent commentators have tried to "rescue" Aristotle from the alleged commitment to such Stoutian particulars. Their strategy has been to weaken (b) so that the particular inherent property is not existentially dependent on the very particular substance it inheres in. G.E.L. Owen opened the debate by arguing that (b) can mean "cannot exist without something to contain it," and thus Aristotle is only committed to the view that particular properties need some substance or other in order to exist. A particular white, for example, would be a particular shade of white, which could, of course, be exemplified by more than one particular substance. The task I’ve set for myself in this paper is not to argue for either the weak or the strong interpretation of inherence in Aristotle. That is already a well-trodden path. Instead, I shall look at what the ancient commentators on Aristotle had to say on the subject. Which interpretation, the strong or the weak, do they support? My strategy is to focus on one of the many problems they consider, that of fragrance, and to see if their treatment of it yields an answer. The fragrance problem attacks the basis of Aristotle's ontology—the distinction between substance and accident. Didn’t Aristotle say that accidents cannot exist apart from that in which they inhere? But fragrances seem to travel to us from their subjects, and aren’t they accidents? In the attempts, from Porphyry (232–309 AD) to Elias (fl. 541), to save Aristotle’s ontology from this objection, we shall find, I hope to show, an interesting development in the complexity of the discussions. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the problem, the discussions move into psychological theory, and we find that, in order for his ontology to be saved, Aristotle’s psychological theory must be deepened. Concluding Remarks There seems to be a clear development in the way the commentators construed "in a subject." Starting with Porphyry’s tense solution, it is possible to see a gradual movement away from that solution and the weak construal it implies, toward the stronger reading implied by the other solutions. Ammonius introduces an alternative, the effluence solution, albeit without indicating his preference. His students, Philoponus and Simplicius, add further developments or modifications to his view: Simplicius, by rejecting the tense solution and offering new alternatives; and Philoponus, by turning the discussion more toward psychology and revealing both the conflict between the effluence and diosmic theories and his preference for the latter. This shift in the discussion toward psychology is evidenced by Olympiodorus, who responds to the fragrance problem only with alternative psychological theories, making no mention of the tense solution. Finally, Elias, although mentioning the tense solution, devotes most of his energy to evaluating the alternative psychological answers to the fragrance problem. [introduction p. 290-291; conclusion p. 302] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HQWPG36viwyMCbr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"751","_score":null,"_source":{"id":751,"authors_free":[{"id":1116,"entry_id":751,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":81,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ellis, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Ellis","norm_person":{"id":81,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Ellis","full_name":"Ellis, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Trouble with Fragrance","main_title":{"title":"The Trouble with Fragrance"},"abstract":"By 'in a subject' I mean what (a) is in something, not as a part, and (b) cannot exist separately from what it is in. (Aristotle, Categories 1a24-5)\r\n\r\nThese lines have been extensively discussed in recent years. The crux of the debate is whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties. On the \"traditional\" interpretation, a property is in an individual thing as in a subject, say, Socrates, only if it cannot exist apart from Socrates. This implies that the properties of an individual thing are peculiar to it or non-sharable, in the sense that they cannot be in any other thing. The particular white in Socrates, for example, ceases to exist when he gets a tan. It does not move on to inhere in Callias or any other subject, nor is the white in Callias numerically the same white as the white in Socrates. Although both are white, perhaps even the same shade of white, nonetheless, they are numerically distinct particulars inhering in different individual things.\r\n\r\nMany recent commentators have tried to \"rescue\" Aristotle from the alleged commitment to such Stoutian particulars. Their strategy has been to weaken (b) so that the particular inherent property is not existentially dependent on the very particular substance it inheres in. G.E.L. Owen opened the debate by arguing that (b) can mean \"cannot exist without something to contain it,\" and thus Aristotle is only committed to the view that particular properties need some substance or other in order to exist. A particular white, for example, would be a particular shade of white, which could, of course, be exemplified by more than one particular substance.\r\n\r\nThe task I\u2019ve set for myself in this paper is not to argue for either the weak or the strong interpretation of inherence in Aristotle. That is already a well-trodden path. Instead, I shall look at what the ancient commentators on Aristotle had to say on the subject. Which interpretation, the strong or the weak, do they support? My strategy is to focus on one of the many problems they consider, that of fragrance, and to see if their treatment of it yields an answer.\r\n\r\nThe fragrance problem attacks the basis of Aristotle's ontology\u2014the distinction between substance and accident. Didn\u2019t Aristotle say that accidents cannot exist apart from that in which they inhere? But fragrances seem to travel to us from their subjects, and aren\u2019t they accidents? In the attempts, from Porphyry (232\u2013309 AD) to Elias (fl. 541), to save Aristotle\u2019s ontology from this objection, we shall find, I hope to show, an interesting development in the complexity of the discussions. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the problem, the discussions move into psychological theory, and we find that, in order for his ontology to be saved, Aristotle\u2019s psychological theory must be deepened.\r\nConcluding Remarks\r\n\r\nThere seems to be a clear development in the way the commentators construed \"in a subject.\" Starting with Porphyry\u2019s tense solution, it is possible to see a gradual movement away from that solution and the weak construal it implies, toward the stronger reading implied by the other solutions. Ammonius introduces an alternative, the effluence solution, albeit without indicating his preference. His students, Philoponus and Simplicius, add further developments or modifications to his view: Simplicius, by rejecting the tense solution and offering new alternatives; and Philoponus, by turning the discussion more toward psychology and revealing both the conflict between the effluence and diosmic theories and his preference for the latter.\r\n\r\nThis shift in the discussion toward psychology is evidenced by Olympiodorus, who responds to the fragrance problem only with alternative psychological theories, making no mention of the tense solution. Finally, Elias, although mentioning the tense solution, devotes most of his energy to evaluating the alternative psychological answers to the fragrance problem. [introduction p. 290-291; conclusion p. 302]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HQWPG36viwyMCbr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":81,"full_name":"Ellis, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":751,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"35","issue":"3","pages":"290-302"}},"sort":[1990]}
Title | More on Zeno's "Forty logoi" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Illinois Classical Studies |
Volume | 15 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 23-37 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarrant, Harold |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1986), 35-41, John Dillon presents material from Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides in which he makes it clear that Proclus knew of a work purporting to be by Zeno, which contained forty logoi. This work was allegedly the one that "Zeno" had just read at the opening of the main narrative of Plato’s Parmenides (127c), and which Socrates subsequently challenges (127d-130a). Dillon presents the same material in his introduction to Proclus' In Parmenidem. Its relevance is no longer confined to the Neoplatonists, as Dillon believes that it is possible the Forty Logoi “at least contained genuine material, though perhaps worked over at a later date.” It threatens to have implications both for Eleatic studies and for the interpretation of the Parmenides itself. I believe that the issue must be tackled again, not merely because of Dillon’s judiciously aporetic conclusion, but because I fear that there are important points which have not yet been addressed. Firstly, from a passage not included in Dillon's survey but which seems to me to be relevant, it appears that the allegedly Zenonian work was known to much earlier, pre-Plotinian interpreters, who considered it important for the interpretation of the hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, at least down to 155e and possibly beyond. This increases the potential importance of the work, as well as marginally increasing its claim to be genuine; at least it was not a Neoplatonic forgery. Secondly, despite Proclus’ apparent familiarity with it, the work does not seem to clarify Plato's puzzling reference to the “first hypothesis of the first logos” at 127d7. One would have expected that consultation of the relevant text of Zeno would have done so, and this might be considered an obstacle to believing that the work is what it purports to be. Thirdly, there is a significant question of Proclus’ independence. There are some troubling features about the historical material in this commentary which are absent from his Timaeus commentary, for instance. Most relevant here is the rather scrappy way in which Parmenides himself has been quoted. On p. 665, the three short quotations from B8 are out of order; on p. 708, two of the same snippets from B8 have B5 (whose genuineness is less than certain) inserted between them. On p. 1152, we encounter seven tiny quotations, with the five from B8 this time being in the correct order, but with an impossible version of B3 inserted between B8.30 and B8.35-36; B4.1 then follows. The total number of lines quoted in whole or in part (excluding uncertain allusions) amounts to only 21 (9 of these from B8.25-36), but some lines appear three or more times (B8.4, 25, 29, 44). It is clear that Proclus remembered certain favorite phrases, and one doubts whether he was referring to any text, except possibly at p. 1134, where a passage of four lines is quoted. Even here, either Proclus or the scribes have failed us in the last line. Likewise, there is no need to suppose that he is referring at any point to the alleged work of Zeno. Certainly, he knows something about it, and he may well have had access to it and read it in the past. But I do not find anything in the text requiring that he consult the work as he writes. Furthermore, if we bear in mind that earlier interpreters had made use of the Forty Logoi, much of Proclus' material on the work could plausibly be attributed to borrowings from earlier commentaries. One commentary he certainly used is that of Plutarch of Athens, whose work on earlier interpreters Proclus evidently admired (p. 1061.18-20). We should not allow any admiration for Proclus as a philosopher, or even for the doxographic material in other commentaries, to lead us to suppose that his reports will be either original or reliable in this commentary. [introduction p. 23-24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YLhtdTiVc9rnvdt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"408","_score":null,"_source":{"id":408,"authors_free":[{"id":546,"entry_id":408,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":122,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tarrant, Harold","free_first_name":"Harold","free_last_name":"Tarrant","norm_person":{"id":122,"first_name":"Harold ","last_name":"Tarrant","full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132040077","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"More on Zeno's \"Forty logoi\"","main_title":{"title":"More on Zeno's \"Forty logoi\""},"abstract":"In Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1986), 35-41, John Dillon presents material from Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides in which he makes it clear that Proclus knew of a work purporting to be by Zeno, which contained forty logoi. This work was allegedly the one that \"Zeno\" had just read at the opening of the main narrative of Plato\u2019s Parmenides (127c), and which Socrates subsequently challenges (127d-130a). Dillon presents the same material in his introduction to Proclus' In Parmenidem. Its relevance is no longer confined to the Neoplatonists, as Dillon believes that it is possible the Forty Logoi \u201cat least contained genuine material, though perhaps worked over at a later date.\u201d It threatens to have implications both for Eleatic studies and for the interpretation of the Parmenides itself.\r\n\r\nI believe that the issue must be tackled again, not merely because of Dillon\u2019s judiciously aporetic conclusion, but because I fear that there are important points which have not yet been addressed. Firstly, from a passage not included in Dillon's survey but which seems to me to be relevant, it appears that the allegedly Zenonian work was known to much earlier, pre-Plotinian interpreters, who considered it important for the interpretation of the hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, at least down to 155e and possibly beyond. This increases the potential importance of the work, as well as marginally increasing its claim to be genuine; at least it was not a Neoplatonic forgery.\r\n\r\nSecondly, despite Proclus\u2019 apparent familiarity with it, the work does not seem to clarify Plato's puzzling reference to the \u201cfirst hypothesis of the first logos\u201d at 127d7. One would have expected that consultation of the relevant text of Zeno would have done so, and this might be considered an obstacle to believing that the work is what it purports to be.\r\n\r\nThirdly, there is a significant question of Proclus\u2019 independence. There are some troubling features about the historical material in this commentary which are absent from his Timaeus commentary, for instance. Most relevant here is the rather scrappy way in which Parmenides himself has been quoted. On p. 665, the three short quotations from B8 are out of order; on p. 708, two of the same snippets from B8 have B5 (whose genuineness is less than certain) inserted between them. On p. 1152, we encounter seven tiny quotations, with the five from B8 this time being in the correct order, but with an impossible version of B3 inserted between B8.30 and B8.35-36; B4.1 then follows.\r\n\r\nThe total number of lines quoted in whole or in part (excluding uncertain allusions) amounts to only 21 (9 of these from B8.25-36), but some lines appear three or more times (B8.4, 25, 29, 44). It is clear that Proclus remembered certain favorite phrases, and one doubts whether he was referring to any text, except possibly at p. 1134, where a passage of four lines is quoted. Even here, either Proclus or the scribes have failed us in the last line. Likewise, there is no need to suppose that he is referring at any point to the alleged work of Zeno. Certainly, he knows something about it, and he may well have had access to it and read it in the past. But I do not find anything in the text requiring that he consult the work as he writes.\r\n\r\nFurthermore, if we bear in mind that earlier interpreters had made use of the Forty Logoi, much of Proclus' material on the work could plausibly be attributed to borrowings from earlier commentaries. One commentary he certainly used is that of Plutarch of Athens, whose work on earlier interpreters Proclus evidently admired (p. 1061.18-20). We should not allow any admiration for Proclus as a philosopher, or even for the doxographic material in other commentaries, to lead us to suppose that his reports will be either original or reliable in this commentary. [introduction p. 23-24]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YLhtdTiVc9rnvdt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":122,"full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":408,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Illinois Classical Studies","volume":"15","issue":"1","pages":"23-37"}},"sort":[1990]}
Title | Le thème de la grande année d'Héraclite aux Stoiciens |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 169-183 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bels, Jacques |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
D’Héraclite aux stoïciens, en passant par Platon qui adopte un point de vue analogue à celui de l’Éphésien, le discours sur la Grande Année est au cœur même de la conception philosophique, même s’il subit une modification dans son appréhension. En effet, à une lecture (re)générante, le stoïcisme substitue une perspective finaliste quand il privilégie le lien Grande Année-ekpyrosis. Cette accentuation d’une Grande Année conçue comme limite, au détriment de la régénération, se marque également dans la liaison ekpyrosis-fin de la survie limitée. En effet, selon les stoïciens, à la disparition des corps, la partie spirituelle subsiste un certain temps avant de disparaître à son tour. Conséquence logique de la thèse selon laquelle ce qui est engendré doit disparaître, cette mort de l’âme correspond, chez Cléanthe et Chrysippe, à la conflagration universelle. Pour le premier, en effet, toutes les âmes survivent jusqu’à l’embrasement final, tandis que, pour le second, seules les âmes des sages connaissent ce privilège, celles des "insensés" disparaissant plus rapidement. Dès lors, quand il établit une parenté entre les stoïciens et Héraclite, Simplicius a partiellement raison : ces penseurs ont posé l’existence d’une Grande Année. Il oublie simplement de préciser qu’ils lui ont assigné des priorités différentes. [conclusion p. 183] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Wt3OVL4zzPJWT2a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"831","_score":null,"_source":{"id":831,"authors_free":[{"id":1235,"entry_id":831,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":421,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bels, Jacques","free_first_name":"Jacques","free_last_name":"Bels","norm_person":{"id":421,"first_name":"Jacques","last_name":"Bels","full_name":"Bels, Jacques","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le th\u00e8me de la grande ann\u00e9e d'H\u00e9raclite aux Stoiciens","main_title":{"title":"Le th\u00e8me de la grande ann\u00e9e d'H\u00e9raclite aux Stoiciens"},"abstract":"D\u2019H\u00e9raclite aux sto\u00efciens, en passant par Platon qui adopte un point de vue analogue \u00e0 celui de l\u2019\u00c9ph\u00e9sien, le discours sur la Grande Ann\u00e9e est au c\u0153ur m\u00eame de la conception philosophique, m\u00eame s\u2019il subit une modification dans son appr\u00e9hension. En effet, \u00e0 une lecture (re)g\u00e9n\u00e9rante, le sto\u00efcisme substitue une perspective finaliste quand il privil\u00e9gie le lien Grande Ann\u00e9e-ekpyrosis. Cette accentuation d\u2019une Grande Ann\u00e9e con\u00e7ue comme limite, au d\u00e9triment de la r\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, se marque \u00e9galement dans la liaison ekpyrosis-fin de la survie limit\u00e9e. En effet, selon les sto\u00efciens, \u00e0 la disparition des corps, la partie spirituelle subsiste un certain temps avant de dispara\u00eetre \u00e0 son tour.\r\n\r\nCons\u00e9quence logique de la th\u00e8se selon laquelle ce qui est engendr\u00e9 doit dispara\u00eetre, cette mort de l\u2019\u00e2me correspond, chez Cl\u00e9anthe et Chrysippe, \u00e0 la conflagration universelle. Pour le premier, en effet, toutes les \u00e2mes survivent jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019embrasement final, tandis que, pour le second, seules les \u00e2mes des sages connaissent ce privil\u00e8ge, celles des \"insens\u00e9s\" disparaissant plus rapidement.\r\n\r\nD\u00e8s lors, quand il \u00e9tablit une parent\u00e9 entre les sto\u00efciens et H\u00e9raclite, Simplicius a partiellement raison : ces penseurs ont pos\u00e9 l\u2019existence d\u2019une Grande Ann\u00e9e. Il oublie simplement de pr\u00e9ciser qu\u2019ils lui ont assign\u00e9 des priorit\u00e9s diff\u00e9rentes. [conclusion p. 183]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Wt3OVL4zzPJWT2a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":421,"full_name":"Bels, Jacques","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":831,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"7","issue":"2","pages":"169-183"}},"sort":[1989]}
Title | Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios Physikkommentar |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 117 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 288-303 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wiesner, Jürgen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Für die Tradierung der umstrittenen Xenophanes-Prädikate ergibt sich also folgendes Bild: Theophrasts Urteil, dass Xenophanes sein Prinzip weder eindeutig als begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder eindeutig als bewegt noch unbewegt benannt habe, schließt referierende Einzelangaben über diese uneinheitlichen Lehrmeinungen des Kolophoniers nicht aus. Das negative „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Urteil Theophrasts ist in der Vorlage von MXG und Simplikios (In Phys. 22,30–23,9) später missverstanden worden: Für den dort vorliegenden positiven „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Ausschluss (das Prinzip sei weder begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder bewegt noch unbewegt) wurde eine auf späteren Konzepten beruhende Begründung hinzugefügt. Simplikios hat sich von der Quelle, die ihm und MXG vorlag, irreführen lassen und die äußerlich gleichlautende Auskunft Theophrasts, die er In Phys. 22,26 zitiert, in ihrem wahren Gehalt verkannt. Daher hat er die Argumentation, die aus der mit MXG gemeinsamen Quelle stammt und die gar nicht zu Theophrasts negativem Urteil passt, ab 22,31 folgen lassen. Die Lehrmeinung vom begrenzten, kugeligen Gott gelangte von Theophrast in die Doxographie und zu Alexander. Auch Simplikios kennt eine solche Konzeption aus dem Eresier (In Phys. 28,4 ff.). Er unternimmt eine Harmonisierung des „begrenzt“ mit der „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Bestimmung (29,7 ff.). Da er bei Theophrast sowohl die (von ihm fälschlich als positiver Ausschluss verstandene) „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Bestimmung als auch das einfache Prädikat „begrenzt“ las, könnte er sogar durch den Eresier zu seiner Harmonisierung angeregt worden sein. [conclusion p. 302-303] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GgDE7e58wFISvqX |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"835","_score":null,"_source":{"id":835,"authors_free":[{"id":1239,"entry_id":835,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":75,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wiesner, J\u00fcrgen","free_first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","free_last_name":"Wiesner","norm_person":{"id":75,"first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","last_name":"Wiesner","full_name":"Wiesner, J\u00fcrgen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140610847","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios Physikkommentar","main_title":{"title":"Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios Physikkommentar"},"abstract":"F\u00fcr die Tradierung der umstrittenen Xenophanes-Pr\u00e4dikate ergibt sich also folgendes Bild:\r\n\r\n Theophrasts Urteil, dass Xenophanes sein Prinzip weder eindeutig als begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder eindeutig als bewegt noch unbewegt benannt habe, schlie\u00dft referierende Einzelangaben \u00fcber diese uneinheitlichen Lehrmeinungen des Kolophoniers nicht aus.\r\n\r\n Das negative \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Urteil Theophrasts ist in der Vorlage von MXG und Simplikios (In Phys. 22,30\u201323,9) sp\u00e4ter missverstanden worden: F\u00fcr den dort vorliegenden positiven \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Ausschluss (das Prinzip sei weder begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder bewegt noch unbewegt) wurde eine auf sp\u00e4teren Konzepten beruhende Begr\u00fcndung hinzugef\u00fcgt.\r\n\r\n Simplikios hat sich von der Quelle, die ihm und MXG vorlag, irref\u00fchren lassen und die \u00e4u\u00dferlich gleichlautende Auskunft Theophrasts, die er In Phys. 22,26 zitiert, in ihrem wahren Gehalt verkannt. Daher hat er die Argumentation, die aus der mit MXG gemeinsamen Quelle stammt und die gar nicht zu Theophrasts negativem Urteil passt, ab 22,31 folgen lassen.\r\n\r\n Die Lehrmeinung vom begrenzten, kugeligen Gott gelangte von Theophrast in die Doxographie und zu Alexander. Auch Simplikios kennt eine solche Konzeption aus dem Eresier (In Phys. 28,4 ff.). Er unternimmt eine Harmonisierung des \u201ebegrenzt\u201c mit der \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Bestimmung (29,7 ff.). Da er bei Theophrast sowohl die (von ihm f\u00e4lschlich als positiver Ausschluss verstandene) \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Bestimmung als auch das einfache Pr\u00e4dikat \u201ebegrenzt\u201c las, k\u00f6nnte er sogar durch den Eresier zu seiner Harmonisierung angeregt worden sein. [conclusion p. 302-303]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GgDE7e58wFISvqX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":75,"full_name":"Wiesner, J\u00fcrgen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":835,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"117","issue":"3","pages":"288-303"}},"sort":[1989]}
Title | Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 3 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 319-345 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | de Libera, Alain |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
C'est ici le lieu de revenir sur le concept de denominatio. Dans les versions latines d'Aristote, le mot denominativa désigne, on l'a dit, les « paronymes », c'est-à-dire ces « réalités qui, tout en différant d'une autre (réalité) par la désinence de leur nom, ont une appellation conforme au nom (de cette autre réalité) ». Chez Maître Eckhart, la notion de « prédication dénominative », empruntée à la Logica d'Avicenne (chap. 3, Venise, 1508, fol. 3 vb), rejoint la notion boécienne de praedicatio des accidentia secundum rem (De Trinitate, chap. 4), exprimant un aspect de la déficience ontologique constitutive de l’étant créé comme tel. Pour lui, dire que « les neuf catégories sont prédiquées dénominativement de la substance » (novem praedicamenta accidentium praedicantur denominative de substantia) signifie que tout étant créé est un dénominatif, c'est-à-dire un étant-ceci ou cela (ens hoc et hoc), et qu'aucun étant-ceci n'est en tant que ceci : tout « ceci » ajouté à la substance est l'expression de la défaillance (casus, πτῶσις) qui accidente le créé. C'est dans cette tradition complexe, à la fois liée à la théorie averroïste de l'accident et aux théories avicennienne (ontologique) et boécienne (théologique) de la prédication—et non à la théorie de l’analogie selon Simplicius—que se situe le célèbre passage d’In Exodum, où le Thuringien expose sa théorie des catégories, qu'on peut résumer ainsi : Les dix catégories ne sont pas les dix premiers étants (decem prima entia), mais les dix genres premiers des étants (decem prima entium genera). Il n'y a qu'un étant, la substance ; les autres réalités ne sont pas « étant » (ens), mais « de ou à l’étant » (entis), c’est-à-dire « étant seulement par analogie au seul étant au sens absolu, la substance, comme en témoigne la Métaphysique, livre VII ». Les neuf prédicaments de l’accident ne sont donc pas des étants « au cas régime » (entia in recto), mais des étants au « cas oblique » (in obliquo). C'est en ce sens « oblique » que l’urine est dite « saine », non par la santé « formellement inhérente », « mais seulement par analogie et renvoi extrinsèque à la santé elle-même, qui au sens propre et formel se trouve seulement dans l’animal » (non sanitate formaliter inhaerente, sed sola analogia et respectu ad ipsam sanitatem extra, quae proprie formaliter est in ipso animali). C’est également en ce sens que le vin est dit « être dans l’enseigne », signifiant qu’il se trouve dans la taverne et la bouteille. Telle est donc la théorie dont Nicolas prétend trouver les contours généraux, ou plus exactement l’instrumentation conceptuelle, chez Simplicius. Certes, il n'en laisse pas l’application métaphysique au commentateur lui-même—ce en quoi il a raison—mais il a tort lorsqu'il lui prête une formulation de l’analogia attributionis, qu'il ne pouvait lire que chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Eckhart. On peut spéculer à loisir sur une telle absence d'acribie. Mais n'est-ce pas Albert le Grand lui-même qui en inaugure le principe lorsque, dans sa dernière œuvre, la Summa theologiae, il prête à Proclus une distinction entre quatre types de « prédication commune » : une selon l’univocité stricte, trois selon l’analogie—un véritable montage qui, à partir de certaines expressions de Proclus sur le caractère salvifique du bien (« le bien est ce qui sauve tous les êtres et devient ainsi le terme de leur tendance »), lui permet de retrouver en fait l’interprétation averroïste de la triade porphyrienne des homonymes κατὰ διάνοιαν. Plutôt que d’incriminer les légèretés ou les insuffisances de la doxographie médiévale, nous préférons voir là le témoignage de la puissance d'assimilation et de la productivité de la grille de lecture originairement imposée par Porphyre aux textes d’Aristote. L’histoire des sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie est celle d’un invariant structurel grec et de ses remplissements arabes, qui, pour finir, retrouve d’autres Grecs traduits par Guillaume de Moerbeke. C’est l’histoire d’une dérive péripatéticienne de l’aristotélisme qui commence chez Porphyre et s’achève dans le néoplatonisme. La production médiévale de l’analogie n’est pas seulement une « replatonisation » d’Aristote, c’est aussi la marque de l’affinité structurelle qui lie entre elles toutes les formes de néoplatonisme. Plus décisif encore, elle procède moins d’un rapprochement des πρός ἕν λεγόμενα avec les synonymes que d’une substitution des πρός ἕν λεγόμενα aux paronymes. Reconduite à ses sources gréco-arabes, l’analogie apparaît ainsi avant tout comme la théorie d’une transsumption catégorielle archi-fondatrice : celle qui articule toute pensée du rapport entre la substance et l’accident. [conclusion p. 343-345] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FAqS35nEd0udN0w |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1296","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1296,"authors_free":[{"id":1889,"entry_id":1296,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":85,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"de Libera, Alain ","free_first_name":"Alain","free_last_name":"de Libera ","norm_person":{"id":85,"first_name":"Alain","last_name":"De Libera","full_name":"De Libera, Alain","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130219002","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l'analogie de l'\u00eatre","main_title":{"title":"Les sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l'analogie de l'\u00eatre"},"abstract":"C'est ici le lieu de revenir sur le concept de denominatio. Dans les versions latines d'Aristote, le mot denominativa d\u00e9signe, on l'a dit, les \u00ab paronymes \u00bb, c'est-\u00e0-dire ces \u00ab r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui, tout en diff\u00e9rant d'une autre (r\u00e9alit\u00e9) par la d\u00e9sinence de leur nom, ont une appellation conforme au nom (de cette autre r\u00e9alit\u00e9) \u00bb.\r\n\r\nChez Ma\u00eetre Eckhart, la notion de \u00ab pr\u00e9dication d\u00e9nominative \u00bb, emprunt\u00e9e \u00e0 la Logica d'Avicenne (chap. 3, Venise, 1508, fol. 3 vb), rejoint la notion bo\u00e9cienne de praedicatio des accidentia secundum rem (De Trinitate, chap. 4), exprimant un aspect de la d\u00e9ficience ontologique constitutive de l\u2019\u00e9tant cr\u00e9\u00e9 comme tel. Pour lui, dire que \u00ab les neuf cat\u00e9gories sont pr\u00e9diqu\u00e9es d\u00e9nominativement de la substance \u00bb (novem praedicamenta accidentium praedicantur denominative de substantia) signifie que tout \u00e9tant cr\u00e9\u00e9 est un d\u00e9nominatif, c'est-\u00e0-dire un \u00e9tant-ceci ou cela (ens hoc et hoc), et qu'aucun \u00e9tant-ceci n'est en tant que ceci : tout \u00ab ceci \u00bb ajout\u00e9 \u00e0 la substance est l'expression de la d\u00e9faillance (casus, \u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) qui accidente le cr\u00e9\u00e9.\r\n\r\nC'est dans cette tradition complexe, \u00e0 la fois li\u00e9e \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie averro\u00efste de l'accident et aux th\u00e9ories avicennienne (ontologique) et bo\u00e9cienne (th\u00e9ologique) de la pr\u00e9dication\u2014et non \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie de l\u2019analogie selon Simplicius\u2014que se situe le c\u00e9l\u00e8bre passage d\u2019In Exodum, o\u00f9 le Thuringien expose sa th\u00e9orie des cat\u00e9gories, qu'on peut r\u00e9sumer ainsi :\r\n\r\n Les dix cat\u00e9gories ne sont pas les dix premiers \u00e9tants (decem prima entia), mais les dix genres premiers des \u00e9tants (decem prima entium genera).\r\n Il n'y a qu'un \u00e9tant, la substance ; les autres r\u00e9alit\u00e9s ne sont pas \u00ab \u00e9tant \u00bb (ens), mais \u00ab de ou \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tant \u00bb (entis), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire \u00ab \u00e9tant seulement par analogie au seul \u00e9tant au sens absolu, la substance, comme en t\u00e9moigne la M\u00e9taphysique, livre VII \u00bb.\r\n Les neuf pr\u00e9dicaments de l\u2019accident ne sont donc pas des \u00e9tants \u00ab au cas r\u00e9gime \u00bb (entia in recto), mais des \u00e9tants au \u00ab cas oblique \u00bb (in obliquo).\r\n C'est en ce sens \u00ab oblique \u00bb que l\u2019urine est dite \u00ab saine \u00bb, non par la sant\u00e9 \u00ab formellement inh\u00e9rente \u00bb, \u00ab mais seulement par analogie et renvoi extrins\u00e8que \u00e0 la sant\u00e9 elle-m\u00eame, qui au sens propre et formel se trouve seulement dans l\u2019animal \u00bb (non sanitate formaliter inhaerente, sed sola analogia et respectu ad ipsam sanitatem extra, quae proprie formaliter est in ipso animali).\r\n C\u2019est \u00e9galement en ce sens que le vin est dit \u00ab \u00eatre dans l\u2019enseigne \u00bb, signifiant qu\u2019il se trouve dans la taverne et la bouteille.\r\n\r\nTelle est donc la th\u00e9orie dont Nicolas pr\u00e9tend trouver les contours g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, ou plus exactement l\u2019instrumentation conceptuelle, chez Simplicius. Certes, il n'en laisse pas l\u2019application m\u00e9taphysique au commentateur lui-m\u00eame\u2014ce en quoi il a raison\u2014mais il a tort lorsqu'il lui pr\u00eate une formulation de l\u2019analogia attributionis, qu'il ne pouvait lire que chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Eckhart.\r\n\r\nOn peut sp\u00e9culer \u00e0 loisir sur une telle absence d'acribie. Mais n'est-ce pas Albert le Grand lui-m\u00eame qui en inaugure le principe lorsque, dans sa derni\u00e8re \u0153uvre, la Summa theologiae, il pr\u00eate \u00e0 Proclus une distinction entre quatre types de \u00ab pr\u00e9dication commune \u00bb : une selon l\u2019univocit\u00e9 stricte, trois selon l\u2019analogie\u2014un v\u00e9ritable montage qui, \u00e0 partir de certaines expressions de Proclus sur le caract\u00e8re salvifique du bien (\u00ab le bien est ce qui sauve tous les \u00eatres et devient ainsi le terme de leur tendance \u00bb), lui permet de retrouver en fait l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation averro\u00efste de la triade porphyrienne des homonymes \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd.\r\n\r\nPlut\u00f4t que d\u2019incriminer les l\u00e9g\u00e8ret\u00e9s ou les insuffisances de la doxographie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale, nous pr\u00e9f\u00e9rons voir l\u00e0 le t\u00e9moignage de la puissance d'assimilation et de la productivit\u00e9 de la grille de lecture originairement impos\u00e9e par Porphyre aux textes d\u2019Aristote.\r\n\r\nL\u2019histoire des sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l\u2019analogie est celle d\u2019un invariant structurel grec et de ses remplissements arabes, qui, pour finir, retrouve d\u2019autres Grecs traduits par Guillaume de Moerbeke. C\u2019est l\u2019histoire d\u2019une d\u00e9rive p\u00e9ripat\u00e9ticienne de l\u2019aristot\u00e9lisme qui commence chez Porphyre et s\u2019ach\u00e8ve dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme. La production m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l\u2019analogie n\u2019est pas seulement une \u00ab replatonisation \u00bb d\u2019Aristote, c\u2019est aussi la marque de l\u2019affinit\u00e9 structurelle qui lie entre elles toutes les formes de n\u00e9oplatonisme. Plus d\u00e9cisif encore, elle proc\u00e8de moins d\u2019un rapprochement des \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 avec les synonymes que d\u2019une substitution des \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 aux paronymes.\r\n\r\nReconduite \u00e0 ses sources gr\u00e9co-arabes, l\u2019analogie appara\u00eet ainsi avant tout comme la th\u00e9orie d\u2019une transsumption cat\u00e9gorielle archi-fondatrice : celle qui articule toute pens\u00e9e du rapport entre la substance et l\u2019accident. [conclusion p. 343-345]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FAqS35nEd0udN0w","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":85,"full_name":"De Libera, Alain","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1296,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3","issue":"4","pages":"319-345"}},"sort":[1989]}
Title | La Physique d’Empédocle selon Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire |
Volume | 67 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 65-74 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Stevens, Annick |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
J'en arrive à faire la synthèse de l'apport positif et original qui résulte de l'étude de Simplicius. Tout d'abord, quand il ne se démarque pas de la tradition doxographique, c'est qu'elle transmet l'interprétation la plus plausible : ainsi, la matérialité des racines à partir desquelles sont créés tous les corps et l'explication de leurs mélanges par l'introduction de principes de création, auxquels il donne un nom assez prudent pour ne pas offrir prise à la réfutation. Remarquons en outre sa clairvoyance quant au choix de la désignation des principes créateurs à partir de notions connues dans le réel observable, pour décrire le réel invisible. D'autre part, Simplicius se démarque des autres doxographes anciens en refusant la conception d'un cycle cosmique à quatre phases. Là encore, si l'on veut respecter le texte d'Empédocle, on ne peut que lui donner raison : seuls deux stades cosmiques sont décrits : le tout unifié de la Sphère (où la Haine, néanmoins, n'est pas détruite mais retirée aux confins) et la multiplicité née de l'opposition des deux principes créateurs. Il fallait en effet souligner que ni l'un ni l'autre ne peut créer seul ; en ce sens, ils sont, autant qu'opposés, complémentaires. Reste à savoir si ces deux stades existent alternativement ou simultanément et, à ce propos, il est clair que Simplicius a voulu imposer la vision néo-platonicienne au détriment de la stricte observation du texte. Ses arguments en faveur de la « double disposition » sont faibles et parfois même péremptoires, dans la mesure où il annihile les passages qui le gênent en les qualifiant de « fiction poétique ». En revanche, sa « solution de rechange », qui fait état d'une coexistence entre le mouvement et une certaine forme d'immobilité (donc, d'une certaine manière, d'une double manifestation du réel) — cette immobilité résultant de l'incessant roulement du devenir —, cette conception, loin d'entrer en contradiction avec ce que nous savons des théories présocratiques en général et empédocléenne en particulier, est extrêmement intéressante et peut ouvrir la voie à un nouvel examen approfondi du poème d'Empédocle. [conclusion p. 74] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tQhjx4b0GzJ1L5S |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"480","_score":null,"_source":{"id":480,"authors_free":[{"id":650,"entry_id":480,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":323,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Stevens, Annick","free_first_name":"Annick","free_last_name":"Stevens","norm_person":{"id":323,"first_name":" Annick","last_name":"Stevens","full_name":"Stevens, Annick","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1195240120","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La Physique d\u2019Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"La Physique d\u2019Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius"},"abstract":"J'en arrive \u00e0 faire la synth\u00e8se de l'apport positif et original qui r\u00e9sulte de l'\u00e9tude de Simplicius. Tout d'abord, quand il ne se d\u00e9marque pas de la tradition doxographique, c'est qu'elle transmet l'interpr\u00e9tation la plus plausible : ainsi, la mat\u00e9rialit\u00e9 des racines \u00e0 partir desquelles sont cr\u00e9\u00e9s tous les corps et l'explication de leurs m\u00e9langes par l'introduction de principes de cr\u00e9ation, auxquels il donne un nom assez prudent pour ne pas offrir prise \u00e0 la r\u00e9futation. Remarquons en outre sa clairvoyance quant au choix de la d\u00e9signation des principes cr\u00e9ateurs \u00e0 partir de notions connues dans le r\u00e9el observable, pour d\u00e9crire le r\u00e9el invisible.\r\n\r\nD'autre part, Simplicius se d\u00e9marque des autres doxographes anciens en refusant la conception d'un cycle cosmique \u00e0 quatre phases. L\u00e0 encore, si l'on veut respecter le texte d'Emp\u00e9docle, on ne peut que lui donner raison : seuls deux stades cosmiques sont d\u00e9crits : le tout unifi\u00e9 de la Sph\u00e8re (o\u00f9 la Haine, n\u00e9anmoins, n'est pas d\u00e9truite mais retir\u00e9e aux confins) et la multiplicit\u00e9 n\u00e9e de l'opposition des deux principes cr\u00e9ateurs. Il fallait en effet souligner que ni l'un ni l'autre ne peut cr\u00e9er seul ; en ce sens, ils sont, autant qu'oppos\u00e9s, compl\u00e9mentaires.\r\n\r\nReste \u00e0 savoir si ces deux stades existent alternativement ou simultan\u00e9ment et, \u00e0 ce propos, il est clair que Simplicius a voulu imposer la vision n\u00e9o-platonicienne au d\u00e9triment de la stricte observation du texte. Ses arguments en faveur de la \u00ab double disposition \u00bb sont faibles et parfois m\u00eame p\u00e9remptoires, dans la mesure o\u00f9 il annihile les passages qui le g\u00eanent en les qualifiant de \u00ab fiction po\u00e9tique \u00bb.\r\n\r\nEn revanche, sa \u00ab solution de rechange \u00bb, qui fait \u00e9tat d'une coexistence entre le mouvement et une certaine forme d'immobilit\u00e9 (donc, d'une certaine mani\u00e8re, d'une double manifestation du r\u00e9el) \u2014 cette immobilit\u00e9 r\u00e9sultant de l'incessant roulement du devenir \u2014, cette conception, loin d'entrer en contradiction avec ce que nous savons des th\u00e9ories pr\u00e9socratiques en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et emp\u00e9docl\u00e9enne en particulier, est extr\u00eamement int\u00e9ressante et peut ouvrir la voie \u00e0 un nouvel examen approfondi du po\u00e8me d'Emp\u00e9docle. [conclusion p. 74]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tQhjx4b0GzJ1L5S","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":323,"full_name":"Stevens, Annick","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":480,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire","volume":"67","issue":"1","pages":"65-74"}},"sort":[1989]}
Title | Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Ultimate Reality and Meaning |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 248-255 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Silvestre, Maria Luisa |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
That the world of Anaxagoras is without any soul entails that Nous is for him the ultimate reality. It is not the end of our life, but the origin of the world and of ourselves. It is that which brings life and at the same time that which gives human beings the possibility of knowing anything whatsoever. This is all that we can deduce from Plato and Aristotle's presentation of Anaxagoras' doctrine on Nous. Simplicius cites a passage in which we can see that Nous is infinite, has power over everything, and knows the past, the present, and even future time: While other things have a share of everything, Nous is infinite, self-governing, and has been mixed with nothing ... For it is the lightest of all things and the purest, and maintains complete understanding over everything and wields the greatest power. And Nous controls all, large and small, that has life ... and whatever sort of things were to be—what were and are no longer, what are, and what will be—Nous put all in order. (B12; Sider, 1981, p. 94). We are not sure if Anaxagoras' Nous really was all that Simplicius attributes to it, but there can be no doubt that Simplicius, like Plato and every other interpreter of Anaxagoras' Nous, agrees that Nous is the ultimate reality in Anaxagoras' philosophy. In our view, Anaxagoras' Nous can be described as a force originating in the interior of the All, which suddenly frees itself and introduces a movement that upsets, separates, aggregates, and distinguishes. Yet at the same time, it is a rational force of understanding, since its characteristic function—understanding—for Anaxagoras means nothing else but putting persons and things in their proper places in relation to each other. [conclusion p. 254-255] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/WLkg0ul3k8yw6Tq |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1524","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1524,"authors_free":[{"id":2649,"entry_id":1524,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":404,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","free_first_name":"Maria Luisa","free_last_name":"Silvestre","norm_person":{"id":404,"first_name":"Maria Luisa","last_name":"Silvestre","full_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158446594","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"That the world of Anaxagoras is without any soul entails that Nous is for him the ultimate reality. It is not the end of our life, but the origin of the world and of ourselves. It is that which brings life and at the same time that which gives human beings the possibility of knowing anything whatsoever. This is all that we can deduce from Plato and Aristotle's presentation of Anaxagoras' doctrine on Nous. Simplicius cites a passage in which we can see that Nous is infinite, has power over everything, and knows the past, the present, and even future time:\r\n\r\n While other things have a share of everything, Nous is infinite, self-governing, and has been mixed with nothing ... For it is the lightest of all things and the purest, and maintains complete understanding over everything and wields the greatest power. And Nous controls all, large and small, that has life ... and whatever sort of things were to be\u2014what were and are no longer, what are, and what will be\u2014Nous put all in order. (B12; Sider, 1981, p. 94).\r\n\r\nWe are not sure if Anaxagoras' Nous really was all that Simplicius attributes to it, but there can be no doubt that Simplicius, like Plato and every other interpreter of Anaxagoras' Nous, agrees that Nous is the ultimate reality in Anaxagoras' philosophy.\r\n\r\nIn our view, Anaxagoras' Nous can be described as a force originating in the interior of the All, which suddenly frees itself and introduces a movement that upsets, separates, aggregates, and distinguishes. Yet at the same time, it is a rational force of understanding, since its characteristic function\u2014understanding\u2014for Anaxagoras means nothing else but putting persons and things in their proper places in relation to each other. [conclusion p. 254-255]","btype":3,"date":" 1989","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/WLkg0ul3k8yw6Tq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":404,"full_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1524,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ultimate Reality and Meaning","volume":"12","issue":"4","pages":"248-255"}},"sort":[1989]}
Title | Studi recenti sulla vita e l'opera di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1988 |
Journal | Studi Classici e Orientali |
Volume | 38 |
Pages | 331–346 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Linguiti, Alessandro |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I commentatori neoplatonici di Aristotele sono stati probabilmente gli ultimi a beneficiare del generale risveglio d’interesse per il neoplatonismo che, manifestatosi a partire dal secondo dopoguerra, sta divenendo sempre più evidente negli ultimi anni. Per lungo tempo, come è stato osservato, essi hanno occupato una sorta di terra di nessuno tra la filosofia antica e quella medievale. Inoltre, gli studiosi di neoplatonismo hanno preferito concentrare la loro attenzione sulle opere teoriche originali piuttosto che sui commentari, mentre i moderni interpreti di Aristotele, a differenza di quelli medievali, arabi o cristiani, hanno generalmente trascurato il commento greco, interpellandolo perlopiù su questioni particolari e circoscritte, e quasi mai esaminandolo nel suo impianto generale. Anche Simplicio ha condiviso questa sorte, e se il suo nome suona più familiare di quello di altri autori neoplatonici, ciò è dovuto essenzialmente all’importanza della sua testimonianza sulla scuola eleatica e all’interesse suscitato dalle dottrine contenute nel Corollario sul tempo: due elementi tutto sommato marginali ai fini di una valutazione complessiva del suo pensiero. Negli ultimi tempi, tuttavia, il panorama si sta modificando. Basti pensare, ad esempio, al libro di Ilsetraut Hadot sul neoplatonismo alessandrino apparso dieci anni fa, o a un convegno tenutosi a Parigi nell’autunno del 1985, con il patrocinio del Centre de recherche sur les œuvres et la pensée de Simplicius. Questo evento ha confermato la serietà dell’intento di leggere oggi i commentari neoplatonici come opere filosofiche a sé stanti, dotate di una propria coerenza interna e di un’autonoma responsabilità teorica. Gli atti del convegno, curati da Ilsetraut Hadot, sono stati pubblicati nel 1987: le relazioni presentate sono state distribuite in quattro sezioni, riguardanti rispettivamente le vicende biografiche di Simplicio, gli aspetti dottrinali dell’opera, le questioni attinenti alla trasmissione dei testi e la fortuna dell’autore nell’arco di tempo compreso tra il XIII e il XVII secolo. [introduction p. 331-332] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6LG7LMnxCvxF7RE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"871","_score":null,"_source":{"id":871,"authors_free":[{"id":1280,"entry_id":871,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":250,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Linguiti, Alessandro","free_first_name":"Alessandro","free_last_name":"Linguiti","norm_person":{"id":250,"first_name":"Alessandro","last_name":"Linguiti","full_name":"Linguiti, Alessandro","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137059574","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Studi recenti sulla vita e l'opera di Simplicio","main_title":{"title":"Studi recenti sulla vita e l'opera di Simplicio"},"abstract":"I commentatori neoplatonici di Aristotele sono stati probabilmente gli ultimi a beneficiare del generale risveglio d\u2019interesse per il neoplatonismo che, manifestatosi a partire dal secondo dopoguerra, sta divenendo sempre pi\u00f9 evidente negli ultimi anni. Per lungo tempo, come \u00e8 stato osservato, essi hanno occupato una sorta di terra di nessuno tra la filosofia antica e quella medievale. Inoltre, gli studiosi di neoplatonismo hanno preferito concentrare la loro attenzione sulle opere teoriche originali piuttosto che sui commentari, mentre i moderni interpreti di Aristotele, a differenza di quelli medievali, arabi o cristiani, hanno generalmente trascurato il commento greco, interpellandolo perlopi\u00f9 su questioni particolari e circoscritte, e quasi mai esaminandolo nel suo impianto generale.\r\n\r\nAnche Simplicio ha condiviso questa sorte, e se il suo nome suona pi\u00f9 familiare di quello di altri autori neoplatonici, ci\u00f2 \u00e8 dovuto essenzialmente all\u2019importanza della sua testimonianza sulla scuola eleatica e all\u2019interesse suscitato dalle dottrine contenute nel Corollario sul tempo: due elementi tutto sommato marginali ai fini di una valutazione complessiva del suo pensiero.\r\n\r\nNegli ultimi tempi, tuttavia, il panorama si sta modificando. Basti pensare, ad esempio, al libro di Ilsetraut Hadot sul neoplatonismo alessandrino apparso dieci anni fa, o a un convegno tenutosi a Parigi nell\u2019autunno del 1985, con il patrocinio del Centre de recherche sur les \u0153uvres et la pens\u00e9e de Simplicius. Questo evento ha confermato la seriet\u00e0 dell\u2019intento di leggere oggi i commentari neoplatonici come opere filosofiche a s\u00e9 stanti, dotate di una propria coerenza interna e di un\u2019autonoma responsabilit\u00e0 teorica.\r\n\r\nGli atti del convegno, curati da Ilsetraut Hadot, sono stati pubblicati nel 1987: le relazioni presentate sono state distribuite in quattro sezioni, riguardanti rispettivamente le vicende biografiche di Simplicio, gli aspetti dottrinali dell\u2019opera, le questioni attinenti alla trasmissione dei testi e la fortuna dell\u2019autore nell\u2019arco di tempo compreso tra il XIII e il XVII secolo.\r\n[introduction p. 331-332]","btype":3,"date":"1988","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6LG7LMnxCvxF7RE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":250,"full_name":"Linguiti, Alessandro","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":871,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studi Classici e Orientali","volume":"38","issue":"","pages":"331\u2013346"}},"sort":[1988]}
Title | Définition et description: Le problème de la saisie des genres premiers et des individus chez Aristote dans l'exégèse de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1987 |
Journal | Archives de Philosophie |
Volume | 50 |
Pages | 529-554 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Narbonne, Jean-Marc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius uses (and distorts) the concept of hypographe (of Stoic origin) in order to describe the first genera and the particulars which, in Aristotle, are not susceptible to definition. However, a closer examination of the status of science in Aristotle (with reference to the doctrine of incommunicability of genera and the problem of individuation) shows that Simplicius’ attempt is incompatible, or at least difficult to reconcile, with the aristotelianism (of Aristotle). [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/o2VUk12kzrbnaz0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1107","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1107,"authors_free":[{"id":1674,"entry_id":1107,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":275,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Narbonne, Jean-Marc","free_first_name":"Jean-Marc","free_last_name":"Narbonne","norm_person":{"id":275,"first_name":"Jean-Marc","last_name":"Narbonne","full_name":"Narbonne, Jean-Marc","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/124470408","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"D\u00e9finition et description: Le probl\u00e8me de la saisie des genres premiers et des individus chez Aristote dans l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"D\u00e9finition et description: Le probl\u00e8me de la saisie des genres premiers et des individus chez Aristote dans l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de Simplicius"},"abstract":"Simplicius uses (and distorts) the concept of hypographe (of Stoic origin) in order to describe the first genera and the particulars which, in Aristotle, are not susceptible to definition. However, a closer examination of the status of science in Aristotle (with reference to the doctrine of incommunicability of genera and the problem of individuation) shows that Simplicius\u2019 attempt is incompatible, or at least difficult to reconcile, with the aristotelianism (of Aristotle). [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1987","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/o2VUk12kzrbnaz0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":275,"full_name":"Narbonne, Jean-Marc","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1107,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archives de Philosophie","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"529-554"}},"sort":[1987]}
Title | Empedocles Recycled |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1987 |
Journal | Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 37 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 24-50 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is no longer generally believed that Empedocles was the divided character portrayed by nineteenth-century scholars, a man whose scientific and religious views were incompatible but untouched by each other. Yet it is still widely held that, however unitary his thought, nevertheless he still wrote more than one poem, and that his poems can be clearly divided between those which do, and those which do not, concern 'religious matters'.1 Once this assumption can be shown to be shaky or actually false, the grounds for dividing the quotations of Empedocles into two poems by subject matter disappear; and without that division our interpretation of Empedocles stands in need of radical revision. This paper starts with the modest task of showing that Empedocles may have written only one philosophical poem and not two, and goes on to suggest some of the ways in which we have to rethink the whole story if he did. If all our material belongs to one poem we are bound to link the cycle of the daimones with that of the elements, and this has far-reaching consequences for our interpretation. [Introduction, p. 24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IeJ48ZtTcIZFqmP |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1092","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1092,"authors_free":[{"id":1650,"entry_id":1092,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":280,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Osborne, Catherine","free_first_name":"Catherine","free_last_name":"Osborne","norm_person":{"id":280,"first_name":"Catherine","last_name":"Rowett","full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142220116","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles Recycled","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles Recycled"},"abstract":"It is no longer generally believed that Empedocles was the divided character portrayed by nineteenth-century scholars, a man whose scientific and religious views were incompatible but untouched by each other. Yet it is still widely held that, however unitary his thought, nevertheless he still wrote more than one poem, and that his poems can be clearly divided between those which do, and those which do not, concern \r\n'religious matters'.1 Once this assumption can be shown to be shaky or actually false, the grounds for dividing the quotations of Empedocles into two poems by subject matter disappear; and without that division our interpretation of Empedocles stands in need of radical revision. This paper starts with the modest task of showing that Empedocles may have written only one philosophical poem and not two, and goes on to suggest some of the ways in which we have to rethink the whole story if he did. If all our material belongs to one poem we are bound to link the cycle of the daimones with that of the elements, and this has far-reaching consequences for our \r\ninterpretation. [Introduction, p. 24]","btype":3,"date":"1987","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IeJ48ZtTcIZFqmP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":280,"full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1092,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Quarterly","volume":"37","issue":"1","pages":"24-50"}},"sort":[1987]}
Title | John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 114 |
Pages | 314–335 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
What, in the end, can we say about Philoponus’ position as a Platonist, bearing in mind that our conclusions must still in some respects be provisional? That he was a Neoplatonist is indisputable. Since, however, few if any, of his differences with other Neoplatonists seem to arise from the adoption of a specifically Alexandrian philosophical point of view, we must attribute them to his own philosophical - and theological - orientation. It turns out that, in his case, »Alexandrian Platonist« may mean little more than a man whose philosophy was Neoplatonic, and who worked at Alexandria, though one might observe that there would not have been a warm welcome at Athens for a Christian Neoplatonist, however closely his views might conform to those codified by Proclus and developed by Damascius. One could go on to say that, apart from the concentration on Aristotle, his differences from other Alexandrians were greater than theirs from the Athenians. In this connection we should notice Philoponus’ frequent appeals to Plato against Aristotle in the passages Simplicius singles out for complaint, and his relatively frequent reservations about the agreement, symphônia, of Plato and Aristotle, which most others eagerly sought to demonstrate. And since we started with a critique of P r a e c h t e r , who did so much to initiate the serious study of the Aristotelian commentators, it might be appropriate to end with his characteri sation of Philoponus in the De aeternitate mundi: »es ist der gelehrte Platoniker der spricht«. [conclusion, p. 334-335] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cP5twq2fWJQvBVn |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"628","_score":null,"_source":{"id":628,"authors_free":[{"id":888,"entry_id":628,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist?","main_title":{"title":"John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist?"},"abstract":"What, in the end, can we say about Philoponus\u2019 position as a Platonist, bearing in mind that our conclusions must still in some respects be provision\u00adal? That he was a Neoplatonist is indisputable. Since, however, few if any, of \r\nhis differences with other Neoplatonists seem to arise from the adoption of a specifically Alexandrian philosophical point of view, we must attribute them to his own philosophical - and theological - orientation. It turns out that, in \r\nhis case, \u00bbAlexandrian Platonist\u00ab may mean little more than a man whose philosophy was Neoplatonic, and who worked at Alexandria, though one might observe that there would not have been a warm welcome at Athens for a \r\nChristian Neoplatonist, however closely his views might conform to those codified by Proclus and developed by Damascius. One could go on to say \r\nthat, apart from the concentration on Aristotle, his differences from other Alexandrians were greater than theirs from the Athenians. In this connection \r\nwe should notice Philoponus\u2019 frequent appeals to Plato against Aristotle in the passages Simplicius singles out for complaint, and his relatively frequent reservations about the agreement, symph\u00f4nia, of Plato and Aristotle, which \r\nmost others eagerly sought to demonstrate. And since we started with a critique of P r a e c h t e r , who did so much to initiate the serious study of the \r\nAristotelian commentators, it might be appropriate to end with his characteri\u00ad\r\nsation of Philoponus in the De aeternitate mundi: \u00bbes ist der gelehrte Platoniker der spricht\u00ab. [conclusion, p. 334-335]\r\n","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cP5twq2fWJQvBVn","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":628,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"114","issue":"","pages":"314\u2013335"}},"sort":[1986]}
Title | Simplicio, gli stoici e le categorie |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Rivista di storia della filosofia |
Volume | 41 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 3-18 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Isnardi Parente, Margherita |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius, In Arist. Categ.,165, 32 sqq. Kalbfleisch, give us an example of the Stoic theory of the categories which seems to be inconsistent with the better known chrysippean theory of the ‘quadri¬partite division’. In Simplicius’ statement we find a first diaeresis (kath’hautá/prós ti) and a second division or hypodiaeresis (‘differentiated relations’ and ‘simple dispositions’ or correlations). Such a division follows a rather platonic-academic schematisms, and — as in Xenocratean or Hermodorean classification of being — the concept of relation occupies in it a privilegiate place. Instead of speaking simply of a continuity between Academy and Stoa, we can more probably hypothize a change in the development of the Stoic theory. The concept of ‘relation’ has an increas¬ing importance after Chrysippus, with the elaboration, by Antipater of Tarsus, of the concept of héxis and hektón; whereas the concept of quality — which is regarded, from Zeno to Chrysippus, as a corporeal entity, substratum, pneuma — is profoundly altered by the introduction of the new concept of ‘incorporeal qualities’. Perhaps later Stoics approached Academic thought in their attempt of a new kind of division, in order to find a better ontological status for ‘relation’ and ‘incorporeity’. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zjhuwrqRYr6pD6m |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1090","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1090,"authors_free":[{"id":1648,"entry_id":1090,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":282,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","free_first_name":"Margherita","free_last_name":"Isnardi Parente","norm_person":{"id":282,"first_name":"Margherita","last_name":"Isnardi Parente","full_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1023256045","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicio, gli stoici e le categorie","main_title":{"title":"Simplicio, gli stoici e le categorie"},"abstract":"Simplicius, In Arist. Categ.,165, 32 sqq. Kalbfleisch, give us an example of the Stoic theory of the categories which seems to be inconsistent with the better known chrysippean theory of the \u2018quadri\u00acpartite division\u2019. In Simplicius\u2019 statement we find a first diaeresis (kath\u2019haut\u00e1\/pr\u00f3s ti) and a second division or hypodiaeresis (\u2018differentiated relations\u2019 and \u2018simple dispositions\u2019 or correlations). Such a division follows a rather platonic-academic schematisms, and \u2014 as in Xenocratean or Hermodorean classification of being \u2014 the concept of relation occupies in it a privilegiate place. Instead of speaking simply of a continuity between Academy and Stoa, we can more probably hypothize a change in the development of the Stoic theory. The concept of \u2018relation\u2019 has an increas\u00acing importance after Chrysippus, with the elaboration, by Antipater of Tarsus, of the concept of h\u00e9xis and hekt\u00f3n; whereas the concept of quality \u2014 which is regarded, from Zeno to Chrysippus, as a corporeal entity, substratum, pneuma \u2014 is profoundly altered by the introduction of the new concept of \u2018incorporeal qualities\u2019. Perhaps later Stoics approached Academic thought in their attempt of a new kind of division, in order to find a better ontological status for \u2018relation\u2019 and \u2018incorporeity\u2019. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zjhuwrqRYr6pD6m","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":282,"full_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1090,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista di storia della filosofia","volume":"41","issue":"1","pages":"3-18"}},"sort":[1986]}
Title | The Cosmology of Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 107 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 303-317 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Our main source of information about the cosmological component of Parmenides’ doctrine of Opinion —apart from the first three and a half abstruse lines of fr. 12 — is Aetius’ account. This, however, is generally regarded as confused, garbled and incompatible with fr. 12. The reconstruction of Parmenides’ cosmology is thus considered a hopeless task, for “it must inevitably be based on many conjectures.” I, however, cannot accept this conclusion, for, as I argue below, it is possible to provide a reasonably intelligible account of Aetius’ report (except for the corrupt sentence about the goddess) which is also compatible with fr. 12, provided, of course, that we are not bent upon proving our sources incompatible, but rather seek to reconcile them. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3OYYrw5qTwsrSkx |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"548","_score":null,"_source":{"id":548,"authors_free":[{"id":772,"entry_id":548,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Cosmology of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"The Cosmology of Parmenides"},"abstract":"Our main source of information about the cosmological compo\u00adnent of Parmenides\u2019 doctrine of Opinion \u2014apart from the first three and a half abstruse lines of fr. 12 \u2014 is Aetius\u2019 account. This, however, is generally regarded as confused, garbled and incompatible with fr. 12. The reconstruction of Parmenides\u2019 cosmology is thus considered a hope\u00adless task, for \u201cit must inevitably be based on many conjectures.\u201d I, however, cannot accept this conclusion, for, as I argue below, it is possible to provide a reasonably intelligible account of Aetius\u2019 report (except for the corrupt sentence about the goddess) which is also com\u00adpatible with fr. 12, provided, of course, that we are not bent upon prov\u00ading our sources incompatible, but rather seek to reconcile them. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3OYYrw5qTwsrSkx","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":548,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"107","issue":"3","pages":"303-317"}},"sort":[1986]}
Title | Colloque international sur la vie, l'œuvre et la survie de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Gnomon |
Volume | 58 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 191-192 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Vom 28. September bis zum 1. Oktober 1985 fand in Paris in der Fondation Hugot du Collège de France ein internationales Colloquium statt, das zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie und der Geschichte der Philosophie den neuplatonischen Philosophen Simplikios zum Gegenstand hatte. Das Ziel des Colloquiums war es, einen ersten Gedankenaustausch derjenigen, nicht sehr zahlreichen, Wissenschaftler zu ermöglichen, die etwa seit einem Jahrzehnt begonnen haben, das philosophische Denken des Simplikios systematisch zu erfassen, gesicherte Text grundlagen durch die Erstellung neuer kritischer Editionen zu liefern und die Texte selbst durch Übersetzungen einem weiteren, philosophisch interessierten Publikum zugänglich zu machen. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AUBZDJhIvjp1dxV |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"584","_score":null,"_source":{"id":584,"authors_free":[{"id":828,"entry_id":584,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Colloque international sur la vie, l'\u0153uvre et la survie de Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Colloque international sur la vie, l'\u0153uvre et la survie de Simplicius"},"abstract":"Vom 28. September bis zum 1. Oktober 1985 fand in Paris in der Fondation Hugot du Coll\u00e8ge de France ein internationales Colloquium statt, das zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie und der Geschichte der Philosophie den neuplatonischen Philosophen Simplikios zum Gegenstand hatte. Das Ziel des Colloquiums war es, einen ersten Gedankenaustausch derjenigen, nicht sehr zahlreichen, Wissenschaftler zu erm\u00f6glichen, die etwa seit einem Jahrzehnt begonnen haben, das philosophische Denken des Simplikios systematisch zu erfassen, gesicherte Text grundlagen durch die Erstellung neuer kritischer Editionen zu liefern und die Texte selbst durch \u00dcbersetzungen einem weiteren, philosophisch interessierten Publikum zug\u00e4nglich zu machen. ","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AUBZDJhIvjp1dxV","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":584,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Gnomon","volume":"58","issue":"2","pages":"191-192"}},"sort":[1986]}
Title | Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 31 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 243-257 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gottschalk, Hans B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Three writers of late antiquity, all of them Neoplatonists, refer to the psychological doctrine of a certain Boethus. Several philosophers of that name are known, and the fragments have been variously assigned to the Stoic, Boethus of Sidon, who lived in the middle of the second century BC, and his Peripatetic namesake, active about a century later. ' The purpose of this article is to see what exactly we can learn about this thinker from the extant fragments and then to determine which of the various Boethi he is most likely to have been. [introduction, p. 243] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5lu8RgGIGt7Wnhe |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1331","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1331,"authors_free":[{"id":1964,"entry_id":1331,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":135,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","free_first_name":"Hans B.","free_last_name":"Gottschalk,","norm_person":{"id":135,"first_name":"Hans B.","last_name":"Gottschalk","full_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1161498559","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists","main_title":{"title":"Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists"},"abstract":"Three writers of late antiquity, all of them Neoplatonists, refer to the psychological doctrine of a certain Boethus. Several philosophers of that name are known, and the fragments have been variously assigned to the Stoic, Boethus of Sidon, who lived in the middle of the second century BC, and his Peripatetic namesake, active about a century later. ' The purpose of this article is to see what exactly we can learn about this thinker from the extant fragments and then to determine which of the various Boethi he is most likely to have been. [introduction, p. 243]","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5lu8RgGIGt7Wnhe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":135,"full_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1331,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"31","issue":"3","pages":"243-257"}},"sort":[1986]}
Title | Les sources vénitiennes de l’édition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius sur la „Physique“ d’Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | Scriptorium |
Volume | 39 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 70–88 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Codero, Néstor-Luis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Nous pouvons revenir maintenant à notre point de départ : qui a été le responsable de l'édition de 1526 ? Aucun des éléments nouveaux ne s'oppose à notre hypothèse initiale : l'édition est due aux soins de Francesco d'Asola, responsable de la plupart des titres publiés « ex aedibus Aldi » depuis 1518. Nous avons vu qu'il était le destinataire des manuscrits d'Aetius empruntés par Marcantonio Contarini à la Marciana, et nous avons supposé que le même procédé s'était appliqué aux deux textes de Simplicius édités en 1526. Nous conservons une image très floue de ce personnage, dont le nom complet était Gian Francesco Torresani d'Asola. Il était le beau-frère d'Alde Manuce ; son père, Andrea d'Asola, fut le responsable de l'imprimerie depuis la mort d'Alde (1514) jusqu'à 1529. Selon Degli Agostini, Francesco d'Asola était le protégé du cardinal Hercule de Gonzague — auquel est dédiée l'édition de la Physique — et il avait repris avec succès l'héritage d'Alde. Pour J. B. Egnazio, d'Asola était un « jeune homme cultivé ayant les meilleures habitudes » et, en 1542, Pellicier le remercie de l'envoi à la bibliothèque de Fontainebleau de quatre-vingts manuscrits grecs et de quelques autres manuscrits latins. Malgré sa gentillesse et ses « meilleures habitudes », il est évident que d'Asola n'adopte pas la devise d'Alde : « Non enim recipio emendaturum libros », car il a beaucoup amendé. Diels avait raison lorsqu'il signalait que « Aldini exempli editor haud pauca novavit, infeliciter plurima ». [conclusion p. 86] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Gj5dBBrkScJI1Gs |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"604","_score":null,"_source":{"id":604,"authors_free":[{"id":855,"entry_id":604,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":54,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Codero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Codero","norm_person":{"id":54,"first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","last_name":"Cordero","full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1055808973","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les sources v\u00e9nitiennes de l\u2019\u00e9dition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius sur la \u201ePhysique\u201c d\u2019Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Les sources v\u00e9nitiennes de l\u2019\u00e9dition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius sur la \u201ePhysique\u201c d\u2019Aristote"},"abstract":"Nous pouvons revenir maintenant \u00e0 notre point de d\u00e9part : qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 le responsable de l'\u00e9dition de 1526 ? Aucun des \u00e9l\u00e9ments nouveaux ne s'oppose \u00e0 notre hypoth\u00e8se initiale : l'\u00e9dition est due aux soins de Francesco d'Asola, responsable de la plupart des titres publi\u00e9s \u00ab ex aedibus Aldi \u00bb depuis 1518.\r\n\r\nNous avons vu qu'il \u00e9tait le destinataire des manuscrits d'Aetius emprunt\u00e9s par Marcantonio Contarini \u00e0 la Marciana, et nous avons suppos\u00e9 que le m\u00eame proc\u00e9d\u00e9 s'\u00e9tait appliqu\u00e9 aux deux textes de Simplicius \u00e9dit\u00e9s en 1526.\r\n\r\nNous conservons une image tr\u00e8s floue de ce personnage, dont le nom complet \u00e9tait Gian Francesco Torresani d'Asola. Il \u00e9tait le beau-fr\u00e8re d'Alde Manuce ; son p\u00e8re, Andrea d'Asola, fut le responsable de l'imprimerie depuis la mort d'Alde (1514) jusqu'\u00e0 1529.\r\n\r\nSelon Degli Agostini, Francesco d'Asola \u00e9tait le prot\u00e9g\u00e9 du cardinal Hercule de Gonzague \u2014 auquel est d\u00e9di\u00e9e l'\u00e9dition de la Physique \u2014 et il avait repris avec succ\u00e8s l'h\u00e9ritage d'Alde. Pour J. B. Egnazio, d'Asola \u00e9tait un \u00ab jeune homme cultiv\u00e9 ayant les meilleures habitudes \u00bb et, en 1542, Pellicier le remercie de l'envoi \u00e0 la biblioth\u00e8que de Fontainebleau de quatre-vingts manuscrits grecs et de quelques autres manuscrits latins.\r\n\r\nMalgr\u00e9 sa gentillesse et ses \u00ab meilleures habitudes \u00bb, il est \u00e9vident que d'Asola n'adopte pas la devise d'Alde : \u00ab Non enim recipio emendaturum libros \u00bb, car il a beaucoup amend\u00e9.\r\n\r\nDiels avait raison lorsqu'il signalait que \u00ab Aldini exempli editor haud pauca novavit, infeliciter plurima \u00bb. [conclusion p. 86]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Gj5dBBrkScJI1Gs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":54,"full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":604,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Scriptorium","volume":"39","issue":"1","pages":"70\u201388"}},"sort":[1985]}
Title | The End of Aristotle's on Prayer |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 106 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 110-113 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rist, John M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Jean Pépin recently devoted a lengthy study to Aristotle's On Prayer. There is good reason to think that the work never existed. On Prayer is listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotle's writings (5.22) and in the Vita Hesychii. The only other evidence for its existence is a passage of Simplicius that tells us that at the end of On Prayer, Aristotle says clearly that God is either mind or somehow beyond mind (ἢ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ). The claim that God is beyond mind is unique in an unemended Aristotelian text, but the notion would be acceptable to Simplicius both because, as a Neoplatonist, he would believe it to be true, and because as a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle, he would be happy to find evidence of the basic philosophical harmony of Aristotle and Plato. Our problem, therefore, is to see why Simplicius thought that Aristotle held this view. The immediate answer is that he thought he had found it in a text of Aristotle's called On Prayer (or perhaps more likely in an anthology of Aristotelian material claiming that this was Aristotle's view in such a work). But if there was no such work On Prayer, how could Simplicius (or his source) think there was, and what is the actual source of the apparent fragment that claims that for Aristotle, God might be "beyond mind"? It is possible to understand how Simplicius was misled. There is a Latin work in two chapters called De Bona Fortuna. It is composed of Magna Moralia 2.8 and Eudemian Ethics 8.2. Of the 56 surviving manuscripts of De Bona Fortuna, the earliest datable version is Vat. Lat. 2083, of the year 1284. The producer of this text is unknown. De Bona Fortuna is not an excerpt from existing Latin translations of Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics, because although Bartholomew of Messina translated the Magna Moralia between 1258 and 1266, and although a Greek manuscript of the Eudemian Ethics may have been known in Messina before 1250, there are no medieval Latin translations of the Eudemian Ethics as a whole; indeed, the only other section of the text translated is E.E. 8.3. The original sources of De Bona Fortuna were known to at least some of those who copied it in Latin, but the work itself is a direct translation from Greek. So, unless the translator also both excerpted and combined the two parts of the De Bona Fortuna himself, and showed no concern for the fact that the rest of the Eudemian Ethics was still untranslated, and perhaps even still unknown (which is highly unlikely), he must have used a Greek original of De Bona Fortuna in the form of a separate treatise composed of M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2. The title of the treatise, presumably, was the Greek equivalent of De Bona Fortuna, that is, Περὶ Εὐτυχίας. We have no means of telling when it was assembled, but there is no reason why it should not be ancient and indeed have been available to Simplicius or (if Simplicius is quoting an anthology of some sort) to his source. E.E. 8.2 (1248A28) unemended, reads as follows: Τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπισημότερον εἴποι τις ἢ θεὸς. Spengel added the words καὶ νοῦ after εἴποι, following the reading et intellectu found in De Bona Fortuna. Thus, the Greek original of De Bona Fortuna read: Τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπισημότερον εἴποι καὶ νοῦ πάλιν θεὸς. Thus, in Περὶ Εὐτυχίας, God is greater than mind. Admittedly, Περὶ Εὐτυχίας did not say that God is "beyond mind" (ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ), only that he is greater than mind. But in Platonic or Neopythagorean writings of late antiquity, these phrases are virtually interchangeable. The most striking evidence is from Plotinus, who uses ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ dozens of times and also gives the best examples of the One being "greater (κρείττων)" than mind (5.3.14.16-18, 5.3.16.38, 5.3.17.1-3). Simplicius thought he knew about an Aristotelian text On Prayer (Περὶ Εὐχῆς). Let us suppose that he had direct or indirect access to a work originally called On Good Fortune (Περὶ Εὐτυχίας). The corruption of Εὐτυχίας to Εὐχῆς is easy. In this text, Simplicius found the remark that God is "greater than mind." There is no reason to assume that Simplicius is quoting On Good Fortune verbatim. For Simplicius, as a Neoplatonist, to say that God is "greater than mind" is the same as to say that he is "beyond (ἐπέκεινα) mind." The use of ἐπέκεινα in this way derives, of course, from Neoplatonic, Middle Platonic, and Neopythagorean interpretations of Plato's Republic 509B. Let us therefore posit the following sequence of events. A Greek text, including (but not necessarily restricted to) M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2, is compiled and originally entitled Περὶ Εὐτυχίας. It comes to contain, at some point, an un-Aristotelian phrase (absent from the original text of the E.E. and based on a misinterpretation of that text) saying that God is "greater than mind." The title of the work is at some stage corrupted: Περὶ Εὐτυχίας becomes Περὶ Εὐχῆς. Simplicius either reads it under this title or, more likely, finds it so cited by an excerpter or commentator of Platonizing tendencies. Either Simplicius or the excerpter paraphrases κρείττον τοῦ νοῦ as ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ. Hence, our alleged fragment of Aristotle's work On Prayer, found in Simplicius, is really a corrupted fragment of Περὶ Εὐτυχίας, a work whose origin is lost but which reaches Simplicius, or becomes known to him, through the medium of a Platonizing tradition. The date of the original compilation Περὶ Εὐτυχίας remains unknown, but it must have been early enough for its title, in a mistaken form, to have found its way onto the lists of Aristotle's writings. The corruption of the title was probably achieved by a librarian's error long before the crucial phrase καὶ νοῦ (absent, as we have seen, from the Eudemian Ethics) was imported into the text itself. This can hardly have occurred before the revival of Neopythagoreanism, that is, before the second century B.C. It is not impossible that it was post-Plotinian. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7iwkew2wm2p3qeo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"858","_score":null,"_source":{"id":858,"authors_free":[{"id":1262,"entry_id":858,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":303,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rist, John M.","free_first_name":"John M.","free_last_name":"Rist","norm_person":{"id":303,"first_name":"John M.","last_name":"Rist","full_name":"Rist, John M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137060440","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The End of Aristotle's on Prayer","main_title":{"title":"The End of Aristotle's on Prayer"},"abstract":"Jean P\u00e9pin recently devoted a lengthy study to Aristotle's On Prayer. There is good reason to think that the work never existed. On Prayer is listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotle's writings (5.22) and in the Vita Hesychii. The only other evidence for its existence is a passage of Simplicius that tells us that at the end of On Prayer, Aristotle says clearly that God is either mind or somehow beyond mind (\u1f22 \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6).\r\n\r\nThe claim that God is beyond mind is unique in an unemended Aristotelian text, but the notion would be acceptable to Simplicius both because, as a Neoplatonist, he would believe it to be true, and because as a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle, he would be happy to find evidence of the basic philosophical harmony of Aristotle and Plato. Our problem, therefore, is to see why Simplicius thought that Aristotle held this view. The immediate answer is that he thought he had found it in a text of Aristotle's called On Prayer (or perhaps more likely in an anthology of Aristotelian material claiming that this was Aristotle's view in such a work).\r\n\r\nBut if there was no such work On Prayer, how could Simplicius (or his source) think there was, and what is the actual source of the apparent fragment that claims that for Aristotle, God might be \"beyond mind\"? It is possible to understand how Simplicius was misled.\r\n\r\nThere is a Latin work in two chapters called De Bona Fortuna. It is composed of Magna Moralia 2.8 and Eudemian Ethics 8.2. Of the 56 surviving manuscripts of De Bona Fortuna, the earliest datable version is Vat. Lat. 2083, of the year 1284. The producer of this text is unknown. De Bona Fortuna is not an excerpt from existing Latin translations of Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics, because although Bartholomew of Messina translated the Magna Moralia between 1258 and 1266, and although a Greek manuscript of the Eudemian Ethics may have been known in Messina before 1250, there are no medieval Latin translations of the Eudemian Ethics as a whole; indeed, the only other section of the text translated is E.E. 8.3.\r\n\r\nThe original sources of De Bona Fortuna were known to at least some of those who copied it in Latin, but the work itself is a direct translation from Greek. So, unless the translator also both excerpted and combined the two parts of the De Bona Fortuna himself, and showed no concern for the fact that the rest of the Eudemian Ethics was still untranslated, and perhaps even still unknown (which is highly unlikely), he must have used a Greek original of De Bona Fortuna in the form of a separate treatise composed of M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2.\r\n\r\nThe title of the treatise, presumably, was the Greek equivalent of De Bona Fortuna, that is, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. We have no means of telling when it was assembled, but there is no reason why it should not be ancient and indeed have been available to Simplicius or (if Simplicius is quoting an anthology of some sort) to his source.\r\n\r\nE.E. 8.2 (1248A28) unemended, reads as follows: \u03a4\u03af \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2. Spengel added the words \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 after \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9, following the reading et intellectu found in De Bona Fortuna. Thus, the Greek original of De Bona Fortuna read: \u03a4\u03af \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2. Thus, in \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, God is greater than mind.\r\n\r\nAdmittedly, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 did not say that God is \"beyond mind\" (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6), only that he is greater than mind. But in Platonic or Neopythagorean writings of late antiquity, these phrases are virtually interchangeable. The most striking evidence is from Plotinus, who uses \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 dozens of times and also gives the best examples of the One being \"greater (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd)\" than mind (5.3.14.16-18, 5.3.16.38, 5.3.17.1-3).\r\n\r\nSimplicius thought he knew about an Aristotelian text On Prayer (\u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2). Let us suppose that he had direct or indirect access to a work originally called On Good Fortune (\u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2). The corruption of \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 to \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 is easy. In this text, Simplicius found the remark that God is \"greater than mind.\" There is no reason to assume that Simplicius is quoting On Good Fortune verbatim. For Simplicius, as a Neoplatonist, to say that God is \"greater than mind\" is the same as to say that he is \"beyond (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1) mind.\"\r\n\r\nThe use of \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 in this way derives, of course, from Neoplatonic, Middle Platonic, and Neopythagorean interpretations of Plato's Republic 509B.\r\n\r\nLet us therefore posit the following sequence of events. A Greek text, including (but not necessarily restricted to) M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2, is compiled and originally entitled \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. It comes to contain, at some point, an un-Aristotelian phrase (absent from the original text of the E.E. and based on a misinterpretation of that text) saying that God is \"greater than mind.\" The title of the work is at some stage corrupted: \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 becomes \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2.\r\n\r\nSimplicius either reads it under this title or, more likely, finds it so cited by an excerpter or commentator of Platonizing tendencies. Either Simplicius or the excerpter paraphrases \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 as \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6. Hence, our alleged fragment of Aristotle's work On Prayer, found in Simplicius, is really a corrupted fragment of \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, a work whose origin is lost but which reaches Simplicius, or becomes known to him, through the medium of a Platonizing tradition.\r\n\r\nThe date of the original compilation \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 remains unknown, but it must have been early enough for its title, in a mistaken form, to have found its way onto the lists of Aristotle's writings. The corruption of the title was probably achieved by a librarian's error long before the crucial phrase \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 (absent, as we have seen, from the Eudemian Ethics) was imported into the text itself. This can hardly have occurred before the revival of Neopythagoreanism, that is, before the second century B.C. It is not impossible that it was post-Plotinian. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7iwkew2wm2p3qeo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":303,"full_name":"Rist, John M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":858,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"106","issue":"1","pages":"110-113"}},"sort":[1985]}
Title | The Presidential Address: Analyses of Matter, Ancient and Modern |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series |
Volume | 86 |
Pages | 1-22 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sorabji, Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I want to draw attention to two recurrent themes in the analysis of matter or body. The first theme is the idea that body is extension endowed with properties. To explain this, I shall go back as far as a famous text in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book 7, Chapter 3. Aristotle is here discussing matter in a rather special sense. He does not mean by 'matter' what we might mean, namely, body. He means rather the subject of the properties in a body. The table in front of me may be made of wood. From one point of view, the wood might be thought of as a subject which carries the properties of the table—its rectilinearity, its hardness, its brownness. But according to one persuasive interpretation, Aristotle is looking for the most fundamental subject of properties in a body. He calls it the first subject (hupokeimenon proton, 1029a1-2). The wood of the table is made up of the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water—and these might be thought of as a more fundamental subject carrying the properties of the wood. But the most fundamental subject would be one which carried the properties of the four elements: hot, cold, fluid, and dry. This first subject is referred to by commentators as first or prime matter. [introduction p. 1] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Dk2wV9MF91LwVgZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"490","_score":null,"_source":{"id":490,"authors_free":[{"id":671,"entry_id":490,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":133,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sorabji, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Sorabji","norm_person":{"id":133,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Sorabji","full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130064165","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Presidential Address: Analyses of Matter, Ancient and Modern","main_title":{"title":"The Presidential Address: Analyses of Matter, Ancient and Modern"},"abstract":"I want to draw attention to two recurrent themes in the analysis of matter or body. The first theme is the idea that body is extension endowed with properties. To explain this, I shall go back as far as a famous text in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book 7, Chapter 3.\r\n\r\nAristotle is here discussing matter in a rather special sense. He does not mean by 'matter' what we might mean, namely, body. He means rather the subject of the properties in a body. The table in front of me may be made of wood. From one point of view, the wood might be thought of as a subject which carries the properties of the table\u2014its rectilinearity, its hardness, its brownness.\r\n\r\nBut according to one persuasive interpretation, Aristotle is looking for the most fundamental subject of properties in a body. He calls it the first subject (hupokeimenon proton, 1029a1-2). The wood of the table is made up of the four elements\u2014earth, air, fire, and water\u2014and these might be thought of as a more fundamental subject carrying the properties of the wood.\r\n\r\nBut the most fundamental subject would be one which carried the properties of the four elements: hot, cold, fluid, and dry. This first subject is referred to by commentators as first or prime matter. [introduction p. 1]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Dk2wV9MF91LwVgZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":133,"full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":490,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series","volume":"86","issue":"","pages":"1-22"}},"sort":[1985]}
Title | Aurore, Éros et Ananké autour des dieux Parménidiens (f. 12-f. 13) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 4 |
Pages | 459-470 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Frère, Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Deux textes de Platon dans Le Banquet et un d'Aristote dans La Métaphysique commentent ce passage de Parménide sur Éros. Dans Le Banquet, en 195a, Agathon dit : « Je déclare que c'est Éros le plus jeune des dieux... ; qu'inversement ces antiques divinités qu'énoncent sur les dieux Hésiode et Parménide appartiendraient à la Nécessité et non pas à l'Amour. » Et en 178a, Phèdre s'exprimait ainsi : « Quant à Parménide, voici ce qu'il dit de la génération : le premier de tous les dieux dont s'avisa [la Déesse], ce fut l'Amour. » Pour ce qui est d'Aristote, au livre A, chapitre 4, de La Métaphysique, examinant la thèse des penseurs qui, tel Anaxagore, firent du « la fois la cause de la beauté et la cause du mouvement des êtres », Aristote rapproche à son tour Hésiode et Parménide comme penseurs qui ont posé l'Amour ou le Désir pour principes des êtres ; Aristote cite alors le vers que citait Le Banquet en 178a, vers qui constitue le fragment 13 du poème de Parménide. Ainsi, les deux témoignages de Platon et d'Aristote s'accordent-ils : dans le panthéon parménidien, Anankè est l'origine ; en provient l'Amour, Éros, lequel domine les autres dieux. Dans le commentaire de La Physique d'Aristote, Simplicius apporte à son tour des textes et des indications concernant Anankè et Éros. C'est grâce à ces passages de Simplicius que les éditeurs de Parménide ont ordonné plusieurs fragments de la seconde partie du poème (f. 9 et suiv.). Cependant, l'ordonnance des fragments ici retenue par la plupart des éditeurs, si l'on y apporte quelque attention, semble loin de s'imposer. Relisant de près le texte de Simplicius, nous voudrions ici dégager conjointement plusieurs thèmes. D'abord, en ce qui concerne Simplicius, nous voudrions apporter des précisions sur sa technique de citation des fragments. À partir de là, nous pourrions envisager une nouvelle structuration des fragments portant sur Anankè et Éros. Enfin, nous pourrions ainsi essayer de mieux dégager certains aspects de la place du divin dans l'œuvre parménidienne. [introduction p. 460] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RFpfl1LBytLVPZJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"593","_score":null,"_source":{"id":593,"authors_free":[{"id":844,"entry_id":593,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":101,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":101,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130051187","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aurore, \u00c9ros et Anank\u00e9 autour des dieux Parm\u00e9nidiens (f. 12-f. 13)","main_title":{"title":"Aurore, \u00c9ros et Anank\u00e9 autour des dieux Parm\u00e9nidiens (f. 12-f. 13)"},"abstract":"Deux textes de Platon dans Le Banquet et un d'Aristote dans La M\u00e9taphysique commentent ce passage de Parm\u00e9nide sur \u00c9ros. Dans Le Banquet, en 195a, Agathon dit : \u00ab Je d\u00e9clare que c'est \u00c9ros le plus jeune des dieux... ; qu'inversement ces antiques divinit\u00e9s qu'\u00e9noncent sur les dieux H\u00e9siode et Parm\u00e9nide appartiendraient \u00e0 la N\u00e9cessit\u00e9 et non pas \u00e0 l'Amour. \u00bb Et en 178a, Ph\u00e8dre s'exprimait ainsi : \u00ab Quant \u00e0 Parm\u00e9nide, voici ce qu'il dit de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration : le premier de tous les dieux dont s'avisa [la D\u00e9esse], ce fut l'Amour. \u00bb\r\n\r\nPour ce qui est d'Aristote, au livre A, chapitre 4, de La M\u00e9taphysique, examinant la th\u00e8se des penseurs qui, tel Anaxagore, firent du \u00ab la fois la cause de la beaut\u00e9 et la cause du mouvement des \u00eatres \u00bb, Aristote rapproche \u00e0 son tour H\u00e9siode et Parm\u00e9nide comme penseurs qui ont pos\u00e9 l'Amour ou le D\u00e9sir pour principes des \u00eatres ; Aristote cite alors le vers que citait Le Banquet en 178a, vers qui constitue le fragment 13 du po\u00e8me de Parm\u00e9nide. Ainsi, les deux t\u00e9moignages de Platon et d'Aristote s'accordent-ils : dans le panth\u00e9on parm\u00e9nidien, Anank\u00e8 est l'origine ; en provient l'Amour, \u00c9ros, lequel domine les autres dieux.\r\n\r\nDans le commentaire de La Physique d'Aristote, Simplicius apporte \u00e0 son tour des textes et des indications concernant Anank\u00e8 et \u00c9ros. C'est gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 ces passages de Simplicius que les \u00e9diteurs de Parm\u00e9nide ont ordonn\u00e9 plusieurs fragments de la seconde partie du po\u00e8me (f. 9 et suiv.). Cependant, l'ordonnance des fragments ici retenue par la plupart des \u00e9diteurs, si l'on y apporte quelque attention, semble loin de s'imposer. Relisant de pr\u00e8s le texte de Simplicius, nous voudrions ici d\u00e9gager conjointement plusieurs th\u00e8mes.\r\n\r\nD'abord, en ce qui concerne Simplicius, nous voudrions apporter des pr\u00e9cisions sur sa technique de citation des fragments. \u00c0 partir de l\u00e0, nous pourrions envisager une nouvelle structuration des fragments portant sur Anank\u00e8 et \u00c9ros. Enfin, nous pourrions ainsi essayer de mieux d\u00e9gager certains aspects de la place du divin dans l'\u0153uvre parm\u00e9nidienne. [introduction p. 460]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RFpfl1LBytLVPZJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":101,"full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":593,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"4","issue":"","pages":" 459-470"}},"sort":[1985]}
Title | Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1984 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 37 |
Issue | 1-2 |
Pages | 14-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sider, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notes on Empedocles B 96 |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/gIM2YVFw7r7XnSS |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1018","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1018,"authors_free":[{"id":1534,"entry_id":1018,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":320,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sider, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Sider","norm_person":{"id":320,"first_name":"David","last_name":"Sider","full_name":"Sider, David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1129478610","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion"},"abstract":"Notes on Empedocles B 96","btype":3,"date":"1984","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/gIM2YVFw7r7XnSS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":320,"full_name":"Sider, David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1018,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"37","issue":"1-2","pages":"14-24"}},"sort":[1984]}
Title | (Neo-) Platonica |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1984 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 319-330 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Steel, Carlos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Filosofie is ons vooral in de vorm van teksten toegankelijk. Wie filosofie wil studeren, zal onvermijdelijk teksten moeten bestuderen en zal het resultaat van zijn eigen onderzoek weer in de vorm van teksten produceren. Wel heeft de filosofie van oudsher ook met de mogelijkheid rekening gehouden dat men inzichten kan verwerven die niet discursief uitgedrukt kunnen worden, die niet „textfähig“ zijn; maar toch is de filosofie weinig beïnvloed geworden door deze principiële mogelijkheid. Tenslotte kan men weer reflecteren en schrijven over deze niet-tekstmatige inzichten, zodat het erop lijkt dat men nooit uit de toverban van de tekst geraken kan. Niemand zal eraan denken het voordeel prijs te geven dat de filosofie heeft door zich aan teksten te binden en zo haar inzichten te objectiveren. Maar toch is het bedenkelijk dat men de binding van filosofisch inzicht aan de tekst als vanzelfsprekend ziet. Zo wordt ook niet meer duidelijk wat de „zaak“ is waarop de filosofische tekst betrekking heeft. Is er wel een „zaak-los-van-de-tekst“? Het is bekend dat Plato tegenover het fenomeen „tekst“ bewust afstand heeft genomen. Men kan hem zeker niet verwijten dat hij een naïef vertrouwen heeft in de tekst als medium van filosofisch inzicht: waar het in de filosofie eigenlijk om gaat is niet in tekst uit te drukken. Al is hij zelf meer dan wie ook tekst-kunstenaar, hij blijft zich bewust van de grenzen van de tekst. Wie uit Plato’s dialogen een doctrine construeert, een systeem van uitspraken over „wat het geval is“, verliest deze reserve ten opzichte van de tekst en reduceert de vele „vormen van kennis“ tot objectief „propositioneel“ kennen. Dit is de invalshoek van waaruit Wolfgang Wieland, vooral bekend wegens zijn originele studie over Aristoteles’ Physica, zijn Plato-boek geschreven heeft: Platon und die Formen des Wissens. Het boek bevat drie delen. Het eerste is gewijd aan Plato’s verhouding tot de geschreven tekst. Uitgaande van de bekende passage in de Phaidros onderzoekt Wieland waarom Plato zo kritisch is ten opzichte van het schrift. Plato verzet zich tegen elke poging om het weten te objectiveren alsof men in de tekst over inzicht als over een stuk bezit zou kunnen beschikken. Elke formulering in taal blijft werktuig, iets voorlopigs. Het „gebruiksweten“ dat in de omgang met de dingen tot stand komt, heeft voorrang op het weten dat in proposities is uitgedrukt. Hier staan we meteen voor het centrale thema van Wielands boek. Het is echter de vraag of dit bij Plato wel zo centraal is. Bij Plato gaat het vooreerst om kritiek op het schrift, en niet op het propositionele weten als zodanig. Vanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook de dialoog als medium van filosofisch denken begrijpen. Indien men ondanks alle reserves toch niet aan tekst verzaken kan, dan biedt de dialoogvorm een uitweg. Eén van de tekorten van de tekst heeft namelijk te maken met het ontbreken van een reële context van het woord. De dialoog brengt deze context op dramatisch-fictieve wijze tot stand. De dialoog is geen didactisch hulpmiddel, geen inkleding van een leer. De uitspraken blijven er als „werktuigen“ in de gespreksactie fungeren. Vanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook het statuut van de mythe binnen de tekst begrijpen, het metaforische karakter van vele passages, het gebruik van de ironie. Tenslotte wijst Wieland in § 5 op het belang van de fictieve chronologie bij het beoordelen van een dialoog. Men kan namelijk, uitgaande van de dramatische situatie van de verschillende dialogen, een fictieve chronologie opstellen: zo zal niemand betwisten dat de Parmenides later is geschreven dan de Phaidon (reële chronologie), maar in de fictieve chronologie komt de Parmenides veel eerder, omdat hierin de jonge Socrates optreedt, terwijl in de Phaidon Socrates voor de dood staat. In de interpretatie heeft men te weinig rekening gehouden met de plaats van een dialoog in deze fictieve chronologie. [introduction p. 319-320] Übersetzung: Philosophie ist uns vor allem in der Form von Texten zugänglich. Wer Philosophie studieren will, muss zwangsläufig Texte studieren und wird die Ergebnisse seiner eigenen Forschung wiederum in Form von Texten präsentieren. Die Philosophie hat jedoch seit jeher auch die Möglichkeit berücksichtigt, dass Erkenntnisse gewonnen werden können, die nicht diskursiv ausgedrückt werden können, die also nicht „textfähig“ sind. Dennoch hat diese prinzipielle Möglichkeit die Philosophie kaum beeinflusst. Letztendlich kann man auch über diese nicht-textlichen Erkenntnisse reflektieren und schreiben, sodass es scheint, als könne man niemals aus dem Bann des Textes entkommen. Niemand wird daran denken, den Vorteil aufzugeben, den die Philosophie dadurch hat, sich an Texte zu binden und ihre Erkenntnisse so zu objektivieren. Doch es ist bedenklich, dass man die Bindung philosophischer Erkenntnis an den Text als selbstverständlich betrachtet. Dadurch wird auch unklar, was die „Sache“ ist, auf die sich der philosophische Text bezieht. Gibt es überhaupt eine „Sache außerhalb des Textes“? Es ist bekannt, dass Platon dem Phänomen „Text“ bewusst distanziert gegenüberstand. Man kann ihm sicher nicht vorwerfen, ein naives Vertrauen in den Text als Medium philosophischer Erkenntnis gehabt zu haben: Worauf es in der Philosophie eigentlich ankommt, lässt sich nicht in Texten ausdrücken. Auch wenn er selbst mehr als jeder andere ein Künstler des Textes war, war er sich stets der Grenzen des Textes bewusst. Wer aus Platons Dialogen eine Doktrin konstruiert, ein System von Aussagen über „das, was der Fall ist“, verliert diese kritische Distanz zum Text und reduziert die vielen „Formen des Wissens“ auf ein objektives „propositionales“ Wissen. Dies ist die Perspektive, aus der Wolfgang Wieland, vor allem bekannt für seine originelle Studie über Aristoteles’ Physik, sein Platon-Buch Platon und die Formen des Wissens geschrieben hat. Das Buch besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil widmet sich Platons Verhältnis zum geschriebenen Text. Ausgehend von der bekannten Passage im Phaidros untersucht Wieland, warum Platon dem Schreiben so kritisch gegenüberstand. Platon wendet sich gegen jede Versuchung, Wissen zu objektivieren, als könne man in einem Text über Erkenntnisse verfügen wie über einen Besitz. Jede Formulierung in Sprache bleibt ein Werkzeug, etwas Vorläufiges. Das „Gebrauchswissen“, das im Umgang mit den Dingen entsteht, hat Vorrang vor dem Wissen, das in Propositionen ausgedrückt ist. Hier begegnen wir dem zentralen Thema von Wielands Buch. Es bleibt jedoch die Frage, ob dies bei Platon tatsächlich zentral ist. Bei Platon geht es zunächst um Kritik am Schreiben und nicht um Kritik am propositionalen Wissen als solches. Aus der Schriftkritik lässt sich auch die Dialogform als Medium des philosophischen Denkens verstehen. Wenn man trotz aller Vorbehalte nicht auf den Text verzichten kann, bietet die Dialogform einen Ausweg. Ein Mangel des Textes liegt nämlich im Fehlen eines realen Kontexts des Wortes. Der Dialog stellt diesen Kontext auf dramatisch-fiktive Weise her. Der Dialog ist kein didaktisches Hilfsmittel, keine Verpackung einer Lehre. Die Aussagen fungieren in der Dialoghandlung weiterhin als „Werkzeuge“. Aus der Schriftkritik lässt sich auch der Status des Mythos im Text verstehen, ebenso wie der metaphorische Charakter vieler Passagen und die Verwendung von Ironie. Schließlich weist Wieland in § 5 auf die Bedeutung der fiktiven Chronologie für die Beurteilung eines Dialogs hin. Ausgehend von der dramatischen Situation der verschiedenen Dialoge lässt sich eine fiktive Chronologie erstellen: Niemand wird bestreiten, dass der Parmenides später geschrieben wurde als der Phaidon (reale Chronologie), aber in der fiktiven Chronologie kommt der Parmenides viel früher, da dort der junge Sokrates auftritt, während im Phaidon Sokrates vor seinem Tod steht. In der Interpretation hat man die Stellung eines Dialogs in dieser fiktiven Chronologie bisher zu wenig berücksichtigt. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H1e3T5fZsfMIh5O |
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Wel heeft de filosofie van oudsher ook met de mogelijkheid rekening gehouden dat men inzichten kan verwerven die niet discursief uitgedrukt kunnen worden, die niet \u201etextf\u00e4hig\u201c zijn; maar toch is de filosofie weinig be\u00efnvloed geworden door deze principi\u00eble mogelijkheid. Tenslotte kan men weer reflecteren en schrijven over deze niet-tekstmatige inzichten, zodat het erop lijkt dat men nooit uit de toverban van de tekst geraken kan. Niemand zal eraan denken het voordeel prijs te geven dat de filosofie heeft door zich aan teksten te binden en zo haar inzichten te objectiveren. Maar toch is het bedenkelijk dat men de binding van filosofisch inzicht aan de tekst als vanzelfsprekend ziet. Zo wordt ook niet meer duidelijk wat de \u201ezaak\u201c is waarop de filosofische tekst betrekking heeft. Is er wel een \u201ezaak-los-van-de-tekst\u201c? Het is bekend dat Plato tegenover het fenomeen \u201etekst\u201c bewust afstand heeft genomen. Men kan hem zeker niet verwijten dat hij een na\u00efef vertrouwen heeft in de tekst als medium van filosofisch inzicht: waar het in de filosofie eigenlijk om gaat is niet in tekst uit te drukken. Al is hij zelf meer dan wie ook tekst-kunstenaar, hij blijft zich bewust van de grenzen van de tekst. Wie uit Plato\u2019s dialogen een doctrine construeert, een systeem van uitspraken over \u201ewat het geval is\u201c, verliest deze reserve ten opzichte van de tekst en reduceert de vele \u201evormen van kennis\u201c tot objectief \u201epropositioneel\u201c kennen.\r\n\r\nDit is de invalshoek van waaruit Wolfgang Wieland, vooral bekend wegens zijn originele studie over Aristoteles\u2019 Physica, zijn Plato-boek geschreven heeft: Platon und die Formen des Wissens. Het boek bevat drie delen. Het eerste is gewijd aan Plato\u2019s verhouding tot de geschreven tekst. Uitgaande van de bekende passage in de Phaidros onderzoekt Wieland waarom Plato zo kritisch is ten opzichte van het schrift. Plato verzet zich tegen elke poging om het weten te objectiveren alsof men in de tekst over inzicht als over een stuk bezit zou kunnen beschikken. Elke formulering in taal blijft werktuig, iets voorlopigs. Het \u201egebruiksweten\u201c dat in de omgang met de dingen tot stand komt, heeft voorrang op het weten dat in proposities is uitgedrukt. Hier staan we meteen voor het centrale thema van Wielands boek. Het is echter de vraag of dit bij Plato wel zo centraal is. Bij Plato gaat het vooreerst om kritiek op het schrift, en niet op het propositionele weten als zodanig.\r\n\r\nVanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook de dialoog als medium van filosofisch denken begrijpen. Indien men ondanks alle reserves toch niet aan tekst verzaken kan, dan biedt de dialoogvorm een uitweg. E\u00e9n van de tekorten van de tekst heeft namelijk te maken met het ontbreken van een re\u00eble context van het woord. De dialoog brengt deze context op dramatisch-fictieve wijze tot stand. De dialoog is geen didactisch hulpmiddel, geen inkleding van een leer. De uitspraken blijven er als \u201ewerktuigen\u201c in de gespreksactie fungeren. Vanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook het statuut van de mythe binnen de tekst begrijpen, het metaforische karakter van vele passages, het gebruik van de ironie. Tenslotte wijst Wieland in \u00a7 5 op het belang van de fictieve chronologie bij het beoordelen van een dialoog. Men kan namelijk, uitgaande van de dramatische situatie van de verschillende dialogen, een fictieve chronologie opstellen: zo zal niemand betwisten dat de Parmenides later is geschreven dan de Phaidon (re\u00eble chronologie), maar in de fictieve chronologie komt de Parmenides veel eerder, omdat hierin de jonge Socrates optreedt, terwijl in de Phaidon Socrates voor de dood staat. In de interpretatie heeft men te weinig rekening gehouden met de plaats van een dialoog in deze fictieve chronologie.\r\n[introduction p. 319-320] \u00dcbersetzung: Philosophie ist uns vor allem in der Form von Texten zug\u00e4nglich. Wer Philosophie studieren will, muss zwangsl\u00e4ufig Texte studieren und wird die Ergebnisse seiner eigenen Forschung wiederum in Form von Texten pr\u00e4sentieren. Die Philosophie hat jedoch seit jeher auch die M\u00f6glichkeit ber\u00fccksichtigt, dass Erkenntnisse gewonnen werden k\u00f6nnen, die nicht diskursiv ausgedr\u00fcckt werden k\u00f6nnen, die also nicht \u201etextf\u00e4hig\u201c sind. Dennoch hat diese prinzipielle M\u00f6glichkeit die Philosophie kaum beeinflusst. Letztendlich kann man auch \u00fcber diese nicht-textlichen Erkenntnisse reflektieren und schreiben, sodass es scheint, als k\u00f6nne man niemals aus dem Bann des Textes entkommen. Niemand wird daran denken, den Vorteil aufzugeben, den die Philosophie dadurch hat, sich an Texte zu binden und ihre Erkenntnisse so zu objektivieren. Doch es ist bedenklich, dass man die Bindung philosophischer Erkenntnis an den Text als selbstverst\u00e4ndlich betrachtet. Dadurch wird auch unklar, was die \u201eSache\u201c ist, auf die sich der philosophische Text bezieht. Gibt es \u00fcberhaupt eine \u201eSache au\u00dferhalb des Textes\u201c?\r\n\r\nEs ist bekannt, dass Platon dem Ph\u00e4nomen \u201eText\u201c bewusst distanziert gegen\u00fcberstand. Man kann ihm sicher nicht vorwerfen, ein naives Vertrauen in den Text als Medium philosophischer Erkenntnis gehabt zu haben: Worauf es in der Philosophie eigentlich ankommt, l\u00e4sst sich nicht in Texten ausdr\u00fccken. Auch wenn er selbst mehr als jeder andere ein K\u00fcnstler des Textes war, war er sich stets der Grenzen des Textes bewusst. Wer aus Platons Dialogen eine Doktrin konstruiert, ein System von Aussagen \u00fcber \u201edas, was der Fall ist\u201c, verliert diese kritische Distanz zum Text und reduziert die vielen \u201eFormen des Wissens\u201c auf ein objektives \u201epropositionales\u201c Wissen.\r\n\r\nDies ist die Perspektive, aus der Wolfgang Wieland, vor allem bekannt f\u00fcr seine originelle Studie \u00fcber Aristoteles\u2019 Physik, sein Platon-Buch Platon und die Formen des Wissens geschrieben hat. Das Buch besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil widmet sich Platons Verh\u00e4ltnis zum geschriebenen Text. Ausgehend von der bekannten Passage im Phaidros untersucht Wieland, warum Platon dem Schreiben so kritisch gegen\u00fcberstand. Platon wendet sich gegen jede Versuchung, Wissen zu objektivieren, als k\u00f6nne man in einem Text \u00fcber Erkenntnisse verf\u00fcgen wie \u00fcber einen Besitz. Jede Formulierung in Sprache bleibt ein Werkzeug, etwas Vorl\u00e4ufiges. Das \u201eGebrauchswissen\u201c, das im Umgang mit den Dingen entsteht, hat Vorrang vor dem Wissen, das in Propositionen ausgedr\u00fcckt ist. Hier begegnen wir dem zentralen Thema von Wielands Buch. Es bleibt jedoch die Frage, ob dies bei Platon tats\u00e4chlich zentral ist. Bei Platon geht es zun\u00e4chst um Kritik am Schreiben und nicht um Kritik am propositionalen Wissen als solches.\r\n\r\nAus der Schriftkritik l\u00e4sst sich auch die Dialogform als Medium des philosophischen Denkens verstehen. Wenn man trotz aller Vorbehalte nicht auf den Text verzichten kann, bietet die Dialogform einen Ausweg. Ein Mangel des Textes liegt n\u00e4mlich im Fehlen eines realen Kontexts des Wortes. Der Dialog stellt diesen Kontext auf dramatisch-fiktive Weise her. Der Dialog ist kein didaktisches Hilfsmittel, keine Verpackung einer Lehre. Die Aussagen fungieren in der Dialoghandlung weiterhin als \u201eWerkzeuge\u201c. Aus der Schriftkritik l\u00e4sst sich auch der Status des Mythos im Text verstehen, ebenso wie der metaphorische Charakter vieler Passagen und die Verwendung von Ironie. Schlie\u00dflich weist Wieland in \u00a7 5 auf die Bedeutung der fiktiven Chronologie f\u00fcr die Beurteilung eines Dialogs hin. Ausgehend von der dramatischen Situation der verschiedenen Dialoge l\u00e4sst sich eine fiktive Chronologie erstellen: Niemand wird bestreiten, dass der Parmenides sp\u00e4ter geschrieben wurde als der Phaidon (reale Chronologie), aber in der fiktiven Chronologie kommt der Parmenides viel fr\u00fcher, da dort der junge Sokrates auftritt, w\u00e4hrend im Phaidon Sokrates vor seinem Tod steht. In der Interpretation hat man die Stellung eines Dialogs in dieser fiktiven Chronologie bisher zu wenig ber\u00fccksichtigt.","btype":3,"date":"1984","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H1e3T5fZsfMIh5O","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":845,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"46","issue":"2","pages":"319-330"}},"sort":[1984]}
Title | Conférence de M. Philippe Hoffmann: Sens et dénomination. Homonymie, analogie, métaphore selon le commentaire de Simplicius sur les Catégories d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1984 |
Journal | École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire |
Volume | 93 |
Pages | 343-356 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notre lecture du Commentaire de Simplicius s'est organisée selon plusieurs fils directeurs. Nous avons examiné, tout d'abord, les méthodes mêmes de l'exégèse : Simplicius lit le texte d'Aristote mot à mot (kata tên lexin), en scrutant au besoin tous les sens possibles d'un même mot ; l'explication proprement doctrinale procède en partie par des citations (ou paraphrases) d'auteurs antérieurs : Porphyre (Commentaire par questions et réponses, et surtout Commentaire à Gédalios), Jamblique et Syrianus. Nous avons aussi tenté de dégager les traits proprement néoplatoniciens du commentaire : ainsi, à propos du couple « nom-définition », dont l'interprétation ne peut se comprendre que dans la perspective plus générale du système néoplatonicien. Il apparaît en outre que la condition de possibilité de l'homonymie, et de son contraire la polyonymie, est le caractère « conventionnel » (thesei et non phusei) du langage : il fallait donc situer la réflexion néoplatonicienne dans le cadre des discussions traditionnelles sur l'origine du langage. D'autres questions se posaient encore : quelle est, au fond, la justification et l'utilité d'un tel exposé préliminaire dans un ouvrage consacré aux catégories ? La doctrine des homonymes, synonymes et paronymes exprime-t-elle des propriétés des réalités, ou des noms (onomata) ? Quelle est la spécificité de la recherche philosophique d'Aristote par rapport à la grammaire, ou à l'étude littéraire du langage, qui relève de la Rhétorique ? Le commentaire de Simplicius cite le témoignage de Boèthos de Sidon sur la doctrine de Speusippe, qui, à la différence d'Aristote, divise les onomata : ce fut l'occasion d'une mise au point portant à la fois sur les théories antiques de l'homonymie et de la synonymie, et sur l'importance de ces commentaires comme sources de nos connaissances en matière de philosophie antique. [introduction p. 344-345] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/oqTrFiRR6jzhlNL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"507","_score":null,"_source":{"id":507,"authors_free":[{"id":701,"entry_id":507,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Conf\u00e9rence de M. Philippe Hoffmann: Sens et d\u00e9nomination. Homonymie, analogie, m\u00e9taphore selon le commentaire de Simplicius sur les Cat\u00e9gories d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Conf\u00e9rence de M. Philippe Hoffmann: Sens et d\u00e9nomination. Homonymie, analogie, m\u00e9taphore selon le commentaire de Simplicius sur les Cat\u00e9gories d'Aristote"},"abstract":"Notre lecture du Commentaire de Simplicius s'est organis\u00e9e selon plusieurs fils directeurs. Nous avons examin\u00e9, tout d'abord, les m\u00e9thodes m\u00eames de l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se : Simplicius lit le texte d'Aristote mot \u00e0 mot (kata t\u00ean lexin), en scrutant au besoin tous les sens possibles d'un m\u00eame mot ; l'explication proprement doctrinale proc\u00e8de en partie par des citations (ou paraphrases) d'auteurs ant\u00e9rieurs : Porphyre (Commentaire par questions et r\u00e9ponses, et surtout Commentaire \u00e0 G\u00e9dalios), Jamblique et Syrianus.\r\n\r\nNous avons aussi tent\u00e9 de d\u00e9gager les traits proprement n\u00e9oplatoniciens du commentaire : ainsi, \u00e0 propos du couple \u00ab nom-d\u00e9finition \u00bb, dont l'interpr\u00e9tation ne peut se comprendre que dans la perspective plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du syst\u00e8me n\u00e9oplatonicien. Il appara\u00eet en outre que la condition de possibilit\u00e9 de l'homonymie, et de son contraire la polyonymie, est le caract\u00e8re \u00ab conventionnel \u00bb (thesei et non phusei) du langage : il fallait donc situer la r\u00e9flexion n\u00e9oplatonicienne dans le cadre des discussions traditionnelles sur l'origine du langage.\r\n\r\nD'autres questions se posaient encore : quelle est, au fond, la justification et l'utilit\u00e9 d'un tel expos\u00e9 pr\u00e9liminaire dans un ouvrage consacr\u00e9 aux cat\u00e9gories ? La doctrine des homonymes, synonymes et paronymes exprime-t-elle des propri\u00e9t\u00e9s des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s, ou des noms (onomata) ? Quelle est la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 de la recherche philosophique d'Aristote par rapport \u00e0 la grammaire, ou \u00e0 l'\u00e9tude litt\u00e9raire du langage, qui rel\u00e8ve de la Rh\u00e9torique ?\r\n\r\nLe commentaire de Simplicius cite le t\u00e9moignage de Bo\u00e8thos de Sidon sur la doctrine de Speusippe, qui, \u00e0 la diff\u00e9rence d'Aristote, divise les onomata : ce fut l'occasion d'une mise au point portant \u00e0 la fois sur les th\u00e9ories antiques de l'homonymie et de la synonymie, et sur l'importance de ces commentaires comme sources de nos connaissances en mati\u00e8re de philosophie antique. [introduction p. 344-345]","btype":3,"date":"1984","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/oqTrFiRR6jzhlNL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":507,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":" \u00c9cole pratique des hautes \u00e9tudes, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire","volume":"93","issue":"","pages":"343-356"}},"sort":[1984]}
Title | Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs à une définition du temps dans le néoplatonisme tardif |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 455/459 |
Pages | 1-26 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ainsi, le concept de paralasis est profondément solidaire d’un thème qui est au cœur de la pensée de Damascius : la distinction entre ce qui est en train de se différencier et ce dont la différenciation est achevée. C’est aussi la distinction entre la procession et la conversion, entre la puissance et l’activité, entre la vie et l’intellect, entre le second diacosme (intelligible et intellectif) et le troisième (intellectif) : dans tous ces couples, le premier terme se distingue du second comme, dans Physique VI, « l’action de se mouvoir se distingue du mouvement accompli » (95). Aristote est la source avouée de Damascius, qui lui consacrait des cours (on sait par exemple que le premier livre du Commentaire de Simplicius au De Caelo a vraisemblablement été rédigé à partir de notes prises au cours de Damascius) (96) : il « pense le temps à la fois à partir du Parménide de Platon et à partir des livres IV et VI de la Physique d’Aristote. C’est à la lumière d’Aristote qu’il interprète Platon. C’est à Aristote lui-même qu’il emprunte les éléments de sa résolution des apories posées en Physique IV. Et la clé de sa doctrine du temps est à chercher en Physique VI » (97). Il faut ajouter immédiatement que c’est à partir de la pensée stoïcienne du temps que Damascius lit Physique VI et élabore sa théorie du « temps intégral ». Le « temps intégral », qui demeure « tout entier à la fois dans la subsistance », est pensé selon l’être-ensemble de ses parties. Analogue au maintenant diastèmatique, qui est partie et non limite du temps, il a pour image le présent de la danse, en qui passé et futur sont contenus et résorbés : bien qu’elle se déroute dans une succession, la danse est présentement en train d’être dansée (98), et c’est sur le même mode que le combat est lui aussi présent. La subsistance d’un tel présent se fonde sur l’unité d’une action en devenir, qui s’exprime par un verbe au présent extensif. L’influence du stoïcisme sur Damascius semble déterminante : on reconnaît sans peine dans ses analyses le présent étendu qui est le présent sensible de l’expérience pratique, celui en qui vient se loger une action comme « je marche » (action portée à élocution par un présent extensif) ; et son « temps intégral » n’est pas sans analogie avec le mode de présence de la période cosmique stoïcienne (99). À cette influence philosophique du stoïcisme, il faut ajouter son influence grammaticale. Damascius fut pendant neuf ans professeur de rhétorique. C’est sans aucun doute à cette longue pratique des textes et des mots qu’il faut rapporter l’attention extrême qu’il prête au langage, ainsi que la thématisation des problèmes du langage au sein même de sa pensée philosophique (100). C’est à une grammaire d’inspiration stoïcienne qu’il faut rapporter sa méthode d’exégèse, ou plutôt le contenu de son exégèse de Physique IV (221 a 6-9) : l’infinitif être, compris comme activité d’être, est envisagé dans l’extension aspectuelle, et Damascius le considère comme l’équivalent de paratasis tou einai. Cette explication de texte scrupuleuse, qui est bien dans la manière de Damascius, permet à celui-ci de proposer sa définition du temps, tout en soulignant sa fidélité par rapport à la double autorité d’Archytas et d’Aristote. [conclusion p. 23-25] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/LNb8H8UiMDNsVyS |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"713","_score":null,"_source":{"id":713,"authors_free":[{"id":1063,"entry_id":713,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition du temps dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme tardif","main_title":{"title":"Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition du temps dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme tardif"},"abstract":"Ainsi, le concept de paralasis est profond\u00e9ment solidaire d\u2019un th\u00e8me qui est au c\u0153ur de la pens\u00e9e de Damascius : la distinction entre ce qui est en train de se diff\u00e9rencier et ce dont la diff\u00e9renciation est achev\u00e9e. C\u2019est aussi la distinction entre la procession et la conversion, entre la puissance et l\u2019activit\u00e9, entre la vie et l\u2019intellect, entre le second diacosme (intelligible et intellectif) et le troisi\u00e8me (intellectif) : dans tous ces couples, le premier terme se distingue du second comme, dans Physique VI, \u00ab l\u2019action de se mouvoir se distingue du mouvement accompli \u00bb (95).\r\n\r\nAristote est la source avou\u00e9e de Damascius, qui lui consacrait des cours (on sait par exemple que le premier livre du Commentaire de Simplicius au De Caelo a vraisemblablement \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9dig\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de notes prises au cours de Damascius) (96) : il \u00ab pense le temps \u00e0 la fois \u00e0 partir du Parm\u00e9nide de Platon et \u00e0 partir des livres IV et VI de la Physique d\u2019Aristote. C\u2019est \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re d\u2019Aristote qu\u2019il interpr\u00e8te Platon. C\u2019est \u00e0 Aristote lui-m\u00eame qu\u2019il emprunte les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de sa r\u00e9solution des apories pos\u00e9es en Physique IV. Et la cl\u00e9 de sa doctrine du temps est \u00e0 chercher en Physique VI \u00bb (97).\r\n\r\nIl faut ajouter imm\u00e9diatement que c\u2019est \u00e0 partir de la pens\u00e9e sto\u00efcienne du temps que Damascius lit Physique VI et \u00e9labore sa th\u00e9orie du \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb. Le \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb, qui demeure \u00ab tout entier \u00e0 la fois dans la subsistance \u00bb, est pens\u00e9 selon l\u2019\u00eatre-ensemble de ses parties. Analogue au maintenant diast\u00e8matique, qui est partie et non limite du temps, il a pour image le pr\u00e9sent de la danse, en qui pass\u00e9 et futur sont contenus et r\u00e9sorb\u00e9s : bien qu\u2019elle se d\u00e9route dans une succession, la danse est pr\u00e9sentement en train d\u2019\u00eatre dans\u00e9e (98), et c\u2019est sur le m\u00eame mode que le combat est lui aussi pr\u00e9sent.\r\n\r\nLa subsistance d\u2019un tel pr\u00e9sent se fonde sur l\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u2019une action en devenir, qui s\u2019exprime par un verbe au pr\u00e9sent extensif. L\u2019influence du sto\u00efcisme sur Damascius semble d\u00e9terminante : on reconna\u00eet sans peine dans ses analyses le pr\u00e9sent \u00e9tendu qui est le pr\u00e9sent sensible de l\u2019exp\u00e9rience pratique, celui en qui vient se loger une action comme \u00ab je marche \u00bb (action port\u00e9e \u00e0 \u00e9locution par un pr\u00e9sent extensif) ; et son \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb n\u2019est pas sans analogie avec le mode de pr\u00e9sence de la p\u00e9riode cosmique sto\u00efcienne (99).\r\n\r\n\u00c0 cette influence philosophique du sto\u00efcisme, il faut ajouter son influence grammaticale. Damascius fut pendant neuf ans professeur de rh\u00e9torique. C\u2019est sans aucun doute \u00e0 cette longue pratique des textes et des mots qu\u2019il faut rapporter l\u2019attention extr\u00eame qu\u2019il pr\u00eate au langage, ainsi que la th\u00e9matisation des probl\u00e8mes du langage au sein m\u00eame de sa pens\u00e9e philosophique (100). C\u2019est \u00e0 une grammaire d\u2019inspiration sto\u00efcienne qu\u2019il faut rapporter sa m\u00e9thode d\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, ou plut\u00f4t le contenu de son ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de Physique IV (221 a 6-9) : l\u2019infinitif \u00eatre, compris comme activit\u00e9 d\u2019\u00eatre, est envisag\u00e9 dans l\u2019extension aspectuelle, et Damascius le consid\u00e8re comme l\u2019\u00e9quivalent de paratasis tou einai. Cette explication de texte scrupuleuse, qui est bien dans la mani\u00e8re de Damascius, permet \u00e0 celui-ci de proposer sa d\u00e9finition du temps, tout en soulignant sa fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 par rapport \u00e0 la double autorit\u00e9 d\u2019Archytas et d\u2019Aristote. [conclusion p. 23-25]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/LNb8H8UiMDNsVyS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":713,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques","volume":"96","issue":"455\/459","pages":"1-26"}},"sort":[1983]}
Title | On Some Epicurean and Lucretian Arguments for the Infinity of the Universe |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 421-427 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Avotins, Ivars |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As is well known, Epicurus and his followers held that the universe was infinite and that its two primary components, void and atoms, were each infinite. The void was infinite in extension, the atoms were infinite in number and their total was infinite also in extension.' The chief Epicurean proofs of these infinities are found in Epicurus, Ad Herod. 41-2, and in Lucretius 1. 951-1020. As far as I can see, both the commentators to these works and writers on Epicurean physics in general have neglected to take into account some material pertinent to these proofs, material found in Aristotle and especially in his commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Simplicius, and Philoponus.2 In this article I wish to compare this neglected information with the proofs of infinity found in Epicurus and Lucretius and to discuss their authorship. [p. 421] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ZJK8o9VUGwRqW5s |
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Title | Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: Über die Zeit |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | The Classical Review, New Series |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 337-338 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Like a well-trained Neoplatonist commentator, Sonderegger outlines the skopos of his book on the first page. It is to consider Simplicius' thought about time and make it available to a wider audience (an audience that would, however, need to know Greek). His basis is the 28-page excursus at the end of Simplicius' commentary on Physics 4, known as the Corollarium de Tempore (hereafter, with S., CdT), to which, in the main body of the book, he attends with the minimum of excursions. This is partly dictated by his announced interest in Simplicius himself rather than his relation to other thinkers: as he rightly says, that cannot be treated until it is clear what Simplicius himself thought. In the present state of work on late Neoplatonism, this is not a trivial point. Sonderegger's aims have produced a very different book from the little-noticed work of H. Meyer, Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles über die Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969). Meyer's book is more philosophical and also differs in that his purpose was primarily to understand Aristotle, with no notion of being exoteric. Of this book, Sonderegger takes virtually no account, on the grounds that its presuppositions are very different from his own. What Sonderegger has given us is a very detailed and careful descriptive analysis of CdT, with special attention to the organization of the discussions (pp. 38–139), preceded by an introduction on Simplicius' Physics commentary, his excursuses, and Neoplatonism in general, and followed by some 30 pages of translation and 20 of appendices. These include a table of the uses and contexts of key terms in CdT, examinations of the extent and authenticity of quotations from Ps.-Archytas, Iamblichus, and Damascius, and a translation of Simplicius In Categorias 356.8–25, which contains in nuce much of the thought of CdT. Sonderegger is clearly aware that Simplicius wrote commentaries to expound his own philosophy, yet he tends to exaggerate the difference in thought rather than merely presentation, which might be expected in CdT and the analogous digressions on chance and place, as opposed to those parts of the commentary that start from specific lemmata. Even if CdT is more connected, it still proceeds largely by discussing quoted texts, and, as Sonderegger reminds us, Simplicius' aim is always to arrive at his own view of time. That, he claims, will help us to understand Aristotle (773.12–14): one recalls uneasily the project of expounding the De anima while following Iamblichus (In De an. 1.18–20). Sonderegger perhaps underestimates the extent to which Simplicius saw himself as engaged in the same enterprise as Aristotle—and Plato. Though he can cite texts for Simplicius' awareness of the difference between what he and Aristotle say, it does not always follow that Simplicius saw the difference between what he and Aristotle think. The texts Sonderegger quotes at p. 25 n.50 rather point out that Aristotle's intentions are the same, even if his language is not. Thus, 356.31 ff. clearly shows that Simplicius thinks the views on time (chronos) of Aristotle and hoi Neoteroi (the Neoplatonists) are not different. Conversely, in his sketch of the Neoplatonist background, which, as he says, constantly appears in Simplicius' commentary, Sonderegger is inclined to underplay divergences. It is only in the broadest sense true that the outlines of Simplicius' Neoplatonism were determined by Plotinus. The qualification that he liked to attach himself to Iamblichus and used terminology that can be traced back to Proclus is more important. The extent of Proclus' influence is thoroughly documented by I. Hadot, Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris, 1978), cited on p. 26 n. 51. I cannot understand the arguments here (29–35) that, for Simplicius, the hypostases are somehow unreal. This is conducted in terms drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, which, to an English-speaking reader, are not immediately illuminating. Incidentally, diakrisis is not an entity. To treat it as if it were is a kind of hyper-Neoplatonic realism: the meaning of "differentiation" is normally adequate. On time itself, there is a major difference between Plotinus and his post-Iamblichean successors on a point which concerns Sonderegger throughout: the invention of a further type of time that almost becomes a separate hypostasis. This is the psychic time that Simplicius calls protos chronos, as opposed to ordinary physical time on the one hand and aion on the other. The exposition and defense of this first time is the main aim of CdT. It is even more clearly a product of late Neoplatonic triadic thinking than Sonderegger's discussion (69–74) shows. If there is a triad of things permanent and ungenerated, permanent and generated, impermanent and generated, a mediating time is required for the second member of the triad. That this is Simplicius' thinking is shown by the way he has opposed aion as adiakritos and physical time as ho en ti thesei theôrmenos (784.34 ff.), a relation justifying, if not requiring, a higher time. The most notable recasting of Aristotle in Neoplatonist terms is the transformation of his definition into metron tou kata to einai rhontos (not quite "Mass des Seins des Physischen"), which, for all his concern to show that Simplicius distinguishes between Aristotle's views and his own, Sonderegger seems inclined to accept (cf. esp. 43 f. and 138). The translation aims at utility rather than elegance. Its value is greater at a time when interest in the thought of late antiquity is spreading among the wholly or nearly Greekless. Translations are increasingly called for. But who would translate the 1,366 pages of Simplicius' Physics commentary, or, indeed, publish the translation? [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ZCYOjLO9LGrxQNt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"770","_score":null,"_source":{"id":770,"authors_free":[{"id":1134,"entry_id":770,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: \u00dcber die Zeit","main_title":{"title":"Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: \u00dcber die Zeit"},"abstract":"Like a well-trained Neoplatonist commentator, Sonderegger outlines the skopos of his book on the first page. It is to consider Simplicius' thought about time and make it available to a wider audience (an audience that would, however, need to know Greek). His basis is the 28-page excursus at the end of Simplicius' commentary on Physics 4, known as the Corollarium de Tempore (hereafter, with S., CdT), to which, in the main body of the book, he attends with the minimum of excursions. This is partly dictated by his announced interest in Simplicius himself rather than his relation to other thinkers: as he rightly says, that cannot be treated until it is clear what Simplicius himself thought. In the present state of work on late Neoplatonism, this is not a trivial point.\r\n\r\nSonderegger's aims have produced a very different book from the little-noticed work of H. Meyer, Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles \u00fcber die Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969). Meyer's book is more philosophical and also differs in that his purpose was primarily to understand Aristotle, with no notion of being exoteric. Of this book, Sonderegger takes virtually no account, on the grounds that its presuppositions are very different from his own. What Sonderegger has given us is a very detailed and careful descriptive analysis of CdT, with special attention to the organization of the discussions (pp. 38\u2013139), preceded by an introduction on Simplicius' Physics commentary, his excursuses, and Neoplatonism in general, and followed by some 30 pages of translation and 20 of appendices. These include a table of the uses and contexts of key terms in CdT, examinations of the extent and authenticity of quotations from Ps.-Archytas, Iamblichus, and Damascius, and a translation of Simplicius In Categorias 356.8\u201325, which contains in nuce much of the thought of CdT.\r\n\r\nSonderegger is clearly aware that Simplicius wrote commentaries to expound his own philosophy, yet he tends to exaggerate the difference in thought rather than merely presentation, which might be expected in CdT and the analogous digressions on chance and place, as opposed to those parts of the commentary that start from specific lemmata. Even if CdT is more connected, it still proceeds largely by discussing quoted texts, and, as Sonderegger reminds us, Simplicius' aim is always to arrive at his own view of time. That, he claims, will help us to understand Aristotle (773.12\u201314): one recalls uneasily the project of expounding the De anima while following Iamblichus (In De an. 1.18\u201320). Sonderegger perhaps underestimates the extent to which Simplicius saw himself as engaged in the same enterprise as Aristotle\u2014and Plato.\r\n\r\nThough he can cite texts for Simplicius' awareness of the difference between what he and Aristotle say, it does not always follow that Simplicius saw the difference between what he and Aristotle think. The texts Sonderegger quotes at p. 25 n.50 rather point out that Aristotle's intentions are the same, even if his language is not. Thus, 356.31 ff. clearly shows that Simplicius thinks the views on time (chronos) of Aristotle and hoi Neoteroi (the Neoplatonists) are not different. Conversely, in his sketch of the Neoplatonist background, which, as he says, constantly appears in Simplicius' commentary, Sonderegger is inclined to underplay divergences. It is only in the broadest sense true that the outlines of Simplicius' Neoplatonism were determined by Plotinus. The qualification that he liked to attach himself to Iamblichus and used terminology that can be traced back to Proclus is more important.\r\n\r\nThe extent of Proclus' influence is thoroughly documented by I. Hadot, Le Probl\u00e8me du N\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin: Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius (Paris, 1978), cited on p. 26 n. 51. I cannot understand the arguments here (29\u201335) that, for Simplicius, the hypostases are somehow unreal. This is conducted in terms drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, which, to an English-speaking reader, are not immediately illuminating. Incidentally, diakrisis is not an entity. To treat it as if it were is a kind of hyper-Neoplatonic realism: the meaning of \"differentiation\" is normally adequate.\r\n\r\nOn time itself, there is a major difference between Plotinus and his post-Iamblichean successors on a point which concerns Sonderegger throughout: the invention of a further type of time that almost becomes a separate hypostasis. This is the psychic time that Simplicius calls protos chronos, as opposed to ordinary physical time on the one hand and aion on the other. The exposition and defense of this first time is the main aim of CdT. It is even more clearly a product of late Neoplatonic triadic thinking than Sonderegger's discussion (69\u201374) shows.\r\n\r\nIf there is a triad of things permanent and ungenerated, permanent and generated, impermanent and generated, a mediating time is required for the second member of the triad. That this is Simplicius' thinking is shown by the way he has opposed aion as adiakritos and physical time as ho en ti thesei the\u00f4rmenos (784.34 ff.), a relation justifying, if not requiring, a higher time. The most notable recasting of Aristotle in Neoplatonist terms is the transformation of his definition into metron tou kata to einai rhontos (not quite \"Mass des Seins des Physischen\"), which, for all his concern to show that Simplicius distinguishes between Aristotle's views and his own, Sonderegger seems inclined to accept (cf. esp. 43 f. and 138).\r\n\r\nThe translation aims at utility rather than elegance. Its value is greater at a time when interest in the thought of late antiquity is spreading among the wholly or nearly Greekless. Translations are increasingly called for. But who would translate the 1,366 pages of Simplicius' Physics commentary, or, indeed, publish the translation? [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ZCYOjLO9LGrxQNt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":770,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review, New Series","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"337-338"}},"sort":[1983]}
Title | La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle "Categorie" di Aristotele |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Rivista critica di storia della filosofia |
Volume | 38 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 259-283 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Conti, Alessandro D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Uno dei contributi particolari più rilevanti che i commentatori neoplatonici hanno recato allo sviluppo e alla sistemazione della dottrina categoriale aristotelica è senza dubbio quello relativo all'analisi della nozione di πρός τι. Essi, infatti, nel tentativo di fornire un'interpretazione del settimo capitolo delle Categorie che fosse (i) internamente coerente e (ii) solidale con la lettura generale del trattato, sono giunti a elaborare in forma sufficientemente compiuta un concetto di relazione analogo al moderno concetto di relazione binaria, del tutto assente, invece, negli scritti di Aristotele, che pare conoscere solo un non ben definito concetto di relativo (πρός τι). In altre parole: mentre lo Stagirita (i) operava con la sola nozione di relativo e (ii) concepiva i relativi — sotto l'influenza di evidenti suggestioni grammaticali — come le entità che corrispondono ai termini non assoluti del linguaggio (cioè non aventi significato se non in riferimento a un altro termine), i neoplatonici, al contrario, saranno in grado (i) di servirsi sia della nozione di relativo che di quella di relazione (σχέσις), e (ii) di concepire, in un certo qual modo, le relazioni come funzioni diadiche (o meglio, come una sorta di corrispettivo ontologico delle nostre funzioni diadiche) e i relativi come gli argomenti che tali funzioni soddisfano. Le precise scelte interpretative su alcuni problemi cruciali del trattato, e cioè: la valenza della tavola categoriale, la distinzione delle categorie, il tipo d'esistenza degli accidenti da una parte, e l'accettazione dell'idea, aristotelicamente corretta, che i πρός τι devono essere presi a coppie, dall'altra, sono gli elementi che hanno reso possibile ai neoplatonici la formulazione del concetto di relazione (binaria). Essi infatti ritenevano: che la tavola categoriale avesse una precisa valenza ontologica, ripartendo non solo nomi e concetti, ma anche cose; che la distinzione tra le dieci categorie fosse reale e non concettuale; che gli accidenti fossero forme inerenti alle sostanze. In conseguenza dei primi due punti, i neoplatonici erano indotti a difendere l'oggettività, la realtà e l'indipendenza della categoria dei πρός τι e dei suoi appartenenti, e a rifiutare, quindi, qualsiasi tentativo di interpretazione che volesse ridurla, direttamente o indirettamente, alle altre categorie. D'altra parte, concepire gli accidenti come forme inerenti alle sostanze equivaleva a considerare il rapporto tra ciascun genere degli accidenti e la sostanza alla stregua di quello della qualità, e quindi secondo il modello qualità-cosa qualificata. Così, nel caso dei πρός τι, i neoplatonici pensavano che l'entità "padre" fosse un'entità composta di una sostanza e di una certa forma accidentale, la paternità, ad essa inerente, non diversamente da come "bianco" è un'entità composta da una sostanza e dalla forma della bianchezza. Per avere un concetto corretto di relazione bastava, a questo punto, assumere, coerentemente con l'idea che i πρός τι vanno presi a coppie, che la caratteristica peculiare di queste particolari forme accidentali fosse quella di riferirsi e collegare tra loro due entità distinte. Scrive, ad esempio, Simplicio: «È proprio soltanto della relazione il sussistere una in molti enti, cosa che non capita a nessuna delle altre categorie» (Simplicio, In Cat., p. 161, 6-8). E si legge in Olimpiodoro: «Infatti nei relativi una è la relazione, ma distinte le entità che l'accolgono» (Olimpiodoro, In Cat., p. 97, 30-1). Su queste nuove basi concettuali, i commentatori neoplatonici potranno sviluppare una teoria dei πρός τι sufficientemente omogenea e coerente nelle sue linee più generali, che adopereranno come modello interpretativo della confusa dottrina aristotelica. In questo modo, essi riusciranno a presentare quest'ultima come un sistema sostanzialmente compiuto e ordinato. E anzi, i punti e gli elementi incongrui che ancora vi sopravviveranno saranno dovuti più a un evidente desiderio di giustificare e spiegare comunque — per lo meno parzialmente se non in toto — le affermazioni dello Stagirita, che a delle effettive carenze nella teoria da essi elaborata. [introduction p. 259-263] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9gdQy8F1p83C8kj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1275","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1275,"authors_free":[{"id":1864,"entry_id":1275,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":52,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Conti, Alessandro D.","free_first_name":"Alessandro D.","free_last_name":"Conti","norm_person":{"id":52,"first_name":"Alessandro D.","last_name":"Conti","full_name":"Conti, Alessandro D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1047115123","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle \"Categorie\" di Aristotele","main_title":{"title":"La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle \"Categorie\" di Aristotele"},"abstract":"Uno dei contributi particolari pi\u00f9 rilevanti che i commentatori neoplatonici hanno recato allo sviluppo e alla sistemazione della dottrina categoriale aristotelica \u00e8 senza dubbio quello relativo all'analisi della nozione di \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9.\r\n\r\nEssi, infatti, nel tentativo di fornire un'interpretazione del settimo capitolo delle Categorie che fosse (i) internamente coerente e (ii) solidale con la lettura generale del trattato, sono giunti a elaborare in forma sufficientemente compiuta un concetto di relazione analogo al moderno concetto di relazione binaria, del tutto assente, invece, negli scritti di Aristotele, che pare conoscere solo un non ben definito concetto di relativo (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9).\r\n\r\nIn altre parole: mentre lo Stagirita (i) operava con la sola nozione di relativo e (ii) concepiva i relativi \u2014 sotto l'influenza di evidenti suggestioni grammaticali \u2014 come le entit\u00e0 che corrispondono ai termini non assoluti del linguaggio (cio\u00e8 non aventi significato se non in riferimento a un altro termine), i neoplatonici, al contrario, saranno in grado (i) di servirsi sia della nozione di relativo che di quella di relazione (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), e (ii) di concepire, in un certo qual modo, le relazioni come funzioni diadiche (o meglio, come una sorta di corrispettivo ontologico delle nostre funzioni diadiche) e i relativi come gli argomenti che tali funzioni soddisfano.\r\n\r\nLe precise scelte interpretative su alcuni problemi cruciali del trattato, e cio\u00e8:\r\n\r\n la valenza della tavola categoriale,\r\n la distinzione delle categorie,\r\n il tipo d'esistenza degli accidenti\r\n\r\nda una parte, e l'accettazione dell'idea, aristotelicamente corretta, che i \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 devono essere presi a coppie, dall'altra, sono gli elementi che hanno reso possibile ai neoplatonici la formulazione del concetto di relazione (binaria).\r\n\r\nEssi infatti ritenevano:\r\n\r\n che la tavola categoriale avesse una precisa valenza ontologica, ripartendo non solo nomi e concetti, ma anche cose;\r\n che la distinzione tra le dieci categorie fosse reale e non concettuale;\r\n che gli accidenti fossero forme inerenti alle sostanze.\r\n\r\nIn conseguenza dei primi due punti, i neoplatonici erano indotti a difendere l'oggettivit\u00e0, la realt\u00e0 e l'indipendenza della categoria dei \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 e dei suoi appartenenti, e a rifiutare, quindi, qualsiasi tentativo di interpretazione che volesse ridurla, direttamente o indirettamente, alle altre categorie.\r\n\r\nD'altra parte, concepire gli accidenti come forme inerenti alle sostanze equivaleva a considerare il rapporto tra ciascun genere degli accidenti e la sostanza alla stregua di quello della qualit\u00e0, e quindi secondo il modello qualit\u00e0-cosa qualificata.\r\n\r\nCos\u00ec, nel caso dei \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9, i neoplatonici pensavano che l'entit\u00e0 \"padre\" fosse un'entit\u00e0 composta di una sostanza e di una certa forma accidentale, la paternit\u00e0, ad essa inerente, non diversamente da come \"bianco\" \u00e8 un'entit\u00e0 composta da una sostanza e dalla forma della bianchezza.\r\n\r\nPer avere un concetto corretto di relazione bastava, a questo punto, assumere, coerentemente con l'idea che i \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 vanno presi a coppie, che la caratteristica peculiare di queste particolari forme accidentali fosse quella di riferirsi e collegare tra loro due entit\u00e0 distinte.\r\n\r\nScrive, ad esempio, Simplicio:\r\n\r\n \u00ab\u00c8 proprio soltanto della relazione il sussistere una in molti enti, cosa che non capita a nessuna delle altre categorie\u00bb (Simplicio, In Cat., p. 161, 6-8).\r\n\r\nE si legge in Olimpiodoro:\r\n\r\n \u00abInfatti nei relativi una \u00e8 la relazione, ma distinte le entit\u00e0 che l'accolgono\u00bb (Olimpiodoro, In Cat., p. 97, 30-1).\r\n\r\nSu queste nuove basi concettuali, i commentatori neoplatonici potranno sviluppare una teoria dei \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 sufficientemente omogenea e coerente nelle sue linee pi\u00f9 generali, che adopereranno come modello interpretativo della confusa dottrina aristotelica.\r\n\r\nIn questo modo, essi riusciranno a presentare quest'ultima come un sistema sostanzialmente compiuto e ordinato.\r\n\r\nE anzi, i punti e gli elementi incongrui che ancora vi sopravviveranno saranno dovuti pi\u00f9 a un evidente desiderio di giustificare e spiegare comunque \u2014 per lo meno parzialmente se non in toto \u2014 le affermazioni dello Stagirita, che a delle effettive carenze nella teoria da essi elaborata. [introduction p. 259-263]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9gdQy8F1p83C8kj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":52,"full_name":"Conti, Alessandro D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1275,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista critica di storia della filosofia","volume":"38","issue":"3","pages":"259-283"}},"sort":[1983]}
Title | La teoria della relazione nei commenti neoplatonici alle Categorie di Aristotele |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofía |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 159-283 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Conti, A. D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/OTIdcLG5JO15mv8 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1563","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1563,"authors_free":[{"id":2730,"entry_id":1563,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Conti, A. D. ","free_first_name":"A. D. ","free_last_name":"Conti","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"La teoria della relazione nei commenti neoplatonici alle Categorie di Aristotele","main_title":{"title":"La teoria della relazione nei commenti neoplatonici alle Categorie di Aristotele"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/OTIdcLG5JO15mv8","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1563,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosof\u00eda ","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"159-283"}},"sort":[1983]}
Title | La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Addenda et Corrigenda |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Revue d'histoire des textes |
Volume | 11 |
Pages | 387-395 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The present study, as the title indicates, brings some supplementary information and minor corrections to my article on La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le « Manuel » d'Épictète, which appeared in volume VIII (1978) if the Revue d'Histoire des Textes (pp. 1-108). As part of these addenda, I have identified two new Greek texts, contained in the Neapolitans III. B. 12 : one fragment of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and another fragment of the commentary by Simplicius on Aristotle's De caelo ; each of these fragments is the length of a quaternion. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IyOsWDpihx7t4Q1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1496","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1496,"authors_free":[{"id":2596,"entry_id":1496,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te. Addenda et Corrigenda","main_title":{"title":"La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te. Addenda et Corrigenda"},"abstract":"The present study, as the title indicates, brings some supplementary information and minor corrections to my article on La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le \u00ab Manuel \u00bb d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te, which appeared in volume VIII (1978) if\r\nthe Revue d'Histoire des Textes (pp. 1-108). As part of these addenda, I have identified two new Greek texts, contained in the Neapolitans III. B. 12 : one fragment of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and another fragment of the commentary by Simplicius on Aristotle's De caelo ; each of these fragments is the length of a quaternion. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IyOsWDpihx7t4Q1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1496,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue d'histoire des textes","volume":"11","issue":"","pages":"387-395"}},"sort":[1983]}
Title | La taille et la forme des atomes dans les systèmes de Démocrite et d'Épicure («Préjugé» et «présupposé» en histoire de la philosophie) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 172 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 187-203 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Qu'on n'aille pas en conclure que nous suivons aveuglément tout propos du Stagirite. Une observation permettra d'atténuer la valeur de son témoignage et de nuancer la conclusion à laquelle nous sommes arrivés jusqu'ici. Selon l'hypothèse élaborée ci-dessus, Démocrite et Épicure ne se seraient pas opposés sur la question de la grandeur des atomes. Pour l'un et l'autre philosophe, la gamme des grandeurs aura été en effet finie. Mais scrutons de plus près les deux thèses concernant la forme des atomes. Épicure précise que les variétés de forme sont, non pas « infinies », mais « insaisissables » (ἀπερίληπτοι). Quant à Démocrite et à Leucippe, Aristote affirme deux fois que les variétés de forme sont « infinies », d'une part en parlant de la multiplicité « infinie » des atomes, d'autre part en opposant la théorie de Leucippe à celle de Platon. En revanche, lorsqu'il présente le système atomiste dans le fragment Sur Démocrite, les différences de forme sont dites, non plus « infinies », mais « innombrables » (ἀναρίθμητος). À en juger d'après l'Index de Bonitz, ce dernier terme est un hapax dans l'œuvre d'Aristote. S'ensuit-il qu'il soit, sinon un vocable d'emprunt, du moins un terme transposé, plus proche de l'expression originale de Démocrite ? Mais qu'est-ce qui sépare alors la doctrine des Abdéritains et celle d'Épicure ? Où passe la distinction entre différences « innombrables » (Démocrite) et différences « insaisissables » (Épicure) ? Un dernier paradoxe semble poindre : on peut en effet se demander si, en refusant l'hypothèse d'une variété infinie de formes, Épicure ne s'opposait pas à la formulation qu'en avait donnée Aristote, bien plus qu'il ne songeait à rectifier la théorie de Démocrite. Mais nous effleurons ici un problème nouveau, celui de l'élaboration progressive des notions d'infini et de fini ; impossible de l'approfondir sans balayer les « préjugés » et les « présupposés » qui, sur ce point aussi, nous séparent des notions primitives par une proximité illusoire. Problème trop vaste pour qu'on puisse l'aborder dans cet article. [conclusion 201-203] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AhK7pfqowUhUex4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1101","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1101,"authors_free":[{"id":1664,"entry_id":1101,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La taille et la forme des atomes dans les syst\u00e8mes de D\u00e9mocrite et d'\u00c9picure (\u00abPr\u00e9jug\u00e9\u00bb et \u00abpr\u00e9suppos\u00e9\u00bb en histoire de la philosophie)","main_title":{"title":"La taille et la forme des atomes dans les syst\u00e8mes de D\u00e9mocrite et d'\u00c9picure (\u00abPr\u00e9jug\u00e9\u00bb et \u00abpr\u00e9suppos\u00e9\u00bb en histoire de la philosophie)"},"abstract":"Qu'on n'aille pas en conclure que nous suivons aveugl\u00e9ment tout propos du Stagirite. Une observation permettra d'att\u00e9nuer la valeur de son t\u00e9moignage et de nuancer la conclusion \u00e0 laquelle nous sommes arriv\u00e9s jusqu'ici.\r\n\r\nSelon l'hypoth\u00e8se \u00e9labor\u00e9e ci-dessus, D\u00e9mocrite et \u00c9picure ne se seraient pas oppos\u00e9s sur la question de la grandeur des atomes. Pour l'un et l'autre philosophe, la gamme des grandeurs aura \u00e9t\u00e9 en effet finie. Mais scrutons de plus pr\u00e8s les deux th\u00e8ses concernant la forme des atomes. \u00c9picure pr\u00e9cise que les vari\u00e9t\u00e9s de forme sont, non pas \u00ab infinies \u00bb, mais \u00ab insaisissables \u00bb (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9). Quant \u00e0 D\u00e9mocrite et \u00e0 Leucippe, Aristote affirme deux fois que les vari\u00e9t\u00e9s de forme sont \u00ab infinies \u00bb, d'une part en parlant de la multiplicit\u00e9 \u00ab infinie \u00bb des atomes, d'autre part en opposant la th\u00e9orie de Leucippe \u00e0 celle de Platon.\r\n\r\nEn revanche, lorsqu'il pr\u00e9sente le syst\u00e8me atomiste dans le fragment Sur D\u00e9mocrite, les diff\u00e9rences de forme sont dites, non plus \u00ab infinies \u00bb, mais \u00ab innombrables \u00bb (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03b8\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2).\r\n\r\n\u00c0 en juger d'apr\u00e8s l'Index de Bonitz, ce dernier terme est un hapax dans l'\u0153uvre d'Aristote. S'ensuit-il qu'il soit, sinon un vocable d'emprunt, du moins un terme transpos\u00e9, plus proche de l'expression originale de D\u00e9mocrite ?\r\n\r\nMais qu'est-ce qui s\u00e9pare alors la doctrine des Abd\u00e9ritains et celle d'\u00c9picure ? O\u00f9 passe la distinction entre diff\u00e9rences \u00ab innombrables \u00bb (D\u00e9mocrite) et diff\u00e9rences \u00ab insaisissables \u00bb (\u00c9picure) ?\r\n\r\nUn dernier paradoxe semble poindre : on peut en effet se demander si, en refusant l'hypoth\u00e8se d'une vari\u00e9t\u00e9 infinie de formes, \u00c9picure ne s'opposait pas \u00e0 la formulation qu'en avait donn\u00e9e Aristote, bien plus qu'il ne songeait \u00e0 rectifier la th\u00e9orie de D\u00e9mocrite.\r\n\r\nMais nous effleurons ici un probl\u00e8me nouveau, celui de l'\u00e9laboration progressive des notions d'infini et de fini ; impossible de l'approfondir sans balayer les \u00ab pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s \u00bb et les \u00ab pr\u00e9suppos\u00e9s \u00bb qui, sur ce point aussi, nous s\u00e9parent des notions primitives par une proximit\u00e9 illusoire.\r\n\r\nProbl\u00e8me trop vaste pour qu'on puisse l'aborder dans cet article. [conclusion 201-203]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AhK7pfqowUhUex4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1101,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"172","issue":"2","pages":"187-203"}},"sort":[1982]}
Title | Digging up a Paradox: A Philological Note on Zeno's Stadium |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 125 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mansfeld, Jaap |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Of Zeno's four arguments against the reality of motion transmitted by Aristotle, the fourth, the so-called Stadium (Vors. 29 A 28), is perhaps the most difficult. The difficulties involved are of two sorts: philological problems on the one hand, questions of a philosophical nature on the other. In the present paper, I am concerned with the first sort, not the second, although I shall perhaps not be successful in keeping the latter out altogether. A study of the philosophical discussions to be found in the learned literature, however, has convinced me that the first problem to be solved is that of the interpretation of Aristotle's text. There is a general feeling that Aristotle, in reporting and arguing against Zeno's argument, somehow failed. I believe his report is sufficiently clear; although Aristotle's argument contra Zeno is not, perhaps, satisfactory in every respect, Zeno's original paradox can be found in his text. I shall attempt to show that, in order to find it, we must begin by taking both the topography of the stadium and the position of the bodies in it into account, which several recent reconstructions, however satisfactory they may appear to be in other respects, fail to do. I wish to start from a consideration concerned with a non-philosophical feature the four arguments against motion have in common: the fact that they are fun. They undoubtedly are very serious arguments, but they were also written in order to épater le bourgeois. The first argument proves that a runner will never get to the end of the stadium: once he has got halfway, he still has to get halfway the remaining half, halfway the remaining quarter, and so on, in infinitum. The second proves that swift-footed Achilles will never catch up with the slowest thing on earth, because the distance in between, although constantly diminishing, forever remains proportionally the same. The third proves that a flying arrow, which occupies a place equal to its own size, is at rest, because it does not move at the place where it is, and not at the place where it is not either. The first three arguments, then, are genuine and rather hilarious paradoxes. They reveal Zeno as a wit. To ask what is so funny about the fourth argument against motion, therefore, is a legitimate question. Yet I have hardly ever read an account of the fourth paradox which brought out the inevitable smile fetched by the others. Instead, one finds complicated discussions about infinite divisibility versus discrete or granular structure, and endless shufflings and reshufflings of the runners on the course. There are several reasons for this unfortunate situation, the most important of which, I believe, is that both ancient commentators (to judge from Simplicius' account) and modern scholars have failed to distinguish (or to distinguish sufficiently) between Zeno's paradox on the one hand and Aristotle's refutation on the other. Another reason is that Aristotle's text is plagued in parts with variae lectiones that seriously affect the meaning of the argument as a whole. Some of these readings enjoy the support of Simplicius, but this does not prove them right, for Simplicius points out one passage where Alexander of Aphrodisias followed a reading different from that accepted by himself and which, as he believes, Alexander "found in some manuscripts" (ἐν ταῖς ἀντιγράφοις εὗρον, In Phys. 1017, 19). Furthermore, as Simplicius likewise tells us (In Phys. 1019, 27–31), Alexander proposed to interpolate Phys. Z 9, 240a15-16 λαὸν-φρήσιν immediately after 240a11 διελῆλυθεν. Alexander, then, found it difficult to understand the argument of the text as transmitted (which, at at least one other point, differed from Simplicius’). Simplicius' lengthy reconstruction of the fourth argument against motion and of Aristotle's critique thereof (In Phys. 1016, 7–1020, 6, printed—as far as 1019, 9—by Lee as T 36) appears to have no other authority than his own, for he differs from Alexander, and the only other person cited (Eudemus, Fr. 106 Wehrli) is only adduced for points which do not affect the interpretation of the more difficult parts of Phys. Z 9, 239b33–240a17. Although scholars have dealt rather freely with Simplicius' commentary, using only those sections which fit their own views, it should be acknowledged that his reconstruction of the paradox, and especially his diagram of the stadium featuring three rows of runners, have been of crucial importance to the modern history of interpretation of Zeno's argument. I believe, however, that Simplicius (and perhaps Alexander as well) already made the fundamental mistake of failing to distinguish in the proper way between Zeno's paradox and Aristotle's refutation, although in Simplicius' case this is somewhat mitigated by the fact that he apparently noticed the joke of Zeno's argument (one doesn’t know if Alexander did). We are not bound, then, to follow Simplicius all, or even half the way, and need not even accept his guidance as to the choice to be made among the variae lectiones. These different readings themselves, so it seems, reflect different ancient interpretations of Aristotle's exposition. In some manuscripts, interpretamenta may have got into the text (as at 240a6), or even have ousted other, more difficult readings (as at 240a11). [introduction p. 1-3] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/y2jILmoDyxD389y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1108","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1108,"authors_free":[{"id":2070,"entry_id":1108,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":29,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","free_first_name":"Jaap","free_last_name":"Mansfeld","norm_person":{"id":29,"first_name":"Jaap","last_name":"Mansfeld","full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119383217","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Digging up a Paradox: A Philological Note on Zeno's Stadium","main_title":{"title":"Digging up a Paradox: A Philological Note on Zeno's Stadium"},"abstract":"Of Zeno's four arguments against the reality of motion transmitted by Aristotle, the fourth, the so-called Stadium (Vors. 29 A 28), is perhaps the most difficult. The difficulties involved are of two sorts: philological problems on the one hand, questions of a philosophical nature on the other. In the present paper, I am concerned with the first sort, not the second, although I shall perhaps not be successful in keeping the latter out altogether. A study of the philosophical discussions to be found in the learned literature, however, has convinced me that the first problem to be solved is that of the interpretation of Aristotle's text. There is a general feeling that Aristotle, in reporting and arguing against Zeno's argument, somehow failed. I believe his report is sufficiently clear; although Aristotle's argument contra Zeno is not, perhaps, satisfactory in every respect, Zeno's original paradox can be found in his text. I shall attempt to show that, in order to find it, we must begin by taking both the topography of the stadium and the position of the bodies in it into account, which several recent reconstructions, however satisfactory they may appear to be in other respects, fail to do.\r\n\r\nI wish to start from a consideration concerned with a non-philosophical feature the four arguments against motion have in common: the fact that they are fun. They undoubtedly are very serious arguments, but they were also written in order to \u00e9pater le bourgeois. The first argument proves that a runner will never get to the end of the stadium: once he has got halfway, he still has to get halfway the remaining half, halfway the remaining quarter, and so on, in infinitum. The second proves that swift-footed Achilles will never catch up with the slowest thing on earth, because the distance in between, although constantly diminishing, forever remains proportionally the same. The third proves that a flying arrow, which occupies a place equal to its own size, is at rest, because it does not move at the place where it is, and not at the place where it is not either.\r\n\r\nThe first three arguments, then, are genuine and rather hilarious paradoxes. They reveal Zeno as a wit. To ask what is so funny about the fourth argument against motion, therefore, is a legitimate question. Yet I have hardly ever read an account of the fourth paradox which brought out the inevitable smile fetched by the others. Instead, one finds complicated discussions about infinite divisibility versus discrete or granular structure, and endless shufflings and reshufflings of the runners on the course. There are several reasons for this unfortunate situation, the most important of which, I believe, is that both ancient commentators (to judge from Simplicius' account) and modern scholars have failed to distinguish (or to distinguish sufficiently) between Zeno's paradox on the one hand and Aristotle's refutation on the other. Another reason is that Aristotle's text is plagued in parts with variae lectiones that seriously affect the meaning of the argument as a whole. Some of these readings enjoy the support of Simplicius, but this does not prove them right, for Simplicius points out one passage where Alexander of Aphrodisias followed a reading different from that accepted by himself and which, as he believes, Alexander \"found in some manuscripts\" (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f57\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, In Phys. 1017, 19). Furthermore, as Simplicius likewise tells us (In Phys. 1019, 27\u201331), Alexander proposed to interpolate Phys. Z 9, 240a15-16 \u03bb\u03b1\u1f78\u03bd-\u03c6\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd immediately after 240a11 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6\u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd. Alexander, then, found it difficult to understand the argument of the text as transmitted (which, at at least one other point, differed from Simplicius\u2019). Simplicius' lengthy reconstruction of the fourth argument against motion and of Aristotle's critique thereof (In Phys. 1016, 7\u20131020, 6, printed\u2014as far as 1019, 9\u2014by Lee as T 36) appears to have no other authority than his own, for he differs from Alexander, and the only other person cited (Eudemus, Fr. 106 Wehrli) is only adduced for points which do not affect the interpretation of the more difficult parts of Phys. Z 9, 239b33\u2013240a17.\r\n\r\nAlthough scholars have dealt rather freely with Simplicius' commentary, using only those sections which fit their own views, it should be acknowledged that his reconstruction of the paradox, and especially his diagram of the stadium featuring three rows of runners, have been of crucial importance to the modern history of interpretation of Zeno's argument. I believe, however, that Simplicius (and perhaps Alexander as well) already made the fundamental mistake of failing to distinguish in the proper way between Zeno's paradox and Aristotle's refutation, although in Simplicius' case this is somewhat mitigated by the fact that he apparently noticed the joke of Zeno's argument (one doesn\u2019t know if Alexander did). We are not bound, then, to follow Simplicius all, or even half the way, and need not even accept his guidance as to the choice to be made among the variae lectiones. These different readings themselves, so it seems, reflect different ancient interpretations of Aristotle's exposition. In some manuscripts, interpretamenta may have got into the text (as at 240a6), or even have ousted other, more difficult readings (as at 240a11). [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/y2jILmoDyxD389y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":29,"full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1108,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"125","issue":"1","pages":"1-24"}},"sort":[1982]}
Title | Zeno on Plurality |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 27 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 223-238 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Makin, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
We want to discuss some Eleatic arguments against plurality, which are of interest both in themselves and as precursors of Atomist thought. The arguments to be considered are from Zeno. We will have two guides in interpreting the arguments. First, they should be such that Atomist theory provides a plausible response to them; second, they should pose no threat to the Eleatic theory. [introduction p. 223] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/wOq1opqPtXhX1E6 |
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Title | Simplikios in der arabischen Überlieferung |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Der Islam; Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients |
Volume | 59 |
Pages | 6-31 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gätje, Helmut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wenn Simplikios in der philosophischen Tradition des Islams nicht zu einer so festen Größe geworden ist wie Alexander von Aphrodisias oder Themistios, so hängt das mit der historischen Stellung dieser Exegeten innerhalb der peripatetischen Schule zusammen. Ihnen gegenüber ist Simplikios nachgeboren. Auf der anderen Seite hat aber offenbar sein Zeitgenosse Johannes Philoponos, dem freilich im islamischen Bereich zu Unrecht eine Reihe medizinischer Werke zugeschrieben wurden, einen größeren Widerhall gefunden, was wiederum mit Ausgangspunkt und Wegen der Überlieferung zusammenhängt. Wenn man dem Urteil Praechters folgt und in Simplikios einen der bedeutendsten Kommentatoren des Altertums sieht, so stehen diese Bewertung des Simplikios und seine Wirkung im Islam nicht im rechten Verhältnis zueinander. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nULzjIVmZSFqXQi |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"540","_score":null,"_source":{"id":540,"authors_free":[{"id":764,"entry_id":540,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":134,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"G\u00e4tje, Helmut ","free_first_name":"Helmut ","free_last_name":"G\u00e4tje","norm_person":{"id":134,"first_name":"Helmut ","last_name":"G\u00e4tje","full_name":"G\u00e4tje, Helmut ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1021419966","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplikios in der arabischen \u00dcberlieferung","main_title":{"title":"Simplikios in der arabischen \u00dcberlieferung"},"abstract":"Wenn Simplikios in der philosophischen Tradition des Islams nicht zu einer so festen Gr\u00f6\u00dfe geworden ist wie Alexander von Aphrodisias oder Themistios, so h\u00e4ngt das mit der historischen Stellung dieser Exegeten inner\u00adhalb der peripatetischen Schule zusammen. Ihnen gegen\u00fcber ist Simplikios nachgeboren. Auf der anderen Seite hat aber offenbar sein Zeitgenosse Johannes Philoponos, dem freilich im islamischen Bereich zu Unrecht eine Reihe medizinischer Werke zugeschrieben wurden, einen gr\u00f6\u00dferen Wider\u00adhall gefunden, was wiederum mit Ausgangspunkt und Wegen der \u00dcberlie\u00adferung zusammenh\u00e4ngt. Wenn man dem Urteil Praechters folgt und in Simplikios einen der bedeutendsten Kommentatoren des Altertums sieht, so stehen diese Bewertung des Simplikios und seine Wirkung im Islam nicht im rechten Verh\u00e4ltnis zueinander. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nULzjIVmZSFqXQi","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":134,"full_name":"G\u00e4tje, Helmut ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":540,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Der Islam; Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients","volume":"59","issue":"","pages":"6-31"}},"sort":[1982]}
Title | A Fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, concerning Synonymy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 323-326 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Janko, Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
An important fragment of the lost portion of Aristotle's Poetics is the definition of synonyms preserved by Simplicius,' which corresponds to Aristotle's own citation of the Poetics for synonyms in the Rhetoric, 3. 2. 1404b 37 ff. I shall argue elsewhere that this derives from a discussion of the sources of verbal humour in the lost account of comedy and humour. Here it is my aim to show that Simplicius definitely derived the quotation from Porphyry, which pushes back the attestation of this part of the Poetics by more than two centuries (although the citation in the Antiatticist, Poet. fr. 4 Kassel, is older still). Furthermore, I shall show that some of the words in the definition are a gloss added by Porphyry for the purposes of his own polemic. [introduction, p. 323] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FEkzGy6BAHpTaIG |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1359","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1359,"authors_free":[{"id":2035,"entry_id":1359,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":203,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Janko, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Janko","norm_person":{"id":203,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Janko","full_name":"Janko, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1013357299","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A Fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, concerning Synonymy","main_title":{"title":"A Fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, concerning Synonymy"},"abstract":"An important fragment of the lost portion of Aristotle's Poetics is the definition of synonyms preserved by Simplicius,' which corresponds to Aristotle's own citation of the Poetics for synonyms in the Rhetoric, 3. 2. 1404b 37 ff. I shall argue elsewhere that this derives from a discussion of the sources of verbal humour in the lost account of \r\ncomedy and humour. Here it is my aim to show that Simplicius definitely derived the quotation from Porphyry, which pushes back the attestation of this part of the Poetics by more than two centuries (although the citation in the Antiatticist, Poet. fr. 4 Kassel, is older still). Furthermore, I shall show that some of the words in the \r\ndefinition are a gloss added by Porphyry for the purposes of his own polemic. [introduction, p. 323]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FEkzGy6BAHpTaIG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":203,"full_name":"Janko, Richard","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1359,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"32","issue":"2","pages":"323-326"}},"sort":[1982]}
Title | L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs néo-platoniciens |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1981 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 35-52 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Narcy, Michel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the expression of Neoplatonism after Plotinus, which was primarily in the form of commentary on earlier works. However, this method can lead to errors and departures from the original ideas. The article examines how this applies to interpretations of homonymy in Aristotle's Categories, which are inconsistent among commentators. The author suggests that by examining how homonymy is used to resolve specific problems, one can better understand its meaning and transformation from Aristotle to Neoplatonism. The discussion centers on a passage in Simplicius's commentary on Categories in which he comments on Aristotle's remarks about the paronymous naming of beings defined by their quality. The author compares Simplicius's comments to Aristotle's original text, and argues that the former intentionally misrepresents the latter. [derived from the introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/LehHtPQbB1BKLEC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1104","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1104,"authors_free":[{"id":1667,"entry_id":1104,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":277,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Narcy, Michel","free_first_name":"Michel","free_last_name":"Narcy","norm_person":{"id":277,"first_name":"Michel","last_name":"Narcy","full_name":"Narcy, Michel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/129449512","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs n\u00e9o-platoniciens","main_title":{"title":"L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs n\u00e9o-platoniciens"},"abstract":"This text discusses the expression of Neoplatonism after Plotinus, which was primarily in the form of commentary on earlier works. However, this method can lead to errors and departures from the original ideas. The article examines how this applies to interpretations of homonymy in Aristotle's Categories, which are inconsistent among commentators. The author suggests that by examining how homonymy is used to resolve specific problems, one can better understand its meaning and transformation from Aristotle to Neoplatonism. The discussion centers on a passage in Simplicius's commentary on Categories in which he comments on Aristotle's remarks about the paronymous naming of beings defined by their quality. The author compares Simplicius's comments to Aristotle's original text, and argues that the former intentionally misrepresents the latter. [derived from the introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1981","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/LehHtPQbB1BKLEC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":277,"full_name":"Narcy, Michel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1104,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"35-52"}},"sort":[1981]}
Title | Les présocratiques et la question de l'infini |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1981 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 19-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Frère, Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Bien avant la philosophie de Platon et celle d'Aristote, la pensée grecque a rencontré la question du rapport entre l'infini (apeiros) et la perfection. Mais, pour aborder ce que les Grecs veulent nommer par le « non-limité », il convient de partir du débat que les linguistes ont engagé autour du terme. Plusieurs interprétations sémantiques sont envisagées dans le rapport entre apeiros et peirar/peras. Dans une première solution, le préfixe négatif a- se combine avec peras ; dans une seconde, le a- privatif porte sur la racine per (perô, peirô, perainô), qui signifie passage et traversée. En ce qui concerne peras, les linguistes sont de nouveau partagés entre « limite, bout, extrémité » ou « lien ». Pour ce qui est de la langue grecque, non encore conceptualisée par la démarche philosophique, ce que « illimité » peut véhiculer de non clair pour la raison ou de non rassurant pour le sentiment ne comporte pourtant aucune dimension de cette angoisse et de ce vertige que retiendra Pascal. Lorsque Homère ou Hésiode parlent de la « terre sans limite », lorsque Pindare chante la « renommée infinie » du héros, l’adjectif apeirôn se relie généralement à l’éloge de qualités concernant choses ou hommes. Il y a aussi l’idée de profondeur sans fin (le sommeil, hypnos, Odyssée VII, 286) ou d’ampleur (une foule d’hommes, Iliade XXIV, 776). C’est moins son aspect infini que son pouvoir d’engloutir qui fait caractériser comme terrible la mer infinie. De même, l’adjectif apeirôn, infini, renvoie à l’immensité comme profusion et comme richesse, qu’il s’agisse du lieu, du temps ou du nombre. Avec les présocratiques, apeiros/to apeiron s’installent dans la pensée philosophique. À travers des textes fragmentaires, il est difficile de savoir avec certitude la conception de l’infini (apeiron) que les présocratiques, de Thalès à Anaxagore et aux sophistes, avaient pu élaborer. Néanmoins, le problème de apeiron n’a pas été sans importance pour eux. Que l’un d’eux, Anaximandre, ait fait de l’apeiron l’archê de l’univers en est la marque. Et Mélissos caractérise le principe (archê) comme infini (apeiron). L’apeiron n’est donc point pour les présocratiques uniquement lié à l’imperfection que sera l’apeiron du Philebe. Il y a dans la pensée grecque des premiers temps comme un pressentiment de la richesse de l’infini, aussi bien qu’il désigne une absence de limite où la raison se perd. L’apeiron renvoie surtout à la spatialité, se lie à la grandeur (megethos), comme l’éternité (to aidion) se lie au temps. Dans les philosophies où la nature (physis) est aux confins du divin et du matériel, le principe, le tout, les mondes sont caractérisés d’abord par l’infini de grandeur, l’illimité. Mais l’infini est aussi envisagé comme indéfini qualitatif. Toutefois, face à l’infini qui est déterminé par sa richesse, certains présocratiques ont envisagé aussi l’infini qui est pure indétermination, degré incomplet de l’Être et forme du moindre Être. On trouve ici l’esquisse des conceptions philosophiques qui vont se préciser dans les théories plus élaborées de Platon et d’Aristote. [introduction p. 19-20] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/TpFRmhxNzvv4XUL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"745","_score":null,"_source":{"id":745,"authors_free":[{"id":1108,"entry_id":745,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":101,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":101,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130051187","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les pr\u00e9socratiques et la question de l'infini","main_title":{"title":"Les pr\u00e9socratiques et la question de l'infini"},"abstract":"Bien avant la philosophie de Platon et celle d'Aristote, la pens\u00e9e grecque a rencontr\u00e9 la question du rapport entre l'infini (apeiros) et la perfection. Mais, pour aborder ce que les Grecs veulent nommer par le \u00ab non-limit\u00e9 \u00bb, il convient de partir du d\u00e9bat que les linguistes ont engag\u00e9 autour du terme. Plusieurs interpr\u00e9tations s\u00e9mantiques sont envisag\u00e9es dans le rapport entre apeiros et peirar\/peras. Dans une premi\u00e8re solution, le pr\u00e9fixe n\u00e9gatif a- se combine avec peras ; dans une seconde, le a- privatif porte sur la racine per (per\u00f4, peir\u00f4, perain\u00f4), qui signifie passage et travers\u00e9e. En ce qui concerne peras, les linguistes sont de nouveau partag\u00e9s entre \u00ab limite, bout, extr\u00e9mit\u00e9 \u00bb ou \u00ab lien \u00bb.\r\n\r\nPour ce qui est de la langue grecque, non encore conceptualis\u00e9e par la d\u00e9marche philosophique, ce que \u00ab illimit\u00e9 \u00bb peut v\u00e9hiculer de non clair pour la raison ou de non rassurant pour le sentiment ne comporte pourtant aucune dimension de cette angoisse et de ce vertige que retiendra Pascal. Lorsque Hom\u00e8re ou H\u00e9siode parlent de la \u00ab terre sans limite \u00bb, lorsque Pindare chante la \u00ab renomm\u00e9e infinie \u00bb du h\u00e9ros, l\u2019adjectif apeir\u00f4n se relie g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9loge de qualit\u00e9s concernant choses ou hommes. Il y a aussi l\u2019id\u00e9e de profondeur sans fin (le sommeil, hypnos, Odyss\u00e9e VII, 286) ou d\u2019ampleur (une foule d\u2019hommes, Iliade XXIV, 776). C\u2019est moins son aspect infini que son pouvoir d\u2019engloutir qui fait caract\u00e9riser comme terrible la mer infinie. De m\u00eame, l\u2019adjectif apeir\u00f4n, infini, renvoie \u00e0 l\u2019immensit\u00e9 comme profusion et comme richesse, qu\u2019il s\u2019agisse du lieu, du temps ou du nombre.\r\n\r\nAvec les pr\u00e9socratiques, apeiros\/to apeiron s\u2019installent dans la pens\u00e9e philosophique. \u00c0 travers des textes fragmentaires, il est difficile de savoir avec certitude la conception de l\u2019infini (apeiron) que les pr\u00e9socratiques, de Thal\u00e8s \u00e0 Anaxagore et aux sophistes, avaient pu \u00e9laborer. N\u00e9anmoins, le probl\u00e8me de apeiron n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 sans importance pour eux. Que l\u2019un d\u2019eux, Anaximandre, ait fait de l\u2019apeiron l\u2019arch\u00ea de l\u2019univers en est la marque. Et M\u00e9lissos caract\u00e9rise le principe (arch\u00ea) comme infini (apeiron). L\u2019apeiron n\u2019est donc point pour les pr\u00e9socratiques uniquement li\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019imperfection que sera l\u2019apeiron du Philebe.\r\n\r\nIl y a dans la pens\u00e9e grecque des premiers temps comme un pressentiment de la richesse de l\u2019infini, aussi bien qu\u2019il d\u00e9signe une absence de limite o\u00f9 la raison se perd. L\u2019apeiron renvoie surtout \u00e0 la spatialit\u00e9, se lie \u00e0 la grandeur (megethos), comme l\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 (to aidion) se lie au temps. Dans les philosophies o\u00f9 la nature (physis) est aux confins du divin et du mat\u00e9riel, le principe, le tout, les mondes sont caract\u00e9ris\u00e9s d\u2019abord par l\u2019infini de grandeur, l\u2019illimit\u00e9. Mais l\u2019infini est aussi envisag\u00e9 comme ind\u00e9fini qualitatif.\r\n\r\nToutefois, face \u00e0 l\u2019infini qui est d\u00e9termin\u00e9 par sa richesse, certains pr\u00e9socratiques ont envisag\u00e9 aussi l\u2019infini qui est pure ind\u00e9termination, degr\u00e9 incomplet de l\u2019\u00catre et forme du moindre \u00catre. On trouve ici l\u2019esquisse des conceptions philosophiques qui vont se pr\u00e9ciser dans les th\u00e9ories plus \u00e9labor\u00e9es de Platon et d\u2019Aristote. [introduction p. 19-20]","btype":3,"date":"1981","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/TpFRmhxNzvv4XUL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":101,"full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":745,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"19-33"}},"sort":[1981]}
Title | An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the Categories? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1981 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 31 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 398-409 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Huby, Pamela M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text discusses an excerpt of a set of leaves from a fourteenth-century manuscript called Laurentianus 71, 32, containing paraphrases of several works. Theodore Waitz uses these leaves for scholia on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. The heading of the leaves is "Peri tês tou pote katêgorias," and the work consists of two parts. The first part discusses Time, based on Physics 4, while the second part deals with the category of When, which Aristotle only briefly mentions. The author of the work is believed to be Boethus of Sidon, the Peripatetic, who wrote a commentary on the Categories, as mentioned by Simplicius in his own commentary on the same work. Boethus is seen as a conservative who defended Aristotle against innovations, particularly Andronicus of Rhodes' attempt to substitute the category of Time for When. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MEh6PB5J3LpaDg5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1355","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1355,"authors_free":[{"id":2029,"entry_id":1355,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":200,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Huby, Pamela M.","free_first_name":"Pamela M.","free_last_name":"Huby","norm_person":{"id":200,"first_name":"Pamela M.","last_name":"Huby","full_name":"Huby, Pamela M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120868962","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the Categories?","main_title":{"title":"An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the Categories?"},"abstract":"The text discusses an excerpt of a set of leaves from a fourteenth-century manuscript called Laurentianus 71, 32, containing paraphrases of several works. Theodore Waitz uses these leaves for scholia on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. The heading of the leaves is \"Peri t\u00eas tou pote kat\u00eagorias,\" and the work consists of two parts. The first part discusses Time, based on Physics 4, while the second part deals with the category of When, which Aristotle only briefly mentions. The author of the work is believed to be Boethus of Sidon, the Peripatetic, who wrote a commentary on the Categories, as mentioned by Simplicius in his own commentary on the same work. Boethus is seen as a conservative who defended Aristotle against innovations, particularly Andronicus of Rhodes' attempt to substitute the category of Time for When. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1981","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MEh6PB5J3LpaDg5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":200,"full_name":"Huby, Pamela M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1355,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"31","issue":"2","pages":"398-409"}},"sort":[1981]}
Title | Jamblique exégète du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalités d’une doctrine du temps |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 307-323 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Le développement de la philosophie grecque tardive est inséparable de l'exégèse de textes canoniques, parmi lesquels les traités d'Aristote et les dialogues de Platon occupent une place tout à fait particulière. Dans le cadre d'une pratique essentiellement scolaire, la tâche du commentateur est d'expliciter une vérité supposée donnée à l'origine, présente dans le texte qui est lu. On a déjà fait remarquer la fécondité philosophique des faux sens, contresens ou déviations qui ne manquent pas de se produire à l'occasion de ces exégèses : c'est par ce travail de l'erreur qu'apparaît souvent une nouveauté doctrinale, et tout se passe comme si la philosophie aimait à se nourrir d'analyses philologiquement erronées ou insoutenables. Nous voudrions présenter ici un exemple typique de ce phénomène : comment une exégèse néoplatonicienne d'un "faux" pythagoricien a permis l'apparition d'une pensée nouvelle du temps. Lorsqu'il explique la doctrine aristotélicienne du temps dans ses commentaires aux Catégories et à la Physique, Simplicius suit les traces de Jamblique, aux yeux de qui la source d'Aristote est le pythagoricien Archytas de Tarente. [introduction p. 307] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/67kpJTeAGPd2zao |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"686","_score":null,"_source":{"id":686,"authors_free":[{"id":1019,"entry_id":686,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Jamblique ex\u00e9g\u00e8te du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalit\u00e9s d\u2019une doctrine du temps","main_title":{"title":"Jamblique ex\u00e9g\u00e8te du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalit\u00e9s d\u2019une doctrine du temps"},"abstract":"Le d\u00e9veloppement de la philosophie grecque tardive est ins\u00e9parable de l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de textes canoniques, parmi lesquels les trait\u00e9s d'Aristote et les dialogues de Platon occupent une place tout \u00e0 fait particuli\u00e8re. Dans le cadre d'une pratique essentiellement scolaire, la t\u00e2che du commentateur est d'expliciter une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 suppos\u00e9e donn\u00e9e \u00e0 l'origine, pr\u00e9sente dans le texte qui est lu. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait remarquer la f\u00e9condit\u00e9 philosophique des faux sens, contresens ou d\u00e9viations qui ne manquent pas de se produire \u00e0 l'occasion de ces ex\u00e9g\u00e8ses : c'est par ce travail de l'erreur qu'appara\u00eet souvent une nouveaut\u00e9 doctrinale, et tout se passe comme si la philosophie aimait \u00e0 se nourrir d'analyses philologiquement erron\u00e9es ou insoutenables.\r\n\r\nNous voudrions pr\u00e9senter ici un exemple typique de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne : comment une ex\u00e9g\u00e8se n\u00e9oplatonicienne d'un \"faux\" pythagoricien a permis l'apparition d'une pens\u00e9e nouvelle du temps.\r\n\r\nLorsqu'il explique la doctrine aristot\u00e9licienne du temps dans ses commentaires aux Cat\u00e9gories et \u00e0 la Physique, Simplicius suit les traces de Jamblique, aux yeux de qui la source d'Aristote est le pythagoricien Archytas de Tarente. [introduction p. 307]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/67kpJTeAGPd2zao","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":686,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"307-323"}},"sort":[1980]}
Title | La Récupération d'Anaxagore |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Archives de Philosophie |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 75-98 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ramnoux, Clémence |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The author meant to «recuperate» the Fragments of Anaxagoras, most of which are transmitted in the Commentary of Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics I, 4, without severing them from their context. While doing so he was interested in the neo-platonicist presentation itself, and also in the modern interpretations proceeding from it, enhancing an interpretative tradition. The first article inquires into the presentation of doctrines by dichotomic confrontation and into the problem of contrary couples. Following on the recuperation of the Fragments of Anaxagoras in a neo-platonic context, the second article presents the doctrine of the Spirit as agent both of thinking discrimination and of mechanical separation which starts from the original gathering, and which is both thought and subtantial. It examines subsequently how far a doctrine of the plurality of worlds can be attributed to Anaxagoras. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1063","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1063,"authors_free":[{"id":1613,"entry_id":1063,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":295,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","free_first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","free_last_name":"Ramnoux","norm_person":{"id":295,"first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","last_name":"Ramnoux","full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1219538949","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore","main_title":{"title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore"},"abstract":"The author meant to \u00abrecuperate\u00bb the Fragments of Anaxagoras, most of which are transmitted in the Commentary of Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics I, 4, without severing them from their context. While doing so he was interested in the neo-platonicist presentation itself, and also in the modern interpretations proceeding from it, enhancing an interpretative tradition. The first article inquires into the presentation of doctrines by dichotomic confrontation and into the problem of contrary couples. Following on the recuperation of the Fragments of Anaxagoras in a neo-platonic context, the second article presents the doctrine of the Spirit as agent both of thinking discrimination and of mechanical separation which starts from the original gathering, and which is both thought and subtantial. It examines subsequently how far a doctrine of the plurality of worlds can be attributed to Anaxagoras. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":295,"full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1063,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archives de Philosophie","volume":"43","issue":"1","pages":"75-98"}},"sort":[1980]}
Title | Some Concepts in Physical Theory in John Philoponus' Aristotelian Commentaries |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 151-170 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, Robert B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I have tried, then, to establish the significance of some ideas in Philoponus' commentaries that, in different ways, reveal this commentator's individuality. Individuality is not, of course, the same as originality, and indeed both my examples have shown how dependent Philoponus was on the many philosophical sources that converge in his commentaries. But this very complexity, at times reaching an eclectic inconsistency, is what makes the Aristotelian exegetical tradition in antiquity worth continued study. At their best, these commentaries involve the interaction between, on the one hand, an inventive commentator with prejudices of his own and, on the other hand, a mass of inherited material. The result may not always illuminate Aristotle, but it will invariably shed light on the continuity of the Greek philosophical tradition in late antiquity. [conclusion p. 170] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6cdjUb25vOM63SC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"842","_score":null,"_source":{"id":842,"authors_free":[{"id":1246,"entry_id":842,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":340,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Todd, Robert B.","free_first_name":"Robert B.","free_last_name":"Todd","norm_person":{"id":340,"first_name":"Robert B.","last_name":"Todd","full_name":"Todd, Robert B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/129460788","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Some Concepts in Physical Theory in John Philoponus' Aristotelian Commentaries","main_title":{"title":"Some Concepts in Physical Theory in John Philoponus' Aristotelian Commentaries"},"abstract":"I have tried, then, to establish the significance of some ideas in Philoponus' commentaries that, in different ways, reveal this commentator's individuality. Individuality is not, of course, the same as originality, and indeed both my examples have shown how dependent Philoponus was on the many philosophical sources that converge in his commentaries. But this very complexity, at times reaching an eclectic inconsistency, is what makes the Aristotelian exegetical tradition in antiquity worth continued study.\r\n\r\nAt their best, these commentaries involve the interaction between, on the one hand, an inventive commentator with prejudices of his own and, on the other hand, a mass of inherited material. The result may not always illuminate Aristotle, but it will invariably shed light on the continuity of the Greek philosophical tradition in late antiquity. [conclusion p. 170]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6cdjUb25vOM63SC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":340,"full_name":"Todd, Robert B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":842,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"24","issue":"2","pages":"151-170"}},"sort":[1980]}
Title | Review of: Ilsetraut Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme Alexandrin, Hiéroclès et Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 606-608 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Steel, Carlos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The whole review: In een historisch overzicht van de antieke wijsbegeerte wordt doorgaans, wanneer over het Neoplatonisme gehandeld wordt, een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de 'school' van Athene en die van Alexandrië. Dit onderscheid gaat terug op de bekende studies van K. Praechter (1910-12). Volgens deze geleerde zou er een opvallend doctrineel verschil bestaan tussen beide richtingen in het latere Neoplatonisme. In Alexandrië zou de invloed van de christelijke omgeving zo groot geweest zijn dat de heidense filosofen zich verplicht zagen bepaalde wijzigingen in de doctrine aan te brengen. Het Neoplatonisme vertoont hier niet de complexe structuur die kenmerkend is voor het Atheense speculatieve denken (cf. de hiërarchie van de goddelijke principes zoals die door Proclus ontwikkeld is); het geeft een eenvoudiger verklaring van de leer waarbij dikwijls teruggegrepen wordt naar het Midden-Platonisme (vóór Plotinus); op sommige gebieden (zoals de scheppingsleer) benadert het christelijke standpunten. Deze originaliteit van het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme komt het duidelijkst tot uiting in het œuvre van Hierocles (eerste helft 5de eeuw) en in de commentaar van Simplicius (eerste helft 6de eeuw) op Epictetus. Deze visie van Praechter werd kritiekloos overgenomen in talrijke studies over deze periode. Zo verscheen in 1976 nog een boek over Hierocles (Th. Kobusch, Studien zur Philosophie des Hierokles von Alexandrien, München) waarin de thesis verdedigd wordt dat Hierocles' filosofie „vermittelt“ tussen het Christendom en het „excessieve“ Neoplatonisme zoals het vooral door Proclus uitgewerkt is. „Die Interpretation ergab dass die Hierokleische Philosophie im wesentlichen auf vorneuplatonischer Basis beruht“ (Besluit, p. 193). Het boek van Mme Hadot, die sinds jaren een uitgave voorbereidt van Simplicius' commentaar op Epictetus, komt tot een conclusie die precies het tegenovergestelde beweert. Op grond van een nieuwe lectuur van Hierocles en Simplicius toont zij aan dat de hypothese van Praechter over het latere Neoplatonisme totaal ongegrond is; er bestaat geen enkel doctrineel verschil tussen het Atheense en het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme: „l'évolution du néoplatonisme s'est poursuivie d'une manière homogène“. Het is verkeerd Hierocles of Simplicius vanuit het Midden-Platonisme te willen interpreteren: hun uiteenzetting veronderstelt de ontwikkeling van het latere Neoplatonisme, wat kan geïllustreerd worden door talrijke parallelle passages met Iamblichus en Proclus, en zelfs – voor Simplicius – met Damascius. In het eerste deel van dit boek worden de historische gegevens over beide filosofen onderzocht. Het tweede deel onderzoekt in welke mate zij kunnen beschouwd worden als vertegenwoordigers van een originele Alexandrijnse traditie. Achtereenvolgens worden bestudeerd: de theologie van Simplicius in het Epictetus-commentaar, de opvattingen van Hierocles over de ontwikkeling van het Platonisme, over de materie, over de demiurg en de schepping, over de voorzienigheid en het noodlot. In het derde deel volgen enige capita selecta betreffende de commentaar van Simplicius (o.a. zijn leer over de ziel). Uit al deze analyses komt de auteur tot het besluit dat er geen enkele doctrinaire divergentie aan te wijzen is ten opzichte van de Atheense school. Wel geven beide werken – de commentaar van Hierocles op Pythagoras en die van Simplicius op Epictetus – een eenvoudiger en minder complexe versie van het Neoplatonisme. Dit kan echter verklaard worden door het feit dat beide commentaren bedoeld waren als inleidingen en gericht tot beginnelingen in de school. In een appendix gaat de auteur uitvoerig in op een artikel dat ik zelf samen met F. Bossier in dit tijdschrift gepubliceerd heb (1972, 761-822) over de authenticiteit van de De Anima-commentaar die aan Simplicius wordt toegeschreven. Alhoewel zij onze conclusie aanvaardt – het werk is waarschijnlijk door Priscianus Lydus geschreven – toch meent zij dat er geen enkel doctrineel verschil met de authentieke Simplicius kan aangewezen worden. Haar argumenten lijken ons soms erg zwak: het is echter niet mogelijk om hierover in deze recensie polemiek te voeren. Slechts één ding: indien men aanvaardt dat de In de Anima door iemand anders geschreven is dan Simplicius, waarom is het dan zo nodig te beklemtonen dat zijn opvattingen over de ziel in niets van die van Simplicius verschillen? Dit bezwaar geldt ook voor het gehele werk. Terecht wijst de auteur op de continuïteit die er bestond tussen de school van Athene en die van Alexandrië (zoals dit o.m. tot uiting komt in de veelvuldige persoonlijke relaties van docenten en studenten). Het lijkt ons echter overdreven elk doctrineel verschil tussen beide scholen te ontkennen. De ontwikkeling binnen het latere Neoplatonisme was zeker niet zo homogeen als mevrouw Hadot beweert. Reeds ten tijde van Plotinus bestonden er belangrijke controversen over de doctrine, en die discussies werden verder gezet in de latere school. Indien men de originaliteit van de Alexandrijnse school in vraag stelt, dan volstaat het niet Hierocles en één werk van Simplicius te onderzoeken. Men zou er ook de andere filosofen uit de school moeten bij betrekken, voornamelijk Ammonius. Men kan moeilijk betwisten dat het Neoplatonisme dat door Ammonius uiteengezet werd nogal verschillend is van het systeem van Damascius. En is het ook niet opvallend dat Simplicius, die zowel bij Ammonius als Damascius studeerde, dikwijls afstand neemt van de al te speculatieve beschouwingen van Iamblichus en Damascius? Het boek van mevrouw Hadot is, zoals de auteur zelf toegeeft, vooral polemisch van aard: zij weerlegt hypothesen en interpretaties die niet op de teksten gegrond zijn. Door een nauwkeurige analyse van de teksten ontmaskert zij het stereotiepe beeld dat men over het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme geeft. Haar studie is zo een waardevolle bijdrage tot beter inzicht in deze laatste ontwikkeling van het antieke denken. [p. 606-608] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lIWBQQ2Q5dbWMLm |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"484","_score":null,"_source":{"id":484,"authors_free":[{"id":659,"entry_id":484,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ilsetraut Hadot, Le probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin, Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ilsetraut Hadot, Le probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin, Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius"},"abstract":"The whole review: In een historisch overzicht van de antieke wijsbegeerte wordt doorgaans, wanneer over het Neoplatonisme gehandeld wordt, een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de 'school' van Athene en die van Alexandri\u00eb. Dit onderscheid gaat terug op de bekende studies van K. Praechter (1910-12). Volgens deze geleerde zou er een opvallend doctrineel verschil bestaan tussen beide richtingen in het latere Neoplatonisme. In Alexandri\u00eb zou de invloed van de christelijke omgeving zo groot geweest zijn dat de heidense filosofen zich verplicht zagen bepaalde wijzigingen in de doctrine aan te brengen.\r\n\r\nHet Neoplatonisme vertoont hier niet de complexe structuur die kenmerkend is voor het Atheense speculatieve denken (cf. de hi\u00ebrarchie van de goddelijke principes zoals die door Proclus ontwikkeld is); het geeft een eenvoudiger verklaring van de leer waarbij dikwijls teruggegrepen wordt naar het Midden-Platonisme (v\u00f3\u00f3r Plotinus); op sommige gebieden (zoals de scheppingsleer) benadert het christelijke standpunten. Deze originaliteit van het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme komt het duidelijkst tot uiting in het \u0153uvre van Hierocles (eerste helft 5de eeuw) en in de commentaar van Simplicius (eerste helft 6de eeuw) op Epictetus.\r\n\r\nDeze visie van Praechter werd kritiekloos overgenomen in talrijke studies over deze periode. Zo verscheen in 1976 nog een boek over Hierocles (Th. Kobusch, Studien zur Philosophie des Hierokles von Alexandrien, M\u00fcnchen) waarin de thesis verdedigd wordt dat Hierocles' filosofie \u201evermittelt\u201c tussen het Christendom en het \u201eexcessieve\u201c Neoplatonisme zoals het vooral door Proclus uitgewerkt is. \u201eDie Interpretation ergab dass die Hierokleische Philosophie im wesentlichen auf vorneuplatonischer Basis beruht\u201c (Besluit, p. 193).\r\n\r\nHet boek van Mme Hadot, die sinds jaren een uitgave voorbereidt van Simplicius' commentaar op Epictetus, komt tot een conclusie die precies het tegenovergestelde beweert. Op grond van een nieuwe lectuur van Hierocles en Simplicius toont zij aan dat de hypothese van Praechter over het latere Neoplatonisme totaal ongegrond is; er bestaat geen enkel doctrineel verschil tussen het Atheense en het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme: \u201el'\u00e9volution du n\u00e9oplatonisme s'est poursuivie d'une mani\u00e8re homog\u00e8ne\u201c.\r\n\r\nHet is verkeerd Hierocles of Simplicius vanuit het Midden-Platonisme te willen interpreteren: hun uiteenzetting veronderstelt de ontwikkeling van het latere Neoplatonisme, wat kan ge\u00efllustreerd worden door talrijke parallelle passages met Iamblichus en Proclus, en zelfs \u2013 voor Simplicius \u2013 met Damascius.\r\n\r\nIn het eerste deel van dit boek worden de historische gegevens over beide filosofen onderzocht. Het tweede deel onderzoekt in welke mate zij kunnen beschouwd worden als vertegenwoordigers van een originele Alexandrijnse traditie. Achtereenvolgens worden bestudeerd: de theologie van Simplicius in het Epictetus-commentaar, de opvattingen van Hierocles over de ontwikkeling van het Platonisme, over de materie, over de demiurg en de schepping, over de voorzienigheid en het noodlot. In het derde deel volgen enige capita selecta betreffende de commentaar van Simplicius (o.a. zijn leer over de ziel).\r\n\r\nUit al deze analyses komt de auteur tot het besluit dat er geen enkele doctrinaire divergentie aan te wijzen is ten opzichte van de Atheense school. Wel geven beide werken \u2013 de commentaar van Hierocles op Pythagoras en die van Simplicius op Epictetus \u2013 een eenvoudiger en minder complexe versie van het Neoplatonisme. Dit kan echter verklaard worden door het feit dat beide commentaren bedoeld waren als inleidingen en gericht tot beginnelingen in de school.\r\n\r\nIn een appendix gaat de auteur uitvoerig in op een artikel dat ik zelf samen met F. Bossier in dit tijdschrift gepubliceerd heb (1972, 761-822) over de authenticiteit van de De Anima-commentaar die aan Simplicius wordt toegeschreven. Alhoewel zij onze conclusie aanvaardt \u2013 het werk is waarschijnlijk door Priscianus Lydus geschreven \u2013 toch meent zij dat er geen enkel doctrineel verschil met de authentieke Simplicius kan aangewezen worden.\r\n\r\nHaar argumenten lijken ons soms erg zwak: het is echter niet mogelijk om hierover in deze recensie polemiek te voeren. Slechts \u00e9\u00e9n ding: indien men aanvaardt dat de In de Anima door iemand anders geschreven is dan Simplicius, waarom is het dan zo nodig te beklemtonen dat zijn opvattingen over de ziel in niets van die van Simplicius verschillen?\r\n\r\nDit bezwaar geldt ook voor het gehele werk. Terecht wijst de auteur op de continu\u00efteit die er bestond tussen de school van Athene en die van Alexandri\u00eb (zoals dit o.m. tot uiting komt in de veelvuldige persoonlijke relaties van docenten en studenten). Het lijkt ons echter overdreven elk doctrineel verschil tussen beide scholen te ontkennen.\r\n\r\nDe ontwikkeling binnen het latere Neoplatonisme was zeker niet zo homogeen als mevrouw Hadot beweert. Reeds ten tijde van Plotinus bestonden er belangrijke controversen over de doctrine, en die discussies werden verder gezet in de latere school. Indien men de originaliteit van de Alexandrijnse school in vraag stelt, dan volstaat het niet Hierocles en \u00e9\u00e9n werk van Simplicius te onderzoeken. Men zou er ook de andere filosofen uit de school moeten bij betrekken, voornamelijk Ammonius.\r\n\r\nMen kan moeilijk betwisten dat het Neoplatonisme dat door Ammonius uiteengezet werd nogal verschillend is van het systeem van Damascius. En is het ook niet opvallend dat Simplicius, die zowel bij Ammonius als Damascius studeerde, dikwijls afstand neemt van de al te speculatieve beschouwingen van Iamblichus en Damascius?\r\n\r\nHet boek van mevrouw Hadot is, zoals de auteur zelf toegeeft, vooral polemisch van aard: zij weerlegt hypothesen en interpretaties die niet op de teksten gegrond zijn. Door een nauwkeurige analyse van de teksten ontmaskert zij het stereotiepe beeld dat men over het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme geeft. Haar studie is zo een waardevolle bijdrage tot beter inzicht in deze laatste ontwikkeling van het antieke denken. [p. 606-608]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lIWBQQ2Q5dbWMLm","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":484,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"42","issue":"3","pages":"606-608"}},"sort":[1980]}
Title | Le temps intégral selon Damascius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 3: Doctrines du temps |
Pages | 325-341 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Galperine, Marie-Claire |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text explores Aristotle's unresolved aporias on the nature of time in Physics IV (217b30 - 218a30), highlighting a metaphysical dilemma: whether time belongs to being or non-being. Aristotle leaves the question undecided, shifting focus to the nature of time, a problem he may have deliberately avoided. Ancient thinkers, however, did not shy away from addressing these aporias. Damascius offers a resolution to Aristotle’s dilemmas in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and his lost treatise on number, place, and time, fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius. Damascius’ concept of "integral time" distinguishes between two meanings of "now": Aristotle’s punctual "now," a limit of time, and Damascius’ "present," a temporal continuum. Simplicius, though critical of Damascius’ ideas, acknowledges this distinction as key to resolving Aristotle’s aporias. Simplicius' Corollarium de tempore expands on this, presenting time as simultaneously existent in its entirety ("integral time"), a concept rooted in Damascius’ philosophy. However, Simplicius’ partial understanding of Damascius’ thought highlights his struggle to reconcile Damascius’ notion of time with Aristotelian paradigms. The analysis situates Damascius’ ideas within the framework of both Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s Physics, showcasing how he integrates Platonic metaphysics with Aristotelian logic to address foundational questions about the nature and being of time. [introduction p. 325-327] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/K2X5R1lQigoI37E |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"544","_score":null,"_source":{"id":544,"authors_free":[{"id":768,"entry_id":544,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":123,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","free_first_name":"Marie-Claire","free_last_name":"Galperine","norm_person":{"id":123,"first_name":"Marie-Claire","last_name":"Galperine","full_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le temps int\u00e9gral selon Damascius","main_title":{"title":"Le temps int\u00e9gral selon Damascius"},"abstract":"This text explores Aristotle's unresolved aporias on the nature of time in Physics IV (217b30 - 218a30), highlighting a metaphysical dilemma: whether time belongs to being or non-being. Aristotle leaves the question undecided, shifting focus to the nature of time, a problem he may have deliberately avoided. Ancient thinkers, however, did not shy away from addressing these aporias.\r\n\r\nDamascius offers a resolution to Aristotle\u2019s dilemmas in his commentary on Plato\u2019s Parmenides and his lost treatise on number, place, and time, fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius. Damascius\u2019 concept of \"integral time\" distinguishes between two meanings of \"now\": Aristotle\u2019s punctual \"now,\" a limit of time, and Damascius\u2019 \"present,\" a temporal continuum. Simplicius, though critical of Damascius\u2019 ideas, acknowledges this distinction as key to resolving Aristotle\u2019s aporias.\r\n\r\nSimplicius' Corollarium de tempore expands on this, presenting time as simultaneously existent in its entirety (\"integral time\"), a concept rooted in Damascius\u2019 philosophy. However, Simplicius\u2019 partial understanding of Damascius\u2019 thought highlights his struggle to reconcile Damascius\u2019 notion of time with Aristotelian paradigms.\r\n\r\nThe analysis situates Damascius\u2019 ideas within the framework of both Plato\u2019s Parmenides and Aristotle\u2019s Physics, showcasing how he integrates Platonic metaphysics with Aristotelian logic to address foundational questions about the nature and being of time. [introduction p. 325-327]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/K2X5R1lQigoI37E","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":123,"full_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":544,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3: Doctrines du temps","issue":"","pages":"325-341"}},"sort":[1980]}
Title | La Récupération d'Anaxagore II |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Archives de Philosophie |
Volume | 43 |
Pages | 279-297 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ramnoux, Clémence |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text discusses the concept of the mind and plurality of worlds in Anaxagoras' philosophy. It focuses on a fragment that is the longest and most extensive in relation to the mind. The author explores the vocabulary used by Anaxagoras to articulate his doctrine and how it uses oppositions such as one and multiple, similar and different, light and dark, hot and cold, dry and wet to categorize things. The author also discusses Anaxagoras' use of the concept of infinity in relation to both numbers and spatial dimensions. The text also highlights the attributes of the mind, such as its spatial greatness, lightness, and purity, which allow for quick movement and perception. The author concludes that Anaxagoras' conception of the mind is not divine, but rather characterized by its separation from everything else. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1379","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1379,"authors_free":[{"id":2123,"entry_id":1379,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":295,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","free_first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","free_last_name":"Ramnoux","norm_person":{"id":295,"first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","last_name":"Ramnoux","full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1219538949","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore II","main_title":{"title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore II"},"abstract":"The text discusses the concept of the mind and plurality of worlds in Anaxagoras' philosophy. It focuses on a fragment that is the longest and most extensive in relation to the mind. The author explores the vocabulary used by Anaxagoras to articulate his doctrine and how it uses oppositions such as one and multiple, similar and different, light and dark, hot and cold, dry and wet to categorize things. The author also discusses Anaxagoras' use of the concept of infinity in relation to both numbers and spatial dimensions. The text also highlights the attributes of the mind, such as its spatial greatness, lightness, and purity, which allow for quick movement and perception. The author concludes that Anaxagoras' conception of the mind is not divine, but rather characterized by its separation from everything else. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":295,"full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1379,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archives de Philosophie","volume":"43","issue":"","pages":"279-297"}},"sort":[1980]}
Title | The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1979 |
Journal | The Monist |
Volume | 62 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 30–42 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bormann, Karl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were—as is well known—interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem.Regarding the one being, there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the esse copulae or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being ("Sein des Seienden"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical demography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the First part, the aletheia. We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately; in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part. [Introduction, p. 30] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KVjmlyMlPhuG3iK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1078","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1078,"authors_free":[{"id":1634,"entry_id":1078,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":11,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bormann, Karl ","free_first_name":"Karl","free_last_name":"Bormann","norm_person":{"id":11,"first_name":"Karl ","last_name":"Bormann","full_name":"Bormann, Karl ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119138816","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius"},"abstract":"The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were\u2014as is well known\u2014interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem.Regarding the one being, there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the esse copulae or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being (\"Sein des Seienden\"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical demography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the First part, the aletheia. We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately; in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part. [Introduction, p. 30]","btype":3,"date":"1979","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KVjmlyMlPhuG3iK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":11,"full_name":"Bormann, Karl ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1078,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Monist","volume":"62","issue":"1","pages":"30\u201342"}},"sort":[1979]}
Title | Confirmation of Two "Conjectures" in the Presocratics: Parmenides B 12 and Anaxagoras B 15 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1979 |
Journal | Phoenix |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 67-69 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sider, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In each of the two passages discussed below, the indisputably correct reading is given by Diels as an editorial conjecture, when in fact, for each, there is manuscript authority. [introduction p. 67] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RDFVugAzW2NIhCB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"850","_score":null,"_source":{"id":850,"authors_free":[{"id":1254,"entry_id":850,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":320,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sider, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Sider","norm_person":{"id":320,"first_name":"David","last_name":"Sider","full_name":"Sider, David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1129478610","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Confirmation of Two \"Conjectures\" in the Presocratics: Parmenides B 12 and Anaxagoras B 15","main_title":{"title":"Confirmation of Two \"Conjectures\" in the Presocratics: Parmenides B 12 and Anaxagoras B 15"},"abstract":"In each of the two passages discussed below, the indisputably correct reading is given by Diels as an editorial conjecture, when in fact, for each, there is manuscript authority. [introduction p. 67]","btype":3,"date":"1979","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RDFVugAzW2NIhCB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":320,"full_name":"Sider, David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":850,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phoenix","volume":"33","issue":"1","pages":"67-69"}},"sort":[1979]}
Title | Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1978 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 106 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 73-99 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarán, Leonardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Modern scholarship since the middle of the last century has generally accepted it as an established fact that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of words or names (onomata) in relation to the concepts they express and that he gave definitions of homonyma and synonyma only in reference to words and their meanings. That is to say, for him, homonyma and synonyma are properties of linguistic terms and not of things, whereas for Aristotle, especially in the first chapter of the Categories, they are properties of things. In 1904, E. Hambruch attempted to show that sometimes Aristotle himself uses synonyma in the Speusippean sense just outlined and that in so doing, he was influenced by Speusippus. This thesis of Hambruch has been accepted by several scholars, including Lang, Stenzel, and Cherniss. Although some doubts about its soundness were expressed from different perspectives, it was only in 1971 that Mr. Jonathan Barnes made a systematic assault on it. Barnes contends, first, that Speusippus’s conception of homonyma and synonyma is essentially the same as that of Aristotle, with the slight differences between their respective definitions being trivial, and second, that even though Aristotle occasionally uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of linguistic terms, this is because Aristotle's use of these words is not as rigid as the Categories might suggest. Barnes argues that Aristotle could not have been influenced by Speusippus, because Speusippus conceived homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, and, in any case, if influence were assumed, it could as well have been Aristotle influencing Speusippus. Though I believe Barnes’ two main contentions are mistaken, I am here mainly concerned with the first part of his thesis. If he were right in believing that, for Speusippus, homonyma and synonyma are properties of things and not of names or linguistic terms, then Hambruch’s notion that Speusippus influenced Aristotle when the latter uses synonymon as a property of names would be wrong, even if Barnes were mistaken in his analysis of the Aristotelian passages he reviews in the second part of his paper. On the other hand, if Speusippus's classification is truly of onomata, then, since Barnes himself admits that Aristotle sometimes uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of names, the influence of Speusippus on Aristotle is at least possible. It becomes plausible and probable—regardless of the relative chronology of their respective works—when it is seen, as I shall try to show, that in some cases, Aristotle is in fact attacking doctrines that presuppose a use of homonyma and synonyma such as can be ascribed to Speusippus or is using synonymon in the Speusippean sense, different from Aristotle's own notion of synonymous words. [introduction p. 73-75] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DXL3umbA2JfHxYC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"843","_score":null,"_source":{"id":843,"authors_free":[{"id":1247,"entry_id":843,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":330,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo","free_first_name":"Leonardo","free_last_name":"Tar\u00e1n","norm_person":{"id":330,"first_name":"Tar\u00e1n","last_name":" Leonardo ","full_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1168065100","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy","main_title":{"title":"Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy"},"abstract":"Modern scholarship since the middle of the last century has generally accepted it as an established fact that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of words or names (onomata) in relation to the concepts they express and that he gave definitions of homonyma and synonyma only in reference to words and their meanings. That is to say, for him, homonyma and synonyma are properties of linguistic terms and not of things, whereas for Aristotle, especially in the first chapter of the Categories, they are properties of things.\r\n\r\nIn 1904, E. Hambruch attempted to show that sometimes Aristotle himself uses synonyma in the Speusippean sense just outlined and that in so doing, he was influenced by Speusippus. This thesis of Hambruch has been accepted by several scholars, including Lang, Stenzel, and Cherniss. Although some doubts about its soundness were expressed from different perspectives, it was only in 1971 that Mr. Jonathan Barnes made a systematic assault on it. Barnes contends, first, that Speusippus\u2019s conception of homonyma and synonyma is essentially the same as that of Aristotle, with the slight differences between their respective definitions being trivial, and second, that even though Aristotle occasionally uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of linguistic terms, this is because Aristotle's use of these words is not as rigid as the Categories might suggest. Barnes argues that Aristotle could not have been influenced by Speusippus, because Speusippus conceived homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, and, in any case, if influence were assumed, it could as well have been Aristotle influencing Speusippus.\r\n\r\nThough I believe Barnes\u2019 two main contentions are mistaken, I am here mainly concerned with the first part of his thesis. If he were right in believing that, for Speusippus, homonyma and synonyma are properties of things and not of names or linguistic terms, then Hambruch\u2019s notion that Speusippus influenced Aristotle when the latter uses synonymon as a property of names would be wrong, even if Barnes were mistaken in his analysis of the Aristotelian passages he reviews in the second part of his paper.\r\n\r\nOn the other hand, if Speusippus's classification is truly of onomata, then, since Barnes himself admits that Aristotle sometimes uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of names, the influence of Speusippus on Aristotle is at least possible. It becomes plausible and probable\u2014regardless of the relative chronology of their respective works\u2014when it is seen, as I shall try to show, that in some cases, Aristotle is in fact attacking doctrines that presuppose a use of homonyma and synonyma such as can be ascribed to Speusippus or is using synonymon in the Speusippean sense, different from Aristotle's own notion of synonymous words. [introduction p. 73-75]","btype":3,"date":"1978","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DXL3umbA2JfHxYC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":330,"full_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":843,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"106","issue":"1","pages":"73-99"}},"sort":[1978]}
Title | 529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1978 |
Journal | Byzantion |
Volume | 48 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 369–385 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In an excellent and already well-known article, Professor Alan Cameron has made a strong case for the thesis that, notwithstanding the evidence of Malalas and a long-established tradition, Justinian did not succeed in finally closing the Platonic Academy in 529, and that its activities continued after a short interruption. The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to argue that some of the evidence usually adduced in favor of the view that the Academy was closed may not be applicable, but that it seems nevertheless to have succumbed to some form of imperial pressure, and, secondly, to question the view that philosophy continued to be taught, or even studied, at Athens from 532 until the Slavs sacked the city nearly fifty years later. The most important piece of evidence for the continued existence of the Academy is a passage from Olympiodorus' commentary on Plato's 1st Alcibiades which says, "Perhaps Plato made a practice of taking no fees because he was well-off. That is why the diadochika have lasted till now, in spite of many confiscations." Diadochika is left untranslated since its meaning is by no means certain. It could refer to the salary of the Head of the Academy. It could also, however, be a term for the Academy's endowments in general. A third meaning, suggested by J. Whittaker, is spiritual rather than material heritage, but despite arguments, it is unlikely that the word in its context does not refer to some form of funding. To this point, we must return shortly. Cameron argues convincingly that this passage was written somewhere around 560, on the grounds that it refers to an incident in the career of a grammaticus called Anatolius, dateable to the late 540s, as one that his readers can no longer be expected to remember. He infers from this that the Academy was still operating at that time and, moreover, in possession of substantial funds some thirty years after its alleged closure and expropriation. At about the same time, Whittaker, apparently writing before the appearance of Cameron's paper and arguing against Westerink, questioned whether the text adduced provided evidence either for confiscations at the time when Olympiodorus was writing or for the continued availability of material resources. Olympiodorus' report certainly raises some serious problems. The first relates to the confiscations. Cameron has discussed a number of possible occasions between 529 and the date of the composition of Olympiodorus' commentary about 560. If Academy funds were being confiscated during that period, then clearly there must have been a conspicuous Academy to be subject to the confiscations. But, as Whittaker has pointed out, the reference of the present participle stating that there were confiscations could be to any time during the reference of the main verb, that is, to the whole period between Plato and the time of writing. One possible inference is that the funds had been subjected to confiscations even before 529 but still survived in the hands of the scholarchs after that date. Justinian's edict is quite likely not to have been new but, like much of his legislation, a re-enactment of former decrees—some of which were in any case disregarded. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find a suitable earlier occasion, or occasions, to be the time of the confiscations in question. A second, and more basic, problem attaches to the funds themselves. There is no other evidence, except a report in the Suda article on Plato, and a parallel text in Photius, which attributes any of the late Academy's resources, or those of its office-holders, to inheritance from Plato. This Suda article, which is based on Damascius' Life of Isidore, tells us that only the Academy garden had been Plato's—he was not well-off—and that there were large accretions of funds in the fifth century. We know that most of the major buildings in Athens were destroyed by the Heruls in 267. Damascius, moreover, in the extract provided by Photius, made a point of denying what he says was a commonly held view that the resources of the Academy went back to Plato himself: τῶν δὲ διαδόχων οὐσία οὐκ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι Πλάτωνος ἦν τὸ ἀνέκαθεν. This summary too continues with the points that Plato was not rich, that only the garden was his, and that there were large additions through bequests later. From this text, we may infer that Olympiodorus' diadochika must have been school resources under the control of the school's head: Damascius is talking about sums of money, and the garden could hardly have been part of the scholarch's salary. If, then, such funds as were available to the Academy in the 5th and 6th centuries were not the product of Plato's own endowments, Olympiodorus—or his source—has wrongly inferred from the Academy's current, or recent, wealth, and Plato's aristocratic background and refusal to take fees, that Plato himself was responsible for the endowments. Damascius' disclaimer shows that he was not the first to do so. And if Olympiodorus was wrong about that, then he might also, though less obviously, have been wrong in saying that the funds existed in his own day. His information could have been some thirty years out of date, a period for the survival of obsolete information by no means inconceivable even with modern methods of disseminating information. We need look no further than the reputations of university departments in our own times. If the close relation between Athenian and Alexandrian philosophers that had obtained in the fifth century were by now a thing of the past—whether because of odium academicum, as manifested in the bitter attacks launched by Philoponus on the views of Proclus in a previous generation, and Simplicius in his own, the latter being furiously reciprocated—or because nothing was any longer happening at Athens, or for some other reason, that would be sufficient to explain such an error. To return to the question of a re-endowment in the 5th century. There are a number of indications that this happened. In the first place, negatively, there is little if any evidence that the Academy, or any but insignificant Platonists, were active at Athens in the preceding period. Positively, we have a report from Synesius that he went to Athens and found nothing going on at all: "It is like a sacrificial victim at the end of the proceedings, with only the skin left as a token of the animal that once was. So philosophy has moved its home, and all that is left for a visitor is to wander around looking at the Academy, the Lyceum, and, yes, the Stoa Poikile..." [introduction p. 369-372] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8waAtP8ixbo8cmC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"876","_score":null,"_source":{"id":876,"authors_free":[{"id":1287,"entry_id":876,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy?","main_title":{"title":"529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy?"},"abstract":"In an excellent and already well-known article, Professor Alan Cameron has made a strong case for the thesis that, notwithstanding the evidence of Malalas and a long-established tradition, Justinian did not succeed in finally closing the Platonic Academy in 529, and that its activities continued after a short interruption. The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to argue that some of the evidence usually adduced in favor of the view that the Academy was closed may not be applicable, but that it seems nevertheless to have succumbed to some form of imperial pressure, and, secondly, to question the view that philosophy continued to be taught, or even studied, at Athens from 532 until the Slavs sacked the city nearly fifty years later.\r\n\r\nThe most important piece of evidence for the continued existence of the Academy is a passage from Olympiodorus' commentary on Plato's 1st Alcibiades which says, \"Perhaps Plato made a practice of taking no fees because he was well-off. That is why the diadochika have lasted till now, in spite of many confiscations.\" Diadochika is left untranslated since its meaning is by no means certain. It could refer to the salary of the Head of the Academy. It could also, however, be a term for the Academy's endowments in general. A third meaning, suggested by J. Whittaker, is spiritual rather than material heritage, but despite arguments, it is unlikely that the word in its context does not refer to some form of funding. To this point, we must return shortly.\r\n\r\nCameron argues convincingly that this passage was written somewhere around 560, on the grounds that it refers to an incident in the career of a grammaticus called Anatolius, dateable to the late 540s, as one that his readers can no longer be expected to remember. He infers from this that the Academy was still operating at that time and, moreover, in possession of substantial funds some thirty years after its alleged closure and expropriation. At about the same time, Whittaker, apparently writing before the appearance of Cameron's paper and arguing against Westerink, questioned whether the text adduced provided evidence either for confiscations at the time when Olympiodorus was writing or for the continued availability of material resources.\r\n\r\nOlympiodorus' report certainly raises some serious problems. The first relates to the confiscations. Cameron has discussed a number of possible occasions between 529 and the date of the composition of Olympiodorus' commentary about 560. If Academy funds were being confiscated during that period, then clearly there must have been a conspicuous Academy to be subject to the confiscations. But, as Whittaker has pointed out, the reference of the present participle stating that there were confiscations could be to any time during the reference of the main verb, that is, to the whole period between Plato and the time of writing. One possible inference is that the funds had been subjected to confiscations even before 529 but still survived in the hands of the scholarchs after that date. Justinian's edict is quite likely not to have been new but, like much of his legislation, a re-enactment of former decrees\u2014some of which were in any case disregarded. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find a suitable earlier occasion, or occasions, to be the time of the confiscations in question.\r\n\r\nA second, and more basic, problem attaches to the funds themselves. There is no other evidence, except a report in the Suda article on Plato, and a parallel text in Photius, which attributes any of the late Academy's resources, or those of its office-holders, to inheritance from Plato. This Suda article, which is based on Damascius' Life of Isidore, tells us that only the Academy garden had been Plato's\u2014he was not well-off\u2014and that there were large accretions of funds in the fifth century. We know that most of the major buildings in Athens were destroyed by the Heruls in 267. Damascius, moreover, in the extract provided by Photius, made a point of denying what he says was a commonly held view that the resources of the Academy went back to Plato himself: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03cc\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f26\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd. This summary too continues with the points that Plato was not rich, that only the garden was his, and that there were large additions through bequests later. From this text, we may infer that Olympiodorus' diadochika must have been school resources under the control of the school's head: Damascius is talking about sums of money, and the garden could hardly have been part of the scholarch's salary.\r\n\r\nIf, then, such funds as were available to the Academy in the 5th and 6th centuries were not the product of Plato's own endowments, Olympiodorus\u2014or his source\u2014has wrongly inferred from the Academy's current, or recent, wealth, and Plato's aristocratic background and refusal to take fees, that Plato himself was responsible for the endowments. Damascius' disclaimer shows that he was not the first to do so. And if Olympiodorus was wrong about that, then he might also, though less obviously, have been wrong in saying that the funds existed in his own day. His information could have been some thirty years out of date, a period for the survival of obsolete information by no means inconceivable even with modern methods of disseminating information. We need look no further than the reputations of university departments in our own times. If the close relation between Athenian and Alexandrian philosophers that had obtained in the fifth century were by now a thing of the past\u2014whether because of odium academicum, as manifested in the bitter attacks launched by Philoponus on the views of Proclus in a previous generation, and Simplicius in his own, the latter being furiously reciprocated\u2014or because nothing was any longer happening at Athens, or for some other reason, that would be sufficient to explain such an error.\r\n\r\nTo return to the question of a re-endowment in the 5th century. There are a number of indications that this happened. In the first place, negatively, there is little if any evidence that the Academy, or any but insignificant Platonists, were active at Athens in the preceding period. Positively, we have a report from Synesius that he went to Athens and found nothing going on at all:\r\n\r\n\"It is like a sacrificial victim at the end of the proceedings, with only the skin left as a token of the animal that once was. So philosophy has moved its home, and all that is left for a visitor is to wander around looking at the Academy, the Lyceum, and, yes, the Stoa Poikile...\" [introduction p. 369-372]","btype":3,"date":"1978","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8waAtP8ixbo8cmC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":876,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Byzantion","volume":"48","issue":"2","pages":"369\u2013385"}},"sort":[1978]}
Title | Ficino's Lecture on the Good? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Renaissance Quarterly |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 160-171 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Allen, Michael J. B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article discusses Plato's Lecture on the Good, the only lecture attributed to Plato by ancient sources. The lecture was attended by Aristotle and other students of Plato and was described as a blend of formal exposition, digressions, and asides. Although it was not a public success, the Lecture became famous in the ancient world for what the Neoplatonists presumed was its Pythagorean content. The Lecture played a role in the history of fifteenth-century Florentine Platonism under its chief architect, Marsilio Ficino, who was interested in reviving Neoplatonism and wedding it to Christianity while also dreaming of revitalizing the day-to-day life of the ancient Athenian Academy. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/P2WTHK3pKgeUa4u |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1261","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1261,"authors_free":[{"id":1847,"entry_id":1261,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":33,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Allen, Michael J. B.","free_first_name":"Michael J. B.","free_last_name":"Allen","norm_person":{"id":33,"first_name":"Michael J. B. ","last_name":"Allen","full_name":"Allen, Michael J. B. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/12310405X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ficino's Lecture on the Good?","main_title":{"title":"Ficino's Lecture on the Good?"},"abstract":"This article discusses Plato's Lecture on the Good, the only lecture attributed to Plato by ancient sources. The lecture was attended by Aristotle and other students of Plato and was described as a blend of formal exposition, digressions, and asides. Although it was not a public success, the Lecture became famous in the ancient world for what the Neoplatonists presumed was its Pythagorean content. The Lecture played a role in the history of fifteenth-century Florentine Platonism under its chief architect, Marsilio Ficino, who was interested in reviving Neoplatonism and wedding it to Christianity while also dreaming of revitalizing the day-to-day life of the ancient Athenian Academy. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/P2WTHK3pKgeUa4u","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":33,"full_name":"Allen, Michael J. B. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1261,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Renaissance Quarterly ","volume":"30","issue":"2","pages":"160-171"}},"sort":[1977]}
Title | Lucretius Contra Empedoclen: A Textual Note |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | The Classical Journal |
Volume | 73 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 27-29 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Clay, Diskin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In what must be the shortest textual note ever published, Bailey and Maas recovered the text of Lucretius I. 744: aera solem imbrem terras animalia fruges Imbrem scripsimus; ignem codd. This is their note. Why they wrote imbrem for ignem, they did not say, perhaps because any reader familiar with Lucretius' argument and Empedocles' poem On Nature knows why. Our manuscripts present us with a world composed of air, the sun, fire, the earth, and the products of the earth (aera solem ignem terras animalia fruges); Empedocles presents us with a world that is rooted in the four elements of air, earth, fire, and water. These he describes variously, but Lucretius has already powerfully invoked them at the very beginning of his poem, well before he returns to them in his refutation of Empedocles' theory of matter. Within the first nine lines of his proem, he evokes the stars (which are soon associated with fire, I. 231, 1034), the sea, the earth, the light of the sun, winds, the earth, the sea, and again light: in short, not the familiar Roman universe of three elements—the heaven, earth, and water—but the Greek world of air, earth, fire, and water. This world he returns to as he presents the elemental theories of "those who multiply the elements which generate the world," and who join air to fire and earth to water: I 714 et qui quattuor ex rebus posse omnia rentur ex igni terra atque anima procrescere et imbri. There are no textual problems here, although anima and imber are striking and unusual as descriptions of air and water. Nevertheless, they stand in the text. But the theory of four elements presents a problem when it is reduced by one in the manuscripts of Lucretius: aera, solem, ignem, terras. Christ saw the problem, and in 1853 he emended the text to give a world of four elements: he took the offending term to be solem, which he emended to rorem—creating a world of air, dew, fire, and earth. This emendation has the virtue of changing only two letters of the manuscripts to create water from the sun, and rorem is a perfectly good Lucretian word for water (cf. I. 771). Dew is a form of water, but Empedocles does not use it as a term to represent this elemental mass. ὕδωρ (hydor) is a word he used to represent water: Simplicius (commenting on Aristotle's Physics) noticed this—καλεῖ ὕδωρ ὄμβρον—and at least three passages from Empedocles survive to prove him right. Simplicius knew of Empedocles' various ways of naming his elements, but neither Lucretius' ancient nor modern editors seem to. Imber seemed strange for water, so an early editor or reader of Lucretius emended the text of I. 784-785 to read: "first these followers of Empedocles make fire transform itself into the gusts of air," I 784 hinc ignem gigni terramque creari ex igni retroque in terram cuncta reverti. Marullus understood what had gone wrong and emended ignem by imbrem and igni by imbri, making water out of fire and recovering how a Presocratic could imagine a ladder of elemental transformations moving down from air to precipitation to earth. Lucretius' attack on Empedocles' elemental theory is only one of the many signs of his knowledge of the Περὶ φύσεως (Peri Physeōs). De Rerum Natura I. 744 and 784-785 are not the only passages that reveal this, and these passages are not the only ones where Empedocles' Greek allows Lucretius' modern reader to recover his original text: II. 1114 ignem ignes procudent aetheraque (aether) This is restored by Empedocles (DK 31 B 37): (πυρὶ γὰρ αἰεὶ πῦρ ἐπὶ πυρὶ) αἰεὶ δὲ ξυνοίσει καὶ ἀὴρ ἀέρι Lachmann, with the confidence inspired by knowing too much and too little, emended aeraque (aer). Simplicius could have pointed him in the right direction when he gave one of Empedocles' terms for aether as aer, as could Empedocles himself. This has become a long note on one word in the manuscripts of Lucretius. Its justification is this: Bailey and Maas published their note in 1943. The emendation was incorporated into the text that accompanies Bailey's three-volume commentary on Lucretius (Oxford 1947), but unaccountably, it did not appear in the Oxford text reprinted in 1947 or in any later reprinting. In the tenth edition of his Lucrèce (Paris 1959), Ernout prints the text of our manuscripts; so does Josef Martin in the five editions of his Lucretius published since 1953. Büchner (Wiesbaden 1966) accepts Christ's rorem as "less drastic" (levior) than imbrem, and so, evidently, does Müller (Fribourg 1975). Only one of the major editions of Lucretius to appear since 1943, that of Martin Ferguson Smith (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1975), prints what Lucretius wrote: the rest prefer dew to rain. So weak is the force of ratio et res ipsa. [the entire text p. 27-29] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/a3Cc8mgHkQFW4AL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1272","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1272,"authors_free":[{"id":1862,"entry_id":1272,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":50,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Clay, Diskin","free_first_name":"Diskin","free_last_name":"Clay","norm_person":{"id":50,"first_name":"Diskin","last_name":"Clay","full_name":"Clay, Diskin","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1069425435","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Lucretius Contra Empedoclen: A Textual Note","main_title":{"title":"Lucretius Contra Empedoclen: A Textual Note"},"abstract":"In what must be the shortest textual note ever published, Bailey and Maas recovered the text of Lucretius I. 744:\r\n\r\n aera solem imbrem terras animalia fruges\r\n Imbrem scripsimus; ignem codd.\r\n\r\nThis is their note. Why they wrote imbrem for ignem, they did not say, perhaps because any reader familiar with Lucretius' argument and Empedocles' poem On Nature knows why.\r\n\r\nOur manuscripts present us with a world composed of air, the sun, fire, the earth, and the products of the earth (aera solem ignem terras animalia fruges); Empedocles presents us with a world that is rooted in the four elements of air, earth, fire, and water. These he describes variously, but Lucretius has already powerfully invoked them at the very beginning of his poem, well before he returns to them in his refutation of Empedocles' theory of matter.\r\n\r\nWithin the first nine lines of his proem, he evokes the stars (which are soon associated with fire, I. 231, 1034), the sea, the earth, the light of the sun, winds, the earth, the sea, and again light: in short, not the familiar Roman universe of three elements\u2014the heaven, earth, and water\u2014but the Greek world of air, earth, fire, and water.\r\n\r\nThis world he returns to as he presents the elemental theories of \"those who multiply the elements which generate the world,\" and who join air to fire and earth to water:\r\n\r\n I 714 et qui quattuor ex rebus posse omnia rentur\r\n ex igni terra atque anima procrescere et imbri.\r\n\r\nThere are no textual problems here, although anima and imber are striking and unusual as descriptions of air and water. Nevertheless, they stand in the text. But the theory of four elements presents a problem when it is reduced by one in the manuscripts of Lucretius: aera, solem, ignem, terras.\r\n\r\nChrist saw the problem, and in 1853 he emended the text to give a world of four elements: he took the offending term to be solem, which he emended to rorem\u2014creating a world of air, dew, fire, and earth. This emendation has the virtue of changing only two letters of the manuscripts to create water from the sun, and rorem is a perfectly good Lucretian word for water (cf. I. 771).\r\n\r\nDew is a form of water, but Empedocles does not use it as a term to represent this elemental mass. \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 (hydor) is a word he used to represent water: Simplicius (commenting on Aristotle's Physics) noticed this\u2014\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u1f44\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u2014and at least three passages from Empedocles survive to prove him right.\r\n\r\nSimplicius knew of Empedocles' various ways of naming his elements, but neither Lucretius' ancient nor modern editors seem to. Imber seemed strange for water, so an early editor or reader of Lucretius emended the text of I. 784-785 to read:\r\n\r\n\"first these followers of Empedocles make fire transform itself into the gusts of air,\"\r\n\r\n I 784 hinc ignem gigni terramque creari\r\n ex igni retroque in terram cuncta reverti.\r\n\r\nMarullus understood what had gone wrong and emended ignem by imbrem and igni by imbri, making water out of fire and recovering how a Presocratic could imagine a ladder of elemental transformations moving down from air to precipitation to earth.\r\n\r\nLucretius' attack on Empedocles' elemental theory is only one of the many signs of his knowledge of the \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 (Peri Physe\u014ds). De Rerum Natura I. 744 and 784-785 are not the only passages that reveal this, and these passages are not the only ones where Empedocles' Greek allows Lucretius' modern reader to recover his original text:\r\n\r\n II. 1114 ignem ignes procudent aetheraque (aether)\r\n\r\nThis is restored by Empedocles (DK 31 B 37):\r\n\r\n (\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f76) \u03b1\u1f30\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03be\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\r\n \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\r\n\r\nLachmann, with the confidence inspired by knowing too much and too little, emended aeraque (aer). Simplicius could have pointed him in the right direction when he gave one of Empedocles' terms for aether as aer, as could Empedocles himself.\r\n\r\nThis has become a long note on one word in the manuscripts of Lucretius. Its justification is this: Bailey and Maas published their note in 1943. The emendation was incorporated into the text that accompanies Bailey's three-volume commentary on Lucretius (Oxford 1947), but unaccountably, it did not appear in the Oxford text reprinted in 1947 or in any later reprinting.\r\n\r\nIn the tenth edition of his Lucr\u00e8ce (Paris 1959), Ernout prints the text of our manuscripts; so does Josef Martin in the five editions of his Lucretius published since 1953. B\u00fcchner (Wiesbaden 1966) accepts Christ's rorem as \"less drastic\" (levior) than imbrem, and so, evidently, does M\u00fcller (Fribourg 1975).\r\n\r\nOnly one of the major editions of Lucretius to appear since 1943, that of Martin Ferguson Smith (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1975), prints what Lucretius wrote: the rest prefer dew to rain.\r\n\r\nSo weak is the force of ratio et res ipsa. [the entire text p. 27-29]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/a3Cc8mgHkQFW4AL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":50,"full_name":"Clay, Diskin","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1272,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Journal","volume":"73","issue":"1","pages":"27-29"}},"sort":[1977]}
Title | Light from Aristotle's "Physics" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 22 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 10-12 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant). It would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides’ modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides’ (and Melissus’) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging ὄν deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the "only solution" (monoeidês lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics. In the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1015","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1015,"authors_free":[{"id":1531,"entry_id":1015,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K","main_title":{"title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K"},"abstract":"Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant).\r\nIt would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides\u2019 modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides\u2019 (and Melissus\u2019) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging \u1f44\u03bd deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the \"only solution\" (monoeid\u00eas lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics.\r\nIn the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1015,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"22","issue":"1","pages":"10-12"}},"sort":[1977]}
Title | Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 8 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 173–187 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sambûrsqî, Šemûʾēl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Three basic notions characterize the physical world, namely space, time and matter, the first of which is usually held by scientists to be simpler than the other two. The history of physics and philosophy has shown, however, that even the concept of space abounds with difficulties, to which the doctrines of the later Neoplatonic philosophers form an impressive witness. It is proposed to give here a brief survey of the theories of topos, meaning variously “place” or “space”, from Iamblichus at the beginning of the fourth century to Simplicius in the middle of the sixth. Although most of their treatises were clad in the modest garb of commentaries on works by Plato or Aristotle, the ideas of these thinkers undoubtedly represent one of the peaks of sophistication and metaphysical acumen in the whole history of philosophy. The deliberations and inquiries of these philosophers on the concept of topos took place against a long historical background, spanning nearly a thousand years from the Presocratics to Plotinus. A short synopsis, however condensed, of the earlier developments of the concept will serve as a useful introduction, leading up to the period in which Iamblichus and his successors started to elaborate their ideas on topos. This summary will be concerned with merely the conceptual aspects of the subject and thus will not adhere to a strict chronological order. [introduction p. 173] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FmKjWoNccS499uH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1051","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1051,"authors_free":[{"id":1596,"entry_id":1051,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":308,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","free_first_name":"\u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","free_last_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","norm_person":{"id":308,"first_name":"\u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","last_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee","full_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120109794","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism","main_title":{"title":"Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism"},"abstract":"Three basic notions characterize the physical world, namely space, time and \r\nmatter, the first of which is usually held by scientists to be simpler than the \r\nother two. The history of physics and philosophy has shown, however, that \r\neven the concept of space abounds with difficulties, to which the doctrines of \r\nthe later Neoplatonic philosophers form an impressive witness. It is proposed \r\nto give here a brief survey of the theories of topos, meaning variously \u201cplace\u201d \r\nor \u201cspace\u201d, from Iamblichus at the beginning of the fourth century to \r\nSimplicius in the middle of the sixth. Although most of their treatises were \r\nclad in the modest garb of commentaries on works by Plato or Aristotle, the \r\nideas of these thinkers undoubtedly represent one of the peaks of sophistication \r\nand metaphysical acumen in the whole history of philosophy. The deliberations and inquiries of these philosophers on the concept of \r\ntopos took place against a long historical background, spanning nearly a \r\nthousand years from the Presocratics to Plotinus. A short synopsis, however \r\ncondensed, of the earlier developments of the concept will serve as a useful \r\nintroduction, leading up to the period in which Iamblichus and his successors \r\nstarted to elaborate their ideas on topos. This summary will be concerned with \r\nmerely the conceptual aspects of the subject and thus will not adhere to a \r\nstrict chronological order. [introduction p. 173]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FmKjWoNccS499uH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":308,"full_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1051,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"8","issue":"3","pages":"173\u2013187"}},"sort":[1977]}
Title | Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on "Phantasia" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | The Review of Metaphysics |
Volume | 31 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 242-257 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The ancient commentaries on Aristotle have for the most part remained in that strange kind of no-man's land between Classical and Medieval studies that even now holds so many of the productions of later antiquity. On the whole it would be true to say that students of Neoplatonism?for the commentators were usually Neoplatonists ?prefer to occupy themselves with openly Neoplatonic writings. Modern Aristotelian scholars, on the other hand, tend to take very little account of the opinions of their ancient predecessors. In this way they differ from the Medie vals, both Christian and Moslem: as is well known, Aquinas instigated the translation of many of these commentaries by his fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke, while a century before, Averroes, the greatest of the Arabic commentators, had made ample use of at least the earlier Greek expositions. [Introduction, p. 242] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/xdGhkQhUkY7sWbE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"877","_score":null,"_source":{"id":877,"authors_free":[{"id":1288,"entry_id":877,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on \"Phantasia\"","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on \"Phantasia\""},"abstract":"The ancient commentaries on Aristotle have for the most part \r\nremained in that strange kind of no-man's land between Classical \r\nand Medieval studies that even now holds so many of the productions \r\nof later antiquity. On the whole it would be true to say that students \r\nof Neoplatonism?for the commentators were usually Neoplatonists \r\n?prefer to occupy themselves with openly Neoplatonic writings. \r\nModern Aristotelian scholars, on the other hand, tend to take very \r\nlittle account of the opinions of their ancient predecessors. In this \r\nway they differ from the Medie vals, both Christian and Moslem: as \r\nis well known, Aquinas instigated the translation of many of these \r\ncommentaries by his fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke, while a \r\ncentury before, Averroes, the greatest of the Arabic commentators, \r\nhad made ample use of at least the earlier Greek expositions. [Introduction, p. 242]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xdGhkQhUkY7sWbE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":877,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"31","issue":"2","pages":"242-257"}},"sort":[1977]}
Title | Analyse de l'édition Aldine du Commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 105 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 42-54 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cordero, Néstor-Luis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Pour compléter notre analyse, nous devrions identifier l’éditeur de Simplicius de 1526. Du temps d’Alde, la plupart des ouvrages d’auteurs grecs (rappelons qu’il éditait aussi des ouvrages latins et italiens) étaient réservés à Musurus. À la mort d’Alde, comme nous l’avons dit, Musurus a continué de collaborer avec Andrea d’Asola, mais seulement jusqu’en 1516. En 1517, le fils d’Andrea, Francesco d’Asola, a commencé à travailler à l’imprimerie, et l’année suivante, il figure déjà en tant qu’éditeur responsable de Térence, de Dioscoride et d’Eschyle. À partir de 1518, sauf pour l’édition de Cicéron de 1519, Francesco d’Asola figure en tant que responsable direct de la plupart des éditions aldines où l’on indique le nom de l’éditeur, tout au moins jusqu’en 1529. Mais nous avons des ouvrages d’éditeur anonyme où Francesco d’Asola ne figure qu’en tant qu’auteur de la préface. C’est précisément le cas de l’édition de Simplicius, dont la préface est dédicacée par F. Asulanus au cardinal Hercule Gonzaga. Avec certaines réserves, nous pouvons donc supposer que, d’une manière ou d’une autre, Francesco d’Asola est le responsable de l’édition et, ainsi, l’auteur des conjectures qu’elle présente. En ce qui concerne sa valeur, Renouard fait remarquer qu’il s’agit d’un éditeur intelligent « mais beaucoup trop hardi dans ses conjectures », ainsi qu’il apparaît dans son édition des Argonautica de C. V. Flaccus, en 1523. Cependant, le cas le plus illustratif est son édition d’Homère (à laquelle nous avons fait précédemment allusion) de 1524, qui présente de telles divergences par rapport aux précédentes qu’elle semblerait être fondée sur un nouveau manuscrit. Mais Renouard rejette cette hypothèse : « Il s’agit simplement de conjectures de Francesco d’Asola lui-même, car s’il avait été appuyé de nouveaux manuscrits, il n’eût pas manqué d’en avertir dans une nouvelle préface, au lieu de copier celle d’Alde de l’édition de 1504, déjà imprimée dans celle de 1517. » Tout porte à croire, par conséquent, que l’édition de Simplicius de 1526 a été effectuée sous la responsabilité de Francesco d’Asola, dont les conjectures, en général, n’ont pas été tellement heureuses. Cependant, nous devons reconnaître une fois de plus que nous nous trouvons sur le plan des conjectures et que la possibilité — lointaine, certes — n’est pas exclue que Francesco d’Asola ait disposé de l’archétype de l’œuvre de Simplicius. Toutefois, nous pouvons constater que les manuscrits conservés actuellement présentent le même texte que E et F et, par conséquent, ne justifient pas quelques conjectures "trop hardies". [conclusion p. 53-54] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ooZGKSisiH1j9G1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1277","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1277,"authors_free":[{"id":1866,"entry_id":1277,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":54,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":{"id":54,"first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","last_name":"Cordero","full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1055808973","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Analyse de l'\u00e9dition Aldine du Commentaire de Simplicius \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Analyse de l'\u00e9dition Aldine du Commentaire de Simplicius \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote"},"abstract":"Pour compl\u00e9ter notre analyse, nous devrions identifier l\u2019\u00e9diteur de Simplicius de 1526. Du temps d\u2019Alde, la plupart des ouvrages d\u2019auteurs grecs (rappelons qu\u2019il \u00e9ditait aussi des ouvrages latins et italiens) \u00e9taient r\u00e9serv\u00e9s \u00e0 Musurus.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 la mort d\u2019Alde, comme nous l\u2019avons dit, Musurus a continu\u00e9 de collaborer avec Andrea d\u2019Asola, mais seulement jusqu\u2019en 1516. En 1517, le fils d\u2019Andrea, Francesco d\u2019Asola, a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 travailler \u00e0 l\u2019imprimerie, et l\u2019ann\u00e9e suivante, il figure d\u00e9j\u00e0 en tant qu\u2019\u00e9diteur responsable de T\u00e9rence, de Dioscoride et d\u2019Eschyle.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 partir de 1518, sauf pour l\u2019\u00e9dition de Cic\u00e9ron de 1519, Francesco d\u2019Asola figure en tant que responsable direct de la plupart des \u00e9ditions aldines o\u00f9 l\u2019on indique le nom de l\u2019\u00e9diteur, tout au moins jusqu\u2019en 1529.\r\n\r\nMais nous avons des ouvrages d\u2019\u00e9diteur anonyme o\u00f9 Francesco d\u2019Asola ne figure qu\u2019en tant qu\u2019auteur de la pr\u00e9face. C\u2019est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment le cas de l\u2019\u00e9dition de Simplicius, dont la pr\u00e9face est d\u00e9dicac\u00e9e par F. Asulanus au cardinal Hercule Gonzaga.\r\n\r\nAvec certaines r\u00e9serves, nous pouvons donc supposer que, d\u2019une mani\u00e8re ou d\u2019une autre, Francesco d\u2019Asola est le responsable de l\u2019\u00e9dition et, ainsi, l\u2019auteur des conjectures qu\u2019elle pr\u00e9sente.\r\n\r\nEn ce qui concerne sa valeur, Renouard fait remarquer qu\u2019il s\u2019agit d\u2019un \u00e9diteur intelligent \u00ab mais beaucoup trop hardi dans ses conjectures \u00bb, ainsi qu\u2019il appara\u00eet dans son \u00e9dition des Argonautica de C. V. Flaccus, en 1523.\r\n\r\nCependant, le cas le plus illustratif est son \u00e9dition d\u2019Hom\u00e8re (\u00e0 laquelle nous avons fait pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment allusion) de 1524, qui pr\u00e9sente de telles divergences par rapport aux pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes qu\u2019elle semblerait \u00eatre fond\u00e9e sur un nouveau manuscrit. Mais Renouard rejette cette hypoth\u00e8se :\r\n\r\n \u00ab Il s\u2019agit simplement de conjectures de Francesco d\u2019Asola lui-m\u00eame, car s\u2019il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 appuy\u00e9 de nouveaux manuscrits, il n\u2019e\u00fbt pas manqu\u00e9 d\u2019en avertir dans une nouvelle pr\u00e9face, au lieu de copier celle d\u2019Alde de l\u2019\u00e9dition de 1504, d\u00e9j\u00e0 imprim\u00e9e dans celle de 1517. \u00bb\r\n\r\nTout porte \u00e0 croire, par cons\u00e9quent, que l\u2019\u00e9dition de Simplicius de 1526 a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e sous la responsabilit\u00e9 de Francesco d\u2019Asola, dont les conjectures, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, n\u2019ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9 tellement heureuses.\r\n\r\nCependant, nous devons reconna\u00eetre une fois de plus que nous nous trouvons sur le plan des conjectures et que la possibilit\u00e9 \u2014 lointaine, certes \u2014 n\u2019est pas exclue que Francesco d\u2019Asola ait dispos\u00e9 de l\u2019arch\u00e9type de l\u2019\u0153uvre de Simplicius.\r\n\r\nToutefois, nous pouvons constater que les manuscrits conserv\u00e9s actuellement pr\u00e9sentent le m\u00eame texte que E et F et, par cons\u00e9quent, ne justifient pas quelques conjectures \"trop hardies\".\r\n[conclusion p. 53-54]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ooZGKSisiH1j9G1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":54,"full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1277,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"105","issue":"1","pages":"42-54"}},"sort":[1977]}
Title | Neoplatonic Elements in the "de Anima" Commentaries |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1976 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 21 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 64-87 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Most scholars who refer to the Greek commentators for help in the understanding of difficult Aristotelian texts seem to expect straightforward scholarly treatment of their problems. Not infrequently they are disappointed and complain about the irrelevance of the commentary they read, or inveigh against the incompetence of the commentators. Only Alexander is generally exempt from such censure, and that in itself is significant. For he is the only major commentator whose work survives in any considerable quantity who wrote before Neoplatonism. Shortly after Alexander, the kind of thought that is conveniently described by this label came to dominate Greek philosophy, and nearly all pagan philosophy and philosophical scholarship was pursued under its influence, if not by its active adherents. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that these facts are not trivial items of background interest but are fundamental to a proper assessment of the later commentators' opinions on points of Aristotelian scholarship. It is necessary to take account of the ideas and purpose of these commentators if one is to make any serious critical use of their work, and this cannot be done if one merely dips into their voluminous works in the hope of occasional enlightenment. That these men were swayed by their own opinions and preconceptions is perhaps obvious once stated. Even Simplicius, notwithstanding his reputation for careful scholarship, is no exception. Simplicius may have done us a great service by preserving fragments of the pre-Socratics, but he was nevertheless a man who entertained ideas which were not likely to lead to the correct interpretation of Aristotle, as Hicks for one saw—Ross, it seems, did not. In fact, one might go so far as to say that Simplicius was less well-fitted than some of the other commentators to give a good account of his subject. Those whose immediate reaction to such a statement is that it is grossly unfair to so fine a scholar might be disturbed by some of the material in the preface to Simplicius' De Anima commentary—as they would by that in Philoponus' as well—material which often escapes notice for the simple reason that one normally refers to these works for help with specific passages and does not read them as a whole. This is not to say that there are no obvious signs of what is going on in the body of the commentaries, for there certainly are. A case in point is Simplicius' claim in the De Caelo commentary (640.27–32) that Aristotle's criticisms of Plato are directed not against Plato himself but against those who failed to grasp Plato's real meaning. In the preface to the commentary on the Categories, Simplicius goes further and says that in dealing with Aristotle's attacks on Plato, one should not consider only the philosophers' language and complain about their discord, but rather one should concentrate on their thought and seek out their accord on most matters (In Cat. 7.29–32). Here we have two expressions of the normal Neoplatonic view that Plato and Aristotle were usually trying to say the same thing. This view can, of course, be traced back to the revival of positive teaching in the New Academy. This is not to say that no Neoplatonist was aware of the differences, and certain Aristotelian doctrines remained unacceptable. In the passage we have just mentioned, Simplicius talks about he en tois pleistois symphonia, and elsewhere he shows that he is alive to differences (e.g., In De Caelo 454.23 ff.), even if he does regard Aristotle as Plato's truest pupil (ib. 378.20 f.) or his best interpreter (In De An. 245.12). Philoponus, moreover, actually protested against the view that Aristotle's attacks on Plato's ideas were not directed at Plato himself, a view that seems to have had some currency (cf. De Aet. M. II.2 29.2–8 R). None the less, ever since Plotinus, whose adoption of much Aristotelian thought would be clear enough without Porphyry's explicit statement on the point (Vita Plot. 14.4 ff.), the new Platonism had been more or less Aristotelianized: the controversies about whether or not Aristotelian views could be accepted by Platonists which had been current in the Middle Platonic period were no longer live. By the time Simplicius and Philoponus composed their commentaries, Aristotle's philosophy had been used as the standard introduction to Plato for at least two centuries. The tendency among certain modern scholars to see Aristotle simply as a Platonist has a precedent in the activities of the Neoplatonists: in both cases, it depends on a somewhat special understanding of Plato. [introduction 64-66] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3j2gfRYnCCVhtJC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"612","_score":null,"_source":{"id":612,"authors_free":[{"id":867,"entry_id":612,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Elements in the \"de Anima\" Commentaries","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Elements in the \"de Anima\" Commentaries"},"abstract":"Most scholars who refer to the Greek commentators for help in the understanding of difficult Aristotelian texts seem to expect straightforward scholarly treatment of their problems. Not infrequently they are disappointed and complain about the irrelevance of the commentary they read, or inveigh against the incompetence of the commentators. Only Alexander is generally exempt from such censure, and that in itself is significant. For he is the only major commentator whose work survives in any considerable quantity who wrote before Neoplatonism.\r\n\r\nShortly after Alexander, the kind of thought that is conveniently described by this label came to dominate Greek philosophy, and nearly all pagan philosophy and philosophical scholarship was pursued under its influence, if not by its active adherents. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that these facts are not trivial items of background interest but are fundamental to a proper assessment of the later commentators' opinions on points of Aristotelian scholarship. It is necessary to take account of the ideas and purpose of these commentators if one is to make any serious critical use of their work, and this cannot be done if one merely dips into their voluminous works in the hope of occasional enlightenment.\r\n\r\nThat these men were swayed by their own opinions and preconceptions is perhaps obvious once stated. Even Simplicius, notwithstanding his reputation for careful scholarship, is no exception. Simplicius may have done us a great service by preserving fragments of the pre-Socratics, but he was nevertheless a man who entertained ideas which were not likely to lead to the correct interpretation of Aristotle, as Hicks for one saw\u2014Ross, it seems, did not. In fact, one might go so far as to say that Simplicius was less well-fitted than some of the other commentators to give a good account of his subject.\r\n\r\nThose whose immediate reaction to such a statement is that it is grossly unfair to so fine a scholar might be disturbed by some of the material in the preface to Simplicius' De Anima commentary\u2014as they would by that in Philoponus' as well\u2014material which often escapes notice for the simple reason that one normally refers to these works for help with specific passages and does not read them as a whole.\r\n\r\nThis is not to say that there are no obvious signs of what is going on in the body of the commentaries, for there certainly are. A case in point is Simplicius' claim in the De Caelo commentary (640.27\u201332) that Aristotle's criticisms of Plato are directed not against Plato himself but against those who failed to grasp Plato's real meaning.\r\n\r\nIn the preface to the commentary on the Categories, Simplicius goes further and says that in dealing with Aristotle's attacks on Plato, one should not consider only the philosophers' language and complain about their discord, but rather one should concentrate on their thought and seek out their accord on most matters (In Cat. 7.29\u201332). Here we have two expressions of the normal Neoplatonic view that Plato and Aristotle were usually trying to say the same thing.\r\n\r\nThis view can, of course, be traced back to the revival of positive teaching in the New Academy. This is not to say that no Neoplatonist was aware of the differences, and certain Aristotelian doctrines remained unacceptable. In the passage we have just mentioned, Simplicius talks about he en tois pleistois symphonia, and elsewhere he shows that he is alive to differences (e.g., In De Caelo 454.23 ff.), even if he does regard Aristotle as Plato's truest pupil (ib. 378.20 f.) or his best interpreter (In De An. 245.12).\r\n\r\nPhiloponus, moreover, actually protested against the view that Aristotle's attacks on Plato's ideas were not directed at Plato himself, a view that seems to have had some currency (cf. De Aet. M. II.2 29.2\u20138 R). None the less, ever since Plotinus, whose adoption of much Aristotelian thought would be clear enough without Porphyry's explicit statement on the point (Vita Plot. 14.4 ff.), the new Platonism had been more or less Aristotelianized: the controversies about whether or not Aristotelian views could be accepted by Platonists which had been current in the Middle Platonic period were no longer live.\r\n\r\nBy the time Simplicius and Philoponus composed their commentaries, Aristotle's philosophy had been used as the standard introduction to Plato for at least two centuries. The tendency among certain modern scholars to see Aristotle simply as a Platonist has a precedent in the activities of the Neoplatonists: in both cases, it depends on a somewhat special understanding of Plato. [introduction 64-66]","btype":3,"date":"1976","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3j2gfRYnCCVhtJC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":612,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"21","issue":"1","pages":"64-87"}},"sort":[1976]}
Title | Anaxagoras B 14 DK |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1976 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 104 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 240-241 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Marcovich, Miroslav |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notes about Anaxagoras B 14 DK |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qjqMabHfJRZhGG4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"987","_score":null,"_source":{"id":987,"authors_free":[{"id":1488,"entry_id":987,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":239,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Marcovich, Miroslav","free_first_name":"Miroslav","free_last_name":"Marcovich","norm_person":{"id":239,"first_name":"Miroslav","last_name":"Marcovich","full_name":"Marcovich, Miroslav","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107592630","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaxagoras B 14 DK","main_title":{"title":"Anaxagoras B 14 DK"},"abstract":"Notes about Anaxagoras B 14 DK","btype":3,"date":"1976","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qjqMabHfJRZhGG4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":239,"full_name":"Marcovich, Miroslav","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":987,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"104","issue":"2","pages":"240-241"}},"sort":[1976]}
Title | Doxographica Anaxagorea |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1975 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 103 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schofield, Malcom |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The information provided by these three texts that Anaxagoras made special application of his general theory of mixture to problems of growth and nutrition derives in each case from Theophrastus, whose word we have no reason to doubt, and who is in any case supported by Aristotle in De Generatione Animalium. The view, again presented in all three texts, that it was from reflection upon such problems, chiefly or in part, that Anaxagoras was led to formulate his general theory again derives from Theophrastus (and solely from him in Aetius's case) or from Aristotle glossed by Theophrastus (in the case of Simplicius and the scholium). For it is Aristotle who says that it was from seeing everything coming out of everything that Anaxagoras arrived at the theory of mixture, it is Aristotle who invariably illustrates Anaxagoras's "all things" by flesh and bone, and it is upon texts of Aristotle containing this explanation and these illustrations that both Simplicius's commentary and the scholium are based. Aristotle does not concentrate on biological processes exclusively, to be sure, but no doubt Theophrastus was acting in the spirit of Aristotle when he illustrates his own Aristotelian exposition of Anaxagoras's train of thought by reference to the problem of nutrition. How much, then, are the texts to which Jaeger appealed for his account of Anaxagoras's "methodical point of departure" worth? Just and only as much as are Aristotle and Theophrastus. But whether they are right is, as I have said, another story. [conclusion p. 24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dX7s9j2RuDMGCdU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"854","_score":null,"_source":{"id":854,"authors_free":[{"id":1258,"entry_id":854,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":285,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schofield, Malcom","free_first_name":"Malcom","free_last_name":"Schofield","norm_person":{"id":285,"first_name":"Malcolm","last_name":"Schofield","full_name":"Schofield, Malcolm","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132323737","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Doxographica Anaxagorea","main_title":{"title":"Doxographica Anaxagorea"},"abstract":"The information provided by these three texts that Anaxagoras made special application of his general theory of mixture to problems of growth and nutrition derives in each case from Theophrastus, whose word we have no reason to doubt, and who is in any case supported by Aristotle in De Generatione Animalium. The view, again presented in all three texts, that it was from reflection upon such problems, chiefly or in part, that Anaxagoras was led to formulate his general theory again derives from Theophrastus (and solely from him in Aetius's case) or from Aristotle glossed by Theophrastus (in the case of Simplicius and the scholium). For it is Aristotle who says that it was from seeing everything coming out of everything that Anaxagoras arrived at the theory of mixture, it is Aristotle who invariably illustrates Anaxagoras's \"all things\" by flesh and bone, and it is upon texts of Aristotle containing this explanation and these illustrations that both Simplicius's commentary and the scholium are based. Aristotle does not concentrate on biological processes exclusively, to be sure, but no doubt Theophrastus was acting in the spirit of Aristotle when he illustrates his own Aristotelian exposition of Anaxagoras's train of thought by reference to the problem of nutrition.\r\n\r\nHow much, then, are the texts to which Jaeger appealed for his account of Anaxagoras's \"methodical point of departure\" worth? Just and only as much as are Aristotle and Theophrastus. But whether they are right is, as I have said, another story. [conclusion p. 24]","btype":3,"date":"1975","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dX7s9j2RuDMGCdU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":285,"full_name":"Schofield, Malcolm","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":854,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"103","issue":"1","pages":"1-24"}},"sort":[1975]}
Title | Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1974 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 102 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 365-367 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sider, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Note on Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jfkLIWo4A4TjQYr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"851","_score":null,"_source":{"id":851,"authors_free":[{"id":1255,"entry_id":851,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":320,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sider, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Sider","norm_person":{"id":320,"first_name":"David","last_name":"Sider","full_name":"Sider, David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1129478610","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK","main_title":{"title":"Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK"},"abstract":"Note on Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK","btype":3,"date":"1974","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jfkLIWo4A4TjQYr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":320,"full_name":"Sider, David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":851,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"102","issue":"2","pages":"365-367"}},"sort":[1974]}
Title | Zur Methodik antiker Exegese |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1974 |
Journal | Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der Älteren Kirche |
Volume | 65 |
Pages | 121-138 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dörrie, Heinrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Artikel behandelt die Exegese antiker Texte und beginnt mit einem Fokus auf die Auslegung Homers. Die homerischen Epen wurden für mehr als 1000 Jahre als Quelle für Bildung und Literatur betrachtet und waren daher von großer Bedeutung für die antike Exegese. Obwohl sich die Sprache, die Werte und die mythologischen Überzeugungen von antiken Texten von der modernen Welt unterscheiden, blieben sie von Bedeutung. Die allegorische Auslegung Homers war ein Schlüsselthema, das später auch auf die christliche Exegese angewendet wurde. Die antike Exegese befasste sich nicht nur mit literarischen Werken, sondern auch mit Orakeln, Sprichwörtern und Riten. Die Methode der antiken Exegese wurde in Alexandrien von den Philologen auf wenige, einfache Fakten reduziert, aber im Allgemeinen blieb sie kontinuierlich und bestätigte das Bildungserbe, auf das sie zurückgriff. Die christliche Exegese wurde stark von der vorausgehenden antiken Exegese beeinflusst, insbesondere von der stoischen Exegese, die Werkzeuge zur Interpretation von Texten bereitstellte. Die Artikel erörtert die Kontinuität der Exegese im Laufe der Jahrhunderte und betont, dass antike Exegese ein Bildungserbe darstellt, das über Jahrhunderte hinweg bewahrt wurde. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pWm7MqqJ0rmmM7F |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1293","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1293,"authors_free":[{"id":1882,"entry_id":1293,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":69,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich","free_first_name":"Heinrich","free_last_name":"D\u00f6rrie","norm_person":{"id":69,"first_name":"Heinrich ","last_name":"D\u00f6rrie","full_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118526375","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zur Methodik antiker Exegese","main_title":{"title":"Zur Methodik antiker Exegese"},"abstract":"Der Artikel behandelt die Exegese antiker Texte und beginnt mit einem Fokus auf die Auslegung Homers. Die homerischen Epen wurden f\u00fcr mehr als 1000 Jahre als Quelle f\u00fcr Bildung und Literatur betrachtet und waren daher von gro\u00dfer Bedeutung f\u00fcr die antike Exegese. Obwohl sich die Sprache, die Werte und die mythologischen \u00dcberzeugungen von antiken Texten von der modernen Welt unterscheiden, blieben sie von Bedeutung. Die allegorische Auslegung Homers war ein Schl\u00fcsselthema, das sp\u00e4ter auch auf die christliche Exegese angewendet wurde. Die antike Exegese befasste sich nicht nur mit literarischen Werken, sondern auch mit Orakeln, Sprichw\u00f6rtern und Riten. Die Methode der antiken Exegese wurde in Alexandrien von den Philologen auf wenige, einfache Fakten reduziert, aber im Allgemeinen blieb sie kontinuierlich und best\u00e4tigte das Bildungserbe, auf das sie zur\u00fcckgriff. Die christliche Exegese wurde stark von der vorausgehenden antiken Exegese beeinflusst, insbesondere von der stoischen Exegese, die Werkzeuge zur Interpretation von Texten bereitstellte. Die Artikel er\u00f6rtert die Kontinuit\u00e4t der Exegese im Laufe der Jahrhunderte und betont, dass antike Exegese ein Bildungserbe darstellt, das \u00fcber Jahrhunderte hinweg bewahrt wurde. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1974","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pWm7MqqJ0rmmM7F","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":69,"full_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1293,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Zeitschrift f\u00fcr die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der \u00c4lteren Kirche","volume":"65","issue":"","pages":"121-138"}},"sort":[1974]}
Title | Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1974 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 102 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 540–556 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Bearing in mind the reservations already made, what conclusions can we draw? In the first place, it is fair to say that the evidence from Simplicius does, taken overall, suggest that Iamblichus did not write a commentary on the de Anima. Consideration of Stephanus' commentary on de Anima G points in the same direction, but it must not be forgotten that that commentary contains a reference to Iamblichus' that looks more like a quotation from a de Anima commentary than any other that we have. Philoponus is less helpful, as are other members of the Alexandrian school. He certainly gives no positive indication that Iamblichus wrote a commentary, but for the reasons that we have given, the lack of such positive evidence in his case does not amount to anything like conclusive negative evidence. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility that Iamblichus did write a commentary, either on the de Anima as a whole, or on some extended part of it, but it seems probably that he did not. If he did it would certainly be fair to say that his commentary was probably of no great importance. Discussions of isolated texts of Aristotle are another matter: they are only to be expected in the work of any Neoplatonist. [conclusion, p. 556] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/sl42R04H6zbpEIJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"569","_score":null,"_source":{"id":569,"authors_free":[{"id":808,"entry_id":569,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima?","main_title":{"title":"Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima?"},"abstract":"Bearing in mind the reservations already made, what conclusions can we draw? In the first place, it is fair to say that the evidence from Simplicius does, taken overall, suggest that Iamblichus did not write a commentary on the de Anima. Consideration of Stephanus' commentary on de Anima G points in the same direction, but it must not be forgotten that that commentary contains \r\na reference to Iamblichus' that looks more like a quotation from a de Anima commentary than any other that we have. Philoponus is less helpful, as are other members of the Alexandrian school. He certainly gives no positive indication that Iamblichus wrote a commentary, but for the reasons that we have given, the lack of such positive evidence in his case does not amount to \r\nanything like conclusive negative evidence. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility that Iamblichus did write a commentary, either on the de Anima as a whole, or on some extended part of it, but it seems probably that he did \r\nnot. If he did it would certainly be fair to say that his commentary was probably of no great importance. Discussions of isolated texts of Aristotle are another matter: they are only to be expected in the work of any Neoplatonist. [conclusion, p. 556]","btype":3,"date":"1974","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/sl42R04H6zbpEIJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":569,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"102","issue":"4","pages":"540\u2013556"}},"sort":[1974]}
Title | Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of περί τῆς ’Αληθείας |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1973 |
Journal | L'Antiquité Classique |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 178-180 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rankin, Herbert David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This passage (Simplicii in Categoriarum c. 8 [Arist. p. ]) is placed by Caizzi among a group of passages of epistemological interest but not clearly attributable to any of the works which Antisthenes is said to have composed. Its argument is characteristic enough, being one of the representations of Antisthenes' opposition to Plato's eîdē, and an assertion of his view that the concrete phenomenal object is the starting point of our capability of knowledge, which in his view is probably limited by the restrictions placed upon us by the narrow capacity of our language with regard to logical discourse. The purpose of this article is to consider whether a part of this passage is a quotation from Antisthenes' own writings and to suggest a possible place for it in one of the works with which he is credited. [introduction p. 178] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/a36SykFCN2qyzot |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"861","_score":null,"_source":{"id":861,"authors_free":[{"id":1265,"entry_id":861,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":296,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","free_first_name":"Herbert David","free_last_name":"Rankin","norm_person":{"id":296,"first_name":"Herbert David","last_name":"Rankin","full_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1058155474","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u2019\u0391\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2","main_title":{"title":"Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u2019\u0391\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2"},"abstract":"This passage (Simplicii in Categoriarum c. 8 [Arist. p. ]) is placed by Caizzi among a group of passages of epistemological interest but not clearly attributable to any of the works which Antisthenes is said to have composed. Its argument is characteristic enough, being one of the representations of Antisthenes' opposition to Plato's e\u00eed\u0113, and an assertion of his view that the concrete phenomenal object is the starting point of our capability of knowledge, which in his view is probably limited by the restrictions placed upon us by the narrow capacity of our language with regard to logical discourse.\r\n\r\nThe purpose of this article is to consider whether a part of this passage is a quotation from Antisthenes' own writings and to suggest a possible place for it in one of the works with which he is credited. [introduction p. 178]","btype":3,"date":"1973","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/a36SykFCN2qyzot","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":296,"full_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":861,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"L'Antiquit\u00e9 Classique","volume":"42","issue":"1","pages":"178-180"}},"sort":[1973]}
Title | Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Phoenix |
Volume | 26 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 342-357 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Edmunds, Lowell |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In sum, the position of Democritus is decidedly against tyche (chance), and tyche is regarded as a subjective phenomenon. "Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness." There remains only one noteworthy fragment that mentions chance: "Daring is the beginning of action, but chance is responsible for the end." Since this fragment contradicts everything else Democritus says about chance, and since the form of Stobaeus' quotation obscures the reference of these words, we are entitled to ask whether we should think of this as Democritus' view of chance in general, or whether he was referring to persons who, contrary to the advice of his other sententiae on chance, relied on moderation and committed themselves to overreaching and tychistic projects. The note of moral exhortation suggests that man has a free choice between alternative ways of life, and thus that he is not in the grip of the original necessity which created the cosmos and him and endowed him with the arts. From the ethical point of view, man seems to emerge as an island of freedom—a floating island, perhaps, in a sea of necessity. If so, then Democritus' system is either dualistic or self-contradictory. However, the example of chance in the ethical thought of Democritus has shown how freedom, if it has any place at all in Democritus' system, should be understood. Man is free to trust to luck through willful disregard for or ignorance of the laws of nature, given by necessity. But he is powerless to change the facts of necessity, and from this point of view, his freedom is an illusion, like the appearance of color. His freedom is merely subjective and of infinite unconcern to the rest of the universe. The atomic theory, which accounted so well for the various appearances of the same phenomena to various people—tragedies and comedies are composed of the same alphabet—also accounted for a specious freedom. [conclusion p. 356-357] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NNiKvwijO2dtwFP |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"753","_score":null,"_source":{"id":753,"authors_free":[{"id":1118,"entry_id":753,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":80,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Edmunds, Lowell","free_first_name":"Lowell","free_last_name":"Edmunds","norm_person":{"id":80,"first_name":"Lowell","last_name":"Edmunds","full_name":"Edmunds, Lowell","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116147319X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists","main_title":{"title":"Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists"},"abstract":"In sum, the position of Democritus is decidedly against tyche (chance), and tyche is regarded as a subjective phenomenon. \"Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness.\" There remains only one noteworthy fragment that mentions chance: \"Daring is the beginning of action, but chance is responsible for the end.\" Since this fragment contradicts everything else Democritus says about chance, and since the form of Stobaeus' quotation obscures the reference of these words, we are entitled to ask whether we should think of this as Democritus' view of chance in general, or whether he was referring to persons who, contrary to the advice of his other sententiae on chance, relied on moderation and committed themselves to overreaching and tychistic projects.\r\n\r\nThe note of moral exhortation suggests that man has a free choice between alternative ways of life, and thus that he is not in the grip of the original necessity which created the cosmos and him and endowed him with the arts. From the ethical point of view, man seems to emerge as an island of freedom\u2014a floating island, perhaps, in a sea of necessity. If so, then Democritus' system is either dualistic or self-contradictory.\r\n\r\nHowever, the example of chance in the ethical thought of Democritus has shown how freedom, if it has any place at all in Democritus' system, should be understood. Man is free to trust to luck through willful disregard for or ignorance of the laws of nature, given by necessity. But he is powerless to change the facts of necessity, and from this point of view, his freedom is an illusion, like the appearance of color. His freedom is merely subjective and of infinite unconcern to the rest of the universe.\r\n\r\nThe atomic theory, which accounted so well for the various appearances of the same phenomena to various people\u2014tragedies and comedies are composed of the same alphabet\u2014also accounted for a specious freedom. [conclusion p. 356-357]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/NNiKvwijO2dtwFP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":80,"full_name":"Edmunds, Lowell","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":753,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phoenix","volume":"26","issue":"4","pages":"342-357"}},"sort":[1972]}
Title | Priscianus Lydus en de "In De Anima" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 34 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 761-822 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bossier, Fernand , Steel, Carlos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dans cet article, nous avons essayé d'examiner la valeur de l'attribution traditionnelle du commentaire In De Anima à Simplicius. En comparant ce traité aux grands commentaires de Simplicius (sur les Catégories, la Physique et le De Caelo d'Aristote), nous avons en effet été frappés par les divergences de style et de langue, ainsi que par la différente manière de commenter. Dans la première partie, nous démontrons que l'auteur de In D.A. a également écrit la Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, qui nous a été transmise sous le nom de Priscien le Lydien. 1° Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie à une de ses œuvres, qu'il appelle Epitomé de la Physique de Théophraste. En réalité, cette référence se rapporte à un passage de la Metaphrase de Priscien, où la même problématique est exposée dans des termes identiques. 2° Une comparaison détaillée portant sur l'ensemble des deux œuvres nous révèle une telle ressemblance de style et de pensée – il y a même des phrases à peu près identiques – qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer que par l'hypothèse de l'identité de l'auteur. Dans la deuxième partie, nous essayons d'identifier l'auteur de ces deux œuvres qui, pourtant, nous ont été transmises sous deux noms différents. L'étude de la tradition directe et indirecte n'apporte guère de solution, puisque l'attribution des deux textes, l'un à Simplicius, l'autre à Priscien, y paraît très solide. Ce n'est donc que par une critique interne de In D.A., notamment par la confrontation avec les commentaires de Simplicius, dont l'attribution est certaine, que la question pourra être tranchée. 1° Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie trois fois à son commentaire sur la Physique. Pourtant, il est bien difficile de retrouver dans le grand commentaire de Simplicius trois passages dont le contenu et surtout le vocabulaire prouvent que l'auteur s'y réfère. 2° Dans In D.A., on ne retrouve pas les traits caractéristiques de la méthode de commentaire de Simplicius, ni l'approche du texte par la documentation historique, ni les longues discussions avec les exégètes antérieurs, ni l'exposé prolixe et bien structuré. D'autre part, aucun des commentaires de Simplicius ne témoigne de la phraséologie tortueuse de notre œuvre, ni de ses formules stéréotypées. 3° La différence doctrinale est encore plus importante. Nulle part chez Simplicius n'apparaît la théorie de l'âme comme epistêmê, qui est si fondamentale dans In D.A. (epistêmê y est un concept-clé). Les rares digressions de In D.A. à propos de questions physiques et logiques ne correspondent pas aux exposés de Simplicius sur les mêmes problèmes. Ainsi, nous avons confronté la doctrine de la physis, de l'âme et de son automotion, et enfin le rapport entre le genre et les différences constitutives et diérétiques. De tout cela se dégage une telle divergence entre In D.A. et les autres commentaires qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer par une évolution chez Simplicius lui-même. In D.A. lui est donc faussement attribué ; et puisque nous avons établi que ce commentaire est du même auteur que la Metaphrase, nous pouvons conclure qu'il a été vraisemblablement écrit par Priscien le Lydien, un philosophe néoplatonicien dont nous savons seulement qu'il a accompagné Damascius et Simplicius en exil en exil en Perse. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/r917awdAL4tkrdc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1077","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1077,"authors_free":[{"id":1632,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":12,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bossier, Fernand","free_first_name":"Fernand","free_last_name":"Bossier","norm_person":{"id":12,"first_name":"Fernand ","last_name":"Bossier","full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1017981663","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1633,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius"},"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous avons essay\u00e9 d'examiner la valeur de l'attribution traditionnelle du commentaire In De Anima \u00e0 Simplicius. En comparant ce trait\u00e9 aux grands commentaires de Simplicius (sur les Cat\u00e9gories, la Physique et le De Caelo d'Aristote), nous avons en effet \u00e9t\u00e9 frapp\u00e9s par les divergences de style et de langue, ainsi que par la diff\u00e9rente mani\u00e8re de commenter.\r\n\r\nDans la premi\u00e8re partie, nous d\u00e9montrons que l'auteur de In D.A. a \u00e9galement \u00e9crit la Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, qui nous a \u00e9t\u00e9 transmise sous le nom de Priscien le Lydien.\r\n1\u00b0 Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie \u00e0 une de ses \u0153uvres, qu'il appelle Epitom\u00e9 de la Physique de Th\u00e9ophraste. En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, cette r\u00e9f\u00e9rence se rapporte \u00e0 un passage de la Metaphrase de Priscien, o\u00f9 la m\u00eame probl\u00e9matique est expos\u00e9e dans des termes identiques.\r\n2\u00b0 Une comparaison d\u00e9taill\u00e9e portant sur l'ensemble des deux \u0153uvres nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le une telle ressemblance de style et de pens\u00e9e \u2013 il y a m\u00eame des phrases \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s identiques \u2013 qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer que par l'hypoth\u00e8se de l'identit\u00e9 de l'auteur.\r\n\r\nDans la deuxi\u00e8me partie, nous essayons d'identifier l'auteur de ces deux \u0153uvres qui, pourtant, nous ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transmises sous deux noms diff\u00e9rents. L'\u00e9tude de la tradition directe et indirecte n'apporte gu\u00e8re de solution, puisque l'attribution des deux textes, l'un \u00e0 Simplicius, l'autre \u00e0 Priscien, y para\u00eet tr\u00e8s solide. Ce n'est donc que par une critique interne de In D.A., notamment par la confrontation avec les commentaires de Simplicius, dont l'attribution est certaine, que la question pourra \u00eatre tranch\u00e9e.\r\n1\u00b0 Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie trois fois \u00e0 son commentaire sur la Physique. Pourtant, il est bien difficile de retrouver dans le grand commentaire de Simplicius trois passages dont le contenu et surtout le vocabulaire prouvent que l'auteur s'y r\u00e9f\u00e8re.\r\n2\u00b0 Dans In D.A., on ne retrouve pas les traits caract\u00e9ristiques de la m\u00e9thode de commentaire de Simplicius, ni l'approche du texte par la documentation historique, ni les longues discussions avec les ex\u00e9g\u00e8tes ant\u00e9rieurs, ni l'expos\u00e9 prolixe et bien structur\u00e9. D'autre part, aucun des commentaires de Simplicius ne t\u00e9moigne de la phras\u00e9ologie tortueuse de notre \u0153uvre, ni de ses formules st\u00e9r\u00e9otyp\u00e9es.\r\n3\u00b0 La diff\u00e9rence doctrinale est encore plus importante. Nulle part chez Simplicius n'appara\u00eet la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e2me comme epist\u00eam\u00ea, qui est si fondamentale dans In D.A. (epist\u00eam\u00ea y est un concept-cl\u00e9). Les rares digressions de In D.A. \u00e0 propos de questions physiques et logiques ne correspondent pas aux expos\u00e9s de Simplicius sur les m\u00eames probl\u00e8mes.\r\n\r\nAinsi, nous avons confront\u00e9 la doctrine de la physis, de l'\u00e2me et de son automotion, et enfin le rapport entre le genre et les diff\u00e9rences constitutives et di\u00e9r\u00e9tiques. De tout cela se d\u00e9gage une telle divergence entre In D.A. et les autres commentaires qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer par une \u00e9volution chez Simplicius lui-m\u00eame. In D.A. lui est donc faussement attribu\u00e9 ; et puisque nous avons \u00e9tabli que ce commentaire est du m\u00eame auteur que la Metaphrase, nous pouvons conclure qu'il a \u00e9t\u00e9 vraisemblablement \u00e9crit par Priscien le Lydien, un philosophe n\u00e9oplatonicien dont nous savons seulement qu'il a accompagn\u00e9 Damascius et Simplicius en exil en exil en Perse. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/r917awdAL4tkrdc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":12,"full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1077,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"34","issue":"4","pages":"761-822"}},"sort":[1972]}
Title | The Nature of Zeno's Argument against Plurality in DK 29 B 1 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 40-52 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Abraham, William E. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius has preserved (Phys. 140, 34) a Zenonian argument purporting to show that if an object of positive magnitude has parts from which it derives its size, then any such object must be at once of infinite magnitude and zero magnitude. This surprising consequence is based upon a construction which Zeno makes, but his argument is widely thought to be grossly fallacious. Most often he is supposed to have misunderstood the arithmetic of his own construction. Evidently, any such charge must be premised on some view of the particular nature of the sequence to which Zeno's construction gives rise. I seek to develop a view that Zeno's argument is in fact free from fallacy, and offer reason to fear that his real argument has usually been missed. [p. 40] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QHBs8Wv701RyPQh |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"780","_score":null,"_source":{"id":780,"authors_free":[{"id":1145,"entry_id":780,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":3,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Abraham, William E.","free_first_name":"William E.","free_last_name":"Abraham","norm_person":{"id":3,"first_name":"William E.","last_name":"Abraham","full_name":"Abraham, William E.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1120967007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Nature of Zeno's Argument against Plurality in DK 29 B 1","main_title":{"title":"The Nature of Zeno's Argument against Plurality in DK 29 B 1"},"abstract":"Simplicius has preserved (Phys. 140, 34) a Zenonian argument purporting to show that if an object of positive magnitude has parts from \r\nwhich it derives its size, then any such object must be at once of \r\ninfinite magnitude and zero magnitude. This surprising consequence \r\nis based upon a construction which Zeno makes, but his argument is \r\nwidely thought to be grossly fallacious. Most often he is supposed to \r\nhave misunderstood the arithmetic of his own construction. Evidently, \r\nany such charge must be premised on some view of the particular \r\nnature of the sequence to which Zeno's construction gives rise. I seek \r\nto develop a view that Zeno's argument is in fact free from fallacy, \r\nand offer reason to fear that his real argument has usually been missed. [p. 40]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QHBs8Wv701RyPQh","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":3,"full_name":"Abraham, William E.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":780,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"17","issue":"1","pages":"40-52"}},"sort":[1972]}
Title | Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 279-285 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Reesor, Margaret E. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The second category, poia, is the most puzzling of the four Stoic categories. The general term poion (qualified) included the koinos poion (generically qualified) and the idios poion (individually qualified), but the relationship between these two concepts is by no means clear. It is even more difficult to see how they were connected with the idia poiotes (particular quality) and the koine poiotis (common quality). In order to explain how the four terms were related, I shall undertake in this paper as thorough an investigation as possible of a diaeresis described by Boethius in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. Boethius outlines a diaeresis of possible and necessary propositions in Stoic philosophy. He writes: "They (the Stoics) divide propositions in this way: of propositions, they say, some are possible, others impossible; of the possible, some are necessary, others non-necessary; again, of the non-necessary, some are possible and others impossible, foolishly and recklessly deciding that the possible is both a genus and a species of the non-necessary." In the chart below, I have reconstructed this diaeresis, using the definitions of the terms and the examples given by Diogenes Laertius. [introduction p. 279] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DItDwer65QVZSCC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"859","_score":null,"_source":{"id":859,"authors_free":[{"id":1263,"entry_id":859,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":302,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","free_first_name":"Margaret E.","free_last_name":"Reesor","norm_person":{"id":302,"first_name":"Margaret E.","last_name":"Reesor","full_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy"},"abstract":"The second category, poia, is the most puzzling of the four Stoic categories. The general term poion (qualified) included the koinos poion (generically qualified) and the idios poion (individually qualified), but the relationship between these two concepts is by no means clear. It is even more difficult to see how they were connected with the idia poiotes (particular quality) and the koine poiotis (common quality).\r\n\r\nIn order to explain how the four terms were related, I shall undertake in this paper as thorough an investigation as possible of a diaeresis described by Boethius in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione.\r\n\r\nBoethius outlines a diaeresis of possible and necessary propositions in Stoic philosophy. He writes: \"They (the Stoics) divide propositions in this way: of propositions, they say, some are possible, others impossible; of the possible, some are necessary, others non-necessary; again, of the non-necessary, some are possible and others impossible, foolishly and recklessly deciding that the possible is both a genus and a species of the non-necessary.\"\r\n\r\nIn the chart below, I have reconstructed this diaeresis, using the definitions of the terms and the examples given by Diogenes Laertius. [introduction p. 279]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DItDwer65QVZSCC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":302,"full_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":859,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"17","issue":"3","pages":"279-285"}},"sort":[1972]}
Title | Epitêdeiolês in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis |
Type | Article |
Language | undefined |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Acta Classica |
Volume | 15 |
Pages | 25-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, R. B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/i1HyYnNymEt19CA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1562","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1562,"authors_free":[{"id":2729,"entry_id":1562,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Todd, R. B.","free_first_name":"R. B.","free_last_name":"Todd","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Epit\u00eadeiol\u00eas in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis","main_title":{"title":"Epit\u00eadeiol\u00eas in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/i1HyYnNymEt19CA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1562,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Acta Classica","volume":"15","issue":"","pages":"25-35"}},"sort":[1972]}
Title | The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1971 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 16 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 116-141 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them. Accounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that "all is one." The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and "ridiculous" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean "One." In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that "there are many" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more "ridiculous" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory. It is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (tôn symbebêkotôn ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack. Scholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fränkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fränkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called "easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades." Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)—the exuberance of the "youthful" Protagoras being an exception—and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor. But it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fränkel's doubts "as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity." For these doubts apply even farther than Fränkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the ὑποθέσεις in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device—especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1016","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1016,"authors_free":[{"id":1532,"entry_id":1016,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined","main_title":{"title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined"},"abstract":"This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them.\r\nAccounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that \"all is one.\" The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and \"ridiculous\" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean \"One.\" In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that \"there are many\" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more \"ridiculous\" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory.\r\nIt is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (t\u00f4n symbeb\u00eakot\u00f4n ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack.\r\nScholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fr\u00e4nkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fr\u00e4nkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called \"easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades.\" Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)\u2014the exuberance of the \"youthful\" Protagoras being an exception\u2014and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor.\r\nBut it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fr\u00e4nkel's doubts \"as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity.\" For these doubts apply even farther than Fr\u00e4nkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device\u2014especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1016,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"16","issue":"2","pages":"116-141"}},"sort":[1971]}
Title | ΟΜΟΥ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΗΝ |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1971 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 99 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 246-248 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rösler, Wolfgang |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wie alle umfangreicheren Fragmente der Abhandlung Περί φύσεως des Anaxagoras ist auch Fragment 1 (VS 59 B 1) durch den Kommentar des Simplikios zur aristotelischen Physik überliefert. Simplikios hatte die Möglichkeit, ein Exemplar der Schrift des ionischen Philosophen zu benutzen. In seiner ganzen Länge erscheint das Fragment, dessen Stellung am Anfang des Buches ausdrücklich bezeugt ist, nur einmal (155, 26); daneben gibt es weitere Passagen, in denen lediglich der einleitende Satz bzw. dessen Beginn zitiert wird. Ein Überblick zeigt, dass zwischen den einzelnen Zitaten Unterschiede in der Wortstellung bestehen. Deshalb soll im Folgenden der Versuch unternommen werden, die ursprüngliche Anordnung in der Textvorlage des Simplikios zu rekonstruieren. Bekanntlich wird der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras seit Platon in der griechischen Literatur häufig zitiert. Untersucht man jedoch die entsprechenden Stellen – mit Ausnahme derer bei Simplikios – auf ihren Wert als Zeugen für den genauen Wortlaut des Anaxagoras-Textes, so zeigt sich ihre Bedeutungslosigkeit rasch. Platon und Aristoteles zitieren nicht direkt aus dem Buch des Anaxagoras, was auch ihrer sonst geübten Praxis bei der Wiedergabe fremder Meinungen widerspräche, sondern paraphrasieren frei nach dem Gedächtnis. Die beiden Zitate bei Platon bieten zwar eine einheitliche Wortstellung (ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα), doch fehlt jeweils ἦν. In einem Fall (Gorg. 465d) sind die Worte des Anaxagoras sogar völlig in die betreffende Satzkonstruktion eingegangen. Letzteres trifft auch auf viele der Zitate bei Aristoteles zu, die im Übrigen Unterschiede in der Wortfolge zeigen und häufig unvollständig sind. Wie bei Platon umfassen auch die Zitate bei Aristoteles lediglich den unmittelbaren Beginn des Einleitungssatzes. Nur einmal (Met. 1056b 29) erscheint auch der folgende Satzabschnitt (bis πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότης, wobei diese beiden Substantive bei Aristoteles allerdings im Dativ stehen). Auch dieses Zitat besteht jedoch nur aus insgesamt neun Wörtern und konnte daher leicht aus dem Gedächtnis niedergeschrieben werden. Noch geringeren Quellenwert haben die Zitate bei späteren Autoren, da diese ihre Kenntnis Platon, Aristoteles oder einer ihrerseits aus zweiter Hand schöpfenden doxographischen Vorlage verdankten oder die Einleitungsworte des Anaxagoras, die im Laufe der Zeit regelrecht zur παροιμία wurden, überhaupt nur vom Hörensagen kannten. In der Wortstellung treten fast alle denkbaren Variationen auf, kein Zitat reicht über den unmittelbaren Anfang der Schrift Περί φύσεως hinaus. Als Grundlage der Rekonstruktion bleiben somit nur die Passagen bei Simplikios. Wie eingangs bemerkt, wird Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar nur an einer Stelle (155, 26) in seiner Gesamtheit zitiert, während die übrigen Zitate nur den Anfang wiedergeben; im günstigsten Fall reichen sie (wie schon bei Aristoteles) bis σμικρότης. Nun bietet 155, 26 eine Wortstellung, die nur bei Simplikios und im Physik-Kommentar nur hier begegnet, nämlich ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν. Angesichts der Isoliertheit dieser Version trugen H. Diels und W. Kranz, die Herausgeber der Vorsokratiker-Fragmente, keine Bedenken, sich an dieser Stelle über die Überlieferung hinwegzusetzen und für χρήματα πάντα die seit Platon häufig vorkommende Wortfolge πάντα χρήματα in den Text aufzunehmen, die im Übrigen auch in den Kurzzitaten bei Simplikios die Regel ist. Dennoch ist nicht daran zu zweifeln, dass der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras gerade in 155, 26 richtig wiedergegeben ist. Denn nur hier im Physik-Kommentar zitiert Simplikios nachweislich unmittelbar aus seinem Anaxagoras-Text, den er für die übrigen Zitate ihrer Kürze wegen nicht eigens einsah. Dass er in diesen Fällen die geläufige, freilich unkorrekte Wortfolge übernahm, kann nicht verwundern, zumal sie auch in der von ihm kommentierten Schrift des Aristoteles erschien. Diese Auswertung der Zitate von Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar des Simplikios wird dadurch gesichert, dass in einer anderen Abhandlung desselben Autors, im Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo (608, 21), ein zweites Mal der Anfang der Schrift Περί φύσεως in der Version ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν zitiert wird. Entscheidend ist, dass es sich auch in diesem Fall um ein so langes Zitat handelt (bis σμικρότης), dass Simplikios dafür eigens im Anaxagoras-Text nachschlagen musste. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/JNAa63ZtXiLxTdb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"774","_score":null,"_source":{"id":774,"authors_free":[{"id":1138,"entry_id":774,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":383,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"R\u00f6sler, Wolfgang","free_first_name":"Wolfgang","free_last_name":"R\u00f6sler","norm_person":{"id":383,"first_name":"Wolfgang","last_name":"R\u00f6sler","full_name":"R\u00f6sler, Wolfgang","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/133199266","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u039f\u039c\u039f\u03a5 \u03a7\u03a1\u0397\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0391 \u03a0\u0391\u039d\u03a4\u0391 \u0397\u039d","main_title":{"title":"\u039f\u039c\u039f\u03a5 \u03a7\u03a1\u0397\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0391 \u03a0\u0391\u039d\u03a4\u0391 \u0397\u039d"},"abstract":"Wie alle umfangreicheren Fragmente der Abhandlung \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 des Anaxagoras ist auch Fragment 1 (VS 59 B 1) durch den Kommentar des Simplikios zur aristotelischen Physik \u00fcberliefert. Simplikios hatte die M\u00f6glichkeit, ein Exemplar der Schrift des ionischen Philosophen zu benutzen. In seiner ganzen L\u00e4nge erscheint das Fragment, dessen Stellung am Anfang des Buches ausdr\u00fccklich bezeugt ist, nur einmal (155, 26); daneben gibt es weitere Passagen, in denen lediglich der einleitende Satz bzw. dessen Beginn zitiert wird.\r\n\r\nEin \u00dcberblick zeigt, dass zwischen den einzelnen Zitaten Unterschiede in der Wortstellung bestehen. Deshalb soll im Folgenden der Versuch unternommen werden, die urspr\u00fcngliche Anordnung in der Textvorlage des Simplikios zu rekonstruieren.\r\n\r\nBekanntlich wird der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras seit Platon in der griechischen Literatur h\u00e4ufig zitiert. Untersucht man jedoch die entsprechenden Stellen \u2013 mit Ausnahme derer bei Simplikios \u2013 auf ihren Wert als Zeugen f\u00fcr den genauen Wortlaut des Anaxagoras-Textes, so zeigt sich ihre Bedeutungslosigkeit rasch. Platon und Aristoteles zitieren nicht direkt aus dem Buch des Anaxagoras, was auch ihrer sonst ge\u00fcbten Praxis bei der Wiedergabe fremder Meinungen widerspr\u00e4che, sondern paraphrasieren frei nach dem Ged\u00e4chtnis.\r\n\r\nDie beiden Zitate bei Platon bieten zwar eine einheitliche Wortstellung (\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1), doch fehlt jeweils \u1f26\u03bd. In einem Fall (Gorg. 465d) sind die Worte des Anaxagoras sogar v\u00f6llig in die betreffende Satzkonstruktion eingegangen. Letzteres trifft auch auf viele der Zitate bei Aristoteles zu, die im \u00dcbrigen Unterschiede in der Wortfolge zeigen und h\u00e4ufig unvollst\u00e4ndig sind. Wie bei Platon umfassen auch die Zitate bei Aristoteles lediglich den unmittelbaren Beginn des Einleitungssatzes. Nur einmal (Met. 1056b 29) erscheint auch der folgende Satzabschnitt (bis \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, wobei diese beiden Substantive bei Aristoteles allerdings im Dativ stehen). Auch dieses Zitat besteht jedoch nur aus insgesamt neun W\u00f6rtern und konnte daher leicht aus dem Ged\u00e4chtnis niedergeschrieben werden.\r\n\r\nNoch geringeren Quellenwert haben die Zitate bei sp\u00e4teren Autoren, da diese ihre Kenntnis Platon, Aristoteles oder einer ihrerseits aus zweiter Hand sch\u00f6pfenden doxographischen Vorlage verdankten oder die Einleitungsworte des Anaxagoras, die im Laufe der Zeit regelrecht zur \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 wurden, \u00fcberhaupt nur vom H\u00f6rensagen kannten. In der Wortstellung treten fast alle denkbaren Variationen auf, kein Zitat reicht \u00fcber den unmittelbaren Anfang der Schrift \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 hinaus.\r\n\r\nAls Grundlage der Rekonstruktion bleiben somit nur die Passagen bei Simplikios. Wie eingangs bemerkt, wird Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar nur an einer Stelle (155, 26) in seiner Gesamtheit zitiert, w\u00e4hrend die \u00fcbrigen Zitate nur den Anfang wiedergeben; im g\u00fcnstigsten Fall reichen sie (wie schon bei Aristoteles) bis \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. Nun bietet 155, 26 eine Wortstellung, die nur bei Simplikios und im Physik-Kommentar nur hier begegnet, n\u00e4mlich \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f26\u03bd.\r\n\r\nAngesichts der Isoliertheit dieser Version trugen H. Diels und W. Kranz, die Herausgeber der Vorsokratiker-Fragmente, keine Bedenken, sich an dieser Stelle \u00fcber die \u00dcberlieferung hinwegzusetzen und f\u00fcr \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 die seit Platon h\u00e4ufig vorkommende Wortfolge \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 in den Text aufzunehmen, die im \u00dcbrigen auch in den Kurzzitaten bei Simplikios die Regel ist. Dennoch ist nicht daran zu zweifeln, dass der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras gerade in 155, 26 richtig wiedergegeben ist.\r\n\r\nDenn nur hier im Physik-Kommentar zitiert Simplikios nachweislich unmittelbar aus seinem Anaxagoras-Text, den er f\u00fcr die \u00fcbrigen Zitate ihrer K\u00fcrze wegen nicht eigens einsah. Dass er in diesen F\u00e4llen die gel\u00e4ufige, freilich unkorrekte Wortfolge \u00fcbernahm, kann nicht verwundern, zumal sie auch in der von ihm kommentierten Schrift des Aristoteles erschien.\r\n\r\nDiese Auswertung der Zitate von Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar des Simplikios wird dadurch gesichert, dass in einer anderen Abhandlung desselben Autors, im Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo (608, 21), ein zweites Mal der Anfang der Schrift \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 in der Version \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f26\u03bd zitiert wird. Entscheidend ist, dass es sich auch in diesem Fall um ein so langes Zitat handelt (bis \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2), dass Simplikios daf\u00fcr eigens im Anaxagoras-Text nachschlagen musste. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/JNAa63ZtXiLxTdb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":383,"full_name":"R\u00f6sler, Wolfgang","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":774,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"99","issue":"2","pages":"246-248"}},"sort":[1971]}
Title | 'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff. |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1971 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 91 |
Pages | 138-139 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hall, J.J |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Thus all that Simplicius is saying, on Eudemus’ authority, is that Anaximander ‘was the first to discuss’ the sizes and distances of ‘planets’, using the latter term to include sun and moon; and this agrees with what the doxographers tell us: Anaximander had views about the distances of sun and moon, and the size of the sun.11 A sceptic, like Dicks, may question this whole tradition; but it should not be claimed that what Simplicius says of Anaximander and planômena in 471.2-6 is inconsistent with our other authorities. [conclusion, p. 139] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/K5sTJaihiZL0lG5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1342","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1342,"authors_free":[{"id":2000,"entry_id":1342,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":165,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hall, J.J","free_first_name":"J.J.","free_last_name":"Hall","norm_person":{"id":165,"first_name":"J.J","last_name":"Hall","full_name":"Hall, J. J","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff.","main_title":{"title":"'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff."},"abstract":"Thus all that Simplicius is saying, on Eudemus\u2019 \r\nauthority, is that Anaximander \u2018was the first to \r\ndiscuss\u2019 the sizes and distances of \u2018planets\u2019, using the latter term to include sun and moon; and this agrees with what the doxographers tell us: Anaximander had views about the distances of sun and moon, and the size of the sun.11 A sceptic, like Dicks, may question this whole tradition; but it should not be claimed that what Simplicius says of Anaximander and plan\u00f4mena in 471.2-6 is incon\u00adsistent with our other authorities. [conclusion, p. 139]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/K5sTJaihiZL0lG5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":165,"full_name":"Hall, J. J","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1342,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"91","issue":"","pages":"138-139"}},"sort":[1971]}
Title | Anaximander and Dr Dicks |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1970 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 90 |
Pages | 198-199 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I am sorry to have annoyed Dr. Dicks by criticizing two articles of his in one of my footnotes (D. R. Dicks, On Anaximander's Figures, JHS LXXXIX [1969] 120: the offending footnote is in JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 120 n. 44, referring to Dicks, CQ n.s. IX [1959] 294-309, especially 299 and 301, and JHS LXXXVI [1966] 26-40, especially 30 and 36). I limit myself to the four specific points raised, in the hope that Dr. Dicks may one day be kind enough to substantiate his more general criticisms. Pseudo-Galen Five separate doxographical sources attribute to Anaxagoras the statement that the sun is larger, or many times larger, than the Peloponnese. Galen, or pseudo-Galen, notes that Anaxagoras' sun is larger than the earth. I suggested that this second formula, although it may not misrepresent the substance of Anaxagoras' theory, was "probably in Galen simply a random error, arising from the fact that the preceding sentence, on Anaximander, twice makes a comparison of sun and earth" (JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 124 n. 62). It is hard to know what motivates Dr. Dicks to omit my reasoning and to stigmatize my conclusion as "curious" and "eccentric." Tannery Tannery offered three pairs of figures for the distances of the inner and outer diameters of the wheels of stars, moon, and sun in Anaximander's universe: 9 and 10, 18 and 19, 27 and 28 (Science Hellène 94-5). Of these, the figures 19, 27, and 28 are given in doxographical sources. The remaining figures, 9, 10, and 18, are conjectural. If one wishes to criticize Tannery's reconstruction, it makes little sense to isolate one half only of this series. It makes still less sense to isolate the half for which there is less evidence: 9, 18, and 27. But only by doing so is Dr. Dicks able to justify the sentence which I quoted from him: "only 27 in the series has any textual authority." I am sorry if the manner in which I quoted this sentence made it appear that Dr. Dicks had never even heard of the other two figures which appear in the sources, 19 and 28. But Dr. Dicks is wrong to criticize Tannery as though he had generated a single series of numbers from the one figure, 27, which would have been a very dubious procedure. Tannery produced a double series of numbers from the three figures, 19, 27, and 28. This is a very different argument, which has won the support of several scholars and which has recently fallen into disfavour only as the result of a number of misunderstandings, which I have tried to dispel in an article in The Classical Quarterly (n.s. XVII [1967] 423-32). Simplicius In these, and in other doxographical passages, statements are attributed to Anaximander about the sizes and distances of earth, stars, moon, and sun. In Simplicius, mention of megethê kai apostêmata is restricted, albeit loosely, to ta planômena: that the restriction in the context is a loose one anyone may verify who cares to turn up the original passage (De Caelo 470.29 ff = DK 12A19 in part). Because I suggest that Simplicius here may misrepresent Eudemus, whom Simplicius refers to at this point, Dr. Dicks attributes to me the principle that "Simplicius' words may be altered, excised, or transposed at will." In fact, my interpretation of this passage in Simplicius is no different from that implied by Zeller in his great work (Philosophie der Griechen I 1, 298-301) and in part by Tannery (Science Hellène 91). Theophrastus Finally, Dr. Dicks objects to my quotation of two claims: "The chances that the original works of the earlier Pre-Socratics were still readily available to his (sc. Aristotle's) pupils, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus... are extremely small." "There is, therefore, no justification whatsoever for supposing that very late commentators, such as Proclus (5th century A.D.) and Simplicius (6th century A.D.), can possibly possess more authentic information about the Pre-Socratics than the earlier epitomators and excerptors..." It was these two sentences which occasioned my footnote: for here an important principle is at stake. Dr. Dicks now explains that his remarks were intended to be limited to Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. The reader could not have guessed that this was so: for the very paragraphs from which Dr. Dicks' judgment is quoted include references to Xenophanes and (indirectly) Heraclitus, while the paragraph immediately following the second sentence which I quoted (CQ n.s. IX [1959] 301) lists "Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles" as "these early figures." Nonetheless, even if we restrict ourselves to Dr. Dicks' chosen trio, my point remains: there is evidence that Anaximander's work was known both to Apollodorus and to Theophrastus. (N.B. "Known to": for, as I remarked in my note, "I would not claim to distinguish between 'available' and 'readily available' in the case of Theophrastus and Eudemus".) Dr. Dicks ignores this simple refutation of both his earlier and his emended thesis. [the entire note] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YpWmO3Tof91Vb3y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1102","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1102,"authors_free":[{"id":1665,"entry_id":1102,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander and Dr Dicks","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander and Dr Dicks"},"abstract":"I am sorry to have annoyed Dr. Dicks by criticizing two articles of his in one of my footnotes (D. R. Dicks, On Anaximander's Figures, JHS LXXXIX [1969] 120: the offending footnote is in JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 120 n. 44, referring to Dicks, CQ n.s. IX [1959] 294-309, especially 299 and 301, and JHS LXXXVI [1966] 26-40, especially 30 and 36). I limit myself to the four specific points raised, in the hope that Dr. Dicks may one day be kind enough to substantiate his more general criticisms.\r\nPseudo-Galen\r\n\r\nFive separate doxographical sources attribute to Anaxagoras the statement that the sun is larger, or many times larger, than the Peloponnese. Galen, or pseudo-Galen, notes that Anaxagoras' sun is larger than the earth. I suggested that this second formula, although it may not misrepresent the substance of Anaxagoras' theory, was \"probably in Galen simply a random error, arising from the fact that the preceding sentence, on Anaximander, twice makes a comparison of sun and earth\" (JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 124 n. 62). It is hard to know what motivates Dr. Dicks to omit my reasoning and to stigmatize my conclusion as \"curious\" and \"eccentric.\"\r\nTannery\r\n\r\nTannery offered three pairs of figures for the distances of the inner and outer diameters of the wheels of stars, moon, and sun in Anaximander's universe: 9 and 10, 18 and 19, 27 and 28 (Science Hell\u00e8ne 94-5). Of these, the figures 19, 27, and 28 are given in doxographical sources. The remaining figures, 9, 10, and 18, are conjectural.\r\n\r\nIf one wishes to criticize Tannery's reconstruction, it makes little sense to isolate one half only of this series. It makes still less sense to isolate the half for which there is less evidence: 9, 18, and 27. But only by doing so is Dr. Dicks able to justify the sentence which I quoted from him: \"only 27 in the series has any textual authority.\"\r\n\r\nI am sorry if the manner in which I quoted this sentence made it appear that Dr. Dicks had never even heard of the other two figures which appear in the sources, 19 and 28. But Dr. Dicks is wrong to criticize Tannery as though he had generated a single series of numbers from the one figure, 27, which would have been a very dubious procedure. Tannery produced a double series of numbers from the three figures, 19, 27, and 28. This is a very different argument, which has won the support of several scholars and which has recently fallen into disfavour only as the result of a number of misunderstandings, which I have tried to dispel in an article in The Classical Quarterly (n.s. XVII [1967] 423-32).\r\nSimplicius\r\n\r\nIn these, and in other doxographical passages, statements are attributed to Anaximander about the sizes and distances of earth, stars, moon, and sun. In Simplicius, mention of megeth\u00ea kai apost\u00eamata is restricted, albeit loosely, to ta plan\u00f4mena: that the restriction in the context is a loose one anyone may verify who cares to turn up the original passage (De Caelo 470.29 ff = DK 12A19 in part).\r\n\r\nBecause I suggest that Simplicius here may misrepresent Eudemus, whom Simplicius refers to at this point, Dr. Dicks attributes to me the principle that \"Simplicius' words may be altered, excised, or transposed at will.\" In fact, my interpretation of this passage in Simplicius is no different from that implied by Zeller in his great work (Philosophie der Griechen I 1, 298-301) and in part by Tannery (Science Hell\u00e8ne 91).\r\nTheophrastus\r\n\r\nFinally, Dr. Dicks objects to my quotation of two claims:\r\n\r\n \"The chances that the original works of the earlier Pre-Socratics were still readily available to his (sc. Aristotle's) pupils, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus... are extremely small.\"\r\n \"There is, therefore, no justification whatsoever for supposing that very late commentators, such as Proclus (5th century A.D.) and Simplicius (6th century A.D.), can possibly possess more authentic information about the Pre-Socratics than the earlier epitomators and excerptors...\"\r\n\r\nIt was these two sentences which occasioned my footnote: for here an important principle is at stake. Dr. Dicks now explains that his remarks were intended to be limited to Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. The reader could not have guessed that this was so: for the very paragraphs from which Dr. Dicks' judgment is quoted include references to Xenophanes and (indirectly) Heraclitus, while the paragraph immediately following the second sentence which I quoted (CQ n.s. IX [1959] 301) lists \"Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles\" as \"these early figures.\"\r\n\r\nNonetheless, even if we restrict ourselves to Dr. Dicks' chosen trio, my point remains: there is evidence that Anaximander's work was known both to Apollodorus and to Theophrastus. (N.B. \"Known to\": for, as I remarked in my note, \"I would not claim to distinguish between 'available' and 'readily available' in the case of Theophrastus and Eudemus\".)\r\n\r\nDr. Dicks ignores this simple refutation of both his earlier and his emended thesis. [the entire note]","btype":3,"date":"1970","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YpWmO3Tof91Vb3y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1102,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"90","issue":"","pages":"198-199"}},"sort":[1970]}
Title | Parmenides, B 8. 4 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1970 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 20 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 32-34 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wilson, John Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text of Parmenides 8. 4 is unusually corrupt. [p. 32] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ORpDAdKNKbMPRNA |
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Title | Die Widerlegung des Manichäismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 51 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 31-57 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wir haben gesehen, dass Simplikios seiner kurzen Abhandlung über den Manichäismus einen durchaus kunstvollen Aufbau zu geben wusste. Obwohl sie in den großen Zusammenhang seines Epiktetkommentars eingebaut ist, bildet sie doch in sich ein abgerundetes Ganzes. Was die Art seiner Argumentation betrifft, so findet sich in ihr wohl kaum ein Gedanke, der sich nicht schon so oder ähnlich bei Alexander von Lykopolis, Titus von Bostra, Epiphanios oder Augustinus ausgedrückt fände. Das soll natürlich nicht unbedingt heißen, dass Simplikios einen von diesen Schriftstellern direkt benutzt hätte; vielmehr ist damit zu rechnen, dass sich sehr bald ein festes Schema antimanichäischer Polemik herausgebildet hatte – etwa so, wie es in hellenistischer Zeit bestimmte Argumentationsschemata gab, die zum Gemeingut der philosophischen Widerlegung von Epikureern und Stoikern geworden waren. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient die kleine Abhandlung des Simplikios eher dadurch, dass sie Anspielungen auf Lehren der Manichäer enthält, deren Hintergrund, soweit ich sehe, bis heute nicht genügend erhellt ist. In welcher Umgebung hat man den manichäischen Weisen zu suchen, dem Simplikios seine Information über die manichäische Kosmogonie verdankt? Stammte diese Bekanntschaft aus der Zeit seiner Studien in Alexandrien, oder hatte Simplikios mit dem Manichäer anlässlich seines Aufenthaltes in Persien bei dem philosophisch interessierten König Chosrau sprechen können, der ja für seine Diskussionsveranstaltungen – unter anderem über die Frage, ob man ein oder zwei Prinzipien aller Dinge anzunehmen habe – bekannt war? Wie Prächter aus philosophisch-dogmatischen Gründen auf eine frühe, d. h. vor der Übersiedlung des Simplikios nach Athen gelegene Entstehungszeit des Epiktetkommentars schließt, besteht meines Erachtens kein Grund, da keineswegs wichtige Differenzen zwischen dem Neuplatonismus des Epiktetkommentars und dem der athenischen Schule bestehen. Im Gegenteil, stellenweise ist ein starker Einfluss des Proklos nachzuweisen. Aus der Bemerkung des Simplikios, dass ihm die Gelegenheit, Epiktet zu kommentieren, unter den gegenwärtigen Zeitumständen sehr willkommen gewesen sei, glaube ich eher auf eine nach dem Edikt Justinians gelegene Entstehungszeit schließen zu dürfen. Eine Begegnung mit manichäischen Lehren im asiatischen Bereich und deren Aufnahme in den Kommentar lagen somit immerhin im Bereich des Möglichen. Das Anliegen des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es daher, diese teilweise aus den textlichen Veränderungen noch deutlicher hervortretenden Probleme, auf die ich im Zusammenhang mit den Arbeiten zu einer Neuausgabe des Epiktetkommentars gestoßen bin, wieder einmal aufzuwerfen und, wenn möglich, dem Interesse der Fachleute dieses so schwierigen Gebietes zu empfehlen. [conclusion p. 56-57] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YbXwCc1R01MthxV |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1131","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1131,"authors_free":[{"id":1706,"entry_id":1131,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Widerlegung des Manich\u00e4ismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios","main_title":{"title":"Die Widerlegung des Manich\u00e4ismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios"},"abstract":"Wir haben gesehen, dass Simplikios seiner kurzen Abhandlung \u00fcber den Manich\u00e4ismus einen durchaus kunstvollen Aufbau zu geben wusste. Obwohl sie in den gro\u00dfen Zusammenhang seines Epiktetkommentars eingebaut ist, bildet sie doch in sich ein abgerundetes Ganzes. Was die Art seiner Argumentation betrifft, so findet sich in ihr wohl kaum ein Gedanke, der sich nicht schon so oder \u00e4hnlich bei Alexander von Lykopolis, Titus von Bostra, Epiphanios oder Augustinus ausgedr\u00fcckt f\u00e4nde. Das soll nat\u00fcrlich nicht unbedingt hei\u00dfen, dass Simplikios einen von diesen Schriftstellern direkt benutzt h\u00e4tte; vielmehr ist damit zu rechnen, dass sich sehr bald ein festes Schema antimanich\u00e4ischer Polemik herausgebildet hatte \u2013 etwa so, wie es in hellenistischer Zeit bestimmte Argumentationsschemata gab, die zum Gemeingut der philosophischen Widerlegung von Epikureern und Stoikern geworden waren.\r\n\r\nBesondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient die kleine Abhandlung des Simplikios eher dadurch, dass sie Anspielungen auf Lehren der Manich\u00e4er enth\u00e4lt, deren Hintergrund, soweit ich sehe, bis heute nicht gen\u00fcgend erhellt ist. In welcher Umgebung hat man den manich\u00e4ischen Weisen zu suchen, dem Simplikios seine Information \u00fcber die manich\u00e4ische Kosmogonie verdankt? Stammte diese Bekanntschaft aus der Zeit seiner Studien in Alexandrien, oder hatte Simplikios mit dem Manich\u00e4er anl\u00e4sslich seines Aufenthaltes in Persien bei dem philosophisch interessierten K\u00f6nig Chosrau sprechen k\u00f6nnen, der ja f\u00fcr seine Diskussionsveranstaltungen \u2013 unter anderem \u00fcber die Frage, ob man ein oder zwei Prinzipien aller Dinge anzunehmen habe \u2013 bekannt war?\r\n\r\nWie Pr\u00e4chter aus philosophisch-dogmatischen Gr\u00fcnden auf eine fr\u00fche, d. h. vor der \u00dcbersiedlung des Simplikios nach Athen gelegene Entstehungszeit des Epiktetkommentars schlie\u00dft, besteht meines Erachtens kein Grund, da keineswegs wichtige Differenzen zwischen dem Neuplatonismus des Epiktetkommentars und dem der athenischen Schule bestehen. Im Gegenteil, stellenweise ist ein starker Einfluss des Proklos nachzuweisen. Aus der Bemerkung des Simplikios, dass ihm die Gelegenheit, Epiktet zu kommentieren, unter den gegenw\u00e4rtigen Zeitumst\u00e4nden sehr willkommen gewesen sei, glaube ich eher auf eine nach dem Edikt Justinians gelegene Entstehungszeit schlie\u00dfen zu d\u00fcrfen. Eine Begegnung mit manich\u00e4ischen Lehren im asiatischen Bereich und deren Aufnahme in den Kommentar lagen somit immerhin im Bereich des M\u00f6glichen.\r\n\r\nDas Anliegen des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es daher, diese teilweise aus den textlichen Ver\u00e4nderungen noch deutlicher hervortretenden Probleme, auf die ich im Zusammenhang mit den Arbeiten zu einer Neuausgabe des Epiktetkommentars gesto\u00dfen bin, wieder einmal aufzuwerfen und, wenn m\u00f6glich, dem Interesse der Fachleute dieses so schwierigen Gebietes zu empfehlen. [conclusion p. 56-57]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YbXwCc1R01MthxV","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1131,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"51","issue":"1","pages":"31-57"}},"sort":[1969]}
Title | Die Welt, Ungeworden und Unvergänglch: Interpretation und Textkritik zu Aristoteles, De caelo A 11-12 |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 97 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 198-204 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mau, Jürgen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Das Thema für Kap. 11–12 ist am Schluss von Kap. 10 gegeben; 280a 28: „Einige vertreten die Ansicht, etwas dem Werden nicht Unterliegendes (ἀγένητον) könne vergehen, und etwas Entstandenes könne unvergänglich bestehen bleiben, wie im Timaios. Dort nämlich sagt (Platon), der Himmel sei zwar geworden, indessen werde er die übrige immerwährende Zeit existieren. Mit diesen haben wir uns bisher nur unter physikalischen Gesichtspunkten betreffs des Himmels auseinandergesetzt. Nachdem wir die Untersuchung aber allgemein über alles angestellt haben, wird auch hierüber Klarheit sein.“ Wir dürfen also eine Argumentation erwarten, der Form: „Wenn für jedes Subjekt gilt: Es kann nicht geworden und unvergänglich sein, dann gilt es auch für den Himmel. Nun gilt es für jedes, also auch für den Himmel.“ Dieser Beweis – besser: diese Beweise, denn es handelt sich nicht um eine Elementatio, wie Aristoteles sie für die Geometrie kannte und wie, aus Aristoteles schöpfend, 700 Jahre später Proklos sie für Physik und Theologie schrieb – finden sich in Kap. 12. Kap. 11 liefert die zum Beweisen notwendigen Definitionen für ἀγένητον (280b 6), γενητόν (280b 14), φθαρτόν (280b 20), ἄφθαρτον (280b 25), ἀδύνατον (280b 12) und ἀδύνατον-δυνατόν in eingeschränkter Bedeutung noch einmal in 281a 7–19. Der erste Beweis für die Unhaltbarkeit der Position Platons läuft von Kap. 12 Anfang (281a 28) bis 282a 25. Seine Konklusion lautet 282a 21: „Somit ist das Immerseiende weder dem Werden unterliegend (γενητόν) noch dem Vergehen, dasselbe gilt für das Immernichtseiende.“ Das folgende zweite Argument beweist, dass, wenn etwas ist und dem Werden bzw. Vergehen nicht unterliegt, es immerwährend ist. Da nach der Definition für ἀγένητον und ἄφθαρτον (282a 27) deren Konjunktion das Immerwährende einschließt, wird untersucht, ob γενητόν und φθαρτόν bzw. ἀγένητον und ἄφθαρτον sich gegenseitig implizieren (ἀκολουθεῖ ἀλλήλοις), ob also, wenn z. B. ἀγένητον gegeben ist, das αἰώνιον bereits mitgegeben ist. Der Beweis für Letzteres schließt mit der Konklusion 282b 23: „Es folgen also auseinander das dem Werden und dem Vergehen Unterliegende.“ Der auf Grund von Topik B 8. 113b 17ff. eigentlich einfache Beweis für die Äquivalenz der beiden Negate, also ἀγένητον = ἄφθαρτον, macht Aristoteles merkwürdigerweise Schwierigkeiten (282b 23–283a 3). Von 283a 4 bis zum Schluss des Buches werden weitere Möglichkeiten gezeigt, wie man in der Diskussion demjenigen antworten kann, der sagt: „Warum soll denn nicht etwas Gewordenes unvergänglich sein?“ Hier soll das Argument 1 analysiert werden. [introduction p. 198] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4HHd88Jx3Rv3qEZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"994","_score":null,"_source":{"id":994,"authors_free":[{"id":1498,"entry_id":994,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":241,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mau, J\u00fcrgen","free_first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","free_last_name":"Mau","norm_person":{"id":241,"first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","last_name":"Mau","full_name":"Mau,J\u00fcrgen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117747351","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Welt, Ungeworden und Unverg\u00e4nglch: Interpretation und Textkritik zu Aristoteles, De caelo A 11-12","main_title":{"title":"Die Welt, Ungeworden und Unverg\u00e4nglch: Interpretation und Textkritik zu Aristoteles, De caelo A 11-12"},"abstract":"Das Thema f\u00fcr Kap. 11\u201312 ist am Schluss von Kap. 10 gegeben; 280a 28:\r\n\u201eEinige vertreten die Ansicht, etwas dem Werden nicht Unterliegendes (\u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd) k\u00f6nne vergehen, und etwas Entstandenes k\u00f6nne unverg\u00e4nglich bestehen bleiben, wie im Timaios. Dort n\u00e4mlich sagt (Platon), der Himmel sei zwar geworden, indessen werde er die \u00fcbrige immerw\u00e4hrende Zeit existieren. Mit diesen haben wir uns bisher nur unter physikalischen Gesichtspunkten betreffs des Himmels auseinandergesetzt. Nachdem wir die Untersuchung aber allgemein \u00fcber alles angestellt haben, wird auch hier\u00fcber Klarheit sein.\u201c\r\n\r\nWir d\u00fcrfen also eine Argumentation erwarten, der Form: \u201eWenn f\u00fcr jedes Subjekt gilt: Es kann nicht geworden und unverg\u00e4nglich sein, dann gilt es auch f\u00fcr den Himmel. Nun gilt es f\u00fcr jedes, also auch f\u00fcr den Himmel.\u201c Dieser Beweis \u2013 besser: diese Beweise, denn es handelt sich nicht um eine Elementatio, wie Aristoteles sie f\u00fcr die Geometrie kannte und wie, aus Aristoteles sch\u00f6pfend, 700 Jahre sp\u00e4ter Proklos sie f\u00fcr Physik und Theologie schrieb \u2013 finden sich in Kap. 12. Kap. 11 liefert die zum Beweisen notwendigen Definitionen f\u00fcr \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (280b 6), \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd (280b 14), \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd (280b 20), \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (280b 25), \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (280b 12) und \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd-\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd in eingeschr\u00e4nkter Bedeutung noch einmal in 281a 7\u201319.\r\n\r\nDer erste Beweis f\u00fcr die Unhaltbarkeit der Position Platons l\u00e4uft von Kap. 12 Anfang (281a 28) bis 282a 25. Seine Konklusion lautet 282a 21: \u201eSomit ist das Immerseiende weder dem Werden unterliegend (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) noch dem Vergehen, dasselbe gilt f\u00fcr das Immernichtseiende.\u201c Das folgende zweite Argument beweist, dass, wenn etwas ist und dem Werden bzw. Vergehen nicht unterliegt, es immerw\u00e4hrend ist. Da nach der Definition f\u00fcr \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd und \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (282a 27) deren Konjunktion das Immerw\u00e4hrende einschlie\u00dft, wird untersucht, ob \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd und \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd bzw. \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd und \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd sich gegenseitig implizieren (\u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2), ob also, wenn z. B. \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd gegeben ist, das \u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd bereits mitgegeben ist. Der Beweis f\u00fcr Letzteres schlie\u00dft mit der Konklusion 282b 23: \u201eEs folgen also auseinander das dem Werden und dem Vergehen Unterliegende.\u201c Der auf Grund von Topik B 8. 113b 17ff. eigentlich einfache Beweis f\u00fcr die \u00c4quivalenz der beiden Negate, also \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd = \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, macht Aristoteles merkw\u00fcrdigerweise Schwierigkeiten (282b 23\u2013283a 3).\r\n\r\nVon 283a 4 bis zum Schluss des Buches werden weitere M\u00f6glichkeiten gezeigt, wie man in der Diskussion demjenigen antworten kann, der sagt: \u201eWarum soll denn nicht etwas Gewordenes unverg\u00e4nglich sein?\u201c Hier soll das Argument 1 analysiert werden. [introduction p. 198]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4HHd88Jx3Rv3qEZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":241,"full_name":"Mau,J\u00fcrgen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":994,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"97","issue":"2","pages":"198-204"}},"sort":[1969]}
Title | Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Journal of the History of Philosophy |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1–18 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Anton, John Peter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The main pourpose of this paper is to offer an exposition and a critical examination of the ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of homonymy. A circumlocution of what Aristotle means by homonymous things is given in Categories, Ch. 1, 1a. The ancient interpretations with which we are concerned in this paper are to be found in the extant commentaries on this treatise. Evidently, more commentaries had been written on the Categories than the vicissitudes of time allowed to survive, but we have only those of the following writers: Porphyrius (c. 233–303), Dexippus (fl. c. 350), Ammonius (fl. c. 485), Philoponus (c. 490–530), Olympiodorus (fl. c. 535), Simplicius (fl. c. 533), and Elias (fl. c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675–749), Photius (820–891), and Michael Psellus (1018–1079), which are useful paraphrases rather than full commentaries; for that reason, the interpretations they support are not discussed in this paper. The main body of this paper is given to a discussion of the interpretations which the ancient commentators offered and to an analysis of the assumptions which underlie them. It can be stated here, in anticipation of what follows, that the commentators often attached to Aristotle's meaning of homonymy aspects that were quite foreign to his views, and that by doing so, these commentators were taking extensive liberties with the text at hand. As we hope to show, the commentators brought into their discussions of this particular portion of the Categories issues and views that were far more relevant to their own ontologies and logical theories than to Aristotle's doctrines. In order to show how this is the case, we must first give a summary of what we believe our text permits us to say about the meaning of homonymy, as given in the opening chapter of the Categories. Suffice it to add at this point that the interpretations of the doctrine of homonymy with which we are concerned here are only those that are discussed exclusively in the relevant commentaries on this work. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1BGmQytPmPF1QPa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1003","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1003,"authors_free":[{"id":1508,"entry_id":1003,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":34,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Anton, John Peter","free_first_name":"John Peter","free_last_name":"Anton","norm_person":{"id":34,"first_name":"John Peter","last_name":"Anton","full_name":"Anton, John Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/171952154","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma","main_title":{"title":"Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma"},"abstract":"The main pourpose of this paper is to offer an exposition and a critical examination of the ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of homonymy. A circumlocution of what Aristotle means by homonymous things is given in Categories, Ch. 1, 1a. The ancient interpretations with which we are concerned in this paper are to be found in the extant commentaries on this treatise. Evidently, more commentaries had been written on the Categories than the vicissitudes of time allowed to survive, but we have only those of the following writers: Porphyrius (c. 233\u2013303), Dexippus (fl. c. 350), Ammonius (fl. c. 485), Philoponus (c. 490\u2013530), Olympiodorus (fl. c. 535), Simplicius (fl. c. 533), and Elias (fl. c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675\u2013749), Photius (820\u2013891), and Michael Psellus (1018\u20131079), which are useful paraphrases rather than full commentaries; for that reason, the interpretations they support are not discussed in this paper.\r\n\r\nThe main body of this paper is given to a discussion of the interpretations which the ancient commentators offered and to an analysis of the assumptions which underlie them. It can be stated here, in anticipation of what follows, that the commentators often attached to Aristotle's meaning of homonymy aspects that were quite foreign to his views, and that by doing so, these commentators were taking extensive liberties with the text at hand. As we hope to show, the commentators brought into their discussions of this particular portion of the Categories issues and views that were far more relevant to their own ontologies and logical theories than to Aristotle's doctrines. In order to show how this is the case, we must first give a summary of what we believe our text permits us to say about the meaning of homonymy, as given in the opening chapter of the Categories. Suffice it to add at this point that the interpretations of the doctrine of homonymy with which we are concerned here are only those that are discussed exclusively in the relevant commentaries on this work. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1BGmQytPmPF1QPa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":34,"full_name":"Anton, John Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1003,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the History of Philosophy","volume":"7","issue":"1","pages":"1\u201318"}},"sort":[1969]}
Title | Simplicius’s Proof of Euclid’s Parallels Postulate |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes |
Volume | 32 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sabra, A. I. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A commentary by Simplicius on the premises to Book I of Euclid’s Elements survives in an Arabic translation, of which the author and the exact date of execution are unknown. The translation is reproduced by the ninth-century mathematician al-Fadl ibn Hâtim al-Nayrîzî in the course of his own commentary on the Elements. Of Nayrîzî’s commentary, which is based on the earlier translation of the Elements by al-Hajjâj ibn Yûsuf ibn Matar, we have only one manuscript copy at Leiden and Gerard of Cremona’s Latin translation, both of which have been published. The passages quoted by Nayrîzî, owing to their extensiveness and consecutive order, would strongly lead one to assume that they together make up the whole of Simplicius’s text. In what follows, however, I shall argue that they suffer from at least one important omission: a proof by Simplicius himself of Euclid’s parallels postulate. Since the omission occurs both in the Leiden manuscript and in Gerard’s translation, it cannot simply be an accidental feature of the former. My argument will consist in (i) citing evidence (Document I) to the effect that such a proof was known to some Arabic mathematicians, and (ii) producing a hitherto unnoticed text (Document II), which, in the light of the evidence cited, may well be taken to be the missing proof. In addition, I shall show how Simplicius’s proof entered Arabic discussions on parallels, first, by being made subject to criticism (Document I), and then by being incorporated into a new proof, which was designed to take that criticism into account (Document III). The title of Simplicius’s work in question appears in the Arabic sources in slightly different forms. Nayrîzî concludes the last citation from that work with the following words: “There end the matters which Simplicius has put forward in the commentary to the musädara of Euclid for the first part of the book of Elements.” The word musädara has here something a little unexpected about it. Usually, as in translations of Euclid and Aristotle, it corresponds to the Greek αἴτημα (aitêma), and it is used in this sense in the body of Simplicius’s commentary itself. (The Arabic verb sädara appropriately means “to demand.” Musädara: demanding, or that [proposition] which is demanded.) But the commentary is not restricted to the αἰτήματα (postulates) at the beginning of the Elements, but also treats of the common notions (κοιναί ἔννοιαι: 'ulüm muta‘ärafa) and the definitions (ὅροι: hudüd). Could musädara be used here in a general sense that covers all three groups of Euclid’s premises? Such a hypothesis would derive at least partial support from a statement in Proclus that some ancient writers applied the term αἴτημα to axioms (or common notions) as well as to postulates. Proclus quotes Archimedes as an example. In agreement with this usage, the titles of at least two Arabic works on geometry employ the plural musädarät as a collective term for the axioms, definitions, and postulates. It was probably this sense that the eleventh-century scholar Abü cAbd Allah al-Khwarizmï had in mind when he gave the following explanation in his Keys of the Sciences: “al-musädara are those premises of the question which are put at the beginning of a book or chapter of geometry.” The tenth-century bibliographer Ibn al-Nadïm gives a somewhat different version of the title of Simplicius’s book: “A commentary on the sadr of the book of Euclid, which is the introduction to geometry.” Sadr means fore-part or front and is frequently used to refer to the introductory part of a book; it might have rendered the Greek προοίμιον (prooimion). The latter part in this version, “which is the introduction to geometry,” looks like a description of the book supplied, perhaps, by Ibn al-Nadïm himself, but it may also have been an alternative title of the book. Nayrîzî’s version of the title agrees with Khwarizmï’s definition in applying the singular musädara to a multitude of premises, but we shall see that the thirteenth-century author of Document I cites the same title with musädarät in the plural. Simplicius prefaces his comments on the individual postulates of Euclid with a long passage on the meaning and function of postulates in general. It will be useful to quote this passage here in full, since it is one of the channels through which Greek discussions of mathematical methodology were transmitted to the Islamic world—particularly discussions connected with the question of parallels. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DNibNx7ADIjjT3W |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1055","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1055,"authors_free":[{"id":1602,"entry_id":1055,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":396,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sabra, A. I.","free_first_name":"A. I.","free_last_name":"Sabra","norm_person":{"id":396,"first_name":"A. I.","last_name":"Sabra","full_name":"Sabra, A. I.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1023667843","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius\u2019s Proof of Euclid\u2019s Parallels Postulate","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius\u2019s Proof of Euclid\u2019s Parallels Postulate"},"abstract":"A commentary by Simplicius on the premises to Book I of Euclid\u2019s Elements survives in an Arabic translation, of which the author and the exact date of execution are unknown. The translation is reproduced by the ninth-century mathematician al-Fadl ibn H\u00e2tim al-Nayr\u00eez\u00ee in the course of his own commentary on the Elements. Of Nayr\u00eez\u00ee\u2019s commentary, which is based on the earlier translation of the Elements by al-Hajj\u00e2j ibn Y\u00fbsuf ibn Matar, we have only one manuscript copy at Leiden and Gerard of Cremona\u2019s Latin translation, both of which have been published.\r\n\r\nThe passages quoted by Nayr\u00eez\u00ee, owing to their extensiveness and consecutive order, would strongly lead one to assume that they together make up the whole of Simplicius\u2019s text. In what follows, however, I shall argue that they suffer from at least one important omission: a proof by Simplicius himself of Euclid\u2019s parallels postulate. Since the omission occurs both in the Leiden manuscript and in Gerard\u2019s translation, it cannot simply be an accidental feature of the former. My argument will consist in (i) citing evidence (Document I) to the effect that such a proof was known to some Arabic mathematicians, and (ii) producing a hitherto unnoticed text (Document II), which, in the light of the evidence cited, may well be taken to be the missing proof. In addition, I shall show how Simplicius\u2019s proof entered Arabic discussions on parallels, first, by being made subject to criticism (Document I), and then by being incorporated into a new proof, which was designed to take that criticism into account (Document III).\r\n\r\nThe title of Simplicius\u2019s work in question appears in the Arabic sources in slightly different forms. Nayr\u00eez\u00ee concludes the last citation from that work with the following words: \u201cThere end the matters which Simplicius has put forward in the commentary to the mus\u00e4dara of Euclid for the first part of the book of Elements.\u201d The word mus\u00e4dara has here something a little unexpected about it. Usually, as in translations of Euclid and Aristotle, it corresponds to the Greek \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 (ait\u00eama), and it is used in this sense in the body of Simplicius\u2019s commentary itself. (The Arabic verb s\u00e4dara appropriately means \u201cto demand.\u201d Mus\u00e4dara: demanding, or that [proposition] which is demanded.) But the commentary is not restricted to the \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 (postulates) at the beginning of the Elements, but also treats of the common notions (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9: 'ul\u00fcm muta\u2018\u00e4rafa) and the definitions (\u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9: hud\u00fcd). Could mus\u00e4dara be used here in a general sense that covers all three groups of Euclid\u2019s premises?\r\n\r\nSuch a hypothesis would derive at least partial support from a statement in Proclus that some ancient writers applied the term \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 to axioms (or common notions) as well as to postulates. Proclus quotes Archimedes as an example. In agreement with this usage, the titles of at least two Arabic works on geometry employ the plural mus\u00e4dar\u00e4t as a collective term for the axioms, definitions, and postulates. It was probably this sense that the eleventh-century scholar Ab\u00fc cAbd Allah al-Khwarizm\u00ef had in mind when he gave the following explanation in his Keys of the Sciences: \u201cal-mus\u00e4dara are those premises of the question which are put at the beginning of a book or chapter of geometry.\u201d\r\n\r\nThe tenth-century bibliographer Ibn al-Nad\u00efm gives a somewhat different version of the title of Simplicius\u2019s book: \u201cA commentary on the sadr of the book of Euclid, which is the introduction to geometry.\u201d Sadr means fore-part or front and is frequently used to refer to the introductory part of a book; it might have rendered the Greek \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bf\u03af\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd (prooimion). The latter part in this version, \u201cwhich is the introduction to geometry,\u201d looks like a description of the book supplied, perhaps, by Ibn al-Nad\u00efm himself, but it may also have been an alternative title of the book. Nayr\u00eez\u00ee\u2019s version of the title agrees with Khwarizm\u00ef\u2019s definition in applying the singular mus\u00e4dara to a multitude of premises, but we shall see that the thirteenth-century author of Document I cites the same title with mus\u00e4dar\u00e4t in the plural.\r\n\r\nSimplicius prefaces his comments on the individual postulates of Euclid with a long passage on the meaning and function of postulates in general. It will be useful to quote this passage here in full, since it is one of the channels through which Greek discussions of mathematical methodology were transmitted to the Islamic world\u2014particularly discussions connected with the question of parallels. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DNibNx7ADIjjT3W","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":396,"full_name":"Sabra, A. I.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1055,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes","volume":"32","issue":"","pages":"1-24"}},"sort":[1969]}
Title | Die Neuplatonischen Aristoteleskommentatoren über die Ursachen der Pseudepigraphie |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 112 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 120-126 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Müller, Carl Werner |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die ausführliche Darbietung des Materials und der eingehende Vergleich der einzelnen Zeugnisse waren notwendig, um zu zeigen, dass der Fortschritt, der sich bei den Neuplatonikern gegenüber Galen in der Bewältigung des Problems der literarischen Fälschung feststellen lässt, nicht auf einer älteren oder vollständigeren Tradition basiert. Vielmehr liegt eine Entwicklung vor, die – von der Aristoteleskommentierung des Ammonios ausgehend – sich innerhalb der Schule von Alexandrien vollzieht und deren verschiedene Stadien noch deutlich erkennbar sind. Es ist ferner kein Zufall, dass gerade die pythagoreischen Schriften auf diese Weise vor dem Verdikt der Fälschung aus „niederen Motiven“ gerettet werden. Zugleich aber blieb der alexandrinische Neuplatonismus kritisch genug, die Pythagoras-Schwärmerei der Platoniker auf ein philologisch-historisch vertretbares Maß herabzustimmen, indem er die pythagoreischen Schriften nicht als von Pythagoras verfasst, sondern als Manifestationen der Wirkungsgeschichte des großen Mannes verstand. [conclusion p. 125-126] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yDXuCvfx6f6Eun7 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"950","_score":null,"_source":{"id":950,"authors_free":[{"id":1426,"entry_id":950,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":273,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"M\u00fcller, Carl Werner","free_first_name":"Carl Werner","free_last_name":"M\u00fcller","norm_person":{"id":273,"first_name":"Carl Werner","last_name":"M\u00fcller","full_name":"M\u00fcller, Carl Werner","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/11944027X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Neuplatonischen Aristoteleskommentatoren \u00fcber die Ursachen der Pseudepigraphie","main_title":{"title":"Die Neuplatonischen Aristoteleskommentatoren \u00fcber die Ursachen der Pseudepigraphie"},"abstract":"Die ausf\u00fchrliche Darbietung des Materials und der eingehende Vergleich der einzelnen Zeugnisse waren notwendig, um zu zeigen, dass der Fortschritt, der sich bei den Neuplatonikern gegen\u00fcber Galen in der Bew\u00e4ltigung des Problems der literarischen F\u00e4lschung feststellen l\u00e4sst, nicht auf einer \u00e4lteren oder vollst\u00e4ndigeren Tradition basiert. Vielmehr liegt eine Entwicklung vor, die \u2013 von der Aristoteleskommentierung des Ammonios ausgehend \u2013 sich innerhalb der Schule von Alexandrien vollzieht und deren verschiedene Stadien noch deutlich erkennbar sind.\r\n\r\nEs ist ferner kein Zufall, dass gerade die pythagoreischen Schriften auf diese Weise vor dem Verdikt der F\u00e4lschung aus \u201eniederen Motiven\u201c gerettet werden. Zugleich aber blieb der alexandrinische Neuplatonismus kritisch genug, die Pythagoras-Schw\u00e4rmerei der Platoniker auf ein philologisch-historisch vertretbares Ma\u00df herabzustimmen, indem er die pythagoreischen Schriften nicht als von Pythagoras verfasst, sondern als Manifestationen der Wirkungsgeschichte des gro\u00dfen Mannes verstand. [conclusion p. 125-126]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yDXuCvfx6f6Eun7","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":273,"full_name":"M\u00fcller, Carl Werner","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":950,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"112","issue":"2","pages":"120-126"}},"sort":[1969]}
Title | John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Journal of the American Oriental Society |
Volume | 89 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 357-391 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Davidson, Herbert A. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Information from a number of sources has established that John Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem, a refutation of Aristotle's proofs of the eternity of the world, was at least partially available to the Arabic philosophers in the Middle Ages. The present article shows that the Arabic Jewish writer Sacadia used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus. With the aid of this result the following further conclusions are also drawn: Kindi too used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus; a variety of medieval arguments from the impossibility of an infinite are to be traced to Philoponus; the standard Kalām proof of creation, the proof from "accidents," originated as a reformulation of one of Philoponus' arguments. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yI5rGQdubzcVxPL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1295","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1295,"authors_free":[{"id":1888,"entry_id":1295,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":84,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Davidson, Herbert A.","free_first_name":"Herbert A.","free_last_name":"Davidson","norm_person":{"id":84,"first_name":"Herbert A.","last_name":"Davidson","full_name":"Davidson, Herbert A.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/15814743X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation","main_title":{"title":"John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation"},"abstract":"Information from a number of sources has established that John Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem, a refutation of Aristotle's proofs of the eternity of the world, was at least partially available to the Arabic philosophers in the Middle Ages. The present article shows that the Arabic Jewish writer Sacadia used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus. With the aid of this result the following further conclusions are also drawn: Kindi too used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus; a variety of medieval arguments from the impossibility of an infinite are to be traced to Philoponus; the standard Kal\u0101m proof of creation, the proof from \"accidents,\" originated as a reformulation of one of Philoponus' arguments. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yI5rGQdubzcVxPL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":84,"full_name":"Davidson, Herbert A.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1295,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the American Oriental Society","volume":"89","issue":"2","pages":"357-391"}},"sort":[1969]}
Title | Die Entstehung physikalischer Terminologie aus der neuplatonischen Metaphysik |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 13 |
Pages | 7-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tsouyopoulos, Nelly |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Methoden, welche in den neoplatonischen Schulen zum Aufbau eines metaphysischen Systems entwickelt wurden, erwiesen sich sehr geeignet für die Überwindung mancher Vorurteile der traditionellen griechischen Wis senschaft und zugleich für eine Neuorientierung des naturwissenschaft lichen Denkens. Unter den vielen Faktoren, welche die Entwicklung in dieser Richtung positiv beeinflußt haben, sei zunächst die große Bedeut- tung erwähnt, welche alle Neoplatoniker der Mathematik beigemessen haben. Vorab ihre Überzeugung, daß die μαθηματικοί λόγοι auf eindeutige Weise die gesamte Wirklichkeit bestimmen und das Definierbare in den theoretischen und empirischen Wissenschaften darstellen. Die Neigung dann zur Mystik, die Beschäftigung mit den Orakeln, das Praktizieren der Theurgie und die ganze Auseinandersetzung mit dem orientalischen Kult, welche neben dem Hineinbringen irrationaler Elemente in die her kömmlichen Denkweisen auch ein anderes Resultat hatten: Die Umwand lung des Erfahrungsbegriffs und des ganzen Modus des Begreifens der Phänomene, was die traditionelle Wissenschaft dringend benötigte. Die Be grenzung der Erfahrung auf das sinnliche Bewußtsein und die Wahrneh mung, die vor allem die peripatetische Schule charakterisierte, brachte all mählich das naturwissenschaftliche Denken zur Stagnation, indem sie eine quantitative Erfassung nicht direkt gegebener Größen wie Masse, Träg heit, Energie unmöglich machte. Es ist also keine Paradoxie, wenn Gedan ken und Methoden aus der neoplatonischen Tradition den Weg der wis senschaftlichen Abstraktion bahnten, indem sie das Bemühen um Erklärung der Phänomene gleichermaßen von der bloßen Spekulation wie vom primitiven Realismus abzubringen vermochten. Im folgenden wird der Versuch unternommen, an gewissen Beispielen diese Entwicklung zu demonstrieren. [introduction p. 7] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tStPtUxNAaSBrFw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"457","_score":null,"_source":{"id":457,"authors_free":[{"id":614,"entry_id":457,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":410,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tsouyopoulos, Nelly","free_first_name":"Nelly","free_last_name":"Tsouyopoulos","norm_person":{"id":410,"first_name":" Nelly ","last_name":"Tsouyopoulos","full_name":"Tsouyopoulos, Nelly ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Entstehung physikalischer Terminologie aus der neuplatonischen Metaphysik","main_title":{"title":"Die Entstehung physikalischer Terminologie aus der neuplatonischen Metaphysik"},"abstract":"Die Methoden, welche in den neoplatonischen Schulen zum Aufbau eines \r\nmetaphysischen Systems entwickelt wurden, erwiesen sich sehr geeignet f\u00fcr \r\ndie \u00dcberwindung mancher Vorurteile der traditionellen griechischen Wis\u00ad\r\nsenschaft und zugleich f\u00fcr eine Neuorientierung des naturwissenschaft\u00ad\r\nlichen Denkens. Unter den vielen Faktoren, welche die Entwicklung in \r\ndieser Richtung positiv beeinflu\u00dft haben, sei zun\u00e4chst die gro\u00dfe Bedeut- \r\ntung erw\u00e4hnt, welche alle Neoplatoniker der Mathematik beigemessen \r\nhaben. Vorab ihre \u00dcberzeugung, da\u00df die \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 auf eindeutige \r\nWeise die gesamte Wirklichkeit bestimmen und das Definierbare in den \r\ntheoretischen und empirischen Wissenschaften darstellen. Die Neigung \r\ndann zur Mystik, die Besch\u00e4ftigung mit den Orakeln, das Praktizieren \r\nder Theurgie und die ganze Auseinandersetzung mit dem orientalischen \r\nKult, welche neben dem Hineinbringen irrationaler Elemente in die her\u00ad\r\nk\u00f6mmlichen Denkweisen auch ein anderes Resultat hatten: Die Umwand\u00ad\r\nlung des Erfahrungsbegriffs und des ganzen Modus des Begreifens der \r\nPh\u00e4nomene, was die traditionelle Wissenschaft dringend ben\u00f6tigte. Die Be\u00ad\r\ngrenzung der Erfahrung auf das sinnliche Bewu\u00dftsein und die Wahrneh\u00ad\r\nmung, die vor allem die peripatetische Schule charakterisierte, brachte all\u00ad\r\nm\u00e4hlich das naturwissenschaftliche Denken zur Stagnation, indem sie eine \r\nquantitative Erfassung nicht direkt gegebener Gr\u00f6\u00dfen wie Masse, Tr\u00e4g\u00ad\r\nheit, Energie unm\u00f6glich machte. Es ist also keine Paradoxie, wenn Gedan\u00ad\r\nken und Methoden aus der neoplatonischen Tradition den Weg der wis\u00ad\r\nsenschaftlichen Abstraktion bahnten, indem sie das Bem\u00fchen um Erkl\u00e4rung \r\nder Ph\u00e4nomene gleicherma\u00dfen von der blo\u00dfen Spekulation wie vom \r\nprimitiven Realismus abzubringen vermochten. Im folgenden wird der \r\nVersuch unternommen, an gewissen Beispielen diese Entwicklung zu \r\ndemonstrieren. [introduction p. 7]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tStPtUxNAaSBrFw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":410,"full_name":"Tsouyopoulos, Nelly ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":457,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"13","issue":"","pages":"7-33"}},"sort":[1969]}
Title | Parmenides, Fragment 10 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1968 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 629-631 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bicknell, Peter J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text is a critical analysis of the location of two fragments of the work of the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides. The author of the text suggests that the two fragments, VS 28 B 10 (Clement, Strom. 5, I38) and VS 28 B 11 (Simplicius, de Caelo 559, 20), are incorrectly placed together in Parmenides' Way of Seeming. The author argues that there is no evidence to suggest that the two fragments were meant to be together, and that they do not fit into the context of Parmenides' work. The author also suggests that VS 28 B 10 may not be Parmenidean at all, and discusses its possible attribution to Empedocles. The text concludes by considering the language and style of the two fragments, and their relationship to Parmenides' other works. [summary of the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/sgGCDPcG5fRkeId |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1124","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1124,"authors_free":[{"id":1700,"entry_id":1124,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":399,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","free_first_name":"Peter J.","free_last_name":"Bicknell","norm_person":{"id":399,"first_name":"Peter J.","last_name":"Bicknell","full_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1162157143","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenides, Fragment 10","main_title":{"title":"Parmenides, Fragment 10"},"abstract":"This text is a critical analysis of the location of two fragments of the work of the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides. The author of the text suggests that the two fragments, VS 28 B 10 (Clement, Strom. 5, I38) and VS 28 B 11 (Simplicius, de Caelo 559, 20), are incorrectly placed together in Parmenides' Way of Seeming. The author argues that there is no evidence to suggest that the two fragments were meant to be together, and that they do not fit into the context of Parmenides' work. The author also suggests that VS 28 B 10 may not be Parmenidean at all, and discusses its possible attribution to Empedocles. The text concludes by considering the language and style of the two fragments, and their relationship to Parmenides' other works. [summary of the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1968","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/sgGCDPcG5fRkeId","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":399,"full_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1124,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"96","issue":"4","pages":"629-631"}},"sort":[1968]}
Title | War Platons Vorlesung "das Gute" einmalig? |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1968 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 705-709 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Merlan, Philip |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Frage wurde kürzlich von Krämer auf Grundlage einer Sprachanalyse der nunmehr wohl jedem an griechischer Philosophie Interessierten bekannten Aristoxenos-Stelle verneint. Im Folgenden wird versucht, zu beweisen, dass die Frage zu bejahen ist. Wie Krämer die Aristoxenos-Stelle versteht, lässt sich am besten durch eine Art Paraphrase darstellen: „Ich werde lieber, so sagt Aristoxenos, im Vorhinein den Gang meiner Untersuchung angeben, damit es uns nicht geht wie nach einer von Aristoteles oft erzählten Geschichte den meisten Hörern des platonischen Vorlesungskurses Das Gute. So oft er denselben ansagte, ging jeder hin in der Annahme, er werde etwas über Dinge hören, die üblicherweise für menschliche Güter gehalten werden, wie Reichtum, Gesundheit und Stärke, und in der Hauptsache über irgendein Glück wundersamster Art. Als aber die Auseinandersetzung immer wieder auf Mathematisches, Zahlen, Geometrie und Astronomie hinauslief, kam es ihnen—ich glaub’s schon—höchst absonderlich vor. In der Folge war das Ende des Kurses immer wieder, dass ein Teil der Hörer das ganze Ding für bedeutungslos ansah, ein anderer es nachteilig kritisierte. Und warum? Weil sie, statt sich zu erkundigen, um was es sich handeln würde, mit offenen Mündern hinzugehen pflegten, indem sie nur das Wort 'gut' aufgeschnappt hatten.“ Hat meine Paraphrase den Sinn der krämerschen Interpretation richtig getroffen, so hätte also Aristoxenos berichten wollen, dass, so oft Platon seinen Vorlesungskursus Das Gute anzusagen pflegte, sich immer wieder dasselbe ergab: Vom Titel Das Gute (der immer wiederholt wurde) angezogen, finden sich Hörer ein, von denen dann die meisten sich enttäuscht oder getäuscht fühlen. Ich will nicht sagen, dass dies unmöglich ist; aber es werden doch viele empfinden, dass das ganze Geschichtchen seinen Sinn verliert, wenn es sich nicht um ein einmaliges Ereignis handelt. [introduction p. 44-45] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1i5nYpcy51Bvdbu |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"976","_score":null,"_source":{"id":976,"authors_free":[{"id":1475,"entry_id":976,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":258,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Merlan, Philip","free_first_name":"Philip","free_last_name":"Merlan","norm_person":{"id":258,"first_name":"Philip","last_name":"Merlan","full_name":"Merlan, Philip","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128860502","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"War Platons Vorlesung \"das Gute\" einmalig?","main_title":{"title":"War Platons Vorlesung \"das Gute\" einmalig?"},"abstract":"Die Frage wurde k\u00fcrzlich von Kr\u00e4mer auf Grundlage einer Sprachanalyse der nunmehr wohl jedem an griechischer Philosophie Interessierten bekannten Aristoxenos-Stelle verneint. Im Folgenden wird versucht, zu beweisen, dass die Frage zu bejahen ist.\r\n\r\nWie Kr\u00e4mer die Aristoxenos-Stelle versteht, l\u00e4sst sich am besten durch eine Art Paraphrase darstellen:\r\n\r\n\u201eIch werde lieber, so sagt Aristoxenos, im Vorhinein den Gang meiner Untersuchung angeben, damit es uns nicht geht wie nach einer von Aristoteles oft erz\u00e4hlten Geschichte den meisten H\u00f6rern des platonischen Vorlesungskurses Das Gute. So oft er denselben ansagte, ging jeder hin in der Annahme, er werde etwas \u00fcber Dinge h\u00f6ren, die \u00fcblicherweise f\u00fcr menschliche G\u00fcter gehalten werden, wie Reichtum, Gesundheit und St\u00e4rke, und in der Hauptsache \u00fcber irgendein Gl\u00fcck wundersamster Art.\r\n\r\nAls aber die Auseinandersetzung immer wieder auf Mathematisches, Zahlen, Geometrie und Astronomie hinauslief, kam es ihnen\u2014ich glaub\u2019s schon\u2014h\u00f6chst absonderlich vor. In der Folge war das Ende des Kurses immer wieder, dass ein Teil der H\u00f6rer das ganze Ding f\u00fcr bedeutungslos ansah, ein anderer es nachteilig kritisierte. Und warum? Weil sie, statt sich zu erkundigen, um was es sich handeln w\u00fcrde, mit offenen M\u00fcndern hinzugehen pflegten, indem sie nur das Wort 'gut' aufgeschnappt hatten.\u201c\r\n\r\nHat meine Paraphrase den Sinn der kr\u00e4merschen Interpretation richtig getroffen, so h\u00e4tte also Aristoxenos berichten wollen, dass, so oft Platon seinen Vorlesungskursus Das Gute anzusagen pflegte, sich immer wieder dasselbe ergab: Vom Titel Das Gute (der immer wiederholt wurde) angezogen, finden sich H\u00f6rer ein, von denen dann die meisten sich entt\u00e4uscht oder get\u00e4uscht f\u00fchlen.\r\n\r\nIch will nicht sagen, dass dies unm\u00f6glich ist; aber es werden doch viele empfinden, dass das ganze Geschichtchen seinen Sinn verliert, wenn es sich nicht um ein einmaliges Ereignis handelt. [introduction p. 44-45]","btype":3,"date":"1968","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1i5nYpcy51Bvdbu","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":258,"full_name":"Merlan, Philip","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":976,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"96","issue":"5","pages":"705-709"}},"sort":[1968]}
Title | The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1968 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 70-75 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Coxon, Allan D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The critical text of the first four books of Simplicius’ commentary on the Physics, which was published by Diels in Berlin in 1882 and serves as the foundation for the text of many fragments of the Presocratics, was based on collations by Vitelli of three manuscripts (DEF) and of a fragment of Book I in a copy made by the scribe of E, which Diels refers to as Ea. Besides these, Diels lists a considerable number of later manuscripts, which I have examined and found justifiably ignored in his critical apparatus. The total number of manuscripts listed by Diels of some part of Books I-VIII is 44; a further 25 not mentioned by Diels are listed in A. Wartelle’s "Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d’Aristote et de ses commentateurs" (Belles Lettres, 1963). I shall argue that Diels seriously underrated both the value of F and the probability of contamination between his manuscripts, and consequently, his text of some fragments of the Presocratics rests on a false foundation. However, it should be said at the outset that Diels’s understanding of Presocratic thought prevented him from going far wrong in the readings he adopted and printed. [Introduction, p. 70] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/SYzieZXh14vSvjP |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1283","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1283,"authors_free":[{"id":1872,"entry_id":1283,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":57,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coxon, Allan D.","free_first_name":"Allan D. ","free_last_name":"Coxon","norm_person":{"id":57,"first_name":"Allan D.","last_name":"Coxon","full_name":"Coxon, Allan D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1053041829","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv","main_title":{"title":"The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv"},"abstract":"The critical text of the first four books of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the Physics, which was published by Diels in Berlin in 1882 and serves as the foundation for the text of many fragments of the Presocratics, was based on collations by Vitelli of three manuscripts (DEF) and of a fragment of Book I in a copy made by the scribe of E, which Diels refers to as Ea. Besides these, Diels lists a considerable number of later manuscripts, which I have examined and found justifiably ignored in his critical apparatus. The total number of manuscripts listed by Diels of some part of Books I-VIII is 44; a further 25 not mentioned by Diels are listed in A. Wartelle\u2019s \"Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d\u2019Aristote et de ses commentateurs\" (Belles Lettres, 1963). I shall argue that Diels seriously underrated both the value of F and the probability of contamination between his manuscripts, and consequently, his text of some fragments of the Presocratics rests on a false foundation. However, it should be said at the outset that Diels\u2019s understanding of Presocratic thought prevented him from going far wrong in the readings he adopted and printed. [Introduction, p. 70]","btype":3,"date":"1968","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/SYzieZXh14vSvjP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":57,"full_name":"Coxon, Allan D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1283,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"18","issue":"1","pages":"70-75 "}},"sort":[1968]}
Title | Aristote, «De la prière» |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1967 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 157 |
Pages | 59-70 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Pépin, Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Au nombre des Aristotelis fragmenta figure un bref témoignage de Simplicius, selon lequel Aristote, sur la fin de son livre Περ ευχής, aurait dit que Dieu est ou bien intellect, ou bien quelque chose au-delà de l'intellect, ὃτι ό θεός ή νους εστίν ή καΐ έπέκεινά τι του νου. Simplicius est le seul auteur à rapporter cette surprenante doxographie, et même à évoquer le contenu de cet écrit aristotélicien. Son témoignage étant ainsi l'unique point de départ, on doit avant tout l'examiner de très près, en lui adjoignant les quelques lignes qui le précèdent. Cette investigation permettra peut-être d'en évaluer les chances d'authenticité. Il restera alors à s'interroger sur le sens exact de la doctrine ainsi rapportée à Aristote. [Introduction, p. 59] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QHzOiPBFSXVNXwj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1089","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1089,"authors_free":[{"id":1647,"entry_id":1089,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":227,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"P\u00e9pin, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"P\u00e9pin","norm_person":{"id":227,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"P\u00e9pin","full_name":"P\u00e9pin, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119165147","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristote, \u00abDe la pri\u00e8re\u00bb","main_title":{"title":"Aristote, \u00abDe la pri\u00e8re\u00bb"},"abstract":"Au nombre des Aristotelis fragmenta figure un bref t\u00e9moignage de Simplicius, selon lequel Aristote, sur la fin de son livre \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03c2, aurait dit que Dieu est ou bien intellect, ou bien quelque chose au-del\u00e0 de l'intellect, \u1f43\u03c4\u03b9 \u03cc \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2 \u03ae \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd \u03ae \u03ba\u03b1\u0390 \u03ad\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5. Simplicius est le seul auteur \u00e0 rapporter cette surprenante doxographie, et m\u00eame \u00e0 \u00e9voquer le contenu de cet \u00e9crit aristot\u00e9licien. Son t\u00e9moignage \u00e9tant ainsi l'unique point de d\u00e9part, on doit avant tout l'examiner de tr\u00e8s pr\u00e8s, en lui adjoignant les quelques lignes qui le pr\u00e9c\u00e8dent. Cette investigation permettra peut-\u00eatre d'en \u00e9valuer les chances d'authenticit\u00e9. Il restera alors \u00e0 s'interroger sur le sens exact de la doctrine ainsi rapport\u00e9e \u00e0 Aristote. [Introduction, p. 59]","btype":3,"date":"1967","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QHzOiPBFSXVNXwj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":227,"full_name":"P\u00e9pin, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1089,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"157","issue":"","pages":"59-70"}},"sort":[1967]}
Title | Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1967 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-5 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bicknell, Peter J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is commonly maintained that Melissus was the major forerunner of atomism. This has been argued on a number of grounds, one of these being that Leucippus reacted to a Melissean rather than a Parmenidean refutation of locomotion. In the following short paper I shall challenge this view and point out that not only is one other argument for Melissus' influence on atomism insecure, but that Theo- phrastus, our most important witness, unequivocally states that Leucippus opposed a pre-Melissean eleaticism. [p. 1] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ueYDjNWacYJ6N22 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"772","_score":null,"_source":{"id":772,"authors_free":[{"id":1136,"entry_id":772,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":399,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","free_first_name":"Peter J.","free_last_name":"Bicknell","norm_person":{"id":399,"first_name":"Peter J.","last_name":"Bicknell","full_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1162157143","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication","main_title":{"title":"Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication"},"abstract":"It is commonly maintained that Melissus was the major forerunner \r\nof atomism. This has been argued on a number of grounds, one of \r\nthese being that Leucippus reacted to a Melissean rather than a \r\nParmenidean refutation of locomotion. In the following short paper I \r\nshall challenge this view and point out that not only is one other \r\nargument for Melissus' influence on atomism insecure, but that Theo- \r\nphrastus, our most important witness, unequivocally states that \r\nLeucippus opposed a pre-Melissean eleaticism. [p. 1]","btype":3,"date":"1967","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ueYDjNWacYJ6N22","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":399,"full_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":772,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"12","issue":"1","pages":"1-5"}},"sort":[1967]}
Title | Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1967 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 29-40 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Hitherto reconstructions of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or a complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle. There is in fact probably more evidence for Empedocles’ main views than for those of any other Presocratic except Parmenides in his Way of Truth. From a close examination of the fragments and of the secondary sources, principally Aristotle, Plutarch, and Simplicius, there can be formed a reasonably complete picture of the main temporal and spatial features of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle. [Introduction, p. 29] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fiLkRFQK4eMiUJl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"865","_score":null,"_source":{"id":865,"authors_free":[{"id":1269,"entry_id":865,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle"},"abstract":"Hitherto reconstructions of Empedocles\u2019 cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or \r\na complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle. There is in fact probably more evidence \r\nfor Empedocles\u2019 main views than for those of any other Presocratic except Parmenides in his Way of Truth. From a close examination of the fragments \r\nand of the secondary sources, principally Aristotle, Plutarch, and Simplicius, there can be formed a reasonably complete picture of the main temporal and spatial features of Empedocles\u2019 cosmic cycle. [Introduction, p. 29]","btype":3,"date":"1967","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fiLkRFQK4eMiUJl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":865,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"17","issue":"1","pages":"29-40"}},"sort":[1967]}
Title | The End of the Ancient Universities |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1966 |
Journal | Journal of World History |
Volume | 10 |
Pages | 653-673 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cameron, Alan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Strictliy speaking, there were no universities in the Ancient World,if by university we understand a corporate institution offering avariety of courses and granting degrees in the way modern univer sities do. There were, however, university towns, Rome, Constantinople, Athens, Alexandria, Bordeaux, with established chairs, where the leading teachers of the day lectured to classes drawn from all over the Empire. And so many of the ideas we associate with a university were both present and fostered in this atmosphere, that it would clearly he pedantic to avoid using the term. But there were significant differences nonetheless.Not least, each professor in these university towns was independent of, and indeed a rival of, every other professor there. In every city of the Empire except Constantinople, and not there till 425, it was possible for freelance teachers to set up in opposition lo holders of the established chairs (and sometimes entice away their pupils, too). Even holders of the chairs competed with each other for pupils. It was normal for students to sign on with just one professor, and attend his courses alone. Indeed, the rivalry between professors was transmitted to their pupils. Up to a point competion was natural and healthy enough. But by the period that forms the subject of this paper, the fourth to sixth centuries A.D., it far exceeded that point, and cannot but have impaired both the proficiency and the standing of the profession. [Introduction, pp. 653 f.] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NfGl20qhKYCdDTy |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1048","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1048,"authors_free":[{"id":1593,"entry_id":1048,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":20,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cameron, Alan","free_first_name":"Alan","free_last_name":"Cameron","norm_person":{"id":20,"first_name":"Alan","last_name":"Cameron","full_name":"Cameron, Alan ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/143568914","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The End of the Ancient Universities","main_title":{"title":"The End of the Ancient Universities"},"abstract":"Strictliy speaking, there were no universities in the Ancient World,if by university we understand a corporate institution offering avariety of courses and granting degrees in the way modern univer\u00ad\r\nsities do.\r\nThere were, however, university towns, Rome, Constantinople, \r\nAthens, Alexandria, Bordeaux, with established chairs, where the leading \r\nteachers of the day lectured to classes drawn from all over the Empire. \r\nAnd so many of the ideas we associate with a university were both present \r\nand fostered in this atmosphere, that it would clearly he pedantic to avoid \r\nusing the term. But there were significant differences nonetheless.Not least, each professor in these university towns was independent \r\nof, and indeed a rival of, every other professor there. In every city of the \r\nEmpire except Constantinople, and not there till 425, it was possible for \r\nfreelance teachers to set up in opposition lo holders of the established \r\nchairs (and sometimes entice away their pupils, too). Even holders of the \r\nchairs competed with each other for pupils. It was normal for students to \r\nsign on with just one professor, and attend his courses alone. Indeed, the \r\nrivalry between professors was transmitted to their pupils. Up to a point competion was natural and healthy enough. But by the period that\r\nforms the subject of this paper, the fourth to sixth centuries A.D., it\r\nfar exceeded that point, and cannot but have impaired both the \r\nproficiency and the standing of the profession. [Introduction, pp. 653 f.]","btype":3,"date":"1966","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/NfGl20qhKYCdDTy","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":20,"full_name":"Cameron, Alan ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1048,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of World History","volume":"10","issue":"","pages":"653-673"}},"sort":[1966]}
Title | A Lost Passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | Journal of the American Oriental Society |
Volume | 85 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 318-327 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kraemer, Joel L. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A comparison of the Arabic text with the excerpt of Simplicius shows that he, being concerned only with the gist of the argument, did not quote Philoponus' passage in its entirety. He reproduced only the second part of it, in which Philoponus referred to the Greeks and the barbarians, that is, those whose consensus was invoked by Aristotle and who were, for Aristotle, exhaustive of mankind. Simplicius omitted the first part of the passage, in which Philoponus spoke of those who believe in creation, among whom he certainly included Christians ("the people of our time"), a category of mankind unknown to Aristotle. There was no need for him to quote the last part of the passage, in which Philoponus gave his own interpretation of the common belief that the divine is associated with heaven. That the excerpt by Simplicius is not a direct quote, and the Arabic text an expansion of the original passage, is confirmed by the fact that some of the detail in the Arabic rendition, which is missing in Simplicius' excerpt, nevertheless appears in his discussion of Philoponus' argument. The passage before us, a response to a rhetorical argument, is not on a par with the technical aspects of Philoponus' critique of Aristotle, but it is no less appealing or significant for that reason. The last part of it conveys, in a lyrical way, the religious sentiment of the author in a tone that prefigures the devotional pages of the De opificio mundi. There, he returns to the question of the designation of heaven as the seat of the divine. "What wonder," he writes, "if [people] set apart the noblest and purest of bodily existents, heaven, for God, and, while praying, extend their hands to it." He adds that through the physical act of raising the hands and eyes to heaven, the mind is raised to God. Heaven is a symbol of the majesty of the Creator. Philoponus obliterates the pagan-Aristotelian distinction between the divine, eternal heavens and the transitory sublunar world. But it is not quite precise to say that he abrogates the superiority of heaven. Heaven and earth are placed in the same order, but heaven ranks higher than earth. That heaven ranks higher than earth and is more closely associated with the divine is part of his Christian heritage. The light metaphor and the idea that all things receive the divine illumination and do so according to their capacity are reflections from Neo-Platonism, but they appear to have been integrated into his Christian vision. The idea that all things are filled with God is not inconsistent with the biblical view that the whole earth is filled with His presence. [conclusion p. 326-327] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3NxYnrQXBWBXLOL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"735","_score":null,"_source":{"id":735,"authors_free":[{"id":1098,"entry_id":735,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":220,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kraemer, Joel L.","free_first_name":"Joel, L.","free_last_name":"Kraemer","norm_person":{"id":220,"first_name":"Joel L.","last_name":"Kraemer","full_name":"Kraemer, Joel L.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/113182023","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A Lost Passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation","main_title":{"title":"A Lost Passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation"},"abstract":"A comparison of the Arabic text with the excerpt of Simplicius shows that he, being concerned only with the gist of the argument, did not quote Philoponus' passage in its entirety. He reproduced only the second part of it, in which Philoponus referred to the Greeks and the barbarians, that is, those whose consensus was invoked by Aristotle and who were, for Aristotle, exhaustive of mankind. Simplicius omitted the first part of the passage, in which Philoponus spoke of those who believe in creation, among whom he certainly included Christians (\"the people of our time\"), a category of mankind unknown to Aristotle. There was no need for him to quote the last part of the passage, in which Philoponus gave his own interpretation of the common belief that the divine is associated with heaven. That the excerpt by Simplicius is not a direct quote, and the Arabic text an expansion of the original passage, is confirmed by the fact that some of the detail in the Arabic rendition, which is missing in Simplicius' excerpt, nevertheless appears in his discussion of Philoponus' argument.\r\n\r\nThe passage before us, a response to a rhetorical argument, is not on a par with the technical aspects of Philoponus' critique of Aristotle, but it is no less appealing or significant for that reason. The last part of it conveys, in a lyrical way, the religious sentiment of the author in a tone that prefigures the devotional pages of the De opificio mundi. There, he returns to the question of the designation of heaven as the seat of the divine. \"What wonder,\" he writes, \"if [people] set apart the noblest and purest of bodily existents, heaven, for God, and, while praying, extend their hands to it.\" He adds that through the physical act of raising the hands and eyes to heaven, the mind is raised to God. Heaven is a symbol of the majesty of the Creator.\r\n\r\nPhiloponus obliterates the pagan-Aristotelian distinction between the divine, eternal heavens and the transitory sublunar world. But it is not quite precise to say that he abrogates the superiority of heaven. Heaven and earth are placed in the same order, but heaven ranks higher than earth. That heaven ranks higher than earth and is more closely associated with the divine is part of his Christian heritage. The light metaphor and the idea that all things receive the divine illumination and do so according to their capacity are reflections from Neo-Platonism, but they appear to have been integrated into his Christian vision. The idea that all things are filled with God is not inconsistent with the biblical view that the whole earth is filled with His presence. [conclusion p. 326-327]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3NxYnrQXBWBXLOL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":220,"full_name":"Kraemer, Joel L.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":735,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the American Oriental Society","volume":"85","issue":"3","pages":"318-327"}},"sort":[1965]}
Title | Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 109-148 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his "cycle," originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences. The only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented. Perhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction— in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's—my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the Καθαρμοί out of the discussion of Περὶ φύσεως. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio. There are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to "reality" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/S9osco1gJvTdfSD |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"846","_score":null,"_source":{"id":846,"authors_free":[{"id":1250,"entry_id":846,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology","main_title":{"title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology"},"abstract":"In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his \"cycle,\" originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences.\r\n\r\nThe only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented.\r\n\r\nPerhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction\u2014 in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's\u2014my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the \u039a\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03af out of the discussion of \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio.\r\n\r\nThere are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to \"reality\" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/S9osco1gJvTdfSD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":846,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"10","issue":"2","pages":"109-148"}},"sort":[1965]}
Title | Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus: Eine Nachprüfung der Empedokles-Doxographie |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 93 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 7-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hölscher, Uvo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Über die Periodenlehre des Empedokles hat sich bislang noch keine Einigkeit hergestellt. Zwar darin stimmen alle überein, dass nach der Vorstellung des Empedokles die Welt einem periodischen Entstehen und Vergehen unterworfen sei, doch wie das im Einzelnen gedacht war, ist umstritten. Die verbreitetere Auffassung scheint sich am engsten an Aristoteles anzulehnen. Nach ihr würde sich der Kreislauf in vier Phasen abspielen: zwei Zeiten der Bewegung, getrennt je durch Zeiten der Ruhe. Ausgehend von der vollkommenen Einheit der Elemente im Sphairos (I), würde man mit einer Phase der allmählichen Scheidung zu rechnen haben (II), die in einer völligen Trennung der Elemente ihre zeitweilige Ruhe fände (III), bis diese durch eine neue Phase der Wiedervereinigung (IV) in die Einheit des Sphairos zurückkehrten. In jeder der beiden Bewegungsphasen würde sich eine Welt bilden. Aber schon die Frage, in welcher der beiden: auf dem Wege zur Trennung oder auf der Rückkehr zur Einheit, wir mit unserer jetzigen Welt uns befinden, lässt sich offenbar durch einfache Berufung auf Aristoteles nicht entscheiden. Das Missliche bleibt nämlich, dass die beiden Bewegungen in je nur einer Richtung laufen, in fortschreitender Trennung oder fortschreitender Einigung, jede ausgeführte Kosmogonie aber auf beides angewiesen scheint, indem die Weltordnung im Großen zwar durch Trennung geschehen kann, aber die Bildung des Lebens nur durch Verbindung. Alle Versuche, sich eine ganze Welt bloß aus zunehmender Scheidung – oder Verbindung – der Elemente entstehend zu denken, enden in Ungereimtheiten. So ist man genötigt, die Bewegungen in sich wiederum zu teilen: in eine Zeit, in der noch die Kraft der Einigung, und eine andere, in der schon die Kraft der Trennung vorherrschte – und umgekehrt –, sodass aus den vier Phasen im Grunde sechs werden. Aber auch damit gewinnt man kein Bild, das einen überzeugen könnte. Denn da immerhin die Kosmogonie, als die Sonderung der großen Weltteile, der Zoogonie, als der Verbindung der Elemente im Kleinen, vorausgehen musste, wäre sie, im Verlauf der fortschreitenden Trennung, gerade einer ersten Phase zuzuschreiben, in der die Kraft der Trennung noch schwach ist, dagegen die Erzeugung des Lebens der anderen Phase, in der sie die Oberhand gewinnt – was offenbar widersinnig ist. Versucht man aber, sich die Möglichkeiten in der rückläufigen Bewegung auszudenken, so werden die Schwierigkeiten noch größer: die Kraft der Trennung, allmählich abnehmend, würde in einer Phase wirken, in der sie die Elemente bereits getrennt vorfände; die kosmische Verteilung der Massen wäre als ein Vorgang der Vereinigung zu erklären, der in einer Phase stattfände, wo die Kraft der Vereinigung noch gering ist, während ihre wachsende Übermacht die von ihr selbst geschaffene Verteilung wieder zerstören würde. Auch dies ist nicht weniger widersinnig als das erste, und es kann nur als eine Ausrede erscheinen, wenn uns versichert wird, eine Welt bilde sich eben jeweils in dem mittleren Punkt der Bewegungen, wo die beiden Kräfte einander das Gleichgewicht halten. Es war darum ein entscheidender Gewinn, als v. Arnim sich von der Vierphasentheorie trennte. Tatsächlich gibt es kein Zeugnis, das uns die Annahme eines Ruhezustands der getrennten Elemente sicherte. Verzichtet man auf ihn, so rücken die beiden Phasen der wachsenden Trennung und der wachsenden Mischung der Elemente zusammen, und man wird in der ersten die Kosmogonie, in der zweiten die Zoogonie beschrieben finden. Indessen bringt auch diese Auffassung manche Misslichkeit mit sich. Aristoteles unterscheidet zwischen zwei Weltzeiten, einer der Liebe und einer des Streites, und die Zeit des Streites ist die unsere, während die der Liebe zurückliegt. Das Schema nach v. Arnim würde das Umgekehrte zeigen. Freilich könnte man, obschon künstlich genug, auch von der Zeit der Trennung aus, über den Ruhezustand im Sphairos rückwärts, auf den Endzustand der vorigen Welt als die Zeit der Liebe zurückblicken; aber man würde sich in der Zeit der Scheidung von Himmel und Erde, nicht in der des organischen Lebens befinden. Und kann Aristoteles die gesamte Weltzeit, von der Entstehung aus dem Sphairos bis zum Untergang im Sphairos, so in zwei Hälften teilen, dass er – in dieser Reihenfolge – von der Vereinigung des Vielen zu Einem durch die Liebe und „dann wieder“ Trennung des Einen in Vieles durch den Streit redet, und von den Ruhezuständen dazwischen? Als ob der Übergang von der Kosmogonie zur Entstehung des Lebens ein größerer Einschnitt wäre als die völlige Weltvernichtung im Sphairos? Kann er sagen – wie er es tut –: Empedokles lässt die Kosmogonie durch Liebe aus? Als ob eine solche, neben der Kosmogonie durch den Streit, von der Konsequenz des Systems eigentlich gefordert wäre? Ich halte es auch hier für einen Fehler, dass man zu geradewegs auf die Rekonstruktion des empedokleischen Systems aus war und dazu Zeugnisse und Fragmente, wie es sich bot, verwendete und zu vereinigen trachtete, anstatt bei den Zwischenfragen zu verweilen: Was hat sich Aristoteles, was seine Kommentatoren vorgestellt, und welches waren die Zeugnisse, die ihnen zur Hand waren? Auf die eigenen Auffassungen der Letzteren kann allerdings auch hier nur so weit eingegangen werden, als sie der Klärung der aristotelischen dienen – obschon Simplikios wichtig genug wäre, da seine neuplatonische Deutung des Sphairos und des Kosmos, als die intelligible und die sinnliche Welt, die Anschauung des Periodischen im Grunde ausschließt. Aber die Äußerungen des Aristoteles verdienen neu geprüft zu werden. [introduction p. 7-9] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/R2gNRYN2KFgYLw8 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1353","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1353,"authors_free":[{"id":2027,"entry_id":1353,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":198,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","free_first_name":"Uvo","free_last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","norm_person":{"id":198,"first_name":"Uvo","last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118705571","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus: Eine Nachpr\u00fcfung der Empedokles-Doxographie","main_title":{"title":"Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus: Eine Nachpr\u00fcfung der Empedokles-Doxographie"},"abstract":"\u00dcber die Periodenlehre des Empedokles hat sich bislang noch keine Einigkeit hergestellt. Zwar darin stimmen alle \u00fcberein, dass nach der Vorstellung des Empedokles die Welt einem periodischen Entstehen und Vergehen unterworfen sei, doch wie das im Einzelnen gedacht war, ist umstritten.\r\n\r\nDie verbreitetere Auffassung scheint sich am engsten an Aristoteles anzulehnen. Nach ihr w\u00fcrde sich der Kreislauf in vier Phasen abspielen: zwei Zeiten der Bewegung, getrennt je durch Zeiten der Ruhe. Ausgehend von der vollkommenen Einheit der Elemente im Sphairos (I), w\u00fcrde man mit einer Phase der allm\u00e4hlichen Scheidung zu rechnen haben (II), die in einer v\u00f6lligen Trennung der Elemente ihre zeitweilige Ruhe f\u00e4nde (III), bis diese durch eine neue Phase der Wiedervereinigung (IV) in die Einheit des Sphairos zur\u00fcckkehrten. In jeder der beiden Bewegungsphasen w\u00fcrde sich eine Welt bilden. Aber schon die Frage, in welcher der beiden: auf dem Wege zur Trennung oder auf der R\u00fcckkehr zur Einheit, wir mit unserer jetzigen Welt uns befinden, l\u00e4sst sich offenbar durch einfache Berufung auf Aristoteles nicht entscheiden.\r\n\r\nDas Missliche bleibt n\u00e4mlich, dass die beiden Bewegungen in je nur einer Richtung laufen, in fortschreitender Trennung oder fortschreitender Einigung, jede ausgef\u00fchrte Kosmogonie aber auf beides angewiesen scheint, indem die Weltordnung im Gro\u00dfen zwar durch Trennung geschehen kann, aber die Bildung des Lebens nur durch Verbindung. Alle Versuche, sich eine ganze Welt blo\u00df aus zunehmender Scheidung \u2013 oder Verbindung \u2013 der Elemente entstehend zu denken, enden in Ungereimtheiten. So ist man gen\u00f6tigt, die Bewegungen in sich wiederum zu teilen: in eine Zeit, in der noch die Kraft der Einigung, und eine andere, in der schon die Kraft der Trennung vorherrschte \u2013 und umgekehrt \u2013, sodass aus den vier Phasen im Grunde sechs werden. Aber auch damit gewinnt man kein Bild, das einen \u00fcberzeugen k\u00f6nnte. Denn da immerhin die Kosmogonie, als die Sonderung der gro\u00dfen Weltteile, der Zoogonie, als der Verbindung der Elemente im Kleinen, vorausgehen musste, w\u00e4re sie, im Verlauf der fortschreitenden Trennung, gerade einer ersten Phase zuzuschreiben, in der die Kraft der Trennung noch schwach ist, dagegen die Erzeugung des Lebens der anderen Phase, in der sie die Oberhand gewinnt \u2013 was offenbar widersinnig ist.\r\n\r\nVersucht man aber, sich die M\u00f6glichkeiten in der r\u00fcckl\u00e4ufigen Bewegung auszudenken, so werden die Schwierigkeiten noch gr\u00f6\u00dfer: die Kraft der Trennung, allm\u00e4hlich abnehmend, w\u00fcrde in einer Phase wirken, in der sie die Elemente bereits getrennt vorf\u00e4nde; die kosmische Verteilung der Massen w\u00e4re als ein Vorgang der Vereinigung zu erkl\u00e4ren, der in einer Phase stattf\u00e4nde, wo die Kraft der Vereinigung noch gering ist, w\u00e4hrend ihre wachsende \u00dcbermacht die von ihr selbst geschaffene Verteilung wieder zerst\u00f6ren w\u00fcrde. Auch dies ist nicht weniger widersinnig als das erste, und es kann nur als eine Ausrede erscheinen, wenn uns versichert wird, eine Welt bilde sich eben jeweils in dem mittleren Punkt der Bewegungen, wo die beiden Kr\u00e4fte einander das Gleichgewicht halten.\r\n\r\nEs war darum ein entscheidender Gewinn, als v. Arnim sich von der Vierphasentheorie trennte. Tats\u00e4chlich gibt es kein Zeugnis, das uns die Annahme eines Ruhezustands der getrennten Elemente sicherte. Verzichtet man auf ihn, so r\u00fccken die beiden Phasen der wachsenden Trennung und der wachsenden Mischung der Elemente zusammen, und man wird in der ersten die Kosmogonie, in der zweiten die Zoogonie beschrieben finden.\r\n\r\nIndessen bringt auch diese Auffassung manche Misslichkeit mit sich. Aristoteles unterscheidet zwischen zwei Weltzeiten, einer der Liebe und einer des Streites, und die Zeit des Streites ist die unsere, w\u00e4hrend die der Liebe zur\u00fcckliegt. Das Schema nach v. Arnim w\u00fcrde das Umgekehrte zeigen. Freilich k\u00f6nnte man, obschon k\u00fcnstlich genug, auch von der Zeit der Trennung aus, \u00fcber den Ruhezustand im Sphairos r\u00fcckw\u00e4rts, auf den Endzustand der vorigen Welt als die Zeit der Liebe zur\u00fcckblicken; aber man w\u00fcrde sich in der Zeit der Scheidung von Himmel und Erde, nicht in der des organischen Lebens befinden. Und kann Aristoteles die gesamte Weltzeit, von der Entstehung aus dem Sphairos bis zum Untergang im Sphairos, so in zwei H\u00e4lften teilen, dass er \u2013 in dieser Reihenfolge \u2013 von der Vereinigung des Vielen zu Einem durch die Liebe und \u201edann wieder\u201c Trennung des Einen in Vieles durch den Streit redet, und von den Ruhezust\u00e4nden dazwischen? Als ob der \u00dcbergang von der Kosmogonie zur Entstehung des Lebens ein gr\u00f6\u00dferer Einschnitt w\u00e4re als die v\u00f6llige Weltvernichtung im Sphairos? Kann er sagen \u2013 wie er es tut \u2013: Empedokles l\u00e4sst die Kosmogonie durch Liebe aus? Als ob eine solche, neben der Kosmogonie durch den Streit, von der Konsequenz des Systems eigentlich gefordert w\u00e4re?\r\n\r\nIch halte es auch hier f\u00fcr einen Fehler, dass man zu geradewegs auf die Rekonstruktion des empedokleischen Systems aus war und dazu Zeugnisse und Fragmente, wie es sich bot, verwendete und zu vereinigen trachtete, anstatt bei den Zwischenfragen zu verweilen: Was hat sich Aristoteles, was seine Kommentatoren vorgestellt, und welches waren die Zeugnisse, die ihnen zur Hand waren? Auf die eigenen Auffassungen der Letzteren kann allerdings auch hier nur so weit eingegangen werden, als sie der Kl\u00e4rung der aristotelischen dienen \u2013 obschon Simplikios wichtig genug w\u00e4re, da seine neuplatonische Deutung des Sphairos und des Kosmos, als die intelligible und die sinnliche Welt, die Anschauung des Periodischen im Grunde ausschlie\u00dft. Aber die \u00c4u\u00dferungen des Aristoteles verdienen neu gepr\u00fcft zu werden. [introduction p. 7-9]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/R2gNRYN2KFgYLw8","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":198,"full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1353,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"93","issue":"1","pages":"7-33"}},"sort":[1965]}
Title | Empedocles fr. 35. 14-15 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 15 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-4 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the interpretation of the word "zôros" in a couplet attributed to Empedocles, as quoted by various ancient authors such as Plutarch, Simplicius, Theophrastus, Aristotle, Athenaeus, and Eustathius. The author considers the different meanings attributed to the word, including mixed and unmixed, and argues that the context and source of the quotations must be considered in interpreting the couplet. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cxFblbRQPGH3efy |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1376","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1376,"authors_free":[{"id":2120,"entry_id":1376,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles fr. 35. 14-15","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles fr. 35. 14-15"},"abstract":"This text discusses the interpretation of the word \"z\u00f4ros\" in a couplet attributed to Empedocles, as quoted by various ancient authors such as Plutarch, Simplicius, Theophrastus, Aristotle, Athenaeus, and Eustathius. The author considers the different meanings attributed to the word, including mixed and unmixed, and argues that the context and source of the quotations must be considered in interpreting the couplet. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cxFblbRQPGH3efy","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1376,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"15","issue":"1","pages":"1-4"}},"sort":[1965]}
Title | Anaximander: Zu den Quellen und seiner Einordnung im Vorsokratischen Denken |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1964 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 9 |
Pages | 59-72 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schwabl, Hans |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die alten Milesier können erst nach einiger kritischer Vorarbeit Gegenstand begriffsgeschichtlicher Forschung sein. Der Anfang der griechischen Philosophie ist uns ja nur durch die Berichte späterer Autoren überliefert und aus dem Blickwinkel einer Problemstellung, die nicht mehr die der ersten Philosophen ist. So scheint der Versuch, die Eigenart der milesischen Philosophie zu bestimmen, zunächst so gut wie aussichtslos, insbesondere wenn man bedenkt, dass nicht einmal die eigentliche Quelle unserer Nachrichten, das Werk Theophrasts, uns als solche überkommen ist, sondern dass wir auch hier erst rekonstruieren müssen. Der Anfang muss also sein, zu erforschen, was Theophrast gesagt und gemeint hat. Erst dann stellt sich die Aufgabe einer Rückübersetzung seiner Berichte ins Archaische. Diese Rückübersetzung ist nur möglich innerhalb einer entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Linie, die von den Früheren zu den Milesiern und von diesen wieder zu den späteren Vorsokratikern zu ziehen ist. In unserer kurzen Skizze kann das dafür schon Geleistete bzw. noch zu Leistende nur angedeutet werden. Wir beschränken uns außerdem auf Anaximander, einmal wegen der besonderen Stellung, die ihm zukommt, dann aber auch wegen der Quellenlage, die, wenn man sie nur recht einzuschätzen weiß, doch einigermaßen tragfähige Schlüsse auf den Ansatzpunkt und die Eigenart dieses frühen Denkers gestattet. [introduction p. 59-60] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MqdT9PDIArLqpNc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1031","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1031,"authors_free":[{"id":1561,"entry_id":1031,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":288,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schwabl, Hans","free_first_name":"Hans","free_last_name":"Schwabl","norm_person":{"id":288,"first_name":"Hans","last_name":"Schwabl","full_name":"Schwabl, Hans","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107871211","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander: Zu den Quellen und seiner Einordnung im Vorsokratischen Denken","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander: Zu den Quellen und seiner Einordnung im Vorsokratischen Denken"},"abstract":"Die alten Milesier k\u00f6nnen erst nach einiger kritischer Vorarbeit Gegenstand begriffsgeschichtlicher Forschung sein. Der Anfang der griechischen Philosophie ist uns ja nur durch die Berichte sp\u00e4terer Autoren \u00fcberliefert und aus dem Blickwinkel einer Problemstellung, die nicht mehr die der ersten Philosophen ist. So scheint der Versuch, die Eigenart der milesischen Philosophie zu bestimmen, zun\u00e4chst so gut wie aussichtslos, insbesondere wenn man bedenkt, dass nicht einmal die eigentliche Quelle unserer Nachrichten, das Werk Theophrasts, uns als solche \u00fcberkommen ist, sondern dass wir auch hier erst rekonstruieren m\u00fcssen.\r\n\r\nDer Anfang muss also sein, zu erforschen, was Theophrast gesagt und gemeint hat. Erst dann stellt sich die Aufgabe einer R\u00fcck\u00fcbersetzung seiner Berichte ins Archaische. Diese R\u00fcck\u00fcbersetzung ist nur m\u00f6glich innerhalb einer entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Linie, die von den Fr\u00fcheren zu den Milesiern und von diesen wieder zu den sp\u00e4teren Vorsokratikern zu ziehen ist.\r\n\r\nIn unserer kurzen Skizze kann das daf\u00fcr schon Geleistete bzw. noch zu Leistende nur angedeutet werden. Wir beschr\u00e4nken uns au\u00dferdem auf Anaximander, einmal wegen der besonderen Stellung, die ihm zukommt, dann aber auch wegen der Quellenlage, die, wenn man sie nur recht einzusch\u00e4tzen wei\u00df, doch einigerma\u00dfen tragf\u00e4hige Schl\u00fcsse auf den Ansatzpunkt und die Eigenart dieses fr\u00fchen Denkers gestattet. [introduction p. 59-60]","btype":3,"date":"1964","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MqdT9PDIArLqpNc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":288,"full_name":"Schwabl, Hans","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1031,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"9","issue":"","pages":"59-72"}},"sort":[1964]}
Title | Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1962 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 109-111 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Arundel, Maureen Rosemary |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the interpretation and translation of a fragment of Theophrastus and Plutarch. The word "zôros" is of particular concern, as there is difficulty in determining its meaning, with some suggesting it means "mixed" while others argue it means "undiluted." The author suggests that the reading of the Empedocles line should be restored to "zôra" meaning "undiluted" and that the modern interpretation of "mixed" is unjustifiable. The text also examines the use of "zôra" in Philumenus' work and argues that there is no occurrence in which it means "mixed." [derived from the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KKhE3Xs36JAl2Ut |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1262","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1262,"authors_free":[{"id":1848,"entry_id":1262,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":36,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Arundel, Maureen Rosemary","free_first_name":"Maureen Rosemary","free_last_name":"Arundel","norm_person":{"id":36,"first_name":"Maureen Rosemary","last_name":"Arundel","full_name":"Arundel, Maureen Rosemary","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15"},"abstract":"This text discusses the interpretation and translation of a fragment of Theophrastus and Plutarch. The word \"z\u00f4ros\" is of particular concern, as there is difficulty in determining its meaning, with some suggesting it means \"mixed\" while others argue it means \"undiluted.\" The author suggests that the reading of the Empedocles line should be restored to \"z\u00f4ra\" meaning \"undiluted\" and that the modern interpretation of \"mixed\" is unjustifiable. The text also examines the use of \"z\u00f4ra\" in Philumenus' work and argues that there is no occurrence in which it means \"mixed.\" [derived from the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1962","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KKhE3Xs36JAl2Ut","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":36,"full_name":"Arundel, Maureen Rosemary","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1262,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"12","issue":"2","pages":"109-111"}},"sort":[1962]}
Title | The Neoplatonic One and Plato’s Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1962 |
Journal | Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association |
Volume | 93 |
Pages | 389–401 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rist, John M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As long ago as 1928, Professor E. R. Dodds demonstrated the dependence of the One of Plotinus on an interpretation of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. His demonstration has been universally accepted. But Dodds not only showed the dependence of Plotinus on the Parmenides but also offered an account of the history of the doctrine of the One between the late fourth century B.C. and the third century A.D. His view is that the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides were already treated in what we should call a Neoplatonic fashion by Moderatus, a Neopythagorean of the second half of the first century A.D.; further, that Moderatus was not the originator of this interpretation, whose origins can, in fact, be traced back through Eudorus (ca. 25 B.C.) and the Neopythagoreans of his day to the Old Academy. Though Dodds is somewhat unclear at this point, he seems to suggest that already before the time of Eudorus, the Parmenides was being interpreted in Neopythagorean fashion. In order to check this derivation, we should look at the three stages of it in detail. These stages are the Neopythagoreanism of Moderatus, the theories of Eudorus, and those of Speusippus and the Old Academy in general. In opposition to Professor A. H. Armstrong, who used to hold that the One of Speusippus was less than Being, rather than "beyond Being," Dr. Ph. Merlan has recently shown that the Aristotelian texts on which Armstrong's account was based are better interpreted in the light of chapter four of Iamblichus' De communi mathematica scientia. Merlan shows that the system of Speusippus is not an "evolutionary" one, and that Speusippus' One is beyond Being. Yet the system of Speusippus is a dualism; his One is not the cause of all and is thus, as we shall see, unlike the Neopythagorean One which Dodds regards as proto-Neoplatonic. We may therefore leave Speusippus aside. His One can have affected Neoplatonism only very indirectly, if at all. [introduction p. 389-390] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/n0sauehAwynXB03 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1058","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1058,"authors_free":[{"id":1607,"entry_id":1058,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":303,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rist, John M.","free_first_name":"John M.","free_last_name":"Rist","norm_person":{"id":303,"first_name":"John M.","last_name":"Rist","full_name":"Rist, John M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137060440","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Neoplatonic One and Plato\u2019s Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"The Neoplatonic One and Plato\u2019s Parmenides"},"abstract":"As long ago as 1928, Professor E. R. Dodds demonstrated the dependence of the One of Plotinus on an interpretation of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. His demonstration has been universally accepted. But Dodds not only showed the dependence of Plotinus on the Parmenides but also offered an account of the history of the doctrine of the One between the late fourth century B.C. and the third century A.D. His view is that the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides were already treated in what we should call a Neoplatonic fashion by Moderatus, a Neopythagorean of the second half of the first century A.D.; further, that Moderatus was not the originator of this interpretation, whose origins can, in fact, be traced back through Eudorus (ca. 25 B.C.) and the Neopythagoreans of his day to the Old Academy.\r\n\r\nThough Dodds is somewhat unclear at this point, he seems to suggest that already before the time of Eudorus, the Parmenides was being interpreted in Neopythagorean fashion. In order to check this derivation, we should look at the three stages of it in detail. These stages are the Neopythagoreanism of Moderatus, the theories of Eudorus, and those of Speusippus and the Old Academy in general.\r\n\r\nIn opposition to Professor A. H. Armstrong, who used to hold that the One of Speusippus was less than Being, rather than \"beyond Being,\" Dr. Ph. Merlan has recently shown that the Aristotelian texts on which Armstrong's account was based are better interpreted in the light of chapter four of Iamblichus' De communi mathematica scientia. Merlan shows that the system of Speusippus is not an \"evolutionary\" one, and that Speusippus' One is beyond Being. Yet the system of Speusippus is a dualism; his One is not the cause of all and is thus, as we shall see, unlike the Neopythagorean One which Dodds regards as proto-Neoplatonic.\r\n\r\nWe may therefore leave Speusippus aside. His One can have affected Neoplatonism only very indirectly, if at all. [introduction p. 389-390]","btype":3,"date":"1962","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/n0sauehAwynXB03","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":303,"full_name":"Rist, John M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1058,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association","volume":"93","issue":"","pages":"389\u2013401"}},"sort":[1962]}
Title | The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres. From the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1962 |
Journal | Dumbarton Oaks Papers |
Volume | 16 |
Pages | 65-93 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wolfson, Harry Austryn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Kepler, who, as we all know, lived under the new heaven created by Copernicus, discusses the question whether the planets are moved by Intelligences or by souls or by nature. His consideration of Intelligences as possible movers of the planets refers to a view held by those who in the Middle Ages lived under the old Ptolemaic heaven, the term Intelligences being, by a complexity of miscegenation, a descendant of what Aristotle describes as incorporeal substances. His consideration of souls or nature as possible movers of the planets touches upon a topic which was made into a problem b y the Byzantine Greek commentators of Aristotle.In this paper I shall try to show how the Byzantine commentators, in their study of the text of Aristotle, were confronted with a certain problem, how they solved that problem, and how their solution of that problem led to other problems and solutions, all of which lingered in philosophic literature down to Kepler. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/caDB4W1yStAKWKj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"422","_score":null,"_source":{"id":422,"authors_free":[{"id":565,"entry_id":422,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":412,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wolfson, Harry Austryn","free_first_name":"Harry Austryn","free_last_name":"Wolfson","norm_person":{"id":412,"first_name":"Harry Austryn","last_name":"Wolfson","full_name":"Wolfson, Harry Austryn","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123348323","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres. From the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler","main_title":{"title":"The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres. From the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler"},"abstract":"Kepler, who, as we all know, lived under the new heaven created by Copernicus, discusses the question whether the planets are moved by Intelligences or by souls or by nature. His consideration of Intelligences \r\nas possible movers of the planets refers to a view held by those who in the Middle Ages lived under the old Ptolemaic heaven, the term Intelligences being, by a complexity of miscegenation, a descendant of what Aristotle describes as \r\nincorporeal substances. His consideration of souls or nature as possible movers of the planets touches upon a topic which was made into a problem b y the \r\nByzantine Greek commentators of Aristotle.In this paper I shall try to show how the Byzantine commentators, in their study of the text of Aristotle, were confronted with a certain problem, how they solved that problem, and how their solution of that problem led to other \r\nproblems and solutions, all of which lingered in philosophic literature down to Kepler. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1962","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/caDB4W1yStAKWKj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":412,"full_name":"Wolfson, Harry Austryn","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":422,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Dumbarton Oaks Papers","volume":"16","issue":"","pages":"65-93"}},"sort":[1962]}
Title | The Framework of Greek Cosmology |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1961 |
Journal | The Review of Metaphysics |
Volume | 14 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 676-684 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Robinson, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A striking phenomenon of recent years (and one not without its significance for the historian of contemporary philosophy) has been the appearance of a substantial body of work on the early Greek philosophers. Most of this work is characterized by a new approach to the subject, an approach marked on the one hand by greater attention to the fragments themselves as opposed to the doxographic materials, and on the other hand by a more vigorous analysis of the relation of the language of the fragments to the wider non-philosophic context from which it was in so many instances borrowed. Charles Kahn's recent study, beautifully printed and bound by the Columbia University Press, is a worthy contribution to this growing body of literature and bears the impress of its characteristic method. The single remaining fragment of Anaximander is not discussed until it has been firmly fixed in its historical context by a thoroughgoing consideration of the classical conception of the four elements; and one of the most striking features of this consideration is the use made by the author of the extensive body of Greek medical writings known as the Hippocratic Corpus. It was W. A. Heidel who first called attention to the extraordinary value of these writings—the only complete scientific treatises to have come down to us from the early period—for the elucidation of Greek thought. Since then, this material has been referred to more and more frequently by students of the early Greek philosophers, and the tendency is strikingly evidenced in the present study. The use of this material is not without its difficulties. The treatises which form the Hippocratic Corpus are not the work of a single individual, and there is abundant evidence that they were written over a period of at least two hundred years. It is, therefore, essential, in attempting to reconstruct the scientific worldview of the early period, that we rely so far as possible on treatises belonging to this period. Unfortunately, in the present state of Hippocratic studies, it is impossible to date these works with any exactitude. On the other hand, certain of them belong pretty clearly to the fifth century; and it seems fairly well established that the view of the constitution of man which most of them assume dates from the time of Alcmaeon, who flourished around the turn of the century. Since this view is based upon an analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, the processes involved in sickness and health reflect on a small scale the greater processes which constitute the life of the cosmos as a whole; thus, indirectly, these treatises illuminate in striking ways aspects of the larger worldview implicit in the fragments of the early cosmologists, but obscured by the fewness of these fragments and the imperfect state in which they have been preserved. In the present study, they are used to illuminate just such obscurities. [introduction p. 676-677] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hN9oPATyWj4WjP6 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"857","_score":null,"_source":{"id":857,"authors_free":[{"id":1261,"entry_id":857,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":304,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Robinson, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":304,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Robinson","full_name":"Robinson, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Framework of Greek Cosmology","main_title":{"title":"The Framework of Greek Cosmology"},"abstract":"A striking phenomenon of recent years (and one not without its significance for the historian of contemporary philosophy) has been the appearance of a substantial body of work on the early Greek philosophers. Most of this work is characterized by a new approach to the subject, an approach marked on the one hand by greater attention to the fragments themselves as opposed to the doxographic materials, and on the other hand by a more vigorous analysis of the relation of the language of the fragments to the wider non-philosophic context from which it was in so many instances borrowed. Charles Kahn's recent study, beautifully printed and bound by the Columbia University Press, is a worthy contribution to this growing body of literature and bears the impress of its characteristic method.\r\n\r\nThe single remaining fragment of Anaximander is not discussed until it has been firmly fixed in its historical context by a thoroughgoing consideration of the classical conception of the four elements; and one of the most striking features of this consideration is the use made by the author of the extensive body of Greek medical writings known as the Hippocratic Corpus. It was W. A. Heidel who first called attention to the extraordinary value of these writings\u2014the only complete scientific treatises to have come down to us from the early period\u2014for the elucidation of Greek thought. Since then, this material has been referred to more and more frequently by students of the early Greek philosophers, and the tendency is strikingly evidenced in the present study.\r\n\r\nThe use of this material is not without its difficulties. The treatises which form the Hippocratic Corpus are not the work of a single individual, and there is abundant evidence that they were written over a period of at least two hundred years. It is, therefore, essential, in attempting to reconstruct the scientific worldview of the early period, that we rely so far as possible on treatises belonging to this period. Unfortunately, in the present state of Hippocratic studies, it is impossible to date these works with any exactitude. On the other hand, certain of them belong pretty clearly to the fifth century; and it seems fairly well established that the view of the constitution of man which most of them assume dates from the time of Alcmaeon, who flourished around the turn of the century.\r\n\r\nSince this view is based upon an analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, the processes involved in sickness and health reflect on a small scale the greater processes which constitute the life of the cosmos as a whole; thus, indirectly, these treatises illuminate in striking ways aspects of the larger worldview implicit in the fragments of the early cosmologists, but obscured by the fewness of these fragments and the imperfect state in which they have been preserved. In the present study, they are used to illuminate just such obscurities. [introduction p. 676-677]","btype":3,"date":"1961","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hN9oPATyWj4WjP6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":304,"full_name":"Robinson, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":857,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"14","issue":"4","pages":"676-684"}},"sort":[1961]}
Title | A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1960 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 4-5 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wasserstein, Abraham |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Παντάπασι δ' οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου εἰ μὴ ὁ νοῦς· νοῦς δέ ἐστι καθαρὸς ἐκ πάντων καὶ εὐλαβῶν. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν οὐδὲν διακρίνεται ἑτέρῳ ὅμοιον οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἑτέρου κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἄρα τί ἐστι καθαρὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐκρᾶτον καὶ εὐδιακριτὸν τῶν ἄλλων νοῦς τῶν πάντων διαφέρει. These are the last few lines of fragment 12 of Anaxagoras as printed in Diels-Kranz6, ii. 39: D.-K. follow closely, with only a minor modification, the Berlin text of Simplicius in Phys., p. 157, which is the source of our knowledge of this fragment. It seems to me necessary, or at any rate highly desirable, that any interpretation of this passage should, inter alia, satisfy the following three conditions: ὁμοῖος should have the same meaning when applied to νοῦς and when applied to ἕτερον in the next line. The clause ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ... should contain a contrast to the clause νοῦς δέ ..., i.e. we should be able to understand that something is true of νοῦς that is not true of anything other (ἕτερον) than νοῦς. The clause ἀλλ’ ... should follow naturally on the preceding two clauses. This set of conditions is not satisfied by any interpretation that I know. Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet: Diels (loc. cit.): "Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der größere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding." Tannery (Pour l’histoire de la science hellénique, p. 311): "Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable à aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus." Burnet: "And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it." It will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties: In all three cases ὁμοῖος, which, when applied to νοῦς, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like "homogeneous" (i.e. ὁμοῖος κατὰ φύσιν), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause ἕτερον δὲ ... is that any other thing is "like" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are "homogeneous," which had been asserted of νοῦς. But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between νοῦς and anything other than νοῦς. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between νοῦς and other things is made in terms of being ὁμοῖος; but such a comparison loses all point if ὁμοῖος is used in two different senses. It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause ἀλλ’ .... What is ἀλλὰ supposed to mean here? But? ("sondern"? "mais"?) How is this clause related to what precedes? All these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that οὐδενί be excised. Read: νοῦς δὲ ἰσαῖς μέτροις ὅμοιος· ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅμοιον· ἀλλὰ τῶν πλεῖστων εἶναι τὰ φαινόμενα ἔνθα καὶ ἦν. And interpret: "Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it." Thus, if we excise οὐδενί, ὁμοῖος has the same sense ("homogeneous") both as applied to νοῦς and as applied to ἕτερον. There is a pointed comparison between νοῦς and other things: something is true of νοῦς that is not true of other things. The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: "But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?" "No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it." This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι, such as ἐν παντὶ παντός μορφὴ ἐνέστηκε (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: τὰ ἐν παντὶ πλείω μετέχει κτλ. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with τῶν πλείστων εἶναι κτλ.). Lest it be thought that the excision of οὐδενί is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of οὐδενί seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον ὁμοιομέρειαν Ἀναξαγόρας ὑπέθετο λέγειν, ὃς δ’ ἐστὶν πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν. Now, the words ἐπιπεπτῶκεν are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after οὐδενί here are, of course, Diels’s, not Simplicius’s; perhaps we ought to put them before οὐδενί and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν, he may also have added οὐδενί. [the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/0UZZOhtjCwUNKOl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"444","_score":null,"_source":{"id":444,"authors_free":[{"id":596,"entry_id":444,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":356,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","free_first_name":"Abraham","free_last_name":"Wasserstein","norm_person":{"id":356,"first_name":"Abraham","last_name":"Wasserstein","full_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119380102","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"\u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4' \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bd. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1ff3 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9.\r\n\r\nThese are the last few lines of fragment 12 of Anaxagoras as printed in Diels-Kranz6, ii. 39: D.-K. follow closely, with only a minor modification, the Berlin text of Simplicius in Phys., p. 157, which is the source of our knowledge of this fragment.\r\n\r\nIt seems to me necessary, or at any rate highly desirable, that any interpretation of this passage should, inter alia, satisfy the following three conditions:\r\n\r\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 should have the same meaning when applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and when applied to \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd in the next line.\r\n\r\n The clause \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd ... should contain a contrast to the clause \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad ..., i.e. we should be able to understand that something is true of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 that is not true of anything other (\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd) than \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\r\n\r\n The clause \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 ... should follow naturally on the preceding two clauses.\r\n\r\nThis set of conditions is not satisfied by any interpretation that I know. Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet:\r\n\r\n Diels (loc. cit.): \"Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der gr\u00f6\u00dfere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding.\"\r\n Tannery (Pour l\u2019histoire de la science hell\u00e9nique, p. 311): \"Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable \u00e0 aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus.\"\r\n Burnet: \"And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.\"\r\n\r\nIt will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties:\r\n\r\n In all three cases \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2, which, when applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like \"homogeneous\" (i.e. \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 ... is that any other thing is \"like\" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are \"homogeneous,\" which had been asserted of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\r\n\r\n But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and anything other than \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things is made in terms of being \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2; but such a comparison loses all point if \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 is used in two different senses.\r\n\r\n It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 .... What is \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 supposed to mean here? But? (\"sondern\"? \"mais\"?) How is this clause related to what precedes?\r\n\r\nAll these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af be excised. Read:\r\n\r\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f26\u03bd.\r\n\r\nAnd interpret:\r\n\"Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it.\"\r\n\r\nThus, if we excise \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af,\r\n\r\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 has the same sense (\"homogeneous\") both as applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and as applied to \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\r\n\r\n There is a pointed comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things: something is true of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 that is not true of other things.\r\n\r\n The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: \"But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?\" \"No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it.\" This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, such as \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb.).\r\n\r\nLest it be thought that the excision of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f08\u03bd\u03b1\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f43\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd. Now, the words \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af here are, of course, Diels\u2019s, not Simplicius\u2019s; perhaps we ought to put them before \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, he may also have added \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af. [the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1960","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/0UZZOhtjCwUNKOl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":356,"full_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":444,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"10","issue":"1","pages":"4-5"}},"sort":[1960]}
Title | Did Melissus Believe in Incorporeal Being? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1958 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 79 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 61-65 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Booth, N. B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
These questions are difficult to answer; but I think that the difficulty of answering them shows that we should not be too dogmatic about the general interpretation of the fragment. It looks to me—and apparently it looked to Burnet and Zeller also—as if the argument is in the form of a dialectical refutation of pluralist assumptions. Vlastos and Raven see it in a different light; they are entitled to their opinion, but it should be clearly realized that it is an opinion, and not a certainty. [conclusion p. 65] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vYpN7DrahtfkniN |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"769","_score":null,"_source":{"id":769,"authors_free":[{"id":1133,"entry_id":769,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":10,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Booth, N. B.","free_first_name":"N. B.","free_last_name":"Booth","norm_person":{"id":10,"first_name":"N. B.","last_name":"Booth","full_name":"Booth, N. B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Did Melissus Believe in Incorporeal Being?","main_title":{"title":"Did Melissus Believe in Incorporeal Being?"},"abstract":"These questions are difficult to answer; but I think that the difficulty of answering them shows that we should not be too dogmatic about the general interpretation of the fragment. It looks to me\u2014and apparently it looked to Burnet and Zeller also\u2014as if the argument is in the form of a dialectical refutation of pluralist assumptions. Vlastos and Raven see it in a different light; they are entitled to their opinion, but it should be clearly realized that it is an opinion, and not a certainty. [conclusion p. 65]","btype":3,"date":"1958","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vYpN7DrahtfkniN","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":10,"full_name":"Booth, N. B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":769,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"79","issue":"1","pages":"61-65"}},"sort":[1958]}
Title | Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1957 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 2 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-9 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Booth, N.B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article by N. B. Booth examines whether Zeno's arguments were a response to criticisms of Parmenides's principle „the One“. Despite evidence that Zeno was concerned with defending Parmenides's „One“, his arguments about plurality seem to refute the "ones" of a plurality. One possible explanation is that Zeno's arguments were used to counter criticisms of Parmenides's „One“ before he produced them. Plato's Parmenides includes a passage in which "Zeno" apologizes for his book on plurality, which has been interpreted as an answer to criticisms of Parmenides's theory, but Booth notes that Plato's characters are idealized and it is not certain that Zeno's arguments were a response to attacks. Booth looks at the arguments themselves for evidence and suggests that if some of Zeno's arguments against plural "ones" were valid against Parmenides's „One“, it would be fair to infer that they were used by hostile critics and Zeno was throwing them back in their faces. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FZ61i36oW94Hvew |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1127","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1127,"authors_free":[{"id":1702,"entry_id":1127,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":10,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Booth, N.B.","free_first_name":"N.B.","free_last_name":"Booth","norm_person":{"id":10,"first_name":"N. B.","last_name":"Booth","full_name":"Booth, N. B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?","main_title":{"title":"Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?"},"abstract":"This article by N. B. Booth examines whether Zeno's arguments were a response to criticisms of Parmenides's principle \u201ethe One\u201c. Despite evidence that Zeno was concerned with defending Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c, his arguments about plurality seem to refute the \"ones\" of a plurality. One possible explanation is that Zeno's arguments were used to counter criticisms of Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c before he produced them. Plato's Parmenides includes a passage in which \"Zeno\" apologizes for his book on plurality, which has been interpreted as an answer to criticisms of Parmenides's theory, but Booth notes that Plato's characters are idealized and it is not certain that Zeno's arguments were a response to attacks. Booth looks at the arguments themselves for evidence and suggests that if some of Zeno's arguments against plural \"ones\" were valid against Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c, it would be fair to infer that they were used by hostile critics and Zeno was throwing them back in their faces. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1957","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FZ61i36oW94Hvew","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":10,"full_name":"Booth, N. B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1127,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"2","issue":"1","pages":"1-9"}},"sort":[1957]}
Title | Boethius and Andronicus of Rhodes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1957 |
Journal | Vigiliae Christianae |
Volume | 11 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 179-185 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Shiel, James |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
G. Pfligersdorffer has recently described the attitude of the ancient editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, towards the final notes in Aristotle's Categories on opposites, simultaneity, priority, motion, and possession—what the medievals called the postpraedicamenta. The scholar has based his intricate arguments on a passage of Boethius' commentary on the Categories, and as this passage in the printed editions is syntactically unintelligible, he has suggested an emended text of it. Here is the passage as printed, with his emendations alongside and a list of variants beneath. [introduction p. 179] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Z3seGeZGEaA8j5E |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"853","_score":null,"_source":{"id":853,"authors_free":[{"id":1257,"entry_id":853,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":315,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Shiel, James","free_first_name":"James","free_last_name":"Shiel","norm_person":{"id":315,"first_name":"James","last_name":"Shiel","full_name":"Shiel, James","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131572202","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Boethius and Andronicus of Rhodes","main_title":{"title":"Boethius and Andronicus of Rhodes"},"abstract":"G. Pfligersdorffer has recently described the attitude of the ancient editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, towards the final notes in Aristotle's Categories on opposites, simultaneity, priority, motion, and possession\u2014what the medievals called the postpraedicamenta. The scholar has based his intricate arguments on a passage of Boethius' commentary on the Categories, and as this passage in the printed editions is syntactically unintelligible, he has suggested an emended text of it. Here is the passage as printed, with his emendations alongside and a list of variants beneath. [introduction p. 179]","btype":3,"date":"1957","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Z3seGeZGEaA8j5E","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":315,"full_name":"Shiel, James","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":853,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Vigiliae Christianae","volume":"11","issue":"3","pages":"179-185"}},"sort":[1957]}
Title | Der Platoniker Ptolemaios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1957 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 85 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 314-325 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dihle, Albrecht |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In den philosophischen Texten der späten Kaiserzeit stößt man zuweilen auf den Namen Ptolemaios, ohne daß dabei an einen Lagiden oder an den berühmten Astronomen zu denken wäre. Wie jene Zitate auf einen oder mehrere Träger dieses Namens zu verteilen seien, war eine einst viel diskutierte Frage, die dann allerdings im Anschluß an eine Vermutung W. v. Christs durch das Buch von A. Chatzis (Der Philosoph und Grammatiker Ptolemaios Chennos I = Stud. z Gesch. u. Kult. d. Altert. VII 2, Paderborn 1914) endgültig dahin beantwortet schien, es handele sich bei all diesen Ptolemaioi immer wieder um Ptolemaios Chennos aus der Zeit um 100 n. Chr., der uns durch den Auszug des Photios aus seiner καινὴ ἱστορία (cod. 190) recht gut bekannt ist. Diese Frage soll hier einer erneuten Prüfung unterzogen werden. [introduction, p. 314] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/51yflky3RQtCRmc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1305","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1305,"authors_free":[{"id":1929,"entry_id":1305,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":93,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dihle, Albrecht","free_first_name":"Albrecht","free_last_name":"Dihle","norm_person":{"id":93,"first_name":"Albrecht","last_name":"Dihle","full_name":"Dihle, Albrecht","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119194503","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der Platoniker Ptolemaios","main_title":{"title":"Der Platoniker Ptolemaios"},"abstract":"In den philosophischen Texten der sp\u00e4ten Kaiserzeit st\u00f6\u00dft man zuweilen auf den Namen Ptolemaios, ohne da\u00df dabei an einen Lagiden oder an den ber\u00fchmten Astronomen zu denken w\u00e4re. Wie jene Zitate auf einen oder mehrere Tr\u00e4ger dieses Namens zu verteilen seien, war eine einst viel diskutierte Frage, die dann allerdings im Anschlu\u00df an eine Vermutung W. v. Christs durch das Buch von A. Chatzis (Der Philosoph und Grammatiker Ptolemaios Chennos I = Stud. z Gesch. u. Kult. d. Altert. VII 2, Paderborn 1914) endg\u00fcltig dahin beantwortet schien, es handele sich bei all diesen Ptolemaioi immer wieder um Ptolemaios Chennos aus der Zeit um 100 n. Chr., der uns durch den Auszug des Photios aus seiner \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u1f77\u03b1 (cod. 190) recht gut bekannt ist. Diese Frage soll hier einer erneuten Pr\u00fcfung unterzogen werden. [introduction, p. 314]","btype":3,"date":"1957","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/51yflky3RQtCRmc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":93,"full_name":"Dihle, Albrecht","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1305,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"85","issue":"3","pages":"314-325"}},"sort":[1957]}
Title | Heraklit zitiert Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1956 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 84 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 382-384 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bröcker, Walter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Note on a quote of Heraclitus Diels B 126 |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EahzzUNdRvttcBw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1069","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1069,"authors_free":[{"id":1623,"entry_id":1069,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":19,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Br\u00f6cker, Walter ","free_first_name":"Walter","free_last_name":"Br\u00f6cker","norm_person":{"id":19,"first_name":"Walter ","last_name":"Br\u00f6cker","full_name":"Br\u00f6cker, Walter ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116559500","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Heraklit zitiert Anaximander","main_title":{"title":"Heraklit zitiert Anaximander"},"abstract":"Note on a quote of Heraclitus Diels B 126","btype":3,"date":"1956","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EahzzUNdRvttcBw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":19,"full_name":"Br\u00f6cker, Walter ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1069,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"84","issue":"3","pages":"382-384"}},"sort":[1956]}
Title | Herakleides Pontikos de Ontdekker van het Heliocentrisme? |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1956 |
Journal | L'Antiquité Classique |
Volume | 25 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 351-385 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Valckenaere de, Erik |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ons onderzoek van de bronnen resumerend, komen we tot de volgende besluiten: Volgens Herakleides bevindt de aarde zich in het midden van het heelal (Simplikios: fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: fragment 2; Chalcidius: fragment 7). De aarde draait om haar eigen as. In de meeste fragmenten vinden we zelfs de specificatie van deze aswenteling: de aarde draait in 24 uur (Simplikios: fragment 5; Aetios: fragment 4) van west naar oost (Simplikios: fragment 5, 6; Aetios: fragment 4) ter verklaring van de dagelijkse beweging der hemellichamen. De zon draait jaarlijks rond de aarde van oost naar west (Simplikios: fragment 5; Chalcidius: fragment 7). De binnenplaneten Venus en naar alle waarschijnlijkheid ook Mercurius draaien rond de zon (Chalcidius: fragment 7). De meest voor de hand liggende hypothese is dat de buitenplaneten Mars, Jupiter en Saturnus, zoals de zon, eenvoudig rond de aarde draaien ter verklaring van hun jaarlijkse beweging (Simplikios: fragment 5). De vaste sterren staan stil. Voor zover ons onderzoek het uitwees, zijn de getuigenissen niet alleen niet contradictorisch, maar vullen ze elkaar zelfs op een gelukkige wijze aan. Op de vraag dus, die wij ons in het begin gesteld hebben, of er positieve redenen bestonden om aan te nemen, op grond van de ons overgeleverde teksten, dat Herakleides Pontikos vóór Aristarchos een soort van heliocentrisme zou hebben geleerd, menen we beslist negatief te mogen antwoorden. Twee grote onwaarschijnlijkheden, namelijk dat de Oudheid ons niets duidelijks zou hebben bericht over de werkelijke ontdekker van het heliocentrisme en dat één man zonder voorlopers en voorafgaande ontdekkingen het heliocentrisme zou hebben uitgedacht, worden aldus opgeheven als we ons houden aan wat de bronnen werkelijk melden. [conclusion p. 384-385] Übersetzung: Unserer Untersuchung der Quellen zusammenfassend, kommen wir zu den folgenden Schlussfolgerungen: Laut Herakleides befindet sich die Erde im Zentrum des Universums (Simplikios: Fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: Fragment 2; Chalcidius: Fragment 7). Die Erde dreht sich um ihre eigene Achse. In den meisten Fragmenten finden wir sogar die genaue Spezifikation dieser Achsendrehung: Die Erde dreht sich in 24 Stunden (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Aetios: Fragment 4) von Westen nach Osten (Simplikios: Fragment 5, 6; Aetios: Fragment 4), um die tägliche Bewegung der Himmelskörper zu erklären. Die Sonne dreht sich jährlich von Osten nach Westen um die Erde (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Chalcidius: Fragment 7). Die inneren Planeten Venus und höchstwahrscheinlich auch Merkur drehen sich um die Sonne (Chalcidius: Fragment 7). Die naheliegendste Hypothese ist, dass die äußeren Planeten Mars, Jupiter und Saturn, wie die Sonne, einfach um die Erde kreisen, um ihre jährliche Bewegung zu erklären (Simplikios: Fragment 5). Die Fixsterne bleiben unbewegt. Soweit unsere Untersuchung zeigt, sind die Zeugnisse nicht nur nicht widersprüchlich, sondern ergänzen sich sogar auf glückliche Weise. Auf die Frage, die wir uns zu Beginn gestellt haben, ob es positive Gründe gibt, aufgrund der uns überlieferten Texte anzunehmen, dass Herakleides Pontikos vor Aristarchos eine Art von Heliozentrismus gelehrt hat, meinen wir, mit Sicherheit verneinen zu können. Zwei große Unwahrscheinlichkeiten – nämlich, dass die Antike uns nichts Klareres über den tatsächlichen Entdecker des Heliozentrismus berichtet hätte, und dass ein einzelner Mensch ohne Vorgänger und vorherige Entdeckungen den Heliozentrismus erdacht hätte – werden damit ausgeräumt, wenn wir uns an das halten, was die Quellen tatsächlich überliefern. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/e00zJf5ufXc0B6a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"836","_score":null,"_source":{"id":836,"authors_free":[{"id":1240,"entry_id":836,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":343,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Valckenaere de, Erik","free_first_name":"Erik","free_last_name":"Valckenaere de","norm_person":{"id":343,"first_name":"Erik","last_name":"Valckenaere de","full_name":"Valckenaere de, Erik","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Herakleides Pontikos de Ontdekker van het Heliocentrisme?","main_title":{"title":"Herakleides Pontikos de Ontdekker van het Heliocentrisme?"},"abstract":"Ons onderzoek van de bronnen resumerend, komen we tot de volgende besluiten:\r\n\r\n Volgens Herakleides bevindt de aarde zich in het midden van het heelal (Simplikios: fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: fragment 2; Chalcidius: fragment 7).\r\n De aarde draait om haar eigen as. In de meeste fragmenten vinden we zelfs de specificatie van deze aswenteling: de aarde draait in 24 uur (Simplikios: fragment 5; Aetios: fragment 4) van west naar oost (Simplikios: fragment 5, 6; Aetios: fragment 4) ter verklaring van de dagelijkse beweging der hemellichamen.\r\n De zon draait jaarlijks rond de aarde van oost naar west (Simplikios: fragment 5; Chalcidius: fragment 7).\r\n De binnenplaneten Venus en naar alle waarschijnlijkheid ook Mercurius draaien rond de zon (Chalcidius: fragment 7).\r\n De meest voor de hand liggende hypothese is dat de buitenplaneten Mars, Jupiter en Saturnus, zoals de zon, eenvoudig rond de aarde draaien ter verklaring van hun jaarlijkse beweging (Simplikios: fragment 5).\r\n De vaste sterren staan stil.\r\n\r\nVoor zover ons onderzoek het uitwees, zijn de getuigenissen niet alleen niet contradictorisch, maar vullen ze elkaar zelfs op een gelukkige wijze aan.\r\n\r\nOp de vraag dus, die wij ons in het begin gesteld hebben, of er positieve redenen bestonden om aan te nemen, op grond van de ons overgeleverde teksten, dat Herakleides Pontikos v\u00f3\u00f3r Aristarchos een soort van heliocentrisme zou hebben geleerd, menen we beslist negatief te mogen antwoorden. Twee grote onwaarschijnlijkheden, namelijk dat de Oudheid ons niets duidelijks zou hebben bericht over de werkelijke ontdekker van het heliocentrisme en dat \u00e9\u00e9n man zonder voorlopers en voorafgaande ontdekkingen het heliocentrisme zou hebben uitgedacht, worden aldus opgeheven als we ons houden aan wat de bronnen werkelijk melden. [conclusion p. 384-385] \u00dcbersetzung: Unserer Untersuchung der Quellen zusammenfassend, kommen wir zu den folgenden Schlussfolgerungen:\r\n\r\n Laut Herakleides befindet sich die Erde im Zentrum des Universums (Simplikios: Fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: Fragment 2; Chalcidius: Fragment 7).\r\n Die Erde dreht sich um ihre eigene Achse. In den meisten Fragmenten finden wir sogar die genaue Spezifikation dieser Achsendrehung: Die Erde dreht sich in 24 Stunden (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Aetios: Fragment 4) von Westen nach Osten (Simplikios: Fragment 5, 6; Aetios: Fragment 4), um die t\u00e4gliche Bewegung der Himmelsk\u00f6rper zu erkl\u00e4ren.\r\n Die Sonne dreht sich j\u00e4hrlich von Osten nach Westen um die Erde (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Chalcidius: Fragment 7).\r\n Die inneren Planeten Venus und h\u00f6chstwahrscheinlich auch Merkur drehen sich um die Sonne (Chalcidius: Fragment 7).\r\n Die naheliegendste Hypothese ist, dass die \u00e4u\u00dferen Planeten Mars, Jupiter und Saturn, wie die Sonne, einfach um die Erde kreisen, um ihre j\u00e4hrliche Bewegung zu erkl\u00e4ren (Simplikios: Fragment 5).\r\n Die Fixsterne bleiben unbewegt.\r\n\r\nSoweit unsere Untersuchung zeigt, sind die Zeugnisse nicht nur nicht widerspr\u00fcchlich, sondern erg\u00e4nzen sich sogar auf gl\u00fcckliche Weise.\r\n\r\nAuf die Frage, die wir uns zu Beginn gestellt haben, ob es positive Gr\u00fcnde gibt, aufgrund der uns \u00fcberlieferten Texte anzunehmen, dass Herakleides Pontikos vor Aristarchos eine Art von Heliozentrismus gelehrt hat, meinen wir, mit Sicherheit verneinen zu k\u00f6nnen. Zwei gro\u00dfe Unwahrscheinlichkeiten \u2013 n\u00e4mlich, dass die Antike uns nichts Klareres \u00fcber den tats\u00e4chlichen Entdecker des Heliozentrismus berichtet h\u00e4tte, und dass ein einzelner Mensch ohne Vorg\u00e4nger und vorherige Entdeckungen den Heliozentrismus erdacht h\u00e4tte \u2013 werden damit ausger\u00e4umt, wenn wir uns an das halten, was die Quellen tats\u00e4chlich \u00fcberliefern.","btype":3,"date":"1956","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/e00zJf5ufXc0B6a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":343,"full_name":"Valckenaere de, Erik","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":836,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"L'Antiquit\u00e9 Classique","volume":"25","issue":"2","pages":"351-385"}},"sort":[1956]}
Title | Some Problems in Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1955 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1/2 |
Pages | 21-38 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kirk, G.S. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
These considerations indicate that we are not entitled to automatically assume that prose works written in Ionia in the sixth or early fifth century were still available in their entirety to Theophrastus. In the case of Anaximander, I would suggest that what Theophrastus might have had in front of him was not a complete book but a collection of extracts, in which emphasis was laid upon astronomy, meteorology, and anthropogony rather than upon the nature and significance of to apeiron, which might always have seemed confusing. In respect to his arche, indeed, Anaximander must assuredly have been considered obsolete and unimportant by the end of the fifth century. The extant fragment could be quoted by Theophrastus, of course, because it really came among the cosmological-meteorological extracts. [introduction p. 38] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/2A18YiMysdkpynh |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"737","_score":null,"_source":{"id":737,"authors_free":[{"id":1100,"entry_id":737,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":216,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kirk, G.S.","free_first_name":"G.S.","free_last_name":"Kirk","norm_person":{"id":216,"first_name":"G. S.","last_name":"Kirk","full_name":"Kirk, G. S.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Some Problems in Anaximander","main_title":{"title":"Some Problems in Anaximander"},"abstract":"These considerations indicate that we are not entitled to automatically assume that prose works written in Ionia in the sixth or early fifth century were still available in their entirety to Theophrastus. In the case of Anaximander, I would suggest that what Theophrastus might have had in front of him was not a complete book but a collection of extracts, in which emphasis was laid upon astronomy, meteorology, and anthropogony rather than upon the nature and significance of to apeiron, which might always have seemed confusing.\r\n\r\nIn respect to his arche, indeed, Anaximander must assuredly have been considered obsolete and unimportant by the end of the fifth century. The extant fragment could be quoted by Theophrastus, of course, because it really came among the cosmological-meteorological extracts. [introduction p. 38]","btype":3,"date":"1955","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/2A18YiMysdkpynh","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":216,"full_name":"Kirk, G. S.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":737,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"5","issue":"1\/2","pages":"21-38"}},"sort":[1955]}
Title | Der Bericht des Theophrast über Heraklit |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1955 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 83 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 385-411 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kerschensteiner, Jula |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Hauptquelle für die Darstellung der Lehren Heraklits, die Theophrast in seinen Phusikôn doxai gab, ist der Bericht bei Diogenes Laertius 9, 7-II. Er zerfällt in zwei Teile, eine knappe Übersicht (im folgenden DL1) und ein ausführliches Referat (im folgenden DL2). Nach DIELS stammt DL1 aus einer Mittelquelle biographischer Tradition, auf die auch der Einschub mit den Zitaten und die Bemerkung über Heraklits Stil zurückgehe, der zweite Teil dagegen direkt aus Theophrast (Doxographi Graeci I63 f., vgl. auch I80). Dagegen hat K. DEICHGRABER, Bemerkungen zu Diogenes' Bericht fiber Heraklit (Philol. 93, I938, I2ff.) 23ff., zu zeigen versucht, daB es sich nicht um zwei verschiedene Fassungen derselben Vorlage handelt, sondern daß die beiden Teile schon urspruinglich zusammengehören und aufeinander abgestimmt seien, nur durch den spateren Einschub unterbrochen: der Aufbau entspreche der Gewohnheit Theophrasts, den Einzeldarlegungen eine allgemeine Übersicht vorauszuschicken. Eine Klärung des Problems wird sich im folgenden ergeben. [introduction, p. 25] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/iEKNcdvLqiTOzaT |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1368","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1368,"authors_free":[{"id":2061,"entry_id":1368,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":233,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kerschensteiner, Jula","free_first_name":"Jula","free_last_name":"Kerschensteiner","norm_person":{"id":233,"first_name":"Jula","last_name":"Kerschensteiner","full_name":"Kerschensteiner, Jula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116142448","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der Bericht des Theophrast \u00fcber Heraklit","main_title":{"title":"Der Bericht des Theophrast \u00fcber Heraklit"},"abstract":"Die Hauptquelle f\u00fcr die Darstellung der Lehren Heraklits, die Theophrast in seinen Phusik\u00f4n doxai gab, ist der Bericht bei Diogenes Laertius 9, 7-II. Er zerf\u00e4llt in zwei Teile, eine knappe \u00dcbersicht (im folgenden DL1) und ein ausf\u00fchrliches Referat (im folgenden DL2). Nach DIELS stammt DL1 aus einer Mittelquelle biographischer Tradition, auf die auch der Einschub mit den Zitaten und die Bemerkung \u00fcber Heraklits Stil zur\u00fcckgehe, der zweite Teil dagegen direkt aus Theophrast (Doxographi Graeci I63 f., vgl. auch I80). Dagegen hat K. DEICHGRABER, Bemerkungen zu Diogenes' Bericht fiber Heraklit (Philol. 93, I938, I2ff.) 23ff., zu zeigen versucht, daB es sich nicht um zwei verschiedene Fassungen derselben Vorlage handelt, sondern da\u00df die beiden Teile schon urspruinglich zusammengeh\u00f6ren und aufeinander abgestimmt seien, nur durch den spateren Einschub unterbrochen: der Aufbau entspreche der Gewohnheit Theophrasts, den Einzeldarlegungen eine allgemeine \u00dcbersicht vorauszuschicken. Eine Kl\u00e4rung des Problems wird sich im folgenden ergeben. [introduction, p. 25]","btype":3,"date":"1955","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/iEKNcdvLqiTOzaT","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":233,"full_name":"Kerschensteiner, Jula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1368,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"83","issue":"4","pages":"385-411"}},"sort":[1955]}
Title | Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'de Caelo' d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1954 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 82 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 145-182 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Moraux, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Nous en revenons ainsi à une constatation formulée dans les premières pages de cette étude : la tradition manuscrite d'Aristote accessible aux commentateurs était incomparablement plus riche ou, du moins, plus diversifiée que notre tradition médiévale. Plusieurs rameaux de cette tradition sont morts sans quasi laisser de traces ; d'autres ne semblent plus avoir de descendants directs, mais certains de leurs éléments ont été sauvés, en partie grâce à des codices mixti, en partie grâce aux yqépexat et aux variantes des commentateurs. La tradition médiévale, avec son unité relative, semble donc bien représenter, par rapport à la richesse antérieure, un réel appauvrissement. Une sélection, accidentelle ou voulue, doit avoir rétréci, dans des proportions considérables, la variété des manuscrits en cours à l'époque de Simplicius. Quand, comment et pourquoi cette sélection s'est-elle opérée ? À combien d'ancêtres réels remontent nos manuscrits médiévaux ? Ce sont là des questions auxquelles je ne puis répondre, et je crois qu’on n’y pourra répondre avant d'avoir mené à bien, avec toutes les ressources de la paléographie, de la critique et de la codicologie, l'étude systématique de la tradition directe. [conclusion p. 182] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1cq99waVOBFt3tw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1208","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1208,"authors_free":[{"id":1789,"entry_id":1208,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":137,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Moraux, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Moraux","norm_person":{"id":137,"first_name":"Paul ","last_name":"Moraux","full_name":"Moraux, Paul ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117755591","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'de Caelo' d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'de Caelo' d'Aristote"},"abstract":"Nous en revenons ainsi \u00e0 une constatation formul\u00e9e dans les premi\u00e8res pages de cette \u00e9tude : la tradition manuscrite d'Aristote accessible aux commentateurs \u00e9tait incomparablement plus riche ou, du moins, plus diversifi\u00e9e que notre tradition m\u00e9di\u00e9vale. Plusieurs rameaux de cette tradition sont morts sans quasi laisser de traces ; d'autres ne semblent plus avoir de descendants directs, mais certains de leurs \u00e9l\u00e9ments ont \u00e9t\u00e9 sauv\u00e9s, en partie gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 des codices mixti, en partie gr\u00e2ce aux yq\u00e9pexat et aux variantes des commentateurs.\r\n\r\nLa tradition m\u00e9di\u00e9vale, avec son unit\u00e9 relative, semble donc bien repr\u00e9senter, par rapport \u00e0 la richesse ant\u00e9rieure, un r\u00e9el appauvrissement. Une s\u00e9lection, accidentelle ou voulue, doit avoir r\u00e9tr\u00e9ci, dans des proportions consid\u00e9rables, la vari\u00e9t\u00e9 des manuscrits en cours \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque de Simplicius.\r\n\r\nQuand, comment et pourquoi cette s\u00e9lection s'est-elle op\u00e9r\u00e9e ? \u00c0 combien d'anc\u00eatres r\u00e9els remontent nos manuscrits m\u00e9di\u00e9vaux ? Ce sont l\u00e0 des questions auxquelles je ne puis r\u00e9pondre, et je crois qu\u2019on n\u2019y pourra r\u00e9pondre avant d'avoir men\u00e9 \u00e0 bien, avec toutes les ressources de la pal\u00e9ographie, de la critique et de la codicologie, l'\u00e9tude syst\u00e9matique de la tradition directe. [conclusion p. 182]","btype":3,"date":"1954","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1cq99waVOBFt3tw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":137,"full_name":"Moraux, Paul ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1208,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"82","issue":"2","pages":"145-182"}},"sort":[1954]}
Title | Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'École d'Alexandrie au VIe siècle |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1954 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 67 |
Issue | 316-318 |
Pages | 396-410 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Saffrey, Henri Dominique |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ammonias, bien que païen et élève de Proclus, avait su, dès la fin du Ve siècle, faire à l'Église les concessionsnécessaires pour que fût toléré son enseignement officiel à Alexandrie. Mais il convient de reconnaître le rôle capital quedut jouer, quelque vingt à trente ans plus tard, un de ses élèves chrétiens, Jean le grammairien, philoponos dans l'Églised'Alexandrie : il couvrit son maître, et en éditant sous son nom à lui ses rédactions des commentaires à Aristote exposésoralement par Ammonius, et en publiant, dans l'année critique 529, son propre ouvrage De aeternitate mundi ContraProclum, qui détachait opportunément de l'École d'Athènes l'École d'Alexandrie. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Q5nhmaN1gcPD9Ls |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"401","_score":null,"_source":{"id":401,"authors_free":[{"id":536,"entry_id":401,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":228,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Saffrey, Henri Dominique","free_first_name":"Henri Dominique","free_last_name":"Saffrey","norm_person":{"id":228,"first_name":"Henri Dominique","last_name":"Saffrey","full_name":"Saffrey, Henri Dominique","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130160059","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le chr\u00e9tien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'\u00c9cole d'Alexandrie au VIe si\u00e8cle","main_title":{"title":"Le chr\u00e9tien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'\u00c9cole d'Alexandrie au VIe si\u00e8cle"},"abstract":"Ammonias, bien que pa\u00efen et \u00e9l\u00e8ve de Proclus, avait su, d\u00e8s la fin du Ve si\u00e8cle, faire \u00e0 l'\u00c9glise les concessionsn\u00e9cessaires pour que f\u00fbt tol\u00e9r\u00e9 son enseignement officiel \u00e0 Alexandrie. Mais il convient de reconna\u00eetre le r\u00f4le capital quedut jouer, quelque vingt \u00e0 trente ans plus tard, un de ses \u00e9l\u00e8ves chr\u00e9tiens, Jean le grammairien, philoponos dans l'\u00c9glised'Alexandrie : il couvrit son ma\u00eetre, et en \u00e9ditant sous son nom \u00e0 lui ses r\u00e9dactions des commentaires \u00e0 Aristote expos\u00e9soralement par Ammonius, et en publiant, dans l'ann\u00e9e critique 529, son propre ouvrage De aeternitate mundi ContraProclum, qui d\u00e9tachait opportun\u00e9ment de l'\u00c9cole d'Ath\u00e8nes l'\u00c9cole d'Alexandrie. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1954","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Q5nhmaN1gcPD9Ls","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":228,"full_name":"Saffrey, Henri Dominique","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":401,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques","volume":"67","issue":"316-318","pages":"396-410"}},"sort":[1954]}
Title | Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Harvard Studies in Classical Philology |
Volume | 61 |
Pages | 85-156 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | McDiarmid, John B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In sum, the fragments considered disclose no evidence that Theophrastus employed his knowledge of the Presocratics in such a way as to exercise independent judgment about them. Despite his apparent investigation of the original texts, his accounts are in all essentials simply repetitions of some of the interpretations that he found in Aristotle and have, therefore, the same deficiencies. Further, by his method of selection and adaptation, he has frequently misrepresented his source and has exaggerated the faults present in it. It must be concluded that, with regard to the Presocratic causes at least, he is a thoroughly biased witness and is even less trustworthy than Aristotle. [conclusion p. 133] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EubtCOWFaqns9Pq |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"991","_score":null,"_source":{"id":991,"authors_free":[{"id":1492,"entry_id":991,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":251,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McDiarmid, John B.","free_first_name":"John B.","free_last_name":"McDiarmid","norm_person":{"id":251,"first_name":"John B.","last_name":"McDiarmid","full_name":"McDiarmid, John B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1200165888","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes","main_title":{"title":"Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes"},"abstract":"In sum, the fragments considered disclose no evidence that Theophrastus employed his knowledge of the Presocratics in such a way as to exercise independent judgment about them. Despite his apparent investigation of the original texts, his accounts are in all essentials simply repetitions of some of the interpretations that he found in Aristotle and have, therefore, the same deficiencies. Further, by his method of selection and adaptation, he has frequently misrepresented his source and has exaggerated the faults present in it. It must be concluded that, with regard to the Presocratic causes at least, he is a thoroughly biased witness and is even less trustworthy than Aristotle. [conclusion p. 133]","btype":3,"date":"1953","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EubtCOWFaqns9Pq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":251,"full_name":"McDiarmid, John B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":991,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Harvard Studies in Classical Philology","volume":"61","issue":"","pages":"85-156"}},"sort":[1953]}
Title | Andronikos von Rhodos und die Postprädikamente bei Boethius |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Vigiliae Christianae |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 98-115 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Pfligersdorffer, Georg |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In der Erläuterungsschrift des Boethius zu den Kategorien des Aristoteles ist nach Absolvierung der einzelnen Kategorien das vierte Buch der Besprechung der sogenannten Postprädikamente 1 eingeräumt (Migne PL 64, 263-294), wozu freilich gleich auch gesagt werden musz, dasz die handschriftliche Überlieferung vielfach die Abtrennung eines vierten Buches nicht aufweist, sondern die uns geläufigen Bücher III und IV zu einem zusammenfaszt2, worauf hier jedoch nicht weiter eingegangen werden soll. Mit diesem Sachverhalt scheint zusammenzuhängen, dasz — soweit ich bis jetzt sagen kann — die Handschriften C(odex) l(atinus) m(ona- censis) 6403 und 14516, Bern. 265, Paris. B. N. lat. 11129 sowie die Sangallenses 817 und 821 gegenüber der Ausgabe von Migne das Aristoteles-Lemma de oppositis (Kateg. 10, 11b 16 ff.) vor die Kommentar-Partie 263 B-264 B Migne (Expeditis . . . ) treten lassen. [...] Die Zweifel, die sich an die Stelle 263 B M. knüpfen, möchte ich im folgenden, um einschlägige Arbeiten anderer nicht indirekt zu hemmen, schon vor meiner Ausgabe möglichst einschränken und vielleicht auch beheben. [pp. 98 f.] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PbVU1hqwXwhd1ee |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"776","_score":null,"_source":{"id":776,"authors_free":[{"id":1140,"entry_id":776,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":290,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Pfligersdorffer, Georg","free_first_name":"Georg","free_last_name":"Pfligersdorffer","norm_person":{"id":290,"first_name":"Georg","last_name":"Pfligersdorffer","full_name":"Pfligersdorffer, Georg","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118911864","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Andronikos von Rhodos und die Postpr\u00e4dikamente bei Boethius","main_title":{"title":"Andronikos von Rhodos und die Postpr\u00e4dikamente bei Boethius"},"abstract":"In der Erl\u00e4uterungsschrift des Boethius zu den Kategorien des \r\nAristoteles ist nach Absolvierung der einzelnen Kategorien das \r\nvierte Buch der Besprechung der sogenannten Postpr\u00e4dikamente 1 \r\neinger\u00e4umt (Migne PL 64, 263-294), wozu freilich gleich auch \r\ngesagt werden musz, dasz die handschriftliche \u00dcberlieferung vielfach \r\ndie Abtrennung eines vierten Buches nicht aufweist, sondern die \r\nuns gel\u00e4ufigen B\u00fccher III und IV zu einem zusammenfaszt2, \r\nworauf hier jedoch nicht weiter eingegangen werden soll. Mit \r\ndiesem Sachverhalt scheint zusammenzuh\u00e4ngen, dasz \u2014 soweit ich \r\nbis jetzt sagen kann \u2014 die Handschriften C(odex) l(atinus) m(ona- \r\ncensis) 6403 und 14516, Bern. 265, Paris. B. N. lat. 11129 sowie \r\ndie Sangallenses 817 und 821 gegen\u00fcber der Ausgabe von Migne \r\ndas Aristoteles-Lemma de oppositis (Kateg. 10, 11b 16 ff.) vor die \r\nKommentar-Partie 263 B-264 B Migne (Expeditis . . . ) treten \r\nlassen. [...] Die Zweifel, die sich an die Stelle 263 B M. kn\u00fcpfen, m\u00f6chte ich \r\nim folgenden, um einschl\u00e4gige Arbeiten anderer nicht indirekt zu hemmen, schon vor meiner Ausgabe m\u00f6glichst einschr\u00e4nken und \r\nvielleicht auch beheben. [pp. 98 f.]","btype":3,"date":"1953","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PbVU1hqwXwhd1ee","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":290,"full_name":"Pfligersdorffer, Georg","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":776,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Vigiliae Christianae","volume":"7","issue":"2","pages":"98-115"}},"sort":[1953]}
Title | Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux «Météorologiques» |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Bulletin de la classe des lettres, sciences morales et politiques de l'Académie Royale de Belgique |
Volume | 5e Série, Tome 39 |
Pages | 299–357 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Evrard, Étienne |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Philopon était probablement un chrétien de naissance. Rien en tout cas n’indique qu'il ait jamais été païen. Dès le début de son activité littéraire, il manifeste son christianisme en interprétant Aristote d’une manière favorable à l’immortalité de l'âme humaine et en le critiquant à propos de la création du monde et de l’éternité du mouvement. Il fut peut-être séduit un instant par les idées d’Origène, mais les abandonna bientôt. La fermeture de l’école d’Athènes a sans doute produit sur son esprit une assez forte impression. Il est remarquable en tout cas que son Contre Proclus est l’exact contemporain de cet événement. Peut-être la mesure de Justinien fut-elle difficilement admise dans les cercles philosophiques d'Alexandrie, où païens et chrétiens semblent avoir fait un effort pour harmoniser leurs points de vue. Philopon aurait alors voulu montrer qu’elle atteignait les disciples d’un philosophe dont l’enseignement était fort criticable et qui n’avait consenti aucune concession au christianisme. C’est peut-être pour la même raison qu’un peu après, dans son Commentaire aux Météorologiques, il attaqua à plusieurs reprises Damascius, qui dirigeait l’école d'Athènes au moment de sa fermeture. A ce moment encore, il prit apparemment une conscience plus nette des contradictions entre les doctrines des païen’s et sa religion. C’est en effet dans le Contre Proclus qu’apparaît pour la première fois la critique de la cinquième essence. Un ouvrage postérieur que nous ne possédons plus y ajoutait une réfutation de la théorie du mouvement surnaturel du feu. On peut penser que Philopon craignait dans ces doctrines une certaine divinisation du ciel dans laquelle il voyait une atteinte à la majesté de Dieu. Le Commentaire aux Météorologiques, composé après 529, révèle une accentuation de cette attitude. On y voit en plus apparaître la critique de l’astrologie. Enfin le Contre Aristote constitue comme une somme des griefs de Philopon contre le système péripatéticien. Dans le De Opificio mundi, postérieur au Contre Aristote et écrit après 557, la philosophie n’apparaît plus qu’indirectement et cède la place à la théologie et à l’exégèse biblique.Seule une étude exhaustive des œuvres de Philopon révélerait le degré d'exactitude de cette reconstitution provisoire. Celle-ci me semble du moins respecter plus complètement que celle de Gudeman les indications sur lesquelles j’ai attiré l’attention. Elle permet en outre de mieux comprendre les répercussions des événements de la première moitié du VIe siècle sur l'esprit de Philopon. [conclusion, p. 356-357] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/spYKKnIJSQ8Wyan |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"553","_score":null,"_source":{"id":553,"authors_free":[{"id":782,"entry_id":553,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":92,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Evrard, \u00c9tienne ","free_first_name":"\u00c9tienne ","free_last_name":"Evrard","norm_person":{"id":92,"first_name":"\u00c9tienne ","last_name":"Evrard","full_name":"Evrard, \u00c9tienne ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118945750","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux \u00abM\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques\u00bb","main_title":{"title":"Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux \u00abM\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques\u00bb"},"abstract":"Philopon \u00e9tait probablement un chr\u00e9tien de naissance. Rien en tout cas n\u2019indique qu'il ait jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 pa\u00efen. D\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de son activit\u00e9 litt\u00e9raire, il manifeste son christianisme en interpr\u00e9tant Aristote d\u2019une mani\u00e8re favorable \u00e0 l\u2019immortalit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me humaine et en le \r\ncritiquant \u00e0 propos de la cr\u00e9ation du monde et de l\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 du mouvement. Il fut peut-\u00eatre s\u00e9duit un instant par les id\u00e9es d\u2019Orig\u00e8ne, mais les abandonna bient\u00f4t. La fermeture de l\u2019\u00e9cole \r\nd\u2019Ath\u00e8nes a sans doute produit sur son esprit une assez forte impression. Il est remarquable en tout cas que son Contre Proclus est l\u2019exact contemporain de cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement. Peut-\u00eatre la mesure de Justinien fut-elle difficilement admise dans les cercles philoso\u00adphiques d'Alexandrie, o\u00f9 pa\u00efens et chr\u00e9tiens semblent avoir \r\nfait un effort pour harmoniser leurs points de vue. Philopon aurait alors voulu montrer qu\u2019elle atteignait les disciples d\u2019un philosophe dont l\u2019enseignement \u00e9tait fort criticable et qui n\u2019avait \r\nconsenti aucune concession au christianisme. C\u2019est peut-\u00eatre pour la m\u00eame raison qu\u2019un peu apr\u00e8s, dans son Commentaire aux M\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques, il attaqua \u00e0 plusieurs reprises Damascius, qui dirigeait l\u2019\u00e9cole d'Ath\u00e8nes au moment de sa fermeture. A ce moment encore, il prit apparemment une conscience plus nette \r\ndes contradictions entre les doctrines des pa\u00efen\u2019s et sa religion. C\u2019est en effet dans le Contre Proclus qu\u2019appara\u00eet pour la premi\u00e8re fois la critique de la cinqui\u00e8me essence. Un ouvrage post\u00e9rieur \r\nque nous ne poss\u00e9dons plus y ajoutait une r\u00e9futation de la th\u00e9orie du mouvement surnaturel du feu. On peut penser que Philopon craignait dans ces doctrines une certaine divinisation du ciel dans laquelle il voyait une atteinte \u00e0 la majest\u00e9 de Dieu. Le Com\u00admentaire aux M\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques, compos\u00e9 apr\u00e8s 529, r\u00e9v\u00e8le une accentuation de cette attitude. On y voit en plus appara\u00eetre la \r\ncritique de l\u2019astrologie. Enfin le Contre Aristote constitue comme une somme des griefs de Philopon contre le syst\u00e8me p\u00e9ripat\u00e9ticien. Dans le De Opificio mundi, post\u00e9rieur au Contre Aristote \r\net \u00e9crit apr\u00e8s 557, la philosophie n\u2019appara\u00eet plus qu\u2019indirectement et c\u00e8de la place \u00e0 la th\u00e9ologie et \u00e0 l\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se biblique.Seule une \u00e9tude exhaustive des \u0153uvres de Philopon r\u00e9v\u00e9lerait le degr\u00e9 d'exactitude de cette reconstitution provisoire. Celle-ci me semble du moins respecter plus compl\u00e8tement que celle de Gudeman les indications sur lesquelles j\u2019ai attir\u00e9 l\u2019attention. \r\nElle permet en outre de mieux comprendre les r\u00e9percussions des \u00e9v\u00e9nements de la premi\u00e8re moiti\u00e9 du VIe si\u00e8cle sur l'esprit \r\nde Philopon. [conclusion, p. 356-357]","btype":3,"date":"1953","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/spYKKnIJSQ8Wyan","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":92,"full_name":"Evrard, \u00c9tienne ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":553,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin de la classe des lettres, sciences morales et politiques de l'Acad\u00e9mie Royale de Belgique","volume":"5e S\u00e9rie, Tome 39","issue":"","pages":"299\u2013357"}},"sort":[1953]}
Title | Anaximander und die Anfänge der Philosophie |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 81 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 257-277 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hölscher, Uvo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Satz HERMANN FRANKELS, daß alle doxographischen Berichte solange unbestimmt sind, als nicht originaler Wortlaut hinzukommt, gilt in gewissem Sinne auch umgekehrt. Denn obwohl jener Satz gerade auch mit Rücksicht auf Anaximander gesagt worden ist, hat doch die Diskussion des Anaximanderfragments gezeigt, wie vieldeutig ein Satzbruchstück bleibt, wenn man es für sich betrachtet, aber auch, wieviel Hilfe aus der Analyse der Überlieferung kommen kann. Aus dieser wird noch einiges herangezogen, ohne daß hinlänglich gefragt würde, wo es herrührt. Sofern es sich im folgenden noch einmal um die Lehre von den Gegensatzen handelt, kommt es mir weniger darauf an, dem einzelnen Placitum sein Recht zu bestreiten, als etwas von der Weise dieses schwer zugänglichen Denkens zu erkennen. Es wird dabei zunächst in einer Untersuchung fortgefahren werden, die sich schon ausgewiesen hat: der Kritik der aristotelischen Berichte. Im zweiten Teil soll dagegen versucht werden, jene Denkform von den Voraussetzungen her zu bestimmen, aus denen Anaximander seine Konzeption des Ursprungs entwickelt hat. [introduction p. 17] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/THjvXeZsyHON9jV |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1398","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1398,"authors_free":[{"id":2177,"entry_id":1398,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":198,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","free_first_name":"Uvo","free_last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","norm_person":{"id":198,"first_name":"Uvo","last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118705571","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander und die Anf\u00e4nge der Philosophie","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander und die Anf\u00e4nge der Philosophie"},"abstract":"Der Satz HERMANN FRANKELS, da\u00df alle doxographischen Berichte solange unbestimmt sind, als nicht originaler Wortlaut hinzukommt, gilt in gewissem Sinne auch umgekehrt. Denn obwohl jener Satz gerade auch mit R\u00fccksicht auf Anaximander gesagt worden ist, hat doch die Diskussion des Anaximanderfragments gezeigt, wie vieldeutig ein Satzbruchst\u00fcck bleibt, wenn man es f\u00fcr sich betrachtet, aber auch, wieviel Hilfe aus der Analyse der \u00dcberlieferung kommen kann. Aus dieser wird noch einiges herangezogen, ohne da\u00df hinl\u00e4nglich gefragt w\u00fcrde, wo es herr\u00fchrt. Sofern es sich im folgenden noch einmal um die Lehre von den Gegensatzen handelt, kommt es mir weniger darauf an, dem einzelnen Placitum sein Recht zu bestreiten, als etwas von der Weise dieses schwer zug\u00e4nglichen Denkens zu erkennen. Es wird dabei zun\u00e4chst in einer Untersuchung fortgefahren werden, die sich schon ausgewiesen hat: der Kritik der aristotelischen Berichte. Im zweiten Teil soll dagegen versucht werden, jene Denkform von den Voraussetzungen her zu bestimmen, aus denen Anaximander seine Konzeption des Ursprungs entwickelt hat. [introduction p. 17]","btype":3,"date":"1953","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/THjvXeZsyHON9jV","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":198,"full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1398,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"81","issue":"3","pages":"257-277"}},"sort":[1953]}
Title | Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo, and of the Commentary of Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1950 |
Journal | Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies |
Volume | 2 |
Pages | 82–120 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Allan, Donald J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The main problem with which we shall be concerned is the authorship of the versions of De Caelo from the Greek that appeared during the thirteenth century. But it will be best to begin with a recapitulation of the facts ascertained by previous writers concerning the Arabic-Latin versions in which this treatise first became known in the lands of Western Europe. Until the middle of the thirteenth century, the work was commonly known and quoted in one of two versions: 1. A version of the text alone, beginning: Summa cognicionis nature et scientie ipsam demonstrantis. Its author, as we know from manuscript authority, was Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). 2. A version accompanying the commentary of Averroes, beginning: Maxima cognicio nature et scientia demonstrans ipsam. The translator, Michael Scot, dedicated his work to Stephanus de Pruvino, who, along with two others, was commissioned by Gregory IX in 1231 to examine Aristotle’s writings on natural philosophy and to report on their contents. Moreover, Avicenna had compiled a summary of the doctrine of this treatise, arranged under sixteen headings, which had been translated into Latin even before Gerard’s version appeared. It bears the title: Collectiones expositionum ab antiquis Graecis in libro Aristotelis qui dicitur liber caeli et mundi. Expositiones istae in sedecim continentur capitulis. Among the manuscripts of this work (which are, however, very numerous) are: Oxford, Balliol College 173A and 284; Bodleian, Selden supra 24; Paris, B.N. Lat. 16604—all from the thirteenth century. A much-emended text can be found in the edition of Avicenna’s scientific writings printed in Venice in 1308. This is not the place to discuss the origin of Avicenna’s summary or its influence on scholastic philosophy; however, it may be said that the translation, like those of similar works of Avicenna, must have been due to the Toledo scholars, such as Gundisalvi and John Avendehut (c. 1150). The summary clearly foregrounds the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the physical world, which naturally calls to mind the decree issued to the University of Paris in 1215: Non legantur libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et naturali philosophia, nec summa de iisdem. According to Roger Bacon, the attack was directed against the expositions by Avicenna and Averroes. In the latter half of the thirteenth century, a translation from the Greek makes its appearance. No exact date can be given, but several indications point to the decade 1260–1270. Jourdain observed that De Caelo is quoted by Albertus Magnus only in the Arabic versions, and Grabmann has pointed out that Codex Urbinas Latinus 206, written in 1253, contains De Caelo and the first three books of the Meteorologica in Arabic versions, while Physics and De Generatione occur in versions from the Greek. The first author to quote the text in this new translation is, as far as is known, Roger Bacon in the Opus Majus (1266–1267). Finally, it is known from Balliol College MS. 99 that the version of Simplicius’ commentary by William of Moerbeke was completed in 1271. This must have been accompanied by a translation of at least the Aristotelian passages quoted as “lemmata.” An attempt has been made to show that a version from the Greek was already current in the twelfth century. Haskins quotes the following passage from the preface to the version of the Almagest, completed around 1160 by a Sicilian translator: Tut ergo boni muneris memor, quo earum quas Aristoteles acrivellatas vocat artium doctrina—animum sitientem liberaliter imbuit... etc. He sees in this a reference to De Caelo III 306b27, where, in the course of a criticism of the Timaeus, Aristotle says: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀνάγκη μὴ πᾶν σῶμα λέγειν διαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθαι ταῖς ἀκριβεστάταις ἐπιστήμαις. However, at least two other passages must be borne in mind: 1. Metaphysics 982a25: ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσιν. 2. Nicomachean Ethics I 1141a16: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. In neither of these passages do the earliest translators transliterate the Greek word, and it is possible that the writer of the preface is not quoting a current translation but referring to the Greek original. It seems improbable that the De Caelo passage should be the one he had in mind, as it is not part of an explicit discussion of scientific method, and the reference to mathematics is purely incidental. Much stronger evidence would be needed to justify the supposition of an otherwise unknown translation. The commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on this treatise was certainly composed between 1271 and 1274. He uses throughout the version of Simplicius’ commentary that William of Moerbeke completed on June 15, 1271. Balliol College MS. 99 ends with the note: Ego autem frater Guylermus de Morbeka de ordine fratrum predicatorum, domini papae penitenciarius et capellanus, hoc cum magno corporis labore et multo mentis tedio latinitati offero, putans in hoc translationis opere me plura Latinorum studiis addidisse. Expleta autem fuit haec translacio Viterbii A.D. MCCLXXI XVII Kal. Iulii post mortem bonae memoriae Clementis papae quarti, apostolica sede vacante. When St. Thomas died in March 1274, he had only completed his commentary as far as Book III, chapter 3. His manuscript of Simplicius may have temporarily passed into the possession of Peter of Auvergne, who was entrusted with completing the commentary. However, St. Thomas had apparently promised the manuscript to the Faculty of Arts in Paris. A. Birkenmajer, in Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, called attention to a letter addressed by the Faculty to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order, then meeting in Lyons, in which they asked for the dispatch of certain manuscripts, including Simplicius on De Caelo, in accordance with this promise. [introduction p. 82-85] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yBMjK2X5ugL3938 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1013","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1013,"authors_free":[{"id":1529,"entry_id":1013,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":32,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Allan, Donald J.","free_first_name":"Donald J.","free_last_name":"Allan","norm_person":{"id":32,"first_name":"Donald J.","last_name":"Allan","full_name":"Allan, Donald J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158470029","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo, and of the Commentary of Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo, and of the Commentary of Simplicius"},"abstract":"The main problem with which we shall be concerned is the authorship of the versions of De Caelo from the Greek that appeared during the thirteenth century. But it will be best to begin with a recapitulation of the facts ascertained by previous writers concerning the Arabic-Latin versions in which this treatise first became known in the lands of Western Europe.\r\nUntil the middle of the thirteenth century, the work was commonly known and quoted in one of two versions:\r\n1.\tA version of the text alone, beginning: Summa cognicionis nature et scientie ipsam demonstrantis. Its author, as we know from manuscript authority, was Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187).\r\n2.\tA version accompanying the commentary of Averroes, beginning: Maxima cognicio nature et scientia demonstrans ipsam. The translator, Michael Scot, dedicated his work to Stephanus de Pruvino, who, along with two others, was commissioned by Gregory IX in 1231 to examine Aristotle\u2019s writings on natural philosophy and to report on their contents.\r\nMoreover, Avicenna had compiled a summary of the doctrine of this treatise, arranged under sixteen headings, which had been translated into Latin even before Gerard\u2019s version appeared. It bears the title: Collectiones expositionum ab antiquis Graecis in libro Aristotelis qui dicitur liber caeli et mundi. Expositiones istae in sedecim continentur capitulis. Among the manuscripts of this work (which are, however, very numerous) are: Oxford, Balliol College 173A and 284; Bodleian, Selden supra 24; Paris, B.N. Lat. 16604\u2014all from the thirteenth century. A much-emended text can be found in the edition of Avicenna\u2019s scientific writings printed in Venice in 1308. This is not the place to discuss the origin of Avicenna\u2019s summary or its influence on scholastic philosophy; however, it may be said that the translation, like those of similar works of Avicenna, must have been due to the Toledo scholars, such as Gundisalvi and John Avendehut (c. 1150). The summary clearly foregrounds the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the physical world, which naturally calls to mind the decree issued to the University of Paris in 1215: Non legantur libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et naturali philosophia, nec summa de iisdem. According to Roger Bacon, the attack was directed against the expositions by Avicenna and Averroes.\r\nIn the latter half of the thirteenth century, a translation from the Greek makes its appearance. No exact date can be given, but several indications point to the decade 1260\u20131270. Jourdain observed that De Caelo is quoted by Albertus Magnus only in the Arabic versions, and Grabmann has pointed out that Codex Urbinas Latinus 206, written in 1253, contains De Caelo and the first three books of the Meteorologica in Arabic versions, while Physics and De Generatione occur in versions from the Greek. The first author to quote the text in this new translation is, as far as is known, Roger Bacon in the Opus Majus (1266\u20131267). Finally, it is known from Balliol College MS. 99 that the version of Simplicius\u2019 commentary by William of Moerbeke was completed in 1271. This must have been accompanied by a translation of at least the Aristotelian passages quoted as \u201clemmata.\u201d\r\nAn attempt has been made to show that a version from the Greek was already current in the twelfth century. Haskins quotes the following passage from the preface to the version of the Almagest, completed around 1160 by a Sicilian translator: Tut ergo boni muneris memor, quo earum quas Aristoteles acrivellatas vocat artium doctrina\u2014animum sitientem liberaliter imbuit... etc. He sees in this a reference to De Caelo III 306b27, where, in the course of a criticism of the Timaeus, Aristotle says:\r\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2.\r\nHowever, at least two other passages must be borne in mind:\r\n1.\tMetaphysics 982a25:\r\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\r\n2.\tNicomachean Ethics I 1141a16:\r\n\u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u1f21 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1.\r\nIn neither of these passages do the earliest translators transliterate the Greek word, and it is possible that the writer of the preface is not quoting a current translation but referring to the Greek original. It seems improbable that the De Caelo passage should be the one he had in mind, as it is not part of an explicit discussion of scientific method, and the reference to mathematics is purely incidental. Much stronger evidence would be needed to justify the supposition of an otherwise unknown translation.\r\nThe commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on this treatise was certainly composed between 1271 and 1274. He uses throughout the version of Simplicius\u2019 commentary that William of Moerbeke completed on June 15, 1271. Balliol College MS. 99 ends with the note: Ego autem frater Guylermus de Morbeka de ordine fratrum predicatorum, domini papae penitenciarius et capellanus, hoc cum magno corporis labore et multo mentis tedio latinitati offero, putans in hoc translationis opere me plura Latinorum studiis addidisse. Expleta autem fuit haec translacio Viterbii A.D. MCCLXXI XVII Kal. Iulii post mortem bonae memoriae Clementis papae quarti, apostolica sede vacante. When St. Thomas died in March 1274, he had only completed his commentary as far as Book III, chapter 3. His manuscript of Simplicius may have temporarily passed into the possession of Peter of Auvergne, who was entrusted with completing the commentary. However, St. Thomas had apparently promised the manuscript to the Faculty of Arts in Paris. A. Birkenmajer, in Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, called attention to a letter addressed by the Faculty to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order, then meeting in Lyons, in which they asked for the dispatch of certain manuscripts, including Simplicius on De Caelo, in accordance with this promise. [introduction p. 82-85]","btype":3,"date":"1950","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yBMjK2X5ugL3938","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":32,"full_name":"Allan, Donald J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1013,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies","volume":"2","issue":"","pages":"82\u2013120"}},"sort":[1950]}
Title | The Unity of Empedocles' Thought |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1949 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 70 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 142-158 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Long, Herbert S. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I shall first state the problem of the unity of Empedocles' thought, then consider two difficulties in the way of a solution and the effect that not observing them has had, and finally propose and attempt to justify what appears to me to be a reasonable explanation of the problem. [p. 142] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XFRsopl0nu5E6SQ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"731","_score":null,"_source":{"id":731,"authors_free":[{"id":1094,"entry_id":731,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":456,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Long, Herbert S.","free_first_name":"Herbert S.","free_last_name":"Long","norm_person":{"id":456,"first_name":"Herbert, S.","last_name":"Long","full_name":"Long, Herbert, S.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Unity of Empedocles' Thought","main_title":{"title":"The Unity of Empedocles' Thought"},"abstract":"In this paper I shall first \r\nstate the problem of the unity of Empedocles' thought, then \r\nconsider two difficulties in the way of a solution and the effect \r\nthat not observing them has had, and finally propose and attempt to justify what appears to me to be a reasonable explanation of \r\nthe problem. [p. 142]","btype":3,"date":"1949","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/XFRsopl0nu5E6SQ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":456,"full_name":"Long, Herbert, S.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":731,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"70","issue":"2","pages":"142-158"}},"sort":[1949]}
Title | Un vers méconnu des Oracles Chaldaïques dans Simplicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (p. 375. 9 ss. Heib) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1948 |
Journal | Symbolae Osloenses |
Volume | 26 |
Pages | 75–77 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Festugière, André-Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Il avait semblé à Kroll (p. 24) que ce diaphragme était dit doué d’intelligence parce qu’il était dérivé du feu intelligent, et qu’il avait pour rôle de séparer les transmundana des mundana. Il apparaît maintenant, grâce au texte probant de Simplicius, qu’il est dit intelligent en vertu de l’antique association des phrenes avec le nous et qu’il a pour rôle tout à la fois de séparer et de réunir les deux premiers feux-intellects.² Cette doctrine offre de curieuses ressemblances avec le pneuma unifiant de la théologie chrétienne. Il vaudrait la peine de rechercher si c’est à la théologie orthodoxe ou à quelqu’une des sectes gnostiques³ que l’auteur des Oracula l’a empruntée. [conclusion p. 77] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GUbjWMoCMaLBH5d |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"549","_score":null,"_source":{"id":549,"authors_free":[{"id":773,"entry_id":549,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":112,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Festugi\u00e8re, Andr\u00e9-Jean","free_first_name":"Andr\u00e9-Jean","free_last_name":"Festugi\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":112,"first_name":"Andr\u00e9-Jean","last_name":"Festugi\u00e8re","full_name":"Festugi\u00e8re, Andr\u00e9-Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117758256","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un vers m\u00e9connu des Oracles Chalda\u00efques dans Simplicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (p. 375. 9 ss. Heib)","main_title":{"title":"Un vers m\u00e9connu des Oracles Chalda\u00efques dans Simplicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (p. 375. 9 ss. Heib)"},"abstract":"Il avait sembl\u00e9 \u00e0 Kroll (p. 24) que ce diaphragme \u00e9tait dit dou\u00e9 d\u2019intelligence parce qu\u2019il \u00e9tait d\u00e9riv\u00e9 du feu intelligent, et qu\u2019il avait pour r\u00f4le de s\u00e9parer les transmundana des mundana. Il appara\u00eet maintenant, gr\u00e2ce au texte probant de Simplicius, qu\u2019il est dit intelligent en vertu de l\u2019antique association des phrenes avec le nous et qu\u2019il a pour r\u00f4le tout \u00e0 la fois de s\u00e9parer et de r\u00e9unir les deux premiers feux-intellects.\u00b2\r\n\r\nCette doctrine offre de curieuses ressemblances avec le pneuma unifiant de la th\u00e9ologie chr\u00e9tienne. Il vaudrait la peine de rechercher si c\u2019est \u00e0 la th\u00e9ologie orthodoxe ou \u00e0 quelqu\u2019une des sectes gnostiques\u00b3 que l\u2019auteur des Oracula l\u2019a emprunt\u00e9e.\r\n[conclusion p. 77]","btype":3,"date":"1948","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GUbjWMoCMaLBH5d","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":112,"full_name":"Festugi\u00e8re, Andr\u00e9-Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":549,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Symbolae Osloenses","volume":"26","issue":"","pages":"75\u201377"}},"sort":[1948]}
Title | Zeno of Elea's Attacks on Plurality |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1942 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 63 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-25 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fraenkel, Hermann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In recent decades students of mathematics, philosophy, and the classics have again and again raised their voices 1 to vindicate the serious importance of Zeno's paradoxes of motion (Vorsokr.2 29 A 25-28 - Lee,3 nos. 19-36), not even excluding the Stadium. No longer can the problem implied in the paradoxes be disposed of by simply pointing out that time and space are equally divisible. The question which is at the bottom of all four of them is far more profound. [...] Fur- thermore, it has been shown that Aristotle, when qriticizing the paradoxes, was not concerned conscientiously to adjust his objec- tions to that which the historical Zeno had tried to prove, or rather disprove. [...] If it is thus established that Zeno's syllogisms must not necessarily be condemned as a futile play of dialectics 6 and that Aristotle's censure fails to do Zeno justice, a road seems to be open to a full rehabilitation and, perhaps, glorification. But one doubt remains. How adequately did the real Zeno actually deal with the problems he had in hand? And how sincere was he about them? [pp. 1 f.] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kQhlQX6rXg7NB8Y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"746","_score":null,"_source":{"id":746,"authors_free":[{"id":1109,"entry_id":746,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":115,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fraenkel, Hermann","free_first_name":"Hermann","free_last_name":"Fraenkel","norm_person":{"id":115,"first_name":"Hermann","last_name":"Fraenkel","full_name":"Fraenkel, Hermann","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119051478","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zeno of Elea's Attacks on Plurality","main_title":{"title":"Zeno of Elea's Attacks on Plurality"},"abstract":"In recent decades students of mathematics, philosophy, and \r\nthe classics have again and again raised their voices 1 to vindicate \r\nthe serious importance of Zeno's paradoxes of motion (Vorsokr.2 29 A 25-28 - Lee,3 nos. 19-36), not even excluding the Stadium. \r\nNo longer can the problem implied in the paradoxes be disposed of by simply pointing out that time and space are equally divisible. The question which is at the bottom of all four of \r\nthem is far more profound. [...] Fur- \r\nthermore, it has been shown that Aristotle, when qriticizing the \r\nparadoxes, was not concerned conscientiously to adjust his objec- tions to that which the historical Zeno had tried to prove, or \r\nrather disprove. [...] If it is \r\nthus established that Zeno's syllogisms must not necessarily be \r\ncondemned as a futile play of dialectics 6 and that Aristotle's \r\ncensure fails to do Zeno justice, a road seems to be open to a \r\nfull rehabilitation and, perhaps, glorification. But one doubt \r\nremains. How adequately did the real Zeno actually deal with \r\nthe problems he had in hand? And how sincere was he about \r\nthem? [pp. 1 f.]","btype":3,"date":"1942","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kQhlQX6rXg7NB8Y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":115,"full_name":"Fraenkel, Hermann","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":746,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"63","issue":"1","pages":"1-25"}},"sort":[1942]}
Title | Neue Fragmente aus ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1941 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 76 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 225-250 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wilpert, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Fassen wir abschließend zusammen. Der Bericht des Sextus über die pythagoreische Lehre von der Zahl hat sich im wesentlichen als eine ziemlich lückenlose Wiedergabe von Gedanken herausgestellt, die der platonischen Altersvorlesung cÜber das Gute* entstammen4). Vergleiche mit anderen Textzeugnissen ließen erkennen, daß die Gedankenschritte in der Hauptsache treu bewahrt sind und größere Eingriffe in den Zusammenhang unterblieben sind. Damit haben wir aber an unserer Stelle einen Bericht über diese wichtige Vorlesung, der an Umfang6) alle bisher bekannten Texte übertrifft und uns nicht nur erlaubt, verschiedene schon bekannte Stücke in den Gedanken aufbau einzuordnen, sondern auch darüber hinaus neues Gedankengut eröffnet. [conclusion p. 250] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nEGFEAlUmyi99jc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"426","_score":null,"_source":{"id":426,"authors_free":[{"id":572,"entry_id":426,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":362,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wilpert, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Wilpert","norm_person":{"id":362,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Wilpert","full_name":"Wilpert, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/11739629X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neue Fragmente aus \u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u0391\u0393\u0391\u0398\u039f\u03a5","main_title":{"title":"Neue Fragmente aus \u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u0391\u0393\u0391\u0398\u039f\u03a5"},"abstract":"Fassen wir abschlie\u00dfend zusammen. Der Bericht des Sextus \u00fcber die \r\npythagoreische Lehre von der Zahl hat sich im wesentlichen als eine ziemlich \r\nl\u00fcckenlose Wiedergabe von Gedanken herausgestellt, die der platonischen \r\nAltersvorlesung c\u00dcber das Gute* entstammen4). Vergleiche mit anderen \r\nTextzeugnissen lie\u00dfen erkennen, da\u00df die Gedankenschritte in der Hauptsache \r\ntreu bewahrt sind und gr\u00f6\u00dfere Eingriffe in den Zusammenhang unterblieben \r\nsind. Damit haben wir aber an unserer Stelle einen Bericht \u00fcber diese wichtige \r\nVorlesung, der an Umfang6) alle bisher bekannten Texte \u00fcbertrifft und uns \r\nnicht nur erlaubt, verschiedene schon bekannte St\u00fccke in den Gedanken\u00ad\r\naufbau einzuordnen, sondern auch dar\u00fcber hinaus neues Gedankengut \r\ner\u00f6ffnet. [conclusion p. 250]","btype":3,"date":"1941","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nEGFEAlUmyi99jc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":362,"full_name":"Wilpert, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":426,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"76","issue":"3","pages":"225-250"}},"sort":[1941]}
Title | Aristotle De Caelo 288a 2-9 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1939 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 34-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cornford, Francis Macdonald |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this passage from Aristotle's De Caelo, he explores why the heavens revolve in one direction rather than the other. He suggests that the universe has a front and a back, which implies a forward motion that is superior to backward motion, just as upward and rightward motions are superior to their respective opposites. Aristotle argues that since nature always follows the best course, the direction of the heaven's revolution must be forward and therefore better. The text is difficult to understand due to possible corruptions, but a comparison with Simplicius' paraphrase suggests that both the subject and object of the main verb are missing and need to be restored. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/b8mcJ8eN6idQIqA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1281","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1281,"authors_free":[{"id":1870,"entry_id":1281,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":55,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","free_first_name":"Francis Macdonald","free_last_name":"Cornford","norm_person":{"id":55,"first_name":"Francis Macdonald","last_name":"Cornford","full_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118975056","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle De Caelo 288a 2-9","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle De Caelo 288a 2-9"},"abstract":"In this passage from Aristotle's De Caelo, he explores why the heavens revolve in one direction rather than the other. He suggests that the universe has a front and a back, which implies a forward motion that is superior to backward motion, just as upward and rightward motions are superior to their respective opposites. Aristotle argues that since nature always follows the best course, the direction of the heaven's revolution must be forward and therefore better. The text is difficult to understand due to possible corruptions, but a comparison with Simplicius' paraphrase suggests that both the subject and object of the main verb are missing and need to be restored. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1939","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/b8mcJ8eN6idQIqA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":55,"full_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1281,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"33","issue":"1","pages":"34-35"}},"sort":[1939]}
Title | Der Satz des Anaximandros von Milet (VS⁵ 12 B 1) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1938 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 87 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 376-382 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dirlmeier, Franz |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Weltsicht der Ionier wird zu einer Zeit, als sie schon der Geschichte angehörte, neu geformt durch die Wissenschaft- ler der aristotelischen Schule, die somit die uranfängliche Scheu vor dem Unbestimmten, Unbegrenzten treu bewahren. Aber sie dehnen sie auch noch aus auf fast alle Bereiche des Seins. Frühionische Bändigung des Chaos der -feveffeic in irepioboi vollzieht sich aufs neue, wenn etwa Aristoteles den ungeord- neten, den nur „gereihten46 Ablauf der Menschenrede „unter- wirft", mit der Begründung: die XéHiç elpojiévTi sei ein àr'bkç olà tò ÔTreipov tò fàp TéXoç iravreç ßouXovrai K0t6opâv (Rhet. y 9, 1409 a31). Wenn wir zu den Erkenntnissen der schöpferischen Jahrhunderte VI bis III die sorgsame Auseinandersetzung des Simplikios nehmen, der am Ausgang der Antike mit fester Hand das gültig Gedachte noch einmal zusammenfaßt, so haben wir damit ein Jahrtausend hellenischen Geistes überblickt. [p. 382] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/oxNOVgaT4IjUsH6 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"757","_score":null,"_source":{"id":757,"authors_free":[{"id":1122,"entry_id":757,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":63,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dirlmeier, Franz ","free_first_name":"Franz","free_last_name":"Dirlmeier","norm_person":{"id":63,"first_name":"Franz ","last_name":"Dirlmeier","full_name":"Dirlmeier, Franz ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140255591","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der Satz des Anaximandros von Milet (VS\u2075 12 B 1)","main_title":{"title":"Der Satz des Anaximandros von Milet (VS\u2075 12 B 1)"},"abstract":"Die Weltsicht der Ionier wird zu einer Zeit, als sie schon \r\nder Geschichte angeh\u00f6rte, neu geformt durch die Wissenschaft- \r\nler der aristotelischen Schule, die somit die uranf\u00e4ngliche Scheu \r\nvor dem Unbestimmten, Unbegrenzten treu bewahren. Aber \r\nsie dehnen sie auch noch aus auf fast alle Bereiche des Seins. \r\nFr\u00fchionische B\u00e4ndigung des Chaos der -feveffeic in irepioboi \r\nvollzieht sich aufs neue, wenn etwa Aristoteles den ungeord- \r\nneten, den nur \u201egereihten46 Ablauf der Menschenrede \u201eunter- \r\nwirft\", mit der Begr\u00fcndung: die X\u00e9Hi\u00e7 elpoji\u00e9vTi sei ein \u00e0r'bk\u00e7 ol\u00e0 \r\nt\u00f2 \u00d4Treipov t\u00f2 f\u00e0p T\u00e9Xo\u00e7 iravre\u00e7 \u00dfouXovrai K0t6op\u00e2v (Rhet. y 9, \r\n1409 a31). Wenn wir zu den Erkenntnissen der sch\u00f6pferischen \r\nJahrhunderte VI bis III die sorgsame Auseinandersetzung des \r\nSimplikios nehmen, der am Ausgang der Antike mit fester Hand \r\ndas g\u00fcltig Gedachte noch einmal zusammenfa\u00dft, so haben \r\nwir damit ein Jahrtausend hellenischen Geistes \u00fcberblickt. [p. 382]","btype":3,"date":"1938","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/oxNOVgaT4IjUsH6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":63,"full_name":"Dirlmeier, Franz ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":757,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"87","issue":"4","pages":"376-382"}},"sort":[1938]}
Title | Indivisible Lines |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1936 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 120-126 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Nicol, A. T. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To summarize, Democritus, who had moved beyond the confusion between point and atom, also avoided the notion of indivisible lines. The people who confused points and atoms probably held a similar theory of motion and space. However, it was not they but Plato who proposed the existence of indivisible lines, driven by his conception of the problem of continuity. This idea, however, was not straightforward to understand, and Plato did not explain it in detail in the dialogues. Anyone reading the Timaeus and knowing that Plato believed in indivisible lines might become confused trying to locate references to them in that dialogue. It was Xenocrates who made the theory widely known, but he further complicated the issue by introducing the concept of the ideal line, potentially adding other misunderstandings. Aristotle described this as "giving in" to a dichotomy argument, which directly suggests Zeno. All this made it easy for those who did not fully grasp the theory to conflate it with the ideas of the point-atomists. The argument is as follows: if indivisible lines exist, then there must also be surfaces that are divided by those indivisible lines, and all surfaces could be reduced to indivisible surfaces. For example, if x is the length of an indivisible line, a surface measuring x by 2x could be divided into two square surfaces with sides of length x. These squares could then be divided diagonally, but no further division would be possible, as this would require either cutting the indivisible length x or creating a line shorter than x. The same logic applies to solids divided along indivisible surfaces. In this reasoning, the indivisible surface is treated as a surface bounded by indivisible lines. This has been noted by the Oxford translator. The author of περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν (Peri atomōn grammōn) either realized, or was informed, that indivisible lines were essentially points but did not recognize that indivisible surfaces were lines. If there existed, alongside Plato's theory of indivisible lines, another theory positing that matter, space, and motion were composed of tiny indivisibles, it would have been easy to conflate the two ideas. The passage quoted from Peri atomōn grammōn serves as an example of such a confusion. [conclusion p. 125-126 ] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/WmfjXuXivBEx38o |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"866","_score":null,"_source":{"id":866,"authors_free":[{"id":1270,"entry_id":866,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":278,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Nicol, A. T.","free_first_name":"A. T.","free_last_name":"Nicol","norm_person":{"id":278,"first_name":"Nicol","last_name":"A. T.","full_name":"Nicol, A. T.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Indivisible Lines","main_title":{"title":"Indivisible Lines"},"abstract":"To summarize, Democritus, who had moved beyond the confusion between point and atom, also avoided the notion of indivisible lines. The people who confused points and atoms probably held a similar theory of motion and space. However, it was not they but Plato who proposed the existence of indivisible lines, driven by his conception of the problem of continuity. This idea, however, was not straightforward to understand, and Plato did not explain it in detail in the dialogues.\r\n\r\nAnyone reading the Timaeus and knowing that Plato believed in indivisible lines might become confused trying to locate references to them in that dialogue. It was Xenocrates who made the theory widely known, but he further complicated the issue by introducing the concept of the ideal line, potentially adding other misunderstandings. Aristotle described this as \"giving in\" to a dichotomy argument, which directly suggests Zeno. All this made it easy for those who did not fully grasp the theory to conflate it with the ideas of the point-atomists.\r\n\r\nThe argument is as follows: if indivisible lines exist, then there must also be surfaces that are divided by those indivisible lines, and all surfaces could be reduced to indivisible surfaces. For example, if x is the length of an indivisible line, a surface measuring x by 2x could be divided into two square surfaces with sides of length x. These squares could then be divided diagonally, but no further division would be possible, as this would require either cutting the indivisible length x or creating a line shorter than x. The same logic applies to solids divided along indivisible surfaces.\r\n\r\nIn this reasoning, the indivisible surface is treated as a surface bounded by indivisible lines. This has been noted by the Oxford translator. The author of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd (Peri atom\u014dn gramm\u014dn) either realized, or was informed, that indivisible lines were essentially points but did not recognize that indivisible surfaces were lines.\r\n\r\nIf there existed, alongside Plato's theory of indivisible lines, another theory positing that matter, space, and motion were composed of tiny indivisibles, it would have been easy to conflate the two ideas. The passage quoted from Peri atom\u014dn gramm\u014dn serves as an example of such a confusion. [conclusion p. 125-126 ]","btype":3,"date":"1936","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/WmfjXuXivBEx38o","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":278,"full_name":"Nicol, A. T.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":866,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"30","issue":"2","pages":"120-126"}},"sort":[1936]}
Title | Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei Pseudo-Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplikios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1935 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Neue Folge |
Volume | 84 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 154-160 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Merlan, Philipp |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In diesem Text geht es um Simplikios' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo II, 1, 284 a 14 ff. und Pseudo-Alexandros' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Metaphysik A, 8, 1074aff. Beide diskutieren Fragen zur Bewegung des Himmels und stellen ähnliche Gedanken zum Verhältnis von Seele und Bewegung dar. Der Text betrachtet die Möglichkeit, dass Simplikios und Pseudo-Alexandros einander zitiert haben oder dass sie beide den echten Alexandros zitieren. Es wird auch auf die Interpretation von Aristoteles' De caelo H, 1,284a 27 ff. durch Simplikios eingegangen. [derived from the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cyUoxPziHeqUgjb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1209","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1209,"authors_free":[{"id":1790,"entry_id":1209,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":258,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Merlan, Philipp","free_first_name":"Philipp","free_last_name":"Merlan","norm_person":{"id":258,"first_name":"Philip","last_name":"Merlan","full_name":"Merlan, Philip","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128860502","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei Pseudo-Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplikios","main_title":{"title":"Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei Pseudo-Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplikios"},"abstract":"In diesem Text geht es um Simplikios' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo II, 1, 284 a 14 ff. und Pseudo-Alexandros' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Metaphysik A, 8, 1074aff. Beide diskutieren Fragen zur Bewegung des Himmels und stellen \u00e4hnliche Gedanken zum Verh\u00e4ltnis von Seele und Bewegung dar. Der Text betrachtet die M\u00f6glichkeit, dass Simplikios und Pseudo-Alexandros einander zitiert haben oder dass sie beide den echten Alexandros zitieren. Es wird auch auf die Interpretation von Aristoteles' De caelo H, 1,284a 27 ff. durch Simplikios eingegangen. [derived from the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1935","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cyUoxPziHeqUgjb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":258,"full_name":"Merlan, Philip","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1209,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie. Neue Folge","volume":"84","issue":"2","pages":"154-160"}},"sort":[1935]}
Title | A New Fragment of Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1935 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 49 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 122-123 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cornford, Francis Macdonald |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text discusses a disputed line in Parmenides, quoted in Plato's Theaetetus and Simplicius' Physics. Some editors deny the line's independent existence, claiming it was created by Plato by misquoting another verse. The author disagrees with this view, arguing that the line is meaningful and could have been in their texts of Parmenides. The author also argues that there is no reason to believe that Simplicius took the line from Plato, and that Plato was not slovenly in his treatment of Parmenides. The author proposes a corrected version of the line and suggests that it may be Parmenides' last word on the unity and unchangeableness of Being. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T0iSCzh2Kntxx5a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1280","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1280,"authors_free":[{"id":1869,"entry_id":1280,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":55,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","free_first_name":"Francis Macdonald","free_last_name":"Cornford","norm_person":{"id":55,"first_name":"Francis Macdonald","last_name":"Cornford","full_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118975056","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A New Fragment of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"A New Fragment of Parmenides"},"abstract":"The text discusses a disputed line in Parmenides, quoted in Plato's Theaetetus and Simplicius' Physics. Some editors deny the line's independent existence, claiming it was created by Plato by misquoting another verse. The author disagrees with this view, arguing that the line is meaningful and could have been in their texts of Parmenides. The author also argues that there is no reason to believe that Simplicius took the line from Plato, and that Plato was not slovenly in his treatment of Parmenides. The author proposes a corrected version of the line and suggests that it may be Parmenides' last word on the unity and unchangeableness of Being. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1935","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T0iSCzh2Kntxx5a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":55,"full_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1280,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"49","issue":"4","pages":"122-123"}},"sort":[1935]}
Title | Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des griechischen wissenschaftlichen Kommentars |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1932 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 67 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 397-412 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Geffcken, Johannes |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ich habe hier versucht, auf engem Raum die Entstehung des Kommentars als solchen zu skizzieren, einige seiner Erscheinungsformen zu würdigen, ein paar Höchstleistungen zu werten. Gerade Entwicklungslinien darf auch auf diesem Gebiet kein Besonnener suchen oder gar „aufzeigen“; jedes Phänomen, auch in der Welt des Geistes, mag es auch noch so einfacher Struktur sein, verdankt seinen Ursprung einer Reihe von schaffenden Kräften. Auch der antike Kommentar ist aus dem Zusammenwirken verschiedener Faktoren erwachsen. Ein Kraftzentrum aber bildeten der Platonismus und der ältere Peripatos; beide, besonders letzterer, schufen die Stimmung für solche Unternehmungen, sie erzogen das Gewissen des Gelehrten. Das Genie der großen Alexandriner musste sich dann vielfach eigene Wege bahnen. Aber in allen wirklich wissenschaftlichen Kommentaren, die wir kennen, lebt der echte Geist der Aristotelischen Schule. Eine wirkliche Geschichte des antiken Kommentars scheint auch mir unbedingt notwendig. Es wird sich dabei herausstellen, wann sich ein äußeres Schema entwickelt hat und welche Kontinuität auch hier wieder wahrnehmbar ist. Umso kraftvoller aber werden sich von der überlieferten Form die Individuen der Forscher und auch Denker abheben. [conclusion p. 411-412] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Y56uK7HVPYJ1WSa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1314","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1314,"authors_free":[{"id":1948,"entry_id":1314,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":126,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Geffcken, Johannes","free_first_name":"Johannes","free_last_name":"Geffcken","norm_person":{"id":126,"first_name":"Johannes","last_name":"Geffcken","full_name":"Geffcken, Johannes","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120376644","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des griechischen wissenschaftlichen Kommentars","main_title":{"title":"Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des griechischen wissenschaftlichen Kommentars"},"abstract":"Ich habe hier versucht, auf engem Raum die Entstehung des Kommentars als solchen zu skizzieren, einige seiner Erscheinungsformen zu w\u00fcrdigen, ein paar H\u00f6chstleistungen zu werten. Gerade Entwicklungslinien darf auch auf diesem Gebiet kein Besonnener suchen oder gar \u201eaufzeigen\u201c; jedes Ph\u00e4nomen, auch in der Welt des Geistes, mag es auch noch so einfacher Struktur sein, verdankt seinen Ursprung einer Reihe von schaffenden Kr\u00e4ften. Auch der antike Kommentar ist aus dem Zusammenwirken verschiedener Faktoren erwachsen.\r\n\r\nEin Kraftzentrum aber bildeten der Platonismus und der \u00e4ltere Peripatos; beide, besonders letzterer, schufen die Stimmung f\u00fcr solche Unternehmungen, sie erzogen das Gewissen des Gelehrten. Das Genie der gro\u00dfen Alexandriner musste sich dann vielfach eigene Wege bahnen. Aber in allen wirklich wissenschaftlichen Kommentaren, die wir kennen, lebt der echte Geist der Aristotelischen Schule.\r\n\r\nEine wirkliche Geschichte des antiken Kommentars scheint auch mir unbedingt notwendig. Es wird sich dabei herausstellen, wann sich ein \u00e4u\u00dferes Schema entwickelt hat und welche Kontinuit\u00e4t auch hier wieder wahrnehmbar ist. Umso kraftvoller aber werden sich von der \u00fcberlieferten Form die Individuen der Forscher und auch Denker abheben. [conclusion p. 411-412]","btype":3,"date":"1932","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Y56uK7HVPYJ1WSa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":126,"full_name":"Geffcken, Johannes","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1314,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"67","issue":"4","pages":"397-412"}},"sort":[1932]}
Title | The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One' |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1928 |
Journal | Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 22 |
Issue | 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1928), |
Pages | 129–142 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dodds, Eric R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelli- gently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development there are still lamentable lacunae. Three errors in particular have in the past prevented a proper appreciation of Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy. When this false trail was at length abandoned the fashion for orientalizing explanations persisted in another guise: to the earliest historians of Neo- platonism, Simon and Vacherot, the school of Plotinus was (in defiance of geographical facts) 'the school of Alexandria,' and its inspiration was mainly Egyptian. Vacherot says of Neoplatonism that it is 'essentially and radically oriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure.' Few would be found to-day to subscribe to so sweeping a pronouncement; but the existence of an important oriental element in Plotinus' thought is still affirmed by many French and German writers. [introduction p. 129] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/2WBu4QLsdoPjbaC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"554","_score":null,"_source":{"id":554,"authors_free":[{"id":783,"entry_id":554,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":65,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dodds, Eric R. ","free_first_name":"Eric R. ","free_last_name":"Dodds","norm_person":{"id":65,"first_name":"Eric R. ","last_name":"Dodds","full_name":"Dodds, Eric R. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123026288","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One' ","main_title":{"title":"The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One' "},"abstract":"The last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelli- \r\ngently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development \r\nthere are still lamentable lacunae. Three errors in particular have in the past \r\nprevented a proper appreciation of Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy. When this false trail was at length abandoned the fashion for orientalizing \r\nexplanations persisted in another guise: to the earliest historians of Neo- \r\nplatonism, Simon and Vacherot, the school of Plotinus was (in defiance of \r\ngeographical facts) 'the school of Alexandria,' and its inspiration was mainly \r\nEgyptian. Vacherot says of Neoplatonism that it is 'essentially and radically \r\noriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure.' \r\nFew would be found to-day to subscribe to so sweeping a pronouncement; but \r\nthe existence of an important oriental element in Plotinus' thought is still \r\naffirmed by many French and German writers. [introduction p. 129]","btype":3,"date":"1928","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/2WBu4QLsdoPjbaC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":65,"full_name":"Dodds, Eric R. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":554,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Quarterly","volume":"22","issue":"3\/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1928),","pages":"129\u2013142"}},"sort":[1928]}
Title | The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1927 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 21 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 133-141 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Leon, Philip |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Anaxagoras does indeed, as he has been said to do, represent the culminating point of the enquiry into the one bto-tv. That simple enquiry for a simple unity becomes curiously complex, just because of the very simplicity and the thorough-going and uncompromising nature of Anaxagoras' logical mind. It has with him reached a stage where it must become transformed and pass on the one hand into logic in Plato, into the enquiry about the nature of predication through Gorgias and Antisthenes, and on the other hand into metaphysics, the theory of ideas, also in Plato. This central position of Anaxagoras is made clear by the passage discussed, according to which, I think, in considering the 'homoiomeries,' we should look upon parts as 'homoiomerous' primarily to the whole i~c6otov, and only secondarily to subordinate wholes. Indeed, it is implied in Anaxagoras' principle that there are only two entities which are properly wholes, the 0c0/cpo and voDv^. To call anything else a whole is more or less arbitrary, a principle not unworthy of the most thorough-going of modern absolutists. [Conclusion, p. 141] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qJGkpDhgqeYGAi8 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"733","_score":null,"_source":{"id":733,"authors_free":[{"id":1096,"entry_id":733,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":245,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Leon, Philip","free_first_name":"Philip","free_last_name":"Leon","norm_person":{"id":245,"first_name":"Philip","last_name":"Leon","full_name":"Leon, Philip","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"Anaxagoras does indeed, as he has been said to do, represent the \r\nculminating point of the enquiry into the one bto-tv. That simple enquiry \r\nfor a simple unity becomes curiously complex, just because of the very \r\nsimplicity and the thorough-going and uncompromising nature of Anaxagoras' \r\nlogical mind. It has with him reached a stage where it must become \r\ntransformed and pass on the one hand into logic in Plato, into the enquiry \r\nabout the nature of predication through Gorgias and Antisthenes, and on the \r\nother hand into metaphysics, the theory of ideas, also in Plato. This central \r\nposition of Anaxagoras is made clear by the passage discussed, according \r\nto which, I think, in considering the 'homoiomeries,' we should look upon \r\nparts as 'homoiomerous' primarily to the whole i~c6otov, and only secondarily \r\nto subordinate wholes. Indeed, it is implied in Anaxagoras' principle that \r\nthere are only two entities which are properly wholes, the 0c0\/cpo and voDv^. To call anything else a whole is more or less arbitrary, a principle not \r\nunworthy of the most thorough-going of modern absolutists. [Conclusion, p. 141]","btype":3,"date":"1927","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qJGkpDhgqeYGAi8","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":245,"full_name":"Leon, Philip","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":733,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"21","issue":"3\/4","pages":"133-141"}},"sort":[1927]}
Title | Simpl. in Aristot. de Caelo p. 370, 29 ff. H |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1924 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 59 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 118-119 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Praechter, Karl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dieser Beitrag untersucht einen zentralen Passus aus den Schriften des Neuplatonikers Simplikios, der für seine polemische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum von besonderem Interesse ist. Anhand der Überlieferung bei Heiberg wird die Bedeutung der Formulierung διαβεβλαμμένοι („verwirrt“ oder „zerfallen“) im Kontext der Darstellung christlicher Vorstellungen von Himmel und Gottheit analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Simplikios die Christen als unter dem Einfluss falscher metaphysischer Annahmen stehend betrachtet, was ihn dazu veranlasst, ihre Auffassung vom Himmel als Sitz Gottes zu kritisieren. Darüber hinaus wird ein intertextueller Bezug zu Heraklit (fr. 96 Diels) aufgezeigt, der für das Verständnis der Stelle essenziell ist. Die Argumentation von Simplikios reiht sich in die breitere neuplatonische Kritik an der christlichen Theologie ein, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Verehrung des toten Christus und den Gräberkult. Diese Analyse trägt zur Erhellung der spätantiken Debatten zwischen Neuplatonikern und Christen bei und verdeutlicht zugleich die methodischen Herausforderungen bei der Interpretation antiker philosophischer Texte. [derived from the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GHLXvIo8dgtPSpy |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1477","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1477,"authors_free":[{"id":2558,"entry_id":1477,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":293,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Praechter, Karl","free_first_name":"Karl","free_last_name":"Praechter","norm_person":{"id":293,"first_name":"Karl","last_name":"Praechter","full_name":"Praechter, Karl","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116278609","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simpl. in Aristot. de Caelo p. 370, 29 ff. H","main_title":{"title":"Simpl. in Aristot. de Caelo p. 370, 29 ff. H"},"abstract":"Dieser Beitrag untersucht einen zentralen Passus aus den Schriften des Neuplatonikers Simplikios, der f\u00fcr seine polemische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum von besonderem Interesse ist. Anhand der \u00dcberlieferung bei Heiberg wird die Bedeutung der Formulierung \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 (\u201everwirrt\u201c oder \u201ezerfallen\u201c) im Kontext der Darstellung christlicher Vorstellungen von Himmel und Gottheit analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Simplikios die Christen als unter dem Einfluss falscher metaphysischer Annahmen stehend betrachtet, was ihn dazu veranlasst, ihre Auffassung vom Himmel als Sitz Gottes zu kritisieren.\r\n\r\nDar\u00fcber hinaus wird ein intertextueller Bezug zu Heraklit (fr. 96 Diels) aufgezeigt, der f\u00fcr das Verst\u00e4ndnis der Stelle essenziell ist. Die Argumentation von Simplikios reiht sich in die breitere neuplatonische Kritik an der christlichen Theologie ein, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Verehrung des toten Christus und den Gr\u00e4berkult. Diese Analyse tr\u00e4gt zur Erhellung der sp\u00e4tantiken Debatten zwischen Neuplatonikern und Christen bei und verdeutlicht zugleich die methodischen Herausforderungen bei der Interpretation antiker philosophischer Texte. [derived from the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1924","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GHLXvIo8dgtPSpy","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":293,"full_name":"Praechter, Karl","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1477,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"59","issue":"1","pages":"118-119"}},"sort":[1924]}
Title | Nikostratos der Platoniker |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1922 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 57 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 481-517 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Praechter, Karl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Als Beitrag zur Vor- und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Neu platonismus auf einem Teilgebiet seiner Lehre möchte [...] die vorliegende Untersuchung betrachtet werden. Ich selbst habe zu zeigen versucht, daß der alexandrinische Neuplatonismus keines wegs die Linie Plotin-Porphyrios-Iamblich fortsetzt, sondern an ein früheres Stadium platonischer Lehrentwicklung anschließt. [conclusion p. 517] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/VI1pJau1eYyh9C4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"775","_score":null,"_source":{"id":775,"authors_free":[{"id":1139,"entry_id":775,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":293,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Praechter, Karl","free_first_name":"Karl","free_last_name":"Praechter","norm_person":{"id":293,"first_name":"Karl","last_name":"Praechter","full_name":"Praechter, Karl","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116278609","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nikostratos der Platoniker","main_title":{"title":"Nikostratos der Platoniker"},"abstract":"Als Beitrag zur Vor- und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Neu\u00ad\r\nplatonismus auf einem Teilgebiet seiner Lehre m\u00f6chte [...] die \r\nvorliegende Untersuchung betrachtet werden. Ich selbst habe zu \r\nzeigen versucht, da\u00df der alexandrinische Neuplatonismus keines\u00ad\r\nwegs die Linie Plotin-Porphyrios-Iamblich fortsetzt, sondern an ein \r\nfr\u00fcheres Stadium platonischer Lehrentwicklung anschlie\u00dft. [conclusion p. 517]","btype":3,"date":"1922","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/VI1pJau1eYyh9C4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":293,"full_name":"Praechter, Karl","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":775,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"57","issue":"4","pages":"481-517"}},"sort":[1922]}
Title | Simplicius de anima 146. 21 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1922 |
Journal | Classical Philology |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 143-144 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Shorey, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Note on Simplicius de anima 146. 21 |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pOLcHui33vJaEz1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"852","_score":null,"_source":{"id":852,"authors_free":[{"id":1256,"entry_id":852,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":321,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Shorey, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Shorey","norm_person":{"id":321,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Shorey","full_name":"Shorey, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/101356426X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius de anima 146. 21","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius de anima 146. 21"},"abstract":"Note on Simplicius de anima 146. 21","btype":3,"date":"1922","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pOLcHui33vJaEz1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":321,"full_name":"Shorey, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":852,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Philology","volume":"17","issue":"2","pages":"143-144"}},"sort":[1922]}
Title | On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1905 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 19 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 205 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Shorey, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notes on On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/JJdmbGUh1TLKUrg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1019","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1019,"authors_free":[{"id":1535,"entry_id":1019,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":321,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Shorey, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Shorey","norm_person":{"id":321,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Shorey","full_name":"Shorey, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/101356426X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq","main_title":{"title":"On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq"},"abstract":"Notes on On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq.","btype":3,"date":"1905","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/JJdmbGUh1TLKUrg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":321,"full_name":"Shorey, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1019,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"19","issue":"4","pages":"205"}},"sort":[1905]}
Title | Musonius and Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1903 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 23-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mayor, John E.B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A new edition of the remains of Musonius is advertised; and indeed Peerlkamp's edition has long been out of date and is little known. In two interesting fragments (Stob. flor. 17 n. 43 Meineke, n. 42 Hense, and 18 n. 38 M, 37 H, 10. Stob. anthol. iii. 503, 523, Weidmann 1894), Hense illustrates some details from other authors but has missed the most comprehensive parallel, the commentary of Simplicius on Epictetus Enchiridion c. 46 (of Schweighäuser's edition c. 33 s. 7, Epict. iv. 427-8). [introduction p. 23] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cXhfxWvaVaNv6wx |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"988","_score":null,"_source":{"id":988,"authors_free":[{"id":1489,"entry_id":988,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":242,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mayor, John E.B.","free_first_name":"John E.B.","free_last_name":"Mayor","norm_person":{"id":242,"first_name":"John E. B.","last_name":"Mayor","full_name":"Mayor, John E. B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/129593915","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Musonius and Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Musonius and Simplicius"},"abstract":"A new edition of the remains of Musonius is advertised; and indeed Peerlkamp's edition has long been out of date and is little known. In two interesting fragments (Stob. flor. 17 n. 43 Meineke, n. 42 Hense, and 18 n. 38 M, 37 H, 10. Stob. anthol. iii. 503, 523, Weidmann 1894), Hense illustrates some details from other authors but has missed the most comprehensive parallel, the commentary of Simplicius on Epictetus Enchiridion c. 46 (of Schweigh\u00e4user's edition c. 33 s. 7, Epict. iv. 427-8).\r\n[introduction p. 23]","btype":3,"date":"1903","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cXhfxWvaVaNv6wx","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":242,"full_name":"Mayor, John E. B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":988,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"17","issue":"1","pages":"23-24"}},"sort":[1903]}
Title | Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar zu Aristoteles’ Physik (ed. Diels). I. p. 1129–1152 (contra Philoponum) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1902 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 15 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 186–213 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zahlfleisch, Johann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der vorliegende Text behandelt einige Corollarien von Simplicius in seinem Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Physik, wobei er sich insbesondere mit Philoponus' Einwänden auseinandersetzt. Die Diskussion dreht sich um die Definition der Bewegung bei Aristoteles und die Frage nach ewigen und begrenzten Bewegungen. Philoponus hinterfragt, wie begrenzte Bewegung als Folge einer ewigen Bewegung angesehen werden kann, da die Potenz immer bestehe und eine Bedingung für die Bewegung sei. Simplicius argumentiert, dass die Potenz und Bewegung untrennbar verbunden sind und dass es keine ewige Bewegung geben könne. Er erläutert Aristoteles' Position und verteidigt sie gegen Philoponus' Einwände. Die Diskussion umfasst Themen wie die Rolle der Potenz in der Bewegung, die Anwendung der Begriffsdefinition auf verschiedene Sachverhalte und die Frage nach einem obersten Beweger. Am Ende wird betont, dass selbst bei einer Ablehnung des Aristotelischen Axioms von der Bewegung die Annahme eines ewigen obersten Bewegers bestehen bleibt. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vfhmk7U2Ze3RMEr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1548","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1548,"authors_free":[{"id":2705,"entry_id":1548,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Zahlfleisch, Johann","free_first_name":"Johann","free_last_name":"Zahlfleisch","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 Physik (ed. Diels). I. p. 1129\u20131152 (contra Philoponum)","main_title":{"title":"Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 Physik (ed. Diels). I. p. 1129\u20131152 (contra Philoponum)"},"abstract":"Der vorliegende Text behandelt einige Corollarien von Simplicius in seinem Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Physik, wobei er sich insbesondere mit Philoponus' Einw\u00e4nden auseinandersetzt. Die Diskussion dreht sich um die Definition der Bewegung bei Aristoteles und die Frage nach ewigen und begrenzten Bewegungen. Philoponus hinterfragt, wie begrenzte Bewegung als Folge einer ewigen Bewegung angesehen werden kann, da die Potenz immer bestehe und eine Bedingung f\u00fcr die Bewegung sei. Simplicius argumentiert, dass die Potenz und Bewegung untrennbar verbunden sind und dass es keine ewige Bewegung geben k\u00f6nne. Er erl\u00e4utert Aristoteles' Position und verteidigt sie gegen Philoponus' Einw\u00e4nde. Die Diskussion umfasst Themen wie die Rolle der Potenz in der Bewegung, die Anwendung der Begriffsdefinition auf verschiedene Sachverhalte und die Frage nach einem obersten Beweger. Am Ende wird betont, dass selbst bei einer Ablehnung des Aristotelischen Axioms von der Bewegung die Annahme eines ewigen obersten Bewegers bestehen bleibt. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1902","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vfhmk7U2Ze3RMEr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1548,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"15","issue":"2","pages":"186\u2013213"}},"sort":[1902]}
Title | Repetitions in Empedokles |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1898 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 16-17 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fairbanks, Arthur |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The reader of Empedokles, as the text is restored by Stein, cannot fail to be struck by the repetition of certain phrases and lines. The recurrent use of convenient phrases is characteristic of the epic style which Empedokles affects, and in this way the repetition of many phrases is accounted for. The phrase all‘ age, ll. 19, 74, 96 (cf. 130, 262), will serve as an example. The first half of ll. 36, 61, 76, and the last half of ll. 112, 239, 140, are other illustrations of what may be expected in an 'epic' writer, and deserve no special consideration here. A second class of apparent repetitions may be dismissed with a word, namely the repetition of a line for emphasis, with distinct statement of the fact that it is repeated (e.g., ll. 60-62 repeated 75-77). It amounts to the same thing when a thesis is stated, and then repeated at the close of the discussion. In this way, I explain ll. 66 and 72. Thirdly, there are numerous passages that impress the reader as repetitions because they deal with much the same thought, although there is a studied effort to put this thought in different language. In ll. 173 and 248, the language of 67 and 116 almost reappears. Lines 69, 70 repeat the thought of 61-62 with intentional change of language. The fundamental thought of the poem is that all things on the earth are the product of four elements moved by two forces. The three parts of this thought appear again and again, but with intentional variation in language so as to prevent a sense of monotony. The list of things on the earth appears in lines 40 f., 105 f. (= 124 f.), 252 f., 383 f., 421 f. The four elements are mentioned in different terms many times: 33 f., 78, 130 f., 187, 197 f., (200), 204 f., 211, 215 f., 265 f., 333 f., 378 f. These repetitions, like those of the last group, are examples of a literary device appropriate to philosophic poetry. By means of it, the poet is able to enforce and bring home his thought without too much wearying his readers. There remains another class of repetitions which are due, as I believe, to a wrong reconstruction of the text, and it is with the purpose of eliminating the repetitions which belong to this class that I have instituted this study. 105-107 = 124-126. Lines 105-107 appear in Simplicius 7v 33, 15 and 34r 159, 22, and their position in this connection is confirmed by the quotation of 104-107 in Arist. Met. ii. 4, 1000a 29. On the other hand, the same lines after l. 123 are found only in Simplicius 34r 160, 6; the text here is somewhat uncertain, and the link with the preceding by the participle κτίοντε is rather artificial. Simplicius had quoted these lines less than half a page back, and it seems to me probable that the lines were inadvertently repeated here — possibly instead of some similar enumeration of things on the earth. 94(-95) = 108(-109) = 114(-115). Lines 94-95 are the fitting conclusion of the preceding discussion of the elements, but they have no meaning after 107. They stand in Simplicius 34r 159, 3 at the end of a long quotation, and it is not unlikely that they were repeated at the end of the next quotation (34r 159, 25) by the error either of Simplicius or of some copyist. The last half of 109 reads like a gloss that has been incorporated into the text. A negative argument of less weight for the omission of these lines (108-109) is the fact that they are omitted in Simpl. 7v 33, 17. The same lines appear in Simpl. 8r 33, 21. Here they are intimately connected with the two preceding lines, but their connection with the following lines is forced, and the following lines—as I shall hope to show—belong better in another connection. Accordingly, I propose to identify 114-115 with 94-95 and to insert 112-113 before 94-95. The order will then be 90-93, 112-113, 94-95 (= 114-115). The insertion of 112-113 between 93 and 94 is confirmed by the fact that 112-113 form the natural response to 93 and give a fitting introduction to 94-95. 67-68 = 116-117 (cf. 248). Lines 67-68 appear in this connection several times in Simplicius, and indeed 70-73 appear directly after 118 at Simpl. 8r 33, 26. Stein inserts Simpl. 8r 33, 26 as his line 69. My proposal is to insert both Simpl. 8r 33, 25 and 26 after 68, in which case there is no reason for regarding 116-117 as different from 67-68. So I would read 67-68, 118, 69-73. These two changes in the text of Simplicius, which cut out several repetitions, rest on the interpretation of Simpl. 8r 33, 19. Stein breaks this passage after 33, 25 and inserts 33, 26 as line 69. I propose to break it at the point where the meaning halts, namely after 33, 22; the first four lines I would place after 93 as I have suggested in the last paragraph but one, and the remainder after 66, as I have suggested in the last paragraph. 134 = 138. Line 134, which consists simply of the word sphairon, has no reason for existence; as the reference in Simpl. 258r may perfectly well apply to line 138. 3 = 228. The close resemblance between these two lines may be due to the restoration of 228. We may notice, however, merimnas (3, 45, 228) and deila (3, 53, 228, 343, 400, 441, 446) are favourite words with Empedokles, so that perhaps there is no reason to discredit line 228. In conclusion, I should like to suggest a slight emendation of line 85. The text of Simplicius at 34r 158, 24 reads met‘ osoisin (so aE; DE met‘ ossoisin); Preller suggests g‘ ossoisin; Panzerbieter, meth‘ oloisin. What is wanted is a reference to the four elements, with which Love works, though her activity cannot be discerned by mortal men. So I would suggest meta toisin, since tauta, tade, ta are commonly used to refer to the elements in the whole poem. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1EJm8S2SsGJjpTn |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"597","_score":null,"_source":{"id":597,"authors_free":[{"id":848,"entry_id":597,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":94,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fairbanks, Arthur","free_first_name":"Arthur","free_last_name":"Fairbanks","norm_person":{"id":94,"first_name":"Arthur ","last_name":"Fairbanks","full_name":"Fairbanks, Arthur ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157467903","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Repetitions in Empedokles","main_title":{"title":"Repetitions in Empedokles"},"abstract":"The reader of Empedokles, as the text is restored by Stein, cannot fail to be struck by the repetition of certain phrases and lines. The recurrent use of convenient phrases is characteristic of the epic style which Empedokles affects, and in this way the repetition of many phrases is accounted for. The phrase all\u2018 age, ll. 19, 74, 96 (cf. 130, 262), will serve as an example. The first half of ll. 36, 61, 76, and the last half of ll. 112, 239, 140, are other illustrations of what may be expected in an 'epic' writer, and deserve no special consideration here.\r\nA second class of apparent repetitions may be dismissed with a word, namely the repetition of a line for emphasis, with distinct statement of the fact that it is repeated (e.g., ll. 60-62 repeated 75-77). It amounts to the same thing when a thesis is stated, and then repeated at the close of the discussion. In this way, I explain ll. 66 and 72.\r\nThirdly, there are numerous passages that impress the reader as repetitions because they deal with much the same thought, although there is a studied effort to put this thought in different language. In ll. 173 and 248, the language of 67 and 116 almost reappears. Lines 69, 70 repeat the thought of 61-62 with intentional change of language. The fundamental thought of the poem is that all things on the earth are the product of four elements moved by two forces. The three parts of this thought appear again and again, but with intentional variation in language so as to prevent a sense of monotony.\r\nThe list of things on the earth appears in lines 40 f., 105 f. (= 124 f.), 252 f., 383 f., 421 f. The four elements are mentioned in different terms many times: 33 f., 78, 130 f., 187, 197 f., (200), 204 f., 211, 215 f., 265 f., 333 f., 378 f. These repetitions, like those of the last group, are examples of a literary device appropriate to philosophic poetry. By means of it, the poet is able to enforce and bring home his thought without too much wearying his readers.\r\nThere remains another class of repetitions which are due, as I believe, to a wrong reconstruction of the text, and it is with the purpose of eliminating the repetitions which belong to this class that I have instituted this study.\r\n105-107 = 124-126. Lines 105-107 appear in Simplicius 7v 33, 15 and 34r 159, 22, and their position in this connection is confirmed by the quotation of 104-107 in Arist. Met. ii. 4, 1000a 29. On the other hand, the same lines after l. 123 are found only in Simplicius 34r 160, 6; the text here is somewhat uncertain, and the link with the preceding by the participle \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5 is rather artificial. Simplicius had quoted these lines less than half a page back, and it seems to me probable that the lines were inadvertently repeated here \u2014 possibly instead of some similar enumeration of things on the earth.\r\n94(-95) = 108(-109) = 114(-115). Lines 94-95 are the fitting conclusion of the preceding discussion of the elements, but they have no meaning after 107. They stand in Simplicius 34r 159, 3 at the end of a long quotation, and it is not unlikely that they were repeated at the end of the next quotation (34r 159, 25) by the error either of Simplicius or of some copyist. The last half of 109 reads like a gloss that has been incorporated into the text. A negative argument of less weight for the omission of these lines (108-109) is the fact that they are omitted in Simpl. 7v 33, 17.\r\nThe same lines appear in Simpl. 8r 33, 21. Here they are intimately connected with the two preceding lines, but their connection with the following lines is forced, and the following lines\u2014as I shall hope to show\u2014belong better in another connection. Accordingly, I propose to identify 114-115 with 94-95 and to insert 112-113 before 94-95. The order will then be 90-93, 112-113, 94-95 (= 114-115). The insertion of 112-113 between 93 and 94 is confirmed by the fact that 112-113 form the natural response to 93 and give a fitting introduction to 94-95.\r\n67-68 = 116-117 (cf. 248). Lines 67-68 appear in this connection several times in Simplicius, and indeed 70-73 appear directly after 118 at Simpl. 8r 33, 26. Stein inserts Simpl. 8r 33, 26 as his line 69. My proposal is to insert both Simpl. 8r 33, 25 and 26 after 68, in which case there is no reason for regarding 116-117 as different from 67-68. So I would read 67-68, 118, 69-73.\r\nThese two changes in the text of Simplicius, which cut out several repetitions, rest on the interpretation of Simpl. 8r 33, 19. Stein breaks this passage after 33, 25 and inserts 33, 26 as line 69. I propose to break it at the point where the meaning halts, namely after 33, 22; the first four lines I would place after 93 as I have suggested in the last paragraph but one, and the remainder after 66, as I have suggested in the last paragraph.\r\n134 = 138. Line 134, which consists simply of the word sphairon, has no reason for existence; as the reference in Simpl. 258r may perfectly well apply to line 138.\r\n3 = 228. The close resemblance between these two lines may be due to the restoration of 228. We may notice, however, merimnas (3, 45, 228) and deila (3, 53, 228, 343, 400, 441, 446) are favourite words with Empedokles, so that perhaps there is no reason to discredit line 228.\r\nIn conclusion, I should like to suggest a slight emendation of line 85. The text of Simplicius at 34r 158, 24 reads met\u2018 osoisin (so aE; DE met\u2018 ossoisin); Preller suggests g\u2018 ossoisin; Panzerbieter, meth\u2018 oloisin. What is wanted is a reference to the four elements, with which Love works, though her activity cannot be discerned by mortal men. So I would suggest meta toisin, since tauta, tade, ta are commonly used to refer to the elements in the whole poem. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1898","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1EJm8S2SsGJjpTn","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":94,"full_name":"Fairbanks, Arthur ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":597,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"12","issue":"1","pages":"16-17"}},"sort":[1898]}
Title | Die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander und Andere in dem Commentar des ersteren zu der aristotelischen Schrif de coelo |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1897 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 191-227 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zahlfleisch, Johann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In dem Artikel geht es um die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander im Zusammenhang mit der aristotelischen Schrift De Caelo. Während Alexander behauptet, dass es in der Schrift um die physikalischen Verhältnisse der Himmelssphäre geht, argumentiert Simplicius, dass es Aristoteles vielmehr darum geht, die letzte Ursache in der Leitung der Welt anzugeben. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4kk7bZgKnVIHNFv |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1213","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1213,"authors_free":[{"id":1795,"entry_id":1213,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":367,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Zahlfleisch, Johann","free_first_name":"Johann","free_last_name":"Zahlfleisch","norm_person":{"id":367,"first_name":"Johann","last_name":"Zahlfleisch","full_name":"Zahlfleisch, Johann","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116948736","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander und Andere in dem Commentar des ersteren zu der aristotelischen Schrif de coelo","main_title":{"title":"Die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander und Andere in dem Commentar des ersteren zu der aristotelischen Schrif de coelo"},"abstract":"In dem Artikel geht es um die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander im Zusammenhang mit der aristotelischen Schrift De Caelo. W\u00e4hrend Alexander behauptet, dass es in der Schrift um die physikalischen Verh\u00e4ltnisse der Himmelssph\u00e4re geht, argumentiert Simplicius, dass es Aristoteles vielmehr darum geht, die letzte Ursache in der Leitung der Welt anzugeben. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1897","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4kk7bZgKnVIHNFv","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":367,"full_name":"Zahlfleisch, Johann","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1213,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"10","issue":"3","pages":"191-227"}},"sort":[1897]}
Title | Sur la période finale de la philosophie grecque |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1896 |
Journal | Revue philosophique de la France et de L'Étranger |
Volume | 42 |
Pages | 266-287 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tannery, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Les historiens de la philosophie grecque ont pris, entre autres, deux habitudes : la première est de passer sous silence tout personnage reconnu comme chrétien, quand bien même ses écrits suivraient la tradition des maîtres païens ; la seconde est d'adopter comme limite inférieure la date de la fermeture, par Justinien, de l'école d'Athènes en 529. C'est ainsi qu'Édouard Zeller, pour ne citer que son exemple, ne consacre pas une ligne de son texte à Jean Philopon, dont cependant il invoque assez souvent dans ses notes les commentaires sur Aristote ; c'est ainsi encore qu'il parle de Simplicius avant de raconter l'exode en Perse des philosophes d'Athènes, quoique, avec son exactitude ordinaire, il ait soin de remarquer que les ouvrages les plus importants du dernier diadochos sont postérieurs à 529. Ces indications suffisent à montrer que les deux errements que j'ai signalés et qui, à première vue, ne semblent avoir rien de commun, se rattachent cependant à une même opinion, aussi généralement reçue qu'elle est probablement difficile à ébranler. Cette opinion est que le travail, si considérable pourtant, des commentateurs d'Aristote est, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, tout à fait négligeable vis-à-vis de l'œuvre des néoplatoniciens. Je ne veux nullement contester que le mouvement intellectuel dont on rattache l'origine à Ammonius Saccas soit le seul courant qui, en dehors du christianisme, ait, à cette époque de décadence, persisté avec une réelle originalité, malgré le flot montant d'une nouvelle religion, apportant avec elle d'autres solutions aux problèmes métaphysiques, introduisant d'autres habitudes d'esprit, d'autres modes de raisonnement. Je considère également comme tout à fait rationnel de séparer en principe l'histoire de la philosophie ancienne et celle de la philosophie chrétienne, quoique, à partir du IVᵉ siècle, les représentants de cette dernière aient certainement été à la hauteur de leurs rivaux païens ; les influences réciproques que les uns ont pu exercer sur les autres sont en effet beaucoup trop faibles pour qu'il y ait intérêt à lier intimement l'étude des deux camps ennemis. Il n'y a cependant pas là, évidemment, des raisons suffisantes soit pour négliger l'étude des commentateurs d'Aristote postérieurs à Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, soit pour faire rentrer cette étude dans celle du néoplatonisme, en écartant les chrétiens comme Jean Philopon. L'œuvre de ces commentateurs a en effet une importance historique bien supérieure à celle de l'école de Plotin ; quoique cette dernière n'ait nullement été inconnue des Arabes, ni des scolastiques du Moyen Âge, ses doctrines n'ont plus joué, à partir du VIᵉ siècle de notre ère, qu'un rôle passablement insignifiant, sauf le mouvement factice qui s'est produit un moment en leur faveur à la Renaissance. Depuis lors, l'intérêt qu'elles ont provoqué, notamment dans notre siècle, est d'un ordre purement historique. On doit affirmer au contraire que ce sont les commentateurs anciens d'Aristote qui ont décidé le succès des doctrines de leur maître chez les Arabes et, dès lors, par contre-coup, dans l'Occident latin. D'autre part, un fait méconnu, je crois, jusqu'à présent, mais que je me propose particulièrement de mettre en lumière, à savoir qu'après Ammonius, fils d'Hermias, l'école d'Alexandrie est devenue chrétienne, mais qu'on n'en a pas moins continué à y professer la philosophie aristotélique jusqu'à l'invasion arabe, ce fait, dis-je, avait naturellement amené une adaptation de cette philosophie à une religion monothéiste enseignant la création. Cette circonstance ne laissait pour ainsi dire aucune liberté de choix aux Arabes ; en même temps que les écrits des commentateurs idolâtres ou non, constituant un corps de doctrine complet, ils rencontraient, soit en Égypte, soit chez les Syriaques ou les Arméniens, une tradition vivante pour l'enseignement aristotélique aux fidèles d'une religion tout à fait semblable à la leur. Beaucoup moins originaux, comme penseurs ou comme savants, qu'on l'a supposé sans un examen approfondi, ils ne pouvaient que se mettre à la même école, et ils ne surent guère s'en affranchir. Avant donc les Arabes, avant nos scolastiques de l'Occident latin, les commentateurs grecs d'Aristote ont créé la méthode exégétique, signalé les points de controverse, indiqué des solutions qui se sont perpétuées. Ils n'ont pas été seulement des précurseurs, mais bien de véritables maîtres, dont l'influence a persisté jusqu'au XVIIIᵉ siècle. [introduction p. 266-268] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zOpjj1OBM4BnCRa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"476","_score":null,"_source":{"id":476,"authors_free":[{"id":642,"entry_id":476,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":329,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tannery, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Tannery","norm_person":{"id":329,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Tannery","full_name":"Tannery, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117201065","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Sur la p\u00e9riode finale de la philosophie grecque","main_title":{"title":"Sur la p\u00e9riode finale de la philosophie grecque"},"abstract":"Les historiens de la philosophie grecque ont pris, entre autres, deux habitudes : la premi\u00e8re est de passer sous silence tout personnage reconnu comme chr\u00e9tien, quand bien m\u00eame ses \u00e9crits suivraient la tradition des ma\u00eetres pa\u00efens ; la seconde est d'adopter comme limite inf\u00e9rieure la date de la fermeture, par Justinien, de l'\u00e9cole d'Ath\u00e8nes en 529.\r\n\r\nC'est ainsi qu'\u00c9douard Zeller, pour ne citer que son exemple, ne consacre pas une ligne de son texte \u00e0 Jean Philopon, dont cependant il invoque assez souvent dans ses notes les commentaires sur Aristote ; c'est ainsi encore qu'il parle de Simplicius avant de raconter l'exode en Perse des philosophes d'Ath\u00e8nes, quoique, avec son exactitude ordinaire, il ait soin de remarquer que les ouvrages les plus importants du dernier diadochos sont post\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 529.\r\n\r\nCes indications suffisent \u00e0 montrer que les deux errements que j'ai signal\u00e9s et qui, \u00e0 premi\u00e8re vue, ne semblent avoir rien de commun, se rattachent cependant \u00e0 une m\u00eame opinion, aussi g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement re\u00e7ue qu'elle est probablement difficile \u00e0 \u00e9branler. Cette opinion est que le travail, si consid\u00e9rable pourtant, des commentateurs d'Aristote est, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, tout \u00e0 fait n\u00e9gligeable vis-\u00e0-vis de l'\u0153uvre des n\u00e9oplatoniciens.\r\n\r\nJe ne veux nullement contester que le mouvement intellectuel dont on rattache l'origine \u00e0 Ammonius Saccas soit le seul courant qui, en dehors du christianisme, ait, \u00e0 cette \u00e9poque de d\u00e9cadence, persist\u00e9 avec une r\u00e9elle originalit\u00e9, malgr\u00e9 le flot montant d'une nouvelle religion, apportant avec elle d'autres solutions aux probl\u00e8mes m\u00e9taphysiques, introduisant d'autres habitudes d'esprit, d'autres modes de raisonnement.\r\n\r\nJe consid\u00e8re \u00e9galement comme tout \u00e0 fait rationnel de s\u00e9parer en principe l'histoire de la philosophie ancienne et celle de la philosophie chr\u00e9tienne, quoique, \u00e0 partir du IV\u1d49 si\u00e8cle, les repr\u00e9sentants de cette derni\u00e8re aient certainement \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 la hauteur de leurs rivaux pa\u00efens ; les influences r\u00e9ciproques que les uns ont pu exercer sur les autres sont en effet beaucoup trop faibles pour qu'il y ait int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 lier intimement l'\u00e9tude des deux camps ennemis.\r\n\r\nIl n'y a cependant pas l\u00e0, \u00e9videmment, des raisons suffisantes soit pour n\u00e9gliger l'\u00e9tude des commentateurs d'Aristote post\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, soit pour faire rentrer cette \u00e9tude dans celle du n\u00e9oplatonisme, en \u00e9cartant les chr\u00e9tiens comme Jean Philopon.\r\n\r\nL'\u0153uvre de ces commentateurs a en effet une importance historique bien sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle de l'\u00e9cole de Plotin ; quoique cette derni\u00e8re n'ait nullement \u00e9t\u00e9 inconnue des Arabes, ni des scolastiques du Moyen \u00c2ge, ses doctrines n'ont plus jou\u00e9, \u00e0 partir du VI\u1d49 si\u00e8cle de notre \u00e8re, qu'un r\u00f4le passablement insignifiant, sauf le mouvement factice qui s'est produit un moment en leur faveur \u00e0 la Renaissance. Depuis lors, l'int\u00e9r\u00eat qu'elles ont provoqu\u00e9, notamment dans notre si\u00e8cle, est d'un ordre purement historique.\r\n\r\nOn doit affirmer au contraire que ce sont les commentateurs anciens d'Aristote qui ont d\u00e9cid\u00e9 le succ\u00e8s des doctrines de leur ma\u00eetre chez les Arabes et, d\u00e8s lors, par contre-coup, dans l'Occident latin.\r\n\r\nD'autre part, un fait m\u00e9connu, je crois, jusqu'\u00e0 pr\u00e9sent, mais que je me propose particuli\u00e8rement de mettre en lumi\u00e8re, \u00e0 savoir qu'apr\u00e8s Ammonius, fils d'Hermias, l'\u00e9cole d'Alexandrie est devenue chr\u00e9tienne, mais qu'on n'en a pas moins continu\u00e9 \u00e0 y professer la philosophie aristot\u00e9lique jusqu'\u00e0 l'invasion arabe, ce fait, dis-je, avait naturellement amen\u00e9 une adaptation de cette philosophie \u00e0 une religion monoth\u00e9iste enseignant la cr\u00e9ation.\r\n\r\nCette circonstance ne laissait pour ainsi dire aucune libert\u00e9 de choix aux Arabes ; en m\u00eame temps que les \u00e9crits des commentateurs idol\u00e2tres ou non, constituant un corps de doctrine complet, ils rencontraient, soit en \u00c9gypte, soit chez les Syriaques ou les Arm\u00e9niens, une tradition vivante pour l'enseignement aristot\u00e9lique aux fid\u00e8les d'une religion tout \u00e0 fait semblable \u00e0 la leur.\r\n\r\nBeaucoup moins originaux, comme penseurs ou comme savants, qu'on l'a suppos\u00e9 sans un examen approfondi, ils ne pouvaient que se mettre \u00e0 la m\u00eame \u00e9cole, et ils ne surent gu\u00e8re s'en affranchir.\r\n\r\nAvant donc les Arabes, avant nos scolastiques de l'Occident latin, les commentateurs grecs d'Aristote ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 la m\u00e9thode ex\u00e9g\u00e9tique, signal\u00e9 les points de controverse, indiqu\u00e9 des solutions qui se sont perp\u00e9tu\u00e9es. Ils n'ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9 seulement des pr\u00e9curseurs, mais bien de v\u00e9ritables ma\u00eetres, dont l'influence a persist\u00e9 jusqu'au XVIII\u1d49 si\u00e8cle. [introduction p. 266-268]","btype":3,"date":"1896","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zOpjj1OBM4BnCRa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":329,"full_name":"Tannery, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":476,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue philosophique de la France et de L'\u00c9tranger","volume":"42","issue":"","pages":"266-287"}},"sort":[1896]}
Title | Handschriftliches zum Commentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles de caelo |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1892 |
Journal | Sitzungsberichte der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin |
Pages | 59-76 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Heiberg, Johan Ludvig |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Über dem Kommentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles De caelo hat bisher ein besonderer Unglücksstern gewaltet. Das wichtige Werk liegt griechisch nur in zwei Ausgaben vor: der Aldina von 1526, deren Text von Peyron als Rückübersetzung der lateinischen Übersetzung Wilhelms von Moerbeke bezeichnet wurde, an welcher Entdeckung jedoch von neueren wieder gerüttelt worden ist, und der holländischen Akademie-Ausgabe vom Jahre 1865, zu deren Charakteristik diese Abhandlung genügendes liefern wird. Beide Ausgaben sind ohne kritischen Apparat, und derselbe Mangel macht auch die Auszüge bei Brandis, die übrigens auf besserer handschriftlicher Grundlage fußen, wenig brauchbar, besonders für die zahlreichen Zitate aus verlorenen Schriften, welche diesem Werke des Simplicius einen besonderen Wert geben. Es soll hier als erster Schritt zur Hebung des Bannes der Versuch gemacht werden, die handschriftliche Grundlage dieses Werkes festzustellen. [introduction p. 59] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/umbt971kuW4QUC0 |
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Title | ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΥ. Aristot. Phys. B 4-6 |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1875 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 9 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 425-470 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Torstrik, Adolf |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Werfen wir nun noch einen Blick auf den zurückgelegten Weg, so finden wir in dieser Abhandlung eine solche Masse von Verderbnis, wie kaum in irgendeinem anderen Teil gleichen Umfangs der aristotelischen Schriften. Und hier handelt es sich keineswegs um jene harmlosen Verschreibungen und Auslassungen, die sich hier wie überall finden; auch nicht bloß um einen so plumpen und gemeinen Fälscher, der zu drei verschiedenen Malen dem Aristoteles sein exô und entos aufdrängt, das hier lediglich nichts zu schaffen hat, einen Mann von der Geistesrichtung etwa des Straton; nein, bis ins Herz des Begriffs ist die Fälschung gedrungen durch die, welche dem Aristoteles die Meinung zuschrieben, zufällig sei das, was auch ein Werk des Verstandes oder der Natur sein könnte. Andererseits fanden wir gewisse Unvollkommenheiten, welche uns die Vermutung nahelegten, Aristoteles habe zwar den ganzen architektonischen Bau angelegt und den größten Teil auch ausgeführt, einige kleine Teile aber nur für sich durch ein memento angedeutet, welche Teile dann von dem, der dieses Werk herausgegeben hat – also doch wohl Eudemus – nicht immer zum Besten ausgeführt worden seien. Dies verdient Nachsicht, umso eher, als wir an der frommsten Gewissenhaftigkeit des Herausgebers nicht zweifeln können: hat er uns doch sogar an zwei Stellen einen Einblick in die Art gewährt, wie Aristoteles arbeitete, indem er uns zwei Fassungen desselben Gedankens überliefert hat, die er in den Papieren des Meisters vorgefunden hat. Es schließen sich diese doppelten Fassungen den übrigen an, die uns in der Psychologie, der Metaphysik und so vielen anderen Schriften erhalten sind; Tatsachen, die ihre volle Würdigung erst dann finden werden, wenn es sich einst darum handeln wird, die Geschichte des aristotelischen Textes zu schreiben. Aber nicht für den Philologen allein, auch für den Philosophen hat diese Abhandlung des Aristoteles hohe Bedeutung. Sicher geleitet an der Hand der griechischen Sprache, welche mit der zartesten Auffassung aller Schattierungen, die in der Erscheinungswelt des Menschenlebens spielen – wie man dies besonders in der Ethik erkennt – einen metaphysischen Tiefsinn verbindet, die sie zu mehr als zum vollkommensten Werkzeug der Philosophie macht, die sie in dieser selbst zum Ariadnefaden machte, ist es dem Aristoteles gelungen, durch die Entwicklung eines unscheinbaren und von den spekulativen Philosophen meistens auf die Seite geschobenen Begriffs dem Materialismus einen Streich zu versetzen, den er nicht verwinden wird, ohne sich mit dem, was in aller Erscheinung das Offenbarste ist, in Widerspruch zu setzen. Dies Offensichtliche, das a-lêthes, ist der Zweck; und wir sehen denn auch, dass die Materialisten aller Zeiten den Zweck am meisten bekämpfen. Mit Recht: hebt ihn auf, und ihr habt das aition kath' hauto aufgehoben und den göttlichen Kosmos in den wüsten Strudel sich sinnlos befehdender Kräfte gerissen. Dinos basileuei. [conclusion p. 469-470] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Sg8QDCMsdh5qIuI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"841","_score":null,"_source":{"id":841,"authors_free":[{"id":1245,"entry_id":841,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":342,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Torstrik, Adolf","free_first_name":"Adolf","free_last_name":"Torstrik","norm_person":{"id":342,"first_name":"Adolf","last_name":"Torstrik","full_name":"Torstrik, Adolf","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117407224","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u03a5\u03a7\u0397\u03a3 \u039a\u0391\u0399 \u03a4\u039f\u03a5 \u0391\u03a5\u03a4\u039f\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u039f\u03a5. Aristot. Phys. B 4-6","main_title":{"title":"\u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u03a5\u03a7\u0397\u03a3 \u039a\u0391\u0399 \u03a4\u039f\u03a5 \u0391\u03a5\u03a4\u039f\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u039f\u03a5. Aristot. Phys. B 4-6"},"abstract":"Werfen wir nun noch einen Blick auf den zur\u00fcckgelegten Weg, so finden wir in dieser Abhandlung eine solche Masse von Verderbnis, wie kaum in irgendeinem anderen Teil gleichen Umfangs der aristotelischen Schriften. Und hier handelt es sich keineswegs um jene harmlosen Verschreibungen und Auslassungen, die sich hier wie \u00fcberall finden; auch nicht blo\u00df um einen so plumpen und gemeinen F\u00e4lscher, der zu drei verschiedenen Malen dem Aristoteles sein ex\u00f4 und entos aufdr\u00e4ngt, das hier lediglich nichts zu schaffen hat, einen Mann von der Geistesrichtung etwa des Straton; nein, bis ins Herz des Begriffs ist die F\u00e4lschung gedrungen durch die, welche dem Aristoteles die Meinung zuschrieben, zuf\u00e4llig sei das, was auch ein Werk des Verstandes oder der Natur sein k\u00f6nnte.\r\n\r\nAndererseits fanden wir gewisse Unvollkommenheiten, welche uns die Vermutung nahelegten, Aristoteles habe zwar den ganzen architektonischen Bau angelegt und den gr\u00f6\u00dften Teil auch ausgef\u00fchrt, einige kleine Teile aber nur f\u00fcr sich durch ein memento angedeutet, welche Teile dann von dem, der dieses Werk herausgegeben hat \u2013 also doch wohl Eudemus \u2013 nicht immer zum Besten ausgef\u00fchrt worden seien. Dies verdient Nachsicht, umso eher, als wir an der frommsten Gewissenhaftigkeit des Herausgebers nicht zweifeln k\u00f6nnen: hat er uns doch sogar an zwei Stellen einen Einblick in die Art gew\u00e4hrt, wie Aristoteles arbeitete, indem er uns zwei Fassungen desselben Gedankens \u00fcberliefert hat, die er in den Papieren des Meisters vorgefunden hat. Es schlie\u00dfen sich diese doppelten Fassungen den \u00fcbrigen an, die uns in der Psychologie, der Metaphysik und so vielen anderen Schriften erhalten sind; Tatsachen, die ihre volle W\u00fcrdigung erst dann finden werden, wenn es sich einst darum handeln wird, die Geschichte des aristotelischen Textes zu schreiben.\r\n\r\nAber nicht f\u00fcr den Philologen allein, auch f\u00fcr den Philosophen hat diese Abhandlung des Aristoteles hohe Bedeutung. Sicher geleitet an der Hand der griechischen Sprache, welche mit der zartesten Auffassung aller Schattierungen, die in der Erscheinungswelt des Menschenlebens spielen \u2013 wie man dies besonders in der Ethik erkennt \u2013 einen metaphysischen Tiefsinn verbindet, die sie zu mehr als zum vollkommensten Werkzeug der Philosophie macht, die sie in dieser selbst zum Ariadnefaden machte, ist es dem Aristoteles gelungen, durch die Entwicklung eines unscheinbaren und von den spekulativen Philosophen meistens auf die Seite geschobenen Begriffs dem Materialismus einen Streich zu versetzen, den er nicht verwinden wird, ohne sich mit dem, was in aller Erscheinung das Offenbarste ist, in Widerspruch zu setzen.\r\n\r\nDies Offensichtliche, das a-l\u00eathes, ist der Zweck; und wir sehen denn auch, dass die Materialisten aller Zeiten den Zweck am meisten bek\u00e4mpfen. Mit Recht: hebt ihn auf, und ihr habt das aition kath' hauto aufgehoben und den g\u00f6ttlichen Kosmos in den w\u00fcsten Strudel sich sinnlos befehdender Kr\u00e4fte gerissen. Dinos basileuei. [conclusion p. 469-470]","btype":3,"date":"1875","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Sg8QDCMsdh5qIuI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":342,"full_name":"Torstrik, Adolf","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":841,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"9","issue":"4","pages":"425-470"}},"sort":[1875]}
Title | Note sur les observations astronomiques envoyées, dit-on, de Babylone en Grèce, par Callisthène, sur la demande d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1862 |
Journal | Revue Archéologique, Nouvelle Série |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 243-246 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Martin, Thomas Henri |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
L'importance du mémoire lu à l'Académie des inscriptions par M. Th. Henri Martin dans la séance du 21 février, et dont nous avons dit un mot dans le compte rendu des séances de l’Académie du mois dernier, nous engage à en donner un résumé plus complet. Plus, en effet, l’opinion soutenue par M. Vivien de Saint-Martin est séduisante au premier abord, plus il est nécessaire d’examiner avec soin les bases sur lesquelles elle repose. Or, M. Henri Martin conteste l’authenticité du chiffre 1903 et apporte à l’appui de sa conviction des arguments qui nous semblent très puissants. Il est donc de notre devoir de mettre nos lecteurs à même de juger la valeur des assertions de M. Henri Martin qui, si elles sont acceptées, ruinent complètement les conclusions de M. Vivien de Saint-Martin. [introduction p. 243] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/39NzQsbvM2BCm0e |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"905","_score":null,"_source":{"id":905,"authors_free":[{"id":2071,"entry_id":905,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":240,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Martin, Thomas Henri","free_first_name":"Thomas Henri","free_last_name":"Martin","norm_person":{"id":240,"first_name":"Thomas Henri","last_name":"Martin","full_name":"Martin, Thomas Henri","short_ident":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120769840","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Note sur les observations astronomiques envoy\u00e9es, dit-on, de Babylone en Gr\u00e8ce, par Callisth\u00e8ne, sur la demande d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Note sur les observations astronomiques envoy\u00e9es, dit-on, de Babylone en Gr\u00e8ce, par Callisth\u00e8ne, sur la demande d'Aristote"},"abstract":"L'importance du m\u00e9moire lu \u00e0 l'Acad\u00e9mie des inscriptions par M. Th. Henri Martin dans la s\u00e9ance du 21 f\u00e9vrier, et dont nous avons dit un mot dans le compte rendu des s\u00e9ances de l\u2019Acad\u00e9mie du mois dernier, nous engage \u00e0 en donner un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 plus complet. Plus, en effet, l\u2019opinion soutenue par M. Vivien de Saint-Martin est s\u00e9duisante au premier abord, plus il est n\u00e9cessaire d\u2019examiner avec soin les bases sur lesquelles elle repose.\r\n\r\nOr, M. Henri Martin conteste l\u2019authenticit\u00e9 du chiffre 1903 et apporte \u00e0 l\u2019appui de sa conviction des arguments qui nous semblent tr\u00e8s puissants. Il est donc de notre devoir de mettre nos lecteurs \u00e0 m\u00eame de juger la valeur des assertions de M. Henri Martin qui, si elles sont accept\u00e9es, ruinent compl\u00e8tement les conclusions de M. Vivien de Saint-Martin. [introduction p. 243]","btype":3,"date":"1862","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/39NzQsbvM2BCm0e","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":240,"full_name":"Martin, Thomas Henri","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":905,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Arch\u00e9ologique, Nouvelle S\u00e9rie","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"243-246"}},"sort":[1862]}
Title | Pagans vs. Christians in Late Neoplatonism: Simplicius and Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (forthcoming) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To characterize Simplicius' views of Philoponus in a nutshell, I can do no better than to cite a passage from Simplicius' commentary on the Categories (p. 7, 23-32 Kalbfleisch), in which the pagan philosopher sums up the qualities that a good commentator on Aristotle should possess:
The worthy exegete of Aristotle's writings must not fall wholly short of the latter's greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have experience of everything the Philosopher has written and must be a connoisseur (epistēmōn) of Aristotle's stylistic habits. His judgment must be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher's school. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XhhKQngjLfncQW0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1260","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1260,"authors_free":[{"id":1842,"entry_id":1260,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":25,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chase, Michael","free_first_name":"Michael","free_last_name":"Chase","norm_person":{"id":25,"first_name":"Michael ","last_name":"Chase","full_name":"Chase, Michael ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1031917152","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Pagans vs. Christians in Late Neoplatonism: Simplicius and Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (forthcoming)","main_title":{"title":"Pagans vs. Christians in Late Neoplatonism: Simplicius and Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (forthcoming)"},"abstract":"To characterize Simplicius' views of Philoponus in a nutshell, I can do no better than to cite a passage from Simplicius' commentary on the Categories (p. 7, 23-32 Kalbfleisch), in which the pagan philosopher sums up the qualities that a good commentator on Aristotle should possess:\r\n\r\n The worthy exegete of Aristotle's writings must not fall wholly short of the latter's greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have experience of everything the Philosopher has written and must be a connoisseur (epist\u0113m\u014dn) of Aristotle's stylistic habits. His judgment must be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher's school. <The good exegete> must, I believe, not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter (lexis) of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (nous) and track down (anikhneuein) the harmony which reigns between them on the majority of points.\r\n\r\nI think it's safe to say that, in Simplicius' view, Philoponus fails to make the grade on all these points: he does not know Aristotle well, he lacks impartiality (although in his case it is not because he strives to prove that Aristotle is always right, but to prove that he is very often wrong), and above all, he insists on the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle, remaining at the level of the surface meaning of their texts and failing to discern the underlying harmony between the two great philosophers.\r\n\r\nI suspect Simplicius would also apply to Philoponus what he says shortly afterward in his Commentary on the Categories about the qualities required of a good philosophy student:\r\n\r\n He must, however, guard against disputatious twaddle (eristik\u00ea phluaria), into which many of those who frequent Aristotle tend to fall. Whereas the Philosopher endeavors to demonstrate everything by means of the irrefutable definitions of science, these smart-alecks (hoi peritt\u00f4s sophoi) have the habit of contradicting even what is obvious, blinding the eye of their souls. Against such people, it is enough to speak Aristotle's words: to wit, they need either sensation (aisth\u0113sis) or punishment. If they are being argumentative without having paid attention, it is perception they need. If, however, they have paid attention to the text but are trying to show off their discursive power, it is punishment they need.\r\n\r\nWe don't know what Philoponus's evaluation of Simplicius would have been, but I am pretty sure it would not have been flattering, either. [conclusion p. 23-24]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/XhhKQngjLfncQW0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":25,"full_name":"Chase, Michael ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":[-2147483648]}
Title | Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius, Philoponus) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 260-264 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
With the publication of the above four volumes, there are now about twenty in the monumental series of translations Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, begun in 1987 under the editorial direction of Richard Sorabji. By my reckoning, the project is just about halfway completed. When all the volumes have appeared, perhaps by the end of the century, we shall have the first complete translation of the corpus of Aristotelian commentaries in any language. Reviewers of earlier volumes have been rightly fulsome in their praise for the general project. Many scholars have pointed out that during the period AD 200–600, commentaries on Aristotle and Plato comprised one of the principal genres of philosophy. Thus, the volumes in this series record far more than a mass of esoterica: they are actually a mine of some of the best philosophical thinking of the time. Even Plotinus, who was not primarily a commentator, structured many of his Enneads as virtual commentaries or meditations on passages of Plato and others. Since this huge project is not likely to be repeated in another modern language, the series will undoubtedly stand as one of the principal tools available to anyone who does not work comfortably in Greek but who wishes to acquire more than the most superficial knowledge of 400 years of philosophy. There are actually three main divisions of the commentaries contained in the great Berlin Academy edition. The first consists of the extensive and relatively straightforward commentaries up to about the fourth century AD. Among the commentators of this period, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who flourished in the early part of the third century AD, is clearly dominant. His understanding of Aristotle had an authoritative role for subsequent generations. His commentaries are the principal means for the revitalization of Peripatetic philosophy after its long period of desuetude, beginning even in the century after Aristotle himself. The second and largest part of the corpus contains the Neoplatonic commentaries up to AD 600. The two most important figures in this group are John Philoponus and Simplicius (both of whom flourished in the mid-sixth century AD). The label "Neoplatonism" is far from unambiguous, but here it refers to the view that the philosophy of Aristotle is basically in harmony with that of Plato. A proposition that Sorabji calls "perfectly crazy" was actually, as he says, philosophically fruitful. I do not think that the contention that Aristotle was in harmony with Plato on essential points is quite as crazy as Sorabji thinks, especially if we insist, as we must, that the Neoplatonists were referring to Plato as they understood him, not as we do. I must add that there are many scholars today—mostly in continental Europe rather than in Britain or North America—who think that the Neoplatonic understanding of Plato is itself worthy of serious attention. At any rate, although Alexander's commentaries are still among the most reliable guides to Aristotle's tortuous arguments, the commentaries of Philoponus and Simplicius, above all the others in that group, are the most consistently provocative. They are unique documents in the history of philosophy, full of surprising and challenging arguments. The third part, outside the purview of this review, contains the works of some of the eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantine commentators. This is material at the outermost reaches of the empire of Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not without interest, particularly as a counterbalance to the medieval Latin Christian interpretations of the Greeks. [introduction p. 260-261] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Ekcc0Hmw42Ha5F6 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"649","_score":null,"_source":{"id":649,"authors_free":[{"id":930,"entry_id":649,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius, Philoponus)","main_title":{"title":"Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius, Philoponus)"},"abstract":"With the publication of the above four volumes, there are now about twenty in the monumental series of translations Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, begun in 1987 under the editorial direction of Richard Sorabji. By my reckoning, the project is just about halfway completed. When all the volumes have appeared, perhaps by the end of the century, we shall have the first complete translation of the corpus of Aristotelian commentaries in any language. Reviewers of earlier volumes have been rightly fulsome in their praise for the general project. Many scholars have pointed out that during the period AD 200\u2013600, commentaries on Aristotle and Plato comprised one of the principal genres of philosophy. Thus, the volumes in this series record far more than a mass of esoterica: they are actually a mine of some of the best philosophical thinking of the time. Even Plotinus, who was not primarily a commentator, structured many of his Enneads as virtual commentaries or meditations on passages of Plato and others. Since this huge project is not likely to be repeated in another modern language, the series will undoubtedly stand as one of the principal tools available to anyone who does not work comfortably in Greek but who wishes to acquire more than the most superficial knowledge of 400 years of philosophy.\r\n\r\nThere are actually three main divisions of the commentaries contained in the great Berlin Academy edition. The first consists of the extensive and relatively straightforward commentaries up to about the fourth century AD. Among the commentators of this period, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who flourished in the early part of the third century AD, is clearly dominant. His understanding of Aristotle had an authoritative role for subsequent generations. His commentaries are the principal means for the revitalization of Peripatetic philosophy after its long period of desuetude, beginning even in the century after Aristotle himself.\r\n\r\nThe second and largest part of the corpus contains the Neoplatonic commentaries up to AD 600. The two most important figures in this group are John Philoponus and Simplicius (both of whom flourished in the mid-sixth century AD). The label \"Neoplatonism\" is far from unambiguous, but here it refers to the view that the philosophy of Aristotle is basically in harmony with that of Plato. A proposition that Sorabji calls \"perfectly crazy\" was actually, as he says, philosophically fruitful. I do not think that the contention that Aristotle was in harmony with Plato on essential points is quite as crazy as Sorabji thinks, especially if we insist, as we must, that the Neoplatonists were referring to Plato as they understood him, not as we do. I must add that there are many scholars today\u2014mostly in continental Europe rather than in Britain or North America\u2014who think that the Neoplatonic understanding of Plato is itself worthy of serious attention. At any rate, although Alexander's commentaries are still among the most reliable guides to Aristotle's tortuous arguments, the commentaries of Philoponus and Simplicius, above all the others in that group, are the most consistently provocative. They are unique documents in the history of philosophy, full of surprising and challenging arguments.\r\n\r\nThe third part, outside the purview of this review, contains the works of some of the eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantine commentators. This is material at the outermost reaches of the empire of Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not without interest, particularly as a counterbalance to the medieval Latin Christian interpretations of the Greeks. [introduction p. 260-261]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Ekcc0Hmw42Ha5F6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":649,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Philosophical Quarterly","volume":"45","issue":"1","pages":"260-264"}},"sort":[-2147483648]}
Title | Théodoret, Graec. Aff. Cur., IV. 12 et l’ordre des fragments de Théophraste issus de Simplicius In Phys. p. 22-28 |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Journal | Unpublished |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Journée, Gérard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the comparison between the fragments of Hippasus and Heraclitus by Theodoret of Cyrus. The similarities between the two texts suggest that they have a common source, which is probably Theophrastus. This observation confirms Theophrastus' use of systematic categories, including unity and plurality, motion, limitation and restriction. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qVCQ9YhZlvKeI75 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1361","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1361,"authors_free":[{"id":2037,"entry_id":1361,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":206,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Journ\u00e9e, G\u00e9rard","free_first_name":"G\u00e9rard","free_last_name":"Journ\u00e9e","norm_person":{"id":206,"first_name":"G\u00e9rard ","last_name":"Journ\u00e9e","full_name":"Journ\u00e9e, G\u00e9rard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Th\u00e9odoret, Graec. Aff. Cur., IV. 12 et l\u2019ordre des fragments de Th\u00e9ophraste issus de Simplicius In Phys. p. 22-28","main_title":{"title":"Th\u00e9odoret, Graec. Aff. Cur., IV. 12 et l\u2019ordre des fragments de Th\u00e9ophraste issus de Simplicius In Phys. p. 22-28"},"abstract":"This text discusses the comparison between the fragments of Hippasus and Heraclitus by Theodoret of Cyrus. The similarities between the two texts suggest that they have a common source, which is probably Theophrastus. This observation confirms Theophrastus' use of systematic categories, including unity and plurality, motion, limitation and restriction. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qVCQ9YhZlvKeI75","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":206,"full_name":"Journ\u00e9e, G\u00e9rard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1361,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Unpublished","volume":"","issue":"","pages":""}},"sort":[-2147483648]}
Title | Creation and Continuity In Neoplatonism: Origins and Legacy (forthcoming) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I think, to make a rather long story short, that Rashed is basically right. The notion of continuity is fundamental for al-Fārābī and probably determines his rejection of the instantaneous, all-at-once character of creation advocated by al-Kindī. Yet while Rashed ascribes this attitude to Fārābī’s "Aristotelian puritanism," I would rather attribute it to his fundamental Neoplatonism—unless we want to say, rather paradoxically, that someone like Simplicius was also an Aristotelian purist. As we have seen, in his debate against Philoponus, Simplicius also denies instantaneous motion or change on the basis of the Aristotelian continuity of time, space, and motion, explaining away the examples of the instantaneous transition of sunlight and other "phase transitions" by which Philoponus had attempted to explain how God created the universe instantaneously and ex nihilo. Among the factors that distinguish Philoponus’ creationism from Simplicius’ emanationism is that for the former, it makes sense—in fact, it is unavoidable—to speak of a first instant in the history of the universe, prior to which the universe did not exist. Such a notion makes no sense for Simplicius, and it makes no sense because Simplicius, like Aristotle, believes time and motion are continuous, at least in the physical world. In the Arabo-Islamic world, Kindī sides with Philoponus, as has been noted by scholars for quite some time. It has been less well noted, I think, that Fārābī sides just as resolutely with Simplicius. In the article on which I have relied so heavily in this paper, Marwan Rashed argues that, given the lacunary state of the evidence that remains to us, we can reconstruct only Fārābī’s physical proof of the eternity of the world: the fact, based on an analytical proof (hoti), that it is eternal. In another, lost part of Fārābī’s work, Rashed speculates, Fārābī will have given a demonstrative proof of this affirmation from a synthetic viewpoint, of why (dioti) the universe is eternal. It may, he thinks, have looked like this: God is an eternal cause. Every eternal cause has an eternal effect. Therefore, God has an eternal effect. But this is nothing other than a simplified version of the proof of continuous creation as we studied it above in Proclus and Porphyry. If Rashed is right on this point, and I suspect he is, we would have one more reason to agree with Philippe Vallat (2004) that Fārābī is basically a Neoplatonist rather than the doctrinaire Aristotelian he is usually made out to be. To return to our starting point, on the basis of this notion of continuity, we may have made some progress toward identifying the difference between creationism and emanationism in general. Assuming that we have some kind of First Principle that provides the world with existence, if the world can be said to have a first moment of its existence—i.e., if time is discontinuous—we have to do with creation; if not—i.e., if time is continuous—we have to do with emanation. This seems to me to be a criterion at least as important as others that are usually brought up in this context, such as the role of the will of the First Principle, or whether or not the process takes place ex nihilo. The role of will is often hard to determine, as we can see in the case of Plotinus, while ex nihilo is perhaps even more tricky, implying as it does the question of the origin of matter, which is even more obscure in Plotinus. But either the world has a first instant in its existence, or it does not. Tertium non datur. [conclusion p. 29-31] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HdCRKhOALHddyFH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1406","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1406,"authors_free":[{"id":2197,"entry_id":1406,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":25,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chase, Michael","free_first_name":"Michael","free_last_name":"Chase","norm_person":{"id":25,"first_name":"Michael ","last_name":"Chase","full_name":"Chase, Michael ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1031917152","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Creation and Continuity In Neoplatonism: Origins and Legacy (forthcoming)","main_title":{"title":"Creation and Continuity In Neoplatonism: Origins and Legacy (forthcoming)"},"abstract":"I think, to make a rather long story short, that Rashed is basically right. The notion of continuity is fundamental for al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b and probably determines his rejection of the instantaneous, all-at-once character of creation advocated by al-Kind\u012b. Yet while Rashed ascribes this attitude to F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s \"Aristotelian puritanism,\" I would rather attribute it to his fundamental Neoplatonism\u2014unless we want to say, rather paradoxically, that someone like Simplicius was also an Aristotelian purist. As we have seen, in his debate against Philoponus, Simplicius also denies instantaneous motion or change on the basis of the Aristotelian continuity of time, space, and motion, explaining away the examples of the instantaneous transition of sunlight and other \"phase transitions\" by which Philoponus had attempted to explain how God created the universe instantaneously and ex nihilo.\r\n\r\nAmong the factors that distinguish Philoponus\u2019 creationism from Simplicius\u2019 emanationism is that for the former, it makes sense\u2014in fact, it is unavoidable\u2014to speak of a first instant in the history of the universe, prior to which the universe did not exist. Such a notion makes no sense for Simplicius, and it makes no sense because Simplicius, like Aristotle, believes time and motion are continuous, at least in the physical world. In the Arabo-Islamic world, Kind\u012b sides with Philoponus, as has been noted by scholars for quite some time. It has been less well noted, I think, that F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b sides just as resolutely with Simplicius.\r\n\r\nIn the article on which I have relied so heavily in this paper, Marwan Rashed argues that, given the lacunary state of the evidence that remains to us, we can reconstruct only F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s physical proof of the eternity of the world: the fact, based on an analytical proof (hoti), that it is eternal. In another, lost part of F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s work, Rashed speculates, F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b will have given a demonstrative proof of this affirmation from a synthetic viewpoint, of why (dioti) the universe is eternal. It may, he thinks, have looked like this:\r\n\r\n God is an eternal cause.\r\n Every eternal cause has an eternal effect.\r\n Therefore, God has an eternal effect.\r\n\r\nBut this is nothing other than a simplified version of the proof of continuous creation as we studied it above in Proclus and Porphyry. If Rashed is right on this point, and I suspect he is, we would have one more reason to agree with Philippe Vallat (2004) that F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b is basically a Neoplatonist rather than the doctrinaire Aristotelian he is usually made out to be.\r\n\r\nTo return to our starting point, on the basis of this notion of continuity, we may have made some progress toward identifying the difference between creationism and emanationism in general. Assuming that we have some kind of First Principle that provides the world with existence, if the world can be said to have a first moment of its existence\u2014i.e., if time is discontinuous\u2014we have to do with creation; if not\u2014i.e., if time is continuous\u2014we have to do with emanation. This seems to me to be a criterion at least as important as others that are usually brought up in this context, such as the role of the will of the First Principle, or whether or not the process takes place ex nihilo. The role of will is often hard to determine, as we can see in the case of Plotinus, while ex nihilo is perhaps even more tricky, implying as it does the question of the origin of matter, which is even more obscure in Plotinus. But either the world has a first instant in its existence, or it does not. Tertium non datur.\r\n[conclusion p. 29-31]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HdCRKhOALHddyFH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":25,"full_name":"Chase, Michael ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":[-2147483648]}
Title | “Creatio ex nihilo”: A genuinely philosophical insight derived from Plato and Aristotle? Some notes on the treatise on the Harmony between the two sages |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Arabic Sciences and Philosophy |
Volume | 22 |
Pages | 91-117 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gleede, Benjamin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The article aims at demonstrating that in attributing the creatio ex nihilo to both Plato and Aristotle as their unanimous philosophical conviction the Treatise on the Harmony between the Two Sages deeply depends upon the Neoplatonic reading of those two philosophers. The main obstacles for such a view in the works of the two sages are Plato’s assumption of a precosmic chaos in the Timaeus and Aristotle’s denial of any efficient causality to the unmoved mover in the Metaphysics. Both of these points had been, however, done away with by the Neoplatonist commentators already, especially by Ammonius in his lost treatise on efficient and final causality in Aristotle the use of which in the Harmony is shown by a comparison with Simplicius. Christian and Muslim readers just had to transfer those arguments and hermeneutical techniques into an anti-eternalist context in order to make the two philosophers agree with one of the basic tenents of their face, a hermeneutical technique considerably different from the one employed by al-Fārābī in his exposition of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy which is compared to the Harmony in a briefly sketched concluding section. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Q6zkHx0QhaNpLZ6 |
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Title | 'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff. |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1971 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 91 |
Pages | 138-139 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hall, J.J |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Thus all that Simplicius is saying, on Eudemus’ authority, is that Anaximander ‘was the first to discuss’ the sizes and distances of ‘planets’, using the latter term to include sun and moon; and this agrees with what the doxographers tell us: Anaximander had views about the distances of sun and moon, and the size of the sun.11 A sceptic, like Dicks, may question this whole tradition; but it should not be claimed that what Simplicius says of Anaximander and planômena in 471.2-6 is inconsistent with our other authorities. [conclusion, p. 139] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/K5sTJaihiZL0lG5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1342","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1342,"authors_free":[{"id":2000,"entry_id":1342,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":165,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hall, J.J","free_first_name":"J.J.","free_last_name":"Hall","norm_person":{"id":165,"first_name":"J.J","last_name":"Hall","full_name":"Hall, J. J","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff.","main_title":{"title":"'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff."},"abstract":"Thus all that Simplicius is saying, on Eudemus\u2019 \r\nauthority, is that Anaximander \u2018was the first to \r\ndiscuss\u2019 the sizes and distances of \u2018planets\u2019, using the latter term to include sun and moon; and this agrees with what the doxographers tell us: Anaximander had views about the distances of sun and moon, and the size of the sun.11 A sceptic, like Dicks, may question this whole tradition; but it should not be claimed that what Simplicius says of Anaximander and plan\u00f4mena in 471.2-6 is incon\u00adsistent with our other authorities. [conclusion, p. 139]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/K5sTJaihiZL0lG5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":165,"full_name":"Hall, J. J","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1342,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"91","issue":"","pages":"138-139"}},"sort":["'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff."]}
Title | (Neo-) Platonica |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1984 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 319-330 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Steel, Carlos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Filosofie is ons vooral in de vorm van teksten toegankelijk. Wie filosofie wil studeren, zal onvermijdelijk teksten moeten bestuderen en zal het resultaat van zijn eigen onderzoek weer in de vorm van teksten produceren. Wel heeft de filosofie van oudsher ook met de mogelijkheid rekening gehouden dat men inzichten kan verwerven die niet discursief uitgedrukt kunnen worden, die niet „textfähig“ zijn; maar toch is de filosofie weinig beïnvloed geworden door deze principiële mogelijkheid. Tenslotte kan men weer reflecteren en schrijven over deze niet-tekstmatige inzichten, zodat het erop lijkt dat men nooit uit de toverban van de tekst geraken kan. Niemand zal eraan denken het voordeel prijs te geven dat de filosofie heeft door zich aan teksten te binden en zo haar inzichten te objectiveren. Maar toch is het bedenkelijk dat men de binding van filosofisch inzicht aan de tekst als vanzelfsprekend ziet. Zo wordt ook niet meer duidelijk wat de „zaak“ is waarop de filosofische tekst betrekking heeft. Is er wel een „zaak-los-van-de-tekst“? Het is bekend dat Plato tegenover het fenomeen „tekst“ bewust afstand heeft genomen. Men kan hem zeker niet verwijten dat hij een naïef vertrouwen heeft in de tekst als medium van filosofisch inzicht: waar het in de filosofie eigenlijk om gaat is niet in tekst uit te drukken. Al is hij zelf meer dan wie ook tekst-kunstenaar, hij blijft zich bewust van de grenzen van de tekst. Wie uit Plato’s dialogen een doctrine construeert, een systeem van uitspraken over „wat het geval is“, verliest deze reserve ten opzichte van de tekst en reduceert de vele „vormen van kennis“ tot objectief „propositioneel“ kennen. Dit is de invalshoek van waaruit Wolfgang Wieland, vooral bekend wegens zijn originele studie over Aristoteles’ Physica, zijn Plato-boek geschreven heeft: Platon und die Formen des Wissens. Het boek bevat drie delen. Het eerste is gewijd aan Plato’s verhouding tot de geschreven tekst. Uitgaande van de bekende passage in de Phaidros onderzoekt Wieland waarom Plato zo kritisch is ten opzichte van het schrift. Plato verzet zich tegen elke poging om het weten te objectiveren alsof men in de tekst over inzicht als over een stuk bezit zou kunnen beschikken. Elke formulering in taal blijft werktuig, iets voorlopigs. Het „gebruiksweten“ dat in de omgang met de dingen tot stand komt, heeft voorrang op het weten dat in proposities is uitgedrukt. Hier staan we meteen voor het centrale thema van Wielands boek. Het is echter de vraag of dit bij Plato wel zo centraal is. Bij Plato gaat het vooreerst om kritiek op het schrift, en niet op het propositionele weten als zodanig. Vanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook de dialoog als medium van filosofisch denken begrijpen. Indien men ondanks alle reserves toch niet aan tekst verzaken kan, dan biedt de dialoogvorm een uitweg. Eén van de tekorten van de tekst heeft namelijk te maken met het ontbreken van een reële context van het woord. De dialoog brengt deze context op dramatisch-fictieve wijze tot stand. De dialoog is geen didactisch hulpmiddel, geen inkleding van een leer. De uitspraken blijven er als „werktuigen“ in de gespreksactie fungeren. Vanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook het statuut van de mythe binnen de tekst begrijpen, het metaforische karakter van vele passages, het gebruik van de ironie. Tenslotte wijst Wieland in § 5 op het belang van de fictieve chronologie bij het beoordelen van een dialoog. Men kan namelijk, uitgaande van de dramatische situatie van de verschillende dialogen, een fictieve chronologie opstellen: zo zal niemand betwisten dat de Parmenides later is geschreven dan de Phaidon (reële chronologie), maar in de fictieve chronologie komt de Parmenides veel eerder, omdat hierin de jonge Socrates optreedt, terwijl in de Phaidon Socrates voor de dood staat. In de interpretatie heeft men te weinig rekening gehouden met de plaats van een dialoog in deze fictieve chronologie. [introduction p. 319-320] Übersetzung: Philosophie ist uns vor allem in der Form von Texten zugänglich. Wer Philosophie studieren will, muss zwangsläufig Texte studieren und wird die Ergebnisse seiner eigenen Forschung wiederum in Form von Texten präsentieren. Die Philosophie hat jedoch seit jeher auch die Möglichkeit berücksichtigt, dass Erkenntnisse gewonnen werden können, die nicht diskursiv ausgedrückt werden können, die also nicht „textfähig“ sind. Dennoch hat diese prinzipielle Möglichkeit die Philosophie kaum beeinflusst. Letztendlich kann man auch über diese nicht-textlichen Erkenntnisse reflektieren und schreiben, sodass es scheint, als könne man niemals aus dem Bann des Textes entkommen. Niemand wird daran denken, den Vorteil aufzugeben, den die Philosophie dadurch hat, sich an Texte zu binden und ihre Erkenntnisse so zu objektivieren. Doch es ist bedenklich, dass man die Bindung philosophischer Erkenntnis an den Text als selbstverständlich betrachtet. Dadurch wird auch unklar, was die „Sache“ ist, auf die sich der philosophische Text bezieht. Gibt es überhaupt eine „Sache außerhalb des Textes“? Es ist bekannt, dass Platon dem Phänomen „Text“ bewusst distanziert gegenüberstand. Man kann ihm sicher nicht vorwerfen, ein naives Vertrauen in den Text als Medium philosophischer Erkenntnis gehabt zu haben: Worauf es in der Philosophie eigentlich ankommt, lässt sich nicht in Texten ausdrücken. Auch wenn er selbst mehr als jeder andere ein Künstler des Textes war, war er sich stets der Grenzen des Textes bewusst. Wer aus Platons Dialogen eine Doktrin konstruiert, ein System von Aussagen über „das, was der Fall ist“, verliert diese kritische Distanz zum Text und reduziert die vielen „Formen des Wissens“ auf ein objektives „propositionales“ Wissen. Dies ist die Perspektive, aus der Wolfgang Wieland, vor allem bekannt für seine originelle Studie über Aristoteles’ Physik, sein Platon-Buch Platon und die Formen des Wissens geschrieben hat. Das Buch besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil widmet sich Platons Verhältnis zum geschriebenen Text. Ausgehend von der bekannten Passage im Phaidros untersucht Wieland, warum Platon dem Schreiben so kritisch gegenüberstand. Platon wendet sich gegen jede Versuchung, Wissen zu objektivieren, als könne man in einem Text über Erkenntnisse verfügen wie über einen Besitz. Jede Formulierung in Sprache bleibt ein Werkzeug, etwas Vorläufiges. Das „Gebrauchswissen“, das im Umgang mit den Dingen entsteht, hat Vorrang vor dem Wissen, das in Propositionen ausgedrückt ist. Hier begegnen wir dem zentralen Thema von Wielands Buch. Es bleibt jedoch die Frage, ob dies bei Platon tatsächlich zentral ist. Bei Platon geht es zunächst um Kritik am Schreiben und nicht um Kritik am propositionalen Wissen als solches. Aus der Schriftkritik lässt sich auch die Dialogform als Medium des philosophischen Denkens verstehen. Wenn man trotz aller Vorbehalte nicht auf den Text verzichten kann, bietet die Dialogform einen Ausweg. Ein Mangel des Textes liegt nämlich im Fehlen eines realen Kontexts des Wortes. Der Dialog stellt diesen Kontext auf dramatisch-fiktive Weise her. Der Dialog ist kein didaktisches Hilfsmittel, keine Verpackung einer Lehre. Die Aussagen fungieren in der Dialoghandlung weiterhin als „Werkzeuge“. Aus der Schriftkritik lässt sich auch der Status des Mythos im Text verstehen, ebenso wie der metaphorische Charakter vieler Passagen und die Verwendung von Ironie. Schließlich weist Wieland in § 5 auf die Bedeutung der fiktiven Chronologie für die Beurteilung eines Dialogs hin. Ausgehend von der dramatischen Situation der verschiedenen Dialoge lässt sich eine fiktive Chronologie erstellen: Niemand wird bestreiten, dass der Parmenides später geschrieben wurde als der Phaidon (reale Chronologie), aber in der fiktiven Chronologie kommt der Parmenides viel früher, da dort der junge Sokrates auftritt, während im Phaidon Sokrates vor seinem Tod steht. In der Interpretation hat man die Stellung eines Dialogs in dieser fiktiven Chronologie bisher zu wenig berücksichtigt. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H1e3T5fZsfMIh5O |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"845","_score":null,"_source":{"id":845,"authors_free":[{"id":1249,"entry_id":845,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"(Neo-) Platonica","main_title":{"title":"(Neo-) Platonica"},"abstract":"Filosofie is ons vooral in de vorm van teksten toegankelijk. Wie filosofie wil studeren, zal onvermijdelijk teksten moeten bestuderen en zal het resultaat van zijn eigen onderzoek weer in de vorm van teksten produceren. Wel heeft de filosofie van oudsher ook met de mogelijkheid rekening gehouden dat men inzichten kan verwerven die niet discursief uitgedrukt kunnen worden, die niet \u201etextf\u00e4hig\u201c zijn; maar toch is de filosofie weinig be\u00efnvloed geworden door deze principi\u00eble mogelijkheid. Tenslotte kan men weer reflecteren en schrijven over deze niet-tekstmatige inzichten, zodat het erop lijkt dat men nooit uit de toverban van de tekst geraken kan. Niemand zal eraan denken het voordeel prijs te geven dat de filosofie heeft door zich aan teksten te binden en zo haar inzichten te objectiveren. Maar toch is het bedenkelijk dat men de binding van filosofisch inzicht aan de tekst als vanzelfsprekend ziet. Zo wordt ook niet meer duidelijk wat de \u201ezaak\u201c is waarop de filosofische tekst betrekking heeft. Is er wel een \u201ezaak-los-van-de-tekst\u201c? Het is bekend dat Plato tegenover het fenomeen \u201etekst\u201c bewust afstand heeft genomen. Men kan hem zeker niet verwijten dat hij een na\u00efef vertrouwen heeft in de tekst als medium van filosofisch inzicht: waar het in de filosofie eigenlijk om gaat is niet in tekst uit te drukken. Al is hij zelf meer dan wie ook tekst-kunstenaar, hij blijft zich bewust van de grenzen van de tekst. Wie uit Plato\u2019s dialogen een doctrine construeert, een systeem van uitspraken over \u201ewat het geval is\u201c, verliest deze reserve ten opzichte van de tekst en reduceert de vele \u201evormen van kennis\u201c tot objectief \u201epropositioneel\u201c kennen.\r\n\r\nDit is de invalshoek van waaruit Wolfgang Wieland, vooral bekend wegens zijn originele studie over Aristoteles\u2019 Physica, zijn Plato-boek geschreven heeft: Platon und die Formen des Wissens. Het boek bevat drie delen. Het eerste is gewijd aan Plato\u2019s verhouding tot de geschreven tekst. Uitgaande van de bekende passage in de Phaidros onderzoekt Wieland waarom Plato zo kritisch is ten opzichte van het schrift. Plato verzet zich tegen elke poging om het weten te objectiveren alsof men in de tekst over inzicht als over een stuk bezit zou kunnen beschikken. Elke formulering in taal blijft werktuig, iets voorlopigs. Het \u201egebruiksweten\u201c dat in de omgang met de dingen tot stand komt, heeft voorrang op het weten dat in proposities is uitgedrukt. Hier staan we meteen voor het centrale thema van Wielands boek. Het is echter de vraag of dit bij Plato wel zo centraal is. Bij Plato gaat het vooreerst om kritiek op het schrift, en niet op het propositionele weten als zodanig.\r\n\r\nVanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook de dialoog als medium van filosofisch denken begrijpen. Indien men ondanks alle reserves toch niet aan tekst verzaken kan, dan biedt de dialoogvorm een uitweg. E\u00e9n van de tekorten van de tekst heeft namelijk te maken met het ontbreken van een re\u00eble context van het woord. De dialoog brengt deze context op dramatisch-fictieve wijze tot stand. De dialoog is geen didactisch hulpmiddel, geen inkleding van een leer. De uitspraken blijven er als \u201ewerktuigen\u201c in de gespreksactie fungeren. Vanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook het statuut van de mythe binnen de tekst begrijpen, het metaforische karakter van vele passages, het gebruik van de ironie. Tenslotte wijst Wieland in \u00a7 5 op het belang van de fictieve chronologie bij het beoordelen van een dialoog. Men kan namelijk, uitgaande van de dramatische situatie van de verschillende dialogen, een fictieve chronologie opstellen: zo zal niemand betwisten dat de Parmenides later is geschreven dan de Phaidon (re\u00eble chronologie), maar in de fictieve chronologie komt de Parmenides veel eerder, omdat hierin de jonge Socrates optreedt, terwijl in de Phaidon Socrates voor de dood staat. In de interpretatie heeft men te weinig rekening gehouden met de plaats van een dialoog in deze fictieve chronologie.\r\n[introduction p. 319-320] \u00dcbersetzung: Philosophie ist uns vor allem in der Form von Texten zug\u00e4nglich. Wer Philosophie studieren will, muss zwangsl\u00e4ufig Texte studieren und wird die Ergebnisse seiner eigenen Forschung wiederum in Form von Texten pr\u00e4sentieren. Die Philosophie hat jedoch seit jeher auch die M\u00f6glichkeit ber\u00fccksichtigt, dass Erkenntnisse gewonnen werden k\u00f6nnen, die nicht diskursiv ausgedr\u00fcckt werden k\u00f6nnen, die also nicht \u201etextf\u00e4hig\u201c sind. Dennoch hat diese prinzipielle M\u00f6glichkeit die Philosophie kaum beeinflusst. Letztendlich kann man auch \u00fcber diese nicht-textlichen Erkenntnisse reflektieren und schreiben, sodass es scheint, als k\u00f6nne man niemals aus dem Bann des Textes entkommen. Niemand wird daran denken, den Vorteil aufzugeben, den die Philosophie dadurch hat, sich an Texte zu binden und ihre Erkenntnisse so zu objektivieren. Doch es ist bedenklich, dass man die Bindung philosophischer Erkenntnis an den Text als selbstverst\u00e4ndlich betrachtet. Dadurch wird auch unklar, was die \u201eSache\u201c ist, auf die sich der philosophische Text bezieht. Gibt es \u00fcberhaupt eine \u201eSache au\u00dferhalb des Textes\u201c?\r\n\r\nEs ist bekannt, dass Platon dem Ph\u00e4nomen \u201eText\u201c bewusst distanziert gegen\u00fcberstand. Man kann ihm sicher nicht vorwerfen, ein naives Vertrauen in den Text als Medium philosophischer Erkenntnis gehabt zu haben: Worauf es in der Philosophie eigentlich ankommt, l\u00e4sst sich nicht in Texten ausdr\u00fccken. Auch wenn er selbst mehr als jeder andere ein K\u00fcnstler des Textes war, war er sich stets der Grenzen des Textes bewusst. Wer aus Platons Dialogen eine Doktrin konstruiert, ein System von Aussagen \u00fcber \u201edas, was der Fall ist\u201c, verliert diese kritische Distanz zum Text und reduziert die vielen \u201eFormen des Wissens\u201c auf ein objektives \u201epropositionales\u201c Wissen.\r\n\r\nDies ist die Perspektive, aus der Wolfgang Wieland, vor allem bekannt f\u00fcr seine originelle Studie \u00fcber Aristoteles\u2019 Physik, sein Platon-Buch Platon und die Formen des Wissens geschrieben hat. Das Buch besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil widmet sich Platons Verh\u00e4ltnis zum geschriebenen Text. Ausgehend von der bekannten Passage im Phaidros untersucht Wieland, warum Platon dem Schreiben so kritisch gegen\u00fcberstand. Platon wendet sich gegen jede Versuchung, Wissen zu objektivieren, als k\u00f6nne man in einem Text \u00fcber Erkenntnisse verf\u00fcgen wie \u00fcber einen Besitz. Jede Formulierung in Sprache bleibt ein Werkzeug, etwas Vorl\u00e4ufiges. Das \u201eGebrauchswissen\u201c, das im Umgang mit den Dingen entsteht, hat Vorrang vor dem Wissen, das in Propositionen ausgedr\u00fcckt ist. Hier begegnen wir dem zentralen Thema von Wielands Buch. Es bleibt jedoch die Frage, ob dies bei Platon tats\u00e4chlich zentral ist. Bei Platon geht es zun\u00e4chst um Kritik am Schreiben und nicht um Kritik am propositionalen Wissen als solches.\r\n\r\nAus der Schriftkritik l\u00e4sst sich auch die Dialogform als Medium des philosophischen Denkens verstehen. Wenn man trotz aller Vorbehalte nicht auf den Text verzichten kann, bietet die Dialogform einen Ausweg. Ein Mangel des Textes liegt n\u00e4mlich im Fehlen eines realen Kontexts des Wortes. Der Dialog stellt diesen Kontext auf dramatisch-fiktive Weise her. Der Dialog ist kein didaktisches Hilfsmittel, keine Verpackung einer Lehre. Die Aussagen fungieren in der Dialoghandlung weiterhin als \u201eWerkzeuge\u201c. Aus der Schriftkritik l\u00e4sst sich auch der Status des Mythos im Text verstehen, ebenso wie der metaphorische Charakter vieler Passagen und die Verwendung von Ironie. Schlie\u00dflich weist Wieland in \u00a7 5 auf die Bedeutung der fiktiven Chronologie f\u00fcr die Beurteilung eines Dialogs hin. Ausgehend von der dramatischen Situation der verschiedenen Dialoge l\u00e4sst sich eine fiktive Chronologie erstellen: Niemand wird bestreiten, dass der Parmenides sp\u00e4ter geschrieben wurde als der Phaidon (reale Chronologie), aber in der fiktiven Chronologie kommt der Parmenides viel fr\u00fcher, da dort der junge Sokrates auftritt, w\u00e4hrend im Phaidon Sokrates vor seinem Tod steht. In der Interpretation hat man die Stellung eines Dialogs in dieser fiktiven Chronologie bisher zu wenig ber\u00fccksichtigt.","btype":3,"date":"1984","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H1e3T5fZsfMIh5O","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":845,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"46","issue":"2","pages":"319-330"}},"sort":["(Neo-) Platonica"]}
Title | 529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1978 |
Journal | Byzantion |
Volume | 48 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 369–385 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In an excellent and already well-known article, Professor Alan Cameron has made a strong case for the thesis that, notwithstanding the evidence of Malalas and a long-established tradition, Justinian did not succeed in finally closing the Platonic Academy in 529, and that its activities continued after a short interruption. The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to argue that some of the evidence usually adduced in favor of the view that the Academy was closed may not be applicable, but that it seems nevertheless to have succumbed to some form of imperial pressure, and, secondly, to question the view that philosophy continued to be taught, or even studied, at Athens from 532 until the Slavs sacked the city nearly fifty years later. The most important piece of evidence for the continued existence of the Academy is a passage from Olympiodorus' commentary on Plato's 1st Alcibiades which says, "Perhaps Plato made a practice of taking no fees because he was well-off. That is why the diadochika have lasted till now, in spite of many confiscations." Diadochika is left untranslated since its meaning is by no means certain. It could refer to the salary of the Head of the Academy. It could also, however, be a term for the Academy's endowments in general. A third meaning, suggested by J. Whittaker, is spiritual rather than material heritage, but despite arguments, it is unlikely that the word in its context does not refer to some form of funding. To this point, we must return shortly. Cameron argues convincingly that this passage was written somewhere around 560, on the grounds that it refers to an incident in the career of a grammaticus called Anatolius, dateable to the late 540s, as one that his readers can no longer be expected to remember. He infers from this that the Academy was still operating at that time and, moreover, in possession of substantial funds some thirty years after its alleged closure and expropriation. At about the same time, Whittaker, apparently writing before the appearance of Cameron's paper and arguing against Westerink, questioned whether the text adduced provided evidence either for confiscations at the time when Olympiodorus was writing or for the continued availability of material resources. Olympiodorus' report certainly raises some serious problems. The first relates to the confiscations. Cameron has discussed a number of possible occasions between 529 and the date of the composition of Olympiodorus' commentary about 560. If Academy funds were being confiscated during that period, then clearly there must have been a conspicuous Academy to be subject to the confiscations. But, as Whittaker has pointed out, the reference of the present participle stating that there were confiscations could be to any time during the reference of the main verb, that is, to the whole period between Plato and the time of writing. One possible inference is that the funds had been subjected to confiscations even before 529 but still survived in the hands of the scholarchs after that date. Justinian's edict is quite likely not to have been new but, like much of his legislation, a re-enactment of former decrees—some of which were in any case disregarded. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find a suitable earlier occasion, or occasions, to be the time of the confiscations in question. A second, and more basic, problem attaches to the funds themselves. There is no other evidence, except a report in the Suda article on Plato, and a parallel text in Photius, which attributes any of the late Academy's resources, or those of its office-holders, to inheritance from Plato. This Suda article, which is based on Damascius' Life of Isidore, tells us that only the Academy garden had been Plato's—he was not well-off—and that there were large accretions of funds in the fifth century. We know that most of the major buildings in Athens were destroyed by the Heruls in 267. Damascius, moreover, in the extract provided by Photius, made a point of denying what he says was a commonly held view that the resources of the Academy went back to Plato himself: τῶν δὲ διαδόχων οὐσία οὐκ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι Πλάτωνος ἦν τὸ ἀνέκαθεν. This summary too continues with the points that Plato was not rich, that only the garden was his, and that there were large additions through bequests later. From this text, we may infer that Olympiodorus' diadochika must have been school resources under the control of the school's head: Damascius is talking about sums of money, and the garden could hardly have been part of the scholarch's salary. If, then, such funds as were available to the Academy in the 5th and 6th centuries were not the product of Plato's own endowments, Olympiodorus—or his source—has wrongly inferred from the Academy's current, or recent, wealth, and Plato's aristocratic background and refusal to take fees, that Plato himself was responsible for the endowments. Damascius' disclaimer shows that he was not the first to do so. And if Olympiodorus was wrong about that, then he might also, though less obviously, have been wrong in saying that the funds existed in his own day. His information could have been some thirty years out of date, a period for the survival of obsolete information by no means inconceivable even with modern methods of disseminating information. We need look no further than the reputations of university departments in our own times. If the close relation between Athenian and Alexandrian philosophers that had obtained in the fifth century were by now a thing of the past—whether because of odium academicum, as manifested in the bitter attacks launched by Philoponus on the views of Proclus in a previous generation, and Simplicius in his own, the latter being furiously reciprocated—or because nothing was any longer happening at Athens, or for some other reason, that would be sufficient to explain such an error. To return to the question of a re-endowment in the 5th century. There are a number of indications that this happened. In the first place, negatively, there is little if any evidence that the Academy, or any but insignificant Platonists, were active at Athens in the preceding period. Positively, we have a report from Synesius that he went to Athens and found nothing going on at all: "It is like a sacrificial victim at the end of the proceedings, with only the skin left as a token of the animal that once was. So philosophy has moved its home, and all that is left for a visitor is to wander around looking at the Academy, the Lyceum, and, yes, the Stoa Poikile..." [introduction p. 369-372] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8waAtP8ixbo8cmC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"876","_score":null,"_source":{"id":876,"authors_free":[{"id":1287,"entry_id":876,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy?","main_title":{"title":"529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy?"},"abstract":"In an excellent and already well-known article, Professor Alan Cameron has made a strong case for the thesis that, notwithstanding the evidence of Malalas and a long-established tradition, Justinian did not succeed in finally closing the Platonic Academy in 529, and that its activities continued after a short interruption. The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to argue that some of the evidence usually adduced in favor of the view that the Academy was closed may not be applicable, but that it seems nevertheless to have succumbed to some form of imperial pressure, and, secondly, to question the view that philosophy continued to be taught, or even studied, at Athens from 532 until the Slavs sacked the city nearly fifty years later.\r\n\r\nThe most important piece of evidence for the continued existence of the Academy is a passage from Olympiodorus' commentary on Plato's 1st Alcibiades which says, \"Perhaps Plato made a practice of taking no fees because he was well-off. That is why the diadochika have lasted till now, in spite of many confiscations.\" Diadochika is left untranslated since its meaning is by no means certain. It could refer to the salary of the Head of the Academy. It could also, however, be a term for the Academy's endowments in general. A third meaning, suggested by J. Whittaker, is spiritual rather than material heritage, but despite arguments, it is unlikely that the word in its context does not refer to some form of funding. To this point, we must return shortly.\r\n\r\nCameron argues convincingly that this passage was written somewhere around 560, on the grounds that it refers to an incident in the career of a grammaticus called Anatolius, dateable to the late 540s, as one that his readers can no longer be expected to remember. He infers from this that the Academy was still operating at that time and, moreover, in possession of substantial funds some thirty years after its alleged closure and expropriation. At about the same time, Whittaker, apparently writing before the appearance of Cameron's paper and arguing against Westerink, questioned whether the text adduced provided evidence either for confiscations at the time when Olympiodorus was writing or for the continued availability of material resources.\r\n\r\nOlympiodorus' report certainly raises some serious problems. The first relates to the confiscations. Cameron has discussed a number of possible occasions between 529 and the date of the composition of Olympiodorus' commentary about 560. If Academy funds were being confiscated during that period, then clearly there must have been a conspicuous Academy to be subject to the confiscations. But, as Whittaker has pointed out, the reference of the present participle stating that there were confiscations could be to any time during the reference of the main verb, that is, to the whole period between Plato and the time of writing. One possible inference is that the funds had been subjected to confiscations even before 529 but still survived in the hands of the scholarchs after that date. Justinian's edict is quite likely not to have been new but, like much of his legislation, a re-enactment of former decrees\u2014some of which were in any case disregarded. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find a suitable earlier occasion, or occasions, to be the time of the confiscations in question.\r\n\r\nA second, and more basic, problem attaches to the funds themselves. There is no other evidence, except a report in the Suda article on Plato, and a parallel text in Photius, which attributes any of the late Academy's resources, or those of its office-holders, to inheritance from Plato. This Suda article, which is based on Damascius' Life of Isidore, tells us that only the Academy garden had been Plato's\u2014he was not well-off\u2014and that there were large accretions of funds in the fifth century. We know that most of the major buildings in Athens were destroyed by the Heruls in 267. Damascius, moreover, in the extract provided by Photius, made a point of denying what he says was a commonly held view that the resources of the Academy went back to Plato himself: \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03cc\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f26\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd. This summary too continues with the points that Plato was not rich, that only the garden was his, and that there were large additions through bequests later. From this text, we may infer that Olympiodorus' diadochika must have been school resources under the control of the school's head: Damascius is talking about sums of money, and the garden could hardly have been part of the scholarch's salary.\r\n\r\nIf, then, such funds as were available to the Academy in the 5th and 6th centuries were not the product of Plato's own endowments, Olympiodorus\u2014or his source\u2014has wrongly inferred from the Academy's current, or recent, wealth, and Plato's aristocratic background and refusal to take fees, that Plato himself was responsible for the endowments. Damascius' disclaimer shows that he was not the first to do so. And if Olympiodorus was wrong about that, then he might also, though less obviously, have been wrong in saying that the funds existed in his own day. His information could have been some thirty years out of date, a period for the survival of obsolete information by no means inconceivable even with modern methods of disseminating information. We need look no further than the reputations of university departments in our own times. If the close relation between Athenian and Alexandrian philosophers that had obtained in the fifth century were by now a thing of the past\u2014whether because of odium academicum, as manifested in the bitter attacks launched by Philoponus on the views of Proclus in a previous generation, and Simplicius in his own, the latter being furiously reciprocated\u2014or because nothing was any longer happening at Athens, or for some other reason, that would be sufficient to explain such an error.\r\n\r\nTo return to the question of a re-endowment in the 5th century. There are a number of indications that this happened. In the first place, negatively, there is little if any evidence that the Academy, or any but insignificant Platonists, were active at Athens in the preceding period. Positively, we have a report from Synesius that he went to Athens and found nothing going on at all:\r\n\r\n\"It is like a sacrificial victim at the end of the proceedings, with only the skin left as a token of the animal that once was. So philosophy has moved its home, and all that is left for a visitor is to wander around looking at the Academy, the Lyceum, and, yes, the Stoa Poikile...\" [introduction p. 369-372]","btype":3,"date":"1978","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8waAtP8ixbo8cmC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":876,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Byzantion","volume":"48","issue":"2","pages":"369\u2013385"}},"sort":["529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy?"]}
Title | A Fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, concerning Synonymy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 323-326 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Janko, Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
An important fragment of the lost portion of Aristotle's Poetics is the definition of synonyms preserved by Simplicius,' which corresponds to Aristotle's own citation of the Poetics for synonyms in the Rhetoric, 3. 2. 1404b 37 ff. I shall argue elsewhere that this derives from a discussion of the sources of verbal humour in the lost account of comedy and humour. Here it is my aim to show that Simplicius definitely derived the quotation from Porphyry, which pushes back the attestation of this part of the Poetics by more than two centuries (although the citation in the Antiatticist, Poet. fr. 4 Kassel, is older still). Furthermore, I shall show that some of the words in the definition are a gloss added by Porphyry for the purposes of his own polemic. [introduction, p. 323] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FEkzGy6BAHpTaIG |
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Title | A Lost Passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | Journal of the American Oriental Society |
Volume | 85 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 318-327 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kraemer, Joel L. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A comparison of the Arabic text with the excerpt of Simplicius shows that he, being concerned only with the gist of the argument, did not quote Philoponus' passage in its entirety. He reproduced only the second part of it, in which Philoponus referred to the Greeks and the barbarians, that is, those whose consensus was invoked by Aristotle and who were, for Aristotle, exhaustive of mankind. Simplicius omitted the first part of the passage, in which Philoponus spoke of those who believe in creation, among whom he certainly included Christians ("the people of our time"), a category of mankind unknown to Aristotle. There was no need for him to quote the last part of the passage, in which Philoponus gave his own interpretation of the common belief that the divine is associated with heaven. That the excerpt by Simplicius is not a direct quote, and the Arabic text an expansion of the original passage, is confirmed by the fact that some of the detail in the Arabic rendition, which is missing in Simplicius' excerpt, nevertheless appears in his discussion of Philoponus' argument. The passage before us, a response to a rhetorical argument, is not on a par with the technical aspects of Philoponus' critique of Aristotle, but it is no less appealing or significant for that reason. The last part of it conveys, in a lyrical way, the religious sentiment of the author in a tone that prefigures the devotional pages of the De opificio mundi. There, he returns to the question of the designation of heaven as the seat of the divine. "What wonder," he writes, "if [people] set apart the noblest and purest of bodily existents, heaven, for God, and, while praying, extend their hands to it." He adds that through the physical act of raising the hands and eyes to heaven, the mind is raised to God. Heaven is a symbol of the majesty of the Creator. Philoponus obliterates the pagan-Aristotelian distinction between the divine, eternal heavens and the transitory sublunar world. But it is not quite precise to say that he abrogates the superiority of heaven. Heaven and earth are placed in the same order, but heaven ranks higher than earth. That heaven ranks higher than earth and is more closely associated with the divine is part of his Christian heritage. The light metaphor and the idea that all things receive the divine illumination and do so according to their capacity are reflections from Neo-Platonism, but they appear to have been integrated into his Christian vision. The idea that all things are filled with God is not inconsistent with the biblical view that the whole earth is filled with His presence. [conclusion p. 326-327] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3NxYnrQXBWBXLOL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"735","_score":null,"_source":{"id":735,"authors_free":[{"id":1098,"entry_id":735,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":220,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kraemer, Joel L.","free_first_name":"Joel, L.","free_last_name":"Kraemer","norm_person":{"id":220,"first_name":"Joel L.","last_name":"Kraemer","full_name":"Kraemer, Joel L.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/113182023","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A Lost Passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation","main_title":{"title":"A Lost Passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation"},"abstract":"A comparison of the Arabic text with the excerpt of Simplicius shows that he, being concerned only with the gist of the argument, did not quote Philoponus' passage in its entirety. He reproduced only the second part of it, in which Philoponus referred to the Greeks and the barbarians, that is, those whose consensus was invoked by Aristotle and who were, for Aristotle, exhaustive of mankind. Simplicius omitted the first part of the passage, in which Philoponus spoke of those who believe in creation, among whom he certainly included Christians (\"the people of our time\"), a category of mankind unknown to Aristotle. There was no need for him to quote the last part of the passage, in which Philoponus gave his own interpretation of the common belief that the divine is associated with heaven. That the excerpt by Simplicius is not a direct quote, and the Arabic text an expansion of the original passage, is confirmed by the fact that some of the detail in the Arabic rendition, which is missing in Simplicius' excerpt, nevertheless appears in his discussion of Philoponus' argument.\r\n\r\nThe passage before us, a response to a rhetorical argument, is not on a par with the technical aspects of Philoponus' critique of Aristotle, but it is no less appealing or significant for that reason. The last part of it conveys, in a lyrical way, the religious sentiment of the author in a tone that prefigures the devotional pages of the De opificio mundi. There, he returns to the question of the designation of heaven as the seat of the divine. \"What wonder,\" he writes, \"if [people] set apart the noblest and purest of bodily existents, heaven, for God, and, while praying, extend their hands to it.\" He adds that through the physical act of raising the hands and eyes to heaven, the mind is raised to God. Heaven is a symbol of the majesty of the Creator.\r\n\r\nPhiloponus obliterates the pagan-Aristotelian distinction between the divine, eternal heavens and the transitory sublunar world. But it is not quite precise to say that he abrogates the superiority of heaven. Heaven and earth are placed in the same order, but heaven ranks higher than earth. That heaven ranks higher than earth and is more closely associated with the divine is part of his Christian heritage. The light metaphor and the idea that all things receive the divine illumination and do so according to their capacity are reflections from Neo-Platonism, but they appear to have been integrated into his Christian vision. The idea that all things are filled with God is not inconsistent with the biblical view that the whole earth is filled with His presence. [conclusion p. 326-327]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3NxYnrQXBWBXLOL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":220,"full_name":"Kraemer, Joel L.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":735,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the American Oriental Society","volume":"85","issue":"3","pages":"318-327"}},"sort":["A Lost Passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation"]}
Title | A New Fragment of Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1935 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 49 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 122-123 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cornford, Francis Macdonald |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text discusses a disputed line in Parmenides, quoted in Plato's Theaetetus and Simplicius' Physics. Some editors deny the line's independent existence, claiming it was created by Plato by misquoting another verse. The author disagrees with this view, arguing that the line is meaningful and could have been in their texts of Parmenides. The author also argues that there is no reason to believe that Simplicius took the line from Plato, and that Plato was not slovenly in his treatment of Parmenides. The author proposes a corrected version of the line and suggests that it may be Parmenides' last word on the unity and unchangeableness of Being. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T0iSCzh2Kntxx5a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1280","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1280,"authors_free":[{"id":1869,"entry_id":1280,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":55,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","free_first_name":"Francis Macdonald","free_last_name":"Cornford","norm_person":{"id":55,"first_name":"Francis Macdonald","last_name":"Cornford","full_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118975056","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A New Fragment of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"A New Fragment of Parmenides"},"abstract":"The text discusses a disputed line in Parmenides, quoted in Plato's Theaetetus and Simplicius' Physics. Some editors deny the line's independent existence, claiming it was created by Plato by misquoting another verse. The author disagrees with this view, arguing that the line is meaningful and could have been in their texts of Parmenides. The author also argues that there is no reason to believe that Simplicius took the line from Plato, and that Plato was not slovenly in his treatment of Parmenides. The author proposes a corrected version of the line and suggests that it may be Parmenides' last word on the unity and unchangeableness of Being. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1935","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T0iSCzh2Kntxx5a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":55,"full_name":"Cornford, Francis Macdonald","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1280,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"49","issue":"4","pages":"122-123"}},"sort":["A New Fragment of Parmenides"]}
Title | A New Role for the Hippopede of Eudoxus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Archive for History of Exact Sciences |
Volume | 56 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 69-93 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Yavetz, Ido |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The geometry of the alternative reconstruction of Eudoxan planetary theory is studied. It is shown that in this framework the hippopede acquires an analytical role, consolidating the theory's geometrical underpinnings. This removes the main point of incompatibility between the alternative reconstruction and Simplicius's account of Eudoxan planetary astronomy. The analysis also suggests a compass and straight-edge procedure for drawing a point by point outline of the retrograde loop created by any given arrangement of the three inner spheres. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AL92XR05kicTihW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"839","_score":null,"_source":{"id":839,"authors_free":[{"id":1243,"entry_id":839,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":366,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Yavetz, Ido","free_first_name":"Ido","free_last_name":"Yavetz","norm_person":{"id":366,"first_name":" Ido","last_name":"Yavetz","full_name":"Yavetz, Ido","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1156978416","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A New Role for the Hippopede of Eudoxus","main_title":{"title":"A New Role for the Hippopede of Eudoxus"},"abstract":"The geometry of the alternative reconstruction of Eudoxan planetary theory is studied. It is \r\nshown that in this framework the hippopede acquires an analytical role, consolidating the theory's geometrical underpinnings. This removes the main point of incompatibility between the alternative reconstruction and Simplicius's account of Eudoxan planetary astronomy. The analysis also suggests a compass and straight-edge procedure for drawing a point by point outline of the retrograde loop created by any given arrangement of the three inner spheres. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AL92XR05kicTihW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":366,"full_name":"Yavetz, Ido","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":839,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archive for History of Exact Sciences","volume":"56","issue":"1","pages":"69-93"}},"sort":["A New Role for the Hippopede of Eudoxus"]}
Title | A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1960 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 4-5 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wasserstein, Abraham |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Παντάπασι δ' οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου εἰ μὴ ὁ νοῦς· νοῦς δέ ἐστι καθαρὸς ἐκ πάντων καὶ εὐλαβῶν. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν οὐδὲν διακρίνεται ἑτέρῳ ὅμοιον οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἑτέρου κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἄρα τί ἐστι καθαρὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐκρᾶτον καὶ εὐδιακριτὸν τῶν ἄλλων νοῦς τῶν πάντων διαφέρει. These are the last few lines of fragment 12 of Anaxagoras as printed in Diels-Kranz6, ii. 39: D.-K. follow closely, with only a minor modification, the Berlin text of Simplicius in Phys., p. 157, which is the source of our knowledge of this fragment. It seems to me necessary, or at any rate highly desirable, that any interpretation of this passage should, inter alia, satisfy the following three conditions: ὁμοῖος should have the same meaning when applied to νοῦς and when applied to ἕτερον in the next line. The clause ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ... should contain a contrast to the clause νοῦς δέ ..., i.e. we should be able to understand that something is true of νοῦς that is not true of anything other (ἕτερον) than νοῦς. The clause ἀλλ’ ... should follow naturally on the preceding two clauses. This set of conditions is not satisfied by any interpretation that I know. Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet: Diels (loc. cit.): "Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der größere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding." Tannery (Pour l’histoire de la science hellénique, p. 311): "Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable à aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus." Burnet: "And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it." It will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties: In all three cases ὁμοῖος, which, when applied to νοῦς, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like "homogeneous" (i.e. ὁμοῖος κατὰ φύσιν), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause ἕτερον δὲ ... is that any other thing is "like" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are "homogeneous," which had been asserted of νοῦς. But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between νοῦς and anything other than νοῦς. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between νοῦς and other things is made in terms of being ὁμοῖος; but such a comparison loses all point if ὁμοῖος is used in two different senses. It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause ἀλλ’ .... What is ἀλλὰ supposed to mean here? But? ("sondern"? "mais"?) How is this clause related to what precedes? All these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that οὐδενί be excised. Read: νοῦς δὲ ἰσαῖς μέτροις ὅμοιος· ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅμοιον· ἀλλὰ τῶν πλεῖστων εἶναι τὰ φαινόμενα ἔνθα καὶ ἦν. And interpret: "Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it." Thus, if we excise οὐδενί, ὁμοῖος has the same sense ("homogeneous") both as applied to νοῦς and as applied to ἕτερον. There is a pointed comparison between νοῦς and other things: something is true of νοῦς that is not true of other things. The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: "But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?" "No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it." This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι, such as ἐν παντὶ παντός μορφὴ ἐνέστηκε (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: τὰ ἐν παντὶ πλείω μετέχει κτλ. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with τῶν πλείστων εἶναι κτλ.). Lest it be thought that the excision of οὐδενί is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of οὐδενί seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον ὁμοιομέρειαν Ἀναξαγόρας ὑπέθετο λέγειν, ὃς δ’ ἐστὶν πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν. Now, the words ἐπιπεπτῶκεν are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after οὐδενί here are, of course, Diels’s, not Simplicius’s; perhaps we ought to put them before οὐδενί and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν, he may also have added οὐδενί. [the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/0UZZOhtjCwUNKOl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"444","_score":null,"_source":{"id":444,"authors_free":[{"id":596,"entry_id":444,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":356,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","free_first_name":"Abraham","free_last_name":"Wasserstein","norm_person":{"id":356,"first_name":"Abraham","last_name":"Wasserstein","full_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119380102","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"\u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4' \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bd. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1ff3 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9.\r\n\r\nThese are the last few lines of fragment 12 of Anaxagoras as printed in Diels-Kranz6, ii. 39: D.-K. follow closely, with only a minor modification, the Berlin text of Simplicius in Phys., p. 157, which is the source of our knowledge of this fragment.\r\n\r\nIt seems to me necessary, or at any rate highly desirable, that any interpretation of this passage should, inter alia, satisfy the following three conditions:\r\n\r\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 should have the same meaning when applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and when applied to \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd in the next line.\r\n\r\n The clause \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd ... should contain a contrast to the clause \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad ..., i.e. we should be able to understand that something is true of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 that is not true of anything other (\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd) than \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\r\n\r\n The clause \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 ... should follow naturally on the preceding two clauses.\r\n\r\nThis set of conditions is not satisfied by any interpretation that I know. Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet:\r\n\r\n Diels (loc. cit.): \"Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der gr\u00f6\u00dfere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding.\"\r\n Tannery (Pour l\u2019histoire de la science hell\u00e9nique, p. 311): \"Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable \u00e0 aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus.\"\r\n Burnet: \"And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.\"\r\n\r\nIt will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties:\r\n\r\n In all three cases \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2, which, when applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like \"homogeneous\" (i.e. \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 ... is that any other thing is \"like\" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are \"homogeneous,\" which had been asserted of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\r\n\r\n But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and anything other than \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things is made in terms of being \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2; but such a comparison loses all point if \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 is used in two different senses.\r\n\r\n It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 .... What is \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 supposed to mean here? But? (\"sondern\"? \"mais\"?) How is this clause related to what precedes?\r\n\r\nAll these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af be excised. Read:\r\n\r\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f26\u03bd.\r\n\r\nAnd interpret:\r\n\"Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it.\"\r\n\r\nThus, if we excise \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af,\r\n\r\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 has the same sense (\"homogeneous\") both as applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and as applied to \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\r\n\r\n There is a pointed comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things: something is true of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 that is not true of other things.\r\n\r\n The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: \"But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?\" \"No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it.\" This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, such as \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb.).\r\n\r\nLest it be thought that the excision of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f08\u03bd\u03b1\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f43\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd. Now, the words \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af here are, of course, Diels\u2019s, not Simplicius\u2019s; perhaps we ought to put them before \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, he may also have added \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af. [the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1960","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/0UZZOhtjCwUNKOl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":356,"full_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":444,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"10","issue":"1","pages":"4-5"}},"sort":["A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras"]}
Title | A propos de la biographie de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Revue philosophique de Louvain |
Volume | 83 |
Pages | 506-514 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Van Riet, Simone |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Known for his adherence to the Neoplatonic School of Athens, Simplicius represents the intellectual lineage that blended Plotinus' metaphysics with oriental mysteries and rites, tracing its roots back to the ancient Platonic Academy. His journey also intersects with the evolution of philosophy in Alexandria, known for its leanings towards natural studies and empirical sciences. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, Simplicius lacks a dedicated biographer, necessitating careful historical reconstruction of his life. A notable event in his life was the closure of the Neoplatonic School of Athens in 529, pushing Simplicius and others to Persia, only to face disappointment and eventual return due to a peace treaty. While his commentaries on Aristotle's treatises form the main body of his works, this study argues for a deeper recognition of Simplicius and his fellow Aristotelian commentators as distinctive thinkers in the history of philosophy, whose biographies merit thorough exploration. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8nsFoCQv5aHc85J |
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Title | Addenda Eudemea |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Leeds International Classical Studies |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-28 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper presents 16 fragments of the Peripatetic philosopher Eudemus (c. 350-290 BC), which were not printed in the (still) standard edition of Wehrli (1955; revised 1969), but which had been signalled in passing by De Lacy (1957) and Gottschalk (1973). The aim is to provide a text with translation and brief annotation, to be included in a future edition, and to argue that context can add to our understanding of these passages. Their importance lies in bringing greater comprehensiveness to the collection, offering at least five additional (near) quotations, and illustrating the new trend in fragment studies to contextualize fragments on several levels in order to gain further insight into their value and reception. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HRE0ldIrfqIxrEE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1119","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1119,"authors_free":[{"id":1692,"entry_id":1119,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Addenda Eudemea","main_title":{"title":"Addenda Eudemea"},"abstract":"This paper presents 16 fragments of the Peripatetic philosopher Eudemus (c. 350-290 BC), which were not printed in the (still) standard edition of Wehrli (1955; revised 1969), but which had been signalled in passing by De Lacy (1957) and Gottschalk (1973). The aim is to provide a text with translation and brief annotation, to be included in a future edition, and to argue that context can add to our understanding of these passages. Their importance lies in bringing greater comprehensiveness to the collection, offering at least five additional (near) quotations, and illustrating the new trend in fragment studies to contextualize fragments on several levels in order to gain further insight into their value and reception. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HRE0ldIrfqIxrEE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1119,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Leeds International Classical Studies","volume":"5","issue":"1","pages":"1-28"}},"sort":["Addenda Eudemea"]}
Title | Albert le Grand sur la dérivation des formes géométriques: Un témoignage de l'influence de Simplicius par le biais des Arabes? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2008 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Faisons donc le bilan de ce parcours qui nous a menés du IVe siècle av. J.-C. au Moyen Âge latin. L'argumentation présentée par Albert dans son De quinque universalibus provient d'une ambiance intellectuelle qui baignait dans des influences de la philosophie arabe : al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī, Averroès, mais surtout Avicenne. Elle est marquée par l'utilisation du schéma de la dérivation des formes géométriques élémentaires — point, ligne, surface, corps — à partir du mouvement en flux générateur de chacun de ces éléments. Or, ce schéma de dérivation géométrique joue un rôle assez important dans la pensée d'Albert, qui l'attribue à Platon. Cette attribution ne semble pas si farfelue que cela, même si la dérivation des formes géométriques à partir du flux du point semble provenir de Speusippe plutôt que de son oncle Platon. Il n'en reste pas moins que, du moins selon l'interprétation de l'École de Tübingen, le schéma de dérivation point/nombre-ligne-surface-corps est d'une importance tout à fait fondamentale pour l'ontologie ésotérique de Platon. Sans accès aux Dialogues de Platon, Albert le Grand finit donc, quelles qu'aient été ses sources prochaines et lointaines pour les doctrines platoniciennes, par défendre une image de Platon qui correspond, dans une large mesure, à celle de l'École de Tübingen. Quant à la question de ses sources et de la voie de transmission de ces doctrines, Albert a pu trouver chez la plus importante d'entre elles — la pensée d'Avicenne — de quoi nourrir une réflexion approfondie sur cette question de la dérivation des formes géométriques. Cependant, le commentaire d'Albert aux Éléments d'Euclide montre qu'à cette influence avicennienne est venue s'ajouter une autre, indépendante : la doctrine géométrique de Simplicius, véhiculée par la traduction latine du commentaire euclidien d'al-Nairīzī. Qu'en est-il de la relation entre Simplicius et Avicenne ? Nous avons vu que certains éléments du schéma simplicien de la dérivation des formes géométriques se retrouvent déjà dans l'École de Bagdad, autour de Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī. G. Freudenthal, pour sa part, avait conclu de son étude de la géométrie d'al-Fārābī qu'« il est fort probable qu'al-Fārābī connaissait soit les ouvrages de Simplicius auxquels an-Nairīzī avait accès, soit seulement la brève citation [p. 2, 19-23 Curze] contenue dans le commentaire d'an-Nairīzī ». Quoi qu'il en soit, il semble difficile d'éviter la conclusion qu'Avicenne connaissait bien la doctrine géométrique de Simplicius, du moins telle que transmise par le commentaire d'al-Nairīzī, soit par l'intermédiaire de l'École de Bagdad, soit par ses lectures propres. De Platon à Speusippe, en passant par des sources hellénistiques telles que Sextus Empiricus, la doctrine de la dérivation des formes géométriques a fini, au VIe siècle apr. J.-C., par faire partie intégrante du bagage intellectuel des derniers néoplatoniciens tels que Philopon et Simplicius. C'est, semble-t-il, la pensée géométrique de ce dernier qui, traduite en arabe et préservée dans le commentaire euclidien d'al-Nairīzī, contribue à former la pensée d'Avicenne au premier quart du XIe siècle, avant d'arriver, quelque deux siècles plus tard, sous les yeux de ce lecteur omnivore qu'était Albert le Grand. Pour expliquer cet itinéraire de la pensée, il n'est sans doute pas nécessaire de postuler que, comme le soutient Mme Hadot, Simplicius ait rédigé son Commentaire d'Euclide à Harran. Mais rien n'exclut cette hypothèse non plus, et quand on pense aux éléments de preuve rassemblés par Mme Hadot et d'autres concernant l'importance du legs de l'École mathématique de Simplicius dans le monde arabe, on peut estimer que le cas du schéma de la dérivation des formes géométriques à partir du point ne fait qu'ajouter une brique de plus à l'édifice des preuves témoignant en faveur de l'hypothèse de l'« École néoplatonicienne de Harran ». [conclusion p. 28-29] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mVjTC4EIjO2Aggg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1259","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1259,"authors_free":[{"id":1838,"entry_id":1259,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":25,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chase, Michael ","free_first_name":"Michael","free_last_name":"Chase","norm_person":{"id":25,"first_name":"Michael ","last_name":"Chase","full_name":"Chase, Michael ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1031917152","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Albert le Grand sur la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques: Un t\u00e9moignage de l'influence de Simplicius par le biais des Arabes?","main_title":{"title":"Albert le Grand sur la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques: Un t\u00e9moignage de l'influence de Simplicius par le biais des Arabes?"},"abstract":"Faisons donc le bilan de ce parcours qui nous a men\u00e9s du IVe si\u00e8cle av. J.-C. au Moyen \u00c2ge latin. L'argumentation pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par Albert dans son De quinque universalibus provient d'une ambiance intellectuelle qui baignait dans des influences de la philosophie arabe : al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b, al-Ghaz\u0101l\u012b, Averro\u00e8s, mais surtout Avicenne. Elle est marqu\u00e9e par l'utilisation du sch\u00e9ma de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques \u00e9l\u00e9mentaires \u2014 point, ligne, surface, corps \u2014 \u00e0 partir du mouvement en flux g\u00e9n\u00e9rateur de chacun de ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments.\r\n\r\nOr, ce sch\u00e9ma de d\u00e9rivation g\u00e9om\u00e9trique joue un r\u00f4le assez important dans la pens\u00e9e d'Albert, qui l'attribue \u00e0 Platon. Cette attribution ne semble pas si farfelue que cela, m\u00eame si la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques \u00e0 partir du flux du point semble provenir de Speusippe plut\u00f4t que de son oncle Platon. Il n'en reste pas moins que, du moins selon l'interpr\u00e9tation de l'\u00c9cole de T\u00fcbingen, le sch\u00e9ma de d\u00e9rivation point\/nombre-ligne-surface-corps est d'une importance tout \u00e0 fait fondamentale pour l'ontologie \u00e9sot\u00e9rique de Platon.\r\n\r\nSans acc\u00e8s aux Dialogues de Platon, Albert le Grand finit donc, quelles qu'aient \u00e9t\u00e9 ses sources prochaines et lointaines pour les doctrines platoniciennes, par d\u00e9fendre une image de Platon qui correspond, dans une large mesure, \u00e0 celle de l'\u00c9cole de T\u00fcbingen.\r\n\r\nQuant \u00e0 la question de ses sources et de la voie de transmission de ces doctrines, Albert a pu trouver chez la plus importante d'entre elles \u2014 la pens\u00e9e d'Avicenne \u2014 de quoi nourrir une r\u00e9flexion approfondie sur cette question de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques. Cependant, le commentaire d'Albert aux \u00c9l\u00e9ments d'Euclide montre qu'\u00e0 cette influence avicennienne est venue s'ajouter une autre, ind\u00e9pendante : la doctrine g\u00e9om\u00e9trique de Simplicius, v\u00e9hicul\u00e9e par la traduction latine du commentaire euclidien d'al-Nair\u012bz\u012b.\r\n\r\nQu'en est-il de la relation entre Simplicius et Avicenne ? Nous avons vu que certains \u00e9l\u00e9ments du sch\u00e9ma simplicien de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques se retrouvent d\u00e9j\u00e0 dans l'\u00c9cole de Bagdad, autour de Ya\u1e25y\u0101 ibn \u2018Ad\u012b. G. Freudenthal, pour sa part, avait conclu de son \u00e9tude de la g\u00e9om\u00e9trie d'al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b qu'\u00ab il est fort probable qu'al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b connaissait soit les ouvrages de Simplicius auxquels an-Nair\u012bz\u012b avait acc\u00e8s, soit seulement la br\u00e8ve citation [p. 2, 19-23 Curze] contenue dans le commentaire d'an-Nair\u012bz\u012b \u00bb.\r\n\r\nQuoi qu'il en soit, il semble difficile d'\u00e9viter la conclusion qu'Avicenne connaissait bien la doctrine g\u00e9om\u00e9trique de Simplicius, du moins telle que transmise par le commentaire d'al-Nair\u012bz\u012b, soit par l'interm\u00e9diaire de l'\u00c9cole de Bagdad, soit par ses lectures propres.\r\n\r\nDe Platon \u00e0 Speusippe, en passant par des sources hell\u00e9nistiques telles que Sextus Empiricus, la doctrine de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques a fini, au VIe si\u00e8cle apr. J.-C., par faire partie int\u00e9grante du bagage intellectuel des derniers n\u00e9oplatoniciens tels que Philopon et Simplicius.\r\n\r\nC'est, semble-t-il, la pens\u00e9e g\u00e9om\u00e9trique de ce dernier qui, traduite en arabe et pr\u00e9serv\u00e9e dans le commentaire euclidien d'al-Nair\u012bz\u012b, contribue \u00e0 former la pens\u00e9e d'Avicenne au premier quart du XIe si\u00e8cle, avant d'arriver, quelque deux si\u00e8cles plus tard, sous les yeux de ce lecteur omnivore qu'\u00e9tait Albert le Grand.\r\n\r\nPour expliquer cet itin\u00e9raire de la pens\u00e9e, il n'est sans doute pas n\u00e9cessaire de postuler que, comme le soutient Mme Hadot, Simplicius ait r\u00e9dig\u00e9 son Commentaire d'Euclide \u00e0 Harran. Mais rien n'exclut cette hypoth\u00e8se non plus, et quand on pense aux \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve rassembl\u00e9s par Mme Hadot et d'autres concernant l'importance du legs de l'\u00c9cole math\u00e9matique de Simplicius dans le monde arabe, on peut estimer que le cas du sch\u00e9ma de la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques \u00e0 partir du point ne fait qu'ajouter une brique de plus \u00e0 l'\u00e9difice des preuves t\u00e9moignant en faveur de l'hypoth\u00e8se de l'\u00ab \u00c9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne de Harran \u00bb. [conclusion p. 28-29]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mVjTC4EIjO2Aggg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":25,"full_name":"Chase, Michael ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["Albert le Grand sur la d\u00e9rivation des formes g\u00e9om\u00e9triques: Un t\u00e9moignage de l'influence de Simplicius par le biais des Arabes?"]}
Title | Alexander of Aphrodisias on Celestial Motions |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 190-205 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bodnár, István M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A number of features of the doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias on heavenly motions are beyond reasonable doubt. First and foremost of these is that he identified the nature of the heavenly spheres with their soul, thereby he could entirely collapse natural motion with voluntary motion into one in their case. Moreover the celestial element, which Alexander tends to call theion sôma, divine body is removed from the components of the everchanging sublunary world to the extent that it can be a legitimate question whether the substrate of celestial bodies can be called matter, and Alexander can refer to perishable entities as evIua, material in contrast to this sublime element. After identifying the contribution of the nature of the celestial spheres with that of their soul, Alexander follows Aristotle in setting out a celestial hierarchy, on top of which there is or there are the separate unmoved mover(s), which move(s) by being object(s) of striving and desire for the less perfect entities of the heavens. This much seems to be firmly settled. A number of further issues, however, call for detailed examination. In this paper first I set out to clarify the contributions of the striving of the different celestial spheres, then I turn to describing the interaction between the various motions of the celestial system, and I discuss whether the theory Alexander propounded could have been a fundamental revision, or rather an alternative exposition of the original, Aristotelian celestial theory deploying homocentric spheres. [Introduction, p. 190-191] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FT5oXWdKEJGehLA |
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Title | Alexander on Physics 2.9 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 19-30 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sharples, Robert W. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I want to draw your attention today to a report of Alexander in Simplicius’s Physics commentary which, as far as I can tell, has escaped the notice of everyone, myself included—and I have rather less excuse than most, for, as we shall see, the report connects directly with issues about which I have written in other contexts. That was concerned with On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away [hereafter GC] 2.11, with Philoponus’s commentary thereon, and with Alexander’s discussion in some of the Quaestiones; the present paper, with Simplicius’s help, extends the discussion to Physics 2.9. Alexander’s GC commentary and the relevant part of his Physics commentary are lost. The text that will chiefly concern us is (3) (2) in the appendix, where Simplicius says: "For my part, I do not understand why Alexander says that unqualified necessity excludes what is for the sake of something." Perhaps indeed he does understand why Alexander says this, and this is a disingenuous way of introducing a problem; but the problem may be real nonetheless. If my story has a moral, it is, I suppose, that those who have an interest in Alexander should be more proactive than I confess I have myself been in looking up the later commentaries on passages of Aristotle that are of interest in the context of Alexander, in order to see whether Alexander is recorded as having had interesting comments to make. Or, if that is a counsel of perfection, I think it shows that we need a collection of the reports of Alexander by name in later Greek commentaries on the Physics, rather like Andrea Rescigno’s recent edition of the fragments of the De Caelo commentary. We already have the fragments of the Physics commentary preserved in Arabic, and the fragments in Greek identified by Marwan Rashed; there may be scope, if copyright and other issues can be overcome, for a compendium assembling all this material in the order of the passages of Aristotle commented upon. This would indeed in a way be assistance for the lazy, making nothing available that individual scholars could not find for themselves in published sources, but it might be useful nonetheless. In Physics 2.9, Aristotle continues his polemic against those who explain nature in terms of necessitating material interactions, arguing that necessity is present in all things that have goal-directedness, if I may so translate “the for-the-sake-of-something,” but that the necessity of matter is not the cause or explanation of what comes about. There is, by the way, in my view a systematic ambiguity in the terminology commonly used here; necessity can be conditional either on a future goal or on some past event, but the custom has developed of using “conditional” or “hypothetical” necessity to indicate that which relates to the future, “absolute” to indicate that which is conditional on past events—presumably because there is no longer anything hypothetical about these. But, especially in the ancient Peripatetic context where, as Patzig pointed out, qualifications attach to predicates rather than to whole propositions, this could be misleading from the point of view of logical analysis. Building a house necessarily requires bricks; but the fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders’ merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. (It could be an explanation of why you have a brick house, or more strictly of why, given that you have a house, it is a brick one; but that is a different point.) To be sure, Aristotle’s argument in 2.9 is open to challenge in that he takes his examples from human goal-directed activity, and the extrapolation from these to natural processes is open to question. David Sedley well suggests that the self-building wall may be a parody of atomist cosmogony. A human being requires human flesh and human bones; but, Aristotle’s view would seem to imply, human flesh does not self-assemble into a human being—perhaps because it cannot even be human flesh, except homonymously, if it is not part of a human being. There are well-known problems here about how the final cause of embryonic development can also be the efficient cause, but I do not propose to pursue them now. For, more important in the present context, is a distinction indicated by the example I have just used. The fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders’ merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. Why not? Well, presumably, because sitting looking at the pile of bricks will not give you a house; you, or the builder, need to do something with them. Bricks not only do not explain the coming-to-be of a brick house (let us call this “thesis A”); they do not necessarily lead to it, either (let us call this “thesis B”). In more formal language, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions. For the Presocratic natural philosophers whom Aristotle is attacking, on the other hand, material interactions are both sufficient conditions for, and explanations of, natural phenomena. Normally, an explanation will be a sufficient condition, or at least that one of a number of jointly sufficient conditions that is relevant in the explanatory context. Consequently, to say that material actions may necessitate, i.e., may be sufficient for, but may not explain, some event, or in the contexts with which we are concerned the coming-to-be of something, is to raise the specter of over-determination. If natural comings-to-be are necessitated by matter and its interactions—what some call “absolute” necessity—is there any room left in which to argue that they are explained by the purposes or goals for which they are necessary means? [introduction p. 19-20] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RKYRiSGUGVV8cTg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1172","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1172,"authors_free":[{"id":1747,"entry_id":1172,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":42,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","free_first_name":"Robert W.","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":42,"first_name":"Robert W.","last_name":"Sharples","full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114269505","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Alexander on Physics 2.9","main_title":{"title":"Alexander on Physics 2.9"},"abstract":"I want to draw your attention today to a report of Alexander in Simplicius\u2019s Physics commentary which, as far as I can tell, has escaped the notice of everyone, myself included\u2014and I have rather less excuse than most, for, as we shall see, the report connects directly with issues about which I have written in other contexts. That was concerned with On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away [hereafter GC] 2.11, with Philoponus\u2019s commentary thereon, and with Alexander\u2019s discussion in some of the Quaestiones; the present paper, with Simplicius\u2019s help, extends the discussion to Physics 2.9. Alexander\u2019s GC commentary and the relevant part of his Physics commentary are lost. The text that will chiefly concern us is (3) (2) in the appendix, where Simplicius says:\r\n\r\n \"For my part, I do not understand why Alexander says that unqualified necessity excludes what is for the sake of something.\"\r\n\r\nPerhaps indeed he does understand why Alexander says this, and this is a disingenuous way of introducing a problem; but the problem may be real nonetheless.\r\n\r\nIf my story has a moral, it is, I suppose, that those who have an interest in Alexander should be more proactive than I confess I have myself been in looking up the later commentaries on passages of Aristotle that are of interest in the context of Alexander, in order to see whether Alexander is recorded as having had interesting comments to make. Or, if that is a counsel of perfection, I think it shows that we need a collection of the reports of Alexander by name in later Greek commentaries on the Physics, rather like Andrea Rescigno\u2019s recent edition of the fragments of the De Caelo commentary. We already have the fragments of the Physics commentary preserved in Arabic, and the fragments in Greek identified by Marwan Rashed; there may be scope, if copyright and other issues can be overcome, for a compendium assembling all this material in the order of the passages of Aristotle commented upon. This would indeed in a way be assistance for the lazy, making nothing available that individual scholars could not find for themselves in published sources, but it might be useful nonetheless.\r\n\r\nIn Physics 2.9, Aristotle continues his polemic against those who explain nature in terms of necessitating material interactions, arguing that necessity is present in all things that have goal-directedness, if I may so translate \u201cthe for-the-sake-of-something,\u201d but that the necessity of matter is not the cause or explanation of what comes about. There is, by the way, in my view a systematic ambiguity in the terminology commonly used here; necessity can be conditional either on a future goal or on some past event, but the custom has developed of using \u201cconditional\u201d or \u201chypothetical\u201d necessity to indicate that which relates to the future, \u201cabsolute\u201d to indicate that which is conditional on past events\u2014presumably because there is no longer anything hypothetical about these. But, especially in the ancient Peripatetic context where, as Patzig pointed out, qualifications attach to predicates rather than to whole propositions, this could be misleading from the point of view of logical analysis.\r\n\r\nBuilding a house necessarily requires bricks; but the fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders\u2019 merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. (It could be an explanation of why you have a brick house, or more strictly of why, given that you have a house, it is a brick one; but that is a different point.) To be sure, Aristotle\u2019s argument in 2.9 is open to challenge in that he takes his examples from human goal-directed activity, and the extrapolation from these to natural processes is open to question. David Sedley well suggests that the self-building wall may be a parody of atomist cosmogony. A human being requires human flesh and human bones; but, Aristotle\u2019s view would seem to imply, human flesh does not self-assemble into a human being\u2014perhaps because it cannot even be human flesh, except homonymously, if it is not part of a human being. There are well-known problems here about how the final cause of embryonic development can also be the efficient cause, but I do not propose to pursue them now.\r\n\r\nFor, more important in the present context, is a distinction indicated by the example I have just used. The fact that you, or the builder, purchased a pile of bricks from the builders\u2019 merchant is not an explanation of why you now have a house. Why not? Well, presumably, because sitting looking at the pile of bricks will not give you a house; you, or the builder, need to do something with them. Bricks not only do not explain the coming-to-be of a brick house (let us call this \u201cthesis A\u201d); they do not necessarily lead to it, either (let us call this \u201cthesis B\u201d). In more formal language, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions. For the Presocratic natural philosophers whom Aristotle is attacking, on the other hand, material interactions are both sufficient conditions for, and explanations of, natural phenomena.\r\n\r\nNormally, an explanation will be a sufficient condition, or at least that one of a number of jointly sufficient conditions that is relevant in the explanatory context. Consequently, to say that material actions may necessitate, i.e., may be sufficient for, but may not explain, some event, or in the contexts with which we are concerned the coming-to-be of something, is to raise the specter of over-determination. If natural comings-to-be are necessitated by matter and its interactions\u2014what some call \u201cabsolute\u201d necessity\u2014is there any room left in which to argue that they are explained by the purposes or goals for which they are necessary means?\r\n[introduction p. 19-20]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RKYRiSGUGVV8cTg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":42,"full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1172,"section_of":1171,"pages":"19-30","is_catalog":null,"book":null},"article":{"id":1172,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies","volume":"55","issue":"1","pages":"19-30"}},"sort":["Alexander on Physics 2.9"]}
Title | Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la « magna quaestio ». Rôle et indépendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristotélicien |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1995 |
Journal | Les Études Classiques |
Volume | 63 |
Pages | 295–351 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rashed, Marwan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Sur le problème du lieu du Tout et de la sphère des fixes, on assiste ainsi, au sein même de la tradition aristotélicienne, à un débat qui, d’Eudème à Ibn Ruschd, en passant, comme on pense l’avoir découvert, par les premiers commentateurs péripatéticiens, puis Alexandre et ses successeurs grecs et arabes, fut le premier à révéler l’antagonisme, voire la contradiction, entre cosmologie et physique aristotéliciennes. Il est peu d’apories, dans l’histoire de l’aristotélisme, qui aient autant mis à mal le système du Maître. Elle n’est cependant pas la seule, et bien d’autres points nous demanderont une étude attentive et difficile ; aussi, au terme de ce travail, voudrions-nous souligner l’importance du chemin restant à parcourir : les résultats acquis devront être discutés, affinés et, surtout, interprétés à la lumière d’études ponctuelles et précises sur la tradition aristotélicienne en général et alexandrine en particulier. Si l’on a choisi de traiter d'un cas restreint et bien déterminé, le problème cosmologique du lieu aristotélicien interprété par Alexandre, c’était autant pour éclairer la profonde originalité de pensée de l’Exégète et l’importance capitale, dans l’histoire de l’aristotélisme, de son commentaire partiellement retrouvé à la Physique, que pour montrer qu’il n’y a pas, en la matière, d’histoire partielle : l’aristotélisme fit plus que se survivre au contact des doctrines stoïciennes, et l’hellénisme arabe eut tôt fait d’atteindre et de dépasser les horizons de sa jeunesse attique. Est-il dès lors besoin d’insister sur l’idée de tradition aristotélicienne qui semble se dégager ? Celle-ci ne se reconnaît pas à l’acceptation servile de la lettre du Maître, mais à une façon commune de questionner l'ensemble de son œuvre. Interprétée par cette lignée, la véracité d’Aristote dépasse l’immédiateté de son texte pour devenir, limite et condition de la philosophie, l’assurance d’un sens « où tous les sens s’accordent ». [conclusion p. 350-351] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/m86rWMBz7g2Vnfn |
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Title | Alexandria as a Center of Greek Philosophy in Later Classical Antiquity |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Illinois Classical Studies |
Volume | 18 |
Pages | 307-325 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Any discussion of Greek Alexandria may properly take its starting point from the work of P. M. Fraser, even if only to dissent from it. In the preface to Ptolemaic Alexandria Fraser observes that philosophy was one of the “items” that “were not effectively transplanted to Alexandria.”1 In his chapter on philosophy, talking of the establishment of the main philosophical schools at Athens, Fraser writes that it “remained the centre of philosophical studies down to the closing of the schools by Justinian in A.D. 563.”2 The first of these statements is near enough the truth, since the Alexandria of the Ptolemies was not distinguished in philosophy as ifwas in literature or science, though even then some important things happened during that period too. But the implication that this situation continued during the Roman and early Byzantine periods is misleading, and by the end of the period simply false.3 The purpose of this paper is to examine some aspects of the considerable contribution that Alexandria made to the philosophical tradition that continued into the Islamic and Christian middle ages and beyond, and to show that it may lay claim to have been at least equal to that of Athens itself. [Introduction, p. 307] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MGb8ujHWfXvghPD |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"898","_score":null,"_source":{"id":898,"authors_free":[{"id":1326,"entry_id":898,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Alexandria as a Center of Greek Philosophy in Later Classical Antiquity","main_title":{"title":"Alexandria as a Center of Greek Philosophy in Later Classical Antiquity"},"abstract":"Any discussion of Greek Alexandria may properly take its starting point \r\nfrom the work of P. M. Fraser, even if only to dissent from it. In the preface \r\nto Ptolemaic Alexandria Fraser observes that philosophy was one of the \r\n\u201citems\u201d that \u201cwere not effectively transplanted to Alexandria.\u201d1 In his \r\nchapter on philosophy, talking of the establishment of the main \r\nphilosophical schools at Athens, Fraser writes that it \u201cremained the centre of \r\nphilosophical studies down to the closing of the schools by Justinian in A.D. \r\n563.\u201d2 The first of these statements is near enough the truth, since the \r\nAlexandria of the Ptolemies was not distinguished in philosophy as ifwas in \r\nliterature or science, though even then some important things happened \r\nduring that period too. But the implication that this situation continued \r\nduring the Roman and early Byzantine periods is misleading, and by the end \r\nof the period simply false.3 The purpose of this paper is to examine some \r\naspects of the considerable contribution that Alexandria made to the \r\nphilosophical tradition that continued into the Islamic and Christian middle \r\nages and beyond, and to show that it may lay claim to have been at least \r\nequal to that of Athens itself. [Introduction, p. 307]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MGb8ujHWfXvghPD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":898,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Illinois Classical Studies","volume":"18","issue":"","pages":"307-325"}},"sort":["Alexandria as a Center of Greek Philosophy in Later Classical Antiquity"]}
Title | All Voids Large and Small, Being a Discussion of Place and Void in Strato of Lampsacus's Matter Theory |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Apeiron. A journal for ancient philosophy and science |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1–36 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lehoux, Daryn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Strato of Lampsacus, third head of Aristotle's school at Athens, who was known as 'the Physicist' in antiquity, is a problematic character. Like many other Greek philosophers, none of his books have survived to the present day. There are, to be sure, a few quotes scattered here and there in the philosophical and technical literature of antiquity, but these serve to give us only a flavor of his thinking and his physical theories, from which several reconstructions have been attempted in the last century. Based on this handful of fragments, Hermann Diels published an argument in 1893 which claimed to have fleshed out Strato's physical theory of matter and tried to show that 'the Physicist' held that all matter was interspersed with small pockets of void (similar to the way a sponge is full of little pockets of air), and that if a larger void than these natural minute 'microvoids' was artificially produced, then the surrounding contiguous matter would rush in to fill the gap. This theory would explain suction splendidly, and Diels argued that Erasistratus the physician and Hero of Alexandria had both used Strato's matter theory in their own works. Indeed, Diels even showed (a conclusion unchallenged to this day) that part of Hero's introduction to the Pneumatics was taken almost verbatim from a book by Strato. In his collection of Strato's fragments, Fritz Wehrli more or less followed Diels, and H.B. Gottschalk took Diels's argument even further, presenting almost the whole of Hero's introduction as a fragment of Strato. Since then, however, a number of writers have contested different parts of Diels's reconstruction. In 1985, David Furley argued that, while the microvoid theory seems plausible enough, we cannot attribute to Strato the theory of horror vacui. And in a recent paper, Sylvia Berryman rejected the idea that we can demonstrate that Erasistratus held a matter theory involving either microvoids or the theoretical prohibition of larger extended voids. Berryman's argument hinges on a careful distinction between the idea of the horror vacui as an explanation for why matter rushes in to fill the void, and the simple observation that matter does simply fill the space being emptied by suction. That is: when a Greek writer refers to the "following-in to what-is-being-emptied," is he referring to some theoretical mechanism by which void spaces are filled (i.e., what has been called the horror vacui), or is he simply saying that when we empty a vessel of one substance, some other substance always follows in to fill the space being emptied? To draw an analogy: in answer to the question "Why does a dropped ball hit the ground?" is the Greek τὸ πρὸς τὸ κενουμένου ἀκολουθεῖν analogous to the answer (a) "because of gravity" (implying a theory about the forces acting on matter) or (b) "because it falls" (implying only an observation that this always happens when you drop something)? Berryman thinks that Erasistratus used the "following-in to what-is-being-emptied" in this latter sense, that is, as an explanandum rather than as an explanans. Another problem, related to this question of voids, revolves around Strato's theory of 'place' (τόπος). The two writers (Simplicius and Stobaeus) who tell us of Strato's definition of place do not agree with each other, and one of them (Simplicius) may even seem at first to be self-contradictory. Through an analysis of the extant testimonia, I shall attempt to establish Strato's theory of place, ultimately favoring Simplicius's account over that of Stobaeus. The arguments and issues involved, however, will take us through a wide variety of the possible sources for Strato and an analysis of their ideas and objectives in providing their evidence. I argue, contra Furley and Berryman, that there is good reason to suppose that Strato held a theory of horror vacui qua explanans, possibly having borrowed it from some earlier source, and that he did in fact create the microvoid theory. These separate strands tie together into a coherent system that is attributable to Strato based on evidence that is sometimes direct and sometimes circumstantial. Thus, Strato will be seen to be breaking away (to a certain extent) from a strictly Aristotelian position, perhaps following Theophrastus's lead. While much of this work is directed at doubts about Strato's theory expressed by Furley and Berryman, I do not wish to overemphasize the amount of certainty we can attain when looking at Strato. We cannot ascertain beyond doubt that the theory I present here is in fact Strato's. But I think the evidence points fairly clearly at Strato as the originator of a physical theory which incorporates both microvoids and horror vacui, and which was adopted into medicine by Erasistratus and into mechanics by Philo or possibly Ctesibius. [introduction p. 1-3] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/uZqo1P8OJqOJxd5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1118","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1118,"authors_free":[{"id":1690,"entry_id":1118,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":244,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lehoux, Daryn","free_first_name":"Daryn","free_last_name":"Lehoux","norm_person":{"id":244,"first_name":"Daryn","last_name":"Lehoux","full_name":"Lehoux, Daryn","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139306099","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"All Voids Large and Small, Being a Discussion of Place and Void in Strato of Lampsacus's Matter Theory","main_title":{"title":"All Voids Large and Small, Being a Discussion of Place and Void in Strato of Lampsacus's Matter Theory"},"abstract":"Strato of Lampsacus, third head of Aristotle's school at Athens, who was known as 'the Physicist' in antiquity, is a problematic character. Like many other Greek philosophers, none of his books have survived to the present day. There are, to be sure, a few quotes scattered here and there in the philosophical and technical literature of antiquity, but these serve to give us only a flavor of his thinking and his physical theories, from which several reconstructions have been attempted in the last century. Based on this handful of fragments, Hermann Diels published an argument in 1893 which claimed to have fleshed out Strato's physical theory of matter and tried to show that 'the Physicist' held that all matter was interspersed with small pockets of void (similar to the way a sponge is full of little pockets of air), and that if a larger void than these natural minute 'microvoids' was artificially produced, then the surrounding contiguous matter would rush in to fill the gap. This theory would explain suction splendidly, and Diels argued that Erasistratus the physician and Hero of Alexandria had both used Strato's matter theory in their own works. Indeed, Diels even showed (a conclusion unchallenged to this day) that part of Hero's introduction to the Pneumatics was taken almost verbatim from a book by Strato.\r\n\r\nIn his collection of Strato's fragments, Fritz Wehrli more or less followed Diels, and H.B. Gottschalk took Diels's argument even further, presenting almost the whole of Hero's introduction as a fragment of Strato. Since then, however, a number of writers have contested different parts of Diels's reconstruction. In 1985, David Furley argued that, while the microvoid theory seems plausible enough, we cannot attribute to Strato the theory of horror vacui. And in a recent paper, Sylvia Berryman rejected the idea that we can demonstrate that Erasistratus held a matter theory involving either microvoids or the theoretical prohibition of larger extended voids.\r\n\r\nBerryman's argument hinges on a careful distinction between the idea of the horror vacui as an explanation for why matter rushes in to fill the void, and the simple observation that matter does simply fill the space being emptied by suction. That is: when a Greek writer refers to the \"following-in to what-is-being-emptied,\" is he referring to some theoretical mechanism by which void spaces are filled (i.e., what has been called the horror vacui), or is he simply saying that when we empty a vessel of one substance, some other substance always follows in to fill the space being emptied? To draw an analogy: in answer to the question \"Why does a dropped ball hit the ground?\" is the Greek \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd analogous to the answer (a) \"because of gravity\" (implying a theory about the forces acting on matter) or (b) \"because it falls\" (implying only an observation that this always happens when you drop something)? Berryman thinks that Erasistratus used the \"following-in to what-is-being-emptied\" in this latter sense, that is, as an explanandum rather than as an explanans.\r\n\r\nAnother problem, related to this question of voids, revolves around Strato's theory of 'place' (\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2). The two writers (Simplicius and Stobaeus) who tell us of Strato's definition of place do not agree with each other, and one of them (Simplicius) may even seem at first to be self-contradictory. Through an analysis of the extant testimonia, I shall attempt to establish Strato's theory of place, ultimately favoring Simplicius's account over that of Stobaeus. The arguments and issues involved, however, will take us through a wide variety of the possible sources for Strato and an analysis of their ideas and objectives in providing their evidence. I argue, contra Furley and Berryman, that there is good reason to suppose that Strato held a theory of horror vacui qua explanans, possibly having borrowed it from some earlier source, and that he did in fact create the microvoid theory. These separate strands tie together into a coherent system that is attributable to Strato based on evidence that is sometimes direct and sometimes circumstantial. Thus, Strato will be seen to be breaking away (to a certain extent) from a strictly Aristotelian position, perhaps following Theophrastus's lead.\r\n\r\nWhile much of this work is directed at doubts about Strato's theory expressed by Furley and Berryman, I do not wish to overemphasize the amount of certainty we can attain when looking at Strato. We cannot ascertain beyond doubt that the theory I present here is in fact Strato's. But I think the evidence points fairly clearly at Strato as the originator of a physical theory which incorporates both microvoids and horror vacui, and which was adopted into medicine by Erasistratus and into mechanics by Philo or possibly Ctesibius. [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":3,"date":"1999","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/uZqo1P8OJqOJxd5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":244,"full_name":"Lehoux, Daryn","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1118,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Apeiron. A journal for ancient philosophy and science","volume":"32","issue":"1","pages":"1\u201336"}},"sort":["All Voids Large and Small, Being a Discussion of Place and Void in Strato of Lampsacus's Matter Theory"]}
Title | Alternatives to Alternatives: Approaches to Aristotle's Arguments per impossibile |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Vivarium |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 137-173 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kukkonen, Taneli |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
When arguing from impossible premises, what was Aristotle's rationale? Is there a way to salvage all of these purported arguments "through the impossible"? In this article, I wish to examine some of the answers offered by commentators on Aristotle ranging from Alexander to Buridan. We shall see that within the discussion, a more systematic picture of Aristotle's intentions slowly emerged. Whether this picture accurately represents Aristotle is arguable. Because the cited examples arose in connection with some of Aristotle's universally held natural principles, the discussion was seen to tie in with cosmological issues of central importance. The various solutions put forward therefore serve to reveal what the discussants took to be the limits to the world's conceptualization. It is not quite a case of assessing "possible worlds"; this systematic notion only enters the discussion in the early 14th century. Rather, what is at stake is what the possible features of the one and only world are. [p. 141] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/j1e9HSV2wsOobQn |
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Title | An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the Categories? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1981 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 31 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 398-409 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Huby, Pamela M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text discusses an excerpt of a set of leaves from a fourteenth-century manuscript called Laurentianus 71, 32, containing paraphrases of several works. Theodore Waitz uses these leaves for scholia on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. The heading of the leaves is "Peri tês tou pote katêgorias," and the work consists of two parts. The first part discusses Time, based on Physics 4, while the second part deals with the category of When, which Aristotle only briefly mentions. The author of the work is believed to be Boethus of Sidon, the Peripatetic, who wrote a commentary on the Categories, as mentioned by Simplicius in his own commentary on the same work. Boethus is seen as a conservative who defended Aristotle against innovations, particularly Andronicus of Rhodes' attempt to substitute the category of Time for When. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MEh6PB5J3LpaDg5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1355","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1355,"authors_free":[{"id":2029,"entry_id":1355,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":200,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Huby, Pamela M.","free_first_name":"Pamela M.","free_last_name":"Huby","norm_person":{"id":200,"first_name":"Pamela M.","last_name":"Huby","full_name":"Huby, Pamela M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120868962","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the Categories?","main_title":{"title":"An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the Categories?"},"abstract":"The text discusses an excerpt of a set of leaves from a fourteenth-century manuscript called Laurentianus 71, 32, containing paraphrases of several works. Theodore Waitz uses these leaves for scholia on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. The heading of the leaves is \"Peri t\u00eas tou pote kat\u00eagorias,\" and the work consists of two parts. The first part discusses Time, based on Physics 4, while the second part deals with the category of When, which Aristotle only briefly mentions. The author of the work is believed to be Boethus of Sidon, the Peripatetic, who wrote a commentary on the Categories, as mentioned by Simplicius in his own commentary on the same work. Boethus is seen as a conservative who defended Aristotle against innovations, particularly Andronicus of Rhodes' attempt to substitute the category of Time for When. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1981","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MEh6PB5J3LpaDg5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":200,"full_name":"Huby, Pamela M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1355,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"31","issue":"2","pages":"398-409"}},"sort":["An Excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's Commentary on the Categories?"]}
Title | Analyse de l'édition Aldine du Commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 105 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 42-54 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cordero, Néstor-Luis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Pour compléter notre analyse, nous devrions identifier l’éditeur de Simplicius de 1526. Du temps d’Alde, la plupart des ouvrages d’auteurs grecs (rappelons qu’il éditait aussi des ouvrages latins et italiens) étaient réservés à Musurus. À la mort d’Alde, comme nous l’avons dit, Musurus a continué de collaborer avec Andrea d’Asola, mais seulement jusqu’en 1516. En 1517, le fils d’Andrea, Francesco d’Asola, a commencé à travailler à l’imprimerie, et l’année suivante, il figure déjà en tant qu’éditeur responsable de Térence, de Dioscoride et d’Eschyle. À partir de 1518, sauf pour l’édition de Cicéron de 1519, Francesco d’Asola figure en tant que responsable direct de la plupart des éditions aldines où l’on indique le nom de l’éditeur, tout au moins jusqu’en 1529. Mais nous avons des ouvrages d’éditeur anonyme où Francesco d’Asola ne figure qu’en tant qu’auteur de la préface. C’est précisément le cas de l’édition de Simplicius, dont la préface est dédicacée par F. Asulanus au cardinal Hercule Gonzaga. Avec certaines réserves, nous pouvons donc supposer que, d’une manière ou d’une autre, Francesco d’Asola est le responsable de l’édition et, ainsi, l’auteur des conjectures qu’elle présente. En ce qui concerne sa valeur, Renouard fait remarquer qu’il s’agit d’un éditeur intelligent « mais beaucoup trop hardi dans ses conjectures », ainsi qu’il apparaît dans son édition des Argonautica de C. V. Flaccus, en 1523. Cependant, le cas le plus illustratif est son édition d’Homère (à laquelle nous avons fait précédemment allusion) de 1524, qui présente de telles divergences par rapport aux précédentes qu’elle semblerait être fondée sur un nouveau manuscrit. Mais Renouard rejette cette hypothèse : « Il s’agit simplement de conjectures de Francesco d’Asola lui-même, car s’il avait été appuyé de nouveaux manuscrits, il n’eût pas manqué d’en avertir dans une nouvelle préface, au lieu de copier celle d’Alde de l’édition de 1504, déjà imprimée dans celle de 1517. » Tout porte à croire, par conséquent, que l’édition de Simplicius de 1526 a été effectuée sous la responsabilité de Francesco d’Asola, dont les conjectures, en général, n’ont pas été tellement heureuses. Cependant, nous devons reconnaître une fois de plus que nous nous trouvons sur le plan des conjectures et que la possibilité — lointaine, certes — n’est pas exclue que Francesco d’Asola ait disposé de l’archétype de l’œuvre de Simplicius. Toutefois, nous pouvons constater que les manuscrits conservés actuellement présentent le même texte que E et F et, par conséquent, ne justifient pas quelques conjectures "trop hardies". [conclusion p. 53-54] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ooZGKSisiH1j9G1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1277","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1277,"authors_free":[{"id":1866,"entry_id":1277,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":54,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":{"id":54,"first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","last_name":"Cordero","full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1055808973","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Analyse de l'\u00e9dition Aldine du Commentaire de Simplicius \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Analyse de l'\u00e9dition Aldine du Commentaire de Simplicius \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote"},"abstract":"Pour compl\u00e9ter notre analyse, nous devrions identifier l\u2019\u00e9diteur de Simplicius de 1526. Du temps d\u2019Alde, la plupart des ouvrages d\u2019auteurs grecs (rappelons qu\u2019il \u00e9ditait aussi des ouvrages latins et italiens) \u00e9taient r\u00e9serv\u00e9s \u00e0 Musurus.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 la mort d\u2019Alde, comme nous l\u2019avons dit, Musurus a continu\u00e9 de collaborer avec Andrea d\u2019Asola, mais seulement jusqu\u2019en 1516. En 1517, le fils d\u2019Andrea, Francesco d\u2019Asola, a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 travailler \u00e0 l\u2019imprimerie, et l\u2019ann\u00e9e suivante, il figure d\u00e9j\u00e0 en tant qu\u2019\u00e9diteur responsable de T\u00e9rence, de Dioscoride et d\u2019Eschyle.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 partir de 1518, sauf pour l\u2019\u00e9dition de Cic\u00e9ron de 1519, Francesco d\u2019Asola figure en tant que responsable direct de la plupart des \u00e9ditions aldines o\u00f9 l\u2019on indique le nom de l\u2019\u00e9diteur, tout au moins jusqu\u2019en 1529.\r\n\r\nMais nous avons des ouvrages d\u2019\u00e9diteur anonyme o\u00f9 Francesco d\u2019Asola ne figure qu\u2019en tant qu\u2019auteur de la pr\u00e9face. C\u2019est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment le cas de l\u2019\u00e9dition de Simplicius, dont la pr\u00e9face est d\u00e9dicac\u00e9e par F. Asulanus au cardinal Hercule Gonzaga.\r\n\r\nAvec certaines r\u00e9serves, nous pouvons donc supposer que, d\u2019une mani\u00e8re ou d\u2019une autre, Francesco d\u2019Asola est le responsable de l\u2019\u00e9dition et, ainsi, l\u2019auteur des conjectures qu\u2019elle pr\u00e9sente.\r\n\r\nEn ce qui concerne sa valeur, Renouard fait remarquer qu\u2019il s\u2019agit d\u2019un \u00e9diteur intelligent \u00ab mais beaucoup trop hardi dans ses conjectures \u00bb, ainsi qu\u2019il appara\u00eet dans son \u00e9dition des Argonautica de C. V. Flaccus, en 1523.\r\n\r\nCependant, le cas le plus illustratif est son \u00e9dition d\u2019Hom\u00e8re (\u00e0 laquelle nous avons fait pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment allusion) de 1524, qui pr\u00e9sente de telles divergences par rapport aux pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes qu\u2019elle semblerait \u00eatre fond\u00e9e sur un nouveau manuscrit. Mais Renouard rejette cette hypoth\u00e8se :\r\n\r\n \u00ab Il s\u2019agit simplement de conjectures de Francesco d\u2019Asola lui-m\u00eame, car s\u2019il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 appuy\u00e9 de nouveaux manuscrits, il n\u2019e\u00fbt pas manqu\u00e9 d\u2019en avertir dans une nouvelle pr\u00e9face, au lieu de copier celle d\u2019Alde de l\u2019\u00e9dition de 1504, d\u00e9j\u00e0 imprim\u00e9e dans celle de 1517. \u00bb\r\n\r\nTout porte \u00e0 croire, par cons\u00e9quent, que l\u2019\u00e9dition de Simplicius de 1526 a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e sous la responsabilit\u00e9 de Francesco d\u2019Asola, dont les conjectures, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, n\u2019ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9 tellement heureuses.\r\n\r\nCependant, nous devons reconna\u00eetre une fois de plus que nous nous trouvons sur le plan des conjectures et que la possibilit\u00e9 \u2014 lointaine, certes \u2014 n\u2019est pas exclue que Francesco d\u2019Asola ait dispos\u00e9 de l\u2019arch\u00e9type de l\u2019\u0153uvre de Simplicius.\r\n\r\nToutefois, nous pouvons constater que les manuscrits conserv\u00e9s actuellement pr\u00e9sentent le m\u00eame texte que E et F et, par cons\u00e9quent, ne justifient pas quelques conjectures \"trop hardies\".\r\n[conclusion p. 53-54]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ooZGKSisiH1j9G1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":54,"full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1277,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"105","issue":"1","pages":"42-54"}},"sort":["Analyse de l'\u00e9dition Aldine du Commentaire de Simplicius \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote"]}
Title | Anaxagoras B 14 DK |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1976 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 104 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 240-241 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Marcovich, Miroslav |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notes about Anaxagoras B 14 DK |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qjqMabHfJRZhGG4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"987","_score":null,"_source":{"id":987,"authors_free":[{"id":1488,"entry_id":987,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":239,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Marcovich, Miroslav","free_first_name":"Miroslav","free_last_name":"Marcovich","norm_person":{"id":239,"first_name":"Miroslav","last_name":"Marcovich","full_name":"Marcovich, Miroslav","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107592630","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaxagoras B 14 DK","main_title":{"title":"Anaxagoras B 14 DK"},"abstract":"Notes about Anaxagoras B 14 DK","btype":3,"date":"1976","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qjqMabHfJRZhGG4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":239,"full_name":"Marcovich, Miroslav","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":987,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"104","issue":"2","pages":"240-241"}},"sort":["Anaxagoras B 14 DK"]}
Title | Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1974 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 102 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 365-367 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sider, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Note on Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jfkLIWo4A4TjQYr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"851","_score":null,"_source":{"id":851,"authors_free":[{"id":1255,"entry_id":851,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":320,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sider, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Sider","norm_person":{"id":320,"first_name":"David","last_name":"Sider","full_name":"Sider, David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1129478610","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK","main_title":{"title":"Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK"},"abstract":"Note on Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK","btype":3,"date":"1974","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jfkLIWo4A4TjQYr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":320,"full_name":"Sider, David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":851,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"102","issue":"2","pages":"365-367"}},"sort":["Anaxagoras Fr. 14 DK"]}
Title | Anaximander and Dr Dicks |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1970 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 90 |
Pages | 198-199 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I am sorry to have annoyed Dr. Dicks by criticizing two articles of his in one of my footnotes (D. R. Dicks, On Anaximander's Figures, JHS LXXXIX [1969] 120: the offending footnote is in JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 120 n. 44, referring to Dicks, CQ n.s. IX [1959] 294-309, especially 299 and 301, and JHS LXXXVI [1966] 26-40, especially 30 and 36). I limit myself to the four specific points raised, in the hope that Dr. Dicks may one day be kind enough to substantiate his more general criticisms. Pseudo-Galen Five separate doxographical sources attribute to Anaxagoras the statement that the sun is larger, or many times larger, than the Peloponnese. Galen, or pseudo-Galen, notes that Anaxagoras' sun is larger than the earth. I suggested that this second formula, although it may not misrepresent the substance of Anaxagoras' theory, was "probably in Galen simply a random error, arising from the fact that the preceding sentence, on Anaximander, twice makes a comparison of sun and earth" (JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 124 n. 62). It is hard to know what motivates Dr. Dicks to omit my reasoning and to stigmatize my conclusion as "curious" and "eccentric." Tannery Tannery offered three pairs of figures for the distances of the inner and outer diameters of the wheels of stars, moon, and sun in Anaximander's universe: 9 and 10, 18 and 19, 27 and 28 (Science Hellène 94-5). Of these, the figures 19, 27, and 28 are given in doxographical sources. The remaining figures, 9, 10, and 18, are conjectural. If one wishes to criticize Tannery's reconstruction, it makes little sense to isolate one half only of this series. It makes still less sense to isolate the half for which there is less evidence: 9, 18, and 27. But only by doing so is Dr. Dicks able to justify the sentence which I quoted from him: "only 27 in the series has any textual authority." I am sorry if the manner in which I quoted this sentence made it appear that Dr. Dicks had never even heard of the other two figures which appear in the sources, 19 and 28. But Dr. Dicks is wrong to criticize Tannery as though he had generated a single series of numbers from the one figure, 27, which would have been a very dubious procedure. Tannery produced a double series of numbers from the three figures, 19, 27, and 28. This is a very different argument, which has won the support of several scholars and which has recently fallen into disfavour only as the result of a number of misunderstandings, which I have tried to dispel in an article in The Classical Quarterly (n.s. XVII [1967] 423-32). Simplicius In these, and in other doxographical passages, statements are attributed to Anaximander about the sizes and distances of earth, stars, moon, and sun. In Simplicius, mention of megethê kai apostêmata is restricted, albeit loosely, to ta planômena: that the restriction in the context is a loose one anyone may verify who cares to turn up the original passage (De Caelo 470.29 ff = DK 12A19 in part). Because I suggest that Simplicius here may misrepresent Eudemus, whom Simplicius refers to at this point, Dr. Dicks attributes to me the principle that "Simplicius' words may be altered, excised, or transposed at will." In fact, my interpretation of this passage in Simplicius is no different from that implied by Zeller in his great work (Philosophie der Griechen I 1, 298-301) and in part by Tannery (Science Hellène 91). Theophrastus Finally, Dr. Dicks objects to my quotation of two claims: "The chances that the original works of the earlier Pre-Socratics were still readily available to his (sc. Aristotle's) pupils, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus... are extremely small." "There is, therefore, no justification whatsoever for supposing that very late commentators, such as Proclus (5th century A.D.) and Simplicius (6th century A.D.), can possibly possess more authentic information about the Pre-Socratics than the earlier epitomators and excerptors..." It was these two sentences which occasioned my footnote: for here an important principle is at stake. Dr. Dicks now explains that his remarks were intended to be limited to Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. The reader could not have guessed that this was so: for the very paragraphs from which Dr. Dicks' judgment is quoted include references to Xenophanes and (indirectly) Heraclitus, while the paragraph immediately following the second sentence which I quoted (CQ n.s. IX [1959] 301) lists "Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles" as "these early figures." Nonetheless, even if we restrict ourselves to Dr. Dicks' chosen trio, my point remains: there is evidence that Anaximander's work was known both to Apollodorus and to Theophrastus. (N.B. "Known to": for, as I remarked in my note, "I would not claim to distinguish between 'available' and 'readily available' in the case of Theophrastus and Eudemus".) Dr. Dicks ignores this simple refutation of both his earlier and his emended thesis. [the entire note] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YpWmO3Tof91Vb3y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1102","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1102,"authors_free":[{"id":1665,"entry_id":1102,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander and Dr Dicks","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander and Dr Dicks"},"abstract":"I am sorry to have annoyed Dr. Dicks by criticizing two articles of his in one of my footnotes (D. R. Dicks, On Anaximander's Figures, JHS LXXXIX [1969] 120: the offending footnote is in JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 120 n. 44, referring to Dicks, CQ n.s. IX [1959] 294-309, especially 299 and 301, and JHS LXXXVI [1966] 26-40, especially 30 and 36). I limit myself to the four specific points raised, in the hope that Dr. Dicks may one day be kind enough to substantiate his more general criticisms.\r\nPseudo-Galen\r\n\r\nFive separate doxographical sources attribute to Anaxagoras the statement that the sun is larger, or many times larger, than the Peloponnese. Galen, or pseudo-Galen, notes that Anaxagoras' sun is larger than the earth. I suggested that this second formula, although it may not misrepresent the substance of Anaxagoras' theory, was \"probably in Galen simply a random error, arising from the fact that the preceding sentence, on Anaximander, twice makes a comparison of sun and earth\" (JHS LXXXVIII [1968] 124 n. 62). It is hard to know what motivates Dr. Dicks to omit my reasoning and to stigmatize my conclusion as \"curious\" and \"eccentric.\"\r\nTannery\r\n\r\nTannery offered three pairs of figures for the distances of the inner and outer diameters of the wheels of stars, moon, and sun in Anaximander's universe: 9 and 10, 18 and 19, 27 and 28 (Science Hell\u00e8ne 94-5). Of these, the figures 19, 27, and 28 are given in doxographical sources. The remaining figures, 9, 10, and 18, are conjectural.\r\n\r\nIf one wishes to criticize Tannery's reconstruction, it makes little sense to isolate one half only of this series. It makes still less sense to isolate the half for which there is less evidence: 9, 18, and 27. But only by doing so is Dr. Dicks able to justify the sentence which I quoted from him: \"only 27 in the series has any textual authority.\"\r\n\r\nI am sorry if the manner in which I quoted this sentence made it appear that Dr. Dicks had never even heard of the other two figures which appear in the sources, 19 and 28. But Dr. Dicks is wrong to criticize Tannery as though he had generated a single series of numbers from the one figure, 27, which would have been a very dubious procedure. Tannery produced a double series of numbers from the three figures, 19, 27, and 28. This is a very different argument, which has won the support of several scholars and which has recently fallen into disfavour only as the result of a number of misunderstandings, which I have tried to dispel in an article in The Classical Quarterly (n.s. XVII [1967] 423-32).\r\nSimplicius\r\n\r\nIn these, and in other doxographical passages, statements are attributed to Anaximander about the sizes and distances of earth, stars, moon, and sun. In Simplicius, mention of megeth\u00ea kai apost\u00eamata is restricted, albeit loosely, to ta plan\u00f4mena: that the restriction in the context is a loose one anyone may verify who cares to turn up the original passage (De Caelo 470.29 ff = DK 12A19 in part).\r\n\r\nBecause I suggest that Simplicius here may misrepresent Eudemus, whom Simplicius refers to at this point, Dr. Dicks attributes to me the principle that \"Simplicius' words may be altered, excised, or transposed at will.\" In fact, my interpretation of this passage in Simplicius is no different from that implied by Zeller in his great work (Philosophie der Griechen I 1, 298-301) and in part by Tannery (Science Hell\u00e8ne 91).\r\nTheophrastus\r\n\r\nFinally, Dr. Dicks objects to my quotation of two claims:\r\n\r\n \"The chances that the original works of the earlier Pre-Socratics were still readily available to his (sc. Aristotle's) pupils, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus... are extremely small.\"\r\n \"There is, therefore, no justification whatsoever for supposing that very late commentators, such as Proclus (5th century A.D.) and Simplicius (6th century A.D.), can possibly possess more authentic information about the Pre-Socratics than the earlier epitomators and excerptors...\"\r\n\r\nIt was these two sentences which occasioned my footnote: for here an important principle is at stake. Dr. Dicks now explains that his remarks were intended to be limited to Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. The reader could not have guessed that this was so: for the very paragraphs from which Dr. Dicks' judgment is quoted include references to Xenophanes and (indirectly) Heraclitus, while the paragraph immediately following the second sentence which I quoted (CQ n.s. IX [1959] 301) lists \"Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles\" as \"these early figures.\"\r\n\r\nNonetheless, even if we restrict ourselves to Dr. Dicks' chosen trio, my point remains: there is evidence that Anaximander's work was known both to Apollodorus and to Theophrastus. (N.B. \"Known to\": for, as I remarked in my note, \"I would not claim to distinguish between 'available' and 'readily available' in the case of Theophrastus and Eudemus\".)\r\n\r\nDr. Dicks ignores this simple refutation of both his earlier and his emended thesis. [the entire note]","btype":3,"date":"1970","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YpWmO3Tof91Vb3y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1102,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"90","issue":"","pages":"198-199"}},"sort":["Anaximander and Dr Dicks"]}
Title | Anaximander und die Anfänge der Philosophie |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 81 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 257-277 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hölscher, Uvo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Satz HERMANN FRANKELS, daß alle doxographischen Berichte solange unbestimmt sind, als nicht originaler Wortlaut hinzukommt, gilt in gewissem Sinne auch umgekehrt. Denn obwohl jener Satz gerade auch mit Rücksicht auf Anaximander gesagt worden ist, hat doch die Diskussion des Anaximanderfragments gezeigt, wie vieldeutig ein Satzbruchstück bleibt, wenn man es für sich betrachtet, aber auch, wieviel Hilfe aus der Analyse der Überlieferung kommen kann. Aus dieser wird noch einiges herangezogen, ohne daß hinlänglich gefragt würde, wo es herrührt. Sofern es sich im folgenden noch einmal um die Lehre von den Gegensatzen handelt, kommt es mir weniger darauf an, dem einzelnen Placitum sein Recht zu bestreiten, als etwas von der Weise dieses schwer zugänglichen Denkens zu erkennen. Es wird dabei zunächst in einer Untersuchung fortgefahren werden, die sich schon ausgewiesen hat: der Kritik der aristotelischen Berichte. Im zweiten Teil soll dagegen versucht werden, jene Denkform von den Voraussetzungen her zu bestimmen, aus denen Anaximander seine Konzeption des Ursprungs entwickelt hat. [introduction p. 17] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/THjvXeZsyHON9jV |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1398","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1398,"authors_free":[{"id":2177,"entry_id":1398,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":198,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","free_first_name":"Uvo","free_last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","norm_person":{"id":198,"first_name":"Uvo","last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118705571","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander und die Anf\u00e4nge der Philosophie","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander und die Anf\u00e4nge der Philosophie"},"abstract":"Der Satz HERMANN FRANKELS, da\u00df alle doxographischen Berichte solange unbestimmt sind, als nicht originaler Wortlaut hinzukommt, gilt in gewissem Sinne auch umgekehrt. Denn obwohl jener Satz gerade auch mit R\u00fccksicht auf Anaximander gesagt worden ist, hat doch die Diskussion des Anaximanderfragments gezeigt, wie vieldeutig ein Satzbruchst\u00fcck bleibt, wenn man es f\u00fcr sich betrachtet, aber auch, wieviel Hilfe aus der Analyse der \u00dcberlieferung kommen kann. Aus dieser wird noch einiges herangezogen, ohne da\u00df hinl\u00e4nglich gefragt w\u00fcrde, wo es herr\u00fchrt. Sofern es sich im folgenden noch einmal um die Lehre von den Gegensatzen handelt, kommt es mir weniger darauf an, dem einzelnen Placitum sein Recht zu bestreiten, als etwas von der Weise dieses schwer zug\u00e4nglichen Denkens zu erkennen. Es wird dabei zun\u00e4chst in einer Untersuchung fortgefahren werden, die sich schon ausgewiesen hat: der Kritik der aristotelischen Berichte. Im zweiten Teil soll dagegen versucht werden, jene Denkform von den Voraussetzungen her zu bestimmen, aus denen Anaximander seine Konzeption des Ursprungs entwickelt hat. [introduction p. 17]","btype":3,"date":"1953","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/THjvXeZsyHON9jV","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":198,"full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1398,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"81","issue":"3","pages":"257-277"}},"sort":["Anaximander und die Anf\u00e4nge der Philosophie"]}
Title | Anaximander's Conception of the "Apeiron" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 38 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 229-256 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Anaximander's Apeiron is perhaps the most obscure notion in Greek philosophy. Aristotle was puzzled by it, suggesting various and greatly differing interpretations of the concept. But while Aristotle's construals were, in a sense, predominantly ad hoc and exempli gratia, Theophrastus committed himself, at least in the expository sections of his Physical Opinions, to a concise presentation—with attention to their authentic setting and idiom—of the teachings of the earlier thinkers. Theophrastus' statement concerning the Apeiron has come down to us in the following three versions: Simpl. Phys. 24, 13 (DK 12 A 9): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element of existing things was the Apeiron... and he says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other infinite nature... Diog. ii 1 (DK 12 A 1): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element is the Apeiron, not determining whether it is air or water or something else. Aet. 1 3, 3 (DK 12 A 14): Anaximander... says that the arche of existing things is the Apeiron... but he errs in that he does not say what the Apeiron is, whether it is air, or water, or earth, or some other body. The question of whether Simplicius or Diogenes and Aetius are true to Theophrastus' genuine wording is not of purely philological interest. As Barnes notes, "the view that Anaximander's principle was qualitatively indeterminate loses in plausibility if he did not positively distinguish it from the elements." Kahn adds, "here again the words of Simplicius must closely reflect the text of Theophrastus. The parallels [in Aetius and Diogenes] prove this, even if they are not precise enough to establish the original wording." However, Barnes also admits that "we cannot tell whether Simplicius or Diogenes better represents Theophrastus' judgment." A decisive answer, however, has already been provided by Hölscher, who assessed Simplicius' words as "clearly a distortion; the correct phrase is in Diogenes, ob ὀρθῶς," and this not merely because Simplicius is in a minority, but for the simple reason that "otherwise there could have been no discussion about it [i.e., the Apeiron] at all." Thus, what Theophrastus actually said is that Anaximander did not determine his arche and element in respect of qualities. It is one thing to say that Anaximander did not determine his arche qualitatively and quite another to say that he posited a qualitatively indeterminate body as the arche; concluding from the former to the latter is not an inference that logicians would approve. That being said, it is not to imply that Anaximander provided his arche with no qualification at all—he called it to Apeiron. The Greek word may mean "boundless, infinite, countless" or "endless" in the sense of "circular" (see LSJ, s.v.). However, the third meaning—"without outlet"—is surely irrelevant to Anaximander. Gottschalk correctly pointed out that the widely accepted idea that under to Apeiron Anaximander meant "that which is without internal boundaries or distinctions," effectively "qualitatively indeterminate," has no linguistic justification. In calling his principle to Apeiron, Anaximander may have meant to specify it as spatially infinite (or, more plausibly historically, indefinitely large), temporally infinite (i.e., eternal), or most probably both; he may even have intended to denote it as spherical. However, qualitative indefiniteness was certainly not what he intended to express by this term. The scholarly belief that Anaximander posited a qualitatively indefinite body as the principle is thus, at best, a speculative conjecture and, at worst, a confusion which has neither doxographical nor linguistic support and, moreover, strictly speaking, goes against our evidence. [introduction p. 229-231] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KFH07EnbKOSrtwC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"749","_score":null,"_source":{"id":749,"authors_free":[{"id":1114,"entry_id":749,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander's Conception of the \"Apeiron\"","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander's Conception of the \"Apeiron\""},"abstract":"Anaximander's Apeiron is perhaps the most obscure notion in Greek philosophy. Aristotle was puzzled by it, suggesting various and greatly differing interpretations of the concept. But while Aristotle's construals were, in a sense, predominantly ad hoc and exempli gratia, Theophrastus committed himself, at least in the expository sections of his Physical Opinions, to a concise presentation\u2014with attention to their authentic setting and idiom\u2014of the teachings of the earlier thinkers. Theophrastus' statement concerning the Apeiron has come down to us in the following three versions:\r\n\r\n Simpl. Phys. 24, 13 (DK 12 A 9): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element of existing things was the Apeiron... and he says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other infinite nature...\r\n Diog. ii 1 (DK 12 A 1): Anaximander... said that the arche and the element is the Apeiron, not determining whether it is air or water or something else.\r\n Aet. 1 3, 3 (DK 12 A 14): Anaximander... says that the arche of existing things is the Apeiron... but he errs in that he does not say what the Apeiron is, whether it is air, or water, or earth, or some other body.\r\n\r\nThe question of whether Simplicius or Diogenes and Aetius are true to Theophrastus' genuine wording is not of purely philological interest. As Barnes notes, \"the view that Anaximander's principle was qualitatively indeterminate loses in plausibility if he did not positively distinguish it from the elements.\" Kahn adds, \"here again the words of Simplicius must closely reflect the text of Theophrastus. The parallels [in Aetius and Diogenes] prove this, even if they are not precise enough to establish the original wording.\" However, Barnes also admits that \"we cannot tell whether Simplicius or Diogenes better represents Theophrastus' judgment.\"\r\n\r\nA decisive answer, however, has already been provided by H\u00f6lscher, who assessed Simplicius' words as \"clearly a distortion; the correct phrase is in Diogenes, ob \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2,\" and this not merely because Simplicius is in a minority, but for the simple reason that \"otherwise there could have been no discussion about it [i.e., the Apeiron] at all.\" Thus, what Theophrastus actually said is that Anaximander did not determine his arche and element in respect of qualities.\r\n\r\nIt is one thing to say that Anaximander did not determine his arche qualitatively and quite another to say that he posited a qualitatively indeterminate body as the arche; concluding from the former to the latter is not an inference that logicians would approve.\r\n\r\nThat being said, it is not to imply that Anaximander provided his arche with no qualification at all\u2014he called it to Apeiron. The Greek word may mean \"boundless, infinite, countless\" or \"endless\" in the sense of \"circular\" (see LSJ, s.v.). However, the third meaning\u2014\"without outlet\"\u2014is surely irrelevant to Anaximander. Gottschalk correctly pointed out that the widely accepted idea that under to Apeiron Anaximander meant \"that which is without internal boundaries or distinctions,\" effectively \"qualitatively indeterminate,\" has no linguistic justification.\r\n\r\nIn calling his principle to Apeiron, Anaximander may have meant to specify it as spatially infinite (or, more plausibly historically, indefinitely large), temporally infinite (i.e., eternal), or most probably both; he may even have intended to denote it as spherical. However, qualitative indefiniteness was certainly not what he intended to express by this term.\r\n\r\nThe scholarly belief that Anaximander posited a qualitatively indefinite body as the principle is thus, at best, a speculative conjecture and, at worst, a confusion which has neither doxographical nor linguistic support and, moreover, strictly speaking, goes against our evidence. [introduction p. 229-231]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KFH07EnbKOSrtwC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":749,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"38","issue":"3","pages":"229-256"}},"sort":["Anaximander's Conception of the \"Apeiron\""]}
Title | Anaximander: Zu den Quellen und seiner Einordnung im Vorsokratischen Denken |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1964 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 9 |
Pages | 59-72 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schwabl, Hans |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die alten Milesier können erst nach einiger kritischer Vorarbeit Gegenstand begriffsgeschichtlicher Forschung sein. Der Anfang der griechischen Philosophie ist uns ja nur durch die Berichte späterer Autoren überliefert und aus dem Blickwinkel einer Problemstellung, die nicht mehr die der ersten Philosophen ist. So scheint der Versuch, die Eigenart der milesischen Philosophie zu bestimmen, zunächst so gut wie aussichtslos, insbesondere wenn man bedenkt, dass nicht einmal die eigentliche Quelle unserer Nachrichten, das Werk Theophrasts, uns als solche überkommen ist, sondern dass wir auch hier erst rekonstruieren müssen. Der Anfang muss also sein, zu erforschen, was Theophrast gesagt und gemeint hat. Erst dann stellt sich die Aufgabe einer Rückübersetzung seiner Berichte ins Archaische. Diese Rückübersetzung ist nur möglich innerhalb einer entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Linie, die von den Früheren zu den Milesiern und von diesen wieder zu den späteren Vorsokratikern zu ziehen ist. In unserer kurzen Skizze kann das dafür schon Geleistete bzw. noch zu Leistende nur angedeutet werden. Wir beschränken uns außerdem auf Anaximander, einmal wegen der besonderen Stellung, die ihm zukommt, dann aber auch wegen der Quellenlage, die, wenn man sie nur recht einzuschätzen weiß, doch einigermaßen tragfähige Schlüsse auf den Ansatzpunkt und die Eigenart dieses frühen Denkers gestattet. [introduction p. 59-60] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MqdT9PDIArLqpNc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1031","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1031,"authors_free":[{"id":1561,"entry_id":1031,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":288,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schwabl, Hans","free_first_name":"Hans","free_last_name":"Schwabl","norm_person":{"id":288,"first_name":"Hans","last_name":"Schwabl","full_name":"Schwabl, Hans","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107871211","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Anaximander: Zu den Quellen und seiner Einordnung im Vorsokratischen Denken","main_title":{"title":"Anaximander: Zu den Quellen und seiner Einordnung im Vorsokratischen Denken"},"abstract":"Die alten Milesier k\u00f6nnen erst nach einiger kritischer Vorarbeit Gegenstand begriffsgeschichtlicher Forschung sein. Der Anfang der griechischen Philosophie ist uns ja nur durch die Berichte sp\u00e4terer Autoren \u00fcberliefert und aus dem Blickwinkel einer Problemstellung, die nicht mehr die der ersten Philosophen ist. So scheint der Versuch, die Eigenart der milesischen Philosophie zu bestimmen, zun\u00e4chst so gut wie aussichtslos, insbesondere wenn man bedenkt, dass nicht einmal die eigentliche Quelle unserer Nachrichten, das Werk Theophrasts, uns als solche \u00fcberkommen ist, sondern dass wir auch hier erst rekonstruieren m\u00fcssen.\r\n\r\nDer Anfang muss also sein, zu erforschen, was Theophrast gesagt und gemeint hat. Erst dann stellt sich die Aufgabe einer R\u00fcck\u00fcbersetzung seiner Berichte ins Archaische. Diese R\u00fcck\u00fcbersetzung ist nur m\u00f6glich innerhalb einer entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Linie, die von den Fr\u00fcheren zu den Milesiern und von diesen wieder zu den sp\u00e4teren Vorsokratikern zu ziehen ist.\r\n\r\nIn unserer kurzen Skizze kann das daf\u00fcr schon Geleistete bzw. noch zu Leistende nur angedeutet werden. Wir beschr\u00e4nken uns au\u00dferdem auf Anaximander, einmal wegen der besonderen Stellung, die ihm zukommt, dann aber auch wegen der Quellenlage, die, wenn man sie nur recht einzusch\u00e4tzen wei\u00df, doch einigerma\u00dfen tragf\u00e4hige Schl\u00fcsse auf den Ansatzpunkt und die Eigenart dieses fr\u00fchen Denkers gestattet. [introduction p. 59-60]","btype":3,"date":"1964","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MqdT9PDIArLqpNc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":288,"full_name":"Schwabl, Hans","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1031,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"9","issue":"","pages":"59-72"}},"sort":["Anaximander: Zu den Quellen und seiner Einordnung im Vorsokratischen Denken"]}
Title | Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Journal of the History of Philosophy |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1–18 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Anton, John Peter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The main pourpose of this paper is to offer an exposition and a critical examination of the ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of homonymy. A circumlocution of what Aristotle means by homonymous things is given in Categories, Ch. 1, 1a. The ancient interpretations with which we are concerned in this paper are to be found in the extant commentaries on this treatise. Evidently, more commentaries had been written on the Categories than the vicissitudes of time allowed to survive, but we have only those of the following writers: Porphyrius (c. 233–303), Dexippus (fl. c. 350), Ammonius (fl. c. 485), Philoponus (c. 490–530), Olympiodorus (fl. c. 535), Simplicius (fl. c. 533), and Elias (fl. c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675–749), Photius (820–891), and Michael Psellus (1018–1079), which are useful paraphrases rather than full commentaries; for that reason, the interpretations they support are not discussed in this paper. The main body of this paper is given to a discussion of the interpretations which the ancient commentators offered and to an analysis of the assumptions which underlie them. It can be stated here, in anticipation of what follows, that the commentators often attached to Aristotle's meaning of homonymy aspects that were quite foreign to his views, and that by doing so, these commentators were taking extensive liberties with the text at hand. As we hope to show, the commentators brought into their discussions of this particular portion of the Categories issues and views that were far more relevant to their own ontologies and logical theories than to Aristotle's doctrines. In order to show how this is the case, we must first give a summary of what we believe our text permits us to say about the meaning of homonymy, as given in the opening chapter of the Categories. Suffice it to add at this point that the interpretations of the doctrine of homonymy with which we are concerned here are only those that are discussed exclusively in the relevant commentaries on this work. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1BGmQytPmPF1QPa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1003","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1003,"authors_free":[{"id":1508,"entry_id":1003,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":34,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Anton, John Peter","free_first_name":"John Peter","free_last_name":"Anton","norm_person":{"id":34,"first_name":"John Peter","last_name":"Anton","full_name":"Anton, John Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/171952154","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma","main_title":{"title":"Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma"},"abstract":"The main pourpose of this paper is to offer an exposition and a critical examination of the ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of homonymy. A circumlocution of what Aristotle means by homonymous things is given in Categories, Ch. 1, 1a. The ancient interpretations with which we are concerned in this paper are to be found in the extant commentaries on this treatise. Evidently, more commentaries had been written on the Categories than the vicissitudes of time allowed to survive, but we have only those of the following writers: Porphyrius (c. 233\u2013303), Dexippus (fl. c. 350), Ammonius (fl. c. 485), Philoponus (c. 490\u2013530), Olympiodorus (fl. c. 535), Simplicius (fl. c. 533), and Elias (fl. c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675\u2013749), Photius (820\u2013891), and Michael Psellus (1018\u20131079), which are useful paraphrases rather than full commentaries; for that reason, the interpretations they support are not discussed in this paper.\r\n\r\nThe main body of this paper is given to a discussion of the interpretations which the ancient commentators offered and to an analysis of the assumptions which underlie them. It can be stated here, in anticipation of what follows, that the commentators often attached to Aristotle's meaning of homonymy aspects that were quite foreign to his views, and that by doing so, these commentators were taking extensive liberties with the text at hand. As we hope to show, the commentators brought into their discussions of this particular portion of the Categories issues and views that were far more relevant to their own ontologies and logical theories than to Aristotle's doctrines. In order to show how this is the case, we must first give a summary of what we believe our text permits us to say about the meaning of homonymy, as given in the opening chapter of the Categories. Suffice it to add at this point that the interpretations of the doctrine of homonymy with which we are concerned here are only those that are discussed exclusively in the relevant commentaries on this work. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1BGmQytPmPF1QPa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":34,"full_name":"Anton, John Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1003,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the History of Philosophy","volume":"7","issue":"1","pages":"1\u201318"}},"sort":["Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma"]}
Title | Ancora su Simplicio e le Categorie |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Rivista di Storia della Filosofia |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 723-732 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Isnardi Parente, Margherita |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
La storia del concetto di relativo ha già precedenti che sarebbe troppo lungo ricordare. Basti accennare qui a due essenziali limitazioni che i relativi hanno già subito nella storia della tradizione platonico-aristotelica: la negazione di un modello ideale per la relazione (i modelli ideali esistono per le realtà poste in relazione, non per la relazione stessa o per ciò che è solo in funzione della relazione); la definizione di paraphyas per il relativo, definizione che va da Aristotele (EN I, 1096 a 21) ad Andronico ed oltre: paraphyas, cioè ciò che si pone accanto alla vera phýsis, come una sorta di natura aggiunta e secondaria. Gli stoici hanno una loro parte nella storia di questa riduzione della relazione a fatto di ordine mentale o soggettivo. I pros ti pôs echonta sono una nuova forma di incorporeo che viene ad aggiungersi alle altre, anche se nessuna lista riveduta ci è fornita dalla tradizione. E di questa nuova importanza dell'incorporeità in rapporto con la teoria dei generi dell'essere, passi come quello di Simplicio o come questo di Sesto offrono una attestazione fondamentale. [conclusion p. 731-732] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RIxIO3H5yPGRKEc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"620","_score":null,"_source":{"id":620,"authors_free":[{"id":876,"entry_id":620,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":282,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","free_first_name":"Margherita","free_last_name":"Parente","norm_person":{"id":282,"first_name":"Margherita","last_name":"Isnardi Parente","full_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1023256045","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ancora su Simplicio e le Categorie","main_title":{"title":"Ancora su Simplicio e le Categorie"},"abstract":"La storia del concetto di relativo ha gi\u00e0 precedenti che sarebbe troppo lungo ricordare. Basti accennare qui a due essenziali limitazioni che i relativi hanno gi\u00e0 subito nella storia della tradizione platonico-aristotelica: la negazione di un modello ideale per la relazione (i modelli ideali esistono per le realt\u00e0 poste in relazione, non per la relazione stessa o per ci\u00f2 che \u00e8 solo in funzione della relazione); la definizione di paraphyas per il relativo, definizione che va da Aristotele (EN I, 1096 a 21) ad Andronico ed oltre: paraphyas, cio\u00e8 ci\u00f2 che si pone accanto alla vera ph\u00fdsis, come una sorta di natura aggiunta e secondaria.\r\n\r\nGli stoici hanno una loro parte nella storia di questa riduzione della relazione a fatto di ordine mentale o soggettivo. I pros ti p\u00f4s echonta sono una nuova forma di incorporeo che viene ad aggiungersi alle altre, anche se nessuna lista riveduta ci \u00e8 fornita dalla tradizione. E di questa nuova importanza dell'incorporeit\u00e0 in rapporto con la teoria dei generi dell'essere, passi come quello di Simplicio o come questo di Sesto offrono una attestazione fondamentale. [conclusion p. 731-732]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RIxIO3H5yPGRKEc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":282,"full_name":"Isnardi Parente, Margherita","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":620,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista di Storia della Filosofia","volume":"45","issue":"4","pages":"723-732"}},"sort":["Ancora su Simplicio e le Categorie"]}
Title | Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin’s Aristotle’s Categories in the Early Roman Empire |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2018 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 29 |
Pages | 13-43 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Menn, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Griffin, Rashed, and Chiaradonna have shown how we can use Simplicius’ Categories commentary to reconstruct much of Porphyry’s greater Categories commentary (also witnessed by the Archimedes Palimpsest), and then use this to reconstruct much of the work of Boethus, and to a lesser extent Andronicus, on the Categories. In some cases building on Griffin, in other cases disagreeing with him, I bring out some ways in which Andronicus and Boethus differ from most later interpreters; this can help us understand Alexander’s and Porphyry’s responses. I reconstruct (i) Andronicus’ interpretation of ‘in’ and ‘said of, which is based on Aristotle’s distinction between abstract nouns and paronymous concrete nouns, and avoids the metaphysical freight that later interpreters load onto the notion of ‘said o f; (ii) Boethus’ use of De Interpretation 1 to explain how a universal term can be synonymous without positing either universals in re or Stoic XeKid, and the consequences he draws for the different aims of the Categories and De Interpretation; and (iii) Boethus’ solution to the tension between Aristotle’s hylomorphism and the Categories’ account of substance. Boethus, unlike later interpreters, thinks the form is in the matter, and is therefore not a substance but (typically) a quality, but that it is nonetheless able to constitute the composite as a substance distinct from the matter. I bring out the Aristotelian basis for Boethus’ reading, connect it with Boethus’ accounts of differentiae and of the soul, and show how Boethus’ views help motivate Porphyry’s responses. In some cases Porphyry constructs his views by triangulating between Boethus and Alexander. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QBnyRLAL62sCzX0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1141","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1141,"authors_free":[{"id":1715,"entry_id":1141,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire","main_title":{"title":"Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire"},"abstract":"Griffin, Rashed, and Chiaradonna have shown how we can use Simplicius\u2019 Categories commentary to reconstruct much of Porphyry\u2019s greater Categories commentary (also witnessed by the Archimedes Palimpsest), and then use this to reconstruct much of the work of Boethus, and to a lesser extent Andronicus, on the Categories. In some cases \r\nbuilding on Griffin, in other cases disagreeing with him, I bring out some ways in which Andronicus and Boethus differ from most later interpreters; this can help us understand Alexander\u2019s and Porphyry\u2019s responses. I reconstruct (i) Andronicus\u2019 interpretation of \u2018in\u2019 and \u2018said of, which is based on Aristotle\u2019s distinction between abstract nouns and paronymous concrete nouns, and avoids the metaphysical freight that later interpreters load onto the notion of \u2018said o f; (ii) Boethus\u2019 use of De Interpretation 1 to explain how \r\na universal term can be synonymous without positing either universals in re or Stoic \r\nXeKid, and the consequences he draws for the different aims of the Categories and De Interpretation; and (iii) Boethus\u2019 solution to the tension between Aristotle\u2019s hylomorphism and the Categories\u2019 account of substance. Boethus, unlike later interpreters, thinks the \r\nform is in the matter, and is therefore not a substance but (typically) a quality, but that it \r\nis nonetheless able to constitute the composite as a substance distinct from the matter. I bring out the Aristotelian basis for Boethus\u2019 reading, connect it with Boethus\u2019 accounts of differentiae and of the soul, and show how Boethus\u2019 views help motivate Porphyry\u2019s responses. In some cases Porphyry constructs his views by triangulating between Boethus and Alexander. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QBnyRLAL62sCzX0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1141,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"29","issue":"","pages":"13-43"}},"sort":["Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire"]}
Title | Andronikos von Rhodos und die Postprädikamente bei Boethius |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Vigiliae Christianae |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 98-115 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Pfligersdorffer, Georg |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In der Erläuterungsschrift des Boethius zu den Kategorien des Aristoteles ist nach Absolvierung der einzelnen Kategorien das vierte Buch der Besprechung der sogenannten Postprädikamente 1 eingeräumt (Migne PL 64, 263-294), wozu freilich gleich auch gesagt werden musz, dasz die handschriftliche Überlieferung vielfach die Abtrennung eines vierten Buches nicht aufweist, sondern die uns geläufigen Bücher III und IV zu einem zusammenfaszt2, worauf hier jedoch nicht weiter eingegangen werden soll. Mit diesem Sachverhalt scheint zusammenzuhängen, dasz — soweit ich bis jetzt sagen kann — die Handschriften C(odex) l(atinus) m(ona- censis) 6403 und 14516, Bern. 265, Paris. B. N. lat. 11129 sowie die Sangallenses 817 und 821 gegenüber der Ausgabe von Migne das Aristoteles-Lemma de oppositis (Kateg. 10, 11b 16 ff.) vor die Kommentar-Partie 263 B-264 B Migne (Expeditis . . . ) treten lassen. [...] Die Zweifel, die sich an die Stelle 263 B M. knüpfen, möchte ich im folgenden, um einschlägige Arbeiten anderer nicht indirekt zu hemmen, schon vor meiner Ausgabe möglichst einschränken und vielleicht auch beheben. [pp. 98 f.] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PbVU1hqwXwhd1ee |
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Title | Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of περί τῆς ’Αληθείας |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1973 |
Journal | L'Antiquité Classique |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 178-180 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rankin, Herbert David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This passage (Simplicii in Categoriarum c. 8 [Arist. p. ]) is placed by Caizzi among a group of passages of epistemological interest but not clearly attributable to any of the works which Antisthenes is said to have composed. Its argument is characteristic enough, being one of the representations of Antisthenes' opposition to Plato's eîdē, and an assertion of his view that the concrete phenomenal object is the starting point of our capability of knowledge, which in his view is probably limited by the restrictions placed upon us by the narrow capacity of our language with regard to logical discourse. The purpose of this article is to consider whether a part of this passage is a quotation from Antisthenes' own writings and to suggest a possible place for it in one of the works with which he is credited. [introduction p. 178] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/a36SykFCN2qyzot |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"861","_score":null,"_source":{"id":861,"authors_free":[{"id":1265,"entry_id":861,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":296,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","free_first_name":"Herbert David","free_last_name":"Rankin","norm_person":{"id":296,"first_name":"Herbert David","last_name":"Rankin","full_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1058155474","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u2019\u0391\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2","main_title":{"title":"Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u2019\u0391\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2"},"abstract":"This passage (Simplicii in Categoriarum c. 8 [Arist. p. ]) is placed by Caizzi among a group of passages of epistemological interest but not clearly attributable to any of the works which Antisthenes is said to have composed. Its argument is characteristic enough, being one of the representations of Antisthenes' opposition to Plato's e\u00eed\u0113, and an assertion of his view that the concrete phenomenal object is the starting point of our capability of knowledge, which in his view is probably limited by the restrictions placed upon us by the narrow capacity of our language with regard to logical discourse.\r\n\r\nThe purpose of this article is to consider whether a part of this passage is a quotation from Antisthenes' own writings and to suggest a possible place for it in one of the works with which he is credited. [introduction p. 178]","btype":3,"date":"1973","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/a36SykFCN2qyzot","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":296,"full_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":861,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"L'Antiquit\u00e9 Classique","volume":"42","issue":"1","pages":"178-180"}},"sort":["Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u2019\u0391\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2"]}
Title | Aperçu de la réception de la doctrine stoïcienne du mélange total dans le néoplatonisme après Plotin |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 25 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 67-100 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cohen, Daniel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aux niveaux les plus inférieurs, où prédomine la multiplicité et la division, le mélange peut se manifester selon deux modes : Ou bien les composants d'une totalité préservent leur identité au détriment de l'unité du produit du mélange (il ne s'agit alors pas à proprement parler d'un mélange mais plutôt d'un « assemblage » dans lequel les éléments sont simplement juxtaposés : il s'agit plutôt de la παράθεσις stoïcienne ou de la σύνθεσις d'Aristote). Ou bien le produit du mélange forme une véritable totalité unifiée, mais alors cette unité est réalisée au détriment de l'identité des composantes, qui s'altèrent et se confondent pour former une entité nouvelle (il s'agit alors de la σύγχυσις stoïcienne ou du véritable mélange au sens aristotélicien). Au niveau des réalités immatérielles, c'est sur le modèle stoïcien du mélange total que les Néoplatoniciens envisagent cette paradoxale « fusion sans confusion » qui unifie toute multiplicité sur le mode de la totalité antérieure à la dispersion de ses parties au sein de la matière. Dans la mesure où les jugements que les Néoplatoniciens portent sur l'héritage philosophique des doctrines anciennes se présentent la plupart du temps comme une confrontation avec la perspective qui est supposée être celle de Platon, on peut dire que la réception néoplatonicienne des physiques du mélange d'Aristote et des Stoïciens aboutit à la conclusion suivante : Les Stoïciens se trompent parce qu'ils rendent les causes immanentes et donc mélangées à la matière. Aristote a raison, mais il se limite à rendre compte des phénomènes sensibles. Aristote et les Stoïciens font partie de ce que Proclus qualifiera de « crème des disputeurs qui, pour avoir observé quelque petite portion de la nature, pensent pouvoir déchirer Platon ». Ce n'est donc pas le moindre des paradoxes si les représentants du Néoplatonisme, après avoir rejeté les lois de la physique aristotélicienne comme n'ayant de validité qu'au seul niveau sensible, et après avoir vigoureusement critiqué le matérialisme stoïcien, ont transposé la donnée la plus fondamentale de la physique stoïcienne — celle qui permettait aux Stoïciens de justifier l'immanence intégrale de la causalité divine (et donc le matérialisme corporaliste le plus radical) — aux niveaux les plus élevés, comme régissant les relations entre les réalités immatérielles et incorporelles. Comme l'a bien montré Pierre Hadot, cette transfiguration doctrinale, qui deviendra typique de la démarche néoplatonicienne, a été amorcée dans le cadre de la synthèse réalisée par Porphyre. En ce sens, écrivait-il, « c'est précisément une des caractéristiques de la doctrine porphyrienne (...) de montrer que le Stoïcisme n'est vrai que dans la transposition néoplatonicienne, la physique stoïcienne devenant ainsi une métaphysique », de sorte que « la théorie des mélanges élaborée par les Stoïciens ne découvre sa vérité que sur le plan intelligible ». Nous avons vu cependant que cette vérité se découvre avant même d'envisager le mélange proprement noétique, Porphyre lui-même ayant déjà fait intervenir la krasis stoïcienne dans le contexte d'un exposé sur l'embryologie, et les Néoplatoniciens ultérieurs dans cet ordre intermédiaire, négligé par Plotin, où se tiennent les « corps immatériels » non qualifiés. La conception stoïcienne du mélange total s'est finalement imposée au sein de la métaphysique néoplatonicienne au prix d'un double réaménagement doctrinal, ayant eu pour résultat : La synthèse de la doctrine stoïcienne de l'interpénétration totale sans confusion avec les élaborations aristotéliciennes de l'acte et de la puissance. La transposition du domaine des réalités matérielles à celui des réalités corporelles non encore engagées dans la matière première. [conclusion p. 99-100] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T9kWS2QRZ2oeq7V |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1273","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1273,"authors_free":[{"id":1863,"entry_id":1273,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":51,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cohen, Daniel","free_first_name":"Daniel","free_last_name":"Cohen","norm_person":{"id":51,"first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Cohen","full_name":"Cohen, Daniel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1024876659","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aper\u00e7u de la r\u00e9ception de la doctrine sto\u00efcienne du m\u00e9lange total dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme apr\u00e8s Plotin","main_title":{"title":"Aper\u00e7u de la r\u00e9ception de la doctrine sto\u00efcienne du m\u00e9lange total dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme apr\u00e8s Plotin"},"abstract":"Aux niveaux les plus inf\u00e9rieurs, o\u00f9 pr\u00e9domine la multiplicit\u00e9 et la division, le m\u00e9lange peut se manifester selon deux modes :\r\n\r\n Ou bien les composants d'une totalit\u00e9 pr\u00e9servent leur identit\u00e9 au d\u00e9triment de l'unit\u00e9 du produit du m\u00e9lange (il ne s'agit alors pas \u00e0 proprement parler d'un m\u00e9lange mais plut\u00f4t d'un \u00ab assemblage \u00bb dans lequel les \u00e9l\u00e9ments sont simplement juxtapos\u00e9s : il s'agit plut\u00f4t de la \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 sto\u00efcienne ou de la \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 d'Aristote).\r\n Ou bien le produit du m\u00e9lange forme une v\u00e9ritable totalit\u00e9 unifi\u00e9e, mais alors cette unit\u00e9 est r\u00e9alis\u00e9e au d\u00e9triment de l'identit\u00e9 des composantes, qui s'alt\u00e8rent et se confondent pour former une entit\u00e9 nouvelle (il s'agit alors de la \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03c7\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 sto\u00efcienne ou du v\u00e9ritable m\u00e9lange au sens aristot\u00e9licien).\r\n\r\nAu niveau des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s immat\u00e9rielles, c'est sur le mod\u00e8le sto\u00efcien du m\u00e9lange total que les N\u00e9oplatoniciens envisagent cette paradoxale \u00ab fusion sans confusion \u00bb qui unifie toute multiplicit\u00e9 sur le mode de la totalit\u00e9 ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 la dispersion de ses parties au sein de la mati\u00e8re.\r\n\r\nDans la mesure o\u00f9 les jugements que les N\u00e9oplatoniciens portent sur l'h\u00e9ritage philosophique des doctrines anciennes se pr\u00e9sentent la plupart du temps comme une confrontation avec la perspective qui est suppos\u00e9e \u00eatre celle de Platon, on peut dire que la r\u00e9ception n\u00e9oplatonicienne des physiques du m\u00e9lange d'Aristote et des Sto\u00efciens aboutit \u00e0 la conclusion suivante :\r\n\r\n Les Sto\u00efciens se trompent parce qu'ils rendent les causes immanentes et donc m\u00e9lang\u00e9es \u00e0 la mati\u00e8re.\r\n Aristote a raison, mais il se limite \u00e0 rendre compte des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes sensibles.\r\n\r\nAristote et les Sto\u00efciens font partie de ce que Proclus qualifiera de \u00ab cr\u00e8me des disputeurs qui, pour avoir observ\u00e9 quelque petite portion de la nature, pensent pouvoir d\u00e9chirer Platon \u00bb.\r\n\r\nCe n'est donc pas le moindre des paradoxes si les repr\u00e9sentants du N\u00e9oplatonisme, apr\u00e8s avoir rejet\u00e9 les lois de la physique aristot\u00e9licienne comme n'ayant de validit\u00e9 qu'au seul niveau sensible, et apr\u00e8s avoir vigoureusement critiqu\u00e9 le mat\u00e9rialisme sto\u00efcien, ont transpos\u00e9 la donn\u00e9e la plus fondamentale de la physique sto\u00efcienne \u2014 celle qui permettait aux Sto\u00efciens de justifier l'immanence int\u00e9grale de la causalit\u00e9 divine (et donc le mat\u00e9rialisme corporaliste le plus radical) \u2014 aux niveaux les plus \u00e9lev\u00e9s, comme r\u00e9gissant les relations entre les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s immat\u00e9rielles et incorporelles.\r\n\r\nComme l'a bien montr\u00e9 Pierre Hadot, cette transfiguration doctrinale, qui deviendra typique de la d\u00e9marche n\u00e9oplatonicienne, a \u00e9t\u00e9 amorc\u00e9e dans le cadre de la synth\u00e8se r\u00e9alis\u00e9e par Porphyre. En ce sens, \u00e9crivait-il, \u00ab c'est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment une des caract\u00e9ristiques de la doctrine porphyrienne (...) de montrer que le Sto\u00efcisme n'est vrai que dans la transposition n\u00e9oplatonicienne, la physique sto\u00efcienne devenant ainsi une m\u00e9taphysique \u00bb, de sorte que \u00ab la th\u00e9orie des m\u00e9langes \u00e9labor\u00e9e par les Sto\u00efciens ne d\u00e9couvre sa v\u00e9rit\u00e9 que sur le plan intelligible \u00bb.\r\n\r\nNous avons vu cependant que cette v\u00e9rit\u00e9 se d\u00e9couvre avant m\u00eame d'envisager le m\u00e9lange proprement no\u00e9tique, Porphyre lui-m\u00eame ayant d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait intervenir la krasis sto\u00efcienne dans le contexte d'un expos\u00e9 sur l'embryologie, et les N\u00e9oplatoniciens ult\u00e9rieurs dans cet ordre interm\u00e9diaire, n\u00e9glig\u00e9 par Plotin, o\u00f9 se tiennent les \u00ab corps immat\u00e9riels \u00bb non qualifi\u00e9s.\r\n\r\nLa conception sto\u00efcienne du m\u00e9lange total s'est finalement impos\u00e9e au sein de la m\u00e9taphysique n\u00e9oplatonicienne au prix d'un double r\u00e9am\u00e9nagement doctrinal, ayant eu pour r\u00e9sultat :\r\n\r\n La synth\u00e8se de la doctrine sto\u00efcienne de l'interp\u00e9n\u00e9tration totale sans confusion avec les \u00e9laborations aristot\u00e9liciennes de l'acte et de la puissance.\r\n La transposition du domaine des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s mat\u00e9rielles \u00e0 celui des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s corporelles non encore engag\u00e9es dans la mati\u00e8re premi\u00e8re. [conclusion p. 99-100]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T9kWS2QRZ2oeq7V","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":51,"full_name":"Cohen, Daniel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1273,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"25 ","issue":"2","pages":"67-100"}},"sort":["Aper\u00e7u de la r\u00e9ception de la doctrine sto\u00efcienne du m\u00e9lange total dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme apr\u00e8s Plotin"]}
Title | Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions – A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | New Blackfriars |
Volume | 82 |
Issue | 968 |
Pages | 467-478 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Boland, Vivian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
One of the areas on which Fergus Kerr has kept a wise eye and to which he has made valued contributions over many years is moral philosophy. In fact, he had the task of teaching moral theology in the early years of his career but quickly moved on. He was quite relieved to do so, he told me once, not least because he found Shakespeare more relevant to morality than the geography of the fallopian tubes. Leaving behind moral theology in that sense did not mean his leaving behind a concern with moral questions. On the contrary, he has maintained great interest in developments in fundamental moral theory and in the centrality of morality for all theology. In this, he is faithful to Aquinas who, as Leonard Boyle has argued, envisaged Summa Theologiae as a work in which the moral is central. If, as Kerr himself has been arguing recently, beatitudo is a key to the unity of the Summa, then this is further support for what Boyle argued on historical and palaeographical grounds. This is not to claim that what Aquinas had in mind was anything like what moral theology came to describe later on, when a strict distinction and even separation of dogma and moral came to prevail, especially in seminary training. Aquinas belongs to an earlier world, from which contemporary moral philosophers continue to learn, in which these later distinctions did not apply. The inherent difficulty in separating them is clear if one tries to answer the question of whether the theology of grace belongs to dogma or to moral. One of the key areas in which Aquinas continues to contribute to debates in moral philosophy is in relation to virtue-theory. Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy has contributed with distinction to the revival of interest in the notion of virtue, as mentioning the names Anscombe, Foot, and MacIntyre is enough to show. A crucial building block in Aquinas's moral theory is the notion of habitus or disposition since, for him, following Aristotle, a virtue is a kind of disposition. But this more philosophical part of his account of virtue has received little enough direct attention in recent times for reasons that may become clearer as we proceed. What I want to do in this paper is to look again at those questions in the Summa where Aquinas explains this notion of habitus or disposition. It is important for his understanding of the human being as a moral agent as well as for his account of grace, and in particular of those gifts of faith, hope, and what Christian tradition calls theological virtues. It is a text whose examination will lead us into a number of central and current questions about the nature of Aquinas's theological synthesis and about whether or not we may consider any of his work as purely philosophical, i.e., philosophical as distinct from theological. [introduction p. 467-468] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zuaVu4YEsILwhuu |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1081","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1081,"authors_free":[{"id":1636,"entry_id":1081,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":9,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Boland, Vivian","free_first_name":"Vivian","free_last_name":"Boland","norm_person":{"id":9,"first_name":"Vivian","last_name":"Boland","full_name":"Boland, Vivian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/94637645X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions \u2013 A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory","main_title":{"title":"Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions \u2013 A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory"},"abstract":"One of the areas on which Fergus Kerr has kept a wise eye and to which he has made valued contributions over many years is moral philosophy. In fact, he had the task of teaching moral theology in the early years of his career but quickly moved on. He was quite relieved to do so, he told me once, not least because he found Shakespeare more relevant to morality than the geography of the fallopian tubes.\r\n\r\nLeaving behind moral theology in that sense did not mean his leaving behind a concern with moral questions. On the contrary, he has maintained great interest in developments in fundamental moral theory and in the centrality of morality for all theology. In this, he is faithful to Aquinas who, as Leonard Boyle has argued, envisaged Summa Theologiae as a work in which the moral is central. If, as Kerr himself has been arguing recently, beatitudo is a key to the unity of the Summa, then this is further support for what Boyle argued on historical and palaeographical grounds.\r\n\r\nThis is not to claim that what Aquinas had in mind was anything like what moral theology came to describe later on, when a strict distinction and even separation of dogma and moral came to prevail, especially in seminary training. Aquinas belongs to an earlier world, from which contemporary moral philosophers continue to learn, in which these later distinctions did not apply. The inherent difficulty in separating them is clear if one tries to answer the question of whether the theology of grace belongs to dogma or to moral.\r\n\r\nOne of the key areas in which Aquinas continues to contribute to debates in moral philosophy is in relation to virtue-theory. Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy has contributed with distinction to the revival of interest in the notion of virtue, as mentioning the names Anscombe, Foot, and MacIntyre is enough to show. A crucial building block in Aquinas's moral theory is the notion of habitus or disposition since, for him, following Aristotle, a virtue is a kind of disposition.\r\n\r\nBut this more philosophical part of his account of virtue has received little enough direct attention in recent times for reasons that may become clearer as we proceed. What I want to do in this paper is to look again at those questions in the Summa where Aquinas explains this notion of habitus or disposition. It is important for his understanding of the human being as a moral agent as well as for his account of grace, and in particular of those gifts of faith, hope, and what Christian tradition calls theological virtues.\r\n\r\nIt is a text whose examination will lead us into a number of central and current questions about the nature of Aquinas's theological synthesis and about whether or not we may consider any of his work as purely philosophical, i.e., philosophical as distinct from theological. [introduction p. 467-468]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zuaVu4YEsILwhuu","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":9,"full_name":"Boland, Vivian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1081,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"New Blackfriars","volume":"82","issue":"968","pages":"467-478"}},"sort":["Aquinas and Simplicius on Dispositions \u2013 A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory"]}
Title | Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 85-158 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Intent upon harmonizing doctrines of their predecessors, some Neoplatonic com-mentators are faced with a problem of resolving doctrinal discrepancies so as to restore the συμφωνία in the history of philosophy. This article considers a parti-cular example of this attempt ats harmonization: how Simplicius reconciles Aris-totle’s Categories with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the Pseudo-Archytas. The chronological inversion introduced by the counterfeiter produces remarkable effects on the late Platonic doctrine about general terms, to the extent that a commentator such as Simplicius works to reduce the dissonance between Archytas’ and Aristotle’s words. This paper has three aims: to restore the general grid that Simplicius uses for reading and commenting on Archytas through Aristotle; to identify the exegeti-cal strategies aimed at a doctrinal reconciliation; to consider a specific case, pro-vided by the doctrine of weight, which engenders a new physical theory by Simplicius. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CcW2PJaT6w7pONA |
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Title | Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique néoplatonicien : les préfaces descommentaires sur les Catégories |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | Revue de théologie et de philosophie |
Volume | 124 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 407–425 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Cet article représente une contribution de plus à ma critique générale des thèses de Praechter selon lesquelles l'école néoplatonicienne dite «d'Alexandrie» se distinguerait, non seulement par le lieu de son enseignement, de celle dite «d'Athènes», mais encore et surtout par ses doctrines philosophiques et par son attitude envers T œuvre d'Aristote. La comparaison entre elles des préfaces des cinq commentaires néoplatoniciens des Catégories d'Aristote. dont l'un, celui de Simplicius, appartiendrait, selon Praechter, à l'école d'Athènes, et ceux des quatre autres à l'école d'Alexandrie, fait apparaître la concordance fondamentale de la philosophie néoplatonicienne qui était enseignée à Athènes avec celle qui était enseignée à Alexandrie: toutes deux interprètent la philosophie d'Aristote dans la même perspective néoplatonicienne et la même volonté d'harmoniser Platon et Aristote. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7tyvPpwgQ6rj4sJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"668","_score":null,"_source":{"id":668,"authors_free":[{"id":979,"entry_id":668,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique n\u00e9oplatonicien : les pr\u00e9faces descommentaires sur les Cat\u00e9gories","main_title":{"title":"Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique n\u00e9oplatonicien : les pr\u00e9faces descommentaires sur les Cat\u00e9gories"},"abstract":"Cet article repr\u00e9sente une contribution de plus \u00e0 ma critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des th\u00e8ses de Praechter selon lesquelles l'\u00e9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne dite \u00abd'Alexandrie\u00bb se distinguerait, non seulement par le lieu de son enseignement, de celle dite \u00abd'Ath\u00e8nes\u00bb, mais encore et surtout par ses\r\ndoctrines philosophiques et par son attitude envers T \u0153uvre d'Aristote. La comparaison entre elles des pr\u00e9faces des cinq commentaires n\u00e9oplatoniciens des Cat\u00e9gories d'Aristote. dont l'un, celui de Simplicius, appartiendrait, selon Praechter, \u00e0 l'\u00e9cole d'Ath\u00e8nes, et ceux des quatre autres \u00e0 l'\u00e9cole d'Alexandrie, fait appara\u00eetre la concordance fondamentale de la philosophie n\u00e9oplatonicienne qui \u00e9tait enseign\u00e9e \u00e0 Ath\u00e8nes avec celle qui \u00e9tait enseign\u00e9e \u00e0 Alexandrie: toutes deux interpr\u00e8tent la philosophie d'Aristote dans la m\u00eame perspective n\u00e9oplatonicienne et la m\u00eame volont\u00e9 d'harmoniser Platon et Aristote. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7tyvPpwgQ6rj4sJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":668,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de th\u00e9ologie et de philosophie","volume":"124","issue":"4","pages":"407\u2013425"}},"sort":["Aristote dans l'enseignement philosophique n\u00e9oplatonicien : les pr\u00e9faces descommentaires sur les Cat\u00e9gories"]}
Title | Aristote, «De la prière» |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1967 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 157 |
Pages | 59-70 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Pépin, Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Au nombre des Aristotelis fragmenta figure un bref témoignage de Simplicius, selon lequel Aristote, sur la fin de son livre Περ ευχής, aurait dit que Dieu est ou bien intellect, ou bien quelque chose au-delà de l'intellect, ὃτι ό θεός ή νους εστίν ή καΐ έπέκεινά τι του νου. Simplicius est le seul auteur à rapporter cette surprenante doxographie, et même à évoquer le contenu de cet écrit aristotélicien. Son témoignage étant ainsi l'unique point de départ, on doit avant tout l'examiner de très près, en lui adjoignant les quelques lignes qui le précèdent. Cette investigation permettra peut-être d'en évaluer les chances d'authenticité. Il restera alors à s'interroger sur le sens exact de la doctrine ainsi rapportée à Aristote. [Introduction, p. 59] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QHzOiPBFSXVNXwj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1089","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1089,"authors_free":[{"id":1647,"entry_id":1089,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":227,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"P\u00e9pin, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"P\u00e9pin","norm_person":{"id":227,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"P\u00e9pin","full_name":"P\u00e9pin, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119165147","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristote, \u00abDe la pri\u00e8re\u00bb","main_title":{"title":"Aristote, \u00abDe la pri\u00e8re\u00bb"},"abstract":"Au nombre des Aristotelis fragmenta figure un bref t\u00e9moignage de Simplicius, selon lequel Aristote, sur la fin de son livre \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\u03c2, aurait dit que Dieu est ou bien intellect, ou bien quelque chose au-del\u00e0 de l'intellect, \u1f43\u03c4\u03b9 \u03cc \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2 \u03ae \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd \u03ae \u03ba\u03b1\u0390 \u03ad\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5. Simplicius est le seul auteur \u00e0 rapporter cette surprenante doxographie, et m\u00eame \u00e0 \u00e9voquer le contenu de cet \u00e9crit aristot\u00e9licien. Son t\u00e9moignage \u00e9tant ainsi l'unique point de d\u00e9part, on doit avant tout l'examiner de tr\u00e8s pr\u00e8s, en lui adjoignant les quelques lignes qui le pr\u00e9c\u00e8dent. Cette investigation permettra peut-\u00eatre d'en \u00e9valuer les chances d'authenticit\u00e9. Il restera alors \u00e0 s'interroger sur le sens exact de la doctrine ainsi rapport\u00e9e \u00e0 Aristote. [Introduction, p. 59]","btype":3,"date":"1967","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QHzOiPBFSXVNXwj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":227,"full_name":"P\u00e9pin, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1089,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"157","issue":"","pages":"59-70"}},"sort":["Aristote, \u00abDe la pri\u00e8re\u00bb"]}
Title | Aristote, «Physique», IV, 2 |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques. Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 377-387 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Brisson, Luc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Le texte, qui se veut une lecture commentée du chapitre 2 du livre IV de la Physique d'Aristote, se présente comme un travail de recherche qui ne prétend pas parvenir à des conclusions définitives. En effet, il a pour but de soulever un certain nombre de questions sur des sujets trop vastes pour être traités en quelques pages. L'idée force ici développée est la suivante : Aristote traduit en des termes soigneusement définis, dans le cadre de sa philosophie, des termes utilisés de façon peu rigoureuse par Platon dans le Timée. Ce faisant, Aristote change le sens même des termes utilisés par Platon. Le mécanisme de cette « traduction », qui équivaut à une distorsion dont les conséquences sont particulièrement importantes, parce que le vocabulaire aristotélicien a longtemps prévalu dans le domaine de la physique, sera ici minutieusement décrit, afin d’en montrer les conséquences philosophiques. [introduction p. 377] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NoOjnCvmvbsUPXt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"768","_score":null,"_source":{"id":768,"authors_free":[{"id":1132,"entry_id":768,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":18,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Brisson, Luc ","free_first_name":"Luc","free_last_name":"Brisson","norm_person":{"id":18,"first_name":"Luc","last_name":"Brisson","full_name":"Brisson, Luc ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114433259","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristote, \u00abPhysique\u00bb, IV, 2","main_title":{"title":"Aristote, \u00abPhysique\u00bb, IV, 2"},"abstract":"Le texte, qui se veut une lecture comment\u00e9e du chapitre 2 du livre IV de la Physique d'Aristote, se pr\u00e9sente comme un travail de recherche qui ne pr\u00e9tend pas parvenir \u00e0 des conclusions d\u00e9finitives. En effet, il a pour but de soulever un certain nombre de questions sur des sujets trop vastes pour \u00eatre trait\u00e9s en quelques pages.\r\n\r\nL'id\u00e9e force ici d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e est la suivante : Aristote traduit en des termes soigneusement d\u00e9finis, dans le cadre de sa philosophie, des termes utilis\u00e9s de fa\u00e7on peu rigoureuse par Platon dans le Tim\u00e9e. Ce faisant, Aristote change le sens m\u00eame des termes utilis\u00e9s par Platon.\r\n\r\nLe m\u00e9canisme de cette \u00ab traduction \u00bb, qui \u00e9quivaut \u00e0 une distorsion dont les cons\u00e9quences sont particuli\u00e8rement importantes, parce que le vocabulaire aristot\u00e9licien a longtemps pr\u00e9valu dans le domaine de la physique, sera ici minutieusement d\u00e9crit, afin d\u2019en montrer les cons\u00e9quences philosophiques. [introduction p. 377]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/NoOjnCvmvbsUPXt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":18,"full_name":"Brisson, Luc ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":768,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques. Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"377-387"}},"sort":["Aristote, \u00abPhysique\u00bb, IV, 2"]}
Title | Aristotle De Caelo 288a 2-9 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1939 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 34-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cornford, Francis Macdonald |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this passage from Aristotle's De Caelo, he explores why the heavens revolve in one direction rather than the other. He suggests that the universe has a front and a back, which implies a forward motion that is superior to backward motion, just as upward and rightward motions are superior to their respective opposites. Aristotle argues that since nature always follows the best course, the direction of the heaven's revolution must be forward and therefore better. The text is difficult to understand due to possible corruptions, but a comparison with Simplicius' paraphrase suggests that both the subject and object of the main verb are missing and need to be restored. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/b8mcJ8eN6idQIqA |
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Title | Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter ("Physics" IV:2, 209 B 17–32) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 48 |
Pages | 45-63 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fritsche, Johannes |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Physics IV.2, Aristotle argues for private Space of a body as its form (209 b 1-6) and as its matter (209 b 6-11) to conclude that Plato maintains that χώρα, matter, and space are the same (209 b 11-17). Subsequently, he réfutés both possibilities of conceiving Space (209 b 17-28). In a paper on 209 b 6-17,1 have tried to show that his view of Plato is right.1 In this paper, I would like to show that in his réfutation of both possibilities Aristotle argues dialectically in the proper sense; that is, he does not use any assumption that is peculiar to his own theory and not shared by his Opponent. For this purpose I présent (I.) Aristotle's différent usages of (ού) χωρίζεται/χωριστός (»[not] separated/separable«) and (II.) the three différent interprétations of 209 b 22-28 in Philoponus, Simplicius, and Sorabji, and I rule out Sorabji's interprétation. Thereafter, I will give three reasons for Simplicius's interprétation. The first relates to (III.) the issue of prin ciples as the main topic of the Physics in général. Secondly, (IV.) Philoponus's interprétation of 209 b 22-28 contradicts Aristotle's own définition of Space. Thirdly, (V.) only in Simplicius's interprétation is the argument dialectically va lid. Thereafter, I will show (VI.) that the argument in Simplicius's interprétation is conclusive against Plato's reasoning in the Timaeus to finish with (VII.) some général remarks on this paper and the paper on 209 b 1-17. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/We3uupXlF3bVzh0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"592","_score":null,"_source":{"id":592,"authors_free":[{"id":843,"entry_id":592,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":102,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fritsche, Johannes ","free_first_name":"Johannes","free_last_name":"Fritsche","norm_person":{"id":102,"first_name":"Johannes ","last_name":"Fritsche","full_name":"Fritsche, Johannes ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1204083266","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter (\"Physics\" IV:2, 209 B 17\u201332)","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter (\"Physics\" IV:2, 209 B 17\u201332)"},"abstract":"In Physics IV.2, Aristotle argues for private Space of a body as its form (209 b 1-6) and as its matter (209 b 6-11) to conclude that Plato maintains that \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1, matter, and space are the same (209 b 11-17). Subsequently, he r\u00e9fut\u00e9s both possibilities of conceiving Space (209 b 17-28). In a paper on 209 b 6-17,1 have tried to show that his view of Plato is right.1 In this paper, I would like to show that in his r\u00e9futation of both possibilities Aristotle argues dialectically in the proper sense; that is, he does not use any assumption that is peculiar to his own theory and not shared by his Opponent. For this purpose I pr\u00e9sent (I.) Aristotle's diff\u00e9rent usages of (\u03bf\u03cd) \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\/\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 (\u00bb[not] separated\/separable\u00ab) and (II.) the three diff\u00e9rent interpr\u00e9tations of 209 b 22-28 in Philoponus, Simplicius, and Sorabji, and I rule out Sorabji's interpr\u00e9tation. Thereafter, I will give three reasons for Simplicius's interpr\u00e9tation. The first relates to (III.) the issue of prin ciples as the main topic of the Physics in g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Secondly, (IV.) Philoponus's interpr\u00e9tation of 209 b 22-28 contradicts Aristotle's own d\u00e9finition of Space. Thirdly, (V.) only in Simplicius's interpr\u00e9tation is the argument dialectically va lid. Thereafter, I will show (VI.) that the argument in Simplicius's interpr\u00e9tation is conclusive against Plato's reasoning in the Timaeus to finish with (VII.) some g\u00e9n\u00e9ral remarks on this paper and the paper on 209 b 1-17. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/We3uupXlF3bVzh0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":102,"full_name":"Fritsche, Johannes ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":592,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"48","issue":"","pages":"45-63"}},"sort":["Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter (\"Physics\" IV:2, 209 B 17\u201332)"]}
Title | Aristotle's Categories in the Greek and Latin medieval exegetical tradition. The case of the argument for the non-simultaneity of relatives |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1996 |
Journal | Cima (Cahiers de l'institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin, Université de Copenhague) |
Volume | 66 |
Pages | 117-134 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Demetracopoulos, John A. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To conclude: even if we are eager to say that in the case of Anselm’s use of the Aristotelian passage 7b38-39 we notice a medieval misconcep tion of the text of the great ancient philosopher, first we should not hasten to infer from this that the medievals couldn’t understand Aristotle or generally ancient writers; and second, we should not be at all surprised. Commentators and users of Aristotle’s works have often been exceptional men, but not super-human. Complaining about the texts’ lan guage and so implicitly apologizing for the value of his interpretive work, one commentator notes that the interpretation of many Aristotelian texts presupposes something like oracular powers of divination (Sophonias, CAG XXIII,2, 2, 8-13). Such modesty on the part of one of the Greek commentators of Aristotle ought to shake any confidence we might have in definitive interpretations of certain difficult or ambiguous Aristotelian passages, which, as often as we insist on examining them intensely, con stantly answer our exegetical anxiety with a spiteful silence. [conclusion, p. 133] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/G5FnskmvoZU1kyI |
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Title | Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of the Changer to the Changed |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 55 (New Series) |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 447–454 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wilberding, James |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As we have seen above, Plotinus' hesitation with respect to (1) probably derived from his theory of double activity, and so Simplicius' willingness to agree to (1) suggests that he did not adopt this theory. Indeed, I suspect this was the case. It is true that the structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics that one encounters in Simplicius bears many similarities to that of Plotinus, including much of the language of procession. Both, for example, speak of lower substances "proceeding (προιέναι)" from and "enjoying" (ἀπολαμβάνειν) "radiation" (ἀπαύγασις or περιλάμπσις) from their priors. But nowhere, I claim, does Simplicius explain procession by means of Plotinus' theory of double activity. There is, of course, no great proof stone for such negative claims. Nevertheless, this claim can be partially verified by checking to see what Simplicius has to say about Plotinus' favourite examples of double activity—light, heat, and the images in mirrors—as well as by searching the Simplician corpus to see if he uses the designations for internal and external activity that Plotinus uses. Investigation shows that Simplicius does not make use of Plotinus' designations. The closest we get is a passage in his commentary on the Physics where he provides a long quotation of Damascius in which the theory seems to appear. Otherwise, we find only some discussion of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality. But Simplicius does not distinguish the activity τῆς οὐσίας from that ἐκ (or ἀπὸ) τῆς οὐσίας, nor that πρὸς τὸ ἄνω from that πρὸς τὸ κάτω, nor that ἐν αὐτῇ (or αὐτῇ) from that ἐξ (or παρ’) αὐτῆς. Moreover, we can see that none of Plotinus' three examples is employed by Simplicius to explain double activity. Regarding the nature of light, Simplicius is even rather non-committal at times. As for heat, even when Simplicius discusses the distinction between the heat that is proper to fire (that is, the internal activity) and the heat that fire produces in another thing (that is, the external activity), he does so without using the language of the double activity theory. And Simplicius simply does not make much use of mirrors. All of this, I believe, points to the conclusion that Simplicius does not employ Plotinus' distinction between internal and external activity. If this is right, it perhaps does not imply that Simplicius' views on the metaphysics of procession are all that different from Plotinus', but at the very least, it would show that there is sometimes a considerable difference in the way he goes about describing those views. [conclusion p. 453-454] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/2vgk7grGxbqIV3p |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"431","_score":null,"_source":{"id":431,"authors_free":[{"id":582,"entry_id":431,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":257,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wilberding, James","free_first_name":"James","free_last_name":"Wilberding","norm_person":{"id":257,"first_name":"James","last_name":"Wilberding","full_name":"Wilberding, James","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/143517465","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of the Changer to the Changed","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of the Changer to the Changed"},"abstract":"As we have seen above, Plotinus' hesitation with respect to (1) probably derived from his theory of double activity, and so Simplicius' willingness to agree to (1) suggests that he did not adopt this theory. Indeed, I suspect this was the case. It is true that the structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics that one encounters in Simplicius bears many similarities to that of Plotinus, including much of the language of procession. Both, for example, speak of lower substances \"proceeding (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9)\" from and \"enjoying\" (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd) \"radiation\" (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03cd\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 or \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bb\u03ac\u03bc\u03c0\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) from their priors. But nowhere, I claim, does Simplicius explain procession by means of Plotinus' theory of double activity.\r\n\r\nThere is, of course, no great proof stone for such negative claims. Nevertheless, this claim can be partially verified by checking to see what Simplicius has to say about Plotinus' favourite examples of double activity\u2014light, heat, and the images in mirrors\u2014as well as by searching the Simplician corpus to see if he uses the designations for internal and external activity that Plotinus uses. Investigation shows that Simplicius does not make use of Plotinus' designations. The closest we get is a passage in his commentary on the Physics where he provides a long quotation of Damascius in which the theory seems to appear. Otherwise, we find only some discussion of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality. But Simplicius does not distinguish the activity \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 from that \u1f10\u03ba (or \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78) \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, nor that \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9 from that \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9, nor that \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 (or \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7) from that \u1f10\u03be (or \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019) \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2.\r\n\r\nMoreover, we can see that none of Plotinus' three examples is employed by Simplicius to explain double activity. Regarding the nature of light, Simplicius is even rather non-committal at times. As for heat, even when Simplicius discusses the distinction between the heat that is proper to fire (that is, the internal activity) and the heat that fire produces in another thing (that is, the external activity), he does so without using the language of the double activity theory. And Simplicius simply does not make much use of mirrors. All of this, I believe, points to the conclusion that Simplicius does not employ Plotinus' distinction between internal and external activity.\r\n\r\nIf this is right, it perhaps does not imply that Simplicius' views on the metaphysics of procession are all that different from Plotinus', but at the very least, it would show that there is sometimes a considerable difference in the way he goes about describing those views. [conclusion p. 453-454]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/2vgk7grGxbqIV3p","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":257,"full_name":"Wilberding, James","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":431,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"55 (New Series)","issue":"2","pages":"447\u2013454"}},"sort":["Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of the Changer to the Changed"]}
Title | Aristotle’s Topics in the Greek Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | PEITHO / EXAMINA ANTIQUA |
Volume | 1 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 91-117 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Militello, Chiara |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper lists and examines the explicit references to Aristotle’s Topics in the Greek Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories. The references to the Topics by Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, Philoponus and David (Elias) are listed according the usual prolegomena to Aristotle’s works. In particular, the paper reconstructs David (Elias)’s original thesis about the proponents of the title Pre-Topics for the Categories and compares Ammonius’, Simplicius’ and Olympiodorus’ doxographies about the postpraedicamenta. Moreover, the study identifies two general trends. The first one is that all the commentators after Proclus share the same general view about: the authenticity of the Topics, Aristotle’s writing style in them, the part of philosophy to which they belong, their purpose, their usefulness and their place in the reading order. The second one is that whereas Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius use the Topics as an aid to understanding the Categories, Ammonius, Olympiodorus and David (Elias) do not. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/62qOZqwQ9rtCf7S |
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Title | Aristotle’s “Now” and the Definition of Time: Method and Exegesis in Simplicius’ Interpretation of Physics IV.10 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2024 |
Journal | History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis |
Volume | 26 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 366-386 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Thomas Seissl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Physics IV.10 (217b30–218a30) is pivotal in Aristotle’s discussion of time, preceding his own account from IV.11 onward. Aristotle presents three puzzles about the existence of time with reference to the “Now”. Modern interpretations often view this section as an aporetic prelude with Aristotle’s failure to provide explicit solutions. This paper examines Simplicius’ alternative interpretation, which draws upon the theory of proof and the syllogistic model from the Posterior Analytics. Simplicius contends that the arguments’ failure lies in their inability to fit within the suitable syllogistic framework to establish a demonstrable definition of time, not in their aporetic nature. Every science has to prove the relation between (i) establishing whether X exists and (ii) showing what X is by establishing what the cause of X is. In evaluating Simplicius’ interpretation, this paper addresses two key aspects of the exegesis of IV.10: firstly, Simplicius can show why the “Now” is not part of the definition of time, and secondly, the ancient commentator underscores the close connection between the arguments in Physics IV.10 and the broader context of Aristotle’s discussion of time. Modern interpreters fail to address both of these issues. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mOkF4fvV0VKbyeR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1587","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1587,"authors_free":[{"id":2786,"entry_id":1587,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Thomas Seissl","free_first_name":"Thomas","free_last_name":"Seissl","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Aristotle\u2019s \u201cNow\u201d and the Definition of Time: Method and Exegesis in Simplicius\u2019 Interpretation of Physics IV.10","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle\u2019s \u201cNow\u201d and the Definition of Time: Method and Exegesis in Simplicius\u2019 Interpretation of Physics IV.10"},"abstract":"Physics IV.10 (217b30\u2013218a30) is pivotal in Aristotle\u2019s discussion of time, preceding his own account from IV.11 onward. Aristotle presents three puzzles about the existence of time with reference to the \u201cNow\u201d. Modern interpretations often view this section as an aporetic prelude with Aristotle\u2019s failure to provide explicit solutions. This paper examines Simplicius\u2019 alternative interpretation, which draws upon the theory of proof and the syllogistic model from the Posterior Analytics. Simplicius contends that the arguments\u2019 failure lies in their inability to fit within the suitable syllogistic framework to establish a demonstrable definition of time, not in their aporetic nature. Every science has to prove the relation between (i) establishing whether X exists and (ii) showing what X is by establishing what the cause of X is. In evaluating Simplicius\u2019 interpretation, this paper addresses two key aspects of the exegesis of IV.10: firstly, Simplicius can show why the \u201cNow\u201d is not part of the definition of time, and secondly, the ancient commentator underscores the close connection between the arguments in Physics IV.10 and the broader context of Aristotle\u2019s discussion of time. Modern interpreters fail to address both of these issues. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2024","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mOkF4fvV0VKbyeR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1587,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis ","volume":"26","issue":"2","pages":"366-386"}},"sort":["Aristotle\u2019s \u201cNow\u201d and the Definition of Time: Method and Exegesis in Simplicius\u2019 Interpretation of Physics IV.10"]}
Title | Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens : sensation (αἴσθησις), sensation commune (κοινὴ αἴσθησις), sensibles communs (κοινὰ αἰσθητά) et conscience de soi (συναίσθησις) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 33–85 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Je résume : en ce qui concerne la possibilité pour les sensations d'avoir conscience de leur activité, Pseudo-Philopon se distingue aussi bien de Priscien que de Simplicius, puisqu’il n'attribue plus le moindre rôle à la sensation commune, mais accorde ce privilège à une faculté de l'âme raisonnable, à la faculté d'attention. [conclusion p. 85] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/N9wzp13Ul2KftSa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"643","_score":null,"_source":{"id":643,"authors_free":[{"id":918,"entry_id":643,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aspects de la th\u00e9orie de la perception chez les n\u00e9oplatoniciens : sensation (\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensation commune (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensibles communs (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac) et conscience de soi (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)","main_title":{"title":"Aspects de la th\u00e9orie de la perception chez les n\u00e9oplatoniciens : sensation (\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensation commune (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensibles communs (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac) et conscience de soi (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)"},"abstract":"Je r\u00e9sume : en ce qui concerne la possibilit\u00e9 pour les sensations d'avoir conscience de leur activit\u00e9, Pseudo-Philopon se distingue aussi bien de Priscien que de Simplicius, puisqu\u2019il n'attribue plus le moindre r\u00f4le \u00e0 la sensation commune, mais accorde ce privil\u00e8ge \u00e0 une facult\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me raisonnable, \u00e0 la facult\u00e9 d'attention. [conclusion p. 85]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/N9wzp13Ul2KftSa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":643,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"33\u201385"}},"sort":["Aspects de la th\u00e9orie de la perception chez les n\u00e9oplatoniciens : sensation (\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensation commune (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), sensibles communs (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac) et conscience de soi (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)"]}
Title | Augustin, «Confessions» 4, 16, 28-29, «Soliloques» 2, 20, 34-36 et les «Commentaires des catégories» |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica |
Volume | 93 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 372-392 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Doucet, Dominique |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Au terme de cette étude montrant les points de consonance entre les thèmes développés dans les derniers paragraphes des Soliloques et les problématiques mises en œuvre dans les commentaires des Catégories, deux conclusions principales se présentent. Premièrement, l'antériorité des écrits d'Augustin sur la rédaction de la plus grande partie des commentaires des Catégories oblige à considérer un seul et même auteur ou une seule et même source, tant pour Augustin que pour les auteurs des commentaires ultérieurs. La place que reçoit le commentaire de Porphyre dans les autres commentaires et l'importance de cet auteur dans l'élaboration des schémas de pensée augustiniens conduisent naturellement à la conclusion que c'est dans une œuvre porphyrienne qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer l'essentiel de cette argumentation. Il reste alors à tenter de déterminer laquelle. Le peu d'intérêt qu'Augustin accorde aux lectures des magistri eruditissimi qu'il évoque dans les Confessions semble écarter l'hypothèse qu'il garderait un vif souvenir des conversations de son adolescence. Autrement, il n'aurait pas oublié à ce point d'en mentionner l'importance, comme il le fait pour sa lecture de l'Hortensius et pour celle des libri platonicorum, qui eurent une influence déterminante sur l'évolution de sa pensée. Il semble alors plus probable de considérer qu'Augustin a rencontré une argumentation identique à celle qui se trouve dans les commentaires ultérieurs des Catégories, celle de Porphyre en son propre commentaire, qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer soit dans un texte du dossier des libri platonicorum, soit inséré dans un autre écrit comme le De regressu animae ou encore le Zêtêma sur l'immortalité de l'âme, dont nous savons qu'il prit connaissance. Il serait même tentant de considérer que la progression même des Soliloques suit en parallèle l'essentiel de la progression qui pourrait être celle du De regressu. Cette hypothèse nous amène directement au second volet de cette conclusion. Si Augustin emprunte un certain nombre de thèmes à l'univers néoplatonicien et porphyrien, il ne manque pas de les transformer profondément. Nous avons déjà signalé, dans une lecture de Sol. 2, 18, 32, la manière dont Augustin reprend les degrés de la hiérarchie des êtres du néoplatonisme et la transforme en une hiérarchie des degrés du vrai. En effet, la hiérarchie de Marius Victorinus (uere sunt, quae sunt, non uere non sunt, uere non sunt) se retrouve en partie chez Augustin sous la forme : uere uerum (ueritas), uerum, tendit esse et non est. Cette transformation de la hiérarchie des êtres en une hiérarchie des degrés du vrai s'explique assez bien par le projet même des Soliloques : connaître Dieu et l'âme, et par la démonstration de l'immortalité de l'âme qui s'y trouve. C'est par la présence en l'âme de l'immortelle Vérité que l'âme est assurée de son immortalité, et cette preuve, dans l'esprit d'Augustin, est supérieure à celle, classique, de l'auto-motricité de l'âme. Dans les paragraphes 34 à 36 de la fin des Soliloques, c'est une semblable hiérarchie des degrés du vrai que nous rencontrons. Il est donc nécessaire sur ce point de conclure que tout en s'inspirant des thèmes néoplatoniciens et en particulier porphyriens, Augustin leur fait subir un déplacement notable et développe, plutôt qu'une ontologie, une métaphysique du vrai qui lui permet de connaître son âme, d'accéder à la certitude de son immortalité, et de progresser dans sa recherche de Dieu, recherche dont il résumera l'essentiel de la progression dans les Confessions et dont il dressera les harmoniques dans le De Trinitate. [conclusion p 390-392] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ilXNYhEQOhMEPLW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"600","_score":null,"_source":{"id":600,"authors_free":[{"id":851,"entry_id":600,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":70,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Doucet, Dominique ","free_first_name":"Dominique","free_last_name":"Doucet","norm_person":{"id":70,"first_name":"Dominique ","last_name":"Doucet","full_name":"Doucet, Dominique ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/105244430X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Augustin, \u00abConfessions\u00bb 4, 16, 28-29, \u00abSoliloques\u00bb 2, 20, 34-36 et les \u00abCommentaires des cat\u00e9gories\u00bb","main_title":{"title":"Augustin, \u00abConfessions\u00bb 4, 16, 28-29, \u00abSoliloques\u00bb 2, 20, 34-36 et les \u00abCommentaires des cat\u00e9gories\u00bb"},"abstract":"Au terme de cette \u00e9tude montrant les points de consonance entre les th\u00e8mes d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s dans les derniers paragraphes des Soliloques et les probl\u00e9matiques mises en \u0153uvre dans les commentaires des Cat\u00e9gories, deux conclusions principales se pr\u00e9sentent. Premi\u00e8rement, l'ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 des \u00e9crits d'Augustin sur la r\u00e9daction de la plus grande partie des commentaires des Cat\u00e9gories oblige \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer un seul et m\u00eame auteur ou une seule et m\u00eame source, tant pour Augustin que pour les auteurs des commentaires ult\u00e9rieurs. La place que re\u00e7oit le commentaire de Porphyre dans les autres commentaires et l'importance de cet auteur dans l'\u00e9laboration des sch\u00e9mas de pens\u00e9e augustiniens conduisent naturellement \u00e0 la conclusion que c'est dans une \u0153uvre porphyrienne qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer l'essentiel de cette argumentation.\r\n\r\nIl reste alors \u00e0 tenter de d\u00e9terminer laquelle. Le peu d'int\u00e9r\u00eat qu'Augustin accorde aux lectures des magistri eruditissimi qu'il \u00e9voque dans les Confessions semble \u00e9carter l'hypoth\u00e8se qu'il garderait un vif souvenir des conversations de son adolescence. Autrement, il n'aurait pas oubli\u00e9 \u00e0 ce point d'en mentionner l'importance, comme il le fait pour sa lecture de l'Hortensius et pour celle des libri platonicorum, qui eurent une influence d\u00e9terminante sur l'\u00e9volution de sa pens\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nIl semble alors plus probable de consid\u00e9rer qu'Augustin a rencontr\u00e9 une argumentation identique \u00e0 celle qui se trouve dans les commentaires ult\u00e9rieurs des Cat\u00e9gories, celle de Porphyre en son propre commentaire, qu'Augustin a pu rencontrer soit dans un texte du dossier des libri platonicorum, soit ins\u00e9r\u00e9 dans un autre \u00e9crit comme le De regressu animae ou encore le Z\u00eat\u00eama sur l'immortalit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me, dont nous savons qu'il prit connaissance.\r\n\r\nIl serait m\u00eame tentant de consid\u00e9rer que la progression m\u00eame des Soliloques suit en parall\u00e8le l'essentiel de la progression qui pourrait \u00eatre celle du De regressu.\r\n\r\nCette hypoth\u00e8se nous am\u00e8ne directement au second volet de cette conclusion. Si Augustin emprunte un certain nombre de th\u00e8mes \u00e0 l'univers n\u00e9oplatonicien et porphyrien, il ne manque pas de les transformer profond\u00e9ment. Nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9, dans une lecture de Sol. 2, 18, 32, la mani\u00e8re dont Augustin reprend les degr\u00e9s de la hi\u00e9rarchie des \u00eatres du n\u00e9oplatonisme et la transforme en une hi\u00e9rarchie des degr\u00e9s du vrai. En effet, la hi\u00e9rarchie de Marius Victorinus (uere sunt, quae sunt, non uere non sunt, uere non sunt) se retrouve en partie chez Augustin sous la forme : uere uerum (ueritas), uerum, tendit esse et non est.\r\n\r\nCette transformation de la hi\u00e9rarchie des \u00eatres en une hi\u00e9rarchie des degr\u00e9s du vrai s'explique assez bien par le projet m\u00eame des Soliloques : conna\u00eetre Dieu et l'\u00e2me, et par la d\u00e9monstration de l'immortalit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me qui s'y trouve. C'est par la pr\u00e9sence en l'\u00e2me de l'immortelle V\u00e9rit\u00e9 que l'\u00e2me est assur\u00e9e de son immortalit\u00e9, et cette preuve, dans l'esprit d'Augustin, est sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle, classique, de l'auto-motricit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me.\r\n\r\nDans les paragraphes 34 \u00e0 36 de la fin des Soliloques, c'est une semblable hi\u00e9rarchie des degr\u00e9s du vrai que nous rencontrons. Il est donc n\u00e9cessaire sur ce point de conclure que tout en s'inspirant des th\u00e8mes n\u00e9oplatoniciens et en particulier porphyriens, Augustin leur fait subir un d\u00e9placement notable et d\u00e9veloppe, plut\u00f4t qu'une ontologie, une m\u00e9taphysique du vrai qui lui permet de conna\u00eetre son \u00e2me, d'acc\u00e9der \u00e0 la certitude de son immortalit\u00e9, et de progresser dans sa recherche de Dieu, recherche dont il r\u00e9sumera l'essentiel de la progression dans les Confessions et dont il dressera les harmoniques dans le De Trinitate. [conclusion p 390-392]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ilXNYhEQOhMEPLW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":70,"full_name":"Doucet, Dominique ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":600,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica","volume":"93","issue":"3","pages":"372-392"}},"sort":["Augustin, \u00abConfessions\u00bb 4, 16, 28-29, \u00abSoliloques\u00bb 2, 20, 34-36 et les \u00abCommentaires des cat\u00e9gories\u00bb"]}
Title | Aurore, Éros et Ananké autour des dieux Parménidiens (f. 12-f. 13) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 4 |
Pages | 459-470 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Frère, Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Deux textes de Platon dans Le Banquet et un d'Aristote dans La Métaphysique commentent ce passage de Parménide sur Éros. Dans Le Banquet, en 195a, Agathon dit : « Je déclare que c'est Éros le plus jeune des dieux... ; qu'inversement ces antiques divinités qu'énoncent sur les dieux Hésiode et Parménide appartiendraient à la Nécessité et non pas à l'Amour. » Et en 178a, Phèdre s'exprimait ainsi : « Quant à Parménide, voici ce qu'il dit de la génération : le premier de tous les dieux dont s'avisa [la Déesse], ce fut l'Amour. » Pour ce qui est d'Aristote, au livre A, chapitre 4, de La Métaphysique, examinant la thèse des penseurs qui, tel Anaxagore, firent du « la fois la cause de la beauté et la cause du mouvement des êtres », Aristote rapproche à son tour Hésiode et Parménide comme penseurs qui ont posé l'Amour ou le Désir pour principes des êtres ; Aristote cite alors le vers que citait Le Banquet en 178a, vers qui constitue le fragment 13 du poème de Parménide. Ainsi, les deux témoignages de Platon et d'Aristote s'accordent-ils : dans le panthéon parménidien, Anankè est l'origine ; en provient l'Amour, Éros, lequel domine les autres dieux. Dans le commentaire de La Physique d'Aristote, Simplicius apporte à son tour des textes et des indications concernant Anankè et Éros. C'est grâce à ces passages de Simplicius que les éditeurs de Parménide ont ordonné plusieurs fragments de la seconde partie du poème (f. 9 et suiv.). Cependant, l'ordonnance des fragments ici retenue par la plupart des éditeurs, si l'on y apporte quelque attention, semble loin de s'imposer. Relisant de près le texte de Simplicius, nous voudrions ici dégager conjointement plusieurs thèmes. D'abord, en ce qui concerne Simplicius, nous voudrions apporter des précisions sur sa technique de citation des fragments. À partir de là, nous pourrions envisager une nouvelle structuration des fragments portant sur Anankè et Éros. Enfin, nous pourrions ainsi essayer de mieux dégager certains aspects de la place du divin dans l'œuvre parménidienne. [introduction p. 460] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RFpfl1LBytLVPZJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"593","_score":null,"_source":{"id":593,"authors_free":[{"id":844,"entry_id":593,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":101,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":101,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130051187","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aurore, \u00c9ros et Anank\u00e9 autour des dieux Parm\u00e9nidiens (f. 12-f. 13)","main_title":{"title":"Aurore, \u00c9ros et Anank\u00e9 autour des dieux Parm\u00e9nidiens (f. 12-f. 13)"},"abstract":"Deux textes de Platon dans Le Banquet et un d'Aristote dans La M\u00e9taphysique commentent ce passage de Parm\u00e9nide sur \u00c9ros. Dans Le Banquet, en 195a, Agathon dit : \u00ab Je d\u00e9clare que c'est \u00c9ros le plus jeune des dieux... ; qu'inversement ces antiques divinit\u00e9s qu'\u00e9noncent sur les dieux H\u00e9siode et Parm\u00e9nide appartiendraient \u00e0 la N\u00e9cessit\u00e9 et non pas \u00e0 l'Amour. \u00bb Et en 178a, Ph\u00e8dre s'exprimait ainsi : \u00ab Quant \u00e0 Parm\u00e9nide, voici ce qu'il dit de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration : le premier de tous les dieux dont s'avisa [la D\u00e9esse], ce fut l'Amour. \u00bb\r\n\r\nPour ce qui est d'Aristote, au livre A, chapitre 4, de La M\u00e9taphysique, examinant la th\u00e8se des penseurs qui, tel Anaxagore, firent du \u00ab la fois la cause de la beaut\u00e9 et la cause du mouvement des \u00eatres \u00bb, Aristote rapproche \u00e0 son tour H\u00e9siode et Parm\u00e9nide comme penseurs qui ont pos\u00e9 l'Amour ou le D\u00e9sir pour principes des \u00eatres ; Aristote cite alors le vers que citait Le Banquet en 178a, vers qui constitue le fragment 13 du po\u00e8me de Parm\u00e9nide. Ainsi, les deux t\u00e9moignages de Platon et d'Aristote s'accordent-ils : dans le panth\u00e9on parm\u00e9nidien, Anank\u00e8 est l'origine ; en provient l'Amour, \u00c9ros, lequel domine les autres dieux.\r\n\r\nDans le commentaire de La Physique d'Aristote, Simplicius apporte \u00e0 son tour des textes et des indications concernant Anank\u00e8 et \u00c9ros. C'est gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 ces passages de Simplicius que les \u00e9diteurs de Parm\u00e9nide ont ordonn\u00e9 plusieurs fragments de la seconde partie du po\u00e8me (f. 9 et suiv.). Cependant, l'ordonnance des fragments ici retenue par la plupart des \u00e9diteurs, si l'on y apporte quelque attention, semble loin de s'imposer. Relisant de pr\u00e8s le texte de Simplicius, nous voudrions ici d\u00e9gager conjointement plusieurs th\u00e8mes.\r\n\r\nD'abord, en ce qui concerne Simplicius, nous voudrions apporter des pr\u00e9cisions sur sa technique de citation des fragments. \u00c0 partir de l\u00e0, nous pourrions envisager une nouvelle structuration des fragments portant sur Anank\u00e8 et \u00c9ros. Enfin, nous pourrions ainsi essayer de mieux d\u00e9gager certains aspects de la place du divin dans l'\u0153uvre parm\u00e9nidienne. [introduction p. 460]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RFpfl1LBytLVPZJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":101,"full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":593,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"4","issue":"","pages":" 459-470"}},"sort":["Aurore, \u00c9ros et Anank\u00e9 autour des dieux Parm\u00e9nidiens (f. 12-f. 13)"]}
Title | Boethius and Andronicus of Rhodes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1957 |
Journal | Vigiliae Christianae |
Volume | 11 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 179-185 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Shiel, James |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
G. Pfligersdorffer has recently described the attitude of the ancient editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, towards the final notes in Aristotle's Categories on opposites, simultaneity, priority, motion, and possession—what the medievals called the postpraedicamenta. The scholar has based his intricate arguments on a passage of Boethius' commentary on the Categories, and as this passage in the printed editions is syntactically unintelligible, he has suggested an emended text of it. Here is the passage as printed, with his emendations alongside and a list of variants beneath. [introduction p. 179] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Z3seGeZGEaA8j5E |
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Title | Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Harvard Studies in Classical Philology |
Volume | 95 |
Pages | 367-407 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Asztalos, Monika |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Gradually, Boethius has been disrobed and divested of many titles to fame in the history of philosophy. It all began with Bidez, a great admirer of Porphyry, who judged Boethius severely: Boethius took almost everything in the Commentarii Categorias (CC) from Porphyry, and Porphyry gained nothing in the process. Shiel showed that Porphyry was by no means the only Greek commentator who had left his imprint on the CC, but this did not help much, since he also claimed that Boethius had not read a complete Greek commentary, not even the short Kleine Prolegomena (K.p.). Finally, the interpretations of two passages in De Interpretatione 2 given by Shiel and Chadwick respectively led John Dillon to conclude that Boethius tried to cover up his lack of familiarity with the primary sources. This made Boethius not only unoriginal and ill-read but, on top of it, dishonest. I am not trying to do the impossible—namely, present Boethius as an expert on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. And I am not in a position to judge whether or not Boethius displays real originality in his later, more mature works. But I think it would be unfair to expect novel interpretations in commentaries like the Isagoge 1 and CC, which, if my assumptions in the first sections of this paper are correct, are not only the earliest of Boethius' works on Greek philosophy but also the context in which he first encountered Aristotle. He seems to have come quite unprepared to both the Isagoge and the Categories, unarmed with proper translations and unfamiliar with the work he was commenting on. Boethius is indeed an epitome of the expression docendo discimus ("we learn by teaching"). [conclusion p. 405-407] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qf1EQ49UxPsJC4F |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"773","_score":null,"_source":{"id":773,"authors_free":[{"id":1137,"entry_id":773,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":37,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Asztalos, Monika","free_first_name":"Monika","free_last_name":"Asztalos","norm_person":{"id":37,"first_name":"Asztalos","last_name":"Monika","full_name":"Asztalos, Monika","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories","main_title":{"title":"Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories"},"abstract":"Gradually, Boethius has been disrobed and divested of many titles to fame in the history of philosophy. It all began with Bidez, a great admirer of Porphyry, who judged Boethius severely: Boethius took almost everything in the Commentarii Categorias (CC) from Porphyry, and Porphyry gained nothing in the process. Shiel showed that Porphyry was by no means the only Greek commentator who had left his imprint on the CC, but this did not help much, since he also claimed that Boethius had not read a complete Greek commentary, not even the short Kleine Prolegomena (K.p.).\r\n\r\nFinally, the interpretations of two passages in De Interpretatione 2 given by Shiel and Chadwick respectively led John Dillon to conclude that Boethius tried to cover up his lack of familiarity with the primary sources. This made Boethius not only unoriginal and ill-read but, on top of it, dishonest.\r\n\r\nI am not trying to do the impossible\u2014namely, present Boethius as an expert on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. And I am not in a position to judge whether or not Boethius displays real originality in his later, more mature works. But I think it would be unfair to expect novel interpretations in commentaries like the Isagoge 1 and CC, which, if my assumptions in the first sections of this paper are correct, are not only the earliest of Boethius' works on Greek philosophy but also the context in which he first encountered Aristotle.\r\n\r\nHe seems to have come quite unprepared to both the Isagoge and the Categories, unarmed with proper translations and unfamiliar with the work he was commenting on. Boethius is indeed an epitome of the expression docendo discimus (\"we learn by teaching\"). [conclusion p. 405-407]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qf1EQ49UxPsJC4F","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":37,"full_name":"Asztalos, Monika","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":773,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Harvard Studies in Classical Philology","volume":"95","issue":"","pages":"367-407"}},"sort":["Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: The Categories"]}
Title | Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 31 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 243-257 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gottschalk, Hans B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Three writers of late antiquity, all of them Neoplatonists, refer to the psychological doctrine of a certain Boethus. Several philosophers of that name are known, and the fragments have been variously assigned to the Stoic, Boethus of Sidon, who lived in the middle of the second century BC, and his Peripatetic namesake, active about a century later. ' The purpose of this article is to see what exactly we can learn about this thinker from the extant fragments and then to determine which of the various Boethi he is most likely to have been. [introduction, p. 243] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5lu8RgGIGt7Wnhe |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1331","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1331,"authors_free":[{"id":1964,"entry_id":1331,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":135,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","free_first_name":"Hans B.","free_last_name":"Gottschalk,","norm_person":{"id":135,"first_name":"Hans B.","last_name":"Gottschalk","full_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1161498559","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists","main_title":{"title":"Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists"},"abstract":"Three writers of late antiquity, all of them Neoplatonists, refer to the psychological doctrine of a certain Boethus. Several philosophers of that name are known, and the fragments have been variously assigned to the Stoic, Boethus of Sidon, who lived in the middle of the second century BC, and his Peripatetic namesake, active about a century later. ' The purpose of this article is to see what exactly we can learn about this thinker from the extant fragments and then to determine which of the various Boethi he is most likely to have been. [introduction, p. 243]","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5lu8RgGIGt7Wnhe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":135,"full_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1331,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"31","issue":"3","pages":"243-257"}},"sort":["Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists"]}
Title | Book Review: Ivan A. Licciardi (2017). Critica dell’apparente e critica apparente. Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel Commentario al de Caelo di Aristotele, Saggio introduttivo, raccolta dei testi, traduzione e commentario (Symbolon 44). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2020 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 41 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 201-207 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Manfred Kraus |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
È fuori d ’ogni dubbio che i commentari di Simplicio alla Fisica e al De Caelo di Aristotele siano d’importanza primaria per la nostra conoscenza della filosofia di Parmenide, come anche –ed anzitutto –per la trasmissione di una gran parte dei frammenti. Nell’anno 2016 Ivan Licciardi ha pubblicato il suo libro intitolato Parmenide tràdito, Parmenide tradìto, in cui ha dedicato la sua analisi al commentario alla Fisica. Solo un anno dopo, Licciardi ha completato questo primo studio con un altro libro, anch’esso con un titolo provocante: Critica dell’apparente e critica apparente, dedicato al commentario al De Caelo. Ambedue i libri sono strettamente legati l’uno all’altro. Nella premessa, l’Autore dice che quando ha pubblicato il primo libro aveva già raccolto quasi tutti i materiali per il secondo. Ha deciso, tuttavia, di pubblicarli in due volumi separati, da un lato per ragioni di quantità (perché un solo libro avrebbe superato le mille pagine), ma anche per una ragione scientifica sostanziale, e cioè perché nei due commentari, secondo Licciardi, Simplicio contempla il pensiero parmenideo da prospettive diverse. Mentre nel commentario alla Fisica l’interpretazione è incentrata sul rapporto fra l’essere e l’uno, nell’altro commentario, invece, il Commentatore si occupa del rapporto fra essere sen- sibile ed essere intelligibile e quindi del problema della generazione e del divenire. [Introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/xCZ6vrIKvYZF5PU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1583","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1583,"authors_free":[{"id":2778,"entry_id":1583,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Manfred Kraus","free_first_name":"Manfred","free_last_name":"Kraus","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Book Review: Ivan A. Licciardi (2017). Critica dell\u2019apparente e critica apparente. Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel Commentario al de Caelo di Aristotele, Saggio introduttivo, raccolta dei testi, traduzione e commentario (Symbolon 44). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. ","main_title":{"title":"Book Review: Ivan A. Licciardi (2017). Critica dell\u2019apparente e critica apparente. Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel Commentario al de Caelo di Aristotele, Saggio introduttivo, raccolta dei testi, traduzione e commentario (Symbolon 44). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. "},"abstract":"\u00c8 fuori d \u2019ogni dubbio che i commentari di Simplicio alla Fisica e al De Caelo di\r\nAristotele siano d\u2019importanza primaria per la nostra conoscenza della filosofia\r\ndi Parmenide, come anche \u2013ed anzitutto \u2013per la trasmissione di una gran\r\nparte dei frammenti. Nell\u2019anno 2016 Ivan Licciardi ha pubblicato il suo libro\r\nintitolato Parmenide tr\u00e0dito, Parmenide trad\u00ecto, in cui ha dedicato la sua\r\nanalisi al commentario alla Fisica. Solo un anno dopo, Licciardi ha completato\r\nquesto primo studio con un altro libro, anch\u2019esso con un titolo provocante: \r\nCritica dell\u2019apparente e critica apparente, dedicato al commentario al De Caelo.\r\nAmbedue i libri sono strettamente legati l\u2019uno all\u2019altro. Nella premessa,\r\nl\u2019Autore dice che quando ha pubblicato il primo libro aveva gi\u00e0 raccolto quasi \r\ntutti i materiali per il secondo. Ha deciso, tuttavia, di pubblicarli in due volumi\r\nseparati, da un lato per ragioni di quantit\u00e0 (perch\u00e9 un solo libro avrebbe\r\nsuperato le mille pagine), ma anche per una ragione scientifica sostanziale, e\r\ncio\u00e8 perch\u00e9 nei due commentari, secondo Licciardi, Simplicio contempla il\r\npensiero parmenideo da prospettive diverse. Mentre nel commentario alla\r\nFisica l\u2019interpretazione \u00e8 incentrata sul rapporto fra l\u2019essere e l\u2019uno, nell\u2019altro\r\ncommentario, invece, il Commentatore si occupa del rapporto fra essere sen-\r\nsibile ed essere intelligibile e quindi del problema della generazione e del\r\ndivenire. [Introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2020","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xCZ6vrIKvYZF5PU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1583,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"41","issue":"1","pages":"201-207"}},"sort":["Book Review: Ivan A. Licciardi (2017). Critica dell\u2019apparente e critica apparente. Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel Commentario al de Caelo di Aristotele, Saggio introduttivo, raccolta dei testi, traduzione e commentario (Symbolon 44). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. "]}
Title | Book review: Simplicius on Aristotle Physics 8.1-5, written by Istvan Bodnár, Michael Chase and Michael Share |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 9 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 124 –125 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hatzistavrou, Antony |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This is a fine addition to the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, which is under the general editorship of Richard Sorabji. The volume contains a translation of Simplicius’ commentary on the first five chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle’s Physics. The translators are Michael Chase (who has been involved in the translation of most of the chapters), Istvan Bodnár, and Michael Slate. The translation is accompanied by a series of notes. Some of the notes identify the ancient texts Simplicius refers to in his commentary, while others are primarily of philological interest. There is also a number of exegetical notes that are particularly useful in helping the reader understand the logic of Simplicius’ arguments and in elucidating the conceptual apparatus of his commentary. The volume also includes: A preface by Richard Sorabji, which explains the importance of the commentary for scholarship on the ancient commentators on Aristotle. An introduction by Michael Chase, which focuses on Simplicius’ polemic against Philoponus. A list of departures of the translation from Diels’ edition of Simplicius’ commentary. An English-Greek glossary. A Greek-English index. A subject index. A bibliography. The volume is clearly designed with the needs of the specialist scholar in mind and aims to become the primary reference text in English for the study of Simplicius’ commentary. Where does the importance of Simplicius’ commentary lie? It is instructive that both Sorabji, in his preface, and Chase, in his introduction, focus on its importance for the history of philosophy in late antiquity. First, it sheds light on an aspect of the philosophical and ideological debate between pagan and Christian thinkers at the end of antiquity concerning the intelligibility of the creation of the world. In Physics 8.1, Aristotle argues that time and motion are eternal. For any arbitrarily chosen moment in time or motion in space, one will always be able to identify a preceding and a subsequent moment or motion. This means that the world as a whole is eternal. Philoponus understood Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of the universe to pose problems for a creationist account of the world, as advocated by the Judeo-Christian religion. In his polemic Against Aristotle On the Eternity of the World, Philoponus undertakes the task of defending a creationist account of the world by attacking Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of motion and time. In his commentary, Simplicius attacks Philoponus, accusing him, among other things, of failing to understand and thus misrepresenting Aristotle’s position. A primary aim of his commentary on Physics 8.1 is, on the one hand, to identify and correct what he takes to be Philoponus’ distortions of Aristotle’s arguments and, on the other hand, to vindicate the cogency of Aristotle’s theory against Philoponus’ polemic. Simplicius makes no attempt to conceal his disdain for Philoponus’ scholarly abilities and intellectual integrity, describing his arguments as "garbage" and accusing him of being motivated by his "zeal for contradicting." In his introduction, Michael Chase clarifies that Simplicius’ attack is not restricted to issues concerning the proper interpretation of Aristotle’s theory but has a wider scope. It is meant as an attack on Philoponus’ Christian faith. In this attack, Simplicius occasionally reveals himself to be conversant with intricate Christian theological debates, such as the debate concerning the nature of Christ (i.e., whether Christ was begotten or made). Second, as Richard Sorabji mentions in his preface, Simplicius’ commentary reports and makes extensive use of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. On Sorabji’s view, Simplicius, on the whole, reports Alexander’s views accurately. Furthermore, despite occasional disagreements about the interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy, Simplicius shows respect for Alexander’s abilities as a commentator and values his intellectual integrity. Simplicius’ attitude towards Alexander is thus sharply contrasted with his attitude towards Philoponus. Scholars interested in the debate between pagan and Christian philosophers at the end of antiquity and in the history of the ancient commentators on Aristotle will welcome the translation into English of Simplicius’ commentary. They may also find much material in the notes to the translation to grapple with. The volume will also appeal to anyone interested in Aristotle’s natural philosophy and, more specifically, in Aristotle’s views about the eternity of the world and the prime mover. The detailed English-Greek glossary and the indices make the volume a significant research tool likely to become a reference point in relevant scholarship. In addition, the volume is nicely produced. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/um5b6staCmgDtbZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1014","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1014,"authors_free":[{"id":1530,"entry_id":1014,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":173,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hatzistavrou, Antony","free_first_name":"Antony","free_last_name":"Hatzistavrou","norm_person":{"id":173,"first_name":"Antony","last_name":"Hatzistavrou","full_name":"Hatzistavrou, Antony","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Book review: Simplicius on Aristotle Physics 8.1-5, written by Istvan Bodn\u00e1r, Michael Chase and Michael Share","main_title":{"title":"Book review: Simplicius on Aristotle Physics 8.1-5, written by Istvan Bodn\u00e1r, Michael Chase and Michael Share"},"abstract":"This is a fine addition to the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, which is under the general editorship of Richard Sorabji. The volume contains a translation of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the first five chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle\u2019s Physics. The translators are Michael Chase (who has been involved in the translation of most of the chapters), Istvan Bodn\u00e1r, and Michael Slate. The translation is accompanied by a series of notes. Some of the notes identify the ancient texts Simplicius refers to in his commentary, while others are primarily of philological interest. There is also a number of exegetical notes that are particularly useful in helping the reader understand the logic of Simplicius\u2019 arguments and in elucidating the conceptual apparatus of his commentary. The volume also includes:\r\n\r\n A preface by Richard Sorabji, which explains the importance of the commentary for scholarship on the ancient commentators on Aristotle.\r\n An introduction by Michael Chase, which focuses on Simplicius\u2019 polemic against Philoponus.\r\n A list of departures of the translation from Diels\u2019 edition of Simplicius\u2019 commentary.\r\n An English-Greek glossary.\r\n A Greek-English index.\r\n A subject index.\r\n A bibliography.\r\n\r\nThe volume is clearly designed with the needs of the specialist scholar in mind and aims to become the primary reference text in English for the study of Simplicius\u2019 commentary.\r\n\r\nWhere does the importance of Simplicius\u2019 commentary lie? It is instructive that both Sorabji, in his preface, and Chase, in his introduction, focus on its importance for the history of philosophy in late antiquity. First, it sheds light on an aspect of the philosophical and ideological debate between pagan and Christian thinkers at the end of antiquity concerning the intelligibility of the creation of the world. In Physics 8.1, Aristotle argues that time and motion are eternal. For any arbitrarily chosen moment in time or motion in space, one will always be able to identify a preceding and a subsequent moment or motion. This means that the world as a whole is eternal. Philoponus understood Aristotle\u2019s arguments for the eternity of the universe to pose problems for a creationist account of the world, as advocated by the Judeo-Christian religion. In his polemic Against Aristotle On the Eternity of the World, Philoponus undertakes the task of defending a creationist account of the world by attacking Aristotle\u2019s arguments for the eternity of motion and time.\r\n\r\nIn his commentary, Simplicius attacks Philoponus, accusing him, among other things, of failing to understand and thus misrepresenting Aristotle\u2019s position. A primary aim of his commentary on Physics 8.1 is, on the one hand, to identify and correct what he takes to be Philoponus\u2019 distortions of Aristotle\u2019s arguments and, on the other hand, to vindicate the cogency of Aristotle\u2019s theory against Philoponus\u2019 polemic. Simplicius makes no attempt to conceal his disdain for Philoponus\u2019 scholarly abilities and intellectual integrity, describing his arguments as \"garbage\" and accusing him of being motivated by his \"zeal for contradicting.\" In his introduction, Michael Chase clarifies that Simplicius\u2019 attack is not restricted to issues concerning the proper interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s theory but has a wider scope. It is meant as an attack on Philoponus\u2019 Christian faith. In this attack, Simplicius occasionally reveals himself to be conversant with intricate Christian theological debates, such as the debate concerning the nature of Christ (i.e., whether Christ was begotten or made).\r\n\r\nSecond, as Richard Sorabji mentions in his preface, Simplicius\u2019 commentary reports and makes extensive use of Alexander of Aphrodisias\u2019 lost commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics. On Sorabji\u2019s view, Simplicius, on the whole, reports Alexander\u2019s views accurately. Furthermore, despite occasional disagreements about the interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s philosophy, Simplicius shows respect for Alexander\u2019s abilities as a commentator and values his intellectual integrity. Simplicius\u2019 attitude towards Alexander is thus sharply contrasted with his attitude towards Philoponus.\r\n\r\nScholars interested in the debate between pagan and Christian philosophers at the end of antiquity and in the history of the ancient commentators on Aristotle will welcome the translation into English of Simplicius\u2019 commentary. They may also find much material in the notes to the translation to grapple with. The volume will also appeal to anyone interested in Aristotle\u2019s natural philosophy and, more specifically, in Aristotle\u2019s views about the eternity of the world and the prime mover. The detailed English-Greek glossary and the indices make the volume a significant research tool likely to become a reference point in relevant scholarship. In addition, the volume is nicely produced. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/um5b6staCmgDtbZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":173,"full_name":"Hatzistavrou, Antony","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1014,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"9","issue":"1","pages":"124 \u2013125"}},"sort":["Book review: Simplicius on Aristotle Physics 8.1-5, written by Istvan Bodn\u00e1r, Michael Chase and Michael Share"]}
Title | Boéthos de Sidon sur les relatifs |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2013 |
Journal | Studia greaco-arabica |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 1-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Luna, Concetta |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The Peripatetic philosopher Boethus of Sidon (mid-first century BC), a pupil of Andronicus of Rhodes, is well-known for his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, whose fragments are transmitted by later commentators together with testimonia about it. In his exegesis of the Categories, Boethus especially focused on the category of relation (Cat. 7), on which he wrote a speci!c treatise, arguing against the Stoics for the unity of the category of relation. The present paper o"ers a translation and analysis of Boethus’ fragments on relation, all of which are preserved in Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9oljjSmWv94OJA7 |
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Title | Categories and Subcategories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Anuario Filosófico |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 395-411 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tegtmeier, Erwin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Starting from the traditional distinction between the minimal and the maximal division, the role of subcategories in Aristotle, as well as that of the highest categories, is discussed. The need for categorial properties which determine categories is pointed out. It is argued that an existent cannot have two such essential properties and that only the lowest subcategories have simple categorial properties. Furthermore, it is emphasised that categories and subcategories must form a tree because they belong to a theory of categories which requires unity. By contrast, it is held that the hierarchy of all concepts need not form a tree. The difficulties Porphyrius and Simplicius find in Aristotle’s minimal and maximal division are analysed. Finally, Aristotle’s way of avoiding categorial properties by referring to an abstraction is criticised. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IN81x5WTB9e5jh5 |
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Title | Collation but not contamination: On some textual problems of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Kappa 1065a 25sqq |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Revue d’histoire des textes, nouvelle série |
Volume | 10 |
Pages | 1-23 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
One of the less felicitous terms in textual criticism, despite its being amply used in modern scholarship, is the term « contamination » (Kontamination), which Paul Maas first coined in his famous Textkritik. By modern-day standards the term is supposed to account, roughly, for two phenomena : (1) the phenomenon of having variant readings in margine or inter lineas of a text, which is an obvious sign that, next to the principal model, at least one other manuscript has been at some point involved in the copying of the text ; (2) the more complicated phenomenon of detecting in the body of the text readings that are not expected to be found there. What we detect in (2) is in principle the result of what has happened in (1). Any scholar acquainted with Byzantine manuscripts produced from the ninth century down to the Fall of Constantinople should know that cases like those described above were frequent in Byzantium’s Buchwesen, provided that an adequately circulating text was concerned. As Byzantine scribes and scholars mostly worked and studied in significant libraries that owned several copies of the same text, the idea of comparing them in order to verify dubious readings and to produce a more satisfying text would naturally occur to their mind. Scribes and scholars in Byzantium were well aware that material damages and copyist errors could happen. And as we nowadays do, they tried to counter such textual problems by collating different manuscripts – not by contaminating them. If we leave aside copies made purely for commercial purposes, we can reasonably say that collation of at least two manuscripts before producing a new copy of a text was something of a rule in Byzantium. I shall henceforth call this rule « the principle of collation » ; it can be formulated like this : « Unless otherwise proved, each Byzantine copy of an adequately circulating text is the product of collation of at least two different manuscripts. » [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HitzMXpWqjAaGGB |
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Title | Colloque international sur la vie, l'œuvre et la survie de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Gnomon |
Volume | 58 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 191-192 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Vom 28. September bis zum 1. Oktober 1985 fand in Paris in der Fondation Hugot du Collège de France ein internationales Colloquium statt, das zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie und der Geschichte der Philosophie den neuplatonischen Philosophen Simplikios zum Gegenstand hatte. Das Ziel des Colloquiums war es, einen ersten Gedankenaustausch derjenigen, nicht sehr zahlreichen, Wissenschaftler zu ermöglichen, die etwa seit einem Jahrzehnt begonnen haben, das philosophische Denken des Simplikios systematisch zu erfassen, gesicherte Text grundlagen durch die Erstellung neuer kritischer Editionen zu liefern und die Texte selbst durch Übersetzungen einem weiteren, philosophisch interessierten Publikum zugänglich zu machen. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AUBZDJhIvjp1dxV |
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Title | Commentary on Gabor: The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2020 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 23-27 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Miller, Dana R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper gives a brief discussion of the problem of ascribing authorship to ancient philosophical texts when there is evidence both for and against traditional ascription. The case in point is tradition’s claim that Simplicius is the author of the De Anima commentary. It is argued here that, while Gabor provides new and important methodological evidence for Simplicius’s authorship, we should not expect certainty. It is suggested that, in cases where historical fact may never be ascertained, we will be better served by the notion of credences. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3xAEvu1rDgjfUMU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1467","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1467,"authors_free":[{"id":2540,"entry_id":1467,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":539,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Miller, Dana R.","free_first_name":"Dana R.","free_last_name":"Miller","norm_person":{"id":539,"first_name":"Dana R.","last_name":"Miller","full_name":"Miller, Dana R.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128406704","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Commentary on Gabor: The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima","main_title":{"title":"Commentary on Gabor: The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima"},"abstract":"This paper gives a brief discussion of the problem of ascribing authorship to ancient philosophical texts when there is evidence both for and against traditional ascription. The case in point is tradition\u2019s claim that Simplicius is the author of the De Anima commentary. It is argued here that, while Gabor provides new and important methodological evidence for Simplicius\u2019s authorship, we should not expect certainty. It is suggested that, in cases where historical fact may never be ascertained, we will be better served by the notion of credences. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2020","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3xAEvu1rDgjfUMU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":539,"full_name":"Miller, Dana R.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1467,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"35","issue":"2","pages":"23-27"}},"sort":["Commentary on Gabor: The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima"]}
Title | Confirmation of Two "Conjectures" in the Presocratics: Parmenides B 12 and Anaxagoras B 15 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1979 |
Journal | Phoenix |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 67-69 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sider, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In each of the two passages discussed below, the indisputably correct reading is given by Diels as an editorial conjecture, when in fact, for each, there is manuscript authority. [introduction p. 67] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RDFVugAzW2NIhCB |
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Title | Confronter les Idées. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | Études platoniciennes |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 145-160 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dans ce lemme, Simplicius n’emploie pas la méthode à laquelle il recourt habituellement pour concilier des doctrines. Entre Aristote et Platon, le problème ne provient pas d’une différence d'expression (lexis), derrière laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d’un problème semblable en des termes différents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d’une question différente mais en recourant à des termes similaires. Sans être formulée ici par Simplicius de façon explicite, la divergence apparaît à la première lecture : lorsqu’Aristote s’en prend à la doctrine des Idées, il ne peut pas, d’une certaine façon, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier à la soutenir. D’emblée, Simplicius élude le problème en redirigeant l’attaque contre d’autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d’abord la véritable cible de l’objection, avant qu’il devienne possible d’en mesurer l’apport à l’égard de la doctrine générale des Idées. La conciliation des doctrines au cœur de l’exégèse d’Aristote suit un parcours précis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture littérale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de façon surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d’Aristote contre elle-même : en faire non plus un adversaire de la théorie des Idées séparées, mais l’auteur d’un critère de validité de la séparation. Dans un deuxième temps, notre exégète s’emploie à montrer la teneur authentiquement aristotélicienne de cette doctrine des Idées séparées. Il isole d’abord les caractères reconnus aux Idées, avant de démontrer qu’ils sont admis au sein même de la pensée d’Aristote. De plus, étant donné que l’enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste à trouver chez Aristote la double caractérisation des Idées que leur attribuent leurs partisans – être à la fois des causes et des modèles semblables pour les réalités naturelles –, il répertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et insère des éléments provenant de la tradition néoplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les réalités qui admettent des Formes séparées et celles qui n’en admettent pas. Comme souvent chez Simplicius, l’examen aboutit à l’énoncé d’un critère net et précis. Il doit permettre ici de démarquer l’homonymie vulgaire des Idées de l’éponymie légitime. La première résulte d’un dépouillement de la forme en dehors de la matière, mais qui continue à raisonner à partir d’ici-bas : elle cherche des Idées séparées pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais être complètement abstraites de la matière à laquelle elles sont liées. La seconde reconnaît que certains noms sont propres aux composés ici-bas et, par conséquent, ne correspondent à aucune réalité là-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Idées, à la fois causes et modèles des composés ici-bas, qui possèdent une subsistance séparée. Si le travail exégétique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son génie philosophique, il s’emploie à chercher des solutions à certains des problèmes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu’il propose, en dépit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, lève la difficulté d’une façon nette et précise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une leçon à méditer. [conclusion p. 159-160] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1313","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1313,"authors_free":[{"id":1947,"entry_id":1313,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius"},"abstract":"Dans ce lemme, Simplicius n\u2019emploie pas la m\u00e9thode \u00e0 laquelle il recourt habituellement pour concilier des doctrines. Entre Aristote et Platon, le probl\u00e8me ne provient pas d\u2019une diff\u00e9rence d'expression (lexis), derri\u00e8re laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d\u2019un probl\u00e8me semblable en des termes diff\u00e9rents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d\u2019une question diff\u00e9rente mais en recourant \u00e0 des termes similaires. Sans \u00eatre formul\u00e9e ici par Simplicius de fa\u00e7on explicite, la divergence appara\u00eet \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re lecture : lorsqu\u2019Aristote s\u2019en prend \u00e0 la doctrine des Id\u00e9es, il ne peut pas, d\u2019une certaine fa\u00e7on, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier \u00e0 la soutenir. D\u2019embl\u00e9e, Simplicius \u00e9lude le probl\u00e8me en redirigeant l\u2019attaque contre d\u2019autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d\u2019abord la v\u00e9ritable cible de l\u2019objection, avant qu\u2019il devienne possible d\u2019en mesurer l\u2019apport \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de la doctrine g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Id\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nLa conciliation des doctrines au c\u0153ur de l\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se d\u2019Aristote suit un parcours pr\u00e9cis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture litt\u00e9rale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de fa\u00e7on surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d\u2019Aristote contre elle-m\u00eame : en faire non plus un adversaire de la th\u00e9orie des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es, mais l\u2019auteur d\u2019un crit\u00e8re de validit\u00e9 de la s\u00e9paration. Dans un deuxi\u00e8me temps, notre ex\u00e9g\u00e8te s\u2019emploie \u00e0 montrer la teneur authentiquement aristot\u00e9licienne de cette doctrine des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es. Il isole d\u2019abord les caract\u00e8res reconnus aux Id\u00e9es, avant de d\u00e9montrer qu\u2019ils sont admis au sein m\u00eame de la pens\u00e9e d\u2019Aristote. De plus, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 que l\u2019enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste \u00e0 trouver chez Aristote la double caract\u00e9risation des Id\u00e9es que leur attribuent leurs partisans \u2013 \u00eatre \u00e0 la fois des causes et des mod\u00e8les semblables pour les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s naturelles \u2013, il r\u00e9pertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et ins\u00e8re des \u00e9l\u00e9ments provenant de la tradition n\u00e9oplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui admettent des Formes s\u00e9par\u00e9es et celles qui n\u2019en admettent pas.\r\n\r\nComme souvent chez Simplicius, l\u2019examen aboutit \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9nonc\u00e9 d\u2019un crit\u00e8re net et pr\u00e9cis. Il doit permettre ici de d\u00e9marquer l\u2019homonymie vulgaire des Id\u00e9es de l\u2019\u00e9ponymie l\u00e9gitime. La premi\u00e8re r\u00e9sulte d\u2019un d\u00e9pouillement de la forme en dehors de la mati\u00e8re, mais qui continue \u00e0 raisonner \u00e0 partir d\u2019ici-bas : elle cherche des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais \u00eatre compl\u00e8tement abstraites de la mati\u00e8re \u00e0 laquelle elles sont li\u00e9es. La seconde reconna\u00eet que certains noms sont propres aux compos\u00e9s ici-bas et, par cons\u00e9quent, ne correspondent \u00e0 aucune r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l\u00e0-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Id\u00e9es, \u00e0 la fois causes et mod\u00e8les des compos\u00e9s ici-bas, qui poss\u00e8dent une subsistance s\u00e9par\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nSi le travail ex\u00e9g\u00e9tique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son g\u00e9nie philosophique, il s\u2019emploie \u00e0 chercher des solutions \u00e0 certains des probl\u00e8mes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu\u2019il propose, en d\u00e9pit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, l\u00e8ve la difficult\u00e9 d\u2019une fa\u00e7on nette et pr\u00e9cise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une le\u00e7on \u00e0 m\u00e9diter. [conclusion p. 159-160]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1313,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"\u00c9tudes platoniciennes","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"145-160"}},"sort":["Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius"]}
Title | Conférence de M. Philippe Hoffmann: Sens et dénomination. Homonymie, analogie, métaphore selon le commentaire de Simplicius sur les Catégories d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1984 |
Journal | École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire |
Volume | 93 |
Pages | 343-356 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notre lecture du Commentaire de Simplicius s'est organisée selon plusieurs fils directeurs. Nous avons examiné, tout d'abord, les méthodes mêmes de l'exégèse : Simplicius lit le texte d'Aristote mot à mot (kata tên lexin), en scrutant au besoin tous les sens possibles d'un même mot ; l'explication proprement doctrinale procède en partie par des citations (ou paraphrases) d'auteurs antérieurs : Porphyre (Commentaire par questions et réponses, et surtout Commentaire à Gédalios), Jamblique et Syrianus. Nous avons aussi tenté de dégager les traits proprement néoplatoniciens du commentaire : ainsi, à propos du couple « nom-définition », dont l'interprétation ne peut se comprendre que dans la perspective plus générale du système néoplatonicien. Il apparaît en outre que la condition de possibilité de l'homonymie, et de son contraire la polyonymie, est le caractère « conventionnel » (thesei et non phusei) du langage : il fallait donc situer la réflexion néoplatonicienne dans le cadre des discussions traditionnelles sur l'origine du langage. D'autres questions se posaient encore : quelle est, au fond, la justification et l'utilité d'un tel exposé préliminaire dans un ouvrage consacré aux catégories ? La doctrine des homonymes, synonymes et paronymes exprime-t-elle des propriétés des réalités, ou des noms (onomata) ? Quelle est la spécificité de la recherche philosophique d'Aristote par rapport à la grammaire, ou à l'étude littéraire du langage, qui relève de la Rhétorique ? Le commentaire de Simplicius cite le témoignage de Boèthos de Sidon sur la doctrine de Speusippe, qui, à la différence d'Aristote, divise les onomata : ce fut l'occasion d'une mise au point portant à la fois sur les théories antiques de l'homonymie et de la synonymie, et sur l'importance de ces commentaires comme sources de nos connaissances en matière de philosophie antique. [introduction p. 344-345] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/oqTrFiRR6jzhlNL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"507","_score":null,"_source":{"id":507,"authors_free":[{"id":701,"entry_id":507,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Conf\u00e9rence de M. Philippe Hoffmann: Sens et d\u00e9nomination. Homonymie, analogie, m\u00e9taphore selon le commentaire de Simplicius sur les Cat\u00e9gories d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Conf\u00e9rence de M. Philippe Hoffmann: Sens et d\u00e9nomination. Homonymie, analogie, m\u00e9taphore selon le commentaire de Simplicius sur les Cat\u00e9gories d'Aristote"},"abstract":"Notre lecture du Commentaire de Simplicius s'est organis\u00e9e selon plusieurs fils directeurs. Nous avons examin\u00e9, tout d'abord, les m\u00e9thodes m\u00eames de l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se : Simplicius lit le texte d'Aristote mot \u00e0 mot (kata t\u00ean lexin), en scrutant au besoin tous les sens possibles d'un m\u00eame mot ; l'explication proprement doctrinale proc\u00e8de en partie par des citations (ou paraphrases) d'auteurs ant\u00e9rieurs : Porphyre (Commentaire par questions et r\u00e9ponses, et surtout Commentaire \u00e0 G\u00e9dalios), Jamblique et Syrianus.\r\n\r\nNous avons aussi tent\u00e9 de d\u00e9gager les traits proprement n\u00e9oplatoniciens du commentaire : ainsi, \u00e0 propos du couple \u00ab nom-d\u00e9finition \u00bb, dont l'interpr\u00e9tation ne peut se comprendre que dans la perspective plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du syst\u00e8me n\u00e9oplatonicien. Il appara\u00eet en outre que la condition de possibilit\u00e9 de l'homonymie, et de son contraire la polyonymie, est le caract\u00e8re \u00ab conventionnel \u00bb (thesei et non phusei) du langage : il fallait donc situer la r\u00e9flexion n\u00e9oplatonicienne dans le cadre des discussions traditionnelles sur l'origine du langage.\r\n\r\nD'autres questions se posaient encore : quelle est, au fond, la justification et l'utilit\u00e9 d'un tel expos\u00e9 pr\u00e9liminaire dans un ouvrage consacr\u00e9 aux cat\u00e9gories ? La doctrine des homonymes, synonymes et paronymes exprime-t-elle des propri\u00e9t\u00e9s des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s, ou des noms (onomata) ? Quelle est la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 de la recherche philosophique d'Aristote par rapport \u00e0 la grammaire, ou \u00e0 l'\u00e9tude litt\u00e9raire du langage, qui rel\u00e8ve de la Rh\u00e9torique ?\r\n\r\nLe commentaire de Simplicius cite le t\u00e9moignage de Bo\u00e8thos de Sidon sur la doctrine de Speusippe, qui, \u00e0 la diff\u00e9rence d'Aristote, divise les onomata : ce fut l'occasion d'une mise au point portant \u00e0 la fois sur les th\u00e9ories antiques de l'homonymie et de la synonymie, et sur l'importance de ces commentaires comme sources de nos connaissances en mati\u00e8re de philosophie antique. [introduction p. 344-345]","btype":3,"date":"1984","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/oqTrFiRR6jzhlNL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":507,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":" \u00c9cole pratique des hautes \u00e9tudes, Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire","volume":"93","issue":"","pages":"343-356"}},"sort":["Conf\u00e9rence de M. Philippe Hoffmann: Sens et d\u00e9nomination. Homonymie, analogie, m\u00e9taphore selon le commentaire de Simplicius sur les Cat\u00e9gories d'Aristote"]}
Title | Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes |
Volume | 68 |
Pages | 157-211 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Knox, Dilwyn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
What do these ideas tell us about Copernicus the philosopher? He drew on Stoic and, perhaps unknowingly at times, Platonic doctrines of the elements, but he avoided their metaphysical implications. There would have been little point, even if he had been so inclined, in compromising his heliocentric hypothesis, contentious as he knew it was, with suspect doctrines of, say, spiritus and cosmic animation. For three centuries, scholastic theologians and philosophers, despite Aristotle's statements to the contrary, had done their best to de-animate the heavens. Nor, for the same reason, should we think that Neoplatonic sun symbolism was important to him. His brief references to sun symbolism and Hermes Trismegistus take up no more than five or so lines and derive mostly from standard classical sources, including Pliny in a passage immediately following the latter's discussion of gravity. The main problem facing Copernicus was to make the earth move, not to explain why the sun stood at the center. He also consulted doxographical works explaining the many and divergent views of ancient thinkers, for instance, pseudo-Plutarch's Placita philosophorum, Bessarion's In calumniatorem Platonis, and Giorgio Valla's De expetendis. He consulted classical Latin authors like Pliny and Cicero, who, through the endeavors of Renaissance humanists and the agency of the printing press, had become better known during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His extensive use of Pliny's Natural History, Book II, exemplifies the way in which the latter became a popular source for alternatives to Aristotelian or scholastic natural philosophy during the sixteenth century. The greatest debt, in other words, that Copernicus the cosmologist owed was not to Renaissance Platonism or a revamped Aristotelianism. It was rather to the variety of ancient learning promoted by Renaissance humanists during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. To them he owed not just the wherewithal and encouragement to consult a much wider library of classical authors than his scholastic predecessors were wont to do but also the intellectual flexibility to regard his sources as no more than that—sources for ideas rather than authorities. In this, Copernicus was typical of many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century "scientific" thinkers, Galileo included. But Renaissance humanism left its mark in another important respect. Copernicus set himself the task of learning Greek, and this provided him, if the evidence above is to be trusted, with one of his most important cosmological doctrines. [conclusion p. 210-211] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/x8JGitPSYOT3L0a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"736","_score":null,"_source":{"id":736,"authors_free":[{"id":1099,"entry_id":736,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":217,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Knox, Dilwyn","free_first_name":"Dilwyn","free_last_name":"Knox","norm_person":{"id":217,"first_name":"Dilwyn","last_name":"Knox","full_name":"Knox, Dilwyn","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1048420108","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements","main_title":{"title":"Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements"},"abstract":"What do these ideas tell us about Copernicus the philosopher? He drew on Stoic and, perhaps unknowingly at times, Platonic doctrines of the elements, but he avoided their metaphysical implications. There would have been little point, even if he had been so inclined, in compromising his heliocentric hypothesis, contentious as he knew it was, with suspect doctrines of, say, spiritus and cosmic animation. For three centuries, scholastic theologians and philosophers, despite Aristotle's statements to the contrary, had done their best to de-animate the heavens.\r\n\r\nNor, for the same reason, should we think that Neoplatonic sun symbolism was important to him. His brief references to sun symbolism and Hermes Trismegistus take up no more than five or so lines and derive mostly from standard classical sources, including Pliny in a passage immediately following the latter's discussion of gravity. The main problem facing Copernicus was to make the earth move, not to explain why the sun stood at the center.\r\n\r\nHe also consulted doxographical works explaining the many and divergent views of ancient thinkers, for instance, pseudo-Plutarch's Placita philosophorum, Bessarion's In calumniatorem Platonis, and Giorgio Valla's De expetendis. He consulted classical Latin authors like Pliny and Cicero, who, through the endeavors of Renaissance humanists and the agency of the printing press, had become better known during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His extensive use of Pliny's Natural History, Book II, exemplifies the way in which the latter became a popular source for alternatives to Aristotelian or scholastic natural philosophy during the sixteenth century.\r\n\r\nThe greatest debt, in other words, that Copernicus the cosmologist owed was not to Renaissance Platonism or a revamped Aristotelianism. It was rather to the variety of ancient learning promoted by Renaissance humanists during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. To them he owed not just the wherewithal and encouragement to consult a much wider library of classical authors than his scholastic predecessors were wont to do but also the intellectual flexibility to regard his sources as no more than that\u2014sources for ideas rather than authorities.\r\n\r\nIn this, Copernicus was typical of many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century \"scientific\" thinkers, Galileo included. But Renaissance humanism left its mark in another important respect. Copernicus set himself the task of learning Greek, and this provided him, if the evidence above is to be trusted, with one of his most important cosmological doctrines. [conclusion p. 210-211]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/x8JGitPSYOT3L0a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":217,"full_name":"Knox, Dilwyn","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":736,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes","volume":"68","issue":"","pages":"157-211"}},"sort":["Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements"]}
Title | Cosmic Justice in Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 36 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-25 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Engmann, Joyce |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In what may be our oldest surviving fragment of Greek literary prose, Anaximander refers to the redress of injustice among parties alternately injured and injuring. Since the parties in question are impersonal entities, and the redress is a cosmic process, Simplicius, probably repeating a remark of Theophrastus, comments on Anaximander's mode of expression as "rather poetical." What, in plain terms, was the meaning of the metaphor? In this paper, I wish to look again at what Vlastos has described as the most controversial text in Presocratic philosophy. The preceding clause in Simplicius indicates that the process of redress is one of perishing or passing away, phthora: not absolute phthora, but phthora "into" something. Two main views have been taken of this process. It has often been thought that that into which perishing took place was the infinite, and that that which perished was what Simplicius referred to as ta onta, existing things—in effect, the world, or a world (the difference is immaterial for present purposes). Thus, the, or a, world perished as a totality into the infinite. The view which prevails today is that both that into which perishing takes place and that which perishes are the opposites or elements, which Simplicius refers to as ta stoicheia. I believe there are difficulties in this view which have not been fully recognised. In the reports of Anaximander in our sources, there are several pointers to a third possibility, which is, in a sense, an amalgam of the two just mentioned: that into which perishing takes place is the infinite, as on the first view, while, as on the second view, the process of perishing is not a sudden but an ongoing process, and, again, that which perishes is the opposites or elements. The hypothesis of ongoing material interaction between the world and the infinite at least seems to merit more consideration than it has received. It has been mooted in one line and rejected in two by Kirk; dismissed in a short footnote by Vlastos; and only taken seriously by Heidel, who, however, does not apply it to the interpretation of the fragment. I believe that it supplies the key to the understanding of the fragment, and shall argue that it provides a way of reconciling Simplicius' report on Anaximander with two supplementary categories of evidence, the value of which is often discounted: Simplicius' isolated statements about Anaximander elsewhere, and the parallel reports of Aetius and pseudo-Plutarch. I shall conclude by suggesting that equality did not play the role in Anaximander's conception of justice that is commonly thought, and that for him the natural world mirrored an aristocratic rather than a democratic society. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4jIf0maBjgUseow |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"598","_score":null,"_source":{"id":598,"authors_free":[{"id":849,"entry_id":598,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":82,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Engmann, Joyce","free_first_name":"Joyce","free_last_name":"Engmann","norm_person":{"id":82,"first_name":"Joyce","last_name":"Engmann","full_name":"Engmann, Joyce","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Cosmic Justice in Anaximander ","main_title":{"title":"Cosmic Justice in Anaximander "},"abstract":"In what may be our oldest surviving fragment of Greek literary prose, Anaximander refers to the redress of injustice among parties alternately injured and injuring. Since the parties in question are impersonal entities, and the redress is a cosmic process, Simplicius, probably repeating a remark of Theophrastus, comments on Anaximander's mode of expression as \"rather poetical.\" What, in plain terms, was the meaning of the metaphor? In this paper, I wish to look again at what Vlastos has described as the most controversial text in Presocratic philosophy.\r\n\r\nThe preceding clause in Simplicius indicates that the process of redress is one of perishing or passing away, phthora: not absolute phthora, but phthora \"into\" something. Two main views have been taken of this process. It has often been thought that that into which perishing took place was the infinite, and that that which perished was what Simplicius referred to as ta onta, existing things\u2014in effect, the world, or a world (the difference is immaterial for present purposes). Thus, the, or a, world perished as a totality into the infinite.\r\n\r\nThe view which prevails today is that both that into which perishing takes place and that which perishes are the opposites or elements, which Simplicius refers to as ta stoicheia. I believe there are difficulties in this view which have not been fully recognised.\r\n\r\nIn the reports of Anaximander in our sources, there are several pointers to a third possibility, which is, in a sense, an amalgam of the two just mentioned: that into which perishing takes place is the infinite, as on the first view, while, as on the second view, the process of perishing is not a sudden but an ongoing process, and, again, that which perishes is the opposites or elements. The hypothesis of ongoing material interaction between the world and the infinite at least seems to merit more consideration than it has received.\r\n\r\nIt has been mooted in one line and rejected in two by Kirk; dismissed in a short footnote by Vlastos; and only taken seriously by Heidel, who, however, does not apply it to the interpretation of the fragment. I believe that it supplies the key to the understanding of the fragment, and shall argue that it provides a way of reconciling Simplicius' report on Anaximander with two supplementary categories of evidence, the value of which is often discounted: Simplicius' isolated statements about Anaximander elsewhere, and the parallel reports of Aetius and pseudo-Plutarch.\r\n\r\nI shall conclude by suggesting that equality did not play the role in Anaximander's conception of justice that is commonly thought, and that for him the natural world mirrored an aristocratic rather than a democratic society. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4jIf0maBjgUseow","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":82,"full_name":"Engmann, Joyce","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":598,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"36","issue":"1","pages":"1-25"}},"sort":["Cosmic Justice in Anaximander "]}
Title | Cosmología, cosmogonía y teogonía en el poema de Parménides |
Type | Article |
Language | Spanish |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Emerita: Revista de Lingüística y Filología Clasíca |
Volume | 78 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 275-297 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bredlow, Luis-Andrés |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The aim of this paper is to offer a fresh reconstruction of Parmenides’ system of the physical world, duly distinguishing the cosmological, cosmogonic and theogonic moments of the theory, whose confusion has been a main source of misunderstanding in earlier interpretations. In particular, the system of wreaths or bands of B 12 and A 37 does not represent the present order of the universe, but the general structure of matter, as well as the initial stage of the cosmogony (section 1), as can be substantiated also from Simplicius’ reading of the fragments (section 2). This distinction will allow a tentative reconstruction of Parmenides’ cosmogony (section 3) and cosmology, whose most striking feature is the position of the fixed stars below the sun and the moon, paralleled in Anaximander and – as I will try to show – in the cosmology of the orphic Derveni Papyrus (section 4). [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IstgO7KI8zaKM84 |
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Title | Creation and Continuity In Neoplatonism: Origins and Legacy (forthcoming) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I think, to make a rather long story short, that Rashed is basically right. The notion of continuity is fundamental for al-Fārābī and probably determines his rejection of the instantaneous, all-at-once character of creation advocated by al-Kindī. Yet while Rashed ascribes this attitude to Fārābī’s "Aristotelian puritanism," I would rather attribute it to his fundamental Neoplatonism—unless we want to say, rather paradoxically, that someone like Simplicius was also an Aristotelian purist. As we have seen, in his debate against Philoponus, Simplicius also denies instantaneous motion or change on the basis of the Aristotelian continuity of time, space, and motion, explaining away the examples of the instantaneous transition of sunlight and other "phase transitions" by which Philoponus had attempted to explain how God created the universe instantaneously and ex nihilo. Among the factors that distinguish Philoponus’ creationism from Simplicius’ emanationism is that for the former, it makes sense—in fact, it is unavoidable—to speak of a first instant in the history of the universe, prior to which the universe did not exist. Such a notion makes no sense for Simplicius, and it makes no sense because Simplicius, like Aristotle, believes time and motion are continuous, at least in the physical world. In the Arabo-Islamic world, Kindī sides with Philoponus, as has been noted by scholars for quite some time. It has been less well noted, I think, that Fārābī sides just as resolutely with Simplicius. In the article on which I have relied so heavily in this paper, Marwan Rashed argues that, given the lacunary state of the evidence that remains to us, we can reconstruct only Fārābī’s physical proof of the eternity of the world: the fact, based on an analytical proof (hoti), that it is eternal. In another, lost part of Fārābī’s work, Rashed speculates, Fārābī will have given a demonstrative proof of this affirmation from a synthetic viewpoint, of why (dioti) the universe is eternal. It may, he thinks, have looked like this: God is an eternal cause. Every eternal cause has an eternal effect. Therefore, God has an eternal effect. But this is nothing other than a simplified version of the proof of continuous creation as we studied it above in Proclus and Porphyry. If Rashed is right on this point, and I suspect he is, we would have one more reason to agree with Philippe Vallat (2004) that Fārābī is basically a Neoplatonist rather than the doctrinaire Aristotelian he is usually made out to be. To return to our starting point, on the basis of this notion of continuity, we may have made some progress toward identifying the difference between creationism and emanationism in general. Assuming that we have some kind of First Principle that provides the world with existence, if the world can be said to have a first moment of its existence—i.e., if time is discontinuous—we have to do with creation; if not—i.e., if time is continuous—we have to do with emanation. This seems to me to be a criterion at least as important as others that are usually brought up in this context, such as the role of the will of the First Principle, or whether or not the process takes place ex nihilo. The role of will is often hard to determine, as we can see in the case of Plotinus, while ex nihilo is perhaps even more tricky, implying as it does the question of the origin of matter, which is even more obscure in Plotinus. But either the world has a first instant in its existence, or it does not. Tertium non datur. [conclusion p. 29-31] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HdCRKhOALHddyFH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1406","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1406,"authors_free":[{"id":2197,"entry_id":1406,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":25,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chase, Michael","free_first_name":"Michael","free_last_name":"Chase","norm_person":{"id":25,"first_name":"Michael ","last_name":"Chase","full_name":"Chase, Michael ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1031917152","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Creation and Continuity In Neoplatonism: Origins and Legacy (forthcoming)","main_title":{"title":"Creation and Continuity In Neoplatonism: Origins and Legacy (forthcoming)"},"abstract":"I think, to make a rather long story short, that Rashed is basically right. The notion of continuity is fundamental for al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b and probably determines his rejection of the instantaneous, all-at-once character of creation advocated by al-Kind\u012b. Yet while Rashed ascribes this attitude to F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s \"Aristotelian puritanism,\" I would rather attribute it to his fundamental Neoplatonism\u2014unless we want to say, rather paradoxically, that someone like Simplicius was also an Aristotelian purist. As we have seen, in his debate against Philoponus, Simplicius also denies instantaneous motion or change on the basis of the Aristotelian continuity of time, space, and motion, explaining away the examples of the instantaneous transition of sunlight and other \"phase transitions\" by which Philoponus had attempted to explain how God created the universe instantaneously and ex nihilo.\r\n\r\nAmong the factors that distinguish Philoponus\u2019 creationism from Simplicius\u2019 emanationism is that for the former, it makes sense\u2014in fact, it is unavoidable\u2014to speak of a first instant in the history of the universe, prior to which the universe did not exist. Such a notion makes no sense for Simplicius, and it makes no sense because Simplicius, like Aristotle, believes time and motion are continuous, at least in the physical world. In the Arabo-Islamic world, Kind\u012b sides with Philoponus, as has been noted by scholars for quite some time. It has been less well noted, I think, that F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b sides just as resolutely with Simplicius.\r\n\r\nIn the article on which I have relied so heavily in this paper, Marwan Rashed argues that, given the lacunary state of the evidence that remains to us, we can reconstruct only F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s physical proof of the eternity of the world: the fact, based on an analytical proof (hoti), that it is eternal. In another, lost part of F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s work, Rashed speculates, F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b will have given a demonstrative proof of this affirmation from a synthetic viewpoint, of why (dioti) the universe is eternal. It may, he thinks, have looked like this:\r\n\r\n God is an eternal cause.\r\n Every eternal cause has an eternal effect.\r\n Therefore, God has an eternal effect.\r\n\r\nBut this is nothing other than a simplified version of the proof of continuous creation as we studied it above in Proclus and Porphyry. If Rashed is right on this point, and I suspect he is, we would have one more reason to agree with Philippe Vallat (2004) that F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b is basically a Neoplatonist rather than the doctrinaire Aristotelian he is usually made out to be.\r\n\r\nTo return to our starting point, on the basis of this notion of continuity, we may have made some progress toward identifying the difference between creationism and emanationism in general. Assuming that we have some kind of First Principle that provides the world with existence, if the world can be said to have a first moment of its existence\u2014i.e., if time is discontinuous\u2014we have to do with creation; if not\u2014i.e., if time is continuous\u2014we have to do with emanation. This seems to me to be a criterion at least as important as others that are usually brought up in this context, such as the role of the will of the First Principle, or whether or not the process takes place ex nihilo. The role of will is often hard to determine, as we can see in the case of Plotinus, while ex nihilo is perhaps even more tricky, implying as it does the question of the origin of matter, which is even more obscure in Plotinus. But either the world has a first instant in its existence, or it does not. Tertium non datur.\r\n[conclusion p. 29-31]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HdCRKhOALHddyFH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":25,"full_name":"Chase, Michael ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["Creation and Continuity In Neoplatonism: Origins and Legacy (forthcoming)"]}
Title | Dans quel lieu le néoplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fondé son école de mathématiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 42–107 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The historian Agathias (Hist. II 30.3-31.4) relates that under the Emperor Justinian seven philosophers (Damascius, Simplicius, Eulamius, Priscianus, Hermeias, Diogenes, and Isidorus) sought refuge in Persia because of their own country’s anti-pagan laws but that they ultimately returned in 532 to the Roman Empire. There have been many hypotheses about the fate of these philosophers after their return. Most recently M. Tardieu has argued that these philosophers went to Harran, a town that was located on the Persian frontier and that remained mostly pagan until the tenth century. This hypothesis, which M. Tardieu had backed with a number of arguments, has found many echoes, both positive and negative, in subsequent secondary literature. Yet the complexity of the issue has never really been faced by Tardieu’s critics. For example, the fact that, according to Arab sources, Simplicius could found a famous school of mathematics has been completely neglected, as has the fact that details of the dogmas of Manicheanism, which he obtained through his encounter with a member of that sect, enable one to envision a Mesopotamian locale for this encounter. The present study aims at taking stock of the elements of this controversy, beginning with a detailed article by D. Watts and a review by C. Luna. Watts mostly bases his criticisms of M. Tardieu and me on Luna’s summary. In the conclusion (pages 58-59), I summarize the main points that seem to me to confirm M. Tardieu’s hypothesis. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/WI7RiFFpXjaRVSX |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"698","_score":null,"_source":{"id":698,"authors_free":[{"id":1038,"entry_id":698,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Dans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9matiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?","main_title":{"title":"Dans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9matiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?"},"abstract":"The historian Agathias (Hist. II 30.3-31.4) relates that under the Emperor Justinian seven philosophers (Damascius, Simplicius, Eulamius, Priscianus, Hermeias, Diogenes, and Isidorus) sought refuge in Persia because of their own country\u2019s anti-pagan laws but that they ultimately returned in 532 to the Roman Empire. There have been many hypotheses about the fate of these philosophers after their return. Most recently M. Tardieu has argued that these philosophers went to Harran, a town that was located on the Persian frontier and that remained mostly pagan until the tenth century. This hypothesis, which M. Tardieu had backed with a number of arguments, has found many echoes, both positive and negative, in subsequent secondary literature. Yet the complexity of the issue has never really been faced by Tardieu\u2019s critics. For example, the fact that, according to Arab sources, Simplicius could found a famous school of mathematics has been completely neglected, as has the fact that details of the dogmas of Manicheanism, which he obtained through his encounter with a member of that sect, enable one to envision a Mesopotamian locale for this encounter. The present study aims at taking stock of the elements of this controversy, beginning with a detailed article by D. Watts and a review by C. Luna. Watts mostly bases his criticisms of M. Tardieu and me on Luna\u2019s summary. In the conclusion (pages 58-59), I summarize the main points that seem to me to confirm M. Tardieu\u2019s hypothesis. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/WI7RiFFpXjaRVSX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":698,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"42\u2013107"}},"sort":["Dans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9matiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?"]}
Title | De Simplicius À Ḥunayn: La Transmission d'Une Doxographie Dans Les Résumés au Traité Sur Les Éléments de Galien |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2023 |
Journal | Arabic Sciences and Philosophy |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-23 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mathilde Brémond |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper examines two doxographies present in Ḥunayn’s summaries to Galen’s treatise On the Elements. We track the origin of these doxographies back, from Greek scolia to Galen’s treatise to Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, which we show to be the ultimate source. We also point out that Simplicius’ Commentary inspired an interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus that we find in Ḥunayn’s texts. This allows us to see remnants of Simplicius’ Commentary in the Arabic world and to shed some light on the production of these summaries to Galen’s work called Summaria Alexandrinorum. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zlN6Bivl0O6bw9q |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1594","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1594,"authors_free":[{"id":2794,"entry_id":1594,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mathilde Br\u00e9mond","free_first_name":"Mathilde","free_last_name":"Br\u00e9mond","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"De Simplicius \u00c0 \u1e24unayn: La Transmission d'Une Doxographie Dans Les R\u00e9sum\u00e9s au Trait\u00e9 Sur Les \u00c9l\u00e9ments de Galien","main_title":{"title":"De Simplicius \u00c0 \u1e24unayn: La Transmission d'Une Doxographie Dans Les R\u00e9sum\u00e9s au Trait\u00e9 Sur Les \u00c9l\u00e9ments de Galien"},"abstract":"This paper examines two doxographies present in \u1e24unayn\u2019s summaries to Galen\u2019s treatise On the Elements. We track the origin of these doxographies back, from Greek scolia to Galen\u2019s treatise to Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics, which we show to be the ultimate source. We also point out that Simplicius\u2019 Commentary inspired an interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus that we find in \u1e24unayn\u2019s texts. This allows us to see remnants of Simplicius\u2019 Commentary in the Arabic world and to shed some light on the production of these summaries to Galen\u2019s work called Summaria Alexandrinorum. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2023","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zlN6Bivl0O6bw9q","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1594,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Arabic Sciences and Philosophy","volume":"33","issue":"1","pages":"1-23"}},"sort":["De Simplicius \u00c0 \u1e24unayn: La Transmission d'Une Doxographie Dans Les R\u00e9sum\u00e9s au Trait\u00e9 Sur Les \u00c9l\u00e9ments de Galien"]}
Title | Defending Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Age of the Counter-Reformation: Iacopo Zabarella on the Mortality of the Soul according to Aristotle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 91 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 330-354 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Branko Mitrovic |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The work of the Paduan Aristotelian philosopher Iacopo Zabarella (1533– 1589) has attracted the attention of historians of philosophy mainly for his contributions to logic, scientific methodology and because of his possible influence on Galileo. At the same time, Zabarella’s views on Aristotelian psychology have been little studied so far; even those historians of Renaissance philosophy who have discussed them, have based their analysis mainly on the psychological essays included in Zabarella’s De rebus naturalibus, but have avoided Zabarella’s commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. This has led to an inaccurate, but widespread, understanding of Zabarella’s views. The intention of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of Zabarella’s arguments about the (im)mortality of the soul in the context of Aristotelian psychology. Zabarella’s view that the soul is mortal according to Aristotle is remarkable for his time, while his elaboration of this position is far more comprehensive than that of Pietro Pomponazzi, the other significant Renaissance thinker who shared the same view. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yApKXKo5NhAKVkF |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1544","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1544,"authors_free":[{"id":2698,"entry_id":1544,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Branko Mitrovic","free_first_name":"Branko","free_last_name":"Mitrovic","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Defending Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Age of the Counter-Reformation: Iacopo Zabarella on the Mortality of the Soul according to Aristotle","main_title":{"title":"Defending Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Age of the Counter-Reformation: Iacopo Zabarella on the Mortality of the Soul according to Aristotle"},"abstract":"The work of the Paduan Aristotelian philosopher Iacopo Zabarella (1533\u2013\r\n1589) has attracted the attention of historians of philosophy mainly for his contributions to logic, scientific methodology and because of his possible influence on Galileo.\r\nAt the same time, Zabarella\u2019s views on Aristotelian psychology have been little studied so far; even those historians of Renaissance philosophy who have discussed them, have based their analysis mainly on the psychological essays included in Zabarella\u2019s De rebus naturalibus, but have avoided Zabarella\u2019s commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De anima. This has led to an inaccurate, but widespread, understanding of Zabarella\u2019s views. The intention of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of Zabarella\u2019s arguments about the (im)mortality of the soul in the context of Aristotelian psychology. Zabarella\u2019s view that the soul is mortal according to Aristotle is remarkable for his time, while his elaboration of this position is far more comprehensive than that of Pietro Pomponazzi, the other significant Renaissance thinker who shared the same view. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yApKXKo5NhAKVkF","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1544,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"91","issue":"3","pages":"330-354"}},"sort":["Defending Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Age of the Counter-Reformation: Iacopo Zabarella on the Mortality of the Soul according to Aristotle"]}
Title | Den Autoren über die Schulter geschaut. Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik |
Volume | 87 |
Pages | 11–33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dorandi, Tiziano |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Fassen wir die Ergebnisse unserer Überlegungen noch einmal zusammen: Man darf annehmen, dass die Abfassung eines antiken literarischen Werkes zumindest zwei Phasen durchlief (von denen die erste komplexer und nicht immer bei allen Autoren gleichartig war). 1a. Die erste Phase konnte in der Ausarbeitung von Konzepten bestehen, denen eine Sammlung von Exzerpten vorausgegangen sein mochte, welche aus kurzen Notizen bestanden, die wahrscheinlich auf Wachs- bzw. Holztäfelchen (pugillares) geschrieben waren. 1b. Sie konnte auch in der Anfertigung von ὑπομνηματικά (hypomnêmatika) bestehen, der provisorischen Fassung eines Buches, wobei das Rohmaterial größtenteils überarbeitet und geordnet war, aber noch nicht die letzte stilistische Verfeinerung erhalten hatte. Es folgte die endgültige Redaktion, die Reinschrift des Werkes (ὑπόμνημα (hypomnêma), σύνταγμα (syntagma) usw.), welche meist die tatsächliche ἔκδοσις (ekdosis) einleitete. Unter ἔκδοσις (ekdosis) verstehe ich, im Anschluss an van Groningen, die Ausarbeitung eines Werkes, die ein Schriftsteller als abgeschlossen ansah und mit allen Risiken herausgab (ἐκδιδόναι (ekdidonai)), die eine Veröffentlichung mit sich brachte, da die antike Gesellschaft ja kein Urheberrecht im modernen Sinne kannte. Die von mir untersuchten und angeführten Zeugnisse bezogen sich vor allem auf Prosaschriften enzyklopädischen (Plinius) oder philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen Charakters (Philodem, die Aristoteleskommentatoren, Galen); freilich scheinen im Bereich der Dichtung das Beispiel des Vergil und des Horaz sowie die Papyri eine ähnliche Arbeitsweise zu bestätigen. Meine Beobachtungen können und dürfen nicht verallgemeinert werden: Es läge meinen Absichten fern, ein und dieselbe, allen Autoren und literarischen Gattungen gemeinsame, in der gesamten Geschichte der griechischen und lateinischen Literatur gleichartige Arbeitsweise zu postulieren.[conclusion p. 32-33] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/gaYJZl79ZT9HzlR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"472","_score":null,"_source":{"id":472,"authors_free":[{"id":637,"entry_id":472,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":66,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dorandi, Tiziano ","free_first_name":"Tiziano ","free_last_name":"Dorandi","norm_person":{"id":66,"first_name":"Tiziano ","last_name":"Dorandi","full_name":"Dorandi, Tiziano ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139071954","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Den Autoren \u00fcber die Schulter geschaut. Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern","main_title":{"title":"Den Autoren \u00fcber die Schulter geschaut. Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern"},"abstract":"Fassen wir die Ergebnisse unserer \u00dcberlegungen noch einmal zusammen: Man darf annehmen, dass die Abfassung eines antiken literarischen Werkes zumindest zwei Phasen durchlief (von denen die erste komplexer und nicht immer bei allen Autoren gleichartig war).\r\n\r\n1a. Die erste Phase konnte in der Ausarbeitung von Konzepten bestehen, denen eine Sammlung von Exzerpten vorausgegangen sein mochte, welche aus kurzen Notizen bestanden, die wahrscheinlich auf Wachs- bzw. Holzt\u00e4felchen (pugillares) geschrieben waren.\r\n\r\n1b. Sie konnte auch in der Anfertigung von \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac (hypomn\u00eamatika) bestehen, der provisorischen Fassung eines Buches, wobei das Rohmaterial gr\u00f6\u00dftenteils \u00fcberarbeitet und geordnet war, aber noch nicht die letzte stilistische Verfeinerung erhalten hatte.\r\n\r\n Es folgte die endg\u00fcltige Redaktion, die Reinschrift des Werkes (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 (hypomn\u00eama), \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 (syntagma) usw.), welche meist die tats\u00e4chliche \u1f14\u03ba\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (ekdosis) einleitete. Unter \u1f14\u03ba\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (ekdosis) verstehe ich, im Anschluss an van Groningen, die Ausarbeitung eines Werkes, die ein Schriftsteller als abgeschlossen ansah und mit allen Risiken herausgab (\u1f10\u03ba\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 (ekdidonai)), die eine Ver\u00f6ffentlichung mit sich brachte, da die antike Gesellschaft ja kein Urheberrecht im modernen Sinne kannte.\r\n\r\nDie von mir untersuchten und angef\u00fchrten Zeugnisse bezogen sich vor allem auf Prosaschriften enzyklop\u00e4dischen (Plinius) oder philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen Charakters (Philodem, die Aristoteleskommentatoren, Galen); freilich scheinen im Bereich der Dichtung das Beispiel des Vergil und des Horaz sowie die Papyri eine \u00e4hnliche Arbeitsweise zu best\u00e4tigen. Meine Beobachtungen k\u00f6nnen und d\u00fcrfen nicht verallgemeinert werden: Es l\u00e4ge meinen Absichten fern, ein und dieselbe, allen Autoren und literarischen Gattungen gemeinsame, in der gesamten Geschichte der griechischen und lateinischen Literatur gleichartige Arbeitsweise zu postulieren.[conclusion p. 32-33]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/gaYJZl79ZT9HzlR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":66,"full_name":"Dorandi, Tiziano ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":472,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Papyrologie und Epigraphik","volume":"87","issue":"","pages":"11\u201333"}},"sort":["Den Autoren \u00fcber die Schulter geschaut. Arbeitsweise und Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern"]}
Title | Der Bericht des Theophrast über Heraklit |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1955 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 83 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 385-411 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kerschensteiner, Jula |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Hauptquelle für die Darstellung der Lehren Heraklits, die Theophrast in seinen Phusikôn doxai gab, ist der Bericht bei Diogenes Laertius 9, 7-II. Er zerfällt in zwei Teile, eine knappe Übersicht (im folgenden DL1) und ein ausführliches Referat (im folgenden DL2). Nach DIELS stammt DL1 aus einer Mittelquelle biographischer Tradition, auf die auch der Einschub mit den Zitaten und die Bemerkung über Heraklits Stil zurückgehe, der zweite Teil dagegen direkt aus Theophrast (Doxographi Graeci I63 f., vgl. auch I80). Dagegen hat K. DEICHGRABER, Bemerkungen zu Diogenes' Bericht fiber Heraklit (Philol. 93, I938, I2ff.) 23ff., zu zeigen versucht, daB es sich nicht um zwei verschiedene Fassungen derselben Vorlage handelt, sondern daß die beiden Teile schon urspruinglich zusammengehören und aufeinander abgestimmt seien, nur durch den spateren Einschub unterbrochen: der Aufbau entspreche der Gewohnheit Theophrasts, den Einzeldarlegungen eine allgemeine Übersicht vorauszuschicken. Eine Klärung des Problems wird sich im folgenden ergeben. [introduction, p. 25] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/iEKNcdvLqiTOzaT |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1368","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1368,"authors_free":[{"id":2061,"entry_id":1368,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":233,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kerschensteiner, Jula","free_first_name":"Jula","free_last_name":"Kerschensteiner","norm_person":{"id":233,"first_name":"Jula","last_name":"Kerschensteiner","full_name":"Kerschensteiner, Jula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116142448","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der Bericht des Theophrast \u00fcber Heraklit","main_title":{"title":"Der Bericht des Theophrast \u00fcber Heraklit"},"abstract":"Die Hauptquelle f\u00fcr die Darstellung der Lehren Heraklits, die Theophrast in seinen Phusik\u00f4n doxai gab, ist der Bericht bei Diogenes Laertius 9, 7-II. Er zerf\u00e4llt in zwei Teile, eine knappe \u00dcbersicht (im folgenden DL1) und ein ausf\u00fchrliches Referat (im folgenden DL2). Nach DIELS stammt DL1 aus einer Mittelquelle biographischer Tradition, auf die auch der Einschub mit den Zitaten und die Bemerkung \u00fcber Heraklits Stil zur\u00fcckgehe, der zweite Teil dagegen direkt aus Theophrast (Doxographi Graeci I63 f., vgl. auch I80). Dagegen hat K. DEICHGRABER, Bemerkungen zu Diogenes' Bericht fiber Heraklit (Philol. 93, I938, I2ff.) 23ff., zu zeigen versucht, daB es sich nicht um zwei verschiedene Fassungen derselben Vorlage handelt, sondern da\u00df die beiden Teile schon urspruinglich zusammengeh\u00f6ren und aufeinander abgestimmt seien, nur durch den spateren Einschub unterbrochen: der Aufbau entspreche der Gewohnheit Theophrasts, den Einzeldarlegungen eine allgemeine \u00dcbersicht vorauszuschicken. Eine Kl\u00e4rung des Problems wird sich im folgenden ergeben. [introduction, p. 25]","btype":3,"date":"1955","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/iEKNcdvLqiTOzaT","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":233,"full_name":"Kerschensteiner, Jula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1368,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"83","issue":"4","pages":"385-411"}},"sort":["Der Bericht des Theophrast \u00fcber Heraklit"]}
Title | Der Platoniker Ptolemaios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1957 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 85 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 314-325 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dihle, Albrecht |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In den philosophischen Texten der späten Kaiserzeit stößt man zuweilen auf den Namen Ptolemaios, ohne daß dabei an einen Lagiden oder an den berühmten Astronomen zu denken wäre. Wie jene Zitate auf einen oder mehrere Träger dieses Namens zu verteilen seien, war eine einst viel diskutierte Frage, die dann allerdings im Anschluß an eine Vermutung W. v. Christs durch das Buch von A. Chatzis (Der Philosoph und Grammatiker Ptolemaios Chennos I = Stud. z Gesch. u. Kult. d. Altert. VII 2, Paderborn 1914) endgültig dahin beantwortet schien, es handele sich bei all diesen Ptolemaioi immer wieder um Ptolemaios Chennos aus der Zeit um 100 n. Chr., der uns durch den Auszug des Photios aus seiner καινὴ ἱστορία (cod. 190) recht gut bekannt ist. Diese Frage soll hier einer erneuten Prüfung unterzogen werden. [introduction, p. 314] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/51yflky3RQtCRmc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1305","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1305,"authors_free":[{"id":1929,"entry_id":1305,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":93,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dihle, Albrecht","free_first_name":"Albrecht","free_last_name":"Dihle","norm_person":{"id":93,"first_name":"Albrecht","last_name":"Dihle","full_name":"Dihle, Albrecht","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119194503","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der Platoniker Ptolemaios","main_title":{"title":"Der Platoniker Ptolemaios"},"abstract":"In den philosophischen Texten der sp\u00e4ten Kaiserzeit st\u00f6\u00dft man zuweilen auf den Namen Ptolemaios, ohne da\u00df dabei an einen Lagiden oder an den ber\u00fchmten Astronomen zu denken w\u00e4re. Wie jene Zitate auf einen oder mehrere Tr\u00e4ger dieses Namens zu verteilen seien, war eine einst viel diskutierte Frage, die dann allerdings im Anschlu\u00df an eine Vermutung W. v. Christs durch das Buch von A. Chatzis (Der Philosoph und Grammatiker Ptolemaios Chennos I = Stud. z Gesch. u. Kult. d. Altert. VII 2, Paderborn 1914) endg\u00fcltig dahin beantwortet schien, es handele sich bei all diesen Ptolemaioi immer wieder um Ptolemaios Chennos aus der Zeit um 100 n. Chr., der uns durch den Auszug des Photios aus seiner \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u1f77\u03b1 (cod. 190) recht gut bekannt ist. Diese Frage soll hier einer erneuten Pr\u00fcfung unterzogen werden. [introduction, p. 314]","btype":3,"date":"1957","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/51yflky3RQtCRmc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":93,"full_name":"Dihle, Albrecht","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1305,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"85","issue":"3","pages":"314-325"}},"sort":["Der Platoniker Ptolemaios"]}
Title | Der Satz des Anaximandros von Milet (VS⁵ 12 B 1) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1938 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 87 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 376-382 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dirlmeier, Franz |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Weltsicht der Ionier wird zu einer Zeit, als sie schon der Geschichte angehörte, neu geformt durch die Wissenschaft- ler der aristotelischen Schule, die somit die uranfängliche Scheu vor dem Unbestimmten, Unbegrenzten treu bewahren. Aber sie dehnen sie auch noch aus auf fast alle Bereiche des Seins. Frühionische Bändigung des Chaos der -feveffeic in irepioboi vollzieht sich aufs neue, wenn etwa Aristoteles den ungeord- neten, den nur „gereihten46 Ablauf der Menschenrede „unter- wirft", mit der Begründung: die XéHiç elpojiévTi sei ein àr'bkç olà tò ÔTreipov tò fàp TéXoç iravreç ßouXovrai K0t6opâv (Rhet. y 9, 1409 a31). Wenn wir zu den Erkenntnissen der schöpferischen Jahrhunderte VI bis III die sorgsame Auseinandersetzung des Simplikios nehmen, der am Ausgang der Antike mit fester Hand das gültig Gedachte noch einmal zusammenfaßt, so haben wir damit ein Jahrtausend hellenischen Geistes überblickt. [p. 382] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/oxNOVgaT4IjUsH6 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"757","_score":null,"_source":{"id":757,"authors_free":[{"id":1122,"entry_id":757,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":63,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dirlmeier, Franz ","free_first_name":"Franz","free_last_name":"Dirlmeier","norm_person":{"id":63,"first_name":"Franz ","last_name":"Dirlmeier","full_name":"Dirlmeier, Franz ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140255591","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der Satz des Anaximandros von Milet (VS\u2075 12 B 1)","main_title":{"title":"Der Satz des Anaximandros von Milet (VS\u2075 12 B 1)"},"abstract":"Die Weltsicht der Ionier wird zu einer Zeit, als sie schon \r\nder Geschichte angeh\u00f6rte, neu geformt durch die Wissenschaft- \r\nler der aristotelischen Schule, die somit die uranf\u00e4ngliche Scheu \r\nvor dem Unbestimmten, Unbegrenzten treu bewahren. Aber \r\nsie dehnen sie auch noch aus auf fast alle Bereiche des Seins. \r\nFr\u00fchionische B\u00e4ndigung des Chaos der -feveffeic in irepioboi \r\nvollzieht sich aufs neue, wenn etwa Aristoteles den ungeord- \r\nneten, den nur \u201egereihten46 Ablauf der Menschenrede \u201eunter- \r\nwirft\", mit der Begr\u00fcndung: die X\u00e9Hi\u00e7 elpoji\u00e9vTi sei ein \u00e0r'bk\u00e7 ol\u00e0 \r\nt\u00f2 \u00d4Treipov t\u00f2 f\u00e0p T\u00e9Xo\u00e7 iravre\u00e7 \u00dfouXovrai K0t6op\u00e2v (Rhet. y 9, \r\n1409 a31). Wenn wir zu den Erkenntnissen der sch\u00f6pferischen \r\nJahrhunderte VI bis III die sorgsame Auseinandersetzung des \r\nSimplikios nehmen, der am Ausgang der Antike mit fester Hand \r\ndas g\u00fcltig Gedachte noch einmal zusammenfa\u00dft, so haben \r\nwir damit ein Jahrtausend hellenischen Geistes \u00fcberblickt. [p. 382]","btype":3,"date":"1938","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/oxNOVgaT4IjUsH6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":63,"full_name":"Dirlmeier, Franz ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":757,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"87","issue":"4","pages":"376-382"}},"sort":["Der Satz des Anaximandros von Milet (VS\u2075 12 B 1)"]}
Title | Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der römischen Kaiserzeit |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Rhein. Museum |
Volume | 146 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 49–71 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Text beschreibt den Zustand des philosophischen Unterrichts während der römischen Kaiserzeit. Obwohl die bekannten Philosophenschulen in Athen nicht mehr existierten, hatten die vier philosophischen Richtungen des Hellenismus dennoch Verbreitung gefunden und wurden in privaten Schulen unterrichtet. Diese Schulen waren jedoch meist kurzlebig und hingen vom Erfolg des Lehrers ab. Philosophie wurde an den griechischen Gymnasien nicht gelehrt, stattdessen konzentrierte man sich auf Grammatik und Rhetorik. Im lateinischen Bereich führten enge Beziehungen führender Römer zu stoischen Philosophen zur Verbreitung der Lehren. Der Philosophieunterricht begann meist erst nach der Pubertät, und das Alter spielte eine wichtige Rolle bei der Seelenleitung. Das Greisenalter wurde als optimal angesehen, da der körperliche Verfall der freien Betätigung des Geistes entgegenkomme. Das Bild des philosophischen Unterrichtsbetriebes in der Kaiserzeit war somit sehr komplex. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bCAQ9Hlrduneobp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1334","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1334,"authors_free":[{"id":1967,"entry_id":1334,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit","main_title":{"title":"Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit"},"abstract":"Der Text beschreibt den Zustand des philosophischen Unterrichts w\u00e4hrend der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit. Obwohl die bekannten Philosophenschulen in Athen nicht mehr existierten, hatten die vier philosophischen Richtungen des Hellenismus dennoch Verbreitung gefunden und wurden in privaten Schulen unterrichtet. Diese Schulen waren jedoch meist kurzlebig und hingen vom Erfolg des Lehrers ab. Philosophie wurde an den griechischen Gymnasien nicht gelehrt, stattdessen konzentrierte man sich auf Grammatik und Rhetorik. Im lateinischen Bereich f\u00fchrten enge Beziehungen f\u00fchrender R\u00f6mer zu stoischen Philosophen zur Verbreitung der Lehren. Der Philosophieunterricht begann meist erst nach der Pubert\u00e4t, und das Alter spielte eine wichtige Rolle bei der Seelenleitung. Das Greisenalter wurde als optimal angesehen, da der k\u00f6rperliche Verfall der freien Bet\u00e4tigung des Geistes entgegenkomme. Das Bild des philosophischen Unterrichtsbetriebes in der Kaiserzeit war somit sehr komplex. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bCAQ9Hlrduneobp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1334,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rhein. Museum","volume":"146","issue":"1","pages":"49\u201371"}},"sort":["Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der r\u00f6mischen Kaiserzeit"]}
Title | Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1974 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 102 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 540–556 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Bearing in mind the reservations already made, what conclusions can we draw? In the first place, it is fair to say that the evidence from Simplicius does, taken overall, suggest that Iamblichus did not write a commentary on the de Anima. Consideration of Stephanus' commentary on de Anima G points in the same direction, but it must not be forgotten that that commentary contains a reference to Iamblichus' that looks more like a quotation from a de Anima commentary than any other that we have. Philoponus is less helpful, as are other members of the Alexandrian school. He certainly gives no positive indication that Iamblichus wrote a commentary, but for the reasons that we have given, the lack of such positive evidence in his case does not amount to anything like conclusive negative evidence. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility that Iamblichus did write a commentary, either on the de Anima as a whole, or on some extended part of it, but it seems probably that he did not. If he did it would certainly be fair to say that his commentary was probably of no great importance. Discussions of isolated texts of Aristotle are another matter: they are only to be expected in the work of any Neoplatonist. [conclusion, p. 556] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/sl42R04H6zbpEIJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"569","_score":null,"_source":{"id":569,"authors_free":[{"id":808,"entry_id":569,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima?","main_title":{"title":"Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima?"},"abstract":"Bearing in mind the reservations already made, what conclusions can we draw? In the first place, it is fair to say that the evidence from Simplicius does, taken overall, suggest that Iamblichus did not write a commentary on the de Anima. Consideration of Stephanus' commentary on de Anima G points in the same direction, but it must not be forgotten that that commentary contains \r\na reference to Iamblichus' that looks more like a quotation from a de Anima commentary than any other that we have. Philoponus is less helpful, as are other members of the Alexandrian school. He certainly gives no positive indication that Iamblichus wrote a commentary, but for the reasons that we have given, the lack of such positive evidence in his case does not amount to \r\nanything like conclusive negative evidence. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility that Iamblichus did write a commentary, either on the de Anima as a whole, or on some extended part of it, but it seems probably that he did \r\nnot. If he did it would certainly be fair to say that his commentary was probably of no great importance. Discussions of isolated texts of Aristotle are another matter: they are only to be expected in the work of any Neoplatonist. [conclusion, p. 556]","btype":3,"date":"1974","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/sl42R04H6zbpEIJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":569,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"102","issue":"4","pages":"540\u2013556"}},"sort":["Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima?"]}
Title | Did Melissus Believe in Incorporeal Being? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1958 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 79 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 61-65 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Booth, N. B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
These questions are difficult to answer; but I think that the difficulty of answering them shows that we should not be too dogmatic about the general interpretation of the fragment. It looks to me—and apparently it looked to Burnet and Zeller also—as if the argument is in the form of a dialectical refutation of pluralist assumptions. Vlastos and Raven see it in a different light; they are entitled to their opinion, but it should be clearly realized that it is an opinion, and not a certainty. [conclusion p. 65] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vYpN7DrahtfkniN |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"769","_score":null,"_source":{"id":769,"authors_free":[{"id":1133,"entry_id":769,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":10,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Booth, N. B.","free_first_name":"N. B.","free_last_name":"Booth","norm_person":{"id":10,"first_name":"N. B.","last_name":"Booth","full_name":"Booth, N. B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Did Melissus Believe in Incorporeal Being?","main_title":{"title":"Did Melissus Believe in Incorporeal Being?"},"abstract":"These questions are difficult to answer; but I think that the difficulty of answering them shows that we should not be too dogmatic about the general interpretation of the fragment. It looks to me\u2014and apparently it looked to Burnet and Zeller also\u2014as if the argument is in the form of a dialectical refutation of pluralist assumptions. Vlastos and Raven see it in a different light; they are entitled to their opinion, but it should be clearly realized that it is an opinion, and not a certainty. [conclusion p. 65]","btype":3,"date":"1958","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vYpN7DrahtfkniN","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":10,"full_name":"Booth, N. B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":769,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"79","issue":"1","pages":"61-65"}},"sort":["Did Melissus Believe in Incorporeal Being?"]}
Title | Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle's "Categories"? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 492-526 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Haas, Frans A. J. de |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I propose a reading of Plotinus Enneads VI.1-3 [41-43] On the genera of being which regards this treatise as a coherent whole in which Aristotle's Categories is explored in a way that turns it into a decisive contribution to Plotinus' Platonic ontology. In addition, I claim that Porphyry's Isagoge and commentaries on the Categories start by adopting Plotinus' point of view, including his notion of genus, and proceed by explaining its consequences for a more detailed reading of the Categories. After Plotinus' integration of the Categories into the Platonic frame of thought Porphyry saw the possibilities of exploiting the Peripatetic tradition both as a means to support the Platonic interpretation of the Categories and as a source for solutions to traditional questions. His allegiance to a division of being into ten, and his emphasis on semantics rather than ontology can be explained from this orientation. In the light of our investigation the alleged disagreement between Plotinus and Porphyry on the Categories changes its appearance completely. There are differences, but these can be best explained as confirmation and extension of Plotinus' perspective on the Categories and its role in Platonism. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yjxJiXgPDTM8LDJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"762","_score":null,"_source":{"id":762,"authors_free":[{"id":1127,"entry_id":762,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":153,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Haas, Frans A. J. de","free_first_name":"Frans A. J.","free_last_name":"Haas, de","norm_person":{"id":153,"first_name":"Frans A. J.","last_name":"de Haas","full_name":"de Haas, Frans A. J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128837020","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?","main_title":{"title":"Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?"},"abstract":"In this paper I propose a reading of Plotinus Enneads VI.1-3 [41-43] On the genera of being which regards this treatise as a coherent whole in which Aristotle's Categories is explored in a way that turns it into a decisive contribution to Plotinus' Platonic ontology. In addition, I claim that Porphyry's Isagoge and commentaries on the Categories start by adopting Plotinus' point of view, including his notion of genus, and proceed by explaining its consequences for a more detailed reading of the Categories. After Plotinus' integration of the Categories into the Platonic frame of thought Porphyry saw the possibilities of exploiting the Peripatetic tradition both as a means to support the Platonic interpretation of the Categories and as a source for solutions to traditional questions. His allegiance to a division of being into ten, and his emphasis on semantics rather than ontology can be explained from this orientation. In the light of our investigation the alleged disagreement between Plotinus and Porphyry on the Categories changes its appearance completely. There are differences, but these can be best explained as confirmation and extension of Plotinus' perspective on the Categories and its role in Platonism. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yjxJiXgPDTM8LDJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":153,"full_name":"de Haas, Frans A. J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":762,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"46","issue":"4","pages":"492-526"}},"sort":["Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?"]}
Title | Did Theophrastus Reject Aristotle's Account of Place? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 68-103 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Morison, Benjamin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is commonly held that Theophrastus criticized or rejected Aristotle's account of place. The evidence that scholars put forward for this view, from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, comes in two parts: (1) Simplicius reports some aporiai that Theophras tus found for Aristotle's account; (2) Simplicius cites a passage of Theophrastus which is said to 'bear witness' to the theory of place which Simplicius himself adopts (that of his teacher Damascius) - a theory which is utterly different from Aristotle's. But the aporiai have relatively straightforward solutions, and we have no reason to suppose that Theophras tus didn't avail himself of them (and some reason to think that he did). Moreover, the text which Simplicius cites as bearing witness to Damascius' view on closer inspection does not seem to be inconsistent with Aristotle's account of place or natural motion. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GbvOxzvRrwDkAHd |
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Title | Die Entstehung physikalischer Terminologie aus der neuplatonischen Metaphysik |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 13 |
Pages | 7-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tsouyopoulos, Nelly |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Methoden, welche in den neoplatonischen Schulen zum Aufbau eines metaphysischen Systems entwickelt wurden, erwiesen sich sehr geeignet für die Überwindung mancher Vorurteile der traditionellen griechischen Wis senschaft und zugleich für eine Neuorientierung des naturwissenschaft lichen Denkens. Unter den vielen Faktoren, welche die Entwicklung in dieser Richtung positiv beeinflußt haben, sei zunächst die große Bedeut- tung erwähnt, welche alle Neoplatoniker der Mathematik beigemessen haben. Vorab ihre Überzeugung, daß die μαθηματικοί λόγοι auf eindeutige Weise die gesamte Wirklichkeit bestimmen und das Definierbare in den theoretischen und empirischen Wissenschaften darstellen. Die Neigung dann zur Mystik, die Beschäftigung mit den Orakeln, das Praktizieren der Theurgie und die ganze Auseinandersetzung mit dem orientalischen Kult, welche neben dem Hineinbringen irrationaler Elemente in die her kömmlichen Denkweisen auch ein anderes Resultat hatten: Die Umwand lung des Erfahrungsbegriffs und des ganzen Modus des Begreifens der Phänomene, was die traditionelle Wissenschaft dringend benötigte. Die Be grenzung der Erfahrung auf das sinnliche Bewußtsein und die Wahrneh mung, die vor allem die peripatetische Schule charakterisierte, brachte all mählich das naturwissenschaftliche Denken zur Stagnation, indem sie eine quantitative Erfassung nicht direkt gegebener Größen wie Masse, Träg heit, Energie unmöglich machte. Es ist also keine Paradoxie, wenn Gedan ken und Methoden aus der neoplatonischen Tradition den Weg der wis senschaftlichen Abstraktion bahnten, indem sie das Bemühen um Erklärung der Phänomene gleichermaßen von der bloßen Spekulation wie vom primitiven Realismus abzubringen vermochten. Im folgenden wird der Versuch unternommen, an gewissen Beispielen diese Entwicklung zu demonstrieren. [introduction p. 7] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tStPtUxNAaSBrFw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"457","_score":null,"_source":{"id":457,"authors_free":[{"id":614,"entry_id":457,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":410,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tsouyopoulos, Nelly","free_first_name":"Nelly","free_last_name":"Tsouyopoulos","norm_person":{"id":410,"first_name":" Nelly ","last_name":"Tsouyopoulos","full_name":"Tsouyopoulos, Nelly ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Entstehung physikalischer Terminologie aus der neuplatonischen Metaphysik","main_title":{"title":"Die Entstehung physikalischer Terminologie aus der neuplatonischen Metaphysik"},"abstract":"Die Methoden, welche in den neoplatonischen Schulen zum Aufbau eines \r\nmetaphysischen Systems entwickelt wurden, erwiesen sich sehr geeignet f\u00fcr \r\ndie \u00dcberwindung mancher Vorurteile der traditionellen griechischen Wis\u00ad\r\nsenschaft und zugleich f\u00fcr eine Neuorientierung des naturwissenschaft\u00ad\r\nlichen Denkens. Unter den vielen Faktoren, welche die Entwicklung in \r\ndieser Richtung positiv beeinflu\u00dft haben, sei zun\u00e4chst die gro\u00dfe Bedeut- \r\ntung erw\u00e4hnt, welche alle Neoplatoniker der Mathematik beigemessen \r\nhaben. Vorab ihre \u00dcberzeugung, da\u00df die \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 auf eindeutige \r\nWeise die gesamte Wirklichkeit bestimmen und das Definierbare in den \r\ntheoretischen und empirischen Wissenschaften darstellen. Die Neigung \r\ndann zur Mystik, die Besch\u00e4ftigung mit den Orakeln, das Praktizieren \r\nder Theurgie und die ganze Auseinandersetzung mit dem orientalischen \r\nKult, welche neben dem Hineinbringen irrationaler Elemente in die her\u00ad\r\nk\u00f6mmlichen Denkweisen auch ein anderes Resultat hatten: Die Umwand\u00ad\r\nlung des Erfahrungsbegriffs und des ganzen Modus des Begreifens der \r\nPh\u00e4nomene, was die traditionelle Wissenschaft dringend ben\u00f6tigte. Die Be\u00ad\r\ngrenzung der Erfahrung auf das sinnliche Bewu\u00dftsein und die Wahrneh\u00ad\r\nmung, die vor allem die peripatetische Schule charakterisierte, brachte all\u00ad\r\nm\u00e4hlich das naturwissenschaftliche Denken zur Stagnation, indem sie eine \r\nquantitative Erfassung nicht direkt gegebener Gr\u00f6\u00dfen wie Masse, Tr\u00e4g\u00ad\r\nheit, Energie unm\u00f6glich machte. Es ist also keine Paradoxie, wenn Gedan\u00ad\r\nken und Methoden aus der neoplatonischen Tradition den Weg der wis\u00ad\r\nsenschaftlichen Abstraktion bahnten, indem sie das Bem\u00fchen um Erkl\u00e4rung \r\nder Ph\u00e4nomene gleicherma\u00dfen von der blo\u00dfen Spekulation wie vom \r\nprimitiven Realismus abzubringen vermochten. Im folgenden wird der \r\nVersuch unternommen, an gewissen Beispielen diese Entwicklung zu \r\ndemonstrieren. [introduction p. 7]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tStPtUxNAaSBrFw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":410,"full_name":"Tsouyopoulos, Nelly ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":457,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"13","issue":"","pages":"7-33"}},"sort":["Die Entstehung physikalischer Terminologie aus der neuplatonischen Metaphysik"]}
Title | Die Neuplatonischen Aristoteleskommentatoren über die Ursachen der Pseudepigraphie |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 112 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 120-126 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Müller, Carl Werner |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die ausführliche Darbietung des Materials und der eingehende Vergleich der einzelnen Zeugnisse waren notwendig, um zu zeigen, dass der Fortschritt, der sich bei den Neuplatonikern gegenüber Galen in der Bewältigung des Problems der literarischen Fälschung feststellen lässt, nicht auf einer älteren oder vollständigeren Tradition basiert. Vielmehr liegt eine Entwicklung vor, die – von der Aristoteleskommentierung des Ammonios ausgehend – sich innerhalb der Schule von Alexandrien vollzieht und deren verschiedene Stadien noch deutlich erkennbar sind. Es ist ferner kein Zufall, dass gerade die pythagoreischen Schriften auf diese Weise vor dem Verdikt der Fälschung aus „niederen Motiven“ gerettet werden. Zugleich aber blieb der alexandrinische Neuplatonismus kritisch genug, die Pythagoras-Schwärmerei der Platoniker auf ein philologisch-historisch vertretbares Maß herabzustimmen, indem er die pythagoreischen Schriften nicht als von Pythagoras verfasst, sondern als Manifestationen der Wirkungsgeschichte des großen Mannes verstand. [conclusion p. 125-126] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yDXuCvfx6f6Eun7 |
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Title | Die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander und Andere in dem Commentar des ersteren zu der aristotelischen Schrif de coelo |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1897 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 191-227 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zahlfleisch, Johann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In dem Artikel geht es um die Polemik des Simplicius gegen Alexander im Zusammenhang mit der aristotelischen Schrift De Caelo. Während Alexander behauptet, dass es in der Schrift um die physikalischen Verhältnisse der Himmelssphäre geht, argumentiert Simplicius, dass es Aristoteles vielmehr darum geht, die letzte Ursache in der Leitung der Welt anzugeben. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4kk7bZgKnVIHNFv |
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Title | Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios in Ph. 230,34-231,24 Diels |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 143 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 197-220 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tornau, Christian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dieser Text untersucht Simplicius' Kommentar zum Doxographen Moderatos von Gades in seinem Kommentar zu Porphyrios' Werk "Über die Materie". Der doxographische Bericht besteht aus zwei Teilen, wobei der erste eine hierarchische Systematik von drei Entitäten präsentiert - dem transzendenten Einen, der Welt der erkennbaren Formen und dem Bereich der Seele - und der zweite die Herkunft der Materie gemäß einem metaphysischen Modell erläutert. Die Analyse dieser Doxographie verdeutlicht ihre Bedeutung für das Verständnis platonischer Einflüsse auf spätere Denker. E.R. Dodds und Matthias Baltes haben das Verhältnis zwischen Moderatos' Hierarchie und Platons Parmenides aufgedeckt und die Rolle des Logos in der Schöpfung der Wesen sowie die Verbindung der ycopa mit der Seele als "seelischer Raum" (psychischer Raum) identifiziert, der es der Seele ermöglicht, den Weltkörper zu umfassen. Obwohl Baltes überzeugende Interpretationen liefert, bleiben einige Fragen und Herausforderungen hinsichtlich der Identifizierung der "Seienden", der Beziehung zwischen dem Logos und den drei Entitäten, um sinnliche Objekte zu beschreiben. Trotz offener Fragen trägt der Text zu den laufenden Diskussionen über die neupythagoreische Interpretation des Platonismus und ihren Einfluss auf spätere philosophische Gedanken bei. Er betont die Bedeutung einer detaillierten und historisch fundierten Untersuchung der Doxographie, um die Komplexität und Implikationen von Moderatos' philosophischem System und dessen Verbindungen zu platonischen Lehren vollständig zu erfassen. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/rTQ3u49mTZLsZxs |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"460","_score":null,"_source":{"id":460,"authors_free":[{"id":617,"entry_id":460,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":341,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tornau, Christian","free_first_name":"Christian","free_last_name":"Tornau","norm_person":{"id":341,"first_name":"Christian","last_name":"Tornau","full_name":"Tornau, Christian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120176394","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios in Ph. 230,34-231,24 Diels","main_title":{"title":"Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios in Ph. 230,34-231,24 Diels"},"abstract":"Dieser Text untersucht Simplicius' Kommentar zum Doxographen Moderatos von Gades in seinem Kommentar zu Porphyrios' Werk \"\u00dcber die Materie\". Der doxographische Bericht besteht aus zwei Teilen, wobei der erste eine hierarchische Systematik von drei Entit\u00e4ten pr\u00e4sentiert - dem transzendenten Einen, der Welt der erkennbaren Formen und dem Bereich der Seele - und der zweite die Herkunft der Materie gem\u00e4\u00df einem metaphysischen Modell erl\u00e4utert. Die Analyse dieser Doxographie verdeutlicht ihre Bedeutung f\u00fcr das Verst\u00e4ndnis platonischer Einfl\u00fcsse auf sp\u00e4tere Denker. E.R. Dodds und Matthias Baltes haben das Verh\u00e4ltnis zwischen Moderatos' Hierarchie und Platons Parmenides aufgedeckt und die Rolle des Logos in der Sch\u00f6pfung der Wesen sowie die Verbindung der ycopa mit der Seele als \"seelischer Raum\" (psychischer Raum) identifiziert, der es der Seele erm\u00f6glicht, den Weltk\u00f6rper zu umfassen. Obwohl Baltes \u00fcberzeugende Interpretationen liefert, bleiben einige Fragen und Herausforderungen hinsichtlich der Identifizierung der \"Seienden\", der Beziehung zwischen dem Logos und den drei Entit\u00e4ten, um sinnliche Objekte zu beschreiben. Trotz offener Fragen tr\u00e4gt der Text zu den laufenden Diskussionen \u00fcber die neupythagoreische Interpretation des Platonismus und ihren Einfluss auf sp\u00e4tere philosophische Gedanken bei. Er betont die Bedeutung einer detaillierten und historisch fundierten Untersuchung der Doxographie, um die Komplexit\u00e4t und Implikationen von Moderatos' philosophischem System und dessen Verbindungen zu platonischen Lehren vollst\u00e4ndig zu erfassen. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/rTQ3u49mTZLsZxs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":341,"full_name":"Tornau, Christian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":460,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"143","issue":"2","pages":"197-220"}},"sort":["Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios in Ph. 230,34-231,24 Diels"]}
Title | Die Welt, Ungeworden und Unvergänglch: Interpretation und Textkritik zu Aristoteles, De caelo A 11-12 |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 97 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 198-204 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mau, Jürgen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Das Thema für Kap. 11–12 ist am Schluss von Kap. 10 gegeben; 280a 28: „Einige vertreten die Ansicht, etwas dem Werden nicht Unterliegendes (ἀγένητον) könne vergehen, und etwas Entstandenes könne unvergänglich bestehen bleiben, wie im Timaios. Dort nämlich sagt (Platon), der Himmel sei zwar geworden, indessen werde er die übrige immerwährende Zeit existieren. Mit diesen haben wir uns bisher nur unter physikalischen Gesichtspunkten betreffs des Himmels auseinandergesetzt. Nachdem wir die Untersuchung aber allgemein über alles angestellt haben, wird auch hierüber Klarheit sein.“ Wir dürfen also eine Argumentation erwarten, der Form: „Wenn für jedes Subjekt gilt: Es kann nicht geworden und unvergänglich sein, dann gilt es auch für den Himmel. Nun gilt es für jedes, also auch für den Himmel.“ Dieser Beweis – besser: diese Beweise, denn es handelt sich nicht um eine Elementatio, wie Aristoteles sie für die Geometrie kannte und wie, aus Aristoteles schöpfend, 700 Jahre später Proklos sie für Physik und Theologie schrieb – finden sich in Kap. 12. Kap. 11 liefert die zum Beweisen notwendigen Definitionen für ἀγένητον (280b 6), γενητόν (280b 14), φθαρτόν (280b 20), ἄφθαρτον (280b 25), ἀδύνατον (280b 12) und ἀδύνατον-δυνατόν in eingeschränkter Bedeutung noch einmal in 281a 7–19. Der erste Beweis für die Unhaltbarkeit der Position Platons läuft von Kap. 12 Anfang (281a 28) bis 282a 25. Seine Konklusion lautet 282a 21: „Somit ist das Immerseiende weder dem Werden unterliegend (γενητόν) noch dem Vergehen, dasselbe gilt für das Immernichtseiende.“ Das folgende zweite Argument beweist, dass, wenn etwas ist und dem Werden bzw. Vergehen nicht unterliegt, es immerwährend ist. Da nach der Definition für ἀγένητον und ἄφθαρτον (282a 27) deren Konjunktion das Immerwährende einschließt, wird untersucht, ob γενητόν und φθαρτόν bzw. ἀγένητον und ἄφθαρτον sich gegenseitig implizieren (ἀκολουθεῖ ἀλλήλοις), ob also, wenn z. B. ἀγένητον gegeben ist, das αἰώνιον bereits mitgegeben ist. Der Beweis für Letzteres schließt mit der Konklusion 282b 23: „Es folgen also auseinander das dem Werden und dem Vergehen Unterliegende.“ Der auf Grund von Topik B 8. 113b 17ff. eigentlich einfache Beweis für die Äquivalenz der beiden Negate, also ἀγένητον = ἄφθαρτον, macht Aristoteles merkwürdigerweise Schwierigkeiten (282b 23–283a 3). Von 283a 4 bis zum Schluss des Buches werden weitere Möglichkeiten gezeigt, wie man in der Diskussion demjenigen antworten kann, der sagt: „Warum soll denn nicht etwas Gewordenes unvergänglich sein?“ Hier soll das Argument 1 analysiert werden. [introduction p. 198] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4HHd88Jx3Rv3qEZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"994","_score":null,"_source":{"id":994,"authors_free":[{"id":1498,"entry_id":994,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":241,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mau, J\u00fcrgen","free_first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","free_last_name":"Mau","norm_person":{"id":241,"first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","last_name":"Mau","full_name":"Mau,J\u00fcrgen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117747351","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Welt, Ungeworden und Unverg\u00e4nglch: Interpretation und Textkritik zu Aristoteles, De caelo A 11-12","main_title":{"title":"Die Welt, Ungeworden und Unverg\u00e4nglch: Interpretation und Textkritik zu Aristoteles, De caelo A 11-12"},"abstract":"Das Thema f\u00fcr Kap. 11\u201312 ist am Schluss von Kap. 10 gegeben; 280a 28:\r\n\u201eEinige vertreten die Ansicht, etwas dem Werden nicht Unterliegendes (\u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd) k\u00f6nne vergehen, und etwas Entstandenes k\u00f6nne unverg\u00e4nglich bestehen bleiben, wie im Timaios. Dort n\u00e4mlich sagt (Platon), der Himmel sei zwar geworden, indessen werde er die \u00fcbrige immerw\u00e4hrende Zeit existieren. Mit diesen haben wir uns bisher nur unter physikalischen Gesichtspunkten betreffs des Himmels auseinandergesetzt. Nachdem wir die Untersuchung aber allgemein \u00fcber alles angestellt haben, wird auch hier\u00fcber Klarheit sein.\u201c\r\n\r\nWir d\u00fcrfen also eine Argumentation erwarten, der Form: \u201eWenn f\u00fcr jedes Subjekt gilt: Es kann nicht geworden und unverg\u00e4nglich sein, dann gilt es auch f\u00fcr den Himmel. Nun gilt es f\u00fcr jedes, also auch f\u00fcr den Himmel.\u201c Dieser Beweis \u2013 besser: diese Beweise, denn es handelt sich nicht um eine Elementatio, wie Aristoteles sie f\u00fcr die Geometrie kannte und wie, aus Aristoteles sch\u00f6pfend, 700 Jahre sp\u00e4ter Proklos sie f\u00fcr Physik und Theologie schrieb \u2013 finden sich in Kap. 12. Kap. 11 liefert die zum Beweisen notwendigen Definitionen f\u00fcr \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (280b 6), \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd (280b 14), \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd (280b 20), \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (280b 25), \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (280b 12) und \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd-\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd in eingeschr\u00e4nkter Bedeutung noch einmal in 281a 7\u201319.\r\n\r\nDer erste Beweis f\u00fcr die Unhaltbarkeit der Position Platons l\u00e4uft von Kap. 12 Anfang (281a 28) bis 282a 25. Seine Konklusion lautet 282a 21: \u201eSomit ist das Immerseiende weder dem Werden unterliegend (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) noch dem Vergehen, dasselbe gilt f\u00fcr das Immernichtseiende.\u201c Das folgende zweite Argument beweist, dass, wenn etwas ist und dem Werden bzw. Vergehen nicht unterliegt, es immerw\u00e4hrend ist. Da nach der Definition f\u00fcr \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd und \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd (282a 27) deren Konjunktion das Immerw\u00e4hrende einschlie\u00dft, wird untersucht, ob \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd und \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd bzw. \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd und \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd sich gegenseitig implizieren (\u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2), ob also, wenn z. B. \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd gegeben ist, das \u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd bereits mitgegeben ist. Der Beweis f\u00fcr Letzteres schlie\u00dft mit der Konklusion 282b 23: \u201eEs folgen also auseinander das dem Werden und dem Vergehen Unterliegende.\u201c Der auf Grund von Topik B 8. 113b 17ff. eigentlich einfache Beweis f\u00fcr die \u00c4quivalenz der beiden Negate, also \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd = \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, macht Aristoteles merkw\u00fcrdigerweise Schwierigkeiten (282b 23\u2013283a 3).\r\n\r\nVon 283a 4 bis zum Schluss des Buches werden weitere M\u00f6glichkeiten gezeigt, wie man in der Diskussion demjenigen antworten kann, der sagt: \u201eWarum soll denn nicht etwas Gewordenes unverg\u00e4nglich sein?\u201c Hier soll das Argument 1 analysiert werden. [introduction p. 198]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4HHd88Jx3Rv3qEZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":241,"full_name":"Mau,J\u00fcrgen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":994,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"97","issue":"2","pages":"198-204"}},"sort":["Die Welt, Ungeworden und Unverg\u00e4nglch: Interpretation und Textkritik zu Aristoteles, De caelo A 11-12"]}
Title | Die Widerlegung des Manichäismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 51 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 31-57 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wir haben gesehen, dass Simplikios seiner kurzen Abhandlung über den Manichäismus einen durchaus kunstvollen Aufbau zu geben wusste. Obwohl sie in den großen Zusammenhang seines Epiktetkommentars eingebaut ist, bildet sie doch in sich ein abgerundetes Ganzes. Was die Art seiner Argumentation betrifft, so findet sich in ihr wohl kaum ein Gedanke, der sich nicht schon so oder ähnlich bei Alexander von Lykopolis, Titus von Bostra, Epiphanios oder Augustinus ausgedrückt fände. Das soll natürlich nicht unbedingt heißen, dass Simplikios einen von diesen Schriftstellern direkt benutzt hätte; vielmehr ist damit zu rechnen, dass sich sehr bald ein festes Schema antimanichäischer Polemik herausgebildet hatte – etwa so, wie es in hellenistischer Zeit bestimmte Argumentationsschemata gab, die zum Gemeingut der philosophischen Widerlegung von Epikureern und Stoikern geworden waren. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient die kleine Abhandlung des Simplikios eher dadurch, dass sie Anspielungen auf Lehren der Manichäer enthält, deren Hintergrund, soweit ich sehe, bis heute nicht genügend erhellt ist. In welcher Umgebung hat man den manichäischen Weisen zu suchen, dem Simplikios seine Information über die manichäische Kosmogonie verdankt? Stammte diese Bekanntschaft aus der Zeit seiner Studien in Alexandrien, oder hatte Simplikios mit dem Manichäer anlässlich seines Aufenthaltes in Persien bei dem philosophisch interessierten König Chosrau sprechen können, der ja für seine Diskussionsveranstaltungen – unter anderem über die Frage, ob man ein oder zwei Prinzipien aller Dinge anzunehmen habe – bekannt war? Wie Prächter aus philosophisch-dogmatischen Gründen auf eine frühe, d. h. vor der Übersiedlung des Simplikios nach Athen gelegene Entstehungszeit des Epiktetkommentars schließt, besteht meines Erachtens kein Grund, da keineswegs wichtige Differenzen zwischen dem Neuplatonismus des Epiktetkommentars und dem der athenischen Schule bestehen. Im Gegenteil, stellenweise ist ein starker Einfluss des Proklos nachzuweisen. Aus der Bemerkung des Simplikios, dass ihm die Gelegenheit, Epiktet zu kommentieren, unter den gegenwärtigen Zeitumständen sehr willkommen gewesen sei, glaube ich eher auf eine nach dem Edikt Justinians gelegene Entstehungszeit schließen zu dürfen. Eine Begegnung mit manichäischen Lehren im asiatischen Bereich und deren Aufnahme in den Kommentar lagen somit immerhin im Bereich des Möglichen. Das Anliegen des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es daher, diese teilweise aus den textlichen Veränderungen noch deutlicher hervortretenden Probleme, auf die ich im Zusammenhang mit den Arbeiten zu einer Neuausgabe des Epiktetkommentars gestoßen bin, wieder einmal aufzuwerfen und, wenn möglich, dem Interesse der Fachleute dieses so schwierigen Gebietes zu empfehlen. [conclusion p. 56-57] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YbXwCc1R01MthxV |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1131","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1131,"authors_free":[{"id":1706,"entry_id":1131,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die Widerlegung des Manich\u00e4ismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios","main_title":{"title":"Die Widerlegung des Manich\u00e4ismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios"},"abstract":"Wir haben gesehen, dass Simplikios seiner kurzen Abhandlung \u00fcber den Manich\u00e4ismus einen durchaus kunstvollen Aufbau zu geben wusste. Obwohl sie in den gro\u00dfen Zusammenhang seines Epiktetkommentars eingebaut ist, bildet sie doch in sich ein abgerundetes Ganzes. Was die Art seiner Argumentation betrifft, so findet sich in ihr wohl kaum ein Gedanke, der sich nicht schon so oder \u00e4hnlich bei Alexander von Lykopolis, Titus von Bostra, Epiphanios oder Augustinus ausgedr\u00fcckt f\u00e4nde. Das soll nat\u00fcrlich nicht unbedingt hei\u00dfen, dass Simplikios einen von diesen Schriftstellern direkt benutzt h\u00e4tte; vielmehr ist damit zu rechnen, dass sich sehr bald ein festes Schema antimanich\u00e4ischer Polemik herausgebildet hatte \u2013 etwa so, wie es in hellenistischer Zeit bestimmte Argumentationsschemata gab, die zum Gemeingut der philosophischen Widerlegung von Epikureern und Stoikern geworden waren.\r\n\r\nBesondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient die kleine Abhandlung des Simplikios eher dadurch, dass sie Anspielungen auf Lehren der Manich\u00e4er enth\u00e4lt, deren Hintergrund, soweit ich sehe, bis heute nicht gen\u00fcgend erhellt ist. In welcher Umgebung hat man den manich\u00e4ischen Weisen zu suchen, dem Simplikios seine Information \u00fcber die manich\u00e4ische Kosmogonie verdankt? Stammte diese Bekanntschaft aus der Zeit seiner Studien in Alexandrien, oder hatte Simplikios mit dem Manich\u00e4er anl\u00e4sslich seines Aufenthaltes in Persien bei dem philosophisch interessierten K\u00f6nig Chosrau sprechen k\u00f6nnen, der ja f\u00fcr seine Diskussionsveranstaltungen \u2013 unter anderem \u00fcber die Frage, ob man ein oder zwei Prinzipien aller Dinge anzunehmen habe \u2013 bekannt war?\r\n\r\nWie Pr\u00e4chter aus philosophisch-dogmatischen Gr\u00fcnden auf eine fr\u00fche, d. h. vor der \u00dcbersiedlung des Simplikios nach Athen gelegene Entstehungszeit des Epiktetkommentars schlie\u00dft, besteht meines Erachtens kein Grund, da keineswegs wichtige Differenzen zwischen dem Neuplatonismus des Epiktetkommentars und dem der athenischen Schule bestehen. Im Gegenteil, stellenweise ist ein starker Einfluss des Proklos nachzuweisen. Aus der Bemerkung des Simplikios, dass ihm die Gelegenheit, Epiktet zu kommentieren, unter den gegenw\u00e4rtigen Zeitumst\u00e4nden sehr willkommen gewesen sei, glaube ich eher auf eine nach dem Edikt Justinians gelegene Entstehungszeit schlie\u00dfen zu d\u00fcrfen. Eine Begegnung mit manich\u00e4ischen Lehren im asiatischen Bereich und deren Aufnahme in den Kommentar lagen somit immerhin im Bereich des M\u00f6glichen.\r\n\r\nDas Anliegen des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es daher, diese teilweise aus den textlichen Ver\u00e4nderungen noch deutlicher hervortretenden Probleme, auf die ich im Zusammenhang mit den Arbeiten zu einer Neuausgabe des Epiktetkommentars gesto\u00dfen bin, wieder einmal aufzuwerfen und, wenn m\u00f6glich, dem Interesse der Fachleute dieses so schwierigen Gebietes zu empfehlen. [conclusion p. 56-57]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YbXwCc1R01MthxV","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1131,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"51","issue":"1","pages":"31-57"}},"sort":["Die Widerlegung des Manich\u00e4ismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios"]}
Title | Die philosophischen Kommentare aus der Antike. Ein Überblick mit ausgewählten Literaturangaben |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 51-79 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Perkams, Matthias |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ein typisches Beispiel für einen systematisch anspruchsvoll argumentierenden Kommentar, auf den viele der hier genannten Merkmale zutreffen, ist der De anima-Kommentar des Neuplatonikers Priskian von Lydien, eines Zeitgenossen und Bekannten des Damaskios und Simplikios um 530. Der Autor setzt es sich zu Beginn seines Kommentars ausdrücklich zum Ziel, sich bei der Auslegung des aristotelischen Textes und der Klärung der hierbei bestehenden Zweifel nach Möglichkeit an die sachliche Wahrheit (alētheia tōn pragmatōn) zu halten. Dabei will er diese nicht einfach aus dem Text ableiten, sondern orientiert sich bewusst an der Seelenlehre Jamblichs (3. Jh.), des eigentlichen Begründers des spätneuplatonischen Systems (1, 18–20). Diese Zugangsweise stellt den Kommentator freilich vor schwierige inhaltliche Probleme: Zum einen gilt es, Aristoteles’ Seelenlehre richtig zu verstehen, die davon ausgeht, dass die Seele schlichtweg das Lebensprinzip des menschlichen Körpers und eben dadurch definiert ist. Andererseits muss Priskian den Intentionen Jamblichs gerecht werden, dessen Neuplatonismus der Transzendenz auch des menschlichen Geistes und damit einer Art Leib-Seele-Dualismus verpflichtet bleibt. Um beiden Ansprüchen genügen zu können, entwickelt der Kommentator eine komplexe Theorie der menschlichen Seele, die das neuplatonische Menschenbild nicht unwesentlich variiert und verfeinert: Erstens führt Priskian in den für Aristoteles’ Seelenlehre zentralen Begriff der Entelechie bzw. Formursache eine Unterscheidung zwischen einer Formursächlichkeit als Gestaltprinzip des leib-seelischen Wesens und einer Formursächlichkeit als dessen Bewegungsprinzip ein (4,12–5,5). Das letztere Prinzip findet Priskian in Aristoteles’ Aussage, der Geist könne möglicherweise auch so im Körper sein wie ein Schiffer auf einem Schiff (De anima II 1, 413a 6–9). Für Priskian gibt es die Unterschiedenheit zwischen formender und bewegender Entelechie jedoch nicht nur (und nicht in erster Linie, wie noch deutlich werden wird) auf der Ebene der rationalen Seele bzw. des menschlichen Nous, sondern auch auf den Seelenstufen des Vegetativen und des Sensitiven, wobei beim Vegetativen der formende Charakter stark überwiegt. Für die Ebene des Nous reicht diese Differenzierung jedoch nicht aus; denn auch ein Bewegungsprinzip ist nach neuplatonischer Vorstellung als solches notwendig mit dem Körper verbunden, während es für den aristotelischen Nous ganz unangemessen ist, dass er überhaupt in irgendeiner notwendigen Verbindung zum Körper steht (227,6–32). Priskian antwortet mit einer feingliedrigen Differenzierung des Nous-Begriffs, wobei die Einheit und Vielheit der verschiedenen unterschiedenen Stufen mit Hilfe der neuplatonischen Idee einer triadischen Dynamik des Geistigen verstanden werden muss. Grundlegend ist der Gedanke, dass der Nous im Menschen, verstanden als sein alltägliches, gleichsam empirisches Selbst, sich entweder ganz von der Verbindung mit Körperlichem lösen und sich dem bloßen Denken zuwenden oder aber durch die eingegangene Verbindung mit dem Körper nur potentiell zu einem derartigen Denken befähigt sein kann. Priskian schildert diesen Gegensatz jedoch nicht nur, wie andere Neuplatoniker, als eine bloße Wahlmöglichkeit der rationalen Seele zwischen einer Wendung nach oben – zum Geistigen – oder nach unten – zum Körperlichen –, sondern er stellt ihn als eine Zuwendung der Seele zu ihrem eigentlichen, idealen Selbst dar, das als transzendentales Subjekt ihres Denkens zu gelten hat und damit das Denken eigentlich erst „bewirkt“ (das ist seine Interpretation des aristotelischen aktiven Geistes). Dieses ideale Selbst ist aber nicht, wie Plotin annimmt, völlig konstant, sondern es entwickelt und verändert sich zusammen mit der Ebene unseres alltäglichen Denkens, das erst durch eine Rückwendung zum Geistigen auch eine volle Wiederherstellung seines transzendentalen Selbst bewirken kann (220,2–25; 240,2–241,26). Unser Geist ist daher „von sich selbst entfremdet“ (allotriōthen heautou; 223,26), und unser Leben eine dauerhafte Suche nach der Wiedergewinnung der Einheit von empirischem und idealem Selbst. Diese kann erreicht werden durch eine Selbsterkenntnis, bei der sich das empirische Selbst als sein ideales Selbst erkennt und zu diesem wird; um diesen Prozess zu erklären, wendet Priskian die neuplatonische Idee einer geistigen Bewegung aus Bleiben, Hervorgehen und Zurückkehren (monē, prohodos, epistrophē) auf den menschlichen Geist an, was hier nicht im Detail nachvollzogen werden kann. Dieser sehr grobe Überblick über einen ebenso scharfsinnigen wie schwierigen und voraussetzungsreichen Text zeigt in besonders extremer Form, mit welchen systematischen Interessen nicht wenige Kommentatoren an ihre Texte herantraten; häufig lässt sich im kommentierten Text allenfalls der Anlass erkennen, der den Kommentator dazu führt, seine eigenen systematischen Fragen am autoritativ verstandenen Vorlagetext abzuhandeln, was entweder zu einem besseren Verständnis des Textes oder – wie im gerade diskutierten Fall – zu einer Bereicherung der zeitgenössischen Diskussion führt, von der auch der heutige Leser profitieren kann, wenn er bereit ist, den häufig mühsamen Weg zum Verständnis eines Kommentators zu gehen. [introduction p. 52-53] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pSf0FMkBh5xKMAw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1085","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1085,"authors_free":[{"id":1641,"entry_id":1085,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":283,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Perkams, Matthias","free_first_name":"Matthias","free_last_name":"Perkams","norm_person":{"id":283,"first_name":"Matthias","last_name":"Perkams","full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123439760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Die philosophischen Kommentare aus der Antike. Ein \u00dcberblick mit ausgew\u00e4hlten Literaturangaben","main_title":{"title":"Die philosophischen Kommentare aus der Antike. Ein \u00dcberblick mit ausgew\u00e4hlten Literaturangaben"},"abstract":"Ein typisches Beispiel f\u00fcr einen systematisch anspruchsvoll argumentierenden Kommentar, auf den viele der hier genannten Merkmale zutreffen, ist der De anima-Kommentar des Neuplatonikers Priskian von Lydien, eines Zeitgenossen und Bekannten des Damaskios und Simplikios um 530. Der Autor setzt es sich zu Beginn seines Kommentars ausdr\u00fccklich zum Ziel, sich bei der Auslegung des aristotelischen Textes und der Kl\u00e4rung der hierbei bestehenden Zweifel nach M\u00f6glichkeit an die sachliche Wahrheit (al\u0113theia t\u014dn pragmat\u014dn) zu halten. Dabei will er diese nicht einfach aus dem Text ableiten, sondern orientiert sich bewusst an der Seelenlehre Jamblichs (3. Jh.), des eigentlichen Begr\u00fcnders des sp\u00e4tneuplatonischen Systems (1, 18\u201320).\r\n\r\nDiese Zugangsweise stellt den Kommentator freilich vor schwierige inhaltliche Probleme: Zum einen gilt es, Aristoteles\u2019 Seelenlehre richtig zu verstehen, die davon ausgeht, dass die Seele schlichtweg das Lebensprinzip des menschlichen K\u00f6rpers und eben dadurch definiert ist. Andererseits muss Priskian den Intentionen Jamblichs gerecht werden, dessen Neuplatonismus der Transzendenz auch des menschlichen Geistes und damit einer Art Leib-Seele-Dualismus verpflichtet bleibt.\r\n\r\nUm beiden Anspr\u00fcchen gen\u00fcgen zu k\u00f6nnen, entwickelt der Kommentator eine komplexe Theorie der menschlichen Seele, die das neuplatonische Menschenbild nicht unwesentlich variiert und verfeinert: Erstens f\u00fchrt Priskian in den f\u00fcr Aristoteles\u2019 Seelenlehre zentralen Begriff der Entelechie bzw. Formursache eine Unterscheidung zwischen einer Formurs\u00e4chlichkeit als Gestaltprinzip des leib-seelischen Wesens und einer Formurs\u00e4chlichkeit als dessen Bewegungsprinzip ein (4,12\u20135,5). Das letztere Prinzip findet Priskian in Aristoteles\u2019 Aussage, der Geist k\u00f6nne m\u00f6glicherweise auch so im K\u00f6rper sein wie ein Schiffer auf einem Schiff (De anima II 1, 413a 6\u20139).\r\n\r\nF\u00fcr Priskian gibt es die Unterschiedenheit zwischen formender und bewegender Entelechie jedoch nicht nur (und nicht in erster Linie, wie noch deutlich werden wird) auf der Ebene der rationalen Seele bzw. des menschlichen Nous, sondern auch auf den Seelenstufen des Vegetativen und des Sensitiven, wobei beim Vegetativen der formende Charakter stark \u00fcberwiegt.\r\n\r\nF\u00fcr die Ebene des Nous reicht diese Differenzierung jedoch nicht aus; denn auch ein Bewegungsprinzip ist nach neuplatonischer Vorstellung als solches notwendig mit dem K\u00f6rper verbunden, w\u00e4hrend es f\u00fcr den aristotelischen Nous ganz unangemessen ist, dass er \u00fcberhaupt in irgendeiner notwendigen Verbindung zum K\u00f6rper steht (227,6\u201332). Priskian antwortet mit einer feingliedrigen Differenzierung des Nous-Begriffs, wobei die Einheit und Vielheit der verschiedenen unterschiedenen Stufen mit Hilfe der neuplatonischen Idee einer triadischen Dynamik des Geistigen verstanden werden muss.\r\n\r\nGrundlegend ist der Gedanke, dass der Nous im Menschen, verstanden als sein allt\u00e4gliches, gleichsam empirisches Selbst, sich entweder ganz von der Verbindung mit K\u00f6rperlichem l\u00f6sen und sich dem blo\u00dfen Denken zuwenden oder aber durch die eingegangene Verbindung mit dem K\u00f6rper nur potentiell zu einem derartigen Denken bef\u00e4higt sein kann. Priskian schildert diesen Gegensatz jedoch nicht nur, wie andere Neuplatoniker, als eine blo\u00dfe Wahlm\u00f6glichkeit der rationalen Seele zwischen einer Wendung nach oben \u2013 zum Geistigen \u2013 oder nach unten \u2013 zum K\u00f6rperlichen \u2013, sondern er stellt ihn als eine Zuwendung der Seele zu ihrem eigentlichen, idealen Selbst dar, das als transzendentales Subjekt ihres Denkens zu gelten hat und damit das Denken eigentlich erst \u201ebewirkt\u201c (das ist seine Interpretation des aristotelischen aktiven Geistes).\r\n\r\nDieses ideale Selbst ist aber nicht, wie Plotin annimmt, v\u00f6llig konstant, sondern es entwickelt und ver\u00e4ndert sich zusammen mit der Ebene unseres allt\u00e4glichen Denkens, das erst durch eine R\u00fcckwendung zum Geistigen auch eine volle Wiederherstellung seines transzendentalen Selbst bewirken kann (220,2\u201325; 240,2\u2013241,26). Unser Geist ist daher \u201evon sich selbst entfremdet\u201c (allotri\u014dthen heautou; 223,26), und unser Leben eine dauerhafte Suche nach der Wiedergewinnung der Einheit von empirischem und idealem Selbst.\r\n\r\nDiese kann erreicht werden durch eine Selbsterkenntnis, bei der sich das empirische Selbst als sein ideales Selbst erkennt und zu diesem wird; um diesen Prozess zu erkl\u00e4ren, wendet Priskian die neuplatonische Idee einer geistigen Bewegung aus Bleiben, Hervorgehen und Zur\u00fcckkehren (mon\u0113, prohodos, epistroph\u0113) auf den menschlichen Geist an, was hier nicht im Detail nachvollzogen werden kann.\r\n\r\nDieser sehr grobe \u00dcberblick \u00fcber einen ebenso scharfsinnigen wie schwierigen und voraussetzungsreichen Text zeigt in besonders extremer Form, mit welchen systematischen Interessen nicht wenige Kommentatoren an ihre Texte herantraten; h\u00e4ufig l\u00e4sst sich im kommentierten Text allenfalls der Anlass erkennen, der den Kommentator dazu f\u00fchrt, seine eigenen systematischen Fragen am autoritativ verstandenen Vorlagetext abzuhandeln, was entweder zu einem besseren Verst\u00e4ndnis des Textes oder \u2013 wie im gerade diskutierten Fall \u2013 zu einer Bereicherung der zeitgen\u00f6ssischen Diskussion f\u00fchrt, von der auch der heutige Leser profitieren kann, wenn er bereit ist, den h\u00e4ufig m\u00fchsamen Weg zum Verst\u00e4ndnis eines Kommentators zu gehen. [introduction p. 52-53]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pSf0FMkBh5xKMAw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":283,"full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1085,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Allgemeine Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie","volume":"32","issue":"1","pages":"51-79"}},"sort":["Die philosophischen Kommentare aus der Antike. Ein \u00dcberblick mit ausgew\u00e4hlten Literaturangaben"]}
Title | Digging up a Paradox: A Philological Note on Zeno's Stadium |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 125 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mansfeld, Jaap |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Of Zeno's four arguments against the reality of motion transmitted by Aristotle, the fourth, the so-called Stadium (Vors. 29 A 28), is perhaps the most difficult. The difficulties involved are of two sorts: philological problems on the one hand, questions of a philosophical nature on the other. In the present paper, I am concerned with the first sort, not the second, although I shall perhaps not be successful in keeping the latter out altogether. A study of the philosophical discussions to be found in the learned literature, however, has convinced me that the first problem to be solved is that of the interpretation of Aristotle's text. There is a general feeling that Aristotle, in reporting and arguing against Zeno's argument, somehow failed. I believe his report is sufficiently clear; although Aristotle's argument contra Zeno is not, perhaps, satisfactory in every respect, Zeno's original paradox can be found in his text. I shall attempt to show that, in order to find it, we must begin by taking both the topography of the stadium and the position of the bodies in it into account, which several recent reconstructions, however satisfactory they may appear to be in other respects, fail to do. I wish to start from a consideration concerned with a non-philosophical feature the four arguments against motion have in common: the fact that they are fun. They undoubtedly are very serious arguments, but they were also written in order to épater le bourgeois. The first argument proves that a runner will never get to the end of the stadium: once he has got halfway, he still has to get halfway the remaining half, halfway the remaining quarter, and so on, in infinitum. The second proves that swift-footed Achilles will never catch up with the slowest thing on earth, because the distance in between, although constantly diminishing, forever remains proportionally the same. The third proves that a flying arrow, which occupies a place equal to its own size, is at rest, because it does not move at the place where it is, and not at the place where it is not either. The first three arguments, then, are genuine and rather hilarious paradoxes. They reveal Zeno as a wit. To ask what is so funny about the fourth argument against motion, therefore, is a legitimate question. Yet I have hardly ever read an account of the fourth paradox which brought out the inevitable smile fetched by the others. Instead, one finds complicated discussions about infinite divisibility versus discrete or granular structure, and endless shufflings and reshufflings of the runners on the course. There are several reasons for this unfortunate situation, the most important of which, I believe, is that both ancient commentators (to judge from Simplicius' account) and modern scholars have failed to distinguish (or to distinguish sufficiently) between Zeno's paradox on the one hand and Aristotle's refutation on the other. Another reason is that Aristotle's text is plagued in parts with variae lectiones that seriously affect the meaning of the argument as a whole. Some of these readings enjoy the support of Simplicius, but this does not prove them right, for Simplicius points out one passage where Alexander of Aphrodisias followed a reading different from that accepted by himself and which, as he believes, Alexander "found in some manuscripts" (ἐν ταῖς ἀντιγράφοις εὗρον, In Phys. 1017, 19). Furthermore, as Simplicius likewise tells us (In Phys. 1019, 27–31), Alexander proposed to interpolate Phys. Z 9, 240a15-16 λαὸν-φρήσιν immediately after 240a11 διελῆλυθεν. Alexander, then, found it difficult to understand the argument of the text as transmitted (which, at at least one other point, differed from Simplicius’). Simplicius' lengthy reconstruction of the fourth argument against motion and of Aristotle's critique thereof (In Phys. 1016, 7–1020, 6, printed—as far as 1019, 9—by Lee as T 36) appears to have no other authority than his own, for he differs from Alexander, and the only other person cited (Eudemus, Fr. 106 Wehrli) is only adduced for points which do not affect the interpretation of the more difficult parts of Phys. Z 9, 239b33–240a17. Although scholars have dealt rather freely with Simplicius' commentary, using only those sections which fit their own views, it should be acknowledged that his reconstruction of the paradox, and especially his diagram of the stadium featuring three rows of runners, have been of crucial importance to the modern history of interpretation of Zeno's argument. I believe, however, that Simplicius (and perhaps Alexander as well) already made the fundamental mistake of failing to distinguish in the proper way between Zeno's paradox and Aristotle's refutation, although in Simplicius' case this is somewhat mitigated by the fact that he apparently noticed the joke of Zeno's argument (one doesn’t know if Alexander did). We are not bound, then, to follow Simplicius all, or even half the way, and need not even accept his guidance as to the choice to be made among the variae lectiones. These different readings themselves, so it seems, reflect different ancient interpretations of Aristotle's exposition. In some manuscripts, interpretamenta may have got into the text (as at 240a6), or even have ousted other, more difficult readings (as at 240a11). [introduction p. 1-3] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/y2jILmoDyxD389y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1108","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1108,"authors_free":[{"id":2070,"entry_id":1108,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":29,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","free_first_name":"Jaap","free_last_name":"Mansfeld","norm_person":{"id":29,"first_name":"Jaap","last_name":"Mansfeld","full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119383217","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Digging up a Paradox: A Philological Note on Zeno's Stadium","main_title":{"title":"Digging up a Paradox: A Philological Note on Zeno's Stadium"},"abstract":"Of Zeno's four arguments against the reality of motion transmitted by Aristotle, the fourth, the so-called Stadium (Vors. 29 A 28), is perhaps the most difficult. The difficulties involved are of two sorts: philological problems on the one hand, questions of a philosophical nature on the other. In the present paper, I am concerned with the first sort, not the second, although I shall perhaps not be successful in keeping the latter out altogether. A study of the philosophical discussions to be found in the learned literature, however, has convinced me that the first problem to be solved is that of the interpretation of Aristotle's text. There is a general feeling that Aristotle, in reporting and arguing against Zeno's argument, somehow failed. I believe his report is sufficiently clear; although Aristotle's argument contra Zeno is not, perhaps, satisfactory in every respect, Zeno's original paradox can be found in his text. I shall attempt to show that, in order to find it, we must begin by taking both the topography of the stadium and the position of the bodies in it into account, which several recent reconstructions, however satisfactory they may appear to be in other respects, fail to do.\r\n\r\nI wish to start from a consideration concerned with a non-philosophical feature the four arguments against motion have in common: the fact that they are fun. They undoubtedly are very serious arguments, but they were also written in order to \u00e9pater le bourgeois. The first argument proves that a runner will never get to the end of the stadium: once he has got halfway, he still has to get halfway the remaining half, halfway the remaining quarter, and so on, in infinitum. The second proves that swift-footed Achilles will never catch up with the slowest thing on earth, because the distance in between, although constantly diminishing, forever remains proportionally the same. The third proves that a flying arrow, which occupies a place equal to its own size, is at rest, because it does not move at the place where it is, and not at the place where it is not either.\r\n\r\nThe first three arguments, then, are genuine and rather hilarious paradoxes. They reveal Zeno as a wit. To ask what is so funny about the fourth argument against motion, therefore, is a legitimate question. Yet I have hardly ever read an account of the fourth paradox which brought out the inevitable smile fetched by the others. Instead, one finds complicated discussions about infinite divisibility versus discrete or granular structure, and endless shufflings and reshufflings of the runners on the course. There are several reasons for this unfortunate situation, the most important of which, I believe, is that both ancient commentators (to judge from Simplicius' account) and modern scholars have failed to distinguish (or to distinguish sufficiently) between Zeno's paradox on the one hand and Aristotle's refutation on the other. Another reason is that Aristotle's text is plagued in parts with variae lectiones that seriously affect the meaning of the argument as a whole. Some of these readings enjoy the support of Simplicius, but this does not prove them right, for Simplicius points out one passage where Alexander of Aphrodisias followed a reading different from that accepted by himself and which, as he believes, Alexander \"found in some manuscripts\" (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f57\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, In Phys. 1017, 19). Furthermore, as Simplicius likewise tells us (In Phys. 1019, 27\u201331), Alexander proposed to interpolate Phys. Z 9, 240a15-16 \u03bb\u03b1\u1f78\u03bd-\u03c6\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd immediately after 240a11 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc6\u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd. Alexander, then, found it difficult to understand the argument of the text as transmitted (which, at at least one other point, differed from Simplicius\u2019). Simplicius' lengthy reconstruction of the fourth argument against motion and of Aristotle's critique thereof (In Phys. 1016, 7\u20131020, 6, printed\u2014as far as 1019, 9\u2014by Lee as T 36) appears to have no other authority than his own, for he differs from Alexander, and the only other person cited (Eudemus, Fr. 106 Wehrli) is only adduced for points which do not affect the interpretation of the more difficult parts of Phys. Z 9, 239b33\u2013240a17.\r\n\r\nAlthough scholars have dealt rather freely with Simplicius' commentary, using only those sections which fit their own views, it should be acknowledged that his reconstruction of the paradox, and especially his diagram of the stadium featuring three rows of runners, have been of crucial importance to the modern history of interpretation of Zeno's argument. I believe, however, that Simplicius (and perhaps Alexander as well) already made the fundamental mistake of failing to distinguish in the proper way between Zeno's paradox and Aristotle's refutation, although in Simplicius' case this is somewhat mitigated by the fact that he apparently noticed the joke of Zeno's argument (one doesn\u2019t know if Alexander did). We are not bound, then, to follow Simplicius all, or even half the way, and need not even accept his guidance as to the choice to be made among the variae lectiones. These different readings themselves, so it seems, reflect different ancient interpretations of Aristotle's exposition. In some manuscripts, interpretamenta may have got into the text (as at 240a6), or even have ousted other, more difficult readings (as at 240a11). [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/y2jILmoDyxD389y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":29,"full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1108,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"125","issue":"1","pages":"1-24"}},"sort":["Digging up a Paradox: A Philological Note on Zeno's Stadium"]}
Title | Discussions on the Eternity of the world in Late Antiquity |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 111-173 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article studies the debate between the Neoplatonist philosophers Simplicius and John Philoponus on the question of the eternity of the world. The first part consists in a historical introduction situating their debate within the context of the conflict between Christians and Pa- gan in the Byzantine Empire of the first half of the sixth century. Particular attention is paid to the attitudes of these two thinkers to Aristotle's attempted proofs of the eternity of motion and time in Physics 8.1. The second part traces the origins, structure and function of a particular argument used by Philoponus to argue for the world's creation within time. Philoponus takes advantage of a tension inherent in Aristotle's theory of motion, between his standard view that all motion and change is continuous and takes place in time, and his occasional admission that at least some kinds of motion and change are instantaneous. For Philoponus, God's creation of the world is precisely such an instantaneous change: it is not a motion on the part of the Creator, but is analo- gous to the activation of a state (hexis), which is timeless and implies no change on the part of the agent. The various transformations of this doctrine at the hands of Peripatetic, Neoplatonic, and Islamic commentators are studied (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, al-Kindi, al-Farabi), as is Philoponus' use of it in his debate against Proclus. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ufpZP6w4wwJDnXs |
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Title | Doctrine, Anecdote, and Action: Reconsidering the Social History of the Last Platonists (c. 430–c. 550 C.E.) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | Classical Philology |
Volume | 106 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 226-244 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Watts, Edward Jay |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Two Parallel narratives have tended to dominate modern recon- structions of the final century and a half of Platonism’s long ancient history. The first ties the dramatic intersection of pagan-Christian conflict, imperial policy, and philosophical principles to the end of Platonic teaching in the Eastern Roman Empire. 1 A second, distinct narrative analyzes Latin philosophical writings and traces the gradual unraveling of the ties that bound Latin philosophical culture and its Greek counterpart. 2 Each of these narratives has its own unique way of viewing and understanding Platonism. The first story culminates with the emperor Justinian’s closing of the Athe- nian Platonic school. It tends to present the affected philosophers as a small, isolated group of pagan intellectuals whose conflict with an increasingly as- sertive Christian political order pushed them to the empire’s margins. The second narrative ends with Boethius and Cassiodorus and stresses how their philosophical efforts both underlined Graeco-Latin philosophical separation and planted the seeds of medieval scholasticism. It sees Platonism primarily as a movement held together by scholastic practices and doctrinal continuities in which Latin writers participated only at some remove. This paper proposes a different, more expansive way to think about late antique philosophical life. Ancient philosophical culture was not defined ex- clusively by religious concerns and doctrinal ties. Beginning with the Old Academy of Xenocrates, Platonists shaped themselves into an intellectual community held together by doctrinal commonalities, a shared history, and defined personal relationships. 3 As the Hellenistic world developed and Platonism spread beyond its Athenian center, doctrine, history, and social ties stopped being conterminous. Platonists remained connected by a shared intellectual genealogy, but Platonism’s social and doctrinal aspects became decentralized as individual schools with their own interests grew up in vari- ous cities. 4 Although no direct institutional connection joined them to the Academy, late antique Platonists saw themselves as part of an old philosophi- cal lineage that reached back to Plato. 5 In their schools, the history of an individual circle’s past mingled with that of the larger intellectual tradition it claimed to have inherited. This amalgamated tradition was handed down from teachers to students in personal conversations that had a number of important, community-building effects. They attracted students to Platonic philosophy, encouraged them to identify with the movement’s past leaders, and influ- enced their ideas and actions once they joined a specific group. As this paper will show, the Platonic circles that these men and women formed were then defined as much by the relationships they formed and by the behaviors they exhibited as by the doctrines they espoused. [introduction p. 226-227] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/rilfF7I9t8ywGlp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"443","_score":null,"_source":{"id":443,"authors_free":[{"id":595,"entry_id":443,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":357,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","free_first_name":"Edward Jay","free_last_name":"Watts","norm_person":{"id":357,"first_name":"Edward Jay","last_name":"Watts","full_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131826530","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Doctrine, Anecdote, and Action: Reconsidering the Social History of the Last Platonists (c. 430\u2013c. 550 C.E.)","main_title":{"title":"Doctrine, Anecdote, and Action: Reconsidering the Social History of the Last Platonists (c. 430\u2013c. 550 C.E.)"},"abstract":"Two Parallel narratives have tended to dominate modern recon-\r\nstructions of the final century and a half of Platonism\u2019s long ancient \r\nhistory. The first ties the dramatic intersection of pagan-Christian \r\nconflict, imperial policy, and philosophical principles to the end of Platonic \r\nteaching in the Eastern Roman Empire. 1 A second, distinct narrative analyzes \r\nLatin philosophical writings and traces the gradual unraveling of the ties that \r\nbound Latin philosophical culture and its Greek counterpart. 2 Each of these \r\nnarratives has its own unique way of viewing and understanding Platonism. \r\nThe first story culminates with the emperor Justinian\u2019s closing of the Athe-\r\nnian Platonic school. It tends to present the affected philosophers as a small, \r\nisolated group of pagan intellectuals whose conflict with an increasingly as-\r\nsertive Christian political order pushed them to the empire\u2019s margins. The \r\nsecond narrative ends with Boethius and Cassiodorus and stresses how their \r\nphilosophical efforts both underlined Graeco-Latin philosophical separation \r\nand planted the seeds of medieval scholasticism. It sees Platonism primarily \r\nas a movement held together by scholastic practices and doctrinal continuities \r\nin which Latin writers participated only at some remove.\r\nThis paper proposes a different, more expansive way to think about late \r\nantique philosophical life. Ancient philosophical culture was not defined ex-\r\nclusively by religious concerns and doctrinal ties. Beginning with the Old \r\n\r\nAcademy of Xenocrates, Platonists shaped themselves into an intellectual \r\ncommunity held together by doctrinal commonalities, a shared history, and \r\ndefined personal relationships. 3 As the Hellenistic world developed and \r\nPlatonism spread beyond its Athenian center, doctrine, history, and social \r\nties stopped being conterminous. Platonists remained connected by a shared \r\nintellectual genealogy, but Platonism\u2019s social and doctrinal aspects became decentralized as individual schools with their own interests grew up in vari-\r\nous cities. 4 Although no direct institutional connection joined them to the \r\nAcademy, late antique Platonists saw themselves as part of an old philosophi-\r\ncal lineage that reached back to Plato. 5 In their schools, the history of an \r\nindividual circle\u2019s past mingled with that of the larger intellectual tradition it \r\nclaimed to have inherited. This amalgamated tradition was handed down from \r\nteachers to students in personal conversations that had a number of important, \r\ncommunity-building effects. They attracted students to Platonic philosophy, \r\nencouraged them to identify with the movement\u2019s past leaders, and influ-\r\nenced their ideas and actions once they joined a specific group. As this paper \r\nwill show, the Platonic circles that these men and women formed were then \r\ndefined as much by the relationships they formed and by the behaviors they \r\nexhibited as by the doctrines they espoused. [introduction p. 226-227]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/rilfF7I9t8ywGlp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":357,"full_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":443,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Philology","volume":"106","issue":"3","pages":"226-244"}},"sort":["Doctrine, Anecdote, and Action: Reconsidering the Social History of the Last Platonists (c. 430\u2013c. 550 C.E.)"]}
Title | Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschenbild in “Simplikios”’ Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ De anima |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 57-91 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Perkams, Matthias |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Durchgang durch „Simplikios’“ Text hat gezeigt, dass dieser Kommentator mit seiner Theorie der doppelten Formursächlichkeit der Seele bzw. ihres doppelten entelecheia-Seins die funktionale Beziehung der Seele zum Körper in ihren verschiedenen Stufen nach einem einheitlichen Schema erklärt. Immer ist es ein seelisch definiertes Organ, zu dem die Seele in Beziehung tritt. Das anthropologische Ergebnis ist kein Dreischritt Körper-Leib-Seele, sondern eine systematisch durchdachte Definition des Verhältnisses zwischen Körper und Seele: Auf der einen Seite steht nicht ein Stück Materie, sondern ein Lebewesen in der Art eines belebten Körpers, bei dessen Formung Körperliches und Seelisches bereits eine Einheit eingegangen sind, auf der anderen Seite eine Seele, die als die, die sie ist, wesentlich auf die Benutzung dieses Leibes ausgerichtet ist. Dabei ist der Leib von der bloßen Materie ebenso verschieden wie die bewegende Seele vom transzendenten nous, in dem sie ursprünglich wurzelt. Erst im Tod gewinnen nous und Materie wieder ihre Selbständigkeit zurück. Diese Darstellung zeigt, wie „Simplikios“ systematisch mit Aristoteles umgeht: Die Terminologie des Stagiriten integriert er nicht nur in seine eigene philosophische Konzeption, sondern er kann mithilfe dieser Terminologie eine logisch und sachlich konsistente und gut nachvollziehbare Fassung der neuplatonischen Seelenlehre entwickeln. Damit erweist sich die Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles für den neuplatonischen Autor als fruchtbar, ohne dass er sachlich die Grenzen des Neuplatonismus überschreitet. Im neuplatonischen Kontext ist es besonders interessant, dass „Simplikios“ in den beiden Formen von entelecheia durchgehende Charakteristika des Seelischen in der Art sieht, dass jede einzelne Seelenart den Leib in der genannten doppelten Weise verwirklicht. Denn mit der Annahme zweier Arten der Einwirkung der Seele auf den Körper entspricht er einer Struktur, die sich bereits bei Plotin entfaltet findet: Der Leib, mit dem sich die Seele vereinigt, ist bereits durch eine Spur oder ein Bild der Seele auf deren Aufnahme vorbereitet. Bei der Interpretation dieser Stellen wird meistens angenommen, dass dieses „Bild“ der vegetativen Seele entspricht, die von der höheren Seele verschieden ist. Diese Identifizierung wurde jüngst von Ch. Tornau unter Verweis auf Enn. IV 4, 20, 22–5; VI 4, 15, 15 in Zweifel gezogen. Bei „Simplikios“ zeigt sich nun klar, dass dieses Seelenbild ebenso wie die bewegende Formursache, die eigentliche Seele, in jeder einzelnen Seelenart vorhanden ist. Damit wird Tornaus Vermutung zumindest für einen neuplatonischen Autor bestätigt. An diesem Punkt, der für die Systematik des neuplatonischen Menschenbildes überhaupt von Bedeutung ist, ist weitere Forschung nötig, um zu mehr Klarheit über die im Neuplatonismus übliche Lehre und die Abweichungen davon zu gelangen. Das von „Simplikios“ entworfene Bild zeigt, dass die menschliche Seele im späten Neuplatonismus nicht als unsystematische Nebeneinanderstellung verschiedener, mehr oder weniger zwanghaft triadisch geordneter Schichten zu verstehen ist, sondern dass die Philosophen dieser Zeit im Rahmen der Voraussetzungen, die sie für selbstverständlich hielten, ein klares Bild der gegenseitigen Bezogenheit von Seele und Leib entwickeln konnten. Die Einheit zwischen Körper und Seele, wie „Simplikios“ sie schildert, ist keineswegs so locker, wie es manche Überblickswerke zum Neuplatonismus nahelegen: Die Seele, die in der materiellen Welt wirkt und erkennt, ist wesentlich mit dem Körper verbunden und kann ohne diese Verbindung nicht existieren. [conclusion p. 90-91] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/egqTFHmjZlWVg7v |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1087","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1087,"authors_free":[{"id":1643,"entry_id":1087,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":283,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Perkams, Matthias","free_first_name":"Matthias","free_last_name":"Perkams","norm_person":{"id":283,"first_name":"Matthias","last_name":"Perkams","full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123439760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschen\u00adbild in \u201cSimplikios\u201d\u2019 Kommentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 De anima","main_title":{"title":"Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschen\u00adbild in \u201cSimplikios\u201d\u2019 Kommentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 De anima"},"abstract":"Der Durchgang durch \u201eSimplikios\u2019\u201c Text hat gezeigt, dass dieser Kommentator mit seiner Theorie der doppelten Formurs\u00e4chlichkeit der Seele bzw. ihres doppelten entelecheia-Seins die funktionale Beziehung der Seele zum K\u00f6rper in ihren verschiedenen Stufen nach einem einheitlichen Schema erkl\u00e4rt. Immer ist es ein seelisch definiertes Organ, zu dem die Seele in Beziehung tritt. Das anthropologische Ergebnis ist kein Dreischritt K\u00f6rper-Leib-Seele, sondern eine systematisch durchdachte Definition des Verh\u00e4ltnisses zwischen K\u00f6rper und Seele:\r\n\r\nAuf der einen Seite steht nicht ein St\u00fcck Materie, sondern ein Lebewesen in der Art eines belebten K\u00f6rpers, bei dessen Formung K\u00f6rperliches und Seelisches bereits eine Einheit eingegangen sind, auf der anderen Seite eine Seele, die als die, die sie ist, wesentlich auf die Benutzung dieses Leibes ausgerichtet ist. Dabei ist der Leib von der blo\u00dfen Materie ebenso verschieden wie die bewegende Seele vom transzendenten nous, in dem sie urspr\u00fcnglich wurzelt. Erst im Tod gewinnen nous und Materie wieder ihre Selbst\u00e4ndigkeit zur\u00fcck.\r\n\r\nDiese Darstellung zeigt, wie \u201eSimplikios\u201c systematisch mit Aristoteles umgeht: Die Terminologie des Stagiriten integriert er nicht nur in seine eigene philosophische Konzeption, sondern er kann mithilfe dieser Terminologie eine logisch und sachlich konsistente und gut nachvollziehbare Fassung der neuplatonischen Seelenlehre entwickeln. Damit erweist sich die Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles f\u00fcr den neuplatonischen Autor als fruchtbar, ohne dass er sachlich die Grenzen des Neuplatonismus \u00fcberschreitet.\r\n\r\nIm neuplatonischen Kontext ist es besonders interessant, dass \u201eSimplikios\u201c in den beiden Formen von entelecheia durchgehende Charakteristika des Seelischen in der Art sieht, dass jede einzelne Seelenart den Leib in der genannten doppelten Weise verwirklicht. Denn mit der Annahme zweier Arten der Einwirkung der Seele auf den K\u00f6rper entspricht er einer Struktur, die sich bereits bei Plotin entfaltet findet:\r\n\r\nDer Leib, mit dem sich die Seele vereinigt, ist bereits durch eine Spur oder ein Bild der Seele auf deren Aufnahme vorbereitet. Bei der Interpretation dieser Stellen wird meistens angenommen, dass dieses \u201eBild\u201c der vegetativen Seele entspricht, die von der h\u00f6heren Seele verschieden ist. Diese Identifizierung wurde j\u00fcngst von Ch. Tornau unter Verweis auf Enn. IV 4, 20, 22\u20135; VI 4, 15, 15 in Zweifel gezogen.\r\n\r\nBei \u201eSimplikios\u201c zeigt sich nun klar, dass dieses Seelenbild ebenso wie die bewegende Formursache, die eigentliche Seele, in jeder einzelnen Seelenart vorhanden ist. Damit wird Tornaus Vermutung zumindest f\u00fcr einen neuplatonischen Autor best\u00e4tigt. An diesem Punkt, der f\u00fcr die Systematik des neuplatonischen Menschenbildes \u00fcberhaupt von Bedeutung ist, ist weitere Forschung n\u00f6tig, um zu mehr Klarheit \u00fcber die im Neuplatonismus \u00fcbliche Lehre und die Abweichungen davon zu gelangen.\r\n\r\nDas von \u201eSimplikios\u201c entworfene Bild zeigt, dass die menschliche Seele im sp\u00e4ten Neuplatonismus nicht als unsystematische Nebeneinanderstellung verschiedener, mehr oder weniger zwanghaft triadisch geordneter Schichten zu verstehen ist, sondern dass die Philosophen dieser Zeit im Rahmen der Voraussetzungen, die sie f\u00fcr selbstverst\u00e4ndlich hielten, ein klares Bild der gegenseitigen Bezogenheit von Seele und Leib entwickeln konnten.\r\n\r\nDie Einheit zwischen K\u00f6rper und Seele, wie \u201eSimplikios\u201c sie schildert, ist keineswegs so locker, wie es manche \u00dcberblickswerke zum Neuplatonismus nahelegen: Die Seele, die in der materiellen Welt wirkt und erkennt, ist wesentlich mit dem K\u00f6rper verbunden und kann ohne diese Verbindung nicht existieren. [conclusion p. 90-91]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/egqTFHmjZlWVg7v","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":283,"full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1087,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"57-91"}},"sort":["Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschen\u00adbild in \u201cSimplikios\u201d\u2019 Kommentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 De anima"]}
Title | Doxographica Anaxagorea |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1975 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 103 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schofield, Malcom |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The information provided by these three texts that Anaxagoras made special application of his general theory of mixture to problems of growth and nutrition derives in each case from Theophrastus, whose word we have no reason to doubt, and who is in any case supported by Aristotle in De Generatione Animalium. The view, again presented in all three texts, that it was from reflection upon such problems, chiefly or in part, that Anaxagoras was led to formulate his general theory again derives from Theophrastus (and solely from him in Aetius's case) or from Aristotle glossed by Theophrastus (in the case of Simplicius and the scholium). For it is Aristotle who says that it was from seeing everything coming out of everything that Anaxagoras arrived at the theory of mixture, it is Aristotle who invariably illustrates Anaxagoras's "all things" by flesh and bone, and it is upon texts of Aristotle containing this explanation and these illustrations that both Simplicius's commentary and the scholium are based. Aristotle does not concentrate on biological processes exclusively, to be sure, but no doubt Theophrastus was acting in the spirit of Aristotle when he illustrates his own Aristotelian exposition of Anaxagoras's train of thought by reference to the problem of nutrition. How much, then, are the texts to which Jaeger appealed for his account of Anaxagoras's "methodical point of departure" worth? Just and only as much as are Aristotle and Theophrastus. But whether they are right is, as I have said, another story. [conclusion p. 24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dX7s9j2RuDMGCdU |
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Title | Définition et description: Le problème de la saisie des genres premiers et des individus chez Aristote dans l'exégèse de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1987 |
Journal | Archives de Philosophie |
Volume | 50 |
Pages | 529-554 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Narbonne, Jean-Marc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius uses (and distorts) the concept of hypographe (of Stoic origin) in order to describe the first genera and the particulars which, in Aristotle, are not susceptible to definition. However, a closer examination of the status of science in Aristotle (with reference to the doctrine of incommunicability of genera and the problem of individuation) shows that Simplicius’ attempt is incompatible, or at least difficult to reconcile, with the aristotelianism (of Aristotle). [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/o2VUk12kzrbnaz0 |
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Title | Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei Pseudo-Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplikios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1935 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Neue Folge |
Volume | 84 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 154-160 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Merlan, Philipp |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In diesem Text geht es um Simplikios' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo II, 1, 284 a 14 ff. und Pseudo-Alexandros' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Metaphysik A, 8, 1074aff. Beide diskutieren Fragen zur Bewegung des Himmels und stellen ähnliche Gedanken zum Verhältnis von Seele und Bewegung dar. Der Text betrachtet die Möglichkeit, dass Simplikios und Pseudo-Alexandros einander zitiert haben oder dass sie beide den echten Alexandros zitieren. Es wird auch auf die Interpretation von Aristoteles' De caelo H, 1,284a 27 ff. durch Simplikios eingegangen. [derived from the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cyUoxPziHeqUgjb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1209","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1209,"authors_free":[{"id":1790,"entry_id":1209,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":258,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Merlan, Philipp","free_first_name":"Philipp","free_last_name":"Merlan","norm_person":{"id":258,"first_name":"Philip","last_name":"Merlan","full_name":"Merlan, Philip","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128860502","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei Pseudo-Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplikios","main_title":{"title":"Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei Pseudo-Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplikios"},"abstract":"In diesem Text geht es um Simplikios' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo II, 1, 284 a 14 ff. und Pseudo-Alexandros' Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Metaphysik A, 8, 1074aff. Beide diskutieren Fragen zur Bewegung des Himmels und stellen \u00e4hnliche Gedanken zum Verh\u00e4ltnis von Seele und Bewegung dar. Der Text betrachtet die M\u00f6glichkeit, dass Simplikios und Pseudo-Alexandros einander zitiert haben oder dass sie beide den echten Alexandros zitieren. Es wird auch auf die Interpretation von Aristoteles' De caelo H, 1,284a 27 ff. durch Simplikios eingegangen. [derived from the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1935","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cyUoxPziHeqUgjb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":258,"full_name":"Merlan, Philip","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1209,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie. Neue Folge","volume":"84","issue":"2","pages":"154-160"}},"sort":["Ein Simplikios-Zitat bei Pseudo-Alexandros und ein Plotinos-Zitat bei Simplikios"]}
Title | Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar zu Aristoteles’ Physik (ed. Diels). I. p. 1129–1152 (contra Philoponum) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1902 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 15 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 186–213 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zahlfleisch, Johann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der vorliegende Text behandelt einige Corollarien von Simplicius in seinem Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Physik, wobei er sich insbesondere mit Philoponus' Einwänden auseinandersetzt. Die Diskussion dreht sich um die Definition der Bewegung bei Aristoteles und die Frage nach ewigen und begrenzten Bewegungen. Philoponus hinterfragt, wie begrenzte Bewegung als Folge einer ewigen Bewegung angesehen werden kann, da die Potenz immer bestehe und eine Bedingung für die Bewegung sei. Simplicius argumentiert, dass die Potenz und Bewegung untrennbar verbunden sind und dass es keine ewige Bewegung geben könne. Er erläutert Aristoteles' Position und verteidigt sie gegen Philoponus' Einwände. Die Diskussion umfasst Themen wie die Rolle der Potenz in der Bewegung, die Anwendung der Begriffsdefinition auf verschiedene Sachverhalte und die Frage nach einem obersten Beweger. Am Ende wird betont, dass selbst bei einer Ablehnung des Aristotelischen Axioms von der Bewegung die Annahme eines ewigen obersten Bewegers bestehen bleibt. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vfhmk7U2Ze3RMEr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1548","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1548,"authors_free":[{"id":2705,"entry_id":1548,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Zahlfleisch, Johann","free_first_name":"Johann","free_last_name":"Zahlfleisch","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 Physik (ed. Diels). I. p. 1129\u20131152 (contra Philoponum)","main_title":{"title":"Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 Physik (ed. Diels). I. p. 1129\u20131152 (contra Philoponum)"},"abstract":"Der vorliegende Text behandelt einige Corollarien von Simplicius in seinem Kommentar zu Aristoteles' Physik, wobei er sich insbesondere mit Philoponus' Einw\u00e4nden auseinandersetzt. Die Diskussion dreht sich um die Definition der Bewegung bei Aristoteles und die Frage nach ewigen und begrenzten Bewegungen. Philoponus hinterfragt, wie begrenzte Bewegung als Folge einer ewigen Bewegung angesehen werden kann, da die Potenz immer bestehe und eine Bedingung f\u00fcr die Bewegung sei. Simplicius argumentiert, dass die Potenz und Bewegung untrennbar verbunden sind und dass es keine ewige Bewegung geben k\u00f6nne. Er erl\u00e4utert Aristoteles' Position und verteidigt sie gegen Philoponus' Einw\u00e4nde. Die Diskussion umfasst Themen wie die Rolle der Potenz in der Bewegung, die Anwendung der Begriffsdefinition auf verschiedene Sachverhalte und die Frage nach einem obersten Beweger. Am Ende wird betont, dass selbst bei einer Ablehnung des Aristotelischen Axioms von der Bewegung die Annahme eines ewigen obersten Bewegers bestehen bleibt. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1902","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vfhmk7U2Ze3RMEr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1548,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"15","issue":"2","pages":"186\u2013213"}},"sort":["Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar zu Aristoteles\u2019 Physik (ed. Diels). I. p. 1129\u20131152 (contra Philoponum)"]}
Title | El extraño criterio utilizado para crear "la Doxa" de Parménides |
Type | Article |
Language | Spanish |
Date | 2021 |
Journal | Dianoia |
Volume | 66 |
Issue | 87 |
Pages | 141-151 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Néstor-Luis Cordero |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In 1795 G.G. Fülleborn, a philologist of Kantian origin, grouped in two "parts" the recovered fragments of the Poem of Parmenides -"the Truth" and "the Doxa". With small modifications, this structure became classic and is accepted unanimously today. However, a reading of each fragment in an isolated way does not justify such division, which is based on an interpretation of Simplicius influenced by Aristotle, who finds already in Parmenides a sketch of the Platonic dualism between the "sensible" and the "intelligible", not actually present in the latter. This work analyzes critically the criterion used by Fülleborn, which is anachronistic in the case of a preplatonic thinker. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MC7go0ESvT7PDWp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1592","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1592,"authors_free":[{"id":2792,"entry_id":1592,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis Cordero","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"El extra\u00f1o criterio utilizado para crear \"la Doxa\" de Parm\u00e9nides","main_title":{"title":"El extra\u00f1o criterio utilizado para crear \"la Doxa\" de Parm\u00e9nides"},"abstract":"In 1795 G.G. F\u00fclleborn, a philologist of Kantian origin, grouped in two \"parts\" the recovered fragments of the Poem of Parmenides -\"the Truth\" and \"the Doxa\". With small modifications, this structure became classic and is accepted unanimously today. However, a reading of each fragment in an isolated way does not justify such division, which is based on an interpretation of Simplicius influenced by Aristotle, who finds already in Parmenides a sketch of the Platonic dualism between the \"sensible\" and the \"intelligible\", not actually present in the latter. This work analyzes critically the criterion used by F\u00fclleborn, which is anachronistic in the case of a preplatonic thinker. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"Spanish","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MC7go0ESvT7PDWp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1592,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Dianoia","volume":"66","issue":"87","pages":"141-151"}},"sort":["El extra\u00f1o criterio utilizado para crear \"la Doxa\" de Parm\u00e9nides"]}
Title | El testimonio de Aristóteles sobre Zenòn de Elea como un detractor de "lo uno" |
Type | Article |
Language | Spanish |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte |
Volume | 23 |
Pages | 157-181 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gardella, Mariana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The aim of this paper is to discuss the traditional interpretation according to which the arguments of Zeno of Elea against multiplicity constitute a defense of monism. I will try to prove that Zeno’s objections on plurality suppose a previous critique to the existence of the one. Therefore Zeno is neither a monist nor a pluralist but a philosopher who criticizes metaphysical theories that consider being in numerical terms, i. e. as many or as one. I will focus on the analysis of the interpretation of Zeno’s philosophy developed by Aristotle. I will consider some passages from Physics, Sophistical Refutations and mainly Metaphysics Hi. 4. 1001b7-I3 (DK 29 A 21). I will also include some testimonies from Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, where he discusses the interpretations of Eudemus of Rhodes and Alexander of Aphrodisias that support the Aristotelian point of view on Zeno’s philosophy (In Ph. 99.7-18, DK 29 A 21; 138. 3-6, DK 29 A 22). [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YSCgmZjhBUMltzI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"621","_score":null,"_source":{"id":621,"authors_free":[{"id":877,"entry_id":621,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":124,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gardella, Mariana","free_first_name":"Mariana","free_last_name":"Gardella","norm_person":{"id":124,"first_name":"Mariana","last_name":"Gardella","full_name":"Gardella, Mariana","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"El testimonio de Arist\u00f3teles sobre Zen\u00f2n de Elea como un detractor de \"lo uno\"","main_title":{"title":"El testimonio de Arist\u00f3teles sobre Zen\u00f2n de Elea como un detractor de \"lo uno\""},"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to discuss the traditional interpretation according to which the arguments of Zeno of Elea against multiplicity constitute a defense of monism. I will try to prove that Zeno\u2019s objections on plurality suppose a previous critique to the existence of the one. Therefore Zeno is neither a monist nor a pluralist but a philosopher who criticizes metaphysical theories that consider being in numerical terms, i. e. as many or as one. I will focus on the analysis of the interpretation of Zeno\u2019s philosophy developed by Aristotle. I will consider some passages from Physics, Sophistical Re\u00adfutations and mainly Metaphysics Hi. 4. 1001b7-I3 (DK 29 A 21). I will also include some testimonies from Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics, where he discusses the interpretations of Eudemus of Rhodes and Alexander of Aphrodisias that support the Aristotelian point of view on Zeno\u2019s philosophy (In Ph. 99.7-18, DK 29 A 21; 138. 3-6, DK 29 A 22). [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"Spanish","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YSCgmZjhBUMltzI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":124,"full_name":"Gardella, Mariana","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":621,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Eidos: Revista de Filosof\u00eda de la Universidad del Norte","volume":"23","issue":"","pages":"157-181"}},"sort":["El testimonio de Arist\u00f3teles sobre Zen\u00f2n de Elea como un detractor de \"lo uno\""]}
Title | Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 50 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-42 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Henry, Devin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Historically embryogenesis has been among the most philosophically intriguing phenomena. In this paper I focus on one aspect of biological development that was particularly perplexing to the ancients: self-organisation. For many ancients, the fact that an organism determines the important features of its own development required a special model for understanding how this was possible. This was especially true for Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius, who all looked to contemporary technology to supply that model. However, they did not all agree on what kind of device should be used. In this paper I explore the way these ancients made use of technology as a model for the developing embryo. I argue that their different choices of device reveal fundamental differences in the way each thinker understood the nature of biological development itself. In the final section of the paper I challenge the traditional view (dating back to Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle) that the use of automata in GA can simply be read off from their use in the de motu. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1E80hY0xXEIYf7e |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"512","_score":null,"_source":{"id":512,"authors_free":[{"id":711,"entry_id":512,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":1,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Henry, Devin","free_first_name":"Devin","free_last_name":"Henry","norm_person":{"id":1,"first_name":"Devin ","last_name":"Henry","full_name":"Henry, Devin ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1071377922","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy"},"abstract":"Historically embryogenesis has been among the most philosophically intriguing phenomena. In this paper I focus on one aspect of biological development that was particularly perplexing to the ancients: self-organisation. For many ancients, the fact that an organism determines the important features of its own develop\u00adment required a special model for understanding how this was possible. This was especially true for Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius, who all looked to con\u00adtemporary technology to supply that model. However, they did not all agree on what kind of device should be used. In this paper I explore the way these ancients made use of technology as a model for the developing embryo. I argue that their different choices of device reveal fundamental differences in the way each thinker understood the nature of biological development itself. In the final section of the paper I challenge the traditional view (dating back to Alexander\u2019s interpretation of Aristotle) that the use of automata in GA can simply be read off from their use in the de motu. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1E80hY0xXEIYf7e","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":1,"full_name":"Henry, Devin ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":512,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"50","issue":"1","pages":"1-42"}},"sort":["Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy"]}
Title | Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1984 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 37 |
Issue | 1-2 |
Pages | 14-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sider, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notes on Empedocles B 96 |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/gIM2YVFw7r7XnSS |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1018","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1018,"authors_free":[{"id":1534,"entry_id":1018,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":320,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sider, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Sider","norm_person":{"id":320,"first_name":"David","last_name":"Sider","full_name":"Sider, David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1129478610","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion"},"abstract":"Notes on Empedocles B 96","btype":3,"date":"1984","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/gIM2YVFw7r7XnSS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":320,"full_name":"Sider, David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1018,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"37","issue":"1-2","pages":"14-24"}},"sort":["Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion"]}
Title | Empedocles Recycled |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1987 |
Journal | Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 37 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 24-50 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is no longer generally believed that Empedocles was the divided character portrayed by nineteenth-century scholars, a man whose scientific and religious views were incompatible but untouched by each other. Yet it is still widely held that, however unitary his thought, nevertheless he still wrote more than one poem, and that his poems can be clearly divided between those which do, and those which do not, concern 'religious matters'.1 Once this assumption can be shown to be shaky or actually false, the grounds for dividing the quotations of Empedocles into two poems by subject matter disappear; and without that division our interpretation of Empedocles stands in need of radical revision. This paper starts with the modest task of showing that Empedocles may have written only one philosophical poem and not two, and goes on to suggest some of the ways in which we have to rethink the whole story if he did. If all our material belongs to one poem we are bound to link the cycle of the daimones with that of the elements, and this has far-reaching consequences for our interpretation. [Introduction, p. 24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IeJ48ZtTcIZFqmP |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1092","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1092,"authors_free":[{"id":1650,"entry_id":1092,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":280,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Osborne, Catherine","free_first_name":"Catherine","free_last_name":"Osborne","norm_person":{"id":280,"first_name":"Catherine","last_name":"Rowett","full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142220116","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles Recycled","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles Recycled"},"abstract":"It is no longer generally believed that Empedocles was the divided character portrayed by nineteenth-century scholars, a man whose scientific and religious views were incompatible but untouched by each other. Yet it is still widely held that, however unitary his thought, nevertheless he still wrote more than one poem, and that his poems can be clearly divided between those which do, and those which do not, concern \r\n'religious matters'.1 Once this assumption can be shown to be shaky or actually false, the grounds for dividing the quotations of Empedocles into two poems by subject matter disappear; and without that division our interpretation of Empedocles stands in need of radical revision. This paper starts with the modest task of showing that Empedocles may have written only one philosophical poem and not two, and goes on to suggest some of the ways in which we have to rethink the whole story if he did. If all our material belongs to one poem we are bound to link the cycle of the daimones with that of the elements, and this has far-reaching consequences for our \r\ninterpretation. [Introduction, p. 24]","btype":3,"date":"1987","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IeJ48ZtTcIZFqmP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":280,"full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1092,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Quarterly","volume":"37","issue":"1","pages":"24-50"}},"sort":["Empedocles Recycled"]}
Title | Empedocles fr. 35. 14-15 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 15 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-4 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the interpretation of the word "zôros" in a couplet attributed to Empedocles, as quoted by various ancient authors such as Plutarch, Simplicius, Theophrastus, Aristotle, Athenaeus, and Eustathius. The author considers the different meanings attributed to the word, including mixed and unmixed, and argues that the context and source of the quotations must be considered in interpreting the couplet. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cxFblbRQPGH3efy |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1376","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1376,"authors_free":[{"id":2120,"entry_id":1376,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles fr. 35. 14-15","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles fr. 35. 14-15"},"abstract":"This text discusses the interpretation of the word \"z\u00f4ros\" in a couplet attributed to Empedocles, as quoted by various ancient authors such as Plutarch, Simplicius, Theophrastus, Aristotle, Athenaeus, and Eustathius. The author considers the different meanings attributed to the word, including mixed and unmixed, and argues that the context and source of the quotations must be considered in interpreting the couplet. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cxFblbRQPGH3efy","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1376,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"15","issue":"1","pages":"1-4"}},"sort":["Empedocles fr. 35. 14-15"]}
Title | Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1967 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 29-40 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Hitherto reconstructions of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or a complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle. There is in fact probably more evidence for Empedocles’ main views than for those of any other Presocratic except Parmenides in his Way of Truth. From a close examination of the fragments and of the secondary sources, principally Aristotle, Plutarch, and Simplicius, there can be formed a reasonably complete picture of the main temporal and spatial features of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle. [Introduction, p. 29] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fiLkRFQK4eMiUJl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"865","_score":null,"_source":{"id":865,"authors_free":[{"id":1269,"entry_id":865,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle"},"abstract":"Hitherto reconstructions of Empedocles\u2019 cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or \r\na complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle. There is in fact probably more evidence \r\nfor Empedocles\u2019 main views than for those of any other Presocratic except Parmenides in his Way of Truth. From a close examination of the fragments \r\nand of the secondary sources, principally Aristotle, Plutarch, and Simplicius, there can be formed a reasonably complete picture of the main temporal and spatial features of Empedocles\u2019 cosmic cycle. [Introduction, p. 29]","btype":3,"date":"1967","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fiLkRFQK4eMiUJl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":865,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"17","issue":"1","pages":"29-40"}},"sort":["Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle"]}
Title | Empedocles' Fragment 20 DK: Some Suggestions |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1996 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 49 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 298-320 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | van der Ben, Nicolaas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It may be assumed that the way in which Empedocles' fragment 20.1 DK was edited by Diels has left many a reader dissatisfied (cf. notes 8, 9, 10, and 11). However, thanks to the discovery of 53 papyrus fragments of an Empedocles text by Professor A. Martin in the University Library of Strasbourg, some light may be dawning. The collection was acquired by the library as long ago as 1905 but had gone unnoticed. Alain Martin made his find public in a lecture given at Strasbourg on April 14th, 1994. I understand that the publication of all 53 fragments will not take place before the spring of 1996. But photographs of two tiny fragments were circulated by Martin, printed on the invitation to his lecture, one of which contains remnants of 20 DK. Another line was made available in the handout distributed to his audience on that memorable occasion. Hopefully, these two texts will help solve one or two textual problems in Empedocles and shed a ray of light on the Empedocles text used by Simplicius. [introduction p. 298] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bkukUWj7zxxEZPo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"454","_score":null,"_source":{"id":454,"authors_free":[{"id":610,"entry_id":454,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":422,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","free_first_name":"Nicolaas","free_last_name":"van der Ben","norm_person":{"id":422,"first_name":"Nicolaas","last_name":"van der Ben","full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles' Fragment 20 DK: Some Suggestions","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles' Fragment 20 DK: Some Suggestions"},"abstract":"It may be assumed that the way in which Empedocles' fragment 20.1 DK was edited by Diels has left many a reader dissatisfied (cf. notes 8, 9, 10, and 11). However, thanks to the discovery of 53 papyrus fragments of an Empedocles text by Professor A. Martin in the University Library of Strasbourg, some light may be dawning. The collection was acquired by the library as long ago as 1905 but had gone unnoticed. Alain Martin made his find public in a lecture given at Strasbourg on April 14th, 1994. I understand that the publication of all 53 fragments will not take place before the spring of 1996. But photographs of two tiny fragments were circulated by Martin, printed on the invitation to his lecture, one of which contains remnants of 20 DK. Another line was made available in the handout distributed to his audience on that memorable occasion. Hopefully, these two texts will help solve one or two textual problems in Empedocles and shed a ray of light on the Empedocles text used by Simplicius. [introduction p. 298]","btype":3,"date":"1996","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bkukUWj7zxxEZPo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":422,"full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":454,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"49","issue":"3","pages":"298-320"}},"sort":["Empedocles' Fragment 20 DK: Some Suggestions"]}
Title | Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1962 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 109-111 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Arundel, Maureen Rosemary |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the interpretation and translation of a fragment of Theophrastus and Plutarch. The word "zôros" is of particular concern, as there is difficulty in determining its meaning, with some suggesting it means "mixed" while others argue it means "undiluted." The author suggests that the reading of the Empedocles line should be restored to "zôra" meaning "undiluted" and that the modern interpretation of "mixed" is unjustifiable. The text also examines the use of "zôra" in Philumenus' work and argues that there is no occurrence in which it means "mixed." [derived from the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KKhE3Xs36JAl2Ut |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1262","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1262,"authors_free":[{"id":1848,"entry_id":1262,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":36,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Arundel, Maureen Rosemary","free_first_name":"Maureen Rosemary","free_last_name":"Arundel","norm_person":{"id":36,"first_name":"Maureen Rosemary","last_name":"Arundel","full_name":"Arundel, Maureen Rosemary","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15","main_title":{"title":"Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15"},"abstract":"This text discusses the interpretation and translation of a fragment of Theophrastus and Plutarch. The word \"z\u00f4ros\" is of particular concern, as there is difficulty in determining its meaning, with some suggesting it means \"mixed\" while others argue it means \"undiluted.\" The author suggests that the reading of the Empedocles line should be restored to \"z\u00f4ra\" meaning \"undiluted\" and that the modern interpretation of \"mixed\" is unjustifiable. The text also examines the use of \"z\u00f4ra\" in Philumenus' work and argues that there is no occurrence in which it means \"mixed.\" [derived from the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1962","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KKhE3Xs36JAl2Ut","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":36,"full_name":"Arundel, Maureen Rosemary","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1262,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"12","issue":"2","pages":"109-111"}},"sort":["Empedocles, fr. 35. 12-15"]}
Title | Empedokleův sfairos v pohledech antických interpretů |
Type | Article |
Language | Czech |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Listy filologické / Folia philologica |
Volume | 131 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 379-439 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hladký, Vojtech |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Tento text si klade za cíl prozkoumat způsob, jakým recipují a reinterpretují Empedokleovu koncepci či spíše představu Sfairu pozdější antičtí autoři. Navazuje přitom na naši předchozí práci, ve které jsme se pokusili – především na základě textů Empedoklea samého – tento moment Empedokleova rozvrhu světa rekonstruovat.² V něm, jak známo, čtyři základní a věčné prvky-živly (oheň, vzduch, vodu, zemi) přetvářejí, navzájem slučují a rozlučují dvě formující síly – Láska a Svár. Působením Lásky tak z původně jednoduchých prvků vznikají vyšší a složitější organismy a vůbec všechny věci, naproti tomu působením Sváru dochází k jejich rozkladu a návratu prvků do jejich původní čisté podoby. Podle závěru našeho předchozího článku je Sfairos, vzniklý v okamžiku největšího vzepětí Lásky, ve skutečnosti jakýsi obrovský organismus, zahrnující do sebe všechny předtím vzniklé věci. Ty se dohromady spojí buď tak, že doslova fyzicky srostou, či přinejmenším dohromady vytvoří harmonický svět, v němž Láska zaručuje mírumilovné soužití a soubytí všeho, co předtím ze základních prvků vytvořila. Navíc je snad možné ztotožnit Sfairos se „svatou a nadlidskou myslí (φρην ιερή και άθέσφατος)“, o níž tento autor mluví ve svém zlomku B 134. Jsme si přitom vědomi, že tato interpretace Empedokleova Sfairu je dosti neobvyklá. Vzhledem k tomu, že se nám báseň velkého Akragantťana nezachovala v úplnosti a její přesné filozofické sdělení bylo na mnoha místech ne zcela jasné patrně již pro antického čtenáře, musíme se bohužel o mnoha aspektech nauky, kterou hlásá, pouze dohadovat. V předchozí práci jsme se pokusili rekonstruovat Sfairos na základě rozboru zachovaného Empedokleova textu doplněného o starověká svědectví. Snažíme-li se nyní provést rozbor výkladů Sfairu, které podávají Empedokleovi filozofičtí následovníci, činíme tak rovněž proto, abychom naši poněkud nezvyklou interpretaci dále nepřímo podpořili a zároveň poukázali na vliv, jaký Empedoklés – zejména pak v případě Platónových dialogů Tímaia, Politika a Symposia – mohl mít. Projdeme-li v detailu ohlasy Empedoklea u pozdějších autorů, které jsou možná někdy poněkud překvapivé, můžeme si pak na konci našeho zkoumání znovu položit otázku, zda by nemohly vrhnout nové světlo na jeho bohužel jen velmi torzovitě zachované dílo. [introduction p. 379-381] Übersetzung: Dieser Text zielt darauf ab, die Art und Weise zu untersuchen, wie spätere antike Autoren Empedokles’ Konzept oder eher die Vorstellung des Sphairos aufnehmen und reinterpretieren. Dabei knüpft er an unsere vorherige Arbeit an, in der wir versucht haben – vor allem auf der Grundlage von Empedokles’ eigenen Texten – diesen Aspekt von Empedokles’ Weltentwurf zu rekonstruieren.² Darin, wie bekannt, formen, verbinden und trennen sich die vier grundlegenden und ewigen Elemente (Feuer, Luft, Wasser, Erde) durch das Wirken von zwei gestaltenden Kräften – Liebe und Streit. Durch die Wirkung der Liebe entstehen aus den ursprünglich einfachen Elementen höhere und komplexere Organismen und überhaupt alle Dinge, während durch die Wirkung des Streits deren Zerfall und die Rückkehr der Elemente in ihre ursprüngliche reine Form erfolgt. Laut dem Schluss unserer vorherigen Arbeit ist der Sphairos, der im Moment des höchsten Wirkens der Liebe entsteht, tatsächlich eine Art riesiger Organismus, der alle zuvor entstandenen Dinge in sich vereint. Diese verbinden sich entweder dadurch, dass sie buchstäblich physisch miteinander verschmelzen, oder zumindest gemeinsam eine harmonische Welt schaffen, in der die Liebe ein friedliches Zusammenleben und Mitsein all dessen garantiert, was zuvor aus den grundlegenden Elementen erschaffen wurde. Darüber hinaus ist es vielleicht möglich, den Sphairos mit dem „heiligen und übermenschlichen Geist (φρην ιερή και άθέσφατος)“ zu identifizieren, von dem dieser Autor in seinem Fragment B 134 spricht. Wir sind uns dabei bewusst, dass diese Interpretation des Sphairos von Empedokles recht ungewöhnlich ist. Da das Gedicht des großen Akragantinischen Dichters nicht vollständig erhalten ist und seine genaue philosophische Aussage wohl schon für die antiken Leser an vielen Stellen nicht völlig klar war, müssen wir uns leider in vielen Aspekten der Lehre, die er verkündet, nur auf Vermutungen stützen. In der vorherigen Arbeit haben wir versucht, den Sphairos auf der Grundlage der Analyse des erhaltenen Textes von Empedokles, ergänzt durch antike Zeugnisse, zu rekonstruieren. Wenn wir nun versuchen, die Auslegungen des Sphairos zu analysieren, die von den philosophischen Nachfolgern des Empedokles gegeben wurden, tun wir dies auch, um unsere etwas ungewöhnliche Interpretation indirekt weiter zu stützen und zugleich auf den Einfluss hinzuweisen, den Empedokles – insbesondere im Fall der platonischen Dialoge Timaios, Politikos und Symposion – möglicherweise hatte. Wenn wir die Rezeptionen von Empedokles bei späteren Autoren im Detail durchgehen, die manchmal vielleicht etwas überraschend sind, können wir uns am Ende unserer Untersuchung erneut die Frage stellen, ob diese nicht ein neues Licht auf sein leider nur sehr fragmentarisch erhaltenes Werk werfen könnten. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DoW1OJgnzqLFDXs |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"778","_score":null,"_source":{"id":778,"authors_free":[{"id":1142,"entry_id":778,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":180,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hladk\u00fd, Vojtech ","free_first_name":"Vojtech","free_last_name":"Hladk\u00fd","norm_person":{"id":180,"first_name":"Vojt\u011bch","last_name":"Hladk\u00fd","full_name":"Hladk\u00fd, Vojt\u011bch","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Empedokle\u016fv sfairos v pohledech antick\u00fdch interpret\u016f","main_title":{"title":"Empedokle\u016fv sfairos v pohledech antick\u00fdch interpret\u016f"},"abstract":"Tento text si klade za c\u00edl prozkoumat zp\u016fsob, jak\u00fdm recipuj\u00ed a reinterpretuj\u00ed Empedokleovu koncepci \u010di sp\u00ed\u0161e p\u0159edstavu Sfairu pozd\u011bj\u0161\u00ed anti\u010dt\u00ed auto\u0159i. Navazuje p\u0159itom na na\u0161i p\u0159edchoz\u00ed pr\u00e1ci, ve kter\u00e9 jsme se pokusili \u2013 p\u0159edev\u0161\u00edm na z\u00e1klad\u011b text\u016f Empedoklea sam\u00e9ho \u2013 tento moment Empedokleova rozvrhu sv\u011bta rekonstruovat.\u00b2 V n\u011bm, jak zn\u00e1mo, \u010dty\u0159i z\u00e1kladn\u00ed a v\u011b\u010dn\u00e9 prvky-\u017eivly (ohe\u0148, vzduch, vodu, zemi) p\u0159etv\u00e1\u0159ej\u00ed, navz\u00e1jem slu\u010duj\u00ed a rozlu\u010duj\u00ed dv\u011b formuj\u00edc\u00ed s\u00edly \u2013 L\u00e1ska a Sv\u00e1r. P\u016fsoben\u00edm L\u00e1sky tak z p\u016fvodn\u011b jednoduch\u00fdch prvk\u016f vznikaj\u00ed vy\u0161\u0161\u00ed a slo\u017eit\u011bj\u0161\u00ed organismy a v\u016fbec v\u0161echny v\u011bci, naproti tomu p\u016fsoben\u00edm Sv\u00e1ru doch\u00e1z\u00ed k jejich rozkladu a n\u00e1vratu prvk\u016f do jejich p\u016fvodn\u00ed \u010dist\u00e9 podoby.\r\n\r\nPodle z\u00e1v\u011bru na\u0161eho p\u0159edchoz\u00edho \u010dl\u00e1nku je Sfairos, vznikl\u00fd v okam\u017eiku nejv\u011bt\u0161\u00edho vzep\u011bt\u00ed L\u00e1sky, ve skute\u010dnosti jak\u00fdsi obrovsk\u00fd organismus, zahrnuj\u00edc\u00ed do sebe v\u0161echny p\u0159edt\u00edm vznikl\u00e9 v\u011bci. Ty se dohromady spoj\u00ed bu\u010f tak, \u017ee doslova fyzicky srostou, \u010di p\u0159inejmen\u0161\u00edm dohromady vytvo\u0159\u00ed harmonick\u00fd sv\u011bt, v n\u011bm\u017e L\u00e1ska zaru\u010duje m\u00edrumilovn\u00e9 sou\u017eit\u00ed a soubyt\u00ed v\u0161eho, co p\u0159edt\u00edm ze z\u00e1kladn\u00edch prvk\u016f vytvo\u0159ila. Nav\u00edc je snad mo\u017en\u00e9 ztoto\u017enit Sfairos se \u201esvatou a nadlidskou mysl\u00ed (\u03c6\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd \u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ac\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\u201c, o n\u00ed\u017e tento autor mluv\u00ed ve sv\u00e9m zlomku B 134.\r\n\r\nJsme si p\u0159itom v\u011bdomi, \u017ee tato interpretace Empedokleova Sfairu je dosti neobvykl\u00e1. Vzhledem k tomu, \u017ee se n\u00e1m b\u00e1se\u0148 velk\u00e9ho Akragant\u0165ana nezachovala v \u00faplnosti a jej\u00ed p\u0159esn\u00e9 filozofick\u00e9 sd\u011blen\u00ed bylo na mnoha m\u00edstech ne zcela jasn\u00e9 patrn\u011b ji\u017e pro antick\u00e9ho \u010dten\u00e1\u0159e, mus\u00edme se bohu\u017eel o mnoha aspektech nauky, kterou hl\u00e1s\u00e1, pouze dohadovat. V p\u0159edchoz\u00ed pr\u00e1ci jsme se pokusili rekonstruovat Sfairos na z\u00e1klad\u011b rozboru zachovan\u00e9ho Empedokleova textu dopln\u011bn\u00e9ho o starov\u011bk\u00e1 sv\u011bdectv\u00ed.\r\n\r\nSna\u017e\u00edme-li se nyn\u00ed prov\u00e9st rozbor v\u00fdklad\u016f Sfairu, kter\u00e9 pod\u00e1vaj\u00ed Empedokleovi filozofi\u010dt\u00ed n\u00e1sledovn\u00edci, \u010din\u00edme tak rovn\u011b\u017e proto, abychom na\u0161i pon\u011bkud nezvyklou interpretaci d\u00e1le nep\u0159\u00edmo podpo\u0159ili a z\u00e1rove\u0148 pouk\u00e1zali na vliv, jak\u00fd Empedokl\u00e9s \u2013 zejm\u00e9na pak v p\u0159\u00edpad\u011b Plat\u00f3nov\u00fdch dialog\u016f T\u00edmaia, Politika a Symposia \u2013 mohl m\u00edt. Projdeme-li v detailu ohlasy Empedoklea u pozd\u011bj\u0161\u00edch autor\u016f, kter\u00e9 jsou mo\u017en\u00e1 n\u011bkdy pon\u011bkud p\u0159ekvapiv\u00e9, m\u016f\u017eeme si pak na konci na\u0161eho zkoum\u00e1n\u00ed znovu polo\u017eit ot\u00e1zku, zda by nemohly vrhnout nov\u00e9 sv\u011btlo na jeho bohu\u017eel jen velmi torzovit\u011b zachovan\u00e9 d\u00edlo. [introduction p. 379-381] \u00dcbersetzung: Dieser Text zielt darauf ab, die Art und Weise zu untersuchen, wie sp\u00e4tere antike Autoren Empedokles\u2019 Konzept oder eher die Vorstellung des Sphairos aufnehmen und reinterpretieren. Dabei kn\u00fcpft er an unsere vorherige Arbeit an, in der wir versucht haben \u2013 vor allem auf der Grundlage von Empedokles\u2019 eigenen Texten \u2013 diesen Aspekt von Empedokles\u2019 Weltentwurf zu rekonstruieren.\u00b2 Darin, wie bekannt, formen, verbinden und trennen sich die vier grundlegenden und ewigen Elemente (Feuer, Luft, Wasser, Erde) durch das Wirken von zwei gestaltenden Kr\u00e4ften \u2013 Liebe und Streit. Durch die Wirkung der Liebe entstehen aus den urspr\u00fcnglich einfachen Elementen h\u00f6here und komplexere Organismen und \u00fcberhaupt alle Dinge, w\u00e4hrend durch die Wirkung des Streits deren Zerfall und die R\u00fcckkehr der Elemente in ihre urspr\u00fcngliche reine Form erfolgt.\r\n\r\nLaut dem Schluss unserer vorherigen Arbeit ist der Sphairos, der im Moment des h\u00f6chsten Wirkens der Liebe entsteht, tats\u00e4chlich eine Art riesiger Organismus, der alle zuvor entstandenen Dinge in sich vereint. Diese verbinden sich entweder dadurch, dass sie buchst\u00e4blich physisch miteinander verschmelzen, oder zumindest gemeinsam eine harmonische Welt schaffen, in der die Liebe ein friedliches Zusammenleben und Mitsein all dessen garantiert, was zuvor aus den grundlegenden Elementen erschaffen wurde. Dar\u00fcber hinaus ist es vielleicht m\u00f6glich, den Sphairos mit dem \u201eheiligen und \u00fcbermenschlichen Geist (\u03c6\u03c1\u03b7\u03bd \u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ac\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\u201c zu identifizieren, von dem dieser Autor in seinem Fragment B 134 spricht.\r\n\r\nWir sind uns dabei bewusst, dass diese Interpretation des Sphairos von Empedokles recht ungew\u00f6hnlich ist. Da das Gedicht des gro\u00dfen Akragantinischen Dichters nicht vollst\u00e4ndig erhalten ist und seine genaue philosophische Aussage wohl schon f\u00fcr die antiken Leser an vielen Stellen nicht v\u00f6llig klar war, m\u00fcssen wir uns leider in vielen Aspekten der Lehre, die er verk\u00fcndet, nur auf Vermutungen st\u00fctzen. In der vorherigen Arbeit haben wir versucht, den Sphairos auf der Grundlage der Analyse des erhaltenen Textes von Empedokles, erg\u00e4nzt durch antike Zeugnisse, zu rekonstruieren.\r\n\r\nWenn wir nun versuchen, die Auslegungen des Sphairos zu analysieren, die von den philosophischen Nachfolgern des Empedokles gegeben wurden, tun wir dies auch, um unsere etwas ungew\u00f6hnliche Interpretation indirekt weiter zu st\u00fctzen und zugleich auf den Einfluss hinzuweisen, den Empedokles \u2013 insbesondere im Fall der platonischen Dialoge Timaios, Politikos und Symposion \u2013 m\u00f6glicherweise hatte. Wenn wir die Rezeptionen von Empedokles bei sp\u00e4teren Autoren im Detail durchgehen, die manchmal vielleicht etwas \u00fcberraschend sind, k\u00f6nnen wir uns am Ende unserer Untersuchung erneut die Frage stellen, ob diese nicht ein neues Licht auf sein leider nur sehr fragmentarisch erhaltenes Werk werfen k\u00f6nnten.","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"Czech","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DoW1OJgnzqLFDXs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":180,"full_name":"Hladk\u00fd, Vojt\u011bch","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":778,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Listy filologick\u00e9 \/ Folia philologica","volume":"131","issue":"3\/4","pages":"379-439"}},"sort":["Empedokle\u016fv sfairos v pohledech antick\u00fdch interpret\u016f"]}
Title | Epictetus, "Encheiridion" 27 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 473-481 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Boter, Gerard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
"Obscuras et dubius locus," is Wolf's comment on chapter 27 of Epictetus' Encheiridion, and rightly so. The comparison employed by Epictetus in this chapter has been interpreted in several different ways, none of which, however, is entirely or even approximately satisfactory. The statement made by Epictetus is rather plain in itself: evil has no autonomous natural existence in the world, and one can hardly doubt that Simplicius is correct in his contention that good is a ὑπόστασις, whereas evil is a παρυπόστασις, i.e., something which exists only as a counterpart of good but has no independent existence of its own. The problem lies in the comparison: in which way can the statement σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται be applied to the notion that ἡ φύσις κακοῦ does not exist in the cosmos? Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the part of the Diatribes from which Arrianus took Ench. 27 is not extant, so that we cannot tell whether Epictetus gave a fuller exposition of the comparison. Before discussing a number of interpretations proposed by commentators, ancient and modern, I would like to stress that in principle, preference should be given to an interpretation that stays as close to the text as possible (i.e., one that does not have to adduce notions which are not expressed explicitly), and in which the parallelism between image and application is seen most directly. [introduction p. 473-474] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/eKcNERBrRo5RK9q |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1074","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1074,"authors_free":[{"id":1628,"entry_id":1074,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":15,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Boter, Gerard","free_first_name":"Gerard","free_last_name":"Boter","norm_person":{"id":15,"first_name":"Gerard ","last_name":"Boter","full_name":"Boter, Gerard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1089766114","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Epictetus, \"Encheiridion\" 27","main_title":{"title":"Epictetus, \"Encheiridion\" 27"},"abstract":"\"Obscuras et dubius locus,\" is Wolf's comment on chapter 27 of Epictetus' Encheiridion, and rightly so. The comparison employed by Epictetus in this chapter has been interpreted in several different ways, none of which, however, is entirely or even approximately satisfactory. The statement made by Epictetus is rather plain in itself: evil has no autonomous natural existence in the world, and one can hardly doubt that Simplicius is correct in his contention that good is a \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, whereas evil is a \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c5\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, i.e., something which exists only as a counterpart of good but has no independent existence of its own.\r\n\r\nThe problem lies in the comparison: in which way can the statement \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 be applied to the notion that \u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 does not exist in the cosmos? Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the part of the Diatribes from which Arrianus took Ench. 27 is not extant, so that we cannot tell whether Epictetus gave a fuller exposition of the comparison.\r\n\r\nBefore discussing a number of interpretations proposed by commentators, ancient and modern, I would like to stress that in principle, preference should be given to an interpretation that stays as close to the text as possible (i.e., one that does not have to adduce notions which are not expressed explicitly), and in which the parallelism between image and application is seen most directly. [introduction p. 473-474]","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/eKcNERBrRo5RK9q","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":15,"full_name":"Boter, Gerard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1074,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"45","issue":"4","pages":"473-481"}},"sort":["Epictetus, \"Encheiridion\" 27"]}
Title | Epitêdeiolês in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis |
Type | Article |
Language | undefined |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Acta Classica |
Volume | 15 |
Pages | 25-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, R. B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/i1HyYnNymEt19CA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1562","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1562,"authors_free":[{"id":2729,"entry_id":1562,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Todd, R. B.","free_first_name":"R. B.","free_last_name":"Todd","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Epit\u00eadeiol\u00eas in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis","main_title":{"title":"Epit\u00eadeiol\u00eas in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/i1HyYnNymEt19CA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1562,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Acta Classica","volume":"15","issue":"","pages":"25-35"}},"sort":["Epit\u00eadeiol\u00eas in Philosophical Literature: Towards an Analysis"]}
Title | Eudorus and the Early Platonist Interpretation of the "Categories" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Laval théologique et philosophique |
Volume | 64 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 583-595 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarrant, Harold |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The hermeneutic tradition concerning Aristotle’s Categories goes back to Eudorus and his contemporaries in the first century BC. Initially a perplexing text, it forces the Platonist to consider a variety of new dialectical questions. The criticisms of Eudorus demonstrate the desire for orderly arrangements, and pose questions that the hermeneutic tradition, culminating in the magnificent commentary of Simplicius, would try to answer. His pursuit of a critical agenda does not warrant the label “anti-Aristotelian” or “polemical”, but it does show why he preferred to be known as an Academic than as a Peripatetic. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/wSO0JNPufdqhWkk |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"473","_score":null,"_source":{"id":473,"authors_free":[{"id":638,"entry_id":473,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":122,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tarrant, Harold","free_first_name":"Harold","free_last_name":"Tarrant","norm_person":{"id":122,"first_name":"Harold ","last_name":"Tarrant","full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132040077","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Eudorus and the Early Platonist Interpretation of the \"Categories\"","main_title":{"title":"Eudorus and the Early Platonist Interpretation of the \"Categories\""},"abstract":"The hermeneutic tradition concerning Aristotle\u2019s Categories goes back to Eudorus and his contemporaries in the first century BC. Initially a perplexing text, it forces the Platonist to consider a variety of new dialectical questions. The criticisms of Eudorus demonstrate the desire for orderly arrangements, and pose questions that the hermeneutic tradition, culminating in the magnificent commentary of Simplicius, would try to answer. His pursuit of a critical agenda does not warrant the label \u201canti-Aristotelian\u201d or \u201cpolemical\u201d, but it does show why he preferred to be known as an Academic than as a Peripatetic. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/wSO0JNPufdqhWkk","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":122,"full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":473,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Laval th\u00e9ologique et philosophique","volume":"64","issue":"3","pages":"583-595"}},"sort":["Eudorus and the Early Platonist Interpretation of the \"Categories\""]}
Title | Ficino's Lecture on the Good? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Renaissance Quarterly |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 160-171 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Allen, Michael J. B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article discusses Plato's Lecture on the Good, the only lecture attributed to Plato by ancient sources. The lecture was attended by Aristotle and other students of Plato and was described as a blend of formal exposition, digressions, and asides. Although it was not a public success, the Lecture became famous in the ancient world for what the Neoplatonists presumed was its Pythagorean content. The Lecture played a role in the history of fifteenth-century Florentine Platonism under its chief architect, Marsilio Ficino, who was interested in reviving Neoplatonism and wedding it to Christianity while also dreaming of revitalizing the day-to-day life of the ancient Athenian Academy. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/P2WTHK3pKgeUa4u |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1261","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1261,"authors_free":[{"id":1847,"entry_id":1261,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":33,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Allen, Michael J. B.","free_first_name":"Michael J. B.","free_last_name":"Allen","norm_person":{"id":33,"first_name":"Michael J. B. ","last_name":"Allen","full_name":"Allen, Michael J. B. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/12310405X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ficino's Lecture on the Good?","main_title":{"title":"Ficino's Lecture on the Good?"},"abstract":"This article discusses Plato's Lecture on the Good, the only lecture attributed to Plato by ancient sources. The lecture was attended by Aristotle and other students of Plato and was described as a blend of formal exposition, digressions, and asides. Although it was not a public success, the Lecture became famous in the ancient world for what the Neoplatonists presumed was its Pythagorean content. The Lecture played a role in the history of fifteenth-century Florentine Platonism under its chief architect, Marsilio Ficino, who was interested in reviving Neoplatonism and wedding it to Christianity while also dreaming of revitalizing the day-to-day life of the ancient Athenian Academy. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/P2WTHK3pKgeUa4u","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":33,"full_name":"Allen, Michael J. B. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1261,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Renaissance Quarterly ","volume":"30","issue":"2","pages":"160-171"}},"sort":["Ficino's Lecture on the Good?"]}
Title | Formal Argument and Olympiodorus’ Development as a Plato-Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2021 |
Journal | History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 210-241 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarrant, Harold |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Olympiodorus led the Platonist school of philosophy at Alexandria for several decades in the sixth century, and both Platonic and Aristotelian commentaries ascribed to him survive. During this time the school’s attitude to the teaching of Aristotelian syllogistic, originally owing something to Ammonius, changed markedly, with an early tendency to reinforce the teaching of syllogistic even in Platonist lectures giving way to a greater awareness of its limitations. The vocabulary for arguments and their construction becomes far commoner than the language of syllogistic and syllogistic figures, and also of demonstration. I discuss the value of these changes for the dating of certain works, especially where the text lectured on does not demand different emphases. The commitment to argument rather than to authority continues, but a greater emphasis eventually falls on the establishment of the premises than on formal validity. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/F0bFT161R2MXdut |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1464","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1464,"authors_free":[{"id":2537,"entry_id":1464,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":122,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tarrant, Harold","free_first_name":"Harold","free_last_name":"Tarrant","norm_person":{"id":122,"first_name":"Harold ","last_name":"Tarrant","full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132040077","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Formal Argument and Olympiodorus\u2019 Development as a Plato-Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Formal Argument and Olympiodorus\u2019 Development as a Plato-Commentator"},"abstract":"Olympiodorus led the Platonist school of philosophy at Alexandria for several decades in the sixth century,\r\nand both Platonic and Aristotelian commentaries ascribed to him survive. During this time the school\u2019s\r\nattitude to the teaching of Aristotelian syllogistic, originally owing something to Ammonius,\r\nchanged markedly, with an early tendency to reinforce the teaching of syllogistic even in Platonist\r\nlectures giving way to a greater awareness of its limitations. The vocabulary for arguments and their\r\nconstruction becomes far commoner than the language of syllogistic and syllogistic figures, and also of\r\ndemonstration. I discuss the value of these changes for the dating of certain works, especially where the\r\ntext lectured on does not demand different emphases. The commitment to argument rather than to authority\r\ncontinues, but a greater emphasis eventually falls on the establishment of the premises than on formal\r\nvalidity. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/F0bFT161R2MXdut","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":122,"full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1464,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"210-241"}},"sort":["Formal Argument and Olympiodorus\u2019 Development as a Plato-Commentator"]}
Title | Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Criticism of Aristotle's Logic |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Vivarum |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 113-124 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Deitz, Luc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Francesco Patrizi da Chersos Discussiones peripateticae (1581) are one of the most com- prehensive analyses of the whole of Aristotelian philosophy to be published before Werner Jaeger s Aristoteles . The main thrust of the argument in the Discussiones is that whatever Aristotle had said that was true was not new, and that whatever he had said that was new was not true. The article shows how Patrizi proves this with respect to the Organon , and deals with the implications for the history of ancient philosophy in general implied by his stance. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jBaQdPWRsyt3XGo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1299","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1299,"authors_free":[{"id":1892,"entry_id":1299,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":88,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Deitz, Luc","free_first_name":"Luc","free_last_name":"Deitz","norm_person":{"id":88,"first_name":"Luc","last_name":"Deitz","full_name":"Deitz, Luc","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/113154011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Criticism of Aristotle's Logic","main_title":{"title":"Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Criticism of Aristotle's Logic"},"abstract":"Francesco Patrizi da Chersos Discussiones peripateticae (1581) are one of the most com- prehensive analyses of the whole of Aristotelian philosophy to be published before Werner Jaeger s Aristoteles . The main thrust of the argument in the Discussiones is that whatever Aristotle had said that was true was not new, and that whatever he had said that was new was not true. The article shows how Patrizi proves this with respect to the Organon , and deals with the implications for the history of ancient philosophy in general implied by his stance. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jBaQdPWRsyt3XGo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":88,"full_name":"Deitz, Luc","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1299,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Vivarum","volume":"45","issue":"1","pages":"113-124"}},"sort":["Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Criticism of Aristotle's Logic"]}
Title | From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Poetics Today |
Volume | 28 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 247–281 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Commentary was an important vehicle for philosophical debate in late antiquity. Its antecedents lie in the rise of rational argumentation, polemical rivalry, literacy, and the canonization of texts. This essay aims to give a historical and typological outline of philosophical exegesis in antiquity, from the earliest allegorizing readings of Homer to the full-blown “running commentary” in the Platonic tradition (fourth to sixth centuries CE). Running commentaries are mostly on authoritative thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. Yet they are never mere scholarly enterprises but, rather, springboards for syncretistic clarification, elaboration, and creative interpretation. Two case studies (Galen 129-219 CE, Simplicius ca. 530 CE) will illustrate the range of exegetical tools available at the end of a long tradition in medical science and in reading Aristotle through Neoplatonic eyes, respectively. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9evl1bXvfOTYX0r |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"968","_score":null,"_source":{"id":968,"authors_free":[{"id":1455,"entry_id":968,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary","main_title":{"title":"From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary"},"abstract":"Commentary was an important vehicle for philosophical debate in late antiquity. Its antecedents lie in the rise of rational argumentation, polemical rivalry, literacy, and the canonization of texts. This essay aims to give a historical and typological outline of philosophical exegesis in antiquity, from the earliest alle\u00adgorizing readings of Homer to the full-blown \u201crunning commentary\u201d in the Pla\u00adtonic tradition (fourth to sixth centuries CE). Running commentaries are mostly on authoritative thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. Yet they are never mere scholarly enterprises but, rather, springboards for syncretistic clarification, elaboration, and creative interpretation. Two case studies (Galen 129-219 CE, Simplicius ca. 530 CE) will illustrate the range of exegetical tools available at the end of a long tradition in medical science and in reading Aristotle through Neoplatonic eyes, respectively. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9evl1bXvfOTYX0r","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":968,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Poetics Today","volume":"28","issue":"2","pages":"247\u2013281"}},"sort":["From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary"]}
Title | Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle’s Categories in the First Century BC |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Acta Antiqua |
Volume | 48 |
Issue | 1-2 |
Pages | 273-287 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sharples, Robert W. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A re-examination of the question of why, during the revival of interest in Aristotle’s esoteric works in the first century BC, the Categories played such a prominent role. The answers suggested are that the work aroused interest precisely because it did not easily fit into the standard Hellenistic divisions of philosophy and their usual agendas, and that, more than Aristotle’s other works—with the possible exception of the Metaphysics—it revealed aspects of Aristotle’s thought that had become unfamiliar during the Hellenistic period. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9elANNxfsrgxsis |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1023","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1023,"authors_free":[{"id":1542,"entry_id":1023,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":42,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","free_first_name":"Robert W.","free_last_name":"Sharples","norm_person":{"id":42,"first_name":"Robert W.","last_name":"Sharples","full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114269505","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the First Century BC","main_title":{"title":"Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the First Century BC"},"abstract":"A re-examination of the question of why, during the revival of interest in Aristotle\u2019s esoteric works in the first century BC, the Categories played such a prominent role. The answers suggested are that the work aroused interest precisely because it did not easily fit into the standard Hellenistic divisions of philosophy and their usual agendas, and that, more than Aristotle\u2019s other works\u2014with the possible exception of the Metaphysics\u2014it revealed aspects of Aristotle\u2019s thought that had become unfamiliar during the Hellenistic period. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9elANNxfsrgxsis","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":42,"full_name":"Sharples, Robert W.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1023,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Acta Antiqua","volume":"48","issue":"1-2","pages":"273-287"}},"sort":["Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the First Century BC"]}
Title | Handschriftliches zum Commentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles de caelo |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1892 |
Journal | Sitzungsberichte der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin |
Pages | 59-76 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Heiberg, Johan Ludvig |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Über dem Kommentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles De caelo hat bisher ein besonderer Unglücksstern gewaltet. Das wichtige Werk liegt griechisch nur in zwei Ausgaben vor: der Aldina von 1526, deren Text von Peyron als Rückübersetzung der lateinischen Übersetzung Wilhelms von Moerbeke bezeichnet wurde, an welcher Entdeckung jedoch von neueren wieder gerüttelt worden ist, und der holländischen Akademie-Ausgabe vom Jahre 1865, zu deren Charakteristik diese Abhandlung genügendes liefern wird. Beide Ausgaben sind ohne kritischen Apparat, und derselbe Mangel macht auch die Auszüge bei Brandis, die übrigens auf besserer handschriftlicher Grundlage fußen, wenig brauchbar, besonders für die zahlreichen Zitate aus verlorenen Schriften, welche diesem Werke des Simplicius einen besonderen Wert geben. Es soll hier als erster Schritt zur Hebung des Bannes der Versuch gemacht werden, die handschriftliche Grundlage dieses Werkes festzustellen. [introduction p. 59] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/umbt971kuW4QUC0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"514","_score":null,"_source":{"id":514,"authors_free":[{"id":2059,"entry_id":514,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":229,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Heiberg, Johan Ludvig","free_first_name":"Johan Ludvig","free_last_name":"Heiberg","norm_person":{"id":229,"first_name":"Johan Ludvig","last_name":"Heiberg","full_name":"Heiberg, Johan Ludvig","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120334100","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Handschriftliches zum Commentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles de caelo","main_title":{"title":"Handschriftliches zum Commentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles de caelo"},"abstract":"\u00dcber dem Kommentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles De caelo hat bisher ein besonderer Ungl\u00fccksstern gewaltet. Das wichtige Werk liegt griechisch nur in zwei Ausgaben vor: der Aldina von 1526, deren Text von Peyron als R\u00fcck\u00fcbersetzung der lateinischen \u00dcbersetzung Wilhelms von Moerbeke bezeichnet wurde, an welcher Entdeckung jedoch von neueren wieder ger\u00fcttelt worden ist, und der holl\u00e4ndischen Akademie-Ausgabe vom Jahre 1865, zu deren Charakteristik diese Abhandlung gen\u00fcgendes liefern wird.\r\n\r\nBeide Ausgaben sind ohne kritischen Apparat, und derselbe Mangel macht auch die Ausz\u00fcge bei Brandis, die \u00fcbrigens auf besserer handschriftlicher Grundlage fu\u00dfen, wenig brauchbar, besonders f\u00fcr die zahlreichen Zitate aus verlorenen Schriften, welche diesem Werke des Simplicius einen besonderen Wert geben.\r\n\r\nEs soll hier als erster Schritt zur Hebung des Bannes der Versuch gemacht werden, die handschriftliche Grundlage dieses Werkes festzustellen. [introduction p. 59]","btype":3,"date":"1892","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/umbt971kuW4QUC0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":229,"full_name":"Heiberg, Johan Ludvig","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":514,"section_of":378,"pages":"59-76","is_catalog":null,"book":null},"article":{"id":514,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Sitzungsberichte der K\u00f6niglich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin","volume":"","issue":"","pages":"59-76"}},"sort":["Handschriftliches zum Commentar des Simplicius zu Aristoteles de caelo"]}
Title | Herakleides Pontikos de Ontdekker van het Heliocentrisme? |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1956 |
Journal | L'Antiquité Classique |
Volume | 25 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 351-385 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Valckenaere de, Erik |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ons onderzoek van de bronnen resumerend, komen we tot de volgende besluiten: Volgens Herakleides bevindt de aarde zich in het midden van het heelal (Simplikios: fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: fragment 2; Chalcidius: fragment 7). De aarde draait om haar eigen as. In de meeste fragmenten vinden we zelfs de specificatie van deze aswenteling: de aarde draait in 24 uur (Simplikios: fragment 5; Aetios: fragment 4) van west naar oost (Simplikios: fragment 5, 6; Aetios: fragment 4) ter verklaring van de dagelijkse beweging der hemellichamen. De zon draait jaarlijks rond de aarde van oost naar west (Simplikios: fragment 5; Chalcidius: fragment 7). De binnenplaneten Venus en naar alle waarschijnlijkheid ook Mercurius draaien rond de zon (Chalcidius: fragment 7). De meest voor de hand liggende hypothese is dat de buitenplaneten Mars, Jupiter en Saturnus, zoals de zon, eenvoudig rond de aarde draaien ter verklaring van hun jaarlijkse beweging (Simplikios: fragment 5). De vaste sterren staan stil. Voor zover ons onderzoek het uitwees, zijn de getuigenissen niet alleen niet contradictorisch, maar vullen ze elkaar zelfs op een gelukkige wijze aan. Op de vraag dus, die wij ons in het begin gesteld hebben, of er positieve redenen bestonden om aan te nemen, op grond van de ons overgeleverde teksten, dat Herakleides Pontikos vóór Aristarchos een soort van heliocentrisme zou hebben geleerd, menen we beslist negatief te mogen antwoorden. Twee grote onwaarschijnlijkheden, namelijk dat de Oudheid ons niets duidelijks zou hebben bericht over de werkelijke ontdekker van het heliocentrisme en dat één man zonder voorlopers en voorafgaande ontdekkingen het heliocentrisme zou hebben uitgedacht, worden aldus opgeheven als we ons houden aan wat de bronnen werkelijk melden. [conclusion p. 384-385] Übersetzung: Unserer Untersuchung der Quellen zusammenfassend, kommen wir zu den folgenden Schlussfolgerungen: Laut Herakleides befindet sich die Erde im Zentrum des Universums (Simplikios: Fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: Fragment 2; Chalcidius: Fragment 7). Die Erde dreht sich um ihre eigene Achse. In den meisten Fragmenten finden wir sogar die genaue Spezifikation dieser Achsendrehung: Die Erde dreht sich in 24 Stunden (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Aetios: Fragment 4) von Westen nach Osten (Simplikios: Fragment 5, 6; Aetios: Fragment 4), um die tägliche Bewegung der Himmelskörper zu erklären. Die Sonne dreht sich jährlich von Osten nach Westen um die Erde (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Chalcidius: Fragment 7). Die inneren Planeten Venus und höchstwahrscheinlich auch Merkur drehen sich um die Sonne (Chalcidius: Fragment 7). Die naheliegendste Hypothese ist, dass die äußeren Planeten Mars, Jupiter und Saturn, wie die Sonne, einfach um die Erde kreisen, um ihre jährliche Bewegung zu erklären (Simplikios: Fragment 5). Die Fixsterne bleiben unbewegt. Soweit unsere Untersuchung zeigt, sind die Zeugnisse nicht nur nicht widersprüchlich, sondern ergänzen sich sogar auf glückliche Weise. Auf die Frage, die wir uns zu Beginn gestellt haben, ob es positive Gründe gibt, aufgrund der uns überlieferten Texte anzunehmen, dass Herakleides Pontikos vor Aristarchos eine Art von Heliozentrismus gelehrt hat, meinen wir, mit Sicherheit verneinen zu können. Zwei große Unwahrscheinlichkeiten – nämlich, dass die Antike uns nichts Klareres über den tatsächlichen Entdecker des Heliozentrismus berichtet hätte, und dass ein einzelner Mensch ohne Vorgänger und vorherige Entdeckungen den Heliozentrismus erdacht hätte – werden damit ausgeräumt, wenn wir uns an das halten, was die Quellen tatsächlich überliefern. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/e00zJf5ufXc0B6a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"836","_score":null,"_source":{"id":836,"authors_free":[{"id":1240,"entry_id":836,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":343,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Valckenaere de, Erik","free_first_name":"Erik","free_last_name":"Valckenaere de","norm_person":{"id":343,"first_name":"Erik","last_name":"Valckenaere de","full_name":"Valckenaere de, Erik","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Herakleides Pontikos de Ontdekker van het Heliocentrisme?","main_title":{"title":"Herakleides Pontikos de Ontdekker van het Heliocentrisme?"},"abstract":"Ons onderzoek van de bronnen resumerend, komen we tot de volgende besluiten:\r\n\r\n Volgens Herakleides bevindt de aarde zich in het midden van het heelal (Simplikios: fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: fragment 2; Chalcidius: fragment 7).\r\n De aarde draait om haar eigen as. In de meeste fragmenten vinden we zelfs de specificatie van deze aswenteling: de aarde draait in 24 uur (Simplikios: fragment 5; Aetios: fragment 4) van west naar oost (Simplikios: fragment 5, 6; Aetios: fragment 4) ter verklaring van de dagelijkse beweging der hemellichamen.\r\n De zon draait jaarlijks rond de aarde van oost naar west (Simplikios: fragment 5; Chalcidius: fragment 7).\r\n De binnenplaneten Venus en naar alle waarschijnlijkheid ook Mercurius draaien rond de zon (Chalcidius: fragment 7).\r\n De meest voor de hand liggende hypothese is dat de buitenplaneten Mars, Jupiter en Saturnus, zoals de zon, eenvoudig rond de aarde draaien ter verklaring van hun jaarlijkse beweging (Simplikios: fragment 5).\r\n De vaste sterren staan stil.\r\n\r\nVoor zover ons onderzoek het uitwees, zijn de getuigenissen niet alleen niet contradictorisch, maar vullen ze elkaar zelfs op een gelukkige wijze aan.\r\n\r\nOp de vraag dus, die wij ons in het begin gesteld hebben, of er positieve redenen bestonden om aan te nemen, op grond van de ons overgeleverde teksten, dat Herakleides Pontikos v\u00f3\u00f3r Aristarchos een soort van heliocentrisme zou hebben geleerd, menen we beslist negatief te mogen antwoorden. Twee grote onwaarschijnlijkheden, namelijk dat de Oudheid ons niets duidelijks zou hebben bericht over de werkelijke ontdekker van het heliocentrisme en dat \u00e9\u00e9n man zonder voorlopers en voorafgaande ontdekkingen het heliocentrisme zou hebben uitgedacht, worden aldus opgeheven als we ons houden aan wat de bronnen werkelijk melden. [conclusion p. 384-385] \u00dcbersetzung: Unserer Untersuchung der Quellen zusammenfassend, kommen wir zu den folgenden Schlussfolgerungen:\r\n\r\n Laut Herakleides befindet sich die Erde im Zentrum des Universums (Simplikios: Fragment I, 5, 6; Proklos: Fragment 2; Chalcidius: Fragment 7).\r\n Die Erde dreht sich um ihre eigene Achse. In den meisten Fragmenten finden wir sogar die genaue Spezifikation dieser Achsendrehung: Die Erde dreht sich in 24 Stunden (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Aetios: Fragment 4) von Westen nach Osten (Simplikios: Fragment 5, 6; Aetios: Fragment 4), um die t\u00e4gliche Bewegung der Himmelsk\u00f6rper zu erkl\u00e4ren.\r\n Die Sonne dreht sich j\u00e4hrlich von Osten nach Westen um die Erde (Simplikios: Fragment 5; Chalcidius: Fragment 7).\r\n Die inneren Planeten Venus und h\u00f6chstwahrscheinlich auch Merkur drehen sich um die Sonne (Chalcidius: Fragment 7).\r\n Die naheliegendste Hypothese ist, dass die \u00e4u\u00dferen Planeten Mars, Jupiter und Saturn, wie die Sonne, einfach um die Erde kreisen, um ihre j\u00e4hrliche Bewegung zu erkl\u00e4ren (Simplikios: Fragment 5).\r\n Die Fixsterne bleiben unbewegt.\r\n\r\nSoweit unsere Untersuchung zeigt, sind die Zeugnisse nicht nur nicht widerspr\u00fcchlich, sondern erg\u00e4nzen sich sogar auf gl\u00fcckliche Weise.\r\n\r\nAuf die Frage, die wir uns zu Beginn gestellt haben, ob es positive Gr\u00fcnde gibt, aufgrund der uns \u00fcberlieferten Texte anzunehmen, dass Herakleides Pontikos vor Aristarchos eine Art von Heliozentrismus gelehrt hat, meinen wir, mit Sicherheit verneinen zu k\u00f6nnen. Zwei gro\u00dfe Unwahrscheinlichkeiten \u2013 n\u00e4mlich, dass die Antike uns nichts Klareres \u00fcber den tats\u00e4chlichen Entdecker des Heliozentrismus berichtet h\u00e4tte, und dass ein einzelner Mensch ohne Vorg\u00e4nger und vorherige Entdeckungen den Heliozentrismus erdacht h\u00e4tte \u2013 werden damit ausger\u00e4umt, wenn wir uns an das halten, was die Quellen tats\u00e4chlich \u00fcberliefern.","btype":3,"date":"1956","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/e00zJf5ufXc0B6a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":343,"full_name":"Valckenaere de, Erik","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":836,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"L'Antiquit\u00e9 Classique","volume":"25","issue":"2","pages":"351-385"}},"sort":["Herakleides Pontikos de Ontdekker van het Heliocentrisme?"]}
Title | Heraklit zitiert Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1956 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 84 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 382-384 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bröcker, Walter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Note on a quote of Heraclitus Diels B 126 |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EahzzUNdRvttcBw |
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Title | I "Cadaveri" di Eraclito (Fr. 96 D.-K.) e la Polemica Neoplatonica di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 127-137 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Saudelli, Lucia |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article focuses on an unpublished allusion to Heraclitus' fragment 96 D.-K. After an analytic study of the ancient preserved testimonia, I have presented the evidence of the Neoplatonist Simplicius, who uses Heraclitus' dictum about corpses in his personal polemic against Christianity. Then I have tried to explain the probable original signification of Heraclitus' fragment in comparison with other Presocratic texts and according to the Ionian philosophical and religious background of the 5th century B.C. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H7VTl0R3s0lDL6j |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"855","_score":null,"_source":{"id":855,"authors_free":[{"id":1259,"entry_id":855,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":311,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Saudelli, Lucia","free_first_name":"Lucia","free_last_name":"Saudelli","norm_person":{"id":311,"first_name":"Lucia","last_name":"Saudelli","full_name":"Saudelli, Lucia","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1047619067","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"I \"Cadaveri\" di Eraclito (Fr. 96 D.-K.) e la Polemica Neoplatonica di Simplicio","main_title":{"title":"I \"Cadaveri\" di Eraclito (Fr. 96 D.-K.) e la Polemica Neoplatonica di Simplicio"},"abstract":"This article focuses on an unpublished allusion to Heraclitus' fragment 96 D.-K. After an analytic study of the ancient preserved testimonia, I have presented the evidence of the Neoplatonist Simplicius, who uses Heraclitus' dictum about corpses in his personal polemic against Christianity. Then I have tried to explain the probable original signification of Heraclitus' fragment in comparison with other Presocratic texts and according to the Ionian philosophical and religious background of the 5th century B.C. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H7VTl0R3s0lDL6j","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":311,"full_name":"Saudelli, Lucia","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":855,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica","volume":"96","issue":"3","pages":"127-137"}},"sort":["I \"Cadaveri\" di Eraclito (Fr. 96 D.-K.) e la Polemica Neoplatonica di Simplicio"]}
Title | Iamblichus as a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Syllecta Classica |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 1–13 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Twenty-two years ago, when that growth in interest in Neoplatonism, which is a culmination of this conference, was only just getting underway, two large books appeared that will be familiar to all who are interested in Iamblichus. I am referring, of course, to J.M. Dillon's collection of the fragmentary remains of Iamblichus' commentaries on Plato's dialogues, supplied with an ample commentary to boot, and B. Dalsgaard Larsen's Jamblique de Chalcis: Exégète et Philosophe, of which some 240 pages are devoted to his role as an exegete; a collection of exegetical fragments appeared as a 130-page appendix. Larsen's book covered the interpretation of both Plato and Aristotle and pre-empted a second volume of Dillon's, which was to deal with Aristotle. I mention these books because we are, inter alia, taking stock, and it is remarkable that not much attention has been paid since then to Iamblichus' role as a commentator. Perhaps they have had the same effect on the study of this aspect of Iamblichus as Proclus' work had on the interpretation of Plato at Alexandria. Be that as it may, I intend to look, not very originally, at Iamblichus' activities as a commentator on philosophical works—and so I shall say nothing about the twenty-eight books or more of his lost commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles—and also to say something, in the manner of core samples, about how his expositions compare with those of the later commentators. Though the process can be traced back in part to Porphyry, I think it is safe to say that Iamblichus was the first Neoplatonist, at least of those about whom we are reasonably well informed, to set out systematically to write commentaries on the major works of both Plato and—in Iamblichus' case to a lesser extent—Aristotle too. The fact that he did both is noteworthy, since most of his successors seem to have specialized, more or less, in one or the other in their published works, if not in their lecture courses. We are, as ever in this area, faced with difficulties about deciding who wrote what, which often amounts to making difficult decisions about the implications of the usual imprecise references that are commonplace in ancient commentary. The best we have are those references which Simplicius, in his Physics commentary, gives to specific books or even chapters of Iamblichus' Timaeus and Categories commentaries (cf. In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria 639.23–24; in the second chapter of book 5 of the commentary on the Timaeus 786.11–12; in the first book of the commentary on the Categories). But that Iamblichus did write commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle can be regarded as firmly established. It is tempting to think, though there is no text which allows us to demonstrate this, that his doing so was connected with the fact that it seems to have been he who set up the thereafter traditional course in which certain works of Aristotle were read as propaedeutic to a selection of twelve—or rather ten plus two—Platonic dialogues, which culminated in the study of the Timaeus and Parmenides.[introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3m984P11hlUhV1x |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"895","_score":null,"_source":{"id":895,"authors_free":[{"id":1321,"entry_id":895,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Iamblichus as a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Iamblichus as a Commentator"},"abstract":"Twenty-two years ago, when that growth in interest in Neoplatonism, which is a culmination of this conference, was only just getting underway, two large books appeared that will be familiar to all who are interested in Iamblichus. I am referring, of course, to J.M. Dillon's collection of the fragmentary remains of Iamblichus' commentaries on Plato's dialogues, supplied with an ample commentary to boot, and B. Dalsgaard Larsen's Jamblique de Chalcis: Ex\u00e9g\u00e8te et Philosophe, of which some 240 pages are devoted to his role as an exegete; a collection of exegetical fragments appeared as a 130-page appendix.\r\n\r\nLarsen's book covered the interpretation of both Plato and Aristotle and pre-empted a second volume of Dillon's, which was to deal with Aristotle. I mention these books because we are, inter alia, taking stock, and it is remarkable that not much attention has been paid since then to Iamblichus' role as a commentator. Perhaps they have had the same effect on the study of this aspect of Iamblichus as Proclus' work had on the interpretation of Plato at Alexandria.\r\n\r\nBe that as it may, I intend to look, not very originally, at Iamblichus' activities as a commentator on philosophical works\u2014and so I shall say nothing about the twenty-eight books or more of his lost commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles\u2014and also to say something, in the manner of core samples, about how his expositions compare with those of the later commentators.\r\n\r\nThough the process can be traced back in part to Porphyry, I think it is safe to say that Iamblichus was the first Neoplatonist, at least of those about whom we are reasonably well informed, to set out systematically to write commentaries on the major works of both Plato and\u2014in Iamblichus' case to a lesser extent\u2014Aristotle too.\r\n\r\nThe fact that he did both is noteworthy, since most of his successors seem to have specialized, more or less, in one or the other in their published works, if not in their lecture courses. We are, as ever in this area, faced with difficulties about deciding who wrote what, which often amounts to making difficult decisions about the implications of the usual imprecise references that are commonplace in ancient commentary.\r\n\r\nThe best we have are those references which Simplicius, in his Physics commentary, gives to specific books or even chapters of Iamblichus' Timaeus and Categories commentaries (cf. In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria 639.23\u201324; in the second chapter of book 5 of the commentary on the Timaeus 786.11\u201312; in the first book of the commentary on the Categories). But that Iamblichus did write commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle can be regarded as firmly established.\r\n\r\nIt is tempting to think, though there is no text which allows us to demonstrate this, that his doing so was connected with the fact that it seems to have been he who set up the thereafter traditional course in which certain works of Aristotle were read as propaedeutic to a selection of twelve\u2014or rather ten plus two\u2014Platonic dialogues, which culminated in the study of the Timaeus and Parmenides.[introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3m984P11hlUhV1x","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":895,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Syllecta \tClassica","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"1\u201313"}},"sort":["Iamblichus as a Commentator"]}
Title | Iamblichus' Transformation of the Aristotelian “katharsis”, its Middle-Platonic Antecedents and Proclus' and Simplicius' Response to it |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae |
Volume | 40 |
Pages | 263–282 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle bequeathed his followers certain notions that were to be of great importance to posterity. Some of them were taken up and discussed at length in Hellenistic schools, but others escaped notice; katharsis belongs to the latter group. This is all the more surprising since the Stoics made considerable effort to demonstrate that passions (pathê) can be tamed by reason. The Stoic ideal of freedom from passions, which implies the conversion of each passion into eupatheia, may at first sight have some affinity with the interpretation of katharsis that focuses on the ethical importance of emotions for Aristotle. But a closer look at the peculiar character of the Stoics’ overall conception of the soul reveals that any similarity is but mere appearance. It is only among some of the later Neoplatonists that Aristotle’s concept regains the significance it once had. By that time, it gains a strong ethical emphasis. As far as our evidence allows us to say, the development started in the early imperial age. My aim is to follow the renascence of this notion in Iamblichus, its antecedents among the Platonists of the early empire, and the way Proclus and Simplicius reacted to Iamblichus’ attempt. I hope that Professor Ritook will consider this an appropriate subject with which to honor him. His latest contribution to explaining the problem of how desire and cognitive activities are interlocked in Aristotle’s concept of poetry will serve as an excellent point of reference for this investigation. We can now see that the discussion of how desires are involved in, and formed by, the watching of tragedies is intimately tied to the account of how understanding and the desire to understand contribute to katharsis. [introduction p. 263] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DphH8s3zrklDFAe |
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Title | Iamblichus’ Νοερὰ Θεωρία of Aristotle’s Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Syllecta Classica |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 65-77 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dillon, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses Iamblichus' commentary on Porphyry's large commentary on Aristotle's Categories. Porphyry is credited with the setting out and responses to all the aporiai that were concocted by critics of the Categories in the Middle Platonic period, as well as with references to Stoic doctrines in the commentary. Iamblichus added certain criticisms, modifications of Porphyry, relevant passages of Archytas, and some "higher criticism" or intellectual interpretation of nearly all sections of the work. Iamblichus' contribution was to apply his techniques of allegorical exegesis to Aristotle's Categories, where he was able to apply much the same method as he did with Plato's dialogues. Iamblichus' method of commentary is discussed in detail, including his definition of the skopos, or essential subject matter, of the treatise, which concerned all three possible subject matters for the Categories: words, things, and concepts. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Oti0shwXiKiyZ4B |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1147","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1147,"authors_free":[{"id":1722,"entry_id":1147,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":97,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dillon, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Dillon","norm_person":{"id":97,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Dillon","full_name":"Dillon, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123498058","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Iamblichus\u2019 \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u0398\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 of Aristotle\u2019s Categories","main_title":{"title":"Iamblichus\u2019 \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u0398\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 of Aristotle\u2019s Categories"},"abstract":"This text discusses Iamblichus' commentary on Porphyry's large commentary on Aristotle's Categories. Porphyry is credited with the setting out and responses to all the aporiai that were concocted by critics of the Categories in the Middle Platonic period, as well as with references to Stoic doctrines in the commentary. Iamblichus added certain criticisms, modifications of Porphyry, relevant passages of Archytas, and some \"higher criticism\" or intellectual interpretation of nearly all sections of the work. Iamblichus' contribution was to apply his techniques of allegorical exegesis to Aristotle's Categories, where he was able to apply much the same method as he did with Plato's dialogues. Iamblichus' method of commentary is discussed in detail, including his definition of the skopos, or essential subject matter, of the treatise, which concerned all three possible subject matters for the Categories: words, things, and concepts. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Oti0shwXiKiyZ4B","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":97,"full_name":"Dillon, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1147,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Syllecta Classica","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"65-77"}},"sort":["Iamblichus\u2019 \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u0398\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 of Aristotle\u2019s Categories"]}
Title | Il De caelo di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averroè e Pietro d'Alvernia |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Quaestio |
Volume | 6 |
Pages | 524–549 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Musatti, Cesare Alberto |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In aggiunta a questi va almeno ricordata l’edizione della traduzione latina dello pseudo-avicenniano Liber de caelo et mundo, parafrasi di alcune parti dei primi due libri del De caelo, tradotta in latino da Domenico Gundissalino e Giovanni di Spagna nel terzo quarto del XII secolo. Inizialmente confuso con lo stesso De caelo di Aristotele, il testo nel XIII secolo (all’incirca dal 1240 in poi) è stato attribuito quasi sempre ad Avicenna. Oggi invece, in virtù soprattutto della testimonianza del Catalogo (Kitāb al-Fihrist) di Ibn al-Nadīm, viene fatto il nome del celebre medico e traduttore Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn come suo possibile autore. In merito a questa attribuzione bisogna tuttavia tenere presenti le osservazioni di Gutman (pp. XIII-XVII dell’introduzione all’edizione), il quale ha editato il testo sotto il nome dello Pseudo-Avicenna. Per quanto riguarda il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo, nel Medioevo si sono avute due traduzioni latine: una parziale (II libro e prologo del III) ad opera di Roberto Grossatesta, che Bossier data tra il 1235 e il 1253, e una completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke, conclusa nel 1271. La traduzione di Grossatesta ci è conservata in un solo manoscritto (Oxford, Balliol College 99), e non sembra avere avuto un’ampia diffusione, mentre della traduzione completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke attualmente sono conosciuti con certezza sei manoscritti. Se sembra da escludere qualsiasi ipotesi di una revisione da parte di Moerbeke della traduzione di Grossatesta del commento di Simplicio, ancora non definitivamente risolta è invece la questione se la traduzione moerbekana del De caelo di Aristotele sia o meno una revisione di quella incompleta del Grossatesta (II libro e prologo del III) che è presente in forma di lemmi nello stesso manoscritto che contiene il commento di Simplicio. Bossier considera «plus probable» l’opinione di D. J. Allan, secondo cui la traduzione di Moerbeke è indipendente da quella del Grossatesta, mentre Lacombe e Franceschini hanno ritenuto trattarsi di una revisione. L’esistenza di un manoscritto (Vat. lat. 2088) nel quale la traduzione del De caelo di Moerbeke risulta contaminata con quella di Grossatesta anche per alcune parti del primo libro lascia supporre che il Lincolniensis abbia tradotto anche quest’ultimo libro, e non solo il II e l’inizio del III. È stato infine ipotizzato che Grossatesta abbia tradotto anche il primo libro del commento di Simplicio. La traduzione del vescovo di Lincoln del II libro del De caelo è ora consultabile nell’Aristoteles Latinus Database, così come il testo della seconda recensione della traduzione di Guglielmo di Moerbeke al De caelo di Aristotele. Di quest’ultima traduzione esistono infatti tre recensioni differenti, di cui la seconda è la cosiddetta recensio vulgata. Il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo è stato scritto probabilmente intorno al 540. Prima di lui almeno due altri autori avevano dedicato un commento al testo aristotelico: Alessandro di Afrodisia e Temistio. Il commento di Alessandro di Afrodisia è andato perduto sia nel testo greco che nella traduzione araba di Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus. Molte notizie le possiamo trarre però dal commento di Simplicio, di cui il testo di Alessandro costituisce la fonte principale. Il commento di Alessandro viene citato anche nella parafrasi sul De caelo scritta da Temistio. Come per Alessandro di Afrodisia, il testo di Temistio è anch’esso andato perduto sia nell’originale greco che nella traduzione araba di Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī. Si è salvato soltanto nella traduzione ebraica di quest’ultima compiuta nel 1284 da Zerahyah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel Gracian, e nella successiva versione latina del testo ebraico ad opera di Mosé Alatino nel 1574. È opportuno ricordare che, a differenza dei commenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia e di Temistio, il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo non è stato conosciuto dal mondo arabo. [introduction p. 525-526] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vE3O8oovZ2S3BG7 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"617","_score":null,"_source":{"id":617,"authors_free":[{"id":873,"entry_id":617,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":274,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Musatti, Cesare Alberto","free_first_name":"Cesare Alberto","free_last_name":"Musatti","norm_person":{"id":274,"first_name":"Cesare Alberto","last_name":"Musatti","full_name":"Musatti, Cesare Alberto","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Il De caelo di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averro\u00e8 e Pietro d'Alvernia","main_title":{"title":"Il De caelo di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averro\u00e8 e Pietro d'Alvernia"},"abstract":"In aggiunta a questi va almeno ricordata l\u2019edizione della traduzione latina dello pseudo-avicenniano Liber de caelo et mundo, parafrasi di alcune parti dei primi due libri del De caelo, tradotta in latino da Domenico Gundissalino e Giovanni di Spagna nel terzo quarto del XII secolo. Inizialmente confuso con lo stesso De caelo di Aristotele, il testo nel XIII secolo (all\u2019incirca dal 1240 in poi) \u00e8 stato attribuito quasi sempre ad Avicenna. Oggi invece, in virt\u00f9 soprattutto della testimonianza del Catalogo (Kit\u0101b al-Fihrist) di Ibn al-Nad\u012bm, viene fatto il nome del celebre medico e traduttore Is\u1e25\u0101q ibn \u1e24unayn come suo possibile autore.\r\n\r\nIn merito a questa attribuzione bisogna tuttavia tenere presenti le osservazioni di Gutman (pp. XIII-XVII dell\u2019introduzione all\u2019edizione), il quale ha editato il testo sotto il nome dello Pseudo-Avicenna.\r\n\r\nPer quanto riguarda il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo, nel Medioevo si sono avute due traduzioni latine: una parziale (II libro e prologo del III) ad opera di Roberto Grossatesta, che Bossier data tra il 1235 e il 1253, e una completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke, conclusa nel 1271.\r\n\r\nLa traduzione di Grossatesta ci \u00e8 conservata in un solo manoscritto (Oxford, Balliol College 99), e non sembra avere avuto un\u2019ampia diffusione, mentre della traduzione completa di Guglielmo di Moerbeke attualmente sono conosciuti con certezza sei manoscritti.\r\n\r\nSe sembra da escludere qualsiasi ipotesi di una revisione da parte di Moerbeke della traduzione di Grossatesta del commento di Simplicio, ancora non definitivamente risolta \u00e8 invece la questione se la traduzione moerbekana del De caelo di Aristotele sia o meno una revisione di quella incompleta del Grossatesta (II libro e prologo del III) che \u00e8 presente in forma di lemmi nello stesso manoscritto che contiene il commento di Simplicio.\r\n\r\nBossier considera \u00abplus probable\u00bb l\u2019opinione di D. J. Allan, secondo cui la traduzione di Moerbeke \u00e8 indipendente da quella del Grossatesta, mentre Lacombe e Franceschini hanno ritenuto trattarsi di una revisione.\r\n\r\nL\u2019esistenza di un manoscritto (Vat. lat. 2088) nel quale la traduzione del De caelo di Moerbeke risulta contaminata con quella di Grossatesta anche per alcune parti del primo libro lascia supporre che il Lincolniensis abbia tradotto anche quest\u2019ultimo libro, e non solo il II e l\u2019inizio del III. \u00c8 stato infine ipotizzato che Grossatesta abbia tradotto anche il primo libro del commento di Simplicio.\r\n\r\nLa traduzione del vescovo di Lincoln del II libro del De caelo \u00e8 ora consultabile nell\u2019Aristoteles Latinus Database, cos\u00ec come il testo della seconda recensione della traduzione di Guglielmo di Moerbeke al De caelo di Aristotele. Di quest\u2019ultima traduzione esistono infatti tre recensioni differenti, di cui la seconda \u00e8 la cosiddetta recensio vulgata.\r\n\r\nIl commento di Simplicio sul De caelo \u00e8 stato scritto probabilmente intorno al 540. Prima di lui almeno due altri autori avevano dedicato un commento al testo aristotelico: Alessandro di Afrodisia e Temistio.\r\n\r\nIl commento di Alessandro di Afrodisia \u00e8 andato perduto sia nel testo greco che nella traduzione araba di Ab\u016b Bishr Matt\u0101 ibn Y\u016bnus. Molte notizie le possiamo trarre per\u00f2 dal commento di Simplicio, di cui il testo di Alessandro costituisce la fonte principale.\r\n\r\nIl commento di Alessandro viene citato anche nella parafrasi sul De caelo scritta da Temistio. Come per Alessandro di Afrodisia, il testo di Temistio \u00e8 anch\u2019esso andato perduto sia nell\u2019originale greco che nella traduzione araba di Ya\u1e25y\u0101 ibn \u02bfAd\u012b. Si \u00e8 salvato soltanto nella traduzione ebraica di quest\u2019ultima compiuta nel 1284 da Zerahyah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel Gracian, e nella successiva versione latina del testo ebraico ad opera di Mos\u00e9 Alatino nel 1574.\r\n\r\n\u00c8 opportuno ricordare che, a differenza dei commenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia e di Temistio, il commento di Simplicio sul De caelo non \u00e8 stato conosciuto dal mondo arabo. [introduction p. 525-526]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vE3O8oovZ2S3BG7","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":274,"full_name":"Musatti, Cesare Alberto","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":617,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestio","volume":"6","issue":"","pages":"524\u2013549"}},"sort":["Il De caelo di Aristotele e alcuni suoi commentatori: Simplicio, Averro\u00e8 e Pietro d'Alvernia"]}
Title | Il male come "privazione". Simplicio e Filopono in difesa della materia |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | PEITHO / EXAMINA ANTIQUA |
Volume | 1 |
Issue | 8 |
Pages | 391-408 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cardullo, R. Loredana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ay8T0flgyMGienR |
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Title | Impetus Theory and the Hermeneutics of Science in Simplicius and Philoponus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Hyperboreus |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 107–124 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wildberg, Christian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Let me come to a conclusion: In the first part of this paper I claimed that historians o f science do and should inquire into the context o f origin of past philosophical theories, not only into the context of the validity (1). Three different attempts to explain the innovative character o f John Philoponus' philosophy were discussed; all were flawed by the fact that they sought an explanation by means o f external historiography: in religion, biography and economic circumstances (II). In the main part o f this paper attention was drawn to the striking difference between the presuppositions at work in Simplicius’ and Philoponus' respective hermeneutics o f science (111). I have argued that Philoponus was able to liberate his mind in an unprecedented way from the constraints of the Neoplatonists' commitment to harmony, authority and salvation through philosophy. Philoponus’ alternative heuristic method, termed constructive criticism, was then identified as perhaps the most im portant driving force behind his scientific innovations (IV). I should like to conclude with the general recommendation that anyone who is interested in elucidating the origin o f philosophical-scientific ideas and controversies, be it o f the sixth century or at any other time, might find it more fruitful to study carefully the methodological presuppositions involved, be they hermeneutic, empirical, or speculative, rather than to gesture all too readily to external parameters like religion, anecdotes, or the socio-economics of the market place. [conclusion p. 123-124] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H1d8bA0zFyyKAUN |
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Title | Indivisible Lines |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1936 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 120-126 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Nicol, A. T. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To summarize, Democritus, who had moved beyond the confusion between point and atom, also avoided the notion of indivisible lines. The people who confused points and atoms probably held a similar theory of motion and space. However, it was not they but Plato who proposed the existence of indivisible lines, driven by his conception of the problem of continuity. This idea, however, was not straightforward to understand, and Plato did not explain it in detail in the dialogues. Anyone reading the Timaeus and knowing that Plato believed in indivisible lines might become confused trying to locate references to them in that dialogue. It was Xenocrates who made the theory widely known, but he further complicated the issue by introducing the concept of the ideal line, potentially adding other misunderstandings. Aristotle described this as "giving in" to a dichotomy argument, which directly suggests Zeno. All this made it easy for those who did not fully grasp the theory to conflate it with the ideas of the point-atomists. The argument is as follows: if indivisible lines exist, then there must also be surfaces that are divided by those indivisible lines, and all surfaces could be reduced to indivisible surfaces. For example, if x is the length of an indivisible line, a surface measuring x by 2x could be divided into two square surfaces with sides of length x. These squares could then be divided diagonally, but no further division would be possible, as this would require either cutting the indivisible length x or creating a line shorter than x. The same logic applies to solids divided along indivisible surfaces. In this reasoning, the indivisible surface is treated as a surface bounded by indivisible lines. This has been noted by the Oxford translator. The author of περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν (Peri atomōn grammōn) either realized, or was informed, that indivisible lines were essentially points but did not recognize that indivisible surfaces were lines. If there existed, alongside Plato's theory of indivisible lines, another theory positing that matter, space, and motion were composed of tiny indivisibles, it would have been easy to conflate the two ideas. The passage quoted from Peri atomōn grammōn serves as an example of such a confusion. [conclusion p. 125-126 ] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/WmfjXuXivBEx38o |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"866","_score":null,"_source":{"id":866,"authors_free":[{"id":1270,"entry_id":866,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":278,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Nicol, A. T.","free_first_name":"A. T.","free_last_name":"Nicol","norm_person":{"id":278,"first_name":"Nicol","last_name":"A. T.","full_name":"Nicol, A. T.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Indivisible Lines","main_title":{"title":"Indivisible Lines"},"abstract":"To summarize, Democritus, who had moved beyond the confusion between point and atom, also avoided the notion of indivisible lines. The people who confused points and atoms probably held a similar theory of motion and space. However, it was not they but Plato who proposed the existence of indivisible lines, driven by his conception of the problem of continuity. This idea, however, was not straightforward to understand, and Plato did not explain it in detail in the dialogues.\r\n\r\nAnyone reading the Timaeus and knowing that Plato believed in indivisible lines might become confused trying to locate references to them in that dialogue. It was Xenocrates who made the theory widely known, but he further complicated the issue by introducing the concept of the ideal line, potentially adding other misunderstandings. Aristotle described this as \"giving in\" to a dichotomy argument, which directly suggests Zeno. All this made it easy for those who did not fully grasp the theory to conflate it with the ideas of the point-atomists.\r\n\r\nThe argument is as follows: if indivisible lines exist, then there must also be surfaces that are divided by those indivisible lines, and all surfaces could be reduced to indivisible surfaces. For example, if x is the length of an indivisible line, a surface measuring x by 2x could be divided into two square surfaces with sides of length x. These squares could then be divided diagonally, but no further division would be possible, as this would require either cutting the indivisible length x or creating a line shorter than x. The same logic applies to solids divided along indivisible surfaces.\r\n\r\nIn this reasoning, the indivisible surface is treated as a surface bounded by indivisible lines. This has been noted by the Oxford translator. The author of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd (Peri atom\u014dn gramm\u014dn) either realized, or was informed, that indivisible lines were essentially points but did not recognize that indivisible surfaces were lines.\r\n\r\nIf there existed, alongside Plato's theory of indivisible lines, another theory positing that matter, space, and motion were composed of tiny indivisibles, it would have been easy to conflate the two ideas. The passage quoted from Peri atom\u014dn gramm\u014dn serves as an example of such a confusion. [conclusion p. 125-126 ]","btype":3,"date":"1936","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/WmfjXuXivBEx38o","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":278,"full_name":"Nicol, A. T.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":866,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"30","issue":"2","pages":"120-126"}},"sort":["Indivisible Lines"]}
Title | Intelligibles = Sinnliches? Simplikios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 155 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 389-412 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Drews, Friedemann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplikios nimmt Parmenides sowohl vor dem potentiellen Vorwurf, er würde nicht hinreichend zwischen Intelligiblem und Sinnlichem unterscheiden, in Schutz als auch integriert er Aristoteles' Kritik im Sinne einer potentiellen Missverständnissen vor beugenden Vorsichtsmaßnahme in seine neuplatonische Parmeni des-Interpretation und weist ihr so einen berechtigten Platz zu. Simplikios' Gründe dafür erscheinen vor dem Hintergrund seines neuplatonischen Denkens plausibel. Ob seine Parmenides-Interpretation als solche dem Eleaten gerecht wird, ist eine andere Frage; zumindest würde Simplikios gegenüber einer Deutung des parmenideischen Seins-Begriffs in dem Sinne, dass „jeder Gegenstand, den wir untersuchen, existieren muß", wohl einwenden wollen, dass dies einer Reduktion von Parmenides' το έόν auf ein abstraktes Erkenntniskriterium gleichkäme, dessen eigene, nur für das νοεΐν erkennbare Seinsfülle dann aus dem Blick geraten wäre. Auch erschiene es in dieser Perspektive fraglich, warum zum Erschließen eines allgemeinen Existenz-Postulats ein Weg „fernab der Menschen" eingeschlagen werden musste oder gar eine göttliche Offenbarung des „unerschütterlichen Herzens der wohlüberzeugenden Wahrheit", von der Parmenides schreibt, nötig war. [conclusion, p. 410-411] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ICo5GC7IUBJgLkS |
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Title | Jamblique exégète du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalités d’une doctrine du temps |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 307-323 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Le développement de la philosophie grecque tardive est inséparable de l'exégèse de textes canoniques, parmi lesquels les traités d'Aristote et les dialogues de Platon occupent une place tout à fait particulière. Dans le cadre d'une pratique essentiellement scolaire, la tâche du commentateur est d'expliciter une vérité supposée donnée à l'origine, présente dans le texte qui est lu. On a déjà fait remarquer la fécondité philosophique des faux sens, contresens ou déviations qui ne manquent pas de se produire à l'occasion de ces exégèses : c'est par ce travail de l'erreur qu'apparaît souvent une nouveauté doctrinale, et tout se passe comme si la philosophie aimait à se nourrir d'analyses philologiquement erronées ou insoutenables. Nous voudrions présenter ici un exemple typique de ce phénomène : comment une exégèse néoplatonicienne d'un "faux" pythagoricien a permis l'apparition d'une pensée nouvelle du temps. Lorsqu'il explique la doctrine aristotélicienne du temps dans ses commentaires aux Catégories et à la Physique, Simplicius suit les traces de Jamblique, aux yeux de qui la source d'Aristote est le pythagoricien Archytas de Tarente. [introduction p. 307] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/67kpJTeAGPd2zao |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"686","_score":null,"_source":{"id":686,"authors_free":[{"id":1019,"entry_id":686,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Jamblique ex\u00e9g\u00e8te du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalit\u00e9s d\u2019une doctrine du temps","main_title":{"title":"Jamblique ex\u00e9g\u00e8te du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalit\u00e9s d\u2019une doctrine du temps"},"abstract":"Le d\u00e9veloppement de la philosophie grecque tardive est ins\u00e9parable de l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de textes canoniques, parmi lesquels les trait\u00e9s d'Aristote et les dialogues de Platon occupent une place tout \u00e0 fait particuli\u00e8re. Dans le cadre d'une pratique essentiellement scolaire, la t\u00e2che du commentateur est d'expliciter une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 suppos\u00e9e donn\u00e9e \u00e0 l'origine, pr\u00e9sente dans le texte qui est lu. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait remarquer la f\u00e9condit\u00e9 philosophique des faux sens, contresens ou d\u00e9viations qui ne manquent pas de se produire \u00e0 l'occasion de ces ex\u00e9g\u00e8ses : c'est par ce travail de l'erreur qu'appara\u00eet souvent une nouveaut\u00e9 doctrinale, et tout se passe comme si la philosophie aimait \u00e0 se nourrir d'analyses philologiquement erron\u00e9es ou insoutenables.\r\n\r\nNous voudrions pr\u00e9senter ici un exemple typique de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne : comment une ex\u00e9g\u00e8se n\u00e9oplatonicienne d'un \"faux\" pythagoricien a permis l'apparition d'une pens\u00e9e nouvelle du temps.\r\n\r\nLorsqu'il explique la doctrine aristot\u00e9licienne du temps dans ses commentaires aux Cat\u00e9gories et \u00e0 la Physique, Simplicius suit les traces de Jamblique, aux yeux de qui la source d'Aristote est le pythagoricien Archytas de Tarente. [introduction p. 307]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/67kpJTeAGPd2zao","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":686,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"307-323"}},"sort":["Jamblique ex\u00e9g\u00e8te du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalit\u00e9s d\u2019une doctrine du temps"]}
Title | John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Journal of the American Oriental Society |
Volume | 89 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 357-391 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Davidson, Herbert A. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Information from a number of sources has established that John Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem, a refutation of Aristotle's proofs of the eternity of the world, was at least partially available to the Arabic philosophers in the Middle Ages. The present article shows that the Arabic Jewish writer Sacadia used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus. With the aid of this result the following further conclusions are also drawn: Kindi too used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus; a variety of medieval arguments from the impossibility of an infinite are to be traced to Philoponus; the standard Kalām proof of creation, the proof from "accidents," originated as a reformulation of one of Philoponus' arguments. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yI5rGQdubzcVxPL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1295","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1295,"authors_free":[{"id":1888,"entry_id":1295,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":84,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Davidson, Herbert A.","free_first_name":"Herbert A.","free_last_name":"Davidson","norm_person":{"id":84,"first_name":"Herbert A.","last_name":"Davidson","full_name":"Davidson, Herbert A.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/15814743X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation","main_title":{"title":"John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation"},"abstract":"Information from a number of sources has established that John Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem, a refutation of Aristotle's proofs of the eternity of the world, was at least partially available to the Arabic philosophers in the Middle Ages. The present article shows that the Arabic Jewish writer Sacadia used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus. With the aid of this result the following further conclusions are also drawn: Kindi too used a set of proofs of creation ultimately deriving from Philoponus; a variety of medieval arguments from the impossibility of an infinite are to be traced to Philoponus; the standard Kal\u0101m proof of creation, the proof from \"accidents,\" originated as a reformulation of one of Philoponus' arguments. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yI5rGQdubzcVxPL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":84,"full_name":"Davidson, Herbert A.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1295,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the American Oriental Society","volume":"89","issue":"2","pages":"357-391"}},"sort":["John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation"]}
Title | John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 114 |
Pages | 314–335 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
What, in the end, can we say about Philoponus’ position as a Platonist, bearing in mind that our conclusions must still in some respects be provisional? That he was a Neoplatonist is indisputable. Since, however, few if any, of his differences with other Neoplatonists seem to arise from the adoption of a specifically Alexandrian philosophical point of view, we must attribute them to his own philosophical - and theological - orientation. It turns out that, in his case, »Alexandrian Platonist« may mean little more than a man whose philosophy was Neoplatonic, and who worked at Alexandria, though one might observe that there would not have been a warm welcome at Athens for a Christian Neoplatonist, however closely his views might conform to those codified by Proclus and developed by Damascius. One could go on to say that, apart from the concentration on Aristotle, his differences from other Alexandrians were greater than theirs from the Athenians. In this connection we should notice Philoponus’ frequent appeals to Plato against Aristotle in the passages Simplicius singles out for complaint, and his relatively frequent reservations about the agreement, symphônia, of Plato and Aristotle, which most others eagerly sought to demonstrate. And since we started with a critique of P r a e c h t e r , who did so much to initiate the serious study of the Aristotelian commentators, it might be appropriate to end with his characteri sation of Philoponus in the De aeternitate mundi: »es ist der gelehrte Platoniker der spricht«. [conclusion, p. 334-335] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cP5twq2fWJQvBVn |
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Title | L' «absurdum ἀκρόαμα» de Copernic |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance |
Volume | 62 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 7-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hallyn, Fernand |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Une présentation du De Revolutionibus en tant qu'« absurdum » est, en un sens, une présentation « silénique », si l'on pense à la signification symbolique qu'Érasme et d'autres donnaient aux célèbres Silènes d'Alcibiade : ces statuettes symbolisaient, selon les Adages, « un objet qui, en apparence – ou, comme on dit, de prime abord – semble vil et ridicule, mais qui est en réalité admirable quand on l'examine de plus près et plus profondément ». « Absurde » : telle pouvait, en effet, apparaître de prime abord une défense jugée obscure et vaine d'un système aussi contraire au sens commun que l'héliocentrisme ; mais elle devenait admirable et profonde si on en étudiait de près les intentions et les implications « acroamatiques ». Les sens du mot ἀκρόασις (acroasis) qui viennent d'être évoqués sont en grande partie des sens cachés, que seule la prise en compte de la nécessité d'une double lecture, ironique et sérieuse, fait apparaître. La signification du mot, réunissant l'apparence d'une qualification péjorative et la profondeur d'une définition appropriée, participe du secret qu'il désigne. Le cas illustre que, pour l'humaniste dans le savant, qui était aussi un lecteur, certains mots n'étaient pas des termes transparents, simples moyens de communication, mais des prismes pouvant réfracter des significations et des connotations variées. Et si Copernic prétend n'écrire que pour des mathématiciens, les composantes sémantiques de son langage supposent aussi que ces mathématiciens soient capables d'apprécier, dans le choix des mots, des significations et des valeurs qui rattachent l'entreprise scientifique à la culture de l'humanisme. [conclusion p. 24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Qo7eOBq3Eph4Ku9 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"741","_score":null,"_source":{"id":741,"authors_free":[{"id":1104,"entry_id":741,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":166,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hallyn, Fernand","free_first_name":"Fernand","free_last_name":"Hallyn","norm_person":{"id":166,"first_name":"Fernand","last_name":"Hallyn","full_name":"Hallyn, Fernand","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142036323","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L' \u00ababsurdum \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u00bb de Copernic","main_title":{"title":"L' \u00ababsurdum \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u00bb de Copernic"},"abstract":"Une pr\u00e9sentation du De Revolutionibus en tant qu'\u00ab absurdum \u00bb est, en un sens, une pr\u00e9sentation \u00ab sil\u00e9nique \u00bb, si l'on pense \u00e0 la signification symbolique qu'\u00c9rasme et d'autres donnaient aux c\u00e9l\u00e8bres Sil\u00e8nes d'Alcibiade : ces statuettes symbolisaient, selon les Adages, \u00ab un objet qui, en apparence \u2013 ou, comme on dit, de prime abord \u2013 semble vil et ridicule, mais qui est en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 admirable quand on l'examine de plus pr\u00e8s et plus profond\u00e9ment \u00bb.\r\n\r\n\u00ab Absurde \u00bb : telle pouvait, en effet, appara\u00eetre de prime abord une d\u00e9fense jug\u00e9e obscure et vaine d'un syst\u00e8me aussi contraire au sens commun que l'h\u00e9liocentrisme ; mais elle devenait admirable et profonde si on en \u00e9tudiait de pr\u00e8s les intentions et les implications \u00ab acroamatiques \u00bb. Les sens du mot \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (acroasis) qui viennent d'\u00eatre \u00e9voqu\u00e9s sont en grande partie des sens cach\u00e9s, que seule la prise en compte de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d'une double lecture, ironique et s\u00e9rieuse, fait appara\u00eetre.\r\n\r\nLa signification du mot, r\u00e9unissant l'apparence d'une qualification p\u00e9jorative et la profondeur d'une d\u00e9finition appropri\u00e9e, participe du secret qu'il d\u00e9signe. Le cas illustre que, pour l'humaniste dans le savant, qui \u00e9tait aussi un lecteur, certains mots n'\u00e9taient pas des termes transparents, simples moyens de communication, mais des prismes pouvant r\u00e9fracter des significations et des connotations vari\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nEt si Copernic pr\u00e9tend n'\u00e9crire que pour des math\u00e9maticiens, les composantes s\u00e9mantiques de son langage supposent aussi que ces math\u00e9maticiens soient capables d'appr\u00e9cier, dans le choix des mots, des significations et des valeurs qui rattachent l'entreprise scientifique \u00e0 la culture de l'humanisme. [conclusion p. 24]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Qo7eOBq3Eph4Ku9","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":166,"full_name":"Hallyn, Fernand","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":741,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Biblioth\u00e8que d'Humanisme et Renaissance","volume":"62","issue":"1","pages":"7-24"}},"sort":["L' \u00ababsurdum \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u00bb de Copernic"]}
Title | L'esperienza estetica fra logica e cosmologia nel Commentario alla Fisica di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Athenaeum |
Volume | 104 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 186-200 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Licciardi, Ivan Adriano |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I will explain some passages of Simplicius, in Phys. 1, in which the Commentator discusses the Aristotelian expression pephyke de ek tôn gvorimoteron (Phys. 1.1, 184a. 16). Here Simplicius distinguishes ta gnorimotera from to autopiston, such as the definitions and the immediate premises, and from the dianoetic knowledge, which is syllogistic and demonstrative. Notwithstanding the topic o f these passages is epistemological, here the Commentator, through a syllogism in which there is an evident reminiscence o f Plato’s Timaeus, cites the beauty o f the universe as an initial step to raise to the goodness o f die Demiurge. After an articulated investigation (in which are involved, as well, Aristotle’s Rhetoric and above all P osteriorA nalytics), Simplicius concludes that to kalon has the same statute of gnorimoteron hemîn (Arise. Phys. 1.1.184a.l6). The purpose o f the Commentator seems that to conciliate Plato and Aristotle, and the result is an original and creative, but at the same rime exact and careful, way to do the exegesis of Aristotle’s Physics. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5jR4LzCbg0vHYAp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"405","_score":null,"_source":{"id":405,"authors_free":[{"id":544,"entry_id":405,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":246,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","free_first_name":"Ivan Adriano","free_last_name":"Licciardi","norm_person":{"id":246,"first_name":"Ivan Adriano","last_name":"Licciardi","full_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L'esperienza estetica fra logica e cosmologia nel Commentario alla Fisica di Simplicio","main_title":{"title":"L'esperienza estetica fra logica e cosmologia nel Commentario alla Fisica di Simplicio"},"abstract":"In this paper I will explain some passages of Simplicius, in Phys. 1, in which the Commentator discusses the Aristotelian expression pephyke de ek t\u00f4n gvorimoteron (Phys. 1.1, 184a. 16). Here Simplicius distinguishes ta gnorimotera from to autopiston, such as the def\u00adinitions and the immediate premises, and from the dianoetic knowledge, which is syllogistic and demonstrative. Notwithstanding the topic o f these passages is epistemological, here the Com\u00admentator, through a syllogism in which there is an evident reminiscence o f Plato\u2019s Timaeus, cites the beauty o f the universe as an initial step to raise to the goodness o f die Demiurge. After an articulated investigation (in which are involved, as well, Aristotle\u2019s Rhetoric and above all P osteriorA nalytics), Simplicius concludes that to kalon has the same statute of gnorimoteron hem\u00een (Arise. Phys. 1.1.184a.l6). The purpose o f the Commentator seems that to conciliate Plato and Aristotle, and the result is an original and creative, but at the same rime exact and careful, way to do the exegesis of Aristotle\u2019s Physics. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5jR4LzCbg0vHYAp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":246,"full_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":405,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Athenaeum","volume":"104","issue":"1","pages":"186-200"}},"sort":["L'esperienza estetica fra logica e cosmologia nel Commentario alla Fisica di Simplicio"]}
Title | L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs néo-platoniciens |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1981 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 35-52 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Narcy, Michel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the expression of Neoplatonism after Plotinus, which was primarily in the form of commentary on earlier works. However, this method can lead to errors and departures from the original ideas. The article examines how this applies to interpretations of homonymy in Aristotle's Categories, which are inconsistent among commentators. The author suggests that by examining how homonymy is used to resolve specific problems, one can better understand its meaning and transformation from Aristotle to Neoplatonism. The discussion centers on a passage in Simplicius's commentary on Categories in which he comments on Aristotle's remarks about the paronymous naming of beings defined by their quality. The author compares Simplicius's comments to Aristotle's original text, and argues that the former intentionally misrepresents the latter. [derived from the introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/LehHtPQbB1BKLEC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1104","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1104,"authors_free":[{"id":1667,"entry_id":1104,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":277,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Narcy, Michel","free_first_name":"Michel","free_last_name":"Narcy","norm_person":{"id":277,"first_name":"Michel","last_name":"Narcy","full_name":"Narcy, Michel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/129449512","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs n\u00e9o-platoniciens","main_title":{"title":"L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs n\u00e9o-platoniciens"},"abstract":"This text discusses the expression of Neoplatonism after Plotinus, which was primarily in the form of commentary on earlier works. However, this method can lead to errors and departures from the original ideas. The article examines how this applies to interpretations of homonymy in Aristotle's Categories, which are inconsistent among commentators. The author suggests that by examining how homonymy is used to resolve specific problems, one can better understand its meaning and transformation from Aristotle to Neoplatonism. The discussion centers on a passage in Simplicius's commentary on Categories in which he comments on Aristotle's remarks about the paronymous naming of beings defined by their quality. The author compares Simplicius's comments to Aristotle's original text, and argues that the former intentionally misrepresents the latter. [derived from the introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1981","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/LehHtPQbB1BKLEC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":277,"full_name":"Narcy, Michel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1104,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"35-52"}},"sort":["L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs n\u00e9o-platoniciens"]}
Title | L'écriture et les Présocratiques: Analyse de l'interprétation de Eric Havelock |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 23 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 75-92 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Palù, Chiara |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
L'interprétation de Havelock situe les penseurs présocratiques, ou plutôt pré-platoniciens, dans un milieu qu'il définit comme étant antérieur à la diffusion de l'écriture (pre-literacy). Cette interprétation provient de sa thèse générale, qui concerne la question du passage entre l'oralité et l'écriture en Grèce ancienne. Si l'introduction de l'alphabet phénicien, à l'époque archaïque, entraîne l'abandon des systèmes de communication orale, fondés sur l'écoute et la mémorisation, au profit de nouveaux systèmes fondés sur la circulation et la lecture individuelle de textes écrits, ce passage ne s'effectue cependant pas d'un seul coup. En dépit de l'introduction de l'écriture, continuent de subsister, pendant presque toute l'époque archaïque, des mécanismes de performance orale, tandis que l'écriture, à son début, n'avait qu'une seule fonction, celle de fixer la parole. Havelock, pour soutenir sa thèse, s'appuie initialement sur le Phèdre de Platon. La réflexion de Platon, qui, du reste, n'est pas isolée, est perçue comme une sorte de prise de conscience de problématiques préexistantes, au terme d'un processus de mutation culturelle dans lequel l'écriture joue un rôle déterminant. La critique de l'écriture, en effet, peut être définie comme une dernière défense de la parole orale à une époque où l'écrit prédomine désormais. C'est en un second temps que Havelock s'est tourné vers les textes des présocratiques eux-mêmes. Il est vrai que dans la tradition pré-platonicienne, il n'existe pas de texte comme le Phèdre, qui thématise la question de l'écriture, mais, d'après Havelock, on peut repérer, dans les textes des présocratiques, les traces des structures orales qui avaient caractérisé la phase précédant la réintroduction de l'écriture. Havelock souligne surtout l'adoption de la métrique et du rythme dans les poèmes d'Empédocle, Xénophane et Parménide, et le recours à une prose poétique dans le discours d'Héraclite, en tant qu'éléments qui devaient faciliter la mémorisation pour un public d'auditeurs. Mais l'approche de Havelock n'est pas seulement stylistique. La diffusion progressive, à l'époque archaïque, de la literacy aux dépens de l'oralité requiert l'adoption d'un nouveau langage, qui prend ses distances par rapport au langage mythique et détermine ainsi l'émergence de la philosophie elle-même. Selon Havelock, c'est justement cette relation que Platon n'a pas vue, et c'est de là que provient le caractère contradictoire de sa critique à l'égard de l'écriture. La thèse de Havelock n'a pas manqué de susciter des réactions parmi les interprètes, en produisant, ces dernières années, une quantité remarquable d'études consacrées à ce sujet. En général, les interprètes ont analysé surtout la relation supposée entre le langage des présocratiques et l'écriture, d'une part, et celle entre l'écriture et l'émergence de la philosophie, d'autre part. La réflexion sur le langage devrait, en effet, renforcer la thèse de Havelock à l'égard de la permanence de structures orales dans les textes des présocratiques, et cette permanence devrait, à son tour, renforcer le rapport reconstitué par Havelock entre écriture et émergence de la philosophie. Mais l'analyse stylistique, à elle seule, ne permet pas de conclure à la permanence de structures orales, et ces dernières sont tout aussi peu concluantes en tant qu'arguments à l'appui du rapport supposé entre écriture et émergence de la philosophie. [introduction p. 75-77] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qlp5mJ4QSDQl1a0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1091","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1091,"authors_free":[{"id":1649,"entry_id":1091,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":281,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","free_first_name":"Chiara","free_last_name":"Pal\u00f9","norm_person":{"id":281,"first_name":"Chiara","last_name":"Pal\u00f9","full_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock","main_title":{"title":"L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock"},"abstract":"L'interpr\u00e9tation de Havelock situe les penseurs pr\u00e9socratiques, ou plut\u00f4t pr\u00e9-platoniciens, dans un milieu qu'il d\u00e9finit comme \u00e9tant ant\u00e9rieur \u00e0 la diffusion de l'\u00e9criture (pre-literacy). Cette interpr\u00e9tation provient de sa th\u00e8se g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, qui concerne la question du passage entre l'oralit\u00e9 et l'\u00e9criture en Gr\u00e8ce ancienne.\r\n\r\nSi l'introduction de l'alphabet ph\u00e9nicien, \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque archa\u00efque, entra\u00eene l'abandon des syst\u00e8mes de communication orale, fond\u00e9s sur l'\u00e9coute et la m\u00e9morisation, au profit de nouveaux syst\u00e8mes fond\u00e9s sur la circulation et la lecture individuelle de textes \u00e9crits, ce passage ne s'effectue cependant pas d'un seul coup. En d\u00e9pit de l'introduction de l'\u00e9criture, continuent de subsister, pendant presque toute l'\u00e9poque archa\u00efque, des m\u00e9canismes de performance orale, tandis que l'\u00e9criture, \u00e0 son d\u00e9but, n'avait qu'une seule fonction, celle de fixer la parole.\r\n\r\nHavelock, pour soutenir sa th\u00e8se, s'appuie initialement sur le Ph\u00e8dre de Platon. La r\u00e9flexion de Platon, qui, du reste, n'est pas isol\u00e9e, est per\u00e7ue comme une sorte de prise de conscience de probl\u00e9matiques pr\u00e9existantes, au terme d'un processus de mutation culturelle dans lequel l'\u00e9criture joue un r\u00f4le d\u00e9terminant. La critique de l'\u00e9criture, en effet, peut \u00eatre d\u00e9finie comme une derni\u00e8re d\u00e9fense de la parole orale \u00e0 une \u00e9poque o\u00f9 l'\u00e9crit pr\u00e9domine d\u00e9sormais.\r\n\r\nC'est en un second temps que Havelock s'est tourn\u00e9 vers les textes des pr\u00e9socratiques eux-m\u00eames. Il est vrai que dans la tradition pr\u00e9-platonicienne, il n'existe pas de texte comme le Ph\u00e8dre, qui th\u00e9matise la question de l'\u00e9criture, mais, d'apr\u00e8s Havelock, on peut rep\u00e9rer, dans les textes des pr\u00e9socratiques, les traces des structures orales qui avaient caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 la phase pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant la r\u00e9introduction de l'\u00e9criture.\r\n\r\nHavelock souligne surtout l'adoption de la m\u00e9trique et du rythme dans les po\u00e8mes d'Emp\u00e9docle, X\u00e9nophane et Parm\u00e9nide, et le recours \u00e0 une prose po\u00e9tique dans le discours d'H\u00e9raclite, en tant qu'\u00e9l\u00e9ments qui devaient faciliter la m\u00e9morisation pour un public d'auditeurs. Mais l'approche de Havelock n'est pas seulement stylistique.\r\n\r\nLa diffusion progressive, \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque archa\u00efque, de la literacy aux d\u00e9pens de l'oralit\u00e9 requiert l'adoption d'un nouveau langage, qui prend ses distances par rapport au langage mythique et d\u00e9termine ainsi l'\u00e9mergence de la philosophie elle-m\u00eame. Selon Havelock, c'est justement cette relation que Platon n'a pas vue, et c'est de l\u00e0 que provient le caract\u00e8re contradictoire de sa critique \u00e0 l'\u00e9gard de l'\u00e9criture.\r\n\r\nLa th\u00e8se de Havelock n'a pas manqu\u00e9 de susciter des r\u00e9actions parmi les interpr\u00e8tes, en produisant, ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, une quantit\u00e9 remarquable d'\u00e9tudes consacr\u00e9es \u00e0 ce sujet.\r\n\r\nEn g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, les interpr\u00e8tes ont analys\u00e9 surtout la relation suppos\u00e9e entre le langage des pr\u00e9socratiques et l'\u00e9criture, d'une part, et celle entre l'\u00e9criture et l'\u00e9mergence de la philosophie, d'autre part. La r\u00e9flexion sur le langage devrait, en effet, renforcer la th\u00e8se de Havelock \u00e0 l'\u00e9gard de la permanence de structures orales dans les textes des pr\u00e9socratiques, et cette permanence devrait, \u00e0 son tour, renforcer le rapport reconstitu\u00e9 par Havelock entre \u00e9criture et \u00e9mergence de la philosophie.\r\n\r\nMais l'analyse stylistique, \u00e0 elle seule, ne permet pas de conclure \u00e0 la permanence de structures orales, et ces derni\u00e8res sont tout aussi peu concluantes en tant qu'arguments \u00e0 l'appui du rapport suppos\u00e9 entre \u00e9criture et \u00e9mergence de la philosophie. [introduction p. 75-77]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qlp5mJ4QSDQl1a0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":281,"full_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1091,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"23","issue":"2","pages":"75-92"}},"sort":["L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock"]}
Title | La Brillance de Nestis (Empédocle, fr. 96) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 26 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 75-100 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Picot, Jean-Claude |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dans le De l'âme, Aristote illustre l'importance de la proportion (λόγος) et de la combinaison (σύνθεσις) des éléments entre eux par rapport à ce que sont les éléments ; pour ce faire, il rapporte trois vers d'Empédocle (410 a 4-6) relatifs à la composition de l'os. Simplicius rapporte les mêmes vers et en ajoute un sur l'action d'Harmonie ; il précise avoir tiré sa citation du premier livre de la Physique d'Empédocle. Ce sont ces quatre vers que Diels a recueillis sous le fr. 96 : ἤ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι τώ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης, τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ' ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο Ἁρμονίης κόλληισιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηισιν. Traduction : Et la terre serviable en ses creusets bien façonnés Reçut deux parts sur huit de la brillance de Nestis, Et quatre d'Héphaïstos ; et ces choses-là devinrent les os blancs, Tenus ensemble par les colles divines d'Harmonie. L'os serait composé de deux parts de la « brillance de Nestis » (δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων [...] Νήστιδος αἴγλης) – où l'on s'accorde à reconnaître l'eau sous le nom de Nestis –, de quatre parts de feu – puisque Héphaïstos désigne traditionnellement le feu (τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο) – et de deux parts de terre (ἤ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος) pour parvenir à huit parts au total. Dans le présent article, je voudrais analyser le texte du fr. 96 pour prendre position sur la question suivante : quel est le sens à donner à l'expression Νήστιδος αἴγλης, c’est-à-dire « la brillance de Nestis » ? La brillance de Nestis désigne-t-elle l'eau, ou bien un mélange d'air et d'eau ? Certaines questions divisent les commentateurs actuels d'Empédocle, mais la question de la brillance de Nestis n'en fait pas partie. En effet, tout le monde ou presque s'accorde pour dire que la brillance de Nestis désigne l'eau et rien d'autre. Pourquoi alors s'interroger sur quelque chose qui ne divise point ? Parce que le consensus est parfois trompeur. Il peut se fixer sur la solution simple, celle qui ne nécessite presque pas ou peu d'explication. Mais à l'analyse, l'objet peut se révéler complexe, et le consensus sur le simple avoir fait fausse route. J'espère parvenir à montrer au fil de cet article que la brillance de Nestis est un mélange d'air et d'eau, et non pas simplement de l'eau. Si Empédocle n'avait pas introduit la brillance (αἴγλη), aucun doute n'aurait été permis pour comprendre que τῶ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων [...] Νήστιδος signifie deux parts sur huit d'eau. Mais la brillance pose problème. Elle pose d'autant plus problème que la tournure τῶ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων [...] Νήστιδος αἴγλης insiste sur le fait que les deux parts en question sont des parts de la brillance et non pas directement des parts de Nestis. Peut-on spontanément dire que pour Empédocle, Nestis apparaît brillante, tout comme Apollon est brillant (αἰγλήτης), tout comme Artémis et Hécate sont dispensatrices de lumière (φωσφόρος) ? Si la brillance n'ajoutait rien à la compréhension de Nestis, la « brillance de Nestis » se réduirait à une façon poétique de dire Nestis. Si, au contraire, la brillance ajoutait quelque chose à Nestis, l'élément qui n'est pas nommé dans le fr. 96, à savoir l'air, pourrait être sous-entendu dans la brillance de Nestis. Nous avons formulé une interprétation en faveur de l'air dans la composition de l'os. La conclusion n'en serait que renforcée si nous pouvions nous appuyer sur un témoignage ancien, différent de celui du Pseudo-Simplicius, voire de Philopon, qu'il est facile de mettre en doute. Ce témoignage existe. Il a été jusqu'ici traité avec indifférence et parfois dévalorisé. C'est celui de Théophraste. Théophraste, critiquant Empédocle, dit que chez cet auteur les os et les poils devraient avoir des sensations puisqu'ils sont formés de tous les éléments (De sensibus, ΧΧΙΠ = A86.23). En d'autres termes, selon Théophraste, les os sont formés des quatre éléments, et les poils de même. Les modernes n'ont pas jugé bon de partir de Théophraste pour contredire Aétius et pour affirmer que l'os doit être composé des quatre éléments. Il n'y a guère de doute que pour Empédocle, il existe des mélanges qui ne comportent pas les quatre éléments. Prenons quelques exemples : le bronze produit par l'alliage de l'étain et du cuivre (fr. 92), le vin mélangé à de l'eau (fr. 91), les couleurs résultant d'un mélange des couleurs de base (fr. 23), la pâte servant à faire le pain (fr. 34), la boue ou la pâte de poterie (fr. 73), l'eau salée de la mer (fr. 55, 56), etc. Mais quand il s'agit des êtres vivant sur terre, il est permis de penser que Philotès fait chaque mélange sans exclure aucun élément, à l'instar du sang et des chairs (fr. 98). En effet, l'œuvre de l'Amour réalisée dans ces êtres éphémères semble préfigurer le grand vivant, composé des quatre éléments, qu'est le Sphairos. Pour les êtres vivants et éphémères, les parts pourraient être inégales dans chaque organe, mais tous les éléments être néanmoins présents. Tout cela, certes, n'est que pure hypothèse. Aucun texte n'affirme que pour Empédocle, toutes les parties des vivants sont un mélange des quatre éléments. Une certitude demeure : on ne peut déconsidérer la parole de Théophraste sur l'os, ce même Théophraste qui disait que pour Empédocle, l'eau est noire. [introduction p. 75-77/conclusion p. 99-100] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Kn8BmLiIsvQZnjb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"863","_score":null,"_source":{"id":863,"authors_free":[{"id":1267,"entry_id":863,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":291,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Picot, Jean-Claude","free_first_name":"Jean-Claude","free_last_name":"Picot","norm_person":{"id":291,"first_name":"Jean-Claude","last_name":"Picot","full_name":"Picot, Jean-Claude","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La Brillance de Nestis (Emp\u00e9docle, fr. 96)","main_title":{"title":"La Brillance de Nestis (Emp\u00e9docle, fr. 96)"},"abstract":"Dans le De l'\u00e2me, Aristote illustre l'importance de la proportion (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) et de la combinaison (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) des \u00e9l\u00e9ments entre eux par rapport \u00e0 ce que sont les \u00e9l\u00e9ments ; pour ce faire, il rapporte trois vers d'Emp\u00e9docle (410 a 4-6) relatifs \u00e0 la composition de l'os. Simplicius rapporte les m\u00eames vers et en ajoute un sur l'action d'Harmonie ; il pr\u00e9cise avoir tir\u00e9 sa citation du premier livre de la Physique d'Emp\u00e9docle. Ce sont ces quatre vers que Diels a recueillis sous le fr. 96 :\r\n\r\n \u1f24 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03b8\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03cd\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03bf\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\r\n \u03c4\u03ce \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b5 \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2,\r\n \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4' \u1f29\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4' \u1f40\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u1f70 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\r\n \u1f09\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cc\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b7\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b7\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\r\n\r\nTraduction :\r\n\r\n Et la terre serviable en ses creusets bien fa\u00e7onn\u00e9s\r\n Re\u00e7ut deux parts sur huit de la brillance de Nestis,\r\n Et quatre d'H\u00e9pha\u00efstos ; et ces choses-l\u00e0 devinrent les os blancs,\r\n Tenus ensemble par les colles divines d'Harmonie.\r\n\r\nL'os serait compos\u00e9 de deux parts de la \u00ab brillance de Nestis \u00bb (\u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd [...] \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2) \u2013 o\u00f9 l'on s'accorde \u00e0 reconna\u00eetre l'eau sous le nom de Nestis \u2013, de quatre parts de feu \u2013 puisque H\u00e9pha\u00efstos d\u00e9signe traditionnellement le feu (\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4' \u1f29\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf) \u2013 et de deux parts de terre (\u1f24 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c7\u03b8\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2) pour parvenir \u00e0 huit parts au total.\r\n\r\nDans le pr\u00e9sent article, je voudrais analyser le texte du fr. 96 pour prendre position sur la question suivante : quel est le sens \u00e0 donner \u00e0 l'expression \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire \u00ab la brillance de Nestis \u00bb ? La brillance de Nestis d\u00e9signe-t-elle l'eau, ou bien un m\u00e9lange d'air et d'eau ?\r\n\r\nCertaines questions divisent les commentateurs actuels d'Emp\u00e9docle, mais la question de la brillance de Nestis n'en fait pas partie. En effet, tout le monde ou presque s'accorde pour dire que la brillance de Nestis d\u00e9signe l'eau et rien d'autre. Pourquoi alors s'interroger sur quelque chose qui ne divise point ? Parce que le consensus est parfois trompeur. Il peut se fixer sur la solution simple, celle qui ne n\u00e9cessite presque pas ou peu d'explication. Mais \u00e0 l'analyse, l'objet peut se r\u00e9v\u00e9ler complexe, et le consensus sur le simple avoir fait fausse route.\r\n\r\nJ'esp\u00e8re parvenir \u00e0 montrer au fil de cet article que la brillance de Nestis est un m\u00e9lange d'air et d'eau, et non pas simplement de l'eau.\r\n\r\nSi Emp\u00e9docle n'avait pas introduit la brillance (\u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7), aucun doute n'aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 permis pour comprendre que \u03c4\u1ff6 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd [...] \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 signifie deux parts sur huit d'eau. Mais la brillance pose probl\u00e8me. Elle pose d'autant plus probl\u00e8me que la tournure \u03c4\u1ff6 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd [...] \u039d\u03ae\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03b3\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 insiste sur le fait que les deux parts en question sont des parts de la brillance et non pas directement des parts de Nestis. Peut-on spontan\u00e9ment dire que pour Emp\u00e9docle, Nestis appara\u00eet brillante, tout comme Apollon est brillant (\u03b1\u1f30\u03b3\u03bb\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2), tout comme Art\u00e9mis et H\u00e9cate sont dispensatrices de lumi\u00e8re (\u03c6\u03c9\u03c3\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2) ?\r\n\r\nSi la brillance n'ajoutait rien \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension de Nestis, la \u00ab brillance de Nestis \u00bb se r\u00e9duirait \u00e0 une fa\u00e7on po\u00e9tique de dire Nestis. Si, au contraire, la brillance ajoutait quelque chose \u00e0 Nestis, l'\u00e9l\u00e9ment qui n'est pas nomm\u00e9 dans le fr. 96, \u00e0 savoir l'air, pourrait \u00eatre sous-entendu dans la brillance de Nestis.\r\n\r\nNous avons formul\u00e9 une interpr\u00e9tation en faveur de l'air dans la composition de l'os. La conclusion n'en serait que renforc\u00e9e si nous pouvions nous appuyer sur un t\u00e9moignage ancien, diff\u00e9rent de celui du Pseudo-Simplicius, voire de Philopon, qu'il est facile de mettre en doute. Ce t\u00e9moignage existe. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 jusqu'ici trait\u00e9 avec indiff\u00e9rence et parfois d\u00e9valoris\u00e9. C'est celui de Th\u00e9ophraste.\r\n\r\nTh\u00e9ophraste, critiquant Emp\u00e9docle, dit que chez cet auteur les os et les poils devraient avoir des sensations puisqu'ils sont form\u00e9s de tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments (De sensibus, \u03a7\u03a7\u0399\u03a0 = A86.23). En d'autres termes, selon Th\u00e9ophraste, les os sont form\u00e9s des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments, et les poils de m\u00eame. Les modernes n'ont pas jug\u00e9 bon de partir de Th\u00e9ophraste pour contredire A\u00e9tius et pour affirmer que l'os doit \u00eatre compos\u00e9 des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments.\r\n\r\nIl n'y a gu\u00e8re de doute que pour Emp\u00e9docle, il existe des m\u00e9langes qui ne comportent pas les quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments. Prenons quelques exemples : le bronze produit par l'alliage de l'\u00e9tain et du cuivre (fr. 92), le vin m\u00e9lang\u00e9 \u00e0 de l'eau (fr. 91), les couleurs r\u00e9sultant d'un m\u00e9lange des couleurs de base (fr. 23), la p\u00e2te servant \u00e0 faire le pain (fr. 34), la boue ou la p\u00e2te de poterie (fr. 73), l'eau sal\u00e9e de la mer (fr. 55, 56), etc.\r\n\r\nMais quand il s'agit des \u00eatres vivant sur terre, il est permis de penser que Philot\u00e8s fait chaque m\u00e9lange sans exclure aucun \u00e9l\u00e9ment, \u00e0 l'instar du sang et des chairs (fr. 98). En effet, l'\u0153uvre de l'Amour r\u00e9alis\u00e9e dans ces \u00eatres \u00e9ph\u00e9m\u00e8res semble pr\u00e9figurer le grand vivant, compos\u00e9 des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments, qu'est le Sphairos. Pour les \u00eatres vivants et \u00e9ph\u00e9m\u00e8res, les parts pourraient \u00eatre in\u00e9gales dans chaque organe, mais tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments \u00eatre n\u00e9anmoins pr\u00e9sents.\r\n\r\nTout cela, certes, n'est que pure hypoth\u00e8se. Aucun texte n'affirme que pour Emp\u00e9docle, toutes les parties des vivants sont un m\u00e9lange des quatre \u00e9l\u00e9ments. Une certitude demeure : on ne peut d\u00e9consid\u00e9rer la parole de Th\u00e9ophraste sur l'os, ce m\u00eame Th\u00e9ophraste qui disait que pour Emp\u00e9docle, l'eau est noire.\r\n[introduction p. 75-77\/conclusion p. 99-100]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Kn8BmLiIsvQZnjb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":291,"full_name":"Picot, Jean-Claude","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":863,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"26","issue":"1","pages":"75-100"}},"sort":["La Brillance de Nestis (Emp\u00e9docle, fr. 96)"]}
Title | La Communauté de l'être (Parménide, fragment B 5) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 3-13 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Destrée, Pierre |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses different interpretations of the methodological significance of the fragment D.K. B 5 of Parmenides' poem, which states "It is indifferent to me where I begin, for I shall come back again to this point" (Trad. M. Conche). The main question is what the statement refers to and its place in the order of fragments. Two main trends of interpretation are identified, one proposing to place the fragment before D.K. B 8 and the other suggesting to read it either before or after D.K. B 2. The author argues that the circularity of Parmenides' philosophy is centered around the concept of being and the experience of the community of being. The world of Parmenides is a world of trust and confidence in being, where even absent things find a real presence and firm consistency. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/y9Q3j9lUXfO31vz |
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Title | La Physique d’Empédocle selon Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire |
Volume | 67 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 65-74 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Stevens, Annick |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
J'en arrive à faire la synthèse de l'apport positif et original qui résulte de l'étude de Simplicius. Tout d'abord, quand il ne se démarque pas de la tradition doxographique, c'est qu'elle transmet l'interprétation la plus plausible : ainsi, la matérialité des racines à partir desquelles sont créés tous les corps et l'explication de leurs mélanges par l'introduction de principes de création, auxquels il donne un nom assez prudent pour ne pas offrir prise à la réfutation. Remarquons en outre sa clairvoyance quant au choix de la désignation des principes créateurs à partir de notions connues dans le réel observable, pour décrire le réel invisible. D'autre part, Simplicius se démarque des autres doxographes anciens en refusant la conception d'un cycle cosmique à quatre phases. Là encore, si l'on veut respecter le texte d'Empédocle, on ne peut que lui donner raison : seuls deux stades cosmiques sont décrits : le tout unifié de la Sphère (où la Haine, néanmoins, n'est pas détruite mais retirée aux confins) et la multiplicité née de l'opposition des deux principes créateurs. Il fallait en effet souligner que ni l'un ni l'autre ne peut créer seul ; en ce sens, ils sont, autant qu'opposés, complémentaires. Reste à savoir si ces deux stades existent alternativement ou simultanément et, à ce propos, il est clair que Simplicius a voulu imposer la vision néo-platonicienne au détriment de la stricte observation du texte. Ses arguments en faveur de la « double disposition » sont faibles et parfois même péremptoires, dans la mesure où il annihile les passages qui le gênent en les qualifiant de « fiction poétique ». En revanche, sa « solution de rechange », qui fait état d'une coexistence entre le mouvement et une certaine forme d'immobilité (donc, d'une certaine manière, d'une double manifestation du réel) — cette immobilité résultant de l'incessant roulement du devenir —, cette conception, loin d'entrer en contradiction avec ce que nous savons des théories présocratiques en général et empédocléenne en particulier, est extrêmement intéressante et peut ouvrir la voie à un nouvel examen approfondi du poème d'Empédocle. [conclusion p. 74] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tQhjx4b0GzJ1L5S |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"480","_score":null,"_source":{"id":480,"authors_free":[{"id":650,"entry_id":480,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":323,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Stevens, Annick","free_first_name":"Annick","free_last_name":"Stevens","norm_person":{"id":323,"first_name":" Annick","last_name":"Stevens","full_name":"Stevens, Annick","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1195240120","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La Physique d\u2019Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"La Physique d\u2019Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius"},"abstract":"J'en arrive \u00e0 faire la synth\u00e8se de l'apport positif et original qui r\u00e9sulte de l'\u00e9tude de Simplicius. Tout d'abord, quand il ne se d\u00e9marque pas de la tradition doxographique, c'est qu'elle transmet l'interpr\u00e9tation la plus plausible : ainsi, la mat\u00e9rialit\u00e9 des racines \u00e0 partir desquelles sont cr\u00e9\u00e9s tous les corps et l'explication de leurs m\u00e9langes par l'introduction de principes de cr\u00e9ation, auxquels il donne un nom assez prudent pour ne pas offrir prise \u00e0 la r\u00e9futation. Remarquons en outre sa clairvoyance quant au choix de la d\u00e9signation des principes cr\u00e9ateurs \u00e0 partir de notions connues dans le r\u00e9el observable, pour d\u00e9crire le r\u00e9el invisible.\r\n\r\nD'autre part, Simplicius se d\u00e9marque des autres doxographes anciens en refusant la conception d'un cycle cosmique \u00e0 quatre phases. L\u00e0 encore, si l'on veut respecter le texte d'Emp\u00e9docle, on ne peut que lui donner raison : seuls deux stades cosmiques sont d\u00e9crits : le tout unifi\u00e9 de la Sph\u00e8re (o\u00f9 la Haine, n\u00e9anmoins, n'est pas d\u00e9truite mais retir\u00e9e aux confins) et la multiplicit\u00e9 n\u00e9e de l'opposition des deux principes cr\u00e9ateurs. Il fallait en effet souligner que ni l'un ni l'autre ne peut cr\u00e9er seul ; en ce sens, ils sont, autant qu'oppos\u00e9s, compl\u00e9mentaires.\r\n\r\nReste \u00e0 savoir si ces deux stades existent alternativement ou simultan\u00e9ment et, \u00e0 ce propos, il est clair que Simplicius a voulu imposer la vision n\u00e9o-platonicienne au d\u00e9triment de la stricte observation du texte. Ses arguments en faveur de la \u00ab double disposition \u00bb sont faibles et parfois m\u00eame p\u00e9remptoires, dans la mesure o\u00f9 il annihile les passages qui le g\u00eanent en les qualifiant de \u00ab fiction po\u00e9tique \u00bb.\r\n\r\nEn revanche, sa \u00ab solution de rechange \u00bb, qui fait \u00e9tat d'une coexistence entre le mouvement et une certaine forme d'immobilit\u00e9 (donc, d'une certaine mani\u00e8re, d'une double manifestation du r\u00e9el) \u2014 cette immobilit\u00e9 r\u00e9sultant de l'incessant roulement du devenir \u2014, cette conception, loin d'entrer en contradiction avec ce que nous savons des th\u00e9ories pr\u00e9socratiques en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et emp\u00e9docl\u00e9enne en particulier, est extr\u00eamement int\u00e9ressante et peut ouvrir la voie \u00e0 un nouvel examen approfondi du po\u00e8me d'Emp\u00e9docle. [conclusion p. 74]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tQhjx4b0GzJ1L5S","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":323,"full_name":"Stevens, Annick","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":480,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire","volume":"67","issue":"1","pages":"65-74"}},"sort":["La Physique d\u2019Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius"]}
Title | La Récupération d'Anaxagore |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Archives de Philosophie |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 75-98 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ramnoux, Clémence |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The author meant to «recuperate» the Fragments of Anaxagoras, most of which are transmitted in the Commentary of Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics I, 4, without severing them from their context. While doing so he was interested in the neo-platonicist presentation itself, and also in the modern interpretations proceeding from it, enhancing an interpretative tradition. The first article inquires into the presentation of doctrines by dichotomic confrontation and into the problem of contrary couples. Following on the recuperation of the Fragments of Anaxagoras in a neo-platonic context, the second article presents the doctrine of the Spirit as agent both of thinking discrimination and of mechanical separation which starts from the original gathering, and which is both thought and subtantial. It examines subsequently how far a doctrine of the plurality of worlds can be attributed to Anaxagoras. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1063","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1063,"authors_free":[{"id":1613,"entry_id":1063,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":295,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","free_first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","free_last_name":"Ramnoux","norm_person":{"id":295,"first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","last_name":"Ramnoux","full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1219538949","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore","main_title":{"title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore"},"abstract":"The author meant to \u00abrecuperate\u00bb the Fragments of Anaxagoras, most of which are transmitted in the Commentary of Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics I, 4, without severing them from their context. While doing so he was interested in the neo-platonicist presentation itself, and also in the modern interpretations proceeding from it, enhancing an interpretative tradition. The first article inquires into the presentation of doctrines by dichotomic confrontation and into the problem of contrary couples. Following on the recuperation of the Fragments of Anaxagoras in a neo-platonic context, the second article presents the doctrine of the Spirit as agent both of thinking discrimination and of mechanical separation which starts from the original gathering, and which is both thought and subtantial. It examines subsequently how far a doctrine of the plurality of worlds can be attributed to Anaxagoras. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":295,"full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1063,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archives de Philosophie","volume":"43","issue":"1","pages":"75-98"}},"sort":["La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore"]}
Title | La Récupération d'Anaxagore II |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Archives de Philosophie |
Volume | 43 |
Pages | 279-297 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ramnoux, Clémence |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text discusses the concept of the mind and plurality of worlds in Anaxagoras' philosophy. It focuses on a fragment that is the longest and most extensive in relation to the mind. The author explores the vocabulary used by Anaxagoras to articulate his doctrine and how it uses oppositions such as one and multiple, similar and different, light and dark, hot and cold, dry and wet to categorize things. The author also discusses Anaxagoras' use of the concept of infinity in relation to both numbers and spatial dimensions. The text also highlights the attributes of the mind, such as its spatial greatness, lightness, and purity, which allow for quick movement and perception. The author concludes that Anaxagoras' conception of the mind is not divine, but rather characterized by its separation from everything else. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1379","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1379,"authors_free":[{"id":2123,"entry_id":1379,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":295,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","free_first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","free_last_name":"Ramnoux","norm_person":{"id":295,"first_name":"Cl\u00e9mence","last_name":"Ramnoux","full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1219538949","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore II","main_title":{"title":"La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore II"},"abstract":"The text discusses the concept of the mind and plurality of worlds in Anaxagoras' philosophy. It focuses on a fragment that is the longest and most extensive in relation to the mind. The author explores the vocabulary used by Anaxagoras to articulate his doctrine and how it uses oppositions such as one and multiple, similar and different, light and dark, hot and cold, dry and wet to categorize things. The author also discusses Anaxagoras' use of the concept of infinity in relation to both numbers and spatial dimensions. The text also highlights the attributes of the mind, such as its spatial greatness, lightness, and purity, which allow for quick movement and perception. The author concludes that Anaxagoras' conception of the mind is not divine, but rather characterized by its separation from everything else. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5IeMTnUXyCXR7VK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":295,"full_name":"Ramnoux, Cl\u00e9mence","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1379,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archives de Philosophie","volume":"43","issue":"","pages":"279-297"}},"sort":["La R\u00e9cup\u00e9ration d'Anaxagore II"]}
Title | La critique aristotélicienne des Idées en Physique II 2 et l’interprétation de Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques |
Volume | 101 |
Pages | 569-584 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Physics II 2, 193b35–194a1, Aristotle criticizes in passing the partisans of the Ideas, comparing them to the mathematicians. The present article first attempts to specify the identity of the Academicians Aristotle has in view and to explain how their method resembles the mathematical one. In a second step, the article sheds light on Simplicius' manner of deflecting the Aristotelian critique, showing that, despite appearances, the Stagirite acknowledges that the forms of natural realities, after the fashion of mathematical realities, can be thought of separately, that is to say, without matter. The Neoplatonist's reflection casts new light on the notion of methexis, basically identical to that of phusikos logos or "form in itself," which is like intelligible Form. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CX8My3vkHJrymmk |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1509","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1509,"authors_free":[{"id":2622,"entry_id":1509,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La critique aristot\u00e9licienne des Id\u00e9es en Physique II 2 et l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation de Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"La critique aristot\u00e9licienne des Id\u00e9es en Physique II 2 et l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation de Simplicius"},"abstract":"In Physics II 2, 193b35\u2013194a1, Aristotle criticizes in passing the partisans of the Ideas, comparing them to the mathematicians. The present article first attempts to specify the identity of the Academicians Aristotle has in view and to explain how their method resembles the mathematical one.\r\n\r\nIn a second step, the article sheds light on Simplicius' manner of deflecting the Aristotelian critique, showing that, despite appearances, the Stagirite acknowledges that the forms of natural realities, after the fashion of mathematical realities, can be thought of separately, that is to say, without matter.\r\n\r\nThe Neoplatonist's reflection casts new light on the notion of methexis, basically identical to that of phusikos logos or \"form in itself,\" which is like intelligible Form. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2017","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CX8My3vkHJrymmk","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1509,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Th\u00e9ologiques","volume":"101","issue":"","pages":"569-584"}},"sort":["La critique aristot\u00e9licienne des Id\u00e9es en Physique II 2 et l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation de Simplicius"]}
Title | La fin du Néoplatonisme Hellénique. Mise au point sur la question |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 20 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 83-110 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Saihi, Sofian |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
À ce stade de notre exposé, il est temps de dresser un bilan récapitulatif des travaux de M. Tardieu. Pour ce dernier, après avoir quitté Athènes, nos philosophes néoplatoniciens se sont rendus à Harrân. Cette cité nous est plus familière sous sa dénomination latine : Carrhae. Il s'agit d'une ville romaine de langue gréco-syriaque, toute proche de la frontière perse, à trente kilomètres au sud-est d'Édesse. Si nous avons dit qu'elle nous est familière, en voici la raison : en 53 avant notre ère, Crassus, membre du premier triumvirat avec Pompée et César, dirige une expédition en Perse. Richissime mais sans gloire militaire, il part à la recherche d'un exploit contre les Parthes. Or, ces derniers le mettent en déroute à Carrhae, où il se fait assassiner. C'est dans cette même ville que, quatre siècles plus tard, l'empereur Julien a effectué ses dernières dévotions avant de tomber sous les coups de Sâbuhr II. D'après M. Tardieu, donc, c'est également là que Simplicius, son maître Damascius, et les autres auraient définitivement élu domicile. Accueillis au sein, ou à l'origine eux-mêmes, d'une école néoplatonicienne, ils auraient continué à vivre, travailler et enseigner ensemble à Harrân. Ils auraient été, en somme, chez eux parmi des populations encore attachées au paganisme. Ils s'y seraient sentis bien et auraient décidé d'y rester. Au vu de ses propres déductions, Ilsetraut Hadot n'a pu rester indifférente aux résultats des travaux de Michel Tardieu. Elle le suit et le soutient ardemment. Et des chercheurs comme Pierre Chuvin, Lambros Couloubaritsis ou Alain de Libéra se sont rangés de leur côté. Par ailleurs, peu de critiques sont venues réfuter ses travaux. Certes, Luc Brisson, Paul Foulkes et, plus sérieusement, Simone Van Riet les ont mis en question. Mais Ilsetraut Hadot a su dissiper leurs doutes sans trop de difficulté. Par conséquent, bien que l'hypothèse de Michel Tardieu reste encore à asseoir plus solidement, si nous admettons avec lui que Damascius et ses compagnons ont emporté les pénates du néoplatonisme à Harrân, nous devrions retrouver les vestiges d'un tel foyer. Nous insinuons par là que si ces lieux ont bel et bien abrité une école néoplatonicienne, il doit nécessairement en subsister des traces tangibles. Une empreinte que nous pourrions peut-être relever dans la pensée philosophique musulmane et dont il faudrait établir les rapports avec la doctrine des Sâbiens. À cette fin, il semble primordial de se pencher sur la première philosophie en terre d'Islam. Par une telle élucidation, nous serions alors en mesure de dégager les structures profondes du néoplatonisme qui y subsistent et, pourquoi pas, déterminer par quelle voie oblique cette doctrine a bien pu cheminer entre l'Antiquité tardive et le Moyen Âge. [conclusion p. 108-110] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dUsC8Irj8dUfNHy |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1052","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1052,"authors_free":[{"id":1597,"entry_id":1052,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":307,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Saihi, Sofian","free_first_name":"Sofian","free_last_name":"Saihi","norm_person":{"id":307,"first_name":"Sofian","last_name":"Saihi","full_name":"Saihi, Sofian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La fin du N\u00e9oplatonisme Hell\u00e9nique. Mise au point sur la question","main_title":{"title":"La fin du N\u00e9oplatonisme Hell\u00e9nique. Mise au point sur la question"},"abstract":"\u00c0 ce stade de notre expos\u00e9, il est temps de dresser un bilan r\u00e9capitulatif des travaux de M. Tardieu. Pour ce dernier, apr\u00e8s avoir quitt\u00e9 Ath\u00e8nes, nos philosophes n\u00e9oplatoniciens se sont rendus \u00e0 Harr\u00e2n. Cette cit\u00e9 nous est plus famili\u00e8re sous sa d\u00e9nomination latine : Carrhae. Il s'agit d'une ville romaine de langue gr\u00e9co-syriaque, toute proche de la fronti\u00e8re perse, \u00e0 trente kilom\u00e8tres au sud-est d'\u00c9desse. Si nous avons dit qu'elle nous est famili\u00e8re, en voici la raison : en 53 avant notre \u00e8re, Crassus, membre du premier triumvirat avec Pomp\u00e9e et C\u00e9sar, dirige une exp\u00e9dition en Perse. Richissime mais sans gloire militaire, il part \u00e0 la recherche d'un exploit contre les Parthes. Or, ces derniers le mettent en d\u00e9route \u00e0 Carrhae, o\u00f9 il se fait assassiner. C'est dans cette m\u00eame ville que, quatre si\u00e8cles plus tard, l'empereur Julien a effectu\u00e9 ses derni\u00e8res d\u00e9votions avant de tomber sous les coups de S\u00e2buhr II.\r\n\r\nD'apr\u00e8s M. Tardieu, donc, c'est \u00e9galement l\u00e0 que Simplicius, son ma\u00eetre Damascius, et les autres auraient d\u00e9finitivement \u00e9lu domicile. Accueillis au sein, ou \u00e0 l'origine eux-m\u00eames, d'une \u00e9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne, ils auraient continu\u00e9 \u00e0 vivre, travailler et enseigner ensemble \u00e0 Harr\u00e2n. Ils auraient \u00e9t\u00e9, en somme, chez eux parmi des populations encore attach\u00e9es au paganisme. Ils s'y seraient sentis bien et auraient d\u00e9cid\u00e9 d'y rester.\r\n\r\nAu vu de ses propres d\u00e9ductions, Ilsetraut Hadot n'a pu rester indiff\u00e9rente aux r\u00e9sultats des travaux de Michel Tardieu. Elle le suit et le soutient ardemment. Et des chercheurs comme Pierre Chuvin, Lambros Couloubaritsis ou Alain de Lib\u00e9ra se sont rang\u00e9s de leur c\u00f4t\u00e9. Par ailleurs, peu de critiques sont venues r\u00e9futer ses travaux. Certes, Luc Brisson, Paul Foulkes et, plus s\u00e9rieusement, Simone Van Riet les ont mis en question. Mais Ilsetraut Hadot a su dissiper leurs doutes sans trop de difficult\u00e9.\r\n\r\nPar cons\u00e9quent, bien que l'hypoth\u00e8se de Michel Tardieu reste encore \u00e0 asseoir plus solidement, si nous admettons avec lui que Damascius et ses compagnons ont emport\u00e9 les p\u00e9nates du n\u00e9oplatonisme \u00e0 Harr\u00e2n, nous devrions retrouver les vestiges d'un tel foyer. Nous insinuons par l\u00e0 que si ces lieux ont bel et bien abrit\u00e9 une \u00e9cole n\u00e9oplatonicienne, il doit n\u00e9cessairement en subsister des traces tangibles. Une empreinte que nous pourrions peut-\u00eatre relever dans la pens\u00e9e philosophique musulmane et dont il faudrait \u00e9tablir les rapports avec la doctrine des S\u00e2biens. \u00c0 cette fin, il semble primordial de se pencher sur la premi\u00e8re philosophie en terre d'Islam. Par une telle \u00e9lucidation, nous serions alors en mesure de d\u00e9gager les structures profondes du n\u00e9oplatonisme qui y subsistent et, pourquoi pas, d\u00e9terminer par quelle voie oblique cette doctrine a bien pu cheminer entre l'Antiquit\u00e9 tardive et le Moyen \u00c2ge. [conclusion p. 108-110]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dUsC8Irj8dUfNHy","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":307,"full_name":"Saihi, Sofian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1052,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"20","issue":"2","pages":"83-110"}},"sort":["La fin du N\u00e9oplatonisme Hell\u00e9nique. Mise au point sur la question"]}
Title | La pensée s'exprime «grâce» à l'être (Parménide, fr. 8.35) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2004 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 194 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 5-13 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cordero, Néstor-Luis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Peu de temps après la mort de son père spirituel, Platon n'hésite pas à rendre un hommage appuyé au « vénérable et redoutable » Parménide ; mais, en même temps, il ne peut pas s'empêcher d'avouer : étant donné sa profondeur (bathos), « je crains tout à la fois que ses paroles, nous ne les comprenions pas, et que ce qu'il pensait en les prononçant nous dépasse beaucoup plus ». Mais ce que Platon ne dit pas, c'est que cette difficulté l'a poussé à essayer de déchiffrer le logos parménidien. Vingt-cinq siècles après, Marcel Conche en a fait autant, et c'est sur le chemin de Parménide que j'ai eu la chance et le grand honneur de faire sa connaissance. Et je peux témoigner que Platon avait raison : la pensée de Parménide nous a tellement dépassés qu'elle a pu être à l'origine d'interprétations très diverses et, même si l'Éléate était surpris d'apprendre qu'il était à la fois un et multiple, il faut admettre que le chemin de recherche qu'il a inauguré reste ouvert, car sa richesse est inépuisable. Le dialogue que je voudrais entamer avec Marcel Conche concerne l'un des passages les plus controversés du Poème, l'énigmatique vers 8.35. Nous nous sommes occupés de ce texte dans notre travail Les deux chemins de Parménide, et Marcel Conche a commenté avec perspicacité notre interprétation, mais il n'a pas été convaincu par le texte que nous proposons de suivre à la place du texte traditionnel. Je voudrais renforcer les arguments donnés il y a quelques années dans le travail cité ci-dessus, car les échos de la lecture (il ne s'agit pas d'une conjecture) que nous proposons n'ont été que très restreints, malgré les points obscurs que notre solution permet d'éclairer. Regardons donc le contexte de ce passage. [introduction p. 5-6] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GrJltxCHr2iNGon |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1279","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1279,"authors_free":[{"id":1868,"entry_id":1279,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":54,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":{"id":54,"first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","last_name":"Cordero","full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1055808973","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)","main_title":{"title":"La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)"},"abstract":"Peu de temps apr\u00e8s la mort de son p\u00e8re spirituel, Platon n'h\u00e9site pas \u00e0 rendre un hommage appuy\u00e9 au \u00ab v\u00e9n\u00e9rable et redoutable \u00bb Parm\u00e9nide ; mais, en m\u00eame temps, il ne peut pas s'emp\u00eacher d'avouer : \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 sa profondeur (bathos), \u00ab je crains tout \u00e0 la fois que ses paroles, nous ne les comprenions pas, et que ce qu'il pensait en les pronon\u00e7ant nous d\u00e9passe beaucoup plus \u00bb. Mais ce que Platon ne dit pas, c'est que cette difficult\u00e9 l'a pouss\u00e9 \u00e0 essayer de d\u00e9chiffrer le logos parm\u00e9nidien. Vingt-cinq si\u00e8cles apr\u00e8s, Marcel Conche en a fait autant, et c'est sur le chemin de Parm\u00e9nide que j'ai eu la chance et le grand honneur de faire sa connaissance. Et je peux t\u00e9moigner que Platon avait raison : la pens\u00e9e de Parm\u00e9nide nous a tellement d\u00e9pass\u00e9s qu'elle a pu \u00eatre \u00e0 l'origine d'interpr\u00e9tations tr\u00e8s diverses et, m\u00eame si l'\u00c9l\u00e9ate \u00e9tait surpris d'apprendre qu'il \u00e9tait \u00e0 la fois un et multiple, il faut admettre que le chemin de recherche qu'il a inaugur\u00e9 reste ouvert, car sa richesse est in\u00e9puisable.\r\n\r\nLe dialogue que je voudrais entamer avec Marcel Conche concerne l'un des passages les plus controvers\u00e9s du Po\u00e8me, l'\u00e9nigmatique vers 8.35. Nous nous sommes occup\u00e9s de ce texte dans notre travail Les deux chemins de Parm\u00e9nide, et Marcel Conche a comment\u00e9 avec perspicacit\u00e9 notre interpr\u00e9tation, mais il n'a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 convaincu par le texte que nous proposons de suivre \u00e0 la place du texte traditionnel. Je voudrais renforcer les arguments donn\u00e9s il y a quelques ann\u00e9es dans le travail cit\u00e9 ci-dessus, car les \u00e9chos de la lecture (il ne s'agit pas d'une conjecture) que nous proposons n'ont \u00e9t\u00e9 que tr\u00e8s restreints, malgr\u00e9 les points obscurs que notre solution permet d'\u00e9clairer. Regardons donc le contexte de ce passage. [introduction p. 5-6]","btype":3,"date":"2004","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GrJltxCHr2iNGon","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":54,"full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1279,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"194","issue":"1","pages":"5-13"}},"sort":["La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)"]}
Title | La saisie des principes physiques chez Aristote. Simplicius contre Alexandre d'Aphrodise |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Oriens-Occidens |
Volume | 2 |
Pages | 77-94 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dalimier, Catherine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The article discusses Aristotle's treatment of knowledge of the principles of natural beings in his Physics, focusing on the process of induction and the contradictions in his approach. The author argues that the discovery of principles through analysis and empirical generalization is based on sensory data, and suggests that the autonomy of physical discourse was a contested issue among commentators. The article highlights divergences in interpretation regarding the existence of physical principles and discusses variations in the manuscript tradition. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hlMzWTGqkFNEImc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1287","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1287,"authors_free":[{"id":1876,"entry_id":1287,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":61,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dalimier, Catherine","free_first_name":"Catherine","free_last_name":"Dalimier","norm_person":{"id":61,"first_name":"Catherine","last_name":"Dalimier","full_name":"Dalimier, Catherine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La saisie des principes physiques chez Aristote. Simplicius contre Alexandre d'Aphrodise","main_title":{"title":"La saisie des principes physiques chez Aristote. Simplicius contre Alexandre d'Aphrodise"},"abstract":"The article discusses Aristotle's treatment of knowledge of the principles of natural beings in his Physics, focusing on the process of induction and the contradictions in his approach. The author argues that the discovery of principles through analysis and empirical generalization is based on sensory data, and suggests that the autonomy of physical discourse was a contested issue among commentators. The article highlights divergences in interpretation regarding the existence of physical principles and discusses variations in the manuscript tradition. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hlMzWTGqkFNEImc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":61,"full_name":"Dalimier, Catherine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1287,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oriens-Occidens","volume":"2","issue":"","pages":"77-94"}},"sort":["La saisie des principes physiques chez Aristote. Simplicius contre Alexandre d'Aphrodise"]}
Title | La taille et la forme des atomes dans les systèmes de Démocrite et d'Épicure («Préjugé» et «présupposé» en histoire de la philosophie) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 172 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 187-203 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Qu'on n'aille pas en conclure que nous suivons aveuglément tout propos du Stagirite. Une observation permettra d'atténuer la valeur de son témoignage et de nuancer la conclusion à laquelle nous sommes arrivés jusqu'ici. Selon l'hypothèse élaborée ci-dessus, Démocrite et Épicure ne se seraient pas opposés sur la question de la grandeur des atomes. Pour l'un et l'autre philosophe, la gamme des grandeurs aura été en effet finie. Mais scrutons de plus près les deux thèses concernant la forme des atomes. Épicure précise que les variétés de forme sont, non pas « infinies », mais « insaisissables » (ἀπερίληπτοι). Quant à Démocrite et à Leucippe, Aristote affirme deux fois que les variétés de forme sont « infinies », d'une part en parlant de la multiplicité « infinie » des atomes, d'autre part en opposant la théorie de Leucippe à celle de Platon. En revanche, lorsqu'il présente le système atomiste dans le fragment Sur Démocrite, les différences de forme sont dites, non plus « infinies », mais « innombrables » (ἀναρίθμητος). À en juger d'après l'Index de Bonitz, ce dernier terme est un hapax dans l'œuvre d'Aristote. S'ensuit-il qu'il soit, sinon un vocable d'emprunt, du moins un terme transposé, plus proche de l'expression originale de Démocrite ? Mais qu'est-ce qui sépare alors la doctrine des Abdéritains et celle d'Épicure ? Où passe la distinction entre différences « innombrables » (Démocrite) et différences « insaisissables » (Épicure) ? Un dernier paradoxe semble poindre : on peut en effet se demander si, en refusant l'hypothèse d'une variété infinie de formes, Épicure ne s'opposait pas à la formulation qu'en avait donnée Aristote, bien plus qu'il ne songeait à rectifier la théorie de Démocrite. Mais nous effleurons ici un problème nouveau, celui de l'élaboration progressive des notions d'infini et de fini ; impossible de l'approfondir sans balayer les « préjugés » et les « présupposés » qui, sur ce point aussi, nous séparent des notions primitives par une proximité illusoire. Problème trop vaste pour qu'on puisse l'aborder dans cet article. [conclusion 201-203] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AhK7pfqowUhUex4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1101","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1101,"authors_free":[{"id":1664,"entry_id":1101,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La taille et la forme des atomes dans les syst\u00e8mes de D\u00e9mocrite et d'\u00c9picure (\u00abPr\u00e9jug\u00e9\u00bb et \u00abpr\u00e9suppos\u00e9\u00bb en histoire de la philosophie)","main_title":{"title":"La taille et la forme des atomes dans les syst\u00e8mes de D\u00e9mocrite et d'\u00c9picure (\u00abPr\u00e9jug\u00e9\u00bb et \u00abpr\u00e9suppos\u00e9\u00bb en histoire de la philosophie)"},"abstract":"Qu'on n'aille pas en conclure que nous suivons aveugl\u00e9ment tout propos du Stagirite. Une observation permettra d'att\u00e9nuer la valeur de son t\u00e9moignage et de nuancer la conclusion \u00e0 laquelle nous sommes arriv\u00e9s jusqu'ici.\r\n\r\nSelon l'hypoth\u00e8se \u00e9labor\u00e9e ci-dessus, D\u00e9mocrite et \u00c9picure ne se seraient pas oppos\u00e9s sur la question de la grandeur des atomes. Pour l'un et l'autre philosophe, la gamme des grandeurs aura \u00e9t\u00e9 en effet finie. Mais scrutons de plus pr\u00e8s les deux th\u00e8ses concernant la forme des atomes. \u00c9picure pr\u00e9cise que les vari\u00e9t\u00e9s de forme sont, non pas \u00ab infinies \u00bb, mais \u00ab insaisissables \u00bb (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9). Quant \u00e0 D\u00e9mocrite et \u00e0 Leucippe, Aristote affirme deux fois que les vari\u00e9t\u00e9s de forme sont \u00ab infinies \u00bb, d'une part en parlant de la multiplicit\u00e9 \u00ab infinie \u00bb des atomes, d'autre part en opposant la th\u00e9orie de Leucippe \u00e0 celle de Platon.\r\n\r\nEn revanche, lorsqu'il pr\u00e9sente le syst\u00e8me atomiste dans le fragment Sur D\u00e9mocrite, les diff\u00e9rences de forme sont dites, non plus \u00ab infinies \u00bb, mais \u00ab innombrables \u00bb (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03b8\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2).\r\n\r\n\u00c0 en juger d'apr\u00e8s l'Index de Bonitz, ce dernier terme est un hapax dans l'\u0153uvre d'Aristote. S'ensuit-il qu'il soit, sinon un vocable d'emprunt, du moins un terme transpos\u00e9, plus proche de l'expression originale de D\u00e9mocrite ?\r\n\r\nMais qu'est-ce qui s\u00e9pare alors la doctrine des Abd\u00e9ritains et celle d'\u00c9picure ? O\u00f9 passe la distinction entre diff\u00e9rences \u00ab innombrables \u00bb (D\u00e9mocrite) et diff\u00e9rences \u00ab insaisissables \u00bb (\u00c9picure) ?\r\n\r\nUn dernier paradoxe semble poindre : on peut en effet se demander si, en refusant l'hypoth\u00e8se d'une vari\u00e9t\u00e9 infinie de formes, \u00c9picure ne s'opposait pas \u00e0 la formulation qu'en avait donn\u00e9e Aristote, bien plus qu'il ne songeait \u00e0 rectifier la th\u00e9orie de D\u00e9mocrite.\r\n\r\nMais nous effleurons ici un probl\u00e8me nouveau, celui de l'\u00e9laboration progressive des notions d'infini et de fini ; impossible de l'approfondir sans balayer les \u00ab pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s \u00bb et les \u00ab pr\u00e9suppos\u00e9s \u00bb qui, sur ce point aussi, nous s\u00e9parent des notions primitives par une proximit\u00e9 illusoire.\r\n\r\nProbl\u00e8me trop vaste pour qu'on puisse l'aborder dans cet article. [conclusion 201-203]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AhK7pfqowUhUex4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1101,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"172","issue":"2","pages":"187-203"}},"sort":["La taille et la forme des atomes dans les syst\u00e8mes de D\u00e9mocrite et d'\u00c9picure (\u00abPr\u00e9jug\u00e9\u00bb et \u00abpr\u00e9suppos\u00e9\u00bb en histoire de la philosophie)"]}
Title | La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle "Categorie" di Aristotele |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Rivista critica di storia della filosofia |
Volume | 38 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 259-283 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Conti, Alessandro D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Uno dei contributi particolari più rilevanti che i commentatori neoplatonici hanno recato allo sviluppo e alla sistemazione della dottrina categoriale aristotelica è senza dubbio quello relativo all'analisi della nozione di πρός τι. Essi, infatti, nel tentativo di fornire un'interpretazione del settimo capitolo delle Categorie che fosse (i) internamente coerente e (ii) solidale con la lettura generale del trattato, sono giunti a elaborare in forma sufficientemente compiuta un concetto di relazione analogo al moderno concetto di relazione binaria, del tutto assente, invece, negli scritti di Aristotele, che pare conoscere solo un non ben definito concetto di relativo (πρός τι). In altre parole: mentre lo Stagirita (i) operava con la sola nozione di relativo e (ii) concepiva i relativi — sotto l'influenza di evidenti suggestioni grammaticali — come le entità che corrispondono ai termini non assoluti del linguaggio (cioè non aventi significato se non in riferimento a un altro termine), i neoplatonici, al contrario, saranno in grado (i) di servirsi sia della nozione di relativo che di quella di relazione (σχέσις), e (ii) di concepire, in un certo qual modo, le relazioni come funzioni diadiche (o meglio, come una sorta di corrispettivo ontologico delle nostre funzioni diadiche) e i relativi come gli argomenti che tali funzioni soddisfano. Le precise scelte interpretative su alcuni problemi cruciali del trattato, e cioè: la valenza della tavola categoriale, la distinzione delle categorie, il tipo d'esistenza degli accidenti da una parte, e l'accettazione dell'idea, aristotelicamente corretta, che i πρός τι devono essere presi a coppie, dall'altra, sono gli elementi che hanno reso possibile ai neoplatonici la formulazione del concetto di relazione (binaria). Essi infatti ritenevano: che la tavola categoriale avesse una precisa valenza ontologica, ripartendo non solo nomi e concetti, ma anche cose; che la distinzione tra le dieci categorie fosse reale e non concettuale; che gli accidenti fossero forme inerenti alle sostanze. In conseguenza dei primi due punti, i neoplatonici erano indotti a difendere l'oggettività, la realtà e l'indipendenza della categoria dei πρός τι e dei suoi appartenenti, e a rifiutare, quindi, qualsiasi tentativo di interpretazione che volesse ridurla, direttamente o indirettamente, alle altre categorie. D'altra parte, concepire gli accidenti come forme inerenti alle sostanze equivaleva a considerare il rapporto tra ciascun genere degli accidenti e la sostanza alla stregua di quello della qualità, e quindi secondo il modello qualità-cosa qualificata. Così, nel caso dei πρός τι, i neoplatonici pensavano che l'entità "padre" fosse un'entità composta di una sostanza e di una certa forma accidentale, la paternità, ad essa inerente, non diversamente da come "bianco" è un'entità composta da una sostanza e dalla forma della bianchezza. Per avere un concetto corretto di relazione bastava, a questo punto, assumere, coerentemente con l'idea che i πρός τι vanno presi a coppie, che la caratteristica peculiare di queste particolari forme accidentali fosse quella di riferirsi e collegare tra loro due entità distinte. Scrive, ad esempio, Simplicio: «È proprio soltanto della relazione il sussistere una in molti enti, cosa che non capita a nessuna delle altre categorie» (Simplicio, In Cat., p. 161, 6-8). E si legge in Olimpiodoro: «Infatti nei relativi una è la relazione, ma distinte le entità che l'accolgono» (Olimpiodoro, In Cat., p. 97, 30-1). Su queste nuove basi concettuali, i commentatori neoplatonici potranno sviluppare una teoria dei πρός τι sufficientemente omogenea e coerente nelle sue linee più generali, che adopereranno come modello interpretativo della confusa dottrina aristotelica. In questo modo, essi riusciranno a presentare quest'ultima come un sistema sostanzialmente compiuto e ordinato. E anzi, i punti e gli elementi incongrui che ancora vi sopravviveranno saranno dovuti più a un evidente desiderio di giustificare e spiegare comunque — per lo meno parzialmente se non in toto — le affermazioni dello Stagirita, che a delle effettive carenze nella teoria da essi elaborata. [introduction p. 259-263] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9gdQy8F1p83C8kj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1275","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1275,"authors_free":[{"id":1864,"entry_id":1275,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":52,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Conti, Alessandro D.","free_first_name":"Alessandro D.","free_last_name":"Conti","norm_person":{"id":52,"first_name":"Alessandro D.","last_name":"Conti","full_name":"Conti, Alessandro D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1047115123","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle \"Categorie\" di Aristotele","main_title":{"title":"La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle \"Categorie\" di Aristotele"},"abstract":"Uno dei contributi particolari pi\u00f9 rilevanti che i commentatori neoplatonici hanno recato allo sviluppo e alla sistemazione della dottrina categoriale aristotelica \u00e8 senza dubbio quello relativo all'analisi della nozione di \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9.\r\n\r\nEssi, infatti, nel tentativo di fornire un'interpretazione del settimo capitolo delle Categorie che fosse (i) internamente coerente e (ii) solidale con la lettura generale del trattato, sono giunti a elaborare in forma sufficientemente compiuta un concetto di relazione analogo al moderno concetto di relazione binaria, del tutto assente, invece, negli scritti di Aristotele, che pare conoscere solo un non ben definito concetto di relativo (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9).\r\n\r\nIn altre parole: mentre lo Stagirita (i) operava con la sola nozione di relativo e (ii) concepiva i relativi \u2014 sotto l'influenza di evidenti suggestioni grammaticali \u2014 come le entit\u00e0 che corrispondono ai termini non assoluti del linguaggio (cio\u00e8 non aventi significato se non in riferimento a un altro termine), i neoplatonici, al contrario, saranno in grado (i) di servirsi sia della nozione di relativo che di quella di relazione (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), e (ii) di concepire, in un certo qual modo, le relazioni come funzioni diadiche (o meglio, come una sorta di corrispettivo ontologico delle nostre funzioni diadiche) e i relativi come gli argomenti che tali funzioni soddisfano.\r\n\r\nLe precise scelte interpretative su alcuni problemi cruciali del trattato, e cio\u00e8:\r\n\r\n la valenza della tavola categoriale,\r\n la distinzione delle categorie,\r\n il tipo d'esistenza degli accidenti\r\n\r\nda una parte, e l'accettazione dell'idea, aristotelicamente corretta, che i \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 devono essere presi a coppie, dall'altra, sono gli elementi che hanno reso possibile ai neoplatonici la formulazione del concetto di relazione (binaria).\r\n\r\nEssi infatti ritenevano:\r\n\r\n che la tavola categoriale avesse una precisa valenza ontologica, ripartendo non solo nomi e concetti, ma anche cose;\r\n che la distinzione tra le dieci categorie fosse reale e non concettuale;\r\n che gli accidenti fossero forme inerenti alle sostanze.\r\n\r\nIn conseguenza dei primi due punti, i neoplatonici erano indotti a difendere l'oggettivit\u00e0, la realt\u00e0 e l'indipendenza della categoria dei \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 e dei suoi appartenenti, e a rifiutare, quindi, qualsiasi tentativo di interpretazione che volesse ridurla, direttamente o indirettamente, alle altre categorie.\r\n\r\nD'altra parte, concepire gli accidenti come forme inerenti alle sostanze equivaleva a considerare il rapporto tra ciascun genere degli accidenti e la sostanza alla stregua di quello della qualit\u00e0, e quindi secondo il modello qualit\u00e0-cosa qualificata.\r\n\r\nCos\u00ec, nel caso dei \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9, i neoplatonici pensavano che l'entit\u00e0 \"padre\" fosse un'entit\u00e0 composta di una sostanza e di una certa forma accidentale, la paternit\u00e0, ad essa inerente, non diversamente da come \"bianco\" \u00e8 un'entit\u00e0 composta da una sostanza e dalla forma della bianchezza.\r\n\r\nPer avere un concetto corretto di relazione bastava, a questo punto, assumere, coerentemente con l'idea che i \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 vanno presi a coppie, che la caratteristica peculiare di queste particolari forme accidentali fosse quella di riferirsi e collegare tra loro due entit\u00e0 distinte.\r\n\r\nScrive, ad esempio, Simplicio:\r\n\r\n \u00ab\u00c8 proprio soltanto della relazione il sussistere una in molti enti, cosa che non capita a nessuna delle altre categorie\u00bb (Simplicio, In Cat., p. 161, 6-8).\r\n\r\nE si legge in Olimpiodoro:\r\n\r\n \u00abInfatti nei relativi una \u00e8 la relazione, ma distinte le entit\u00e0 che l'accolgono\u00bb (Olimpiodoro, In Cat., p. 97, 30-1).\r\n\r\nSu queste nuove basi concettuali, i commentatori neoplatonici potranno sviluppare una teoria dei \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 sufficientemente omogenea e coerente nelle sue linee pi\u00f9 generali, che adopereranno come modello interpretativo della confusa dottrina aristotelica.\r\n\r\nIn questo modo, essi riusciranno a presentare quest'ultima come un sistema sostanzialmente compiuto e ordinato.\r\n\r\nE anzi, i punti e gli elementi incongrui che ancora vi sopravviveranno saranno dovuti pi\u00f9 a un evidente desiderio di giustificare e spiegare comunque \u2014 per lo meno parzialmente se non in toto \u2014 le affermazioni dello Stagirita, che a delle effettive carenze nella teoria da essi elaborata. [introduction p. 259-263]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9gdQy8F1p83C8kj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":52,"full_name":"Conti, Alessandro D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1275,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista critica di storia della filosofia","volume":"38","issue":"3","pages":"259-283"}},"sort":["La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle \"Categorie\" di Aristotele"]}
Title | La teoria della relazione nei commenti neoplatonici alle Categorie di Aristotele |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofía |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 159-283 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Conti, A. D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/OTIdcLG5JO15mv8 |
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Title | La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Addenda et Corrigenda |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Revue d'histoire des textes |
Volume | 11 |
Pages | 387-395 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The present study, as the title indicates, brings some supplementary information and minor corrections to my article on La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le « Manuel » d'Épictète, which appeared in volume VIII (1978) if the Revue d'Histoire des Textes (pp. 1-108). As part of these addenda, I have identified two new Greek texts, contained in the Neapolitans III. B. 12 : one fragment of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and another fragment of the commentary by Simplicius on Aristotle's De caelo ; each of these fragments is the length of a quaternion. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IyOsWDpihx7t4Q1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1496","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1496,"authors_free":[{"id":2596,"entry_id":1496,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te. Addenda et Corrigenda","main_title":{"title":"La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te. Addenda et Corrigenda"},"abstract":"The present study, as the title indicates, brings some supplementary information and minor corrections to my article on La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le \u00ab Manuel \u00bb d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te, which appeared in volume VIII (1978) if\r\nthe Revue d'Histoire des Textes (pp. 1-108). As part of these addenda, I have identified two new Greek texts, contained in the Neapolitans III. B. 12 : one fragment of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and another fragment of the commentary by Simplicius on Aristotle's De caelo ; each of these fragments is the length of a quaternion. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IyOsWDpihx7t4Q1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1496,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue d'histoire des textes","volume":"11","issue":"","pages":"387-395"}},"sort":["La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te. Addenda et Corrigenda"]}
Title | La Νοερὰ θεωρία di Giamblico, come Chiave di Lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Syllecta Classica |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 79-94 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cardullo, R. Loredana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A conclusione di questa parziale indagine sull’esegesi giamblichea delle Categorie, possiamo affermare come proprio questo approccio più intellettivo, più noetico, che Simplicio definisce noera theoria, sia ciò che ci consente di contraddistinguere in modo emblematico l’interpretazione di Giamblico da quelle di altri commentatori. I contesti da noi esaminati ci hanno dato l’opportunità di confrontare, sia pure per sommi capi, alcuni parametri esegetici propri di Giamblico con alcune interpretazioni di Porfirio, da un lato, e di Siriano dall’altro. Certamente, un esame più completo della fonte simpliciana ci permetterebbe di formulare giudizi più precisi in proposito. Tuttavia, già dai contesti qui analizzati è emersa con evidenza l’assoluta diversità dell’esegesi giamblichea rispetto a quella porfiriana delle Categorie. Porfirio, infatti, esamina con particolare cura i lemmi del trattato commentato, sottoponendo ogni singola espressione, ogni singola parola, a un esame che è prima di tutto filologico, poi filosofico, ma sempre circoscritto all’ambito logico-linguistico nel quale esso si trova e rientra. L’esegesi di Giamblico, invece, mira a collegare in maniera inscindibile l’ambito della speculazione logico-linguistica a quello della riflessione metafisica, trasponendo i principi e le leggi dell’uno nell’altro dominio, e viceversa, al fine di rendere chiara l’analogia e la partecipazione vigente tra i vari livelli della realtà, considerati platonicamente come ordinati in senso gerarchico e strettamente collegati secondo un rapporto di immagine e modello, o di principio e principìato. Ma l’esegesi di Giamblico si distingue anche da quella di un suo successore e per molti versi seguace, Siriano di Atene, la cui esegesi si colloca comunque in larga misura sulla stessa falsariga dell’interpretazione metafisica del maestro di Siria. Nonostante i diversi punti di contatto tra Giamblico e Siriano, emerge infatti una differenza sostanziale tra i due esegeti, che dipende in larga misura dal diverso atteggiamento che ciascuno di essi manifesta nei confronti di Aristotele. Siriano, infatti, appare meno preoccupato di Giamblico dall’esigenza di conciliare aristotelismo e platonismo, e ciò lo porta a dare probabilmente un’interpretazione più obiettiva—e perciò stesso più critica e spesso polemica—delle teorie logiche di Aristotele. Giamblico, invece, utilizza espressioni e concezioni aristoteliche in chiave neoplatonica, per dimostrare in ultima analisi come l’aristotelismo, se correttamente interpretato, possa accordarsi col platonismo, anche nelle sue concezioni metafisiche. Ed è anche a questo scopo che Giamblico dà del primo trattato dell’Organon, classicamente inteso come il più antiplatonico dello Stagirita, un’esegesi più speculativa, atta a dimostrare come anche le teorie aristoteliche più squisitamente logiche possano trovare applicazione nella metafisica platonica e rappresentare per essa degli strumenti argomentativi e dimostrativi di importanza e validità fondamentali. [conclusion p. 93-94] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5dwv2YbmwwJB7OE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"938","_score":null,"_source":{"id":938,"authors_free":[{"id":1391,"entry_id":938,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":24,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","free_first_name":"R. Loredana ","free_last_name":"Cardullo","norm_person":{"id":24,"first_name":"R. Loredana ","last_name":"Cardullo","full_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139800220","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 di Giamblico, come Chiave di Lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi","main_title":{"title":"La \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 di Giamblico, come Chiave di Lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi"},"abstract":"A conclusione di questa parziale indagine sull\u2019esegesi giamblichea delle Categorie, possiamo affermare come proprio questo approccio pi\u00f9 intellettivo, pi\u00f9 noetico, che Simplicio definisce noera theoria, sia ci\u00f2 che ci consente di contraddistinguere in modo emblematico l\u2019interpretazione di Giamblico da quelle di altri commentatori. I contesti da noi esaminati ci hanno dato l\u2019opportunit\u00e0 di confrontare, sia pure per sommi capi, alcuni parametri esegetici propri di Giamblico con alcune interpretazioni di Porfirio, da un lato, e di Siriano dall\u2019altro. Certamente, un esame pi\u00f9 completo della fonte simpliciana ci permetterebbe di formulare giudizi pi\u00f9 precisi in proposito. Tuttavia, gi\u00e0 dai contesti qui analizzati \u00e8 emersa con evidenza l\u2019assoluta diversit\u00e0 dell\u2019esegesi giamblichea rispetto a quella porfiriana delle Categorie.\r\n\r\nPorfirio, infatti, esamina con particolare cura i lemmi del trattato commentato, sottoponendo ogni singola espressione, ogni singola parola, a un esame che \u00e8 prima di tutto filologico, poi filosofico, ma sempre circoscritto all\u2019ambito logico-linguistico nel quale esso si trova e rientra. L\u2019esegesi di Giamblico, invece, mira a collegare in maniera inscindibile l\u2019ambito della speculazione logico-linguistica a quello della riflessione metafisica, trasponendo i principi e le leggi dell\u2019uno nell\u2019altro dominio, e viceversa, al fine di rendere chiara l\u2019analogia e la partecipazione vigente tra i vari livelli della realt\u00e0, considerati platonicamente come ordinati in senso gerarchico e strettamente collegati secondo un rapporto di immagine e modello, o di principio e princip\u00ecato.\r\n\r\nMa l\u2019esegesi di Giamblico si distingue anche da quella di un suo successore e per molti versi seguace, Siriano di Atene, la cui esegesi si colloca comunque in larga misura sulla stessa falsariga dell\u2019interpretazione metafisica del maestro di Siria. Nonostante i diversi punti di contatto tra Giamblico e Siriano, emerge infatti una differenza sostanziale tra i due esegeti, che dipende in larga misura dal diverso atteggiamento che ciascuno di essi manifesta nei confronti di Aristotele. Siriano, infatti, appare meno preoccupato di Giamblico dall\u2019esigenza di conciliare aristotelismo e platonismo, e ci\u00f2 lo porta a dare probabilmente un\u2019interpretazione pi\u00f9 obiettiva\u2014e perci\u00f2 stesso pi\u00f9 critica e spesso polemica\u2014delle teorie logiche di Aristotele. Giamblico, invece, utilizza espressioni e concezioni aristoteliche in chiave neoplatonica, per dimostrare in ultima analisi come l\u2019aristotelismo, se correttamente interpretato, possa accordarsi col platonismo, anche nelle sue concezioni metafisiche.\r\n\r\nEd \u00e8 anche a questo scopo che Giamblico d\u00e0 del primo trattato dell\u2019Organon, classicamente inteso come il pi\u00f9 antiplatonico dello Stagirita, un\u2019esegesi pi\u00f9 speculativa, atta a dimostrare come anche le teorie aristoteliche pi\u00f9 squisitamente logiche possano trovare applicazione nella metafisica platonica e rappresentare per essa degli strumenti argomentativi e dimostrativi di importanza e validit\u00e0 fondamentali. [conclusion p. 93-94]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5dwv2YbmwwJB7OE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":24,"full_name":"Cardullo, R. Loredana ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":938,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Syllecta Classica","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"79-94"}},"sort":["La \u039d\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 di Giamblico, come Chiave di Lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi"]}
Title | Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'École d'Alexandrie au VIe siècle |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1954 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 67 |
Issue | 316-318 |
Pages | 396-410 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Saffrey, Henri Dominique |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ammonias, bien que païen et élève de Proclus, avait su, dès la fin du Ve siècle, faire à l'Église les concessionsnécessaires pour que fût toléré son enseignement officiel à Alexandrie. Mais il convient de reconnaître le rôle capital quedut jouer, quelque vingt à trente ans plus tard, un de ses élèves chrétiens, Jean le grammairien, philoponos dans l'Églised'Alexandrie : il couvrit son maître, et en éditant sous son nom à lui ses rédactions des commentaires à Aristote exposésoralement par Ammonius, et en publiant, dans l'année critique 529, son propre ouvrage De aeternitate mundi ContraProclum, qui détachait opportunément de l'École d'Athènes l'École d'Alexandrie. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Q5nhmaN1gcPD9Ls |
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Title | Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l’Antiquité |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | AnTard (Antiquité Tardive. Revue internationale d’histoire et d’archéolog) |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 169–176 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Opening with an overview of the historical development of the continuous philosophical commentary, this study aims to bring out the profound differences between modem philosophicalcommentaries and the Late Antique commentaries on Plato and Aristotle. The modem commentariesare concerned to explain the texts for an audience which is not defined. By contrast, the ancient commentaries belonged to a precise programme of reading the texts concerned, a programme which corresponded both to levels of knowledge and levels of spiritual progression. They were therefore addressed, depending on the type of text, to beginners, to intermediate or to very advanced students; and their content and method varied greatly according to the level of the intended readership. Furthermore, explaining the text was never an end in itself; the commentary was intended not so much to expand knowledge as to assist in the acquisition of a particular ethical attitude, leading to a particular way of life. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bNInszbNd3YEzTp |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"695","_score":null,"_source":{"id":695,"authors_free":[{"id":1034,"entry_id":695,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9","main_title":{"title":"Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9"},"abstract":"Opening with an overview of the historical development of the continuous philosophical commentary, this study aims to bring out the profound differences between modem philosophicalcommentaries and the Late Antique commentaries on Plato and Aristotle. The modem commentariesare concerned to explain the texts for an audience which is not defined. By contrast, the ancient commentaries belonged to a precise programme of reading the texts concerned, a programme which corresponded both to levels of knowledge and levels of spiritual progression. They were therefore addressed, depending on the type of text, to beginners, to intermediate or to very advanced students; and their content and method varied greatly according to the level of the intended readership. Furthermore, explaining the text was never an end in itself; the commentary was intended not so much to expand knowledge as to assist in the acquisition of a particular ethical attitude, leading to a particular way of life. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bNInszbNd3YEzTp","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":695,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"AnTard (Antiquit\u00e9 Tardive. Revue internationale d\u2019histoire et d\u2019arch\u00e9olog)","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"169\u2013176"}},"sort":["Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l\u2019Antiquit\u00e9"]}
Title | Le temps intégral selon Damascius |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 3: Doctrines du temps |
Pages | 325-341 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Galperine, Marie-Claire |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text explores Aristotle's unresolved aporias on the nature of time in Physics IV (217b30 - 218a30), highlighting a metaphysical dilemma: whether time belongs to being or non-being. Aristotle leaves the question undecided, shifting focus to the nature of time, a problem he may have deliberately avoided. Ancient thinkers, however, did not shy away from addressing these aporias. Damascius offers a resolution to Aristotle’s dilemmas in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and his lost treatise on number, place, and time, fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius. Damascius’ concept of "integral time" distinguishes between two meanings of "now": Aristotle’s punctual "now," a limit of time, and Damascius’ "present," a temporal continuum. Simplicius, though critical of Damascius’ ideas, acknowledges this distinction as key to resolving Aristotle’s aporias. Simplicius' Corollarium de tempore expands on this, presenting time as simultaneously existent in its entirety ("integral time"), a concept rooted in Damascius’ philosophy. However, Simplicius’ partial understanding of Damascius’ thought highlights his struggle to reconcile Damascius’ notion of time with Aristotelian paradigms. The analysis situates Damascius’ ideas within the framework of both Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s Physics, showcasing how he integrates Platonic metaphysics with Aristotelian logic to address foundational questions about the nature and being of time. [introduction p. 325-327] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/K2X5R1lQigoI37E |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"544","_score":null,"_source":{"id":544,"authors_free":[{"id":768,"entry_id":544,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":123,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","free_first_name":"Marie-Claire","free_last_name":"Galperine","norm_person":{"id":123,"first_name":"Marie-Claire","last_name":"Galperine","full_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le temps int\u00e9gral selon Damascius","main_title":{"title":"Le temps int\u00e9gral selon Damascius"},"abstract":"This text explores Aristotle's unresolved aporias on the nature of time in Physics IV (217b30 - 218a30), highlighting a metaphysical dilemma: whether time belongs to being or non-being. Aristotle leaves the question undecided, shifting focus to the nature of time, a problem he may have deliberately avoided. Ancient thinkers, however, did not shy away from addressing these aporias.\r\n\r\nDamascius offers a resolution to Aristotle\u2019s dilemmas in his commentary on Plato\u2019s Parmenides and his lost treatise on number, place, and time, fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius. Damascius\u2019 concept of \"integral time\" distinguishes between two meanings of \"now\": Aristotle\u2019s punctual \"now,\" a limit of time, and Damascius\u2019 \"present,\" a temporal continuum. Simplicius, though critical of Damascius\u2019 ideas, acknowledges this distinction as key to resolving Aristotle\u2019s aporias.\r\n\r\nSimplicius' Corollarium de tempore expands on this, presenting time as simultaneously existent in its entirety (\"integral time\"), a concept rooted in Damascius\u2019 philosophy. However, Simplicius\u2019 partial understanding of Damascius\u2019 thought highlights his struggle to reconcile Damascius\u2019 notion of time with Aristotelian paradigms.\r\n\r\nThe analysis situates Damascius\u2019 ideas within the framework of both Plato\u2019s Parmenides and Aristotle\u2019s Physics, showcasing how he integrates Platonic metaphysics with Aristotelian logic to address foundational questions about the nature and being of time. [introduction p. 325-327]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/K2X5R1lQigoI37E","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":123,"full_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":544,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3: Doctrines du temps","issue":"","pages":"325-341"}},"sort":["Le temps int\u00e9gral selon Damascius"]}
Title | Le thème de la grande année d'Héraclite aux Stoiciens |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 169-183 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bels, Jacques |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
D’Héraclite aux stoïciens, en passant par Platon qui adopte un point de vue analogue à celui de l’Éphésien, le discours sur la Grande Année est au cœur même de la conception philosophique, même s’il subit une modification dans son appréhension. En effet, à une lecture (re)générante, le stoïcisme substitue une perspective finaliste quand il privilégie le lien Grande Année-ekpyrosis. Cette accentuation d’une Grande Année conçue comme limite, au détriment de la régénération, se marque également dans la liaison ekpyrosis-fin de la survie limitée. En effet, selon les stoïciens, à la disparition des corps, la partie spirituelle subsiste un certain temps avant de disparaître à son tour. Conséquence logique de la thèse selon laquelle ce qui est engendré doit disparaître, cette mort de l’âme correspond, chez Cléanthe et Chrysippe, à la conflagration universelle. Pour le premier, en effet, toutes les âmes survivent jusqu’à l’embrasement final, tandis que, pour le second, seules les âmes des sages connaissent ce privilège, celles des "insensés" disparaissant plus rapidement. Dès lors, quand il établit une parenté entre les stoïciens et Héraclite, Simplicius a partiellement raison : ces penseurs ont posé l’existence d’une Grande Année. Il oublie simplement de préciser qu’ils lui ont assigné des priorités différentes. [conclusion p. 183] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Wt3OVL4zzPJWT2a |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"831","_score":null,"_source":{"id":831,"authors_free":[{"id":1235,"entry_id":831,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":421,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bels, Jacques","free_first_name":"Jacques","free_last_name":"Bels","norm_person":{"id":421,"first_name":"Jacques","last_name":"Bels","full_name":"Bels, Jacques","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le th\u00e8me de la grande ann\u00e9e d'H\u00e9raclite aux Stoiciens","main_title":{"title":"Le th\u00e8me de la grande ann\u00e9e d'H\u00e9raclite aux Stoiciens"},"abstract":"D\u2019H\u00e9raclite aux sto\u00efciens, en passant par Platon qui adopte un point de vue analogue \u00e0 celui de l\u2019\u00c9ph\u00e9sien, le discours sur la Grande Ann\u00e9e est au c\u0153ur m\u00eame de la conception philosophique, m\u00eame s\u2019il subit une modification dans son appr\u00e9hension. En effet, \u00e0 une lecture (re)g\u00e9n\u00e9rante, le sto\u00efcisme substitue une perspective finaliste quand il privil\u00e9gie le lien Grande Ann\u00e9e-ekpyrosis. Cette accentuation d\u2019une Grande Ann\u00e9e con\u00e7ue comme limite, au d\u00e9triment de la r\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, se marque \u00e9galement dans la liaison ekpyrosis-fin de la survie limit\u00e9e. En effet, selon les sto\u00efciens, \u00e0 la disparition des corps, la partie spirituelle subsiste un certain temps avant de dispara\u00eetre \u00e0 son tour.\r\n\r\nCons\u00e9quence logique de la th\u00e8se selon laquelle ce qui est engendr\u00e9 doit dispara\u00eetre, cette mort de l\u2019\u00e2me correspond, chez Cl\u00e9anthe et Chrysippe, \u00e0 la conflagration universelle. Pour le premier, en effet, toutes les \u00e2mes survivent jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019embrasement final, tandis que, pour le second, seules les \u00e2mes des sages connaissent ce privil\u00e8ge, celles des \"insens\u00e9s\" disparaissant plus rapidement.\r\n\r\nD\u00e8s lors, quand il \u00e9tablit une parent\u00e9 entre les sto\u00efciens et H\u00e9raclite, Simplicius a partiellement raison : ces penseurs ont pos\u00e9 l\u2019existence d\u2019une Grande Ann\u00e9e. Il oublie simplement de pr\u00e9ciser qu\u2019ils lui ont assign\u00e9 des priorit\u00e9s diff\u00e9rentes. [conclusion p. 183]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Wt3OVL4zzPJWT2a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":421,"full_name":"Bels, Jacques","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":831,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"7","issue":"2","pages":"169-183"}},"sort":["Le th\u00e8me de la grande ann\u00e9e d'H\u00e9raclite aux Stoiciens"]}
Title | Le σκοπός du traité aristotélicien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Exégèse, dialectique, théologie |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Studia graeco-arabica |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 27-51 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A six-page Prologue introduces the commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo written by Simplicius after 529 AD. As usual in the exegeses typical of the Neoplatonic schools of late Antiquity, this Prologue addresses a series of preliminary questions that are meant to steer the interpretation in its entirety, as well as to frame the text to be commented upon within the reading canon of the Aristotelian works, which were intended to provide the propaedeutics to the reading canon of Plato’s dialogues. Simplicius addresses the question of the scope of De Caelo, discussing the interpretations advanced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Iamblichus, and Syrianus. According to Alexander, this treatise deals with the universe as a whole, as well as with the five simple bodies contained in it. It was with Iamblichus, who advocated the idea that for each Platonic dialogue there was only one skopos, that the unity of a philosophical work was raised to the rank of a general rule. According to Iamblichus, the skopos of the De Caelo is the divine body of heaven. As a consequence, the primary elements that depend upon the heavens are included in the treatise. Syrianus deepens the theological tendency implied in Iamblichus’ interpretation: for him, the skopos of the De Caelo is primarily the divine body of heaven, and only secondarily the set of sublunar elements. Simplicius treasures the commentary by Alexander; nevertheless, he questions the skopos assigned by him: Alexander underestimated the importance of the unity of the treatise, even though his intention to account for each and every question raised by Aristotle was laudable. Contrarily, Syrianus was right in emphasizing the theological vein of the De Caelo, but focussed only on the section on the divine body of heaven, playing down books III and IV as if they were only ancillary, thus forgetting that the skopos must account for the whole of the treatise at hand. Between the two positions, Simplicius advocates the idea of a synthetical skopos, following in the footsteps of Iamblichus’ interpretation, but taking systematically into account the best of Alexander’s. The skopos of the De Caelo is the divine heaven, that “communicates” its perfections to the entire universe. Simplicius’ position is revealed to be very different with respect to that of other commentators like Ammonius and Philoponus, who both considered that the title was self-evident and required no special investigation. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IkThMj3dyL4pqPR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"581","_score":null,"_source":{"id":581,"authors_free":[{"id":824,"entry_id":581,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie","main_title":{"title":"Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie"},"abstract":"A six-page Prologue introduces the commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo written by Simplicius after 529 AD. As usual in the exegeses typical of the Neoplatonic schools of late Antiquity, this Prologue addresses a series of preliminary \r\nquestions that are meant to steer the interpretation in its entirety, as well as to frame the text to be commented upon within the reading canon of the Aristotelian works, which were intended to provide the propaedeutics to the reading canon of Plato\u2019s dialogues. Simplicius addresses the question of the scope of De Caelo, discussing the interpretations advanced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Iamblichus, and Syrianus. According to Alexander, this treatise deals with the universe as a whole, as well as with the five simple bodies contained in it. It was with Iamblichus, who advocated the idea that for each Platonic dialogue there was only one skopos, that the unity of a philosophical work was raised \r\nto the rank of a general rule. According to Iamblichus, the skopos of the De Caelo is the divine body of heaven. As a consequence, the primary elements that depend upon the heavens are included in the treatise. Syrianus deepens \r\nthe theological tendency implied in Iamblichus\u2019 interpretation: for him, the skopos of the De Caelo is primarily the divine body of heaven, and only secondarily the set of sublunar elements. Simplicius treasures the commentary by \r\nAlexander; nevertheless, he questions the skopos assigned by him: Alexander underestimated the importance of the unity of the treatise, even though his intention to account for each and every question raised by Aristotle was laudable. Contrarily, Syrianus was right in emphasizing the theological vein of the De Caelo, but focussed only on the section on the divine body of heaven, playing down books III and IV as if they were only ancillary, thus forgetting that the skopos must account for the whole of the treatise at hand. Between the two positions, Simplicius advocates the idea of a synthetical skopos, following in the footsteps of Iamblichus\u2019 interpretation, but taking systematically into account the best of Alexander\u2019s. The skopos of the De Caelo is the divine heaven, that \u201ccommunicates\u201d its perfections to the \r\nentire universe. Simplicius\u2019 position is revealed to be very different with respect to that of other commentators like Ammonius and Philoponus, who both considered that the title was self-evident and required no special investigation. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IkThMj3dyL4pqPR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":581,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"27-51"}},"sort":["Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie"]}
Title | Les conséquences tragiques pour Parménide d'une erreur d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2024 |
Journal | Journal of Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Nestor-Luis Cordero |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The difficulty of grasping the thought of Parmenides led interpreters already in antiquity to approach his philosophy according to later schemes of thought. This was the case of Aristotle, whose interpretation was inherited by his disciple Theophrastus and by his commentators, especially Simplicius. Simplicius, a Neoplatonist and Aristotelian at the same time, proposed an interpretation, strongly dualistic (dominated by the sensible/intelligible dichotomy), which is not found in the recovered quotations. The origin of this interpretation is an "error" of Aristotle, inherited by Simplicius, who attributed to Parmenides himself the paternity of the "opinions of mortals". In 1795 G.G.Fülleborn, inspired by Simplicius, proposed a division of the Poem into two "parts", unanimously accepted today, and which must be urgently revised and rejected. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/RcInmMNzff21NUZ |
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Title | Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux «Météorologiques» |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Bulletin de la classe des lettres, sciences morales et politiques de l'Académie Royale de Belgique |
Volume | 5e Série, Tome 39 |
Pages | 299–357 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Evrard, Étienne |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Philopon était probablement un chrétien de naissance. Rien en tout cas n’indique qu'il ait jamais été païen. Dès le début de son activité littéraire, il manifeste son christianisme en interprétant Aristote d’une manière favorable à l’immortalité de l'âme humaine et en le critiquant à propos de la création du monde et de l’éternité du mouvement. Il fut peut-être séduit un instant par les idées d’Origène, mais les abandonna bientôt. La fermeture de l’école d’Athènes a sans doute produit sur son esprit une assez forte impression. Il est remarquable en tout cas que son Contre Proclus est l’exact contemporain de cet événement. Peut-être la mesure de Justinien fut-elle difficilement admise dans les cercles philosophiques d'Alexandrie, où païens et chrétiens semblent avoir fait un effort pour harmoniser leurs points de vue. Philopon aurait alors voulu montrer qu’elle atteignait les disciples d’un philosophe dont l’enseignement était fort criticable et qui n’avait consenti aucune concession au christianisme. C’est peut-être pour la même raison qu’un peu après, dans son Commentaire aux Météorologiques, il attaqua à plusieurs reprises Damascius, qui dirigeait l’école d'Athènes au moment de sa fermeture. A ce moment encore, il prit apparemment une conscience plus nette des contradictions entre les doctrines des païen’s et sa religion. C’est en effet dans le Contre Proclus qu’apparaît pour la première fois la critique de la cinquième essence. Un ouvrage postérieur que nous ne possédons plus y ajoutait une réfutation de la théorie du mouvement surnaturel du feu. On peut penser que Philopon craignait dans ces doctrines une certaine divinisation du ciel dans laquelle il voyait une atteinte à la majesté de Dieu. Le Commentaire aux Météorologiques, composé après 529, révèle une accentuation de cette attitude. On y voit en plus apparaître la critique de l’astrologie. Enfin le Contre Aristote constitue comme une somme des griefs de Philopon contre le système péripatéticien. Dans le De Opificio mundi, postérieur au Contre Aristote et écrit après 557, la philosophie n’apparaît plus qu’indirectement et cède la place à la théologie et à l’exégèse biblique.Seule une étude exhaustive des œuvres de Philopon révélerait le degré d'exactitude de cette reconstitution provisoire. Celle-ci me semble du moins respecter plus complètement que celle de Gudeman les indications sur lesquelles j’ai attiré l’attention. Elle permet en outre de mieux comprendre les répercussions des événements de la première moitié du VIe siècle sur l'esprit de Philopon. [conclusion, p. 356-357] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/spYKKnIJSQ8Wyan |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"553","_score":null,"_source":{"id":553,"authors_free":[{"id":782,"entry_id":553,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":92,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Evrard, \u00c9tienne ","free_first_name":"\u00c9tienne ","free_last_name":"Evrard","norm_person":{"id":92,"first_name":"\u00c9tienne ","last_name":"Evrard","full_name":"Evrard, \u00c9tienne ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118945750","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux \u00abM\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques\u00bb","main_title":{"title":"Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux \u00abM\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques\u00bb"},"abstract":"Philopon \u00e9tait probablement un chr\u00e9tien de naissance. Rien en tout cas n\u2019indique qu'il ait jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 pa\u00efen. D\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de son activit\u00e9 litt\u00e9raire, il manifeste son christianisme en interpr\u00e9tant Aristote d\u2019une mani\u00e8re favorable \u00e0 l\u2019immortalit\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me humaine et en le \r\ncritiquant \u00e0 propos de la cr\u00e9ation du monde et de l\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 du mouvement. Il fut peut-\u00eatre s\u00e9duit un instant par les id\u00e9es d\u2019Orig\u00e8ne, mais les abandonna bient\u00f4t. La fermeture de l\u2019\u00e9cole \r\nd\u2019Ath\u00e8nes a sans doute produit sur son esprit une assez forte impression. Il est remarquable en tout cas que son Contre Proclus est l\u2019exact contemporain de cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement. Peut-\u00eatre la mesure de Justinien fut-elle difficilement admise dans les cercles philoso\u00adphiques d'Alexandrie, o\u00f9 pa\u00efens et chr\u00e9tiens semblent avoir \r\nfait un effort pour harmoniser leurs points de vue. Philopon aurait alors voulu montrer qu\u2019elle atteignait les disciples d\u2019un philosophe dont l\u2019enseignement \u00e9tait fort criticable et qui n\u2019avait \r\nconsenti aucune concession au christianisme. C\u2019est peut-\u00eatre pour la m\u00eame raison qu\u2019un peu apr\u00e8s, dans son Commentaire aux M\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques, il attaqua \u00e0 plusieurs reprises Damascius, qui dirigeait l\u2019\u00e9cole d'Ath\u00e8nes au moment de sa fermeture. A ce moment encore, il prit apparemment une conscience plus nette \r\ndes contradictions entre les doctrines des pa\u00efen\u2019s et sa religion. C\u2019est en effet dans le Contre Proclus qu\u2019appara\u00eet pour la premi\u00e8re fois la critique de la cinqui\u00e8me essence. Un ouvrage post\u00e9rieur \r\nque nous ne poss\u00e9dons plus y ajoutait une r\u00e9futation de la th\u00e9orie du mouvement surnaturel du feu. On peut penser que Philopon craignait dans ces doctrines une certaine divinisation du ciel dans laquelle il voyait une atteinte \u00e0 la majest\u00e9 de Dieu. Le Com\u00admentaire aux M\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques, compos\u00e9 apr\u00e8s 529, r\u00e9v\u00e8le une accentuation de cette attitude. On y voit en plus appara\u00eetre la \r\ncritique de l\u2019astrologie. Enfin le Contre Aristote constitue comme une somme des griefs de Philopon contre le syst\u00e8me p\u00e9ripat\u00e9ticien. Dans le De Opificio mundi, post\u00e9rieur au Contre Aristote \r\net \u00e9crit apr\u00e8s 557, la philosophie n\u2019appara\u00eet plus qu\u2019indirectement et c\u00e8de la place \u00e0 la th\u00e9ologie et \u00e0 l\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se biblique.Seule une \u00e9tude exhaustive des \u0153uvres de Philopon r\u00e9v\u00e9lerait le degr\u00e9 d'exactitude de cette reconstitution provisoire. Celle-ci me semble du moins respecter plus compl\u00e8tement que celle de Gudeman les indications sur lesquelles j\u2019ai attir\u00e9 l\u2019attention. \r\nElle permet en outre de mieux comprendre les r\u00e9percussions des \u00e9v\u00e9nements de la premi\u00e8re moiti\u00e9 du VIe si\u00e8cle sur l'esprit \r\nde Philopon. [conclusion, p. 356-357]","btype":3,"date":"1953","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/spYKKnIJSQ8Wyan","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":92,"full_name":"Evrard, \u00c9tienne ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":553,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin de la classe des lettres, sciences morales et politiques de l'Acad\u00e9mie Royale de Belgique","volume":"5e S\u00e9rie, Tome 39","issue":"","pages":"299\u2013357"}},"sort":["Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux \u00abM\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques\u00bb"]}
Title | Les présocratiques et la question de l'infini |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1981 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 19-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Frère, Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Bien avant la philosophie de Platon et celle d'Aristote, la pensée grecque a rencontré la question du rapport entre l'infini (apeiros) et la perfection. Mais, pour aborder ce que les Grecs veulent nommer par le « non-limité », il convient de partir du débat que les linguistes ont engagé autour du terme. Plusieurs interprétations sémantiques sont envisagées dans le rapport entre apeiros et peirar/peras. Dans une première solution, le préfixe négatif a- se combine avec peras ; dans une seconde, le a- privatif porte sur la racine per (perô, peirô, perainô), qui signifie passage et traversée. En ce qui concerne peras, les linguistes sont de nouveau partagés entre « limite, bout, extrémité » ou « lien ». Pour ce qui est de la langue grecque, non encore conceptualisée par la démarche philosophique, ce que « illimité » peut véhiculer de non clair pour la raison ou de non rassurant pour le sentiment ne comporte pourtant aucune dimension de cette angoisse et de ce vertige que retiendra Pascal. Lorsque Homère ou Hésiode parlent de la « terre sans limite », lorsque Pindare chante la « renommée infinie » du héros, l’adjectif apeirôn se relie généralement à l’éloge de qualités concernant choses ou hommes. Il y a aussi l’idée de profondeur sans fin (le sommeil, hypnos, Odyssée VII, 286) ou d’ampleur (une foule d’hommes, Iliade XXIV, 776). C’est moins son aspect infini que son pouvoir d’engloutir qui fait caractériser comme terrible la mer infinie. De même, l’adjectif apeirôn, infini, renvoie à l’immensité comme profusion et comme richesse, qu’il s’agisse du lieu, du temps ou du nombre. Avec les présocratiques, apeiros/to apeiron s’installent dans la pensée philosophique. À travers des textes fragmentaires, il est difficile de savoir avec certitude la conception de l’infini (apeiron) que les présocratiques, de Thalès à Anaxagore et aux sophistes, avaient pu élaborer. Néanmoins, le problème de apeiron n’a pas été sans importance pour eux. Que l’un d’eux, Anaximandre, ait fait de l’apeiron l’archê de l’univers en est la marque. Et Mélissos caractérise le principe (archê) comme infini (apeiron). L’apeiron n’est donc point pour les présocratiques uniquement lié à l’imperfection que sera l’apeiron du Philebe. Il y a dans la pensée grecque des premiers temps comme un pressentiment de la richesse de l’infini, aussi bien qu’il désigne une absence de limite où la raison se perd. L’apeiron renvoie surtout à la spatialité, se lie à la grandeur (megethos), comme l’éternité (to aidion) se lie au temps. Dans les philosophies où la nature (physis) est aux confins du divin et du matériel, le principe, le tout, les mondes sont caractérisés d’abord par l’infini de grandeur, l’illimité. Mais l’infini est aussi envisagé comme indéfini qualitatif. Toutefois, face à l’infini qui est déterminé par sa richesse, certains présocratiques ont envisagé aussi l’infini qui est pure indétermination, degré incomplet de l’Être et forme du moindre Être. On trouve ici l’esquisse des conceptions philosophiques qui vont se préciser dans les théories plus élaborées de Platon et d’Aristote. [introduction p. 19-20] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/TpFRmhxNzvv4XUL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"745","_score":null,"_source":{"id":745,"authors_free":[{"id":1108,"entry_id":745,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":101,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":101,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130051187","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les pr\u00e9socratiques et la question de l'infini","main_title":{"title":"Les pr\u00e9socratiques et la question de l'infini"},"abstract":"Bien avant la philosophie de Platon et celle d'Aristote, la pens\u00e9e grecque a rencontr\u00e9 la question du rapport entre l'infini (apeiros) et la perfection. Mais, pour aborder ce que les Grecs veulent nommer par le \u00ab non-limit\u00e9 \u00bb, il convient de partir du d\u00e9bat que les linguistes ont engag\u00e9 autour du terme. Plusieurs interpr\u00e9tations s\u00e9mantiques sont envisag\u00e9es dans le rapport entre apeiros et peirar\/peras. Dans une premi\u00e8re solution, le pr\u00e9fixe n\u00e9gatif a- se combine avec peras ; dans une seconde, le a- privatif porte sur la racine per (per\u00f4, peir\u00f4, perain\u00f4), qui signifie passage et travers\u00e9e. En ce qui concerne peras, les linguistes sont de nouveau partag\u00e9s entre \u00ab limite, bout, extr\u00e9mit\u00e9 \u00bb ou \u00ab lien \u00bb.\r\n\r\nPour ce qui est de la langue grecque, non encore conceptualis\u00e9e par la d\u00e9marche philosophique, ce que \u00ab illimit\u00e9 \u00bb peut v\u00e9hiculer de non clair pour la raison ou de non rassurant pour le sentiment ne comporte pourtant aucune dimension de cette angoisse et de ce vertige que retiendra Pascal. Lorsque Hom\u00e8re ou H\u00e9siode parlent de la \u00ab terre sans limite \u00bb, lorsque Pindare chante la \u00ab renomm\u00e9e infinie \u00bb du h\u00e9ros, l\u2019adjectif apeir\u00f4n se relie g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9loge de qualit\u00e9s concernant choses ou hommes. Il y a aussi l\u2019id\u00e9e de profondeur sans fin (le sommeil, hypnos, Odyss\u00e9e VII, 286) ou d\u2019ampleur (une foule d\u2019hommes, Iliade XXIV, 776). C\u2019est moins son aspect infini que son pouvoir d\u2019engloutir qui fait caract\u00e9riser comme terrible la mer infinie. De m\u00eame, l\u2019adjectif apeir\u00f4n, infini, renvoie \u00e0 l\u2019immensit\u00e9 comme profusion et comme richesse, qu\u2019il s\u2019agisse du lieu, du temps ou du nombre.\r\n\r\nAvec les pr\u00e9socratiques, apeiros\/to apeiron s\u2019installent dans la pens\u00e9e philosophique. \u00c0 travers des textes fragmentaires, il est difficile de savoir avec certitude la conception de l\u2019infini (apeiron) que les pr\u00e9socratiques, de Thal\u00e8s \u00e0 Anaxagore et aux sophistes, avaient pu \u00e9laborer. N\u00e9anmoins, le probl\u00e8me de apeiron n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 sans importance pour eux. Que l\u2019un d\u2019eux, Anaximandre, ait fait de l\u2019apeiron l\u2019arch\u00ea de l\u2019univers en est la marque. Et M\u00e9lissos caract\u00e9rise le principe (arch\u00ea) comme infini (apeiron). L\u2019apeiron n\u2019est donc point pour les pr\u00e9socratiques uniquement li\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019imperfection que sera l\u2019apeiron du Philebe.\r\n\r\nIl y a dans la pens\u00e9e grecque des premiers temps comme un pressentiment de la richesse de l\u2019infini, aussi bien qu\u2019il d\u00e9signe une absence de limite o\u00f9 la raison se perd. L\u2019apeiron renvoie surtout \u00e0 la spatialit\u00e9, se lie \u00e0 la grandeur (megethos), comme l\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 (to aidion) se lie au temps. Dans les philosophies o\u00f9 la nature (physis) est aux confins du divin et du mat\u00e9riel, le principe, le tout, les mondes sont caract\u00e9ris\u00e9s d\u2019abord par l\u2019infini de grandeur, l\u2019illimit\u00e9. Mais l\u2019infini est aussi envisag\u00e9 comme ind\u00e9fini qualitatif.\r\n\r\nToutefois, face \u00e0 l\u2019infini qui est d\u00e9termin\u00e9 par sa richesse, certains pr\u00e9socratiques ont envisag\u00e9 aussi l\u2019infini qui est pure ind\u00e9termination, degr\u00e9 incomplet de l\u2019\u00catre et forme du moindre \u00catre. On trouve ici l\u2019esquisse des conceptions philosophiques qui vont se pr\u00e9ciser dans les th\u00e9ories plus \u00e9labor\u00e9es de Platon et d\u2019Aristote. [introduction p. 19-20]","btype":3,"date":"1981","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/TpFRmhxNzvv4XUL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":101,"full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":745,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"19-33"}},"sort":["Les pr\u00e9socratiques et la question de l'infini"]}
Title | Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Les Études philosophiques |
Volume | 3 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 319-345 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | de Libera, Alain |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
C'est ici le lieu de revenir sur le concept de denominatio. Dans les versions latines d'Aristote, le mot denominativa désigne, on l'a dit, les « paronymes », c'est-à-dire ces « réalités qui, tout en différant d'une autre (réalité) par la désinence de leur nom, ont une appellation conforme au nom (de cette autre réalité) ». Chez Maître Eckhart, la notion de « prédication dénominative », empruntée à la Logica d'Avicenne (chap. 3, Venise, 1508, fol. 3 vb), rejoint la notion boécienne de praedicatio des accidentia secundum rem (De Trinitate, chap. 4), exprimant un aspect de la déficience ontologique constitutive de l’étant créé comme tel. Pour lui, dire que « les neuf catégories sont prédiquées dénominativement de la substance » (novem praedicamenta accidentium praedicantur denominative de substantia) signifie que tout étant créé est un dénominatif, c'est-à-dire un étant-ceci ou cela (ens hoc et hoc), et qu'aucun étant-ceci n'est en tant que ceci : tout « ceci » ajouté à la substance est l'expression de la défaillance (casus, πτῶσις) qui accidente le créé. C'est dans cette tradition complexe, à la fois liée à la théorie averroïste de l'accident et aux théories avicennienne (ontologique) et boécienne (théologique) de la prédication—et non à la théorie de l’analogie selon Simplicius—que se situe le célèbre passage d’In Exodum, où le Thuringien expose sa théorie des catégories, qu'on peut résumer ainsi : Les dix catégories ne sont pas les dix premiers étants (decem prima entia), mais les dix genres premiers des étants (decem prima entium genera). Il n'y a qu'un étant, la substance ; les autres réalités ne sont pas « étant » (ens), mais « de ou à l’étant » (entis), c’est-à-dire « étant seulement par analogie au seul étant au sens absolu, la substance, comme en témoigne la Métaphysique, livre VII ». Les neuf prédicaments de l’accident ne sont donc pas des étants « au cas régime » (entia in recto), mais des étants au « cas oblique » (in obliquo). C'est en ce sens « oblique » que l’urine est dite « saine », non par la santé « formellement inhérente », « mais seulement par analogie et renvoi extrinsèque à la santé elle-même, qui au sens propre et formel se trouve seulement dans l’animal » (non sanitate formaliter inhaerente, sed sola analogia et respectu ad ipsam sanitatem extra, quae proprie formaliter est in ipso animali). C’est également en ce sens que le vin est dit « être dans l’enseigne », signifiant qu’il se trouve dans la taverne et la bouteille. Telle est donc la théorie dont Nicolas prétend trouver les contours généraux, ou plus exactement l’instrumentation conceptuelle, chez Simplicius. Certes, il n'en laisse pas l’application métaphysique au commentateur lui-même—ce en quoi il a raison—mais il a tort lorsqu'il lui prête une formulation de l’analogia attributionis, qu'il ne pouvait lire que chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Eckhart. On peut spéculer à loisir sur une telle absence d'acribie. Mais n'est-ce pas Albert le Grand lui-même qui en inaugure le principe lorsque, dans sa dernière œuvre, la Summa theologiae, il prête à Proclus une distinction entre quatre types de « prédication commune » : une selon l’univocité stricte, trois selon l’analogie—un véritable montage qui, à partir de certaines expressions de Proclus sur le caractère salvifique du bien (« le bien est ce qui sauve tous les êtres et devient ainsi le terme de leur tendance »), lui permet de retrouver en fait l’interprétation averroïste de la triade porphyrienne des homonymes κατὰ διάνοιαν. Plutôt que d’incriminer les légèretés ou les insuffisances de la doxographie médiévale, nous préférons voir là le témoignage de la puissance d'assimilation et de la productivité de la grille de lecture originairement imposée par Porphyre aux textes d’Aristote. L’histoire des sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie est celle d’un invariant structurel grec et de ses remplissements arabes, qui, pour finir, retrouve d’autres Grecs traduits par Guillaume de Moerbeke. C’est l’histoire d’une dérive péripatéticienne de l’aristotélisme qui commence chez Porphyre et s’achève dans le néoplatonisme. La production médiévale de l’analogie n’est pas seulement une « replatonisation » d’Aristote, c’est aussi la marque de l’affinité structurelle qui lie entre elles toutes les formes de néoplatonisme. Plus décisif encore, elle procède moins d’un rapprochement des πρός ἕν λεγόμενα avec les synonymes que d’une substitution des πρός ἕν λεγόμενα aux paronymes. Reconduite à ses sources gréco-arabes, l’analogie apparaît ainsi avant tout comme la théorie d’une transsumption catégorielle archi-fondatrice : celle qui articule toute pensée du rapport entre la substance et l’accident. [conclusion p. 343-345] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FAqS35nEd0udN0w |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1296","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1296,"authors_free":[{"id":1889,"entry_id":1296,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":85,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"de Libera, Alain ","free_first_name":"Alain","free_last_name":"de Libera ","norm_person":{"id":85,"first_name":"Alain","last_name":"De Libera","full_name":"De Libera, Alain","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130219002","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l'analogie de l'\u00eatre","main_title":{"title":"Les sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l'analogie de l'\u00eatre"},"abstract":"C'est ici le lieu de revenir sur le concept de denominatio. Dans les versions latines d'Aristote, le mot denominativa d\u00e9signe, on l'a dit, les \u00ab paronymes \u00bb, c'est-\u00e0-dire ces \u00ab r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui, tout en diff\u00e9rant d'une autre (r\u00e9alit\u00e9) par la d\u00e9sinence de leur nom, ont une appellation conforme au nom (de cette autre r\u00e9alit\u00e9) \u00bb.\r\n\r\nChez Ma\u00eetre Eckhart, la notion de \u00ab pr\u00e9dication d\u00e9nominative \u00bb, emprunt\u00e9e \u00e0 la Logica d'Avicenne (chap. 3, Venise, 1508, fol. 3 vb), rejoint la notion bo\u00e9cienne de praedicatio des accidentia secundum rem (De Trinitate, chap. 4), exprimant un aspect de la d\u00e9ficience ontologique constitutive de l\u2019\u00e9tant cr\u00e9\u00e9 comme tel. Pour lui, dire que \u00ab les neuf cat\u00e9gories sont pr\u00e9diqu\u00e9es d\u00e9nominativement de la substance \u00bb (novem praedicamenta accidentium praedicantur denominative de substantia) signifie que tout \u00e9tant cr\u00e9\u00e9 est un d\u00e9nominatif, c'est-\u00e0-dire un \u00e9tant-ceci ou cela (ens hoc et hoc), et qu'aucun \u00e9tant-ceci n'est en tant que ceci : tout \u00ab ceci \u00bb ajout\u00e9 \u00e0 la substance est l'expression de la d\u00e9faillance (casus, \u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) qui accidente le cr\u00e9\u00e9.\r\n\r\nC'est dans cette tradition complexe, \u00e0 la fois li\u00e9e \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie averro\u00efste de l'accident et aux th\u00e9ories avicennienne (ontologique) et bo\u00e9cienne (th\u00e9ologique) de la pr\u00e9dication\u2014et non \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie de l\u2019analogie selon Simplicius\u2014que se situe le c\u00e9l\u00e8bre passage d\u2019In Exodum, o\u00f9 le Thuringien expose sa th\u00e9orie des cat\u00e9gories, qu'on peut r\u00e9sumer ainsi :\r\n\r\n Les dix cat\u00e9gories ne sont pas les dix premiers \u00e9tants (decem prima entia), mais les dix genres premiers des \u00e9tants (decem prima entium genera).\r\n Il n'y a qu'un \u00e9tant, la substance ; les autres r\u00e9alit\u00e9s ne sont pas \u00ab \u00e9tant \u00bb (ens), mais \u00ab de ou \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tant \u00bb (entis), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire \u00ab \u00e9tant seulement par analogie au seul \u00e9tant au sens absolu, la substance, comme en t\u00e9moigne la M\u00e9taphysique, livre VII \u00bb.\r\n Les neuf pr\u00e9dicaments de l\u2019accident ne sont donc pas des \u00e9tants \u00ab au cas r\u00e9gime \u00bb (entia in recto), mais des \u00e9tants au \u00ab cas oblique \u00bb (in obliquo).\r\n C'est en ce sens \u00ab oblique \u00bb que l\u2019urine est dite \u00ab saine \u00bb, non par la sant\u00e9 \u00ab formellement inh\u00e9rente \u00bb, \u00ab mais seulement par analogie et renvoi extrins\u00e8que \u00e0 la sant\u00e9 elle-m\u00eame, qui au sens propre et formel se trouve seulement dans l\u2019animal \u00bb (non sanitate formaliter inhaerente, sed sola analogia et respectu ad ipsam sanitatem extra, quae proprie formaliter est in ipso animali).\r\n C\u2019est \u00e9galement en ce sens que le vin est dit \u00ab \u00eatre dans l\u2019enseigne \u00bb, signifiant qu\u2019il se trouve dans la taverne et la bouteille.\r\n\r\nTelle est donc la th\u00e9orie dont Nicolas pr\u00e9tend trouver les contours g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, ou plus exactement l\u2019instrumentation conceptuelle, chez Simplicius. Certes, il n'en laisse pas l\u2019application m\u00e9taphysique au commentateur lui-m\u00eame\u2014ce en quoi il a raison\u2014mais il a tort lorsqu'il lui pr\u00eate une formulation de l\u2019analogia attributionis, qu'il ne pouvait lire que chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Eckhart.\r\n\r\nOn peut sp\u00e9culer \u00e0 loisir sur une telle absence d'acribie. Mais n'est-ce pas Albert le Grand lui-m\u00eame qui en inaugure le principe lorsque, dans sa derni\u00e8re \u0153uvre, la Summa theologiae, il pr\u00eate \u00e0 Proclus une distinction entre quatre types de \u00ab pr\u00e9dication commune \u00bb : une selon l\u2019univocit\u00e9 stricte, trois selon l\u2019analogie\u2014un v\u00e9ritable montage qui, \u00e0 partir de certaines expressions de Proclus sur le caract\u00e8re salvifique du bien (\u00ab le bien est ce qui sauve tous les \u00eatres et devient ainsi le terme de leur tendance \u00bb), lui permet de retrouver en fait l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation averro\u00efste de la triade porphyrienne des homonymes \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd.\r\n\r\nPlut\u00f4t que d\u2019incriminer les l\u00e9g\u00e8ret\u00e9s ou les insuffisances de la doxographie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale, nous pr\u00e9f\u00e9rons voir l\u00e0 le t\u00e9moignage de la puissance d'assimilation et de la productivit\u00e9 de la grille de lecture originairement impos\u00e9e par Porphyre aux textes d\u2019Aristote.\r\n\r\nL\u2019histoire des sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l\u2019analogie est celle d\u2019un invariant structurel grec et de ses remplissements arabes, qui, pour finir, retrouve d\u2019autres Grecs traduits par Guillaume de Moerbeke. C\u2019est l\u2019histoire d\u2019une d\u00e9rive p\u00e9ripat\u00e9ticienne de l\u2019aristot\u00e9lisme qui commence chez Porphyre et s\u2019ach\u00e8ve dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme. La production m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l\u2019analogie n\u2019est pas seulement une \u00ab replatonisation \u00bb d\u2019Aristote, c\u2019est aussi la marque de l\u2019affinit\u00e9 structurelle qui lie entre elles toutes les formes de n\u00e9oplatonisme. Plus d\u00e9cisif encore, elle proc\u00e8de moins d\u2019un rapprochement des \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 avec les synonymes que d\u2019une substitution des \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 aux paronymes.\r\n\r\nReconduite \u00e0 ses sources gr\u00e9co-arabes, l\u2019analogie appara\u00eet ainsi avant tout comme la th\u00e9orie d\u2019une transsumption cat\u00e9gorielle archi-fondatrice : celle qui articule toute pens\u00e9e du rapport entre la substance et l\u2019accident. [conclusion p. 343-345]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FAqS35nEd0udN0w","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":85,"full_name":"De Libera, Alain","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1296,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3","issue":"4","pages":"319-345"}},"sort":["Les sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l'analogie de l'\u00eatre"]}
Title | Les sources vénitiennes de l’édition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius sur la „Physique“ d’Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | Scriptorium |
Volume | 39 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 70–88 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Codero, Néstor-Luis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Nous pouvons revenir maintenant à notre point de départ : qui a été le responsable de l'édition de 1526 ? Aucun des éléments nouveaux ne s'oppose à notre hypothèse initiale : l'édition est due aux soins de Francesco d'Asola, responsable de la plupart des titres publiés « ex aedibus Aldi » depuis 1518. Nous avons vu qu'il était le destinataire des manuscrits d'Aetius empruntés par Marcantonio Contarini à la Marciana, et nous avons supposé que le même procédé s'était appliqué aux deux textes de Simplicius édités en 1526. Nous conservons une image très floue de ce personnage, dont le nom complet était Gian Francesco Torresani d'Asola. Il était le beau-frère d'Alde Manuce ; son père, Andrea d'Asola, fut le responsable de l'imprimerie depuis la mort d'Alde (1514) jusqu'à 1529. Selon Degli Agostini, Francesco d'Asola était le protégé du cardinal Hercule de Gonzague — auquel est dédiée l'édition de la Physique — et il avait repris avec succès l'héritage d'Alde. Pour J. B. Egnazio, d'Asola était un « jeune homme cultivé ayant les meilleures habitudes » et, en 1542, Pellicier le remercie de l'envoi à la bibliothèque de Fontainebleau de quatre-vingts manuscrits grecs et de quelques autres manuscrits latins. Malgré sa gentillesse et ses « meilleures habitudes », il est évident que d'Asola n'adopte pas la devise d'Alde : « Non enim recipio emendaturum libros », car il a beaucoup amendé. Diels avait raison lorsqu'il signalait que « Aldini exempli editor haud pauca novavit, infeliciter plurima ». [conclusion p. 86] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Gj5dBBrkScJI1Gs |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"604","_score":null,"_source":{"id":604,"authors_free":[{"id":855,"entry_id":604,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":54,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Codero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Codero","norm_person":{"id":54,"first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","last_name":"Cordero","full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1055808973","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les sources v\u00e9nitiennes de l\u2019\u00e9dition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius sur la \u201ePhysique\u201c d\u2019Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Les sources v\u00e9nitiennes de l\u2019\u00e9dition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius sur la \u201ePhysique\u201c d\u2019Aristote"},"abstract":"Nous pouvons revenir maintenant \u00e0 notre point de d\u00e9part : qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 le responsable de l'\u00e9dition de 1526 ? Aucun des \u00e9l\u00e9ments nouveaux ne s'oppose \u00e0 notre hypoth\u00e8se initiale : l'\u00e9dition est due aux soins de Francesco d'Asola, responsable de la plupart des titres publi\u00e9s \u00ab ex aedibus Aldi \u00bb depuis 1518.\r\n\r\nNous avons vu qu'il \u00e9tait le destinataire des manuscrits d'Aetius emprunt\u00e9s par Marcantonio Contarini \u00e0 la Marciana, et nous avons suppos\u00e9 que le m\u00eame proc\u00e9d\u00e9 s'\u00e9tait appliqu\u00e9 aux deux textes de Simplicius \u00e9dit\u00e9s en 1526.\r\n\r\nNous conservons une image tr\u00e8s floue de ce personnage, dont le nom complet \u00e9tait Gian Francesco Torresani d'Asola. Il \u00e9tait le beau-fr\u00e8re d'Alde Manuce ; son p\u00e8re, Andrea d'Asola, fut le responsable de l'imprimerie depuis la mort d'Alde (1514) jusqu'\u00e0 1529.\r\n\r\nSelon Degli Agostini, Francesco d'Asola \u00e9tait le prot\u00e9g\u00e9 du cardinal Hercule de Gonzague \u2014 auquel est d\u00e9di\u00e9e l'\u00e9dition de la Physique \u2014 et il avait repris avec succ\u00e8s l'h\u00e9ritage d'Alde. Pour J. B. Egnazio, d'Asola \u00e9tait un \u00ab jeune homme cultiv\u00e9 ayant les meilleures habitudes \u00bb et, en 1542, Pellicier le remercie de l'envoi \u00e0 la biblioth\u00e8que de Fontainebleau de quatre-vingts manuscrits grecs et de quelques autres manuscrits latins.\r\n\r\nMalgr\u00e9 sa gentillesse et ses \u00ab meilleures habitudes \u00bb, il est \u00e9vident que d'Asola n'adopte pas la devise d'Alde : \u00ab Non enim recipio emendaturum libros \u00bb, car il a beaucoup amend\u00e9.\r\n\r\nDiels avait raison lorsqu'il signalait que \u00ab Aldini exempli editor haud pauca novavit, infeliciter plurima \u00bb. [conclusion p. 86]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Gj5dBBrkScJI1Gs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":54,"full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":604,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Scriptorium","volume":"39","issue":"1","pages":"70\u201388"}},"sort":["Les sources v\u00e9nitiennes de l\u2019\u00e9dition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius sur la \u201ePhysique\u201c d\u2019Aristote"]}
Title | Leucippus, Democritus and the οὐ μᾶλλον Principle: An Examination of Theophrastus Phys.Op. Fr. 8 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 253–263 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schofield, Malcom |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper is a piece of detective work. Starting from an obvious excrescence inthe transmitted text of Simplicius's treatment of the foundations of Presocraticatomism near the beginning of his Physicscommentary, it excavates a Theophrasteancorrection to Aristotle's tendency to lump Leucippus and Democritus together: Theophrastus made application of the οὐ μᾶλλον principle in the sphere of ontol-ogy an innovation by Democritus. Along the way it shows Simplicius reorderinghis Theophrastean source in his efforts to nd material which will strengthen thecontrast between Leucippus's atomism and Eleatic metaphysics. And it arguesthat in doing so he all but obliterates TheophrastusÕs attempt to point up theDemocritean credentials of the οὐ μᾶλλον principle. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Zo6uxvsH3eJYKMj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1035","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1035,"authors_free":[{"id":1566,"entry_id":1035,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":285,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schofield, Malcom","free_first_name":"Malcom","free_last_name":"Schofield","norm_person":{"id":285,"first_name":"Malcolm","last_name":"Schofield","full_name":"Schofield, Malcolm","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132323737","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Leucippus, Democritus and the \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd Principle: An Examination of Theophrastus Phys.Op. Fr. 8","main_title":{"title":"Leucippus, Democritus and the \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd Principle: An Examination of Theophrastus Phys.Op. Fr. 8"},"abstract":"This paper is a piece of detective work. Starting from an obvious excrescence inthe transmitted text of Simplicius's treatment of the foundations of Presocraticatomism near the beginning of his Physicscommentary, it excavates a Theophrasteancorrection to Aristotle's tendency to lump Leucippus and Democritus together: Theophrastus made application of the \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd principle in the sphere of ontol-ogy an innovation by Democritus. Along the way it shows Simplicius reorderinghis Theophrastean source in his efforts to nd material which will strengthen thecontrast between Leucippus's atomism and Eleatic metaphysics. And it arguesthat in doing so he all but obliterates Theophrastus\u00d5s attempt to point up theDemocritean credentials of the \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd principle. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Zo6uxvsH3eJYKMj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":285,"full_name":"Schofield, Malcolm","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1035,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"47","issue":"3","pages":"253\u2013263"}},"sort":["Leucippus, Democritus and the \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd Principle: An Examination of Theophrastus Phys.Op. Fr. 8"]}
Title | Light from Aristotle's "Physics" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 22 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 10-12 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant). It would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides’ modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides’ (and Melissus’) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging ὄν deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the "only solution" (monoeidês lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics. In the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1015","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1015,"authors_free":[{"id":1531,"entry_id":1015,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K","main_title":{"title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K"},"abstract":"Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant).\r\nIt would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides\u2019 modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides\u2019 (and Melissus\u2019) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging \u1f44\u03bd deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the \"only solution\" (monoeid\u00eas lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics.\r\nIn the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1015,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"22","issue":"1","pages":"10-12"}},"sort":["Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K"]}
Title | Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2021 |
Journal | History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 122-139 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius’ use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle’s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius’ assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle’s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle’s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/agke78hkU27DIVu |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1463","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1463,"authors_free":[{"id":2536,"entry_id":1463,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics","main_title":{"title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics"},"abstract":"In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius\u2019 use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle\u2019s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius\u2019 assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle\u2019s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle\u2019s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/agke78hkU27DIVu","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1463,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"122-139"}},"sort":["Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics"]}
Title | Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 109-148 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his "cycle," originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences. The only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented. Perhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction— in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's—my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the Καθαρμοί out of the discussion of Περὶ φύσεως. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio. There are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to "reality" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/S9osco1gJvTdfSD |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"846","_score":null,"_source":{"id":846,"authors_free":[{"id":1250,"entry_id":846,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology","main_title":{"title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology"},"abstract":"In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his \"cycle,\" originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences.\r\n\r\nThe only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented.\r\n\r\nPerhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction\u2014 in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's\u2014my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the \u039a\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03af out of the discussion of \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio.\r\n\r\nThere are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to \"reality\" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/S9osco1gJvTdfSD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":846,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"10","issue":"2","pages":"109-148"}},"sort":["Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology"]}
Title | Lucretius Contra Empedoclen: A Textual Note |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | The Classical Journal |
Volume | 73 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 27-29 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Clay, Diskin |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In what must be the shortest textual note ever published, Bailey and Maas recovered the text of Lucretius I. 744: aera solem imbrem terras animalia fruges Imbrem scripsimus; ignem codd. This is their note. Why they wrote imbrem for ignem, they did not say, perhaps because any reader familiar with Lucretius' argument and Empedocles' poem On Nature knows why. Our manuscripts present us with a world composed of air, the sun, fire, the earth, and the products of the earth (aera solem ignem terras animalia fruges); Empedocles presents us with a world that is rooted in the four elements of air, earth, fire, and water. These he describes variously, but Lucretius has already powerfully invoked them at the very beginning of his poem, well before he returns to them in his refutation of Empedocles' theory of matter. Within the first nine lines of his proem, he evokes the stars (which are soon associated with fire, I. 231, 1034), the sea, the earth, the light of the sun, winds, the earth, the sea, and again light: in short, not the familiar Roman universe of three elements—the heaven, earth, and water—but the Greek world of air, earth, fire, and water. This world he returns to as he presents the elemental theories of "those who multiply the elements which generate the world," and who join air to fire and earth to water: I 714 et qui quattuor ex rebus posse omnia rentur ex igni terra atque anima procrescere et imbri. There are no textual problems here, although anima and imber are striking and unusual as descriptions of air and water. Nevertheless, they stand in the text. But the theory of four elements presents a problem when it is reduced by one in the manuscripts of Lucretius: aera, solem, ignem, terras. Christ saw the problem, and in 1853 he emended the text to give a world of four elements: he took the offending term to be solem, which he emended to rorem—creating a world of air, dew, fire, and earth. This emendation has the virtue of changing only two letters of the manuscripts to create water from the sun, and rorem is a perfectly good Lucretian word for water (cf. I. 771). Dew is a form of water, but Empedocles does not use it as a term to represent this elemental mass. ὕδωρ (hydor) is a word he used to represent water: Simplicius (commenting on Aristotle's Physics) noticed this—καλεῖ ὕδωρ ὄμβρον—and at least three passages from Empedocles survive to prove him right. Simplicius knew of Empedocles' various ways of naming his elements, but neither Lucretius' ancient nor modern editors seem to. Imber seemed strange for water, so an early editor or reader of Lucretius emended the text of I. 784-785 to read: "first these followers of Empedocles make fire transform itself into the gusts of air," I 784 hinc ignem gigni terramque creari ex igni retroque in terram cuncta reverti. Marullus understood what had gone wrong and emended ignem by imbrem and igni by imbri, making water out of fire and recovering how a Presocratic could imagine a ladder of elemental transformations moving down from air to precipitation to earth. Lucretius' attack on Empedocles' elemental theory is only one of the many signs of his knowledge of the Περὶ φύσεως (Peri Physeōs). De Rerum Natura I. 744 and 784-785 are not the only passages that reveal this, and these passages are not the only ones where Empedocles' Greek allows Lucretius' modern reader to recover his original text: II. 1114 ignem ignes procudent aetheraque (aether) This is restored by Empedocles (DK 31 B 37): (πυρὶ γὰρ αἰεὶ πῦρ ἐπὶ πυρὶ) αἰεὶ δὲ ξυνοίσει καὶ ἀὴρ ἀέρι Lachmann, with the confidence inspired by knowing too much and too little, emended aeraque (aer). Simplicius could have pointed him in the right direction when he gave one of Empedocles' terms for aether as aer, as could Empedocles himself. This has become a long note on one word in the manuscripts of Lucretius. Its justification is this: Bailey and Maas published their note in 1943. The emendation was incorporated into the text that accompanies Bailey's three-volume commentary on Lucretius (Oxford 1947), but unaccountably, it did not appear in the Oxford text reprinted in 1947 or in any later reprinting. In the tenth edition of his Lucrèce (Paris 1959), Ernout prints the text of our manuscripts; so does Josef Martin in the five editions of his Lucretius published since 1953. Büchner (Wiesbaden 1966) accepts Christ's rorem as "less drastic" (levior) than imbrem, and so, evidently, does Müller (Fribourg 1975). Only one of the major editions of Lucretius to appear since 1943, that of Martin Ferguson Smith (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1975), prints what Lucretius wrote: the rest prefer dew to rain. So weak is the force of ratio et res ipsa. [the entire text p. 27-29] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/a3Cc8mgHkQFW4AL |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1272","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1272,"authors_free":[{"id":1862,"entry_id":1272,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":50,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Clay, Diskin","free_first_name":"Diskin","free_last_name":"Clay","norm_person":{"id":50,"first_name":"Diskin","last_name":"Clay","full_name":"Clay, Diskin","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1069425435","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Lucretius Contra Empedoclen: A Textual Note","main_title":{"title":"Lucretius Contra Empedoclen: A Textual Note"},"abstract":"In what must be the shortest textual note ever published, Bailey and Maas recovered the text of Lucretius I. 744:\r\n\r\n aera solem imbrem terras animalia fruges\r\n Imbrem scripsimus; ignem codd.\r\n\r\nThis is their note. Why they wrote imbrem for ignem, they did not say, perhaps because any reader familiar with Lucretius' argument and Empedocles' poem On Nature knows why.\r\n\r\nOur manuscripts present us with a world composed of air, the sun, fire, the earth, and the products of the earth (aera solem ignem terras animalia fruges); Empedocles presents us with a world that is rooted in the four elements of air, earth, fire, and water. These he describes variously, but Lucretius has already powerfully invoked them at the very beginning of his poem, well before he returns to them in his refutation of Empedocles' theory of matter.\r\n\r\nWithin the first nine lines of his proem, he evokes the stars (which are soon associated with fire, I. 231, 1034), the sea, the earth, the light of the sun, winds, the earth, the sea, and again light: in short, not the familiar Roman universe of three elements\u2014the heaven, earth, and water\u2014but the Greek world of air, earth, fire, and water.\r\n\r\nThis world he returns to as he presents the elemental theories of \"those who multiply the elements which generate the world,\" and who join air to fire and earth to water:\r\n\r\n I 714 et qui quattuor ex rebus posse omnia rentur\r\n ex igni terra atque anima procrescere et imbri.\r\n\r\nThere are no textual problems here, although anima and imber are striking and unusual as descriptions of air and water. Nevertheless, they stand in the text. But the theory of four elements presents a problem when it is reduced by one in the manuscripts of Lucretius: aera, solem, ignem, terras.\r\n\r\nChrist saw the problem, and in 1853 he emended the text to give a world of four elements: he took the offending term to be solem, which he emended to rorem\u2014creating a world of air, dew, fire, and earth. This emendation has the virtue of changing only two letters of the manuscripts to create water from the sun, and rorem is a perfectly good Lucretian word for water (cf. I. 771).\r\n\r\nDew is a form of water, but Empedocles does not use it as a term to represent this elemental mass. \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 (hydor) is a word he used to represent water: Simplicius (commenting on Aristotle's Physics) noticed this\u2014\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f55\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1 \u1f44\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u2014and at least three passages from Empedocles survive to prove him right.\r\n\r\nSimplicius knew of Empedocles' various ways of naming his elements, but neither Lucretius' ancient nor modern editors seem to. Imber seemed strange for water, so an early editor or reader of Lucretius emended the text of I. 784-785 to read:\r\n\r\n\"first these followers of Empedocles make fire transform itself into the gusts of air,\"\r\n\r\n I 784 hinc ignem gigni terramque creari\r\n ex igni retroque in terram cuncta reverti.\r\n\r\nMarullus understood what had gone wrong and emended ignem by imbrem and igni by imbri, making water out of fire and recovering how a Presocratic could imagine a ladder of elemental transformations moving down from air to precipitation to earth.\r\n\r\nLucretius' attack on Empedocles' elemental theory is only one of the many signs of his knowledge of the \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 (Peri Physe\u014ds). De Rerum Natura I. 744 and 784-785 are not the only passages that reveal this, and these passages are not the only ones where Empedocles' Greek allows Lucretius' modern reader to recover his original text:\r\n\r\n II. 1114 ignem ignes procudent aetheraque (aether)\r\n\r\nThis is restored by Empedocles (DK 31 B 37):\r\n\r\n (\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f30\u03b5\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fe6\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f76) \u03b1\u1f30\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03be\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\r\n \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u1f74\u03c1 \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\r\n\r\nLachmann, with the confidence inspired by knowing too much and too little, emended aeraque (aer). Simplicius could have pointed him in the right direction when he gave one of Empedocles' terms for aether as aer, as could Empedocles himself.\r\n\r\nThis has become a long note on one word in the manuscripts of Lucretius. Its justification is this: Bailey and Maas published their note in 1943. The emendation was incorporated into the text that accompanies Bailey's three-volume commentary on Lucretius (Oxford 1947), but unaccountably, it did not appear in the Oxford text reprinted in 1947 or in any later reprinting.\r\n\r\nIn the tenth edition of his Lucr\u00e8ce (Paris 1959), Ernout prints the text of our manuscripts; so does Josef Martin in the five editions of his Lucretius published since 1953. B\u00fcchner (Wiesbaden 1966) accepts Christ's rorem as \"less drastic\" (levior) than imbrem, and so, evidently, does M\u00fcller (Fribourg 1975).\r\n\r\nOnly one of the major editions of Lucretius to appear since 1943, that of Martin Ferguson Smith (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1975), prints what Lucretius wrote: the rest prefer dew to rain.\r\n\r\nSo weak is the force of ratio et res ipsa. [the entire text p. 27-29]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/a3Cc8mgHkQFW4AL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":50,"full_name":"Clay, Diskin","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1272,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Journal","volume":"73","issue":"1","pages":"27-29"}},"sort":["Lucretius Contra Empedoclen: A Textual Note"]}
Title | Mathematical Explanation and the Philosphy of Nature in Late Ancient Philosophy: Astronomy and the Theory of the Elements |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 23 |
Pages | 65-106 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Opsomer, Jan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Late ancient Platonists discuss two theories in which geometric entities explain natural phenomena : the regular polyhedra of geometric atomism and the eccentrics and epicycles of astronomy. Simplicius explicitly compares the status of the first to the hypotheses of the astronomers. The point of comparison is the fallibility of both theories, not the (lack of) reality of the entities postulated. Simplicius has strong realist commitments as far as astronomy is concerned. Syrianus and Proclus too do not consider the polyhedra as devoid of physical reality. Proclus rejects epicycles and eccentrics, but accepts the reality of material homocentric spheres, moved by their own souls. The spheres move the astral objects contained in them, which, however, add motions caused by their own souls. The epicyclical and eccntric hypotheses are useful, as they help us to understand the complex motions resulting from the interplay of spherical motions and volitional motions of the planets. Yet astral souls do not think in accordance with human theoretical constructs, but rather grasp the complex patterns of their motions directly. Our understanding of astronomy depends upon our own cognition of intelligible patterns and their mathematical images. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NrliupadtaqUhIR |
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Title | Mathematik und Phänomene. Eine Polemik über naturwissenschaftliche Methode bei Simplikios |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption |
Volume | 10 |
Pages | 107–129 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Haas, Frans A. J. de |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Im Hinblick auf die grundlegende Verschiedenheit zwischen der platonischen und aristotelischen Wertung der Mathematik und der Phänomene kann man erwarten, daß es genau im Kontext der platonischen Deutung der aristotelischen Schriften zu einer interessanten Auseinandersetzung kommen mußte. Ein gutes Beispiel ist der Kommentar des Neuplatonikers Simplikios (tätig nach 530 n.Chr.) zur aristotelischen Schrift Über den Himmel. Wie bekannt, hat uns Simplikios in diesem Kommentar wichtige Informationen über die Astronomie und die einschlägige Wissenschaftstheorie bis auf seine Zeit, das 6. Jahrhundert nach Christus, überliefert. Hier werde ich mich mit zwei wichtigen methodischen Fragen befassen, die von Simplikios erörtert werden. Erstens: Was ist die Erklärungskraft der mathematischen Prinzipien im physischen Bereich? und zweitens: Was ist die erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung der Phänomene? In einem letzten Abschnitt werde ich mich kurz dem Einfluß der neuplatonischen Aristotelesdeutung auf das moderne Verstehen der aristotelischen Methodologie zuwenden. [from the introduction, p. 110] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/omuK2yp1p7YceKI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"700","_score":null,"_source":{"id":700,"authors_free":[{"id":1040,"entry_id":700,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":153,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Haas, Frans A. J. de","free_first_name":"Frans A. J.","free_last_name":"Haas, de","norm_person":{"id":153,"first_name":"Frans A. J.","last_name":"de Haas","full_name":"de Haas, Frans A. J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128837020","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Mathematik und Ph\u00e4nomene. Eine Polemik \u00fcber naturwissenschaftliche Methode bei Simplikios","main_title":{"title":"Mathematik und Ph\u00e4nomene. Eine Polemik \u00fcber naturwissenschaftliche Methode bei Simplikios"},"abstract":"Im Hinblick auf die grundlegende Verschiedenheit zwischen der platoni\u00adschen und aristotelischen Wertung der Mathematik und der Ph\u00e4nomene kann man erwarten, da\u00df es genau im Kontext der platonischen Deutung der aristo\u00adtelischen Schriften zu einer interessanten Auseinandersetzung kommen mu\u00dfte. \r\nEin gutes Beispiel ist der Kommentar des Neuplatonikers Simplikios (t\u00e4tig nach 530 n.Chr.) zur aristotelischen Schrift \u00dcber den Himmel. Wie bekannt, hat uns Simplikios in diesem Kommentar wichtige Informationen \u00fcber die \r\nAstronomie und die einschl\u00e4gige Wissenschaftstheorie bis auf seine Zeit, das \r\n6. Jahrhundert nach Christus, \u00fcberliefert. Hier werde ich mich mit zwei wichti\u00adgen methodischen Fragen befassen, die von Simplikios er\u00f6rtert werden. Er\u00adstens: Was ist die Erkl\u00e4rungskraft der mathematischen Prinzipien im physi\u00adschen Bereich? und zweitens: Was ist die erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung \r\nder Ph\u00e4nomene? In einem letzten Abschnitt werde ich mich kurz dem Einflu\u00df der neuplatonischen Aristotelesdeutung auf das moderne Verstehen der aristo\u00adtelischen Methodologie zuwenden. [from the introduction, p. 110]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/omuK2yp1p7YceKI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":153,"full_name":"de Haas, Frans A. J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":700,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption","volume":"10","issue":"","pages":"107\u2013129"}},"sort":["Mathematik und Ph\u00e4nomene. Eine Polemik \u00fcber naturwissenschaftliche Methode bei Simplikios"]}
Title | Matière et résolution : Anaxagore et ses interprètes |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1996 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 186 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 31-54 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lefebvre, René |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Anaxagore est, dit-on, le plus difficile des présocratiques. La doctrine de la matière exerce une fascination toute particulière, ne serait-ce que pour cause d'état lacunaire des textes et sans doute de généralité de l'esquisse ; puis, par un effet d'entraînement, l'ampleur, la diversité et la qualité des réactions herméneutiques elles-mêmes génèrent un commentaire sans cesse recommencé. On entend identifier, résoudre, dissoudre des problèmes, ou des pseudo-problèmes projetés par la tradition sur une œuvre qui n'en peut mais. Anaxagore surtout fascine par la tension qu'engendrent certaines options doctrinales, l'essentiel étant sur ce point le conflit entre une conception réputée homéomérique de la matière et le principe de τὸ ὁμοῦ πάντα. La succession des interprétations a amélioré notre compréhension de la philosophie du Clazoménien ; cependant, nous ne savons plus toujours ni ce qu'il faut imputer à cette dernière, ni même ce que nous n'y comprenons pas, et il nous arrive de confondre des questions différentes : la division spatiale n'est pas la discrimination qualitative, tout élémentarisme n'est peut-être pas corpusculariste, tout corpuscularisme n'est pas nécessairement atomistique. Les réflexions qui suivent se développent sur trois niveaux : la première partie consiste en une présentation minimale de la doctrine ; les notes entendent en faire ressortir les aspects problématiques, en indiquant les principales options herméneutiques. Soucieuse de ne masquer ni les apories ni les paradoxes, la deuxième partie propose des clarifications et des distinctions qu'il faut prendre moins comme des indications matérielles sur la doctrine que comme des suggestions formelles à destination du commentaire ultérieur. La notion de résolution m'a paru la plus apte à englober dans un cadre commun les discussions sur les puissances, les parties, les semences, les homéomères, l'infiniment petit, etc. [introduction p. 31-32] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/X6EflTJBUsEaivP |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"872","_score":null,"_source":{"id":872,"authors_free":[{"id":1281,"entry_id":872,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":243,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lefebvre, Ren\u00e9 ","free_first_name":"Ren\u00e9 ","free_last_name":"Lefebvre","norm_person":{"id":243,"first_name":"Ren\u00e9","last_name":"Lefebvre","full_name":"Lefebvre, Ren\u00e9","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136649084","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Mati\u00e8re et r\u00e9solution : Anaxagore et ses interpr\u00e8tes","main_title":{"title":"Mati\u00e8re et r\u00e9solution : Anaxagore et ses interpr\u00e8tes"},"abstract":"Anaxagore est, dit-on, le plus difficile des pr\u00e9socratiques. La doctrine de la mati\u00e8re exerce une fascination toute particuli\u00e8re, ne serait-ce que pour cause d'\u00e9tat lacunaire des textes et sans doute de g\u00e9n\u00e9ralit\u00e9 de l'esquisse ; puis, par un effet d'entra\u00eenement, l'ampleur, la diversit\u00e9 et la qualit\u00e9 des r\u00e9actions herm\u00e9neutiques elles-m\u00eames g\u00e9n\u00e8rent un commentaire sans cesse recommenc\u00e9. On entend identifier, r\u00e9soudre, dissoudre des probl\u00e8mes, ou des pseudo-probl\u00e8mes projet\u00e9s par la tradition sur une \u0153uvre qui n'en peut mais.\r\n\r\nAnaxagore surtout fascine par la tension qu'engendrent certaines options doctrinales, l'essentiel \u00e9tant sur ce point le conflit entre une conception r\u00e9put\u00e9e hom\u00e9om\u00e9rique de la mati\u00e8re et le principe de \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1. La succession des interpr\u00e9tations a am\u00e9lior\u00e9 notre compr\u00e9hension de la philosophie du Clazom\u00e9nien ; cependant, nous ne savons plus toujours ni ce qu'il faut imputer \u00e0 cette derni\u00e8re, ni m\u00eame ce que nous n'y comprenons pas, et il nous arrive de confondre des questions diff\u00e9rentes : la division spatiale n'est pas la discrimination qualitative, tout \u00e9l\u00e9mentarisme n'est peut-\u00eatre pas corpusculariste, tout corpuscularisme n'est pas n\u00e9cessairement atomistique.\r\n\r\nLes r\u00e9flexions qui suivent se d\u00e9veloppent sur trois niveaux : la premi\u00e8re partie consiste en une pr\u00e9sentation minimale de la doctrine ; les notes entendent en faire ressortir les aspects probl\u00e9matiques, en indiquant les principales options herm\u00e9neutiques. Soucieuse de ne masquer ni les apories ni les paradoxes, la deuxi\u00e8me partie propose des clarifications et des distinctions qu'il faut prendre moins comme des indications mat\u00e9rielles sur la doctrine que comme des suggestions formelles \u00e0 destination du commentaire ult\u00e9rieur.\r\n\r\nLa notion de r\u00e9solution m'a paru la plus apte \u00e0 englober dans un cadre commun les discussions sur les puissances, les parties, les semences, les hom\u00e9om\u00e8res, l'infiniment petit, etc.\r\n[introduction p. 31-32]","btype":3,"date":"1996","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/X6EflTJBUsEaivP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":243,"full_name":"Lefebvre, Ren\u00e9","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":872,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"186","issue":"1","pages":"31-54"}},"sort":["Mati\u00e8re et r\u00e9solution : Anaxagore et ses interpr\u00e8tes"]}
Title | Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo, and of the Commentary of Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1950 |
Journal | Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies |
Volume | 2 |
Pages | 82–120 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Allan, Donald J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The main problem with which we shall be concerned is the authorship of the versions of De Caelo from the Greek that appeared during the thirteenth century. But it will be best to begin with a recapitulation of the facts ascertained by previous writers concerning the Arabic-Latin versions in which this treatise first became known in the lands of Western Europe. Until the middle of the thirteenth century, the work was commonly known and quoted in one of two versions: 1. A version of the text alone, beginning: Summa cognicionis nature et scientie ipsam demonstrantis. Its author, as we know from manuscript authority, was Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). 2. A version accompanying the commentary of Averroes, beginning: Maxima cognicio nature et scientia demonstrans ipsam. The translator, Michael Scot, dedicated his work to Stephanus de Pruvino, who, along with two others, was commissioned by Gregory IX in 1231 to examine Aristotle’s writings on natural philosophy and to report on their contents. Moreover, Avicenna had compiled a summary of the doctrine of this treatise, arranged under sixteen headings, which had been translated into Latin even before Gerard’s version appeared. It bears the title: Collectiones expositionum ab antiquis Graecis in libro Aristotelis qui dicitur liber caeli et mundi. Expositiones istae in sedecim continentur capitulis. Among the manuscripts of this work (which are, however, very numerous) are: Oxford, Balliol College 173A and 284; Bodleian, Selden supra 24; Paris, B.N. Lat. 16604—all from the thirteenth century. A much-emended text can be found in the edition of Avicenna’s scientific writings printed in Venice in 1308. This is not the place to discuss the origin of Avicenna’s summary or its influence on scholastic philosophy; however, it may be said that the translation, like those of similar works of Avicenna, must have been due to the Toledo scholars, such as Gundisalvi and John Avendehut (c. 1150). The summary clearly foregrounds the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the physical world, which naturally calls to mind the decree issued to the University of Paris in 1215: Non legantur libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et naturali philosophia, nec summa de iisdem. According to Roger Bacon, the attack was directed against the expositions by Avicenna and Averroes. In the latter half of the thirteenth century, a translation from the Greek makes its appearance. No exact date can be given, but several indications point to the decade 1260–1270. Jourdain observed that De Caelo is quoted by Albertus Magnus only in the Arabic versions, and Grabmann has pointed out that Codex Urbinas Latinus 206, written in 1253, contains De Caelo and the first three books of the Meteorologica in Arabic versions, while Physics and De Generatione occur in versions from the Greek. The first author to quote the text in this new translation is, as far as is known, Roger Bacon in the Opus Majus (1266–1267). Finally, it is known from Balliol College MS. 99 that the version of Simplicius’ commentary by William of Moerbeke was completed in 1271. This must have been accompanied by a translation of at least the Aristotelian passages quoted as “lemmata.” An attempt has been made to show that a version from the Greek was already current in the twelfth century. Haskins quotes the following passage from the preface to the version of the Almagest, completed around 1160 by a Sicilian translator: Tut ergo boni muneris memor, quo earum quas Aristoteles acrivellatas vocat artium doctrina—animum sitientem liberaliter imbuit... etc. He sees in this a reference to De Caelo III 306b27, where, in the course of a criticism of the Timaeus, Aristotle says: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀνάγκη μὴ πᾶν σῶμα λέγειν διαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθαι ταῖς ἀκριβεστάταις ἐπιστήμαις. However, at least two other passages must be borne in mind: 1. Metaphysics 982a25: ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσιν. 2. Nicomachean Ethics I 1141a16: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. In neither of these passages do the earliest translators transliterate the Greek word, and it is possible that the writer of the preface is not quoting a current translation but referring to the Greek original. It seems improbable that the De Caelo passage should be the one he had in mind, as it is not part of an explicit discussion of scientific method, and the reference to mathematics is purely incidental. Much stronger evidence would be needed to justify the supposition of an otherwise unknown translation. The commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on this treatise was certainly composed between 1271 and 1274. He uses throughout the version of Simplicius’ commentary that William of Moerbeke completed on June 15, 1271. Balliol College MS. 99 ends with the note: Ego autem frater Guylermus de Morbeka de ordine fratrum predicatorum, domini papae penitenciarius et capellanus, hoc cum magno corporis labore et multo mentis tedio latinitati offero, putans in hoc translationis opere me plura Latinorum studiis addidisse. Expleta autem fuit haec translacio Viterbii A.D. MCCLXXI XVII Kal. Iulii post mortem bonae memoriae Clementis papae quarti, apostolica sede vacante. When St. Thomas died in March 1274, he had only completed his commentary as far as Book III, chapter 3. His manuscript of Simplicius may have temporarily passed into the possession of Peter of Auvergne, who was entrusted with completing the commentary. However, St. Thomas had apparently promised the manuscript to the Faculty of Arts in Paris. A. Birkenmajer, in Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, called attention to a letter addressed by the Faculty to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order, then meeting in Lyons, in which they asked for the dispatch of certain manuscripts, including Simplicius on De Caelo, in accordance with this promise. [introduction p. 82-85] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yBMjK2X5ugL3938 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1013","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1013,"authors_free":[{"id":1529,"entry_id":1013,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":32,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Allan, Donald J.","free_first_name":"Donald J.","free_last_name":"Allan","norm_person":{"id":32,"first_name":"Donald J.","last_name":"Allan","full_name":"Allan, Donald J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158470029","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo, and of the Commentary of Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo, and of the Commentary of Simplicius"},"abstract":"The main problem with which we shall be concerned is the authorship of the versions of De Caelo from the Greek that appeared during the thirteenth century. But it will be best to begin with a recapitulation of the facts ascertained by previous writers concerning the Arabic-Latin versions in which this treatise first became known in the lands of Western Europe.\r\nUntil the middle of the thirteenth century, the work was commonly known and quoted in one of two versions:\r\n1.\tA version of the text alone, beginning: Summa cognicionis nature et scientie ipsam demonstrantis. Its author, as we know from manuscript authority, was Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187).\r\n2.\tA version accompanying the commentary of Averroes, beginning: Maxima cognicio nature et scientia demonstrans ipsam. The translator, Michael Scot, dedicated his work to Stephanus de Pruvino, who, along with two others, was commissioned by Gregory IX in 1231 to examine Aristotle\u2019s writings on natural philosophy and to report on their contents.\r\nMoreover, Avicenna had compiled a summary of the doctrine of this treatise, arranged under sixteen headings, which had been translated into Latin even before Gerard\u2019s version appeared. It bears the title: Collectiones expositionum ab antiquis Graecis in libro Aristotelis qui dicitur liber caeli et mundi. Expositiones istae in sedecim continentur capitulis. Among the manuscripts of this work (which are, however, very numerous) are: Oxford, Balliol College 173A and 284; Bodleian, Selden supra 24; Paris, B.N. Lat. 16604\u2014all from the thirteenth century. A much-emended text can be found in the edition of Avicenna\u2019s scientific writings printed in Venice in 1308. This is not the place to discuss the origin of Avicenna\u2019s summary or its influence on scholastic philosophy; however, it may be said that the translation, like those of similar works of Avicenna, must have been due to the Toledo scholars, such as Gundisalvi and John Avendehut (c. 1150). The summary clearly foregrounds the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the physical world, which naturally calls to mind the decree issued to the University of Paris in 1215: Non legantur libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et naturali philosophia, nec summa de iisdem. According to Roger Bacon, the attack was directed against the expositions by Avicenna and Averroes.\r\nIn the latter half of the thirteenth century, a translation from the Greek makes its appearance. No exact date can be given, but several indications point to the decade 1260\u20131270. Jourdain observed that De Caelo is quoted by Albertus Magnus only in the Arabic versions, and Grabmann has pointed out that Codex Urbinas Latinus 206, written in 1253, contains De Caelo and the first three books of the Meteorologica in Arabic versions, while Physics and De Generatione occur in versions from the Greek. The first author to quote the text in this new translation is, as far as is known, Roger Bacon in the Opus Majus (1266\u20131267). Finally, it is known from Balliol College MS. 99 that the version of Simplicius\u2019 commentary by William of Moerbeke was completed in 1271. This must have been accompanied by a translation of at least the Aristotelian passages quoted as \u201clemmata.\u201d\r\nAn attempt has been made to show that a version from the Greek was already current in the twelfth century. Haskins quotes the following passage from the preface to the version of the Almagest, completed around 1160 by a Sicilian translator: Tut ergo boni muneris memor, quo earum quas Aristoteles acrivellatas vocat artium doctrina\u2014animum sitientem liberaliter imbuit... etc. He sees in this a reference to De Caelo III 306b27, where, in the course of a criticism of the Timaeus, Aristotle says:\r\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2.\r\nHowever, at least two other passages must be borne in mind:\r\n1.\tMetaphysics 982a25:\r\n\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\r\n2.\tNicomachean Ethics I 1141a16:\r\n\u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 \u1f21 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1.\r\nIn neither of these passages do the earliest translators transliterate the Greek word, and it is possible that the writer of the preface is not quoting a current translation but referring to the Greek original. It seems improbable that the De Caelo passage should be the one he had in mind, as it is not part of an explicit discussion of scientific method, and the reference to mathematics is purely incidental. Much stronger evidence would be needed to justify the supposition of an otherwise unknown translation.\r\nThe commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on this treatise was certainly composed between 1271 and 1274. He uses throughout the version of Simplicius\u2019 commentary that William of Moerbeke completed on June 15, 1271. Balliol College MS. 99 ends with the note: Ego autem frater Guylermus de Morbeka de ordine fratrum predicatorum, domini papae penitenciarius et capellanus, hoc cum magno corporis labore et multo mentis tedio latinitati offero, putans in hoc translationis opere me plura Latinorum studiis addidisse. Expleta autem fuit haec translacio Viterbii A.D. MCCLXXI XVII Kal. Iulii post mortem bonae memoriae Clementis papae quarti, apostolica sede vacante. When St. Thomas died in March 1274, he had only completed his commentary as far as Book III, chapter 3. His manuscript of Simplicius may have temporarily passed into the possession of Peter of Auvergne, who was entrusted with completing the commentary. However, St. Thomas had apparently promised the manuscript to the Faculty of Arts in Paris. A. Birkenmajer, in Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, called attention to a letter addressed by the Faculty to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order, then meeting in Lyons, in which they asked for the dispatch of certain manuscripts, including Simplicius on De Caelo, in accordance with this promise. [introduction p. 82-85]","btype":3,"date":"1950","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yBMjK2X5ugL3938","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":32,"full_name":"Allan, Donald J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1013,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies","volume":"2","issue":"","pages":"82\u2013120"}},"sort":["Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo, and of the Commentary of Simplicius"]}
Title | Megaric Metaphysics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Ancient philosophy |
Volume | 32 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 303-321 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bailey, Dominic |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I have attempted to show that, with some imaginative reconstruction, there is a good deal more to Megaricism than meets the eye. While the position is doubtless false, there are nevertheless reasons for being sympathetic to its conjuncts, especially if one has, as some philosophers still do, a fetish for the actual and a perplexity about the indefinite, whether the indefiniteness of the modal or that of the non-particular. I have shown how anti-Platonism about common nouns of the kind evinced by Stilpo makes M2 seem better considered than at first. And I have shown how skepticism about possibility without actuality, from which later logicians such as Diodorus and Philo felt they could not stray too far (see Bobzien 1993, 1998), makes M1 seem better considered than at first. Moreover, I have demonstrated the impressive coherence of Megaricism, insofar as its conjuncts, as I interpret them, are both mutually entailing and, each in their ways, both Parmenidean and Protagorean. Megaricism is wrong, but sufficiently intriguing and well-integrated to make it worthy of serious consideration. [conclusion p. 320] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YNcy1URcz4PUK83 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"826","_score":null,"_source":{"id":826,"authors_free":[{"id":1227,"entry_id":826,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":529,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bailey, Dominic","free_first_name":"Dominic","free_last_name":"Bailey","norm_person":{"id":529,"first_name":"Dominic","last_name":"Bailey","full_name":"Bailey, Dominic","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Megaric Metaphysics","main_title":{"title":"Megaric Metaphysics"},"abstract":"I have attempted to show that, with some imaginative reconstruction, there is a good deal more to Megaricism than meets the eye. While the position is doubtless false, there are nevertheless reasons for being sympathetic to its conjuncts, especially if one has, as some philosophers still do, a fetish for the actual and a perplexity about the indefinite, whether the indefiniteness of the modal or that of the non-particular. I have shown how anti-Platonism about common nouns of the kind evinced by Stilpo makes M2 seem better considered than at first. And I have shown how skepticism about possibility without actuality, from which later logicians such as Diodorus and Philo felt they could not stray too far (see Bobzien 1993, 1998), makes M1 seem better considered than at first.\r\n\r\nMoreover, I have demonstrated the impressive coherence of Megaricism, insofar as its conjuncts, as I interpret them, are both mutually entailing and, each in their ways, both Parmenidean and Protagorean. Megaricism is wrong, but sufficiently intriguing and well-integrated to make it worthy of serious consideration. [conclusion p. 320]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YNcy1URcz4PUK83","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":529,"full_name":"Bailey, Dominic","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":826,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ancient philosophy","volume":"32","issue":"2","pages":"303-321"}},"sort":["Megaric Metaphysics"]}
Title | Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories. Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius’ Commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Categorias 4 [CAG 8, 75,6 Kalbfleisch] and In Categorias 8 [291,2 K.]) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 150-165 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bechtle, Gerald |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die aristotelische Kategorienschrift im Neuplatonismus zur Deutung der ersten Prinzipien genutzt und dadurch selbst als Teil metaphysischer Überlegungen etabliert wurde. Dadurch stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Verbindung mit der Rezeption von Platons Parmenides besteht, der für die Deutung der höchsten Prinzipien grundlegend war. Dies wird exemplarisch an Simplicius und dessen Kategorienkommentar untersucht. In diesem geht Simplicius an zwei Stellen explizit auf Platons Parmenides ein. Beide Stellen werden analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Simplicius die Terminologie der Kategorien durchaus auf Gott, das Gute oder das Eine anwendet, auch wenn an der weit verbreiteten Ansicht, die Kategorien könnten sich nur auf sprachlich ausdrückbare, also wahrnehmbare Dinge beziehen, nicht gerüttelt wird. Hiervon ist jedoch die Position des Iamblichus zu unterscheiden, der die Kategorien auch für den noetischen Bereich annehmen konnte. In eine ähnliche Richtung weist die zweite explizite Bezugnahme auf Platons Parmenides in Simplicius’ Kategorienkommentar, die sich mit dem Ausschluss von Mehr-Weniger beschäftigt. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8GUIq8DJVD3GuiA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"824","_score":null,"_source":{"id":824,"authors_free":[{"id":1225,"entry_id":824,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":420,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bechtle, Gerald","free_first_name":"Gerald","free_last_name":"Bechtle","norm_person":{"id":420,"first_name":"Gerald","last_name":"Bechtle","full_name":"Bechtle, Gerald","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120560038","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories. Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Categorias 4 [CAG 8, 75,6 Kalbfleisch] and In Categorias 8 [291,2 K.])","main_title":{"title":"Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories. Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Categorias 4 [CAG 8, 75,6 Kalbfleisch] and In Categorias 8 [291,2 K.])"},"abstract":"Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die aristotelische Kategorienschrift im Neuplatonismus zur Deutung der ersten Prinzipien genutzt und dadurch selbst als Teil metaphysischer \u00dcberlegungen etabliert wurde. Dadurch stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Verbindung mit der Rezeption von Platons Parmenides besteht, der f\u00fcr die Deutung der h\u00f6chsten Prinzipien grundlegend war. Dies wird exemplarisch an Simplicius und dessen Kategorienkommentar untersucht. In diesem geht Simplicius an zwei Stellen explizit auf Platons Parmenides ein. Beide Stellen werden analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Simplicius die Terminologie der Kategorien durchaus auf Gott, das Gute oder das Eine anwendet, auch wenn an der weit verbreiteten Ansicht, die Kategorien k\u00f6nnten sich nur auf sprachlich ausdr\u00fcckbare, also wahrnehmbare Dinge beziehen, nicht ger\u00fcttelt wird.\r\n\r\nHiervon ist jedoch die Position des Iamblichus zu unterscheiden, der die Kategorien auch f\u00fcr den noetischen Bereich annehmen konnte. In eine \u00e4hnliche Richtung weist die zweite explizite Bezugnahme auf Platons Parmenides in Simplicius\u2019 Kategorienkommentar, die sich mit dem Ausschluss von Mehr-Weniger besch\u00e4ftigt. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8GUIq8DJVD3GuiA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":420,"full_name":"Bechtle, Gerald","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":824,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Antikes Christentum","volume":"12","issue":"1","pages":"150-165"}},"sort":["Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories. Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on the Categories (Simplicius, In Categorias 4 [CAG 8, 75,6 Kalbfleisch] and In Categorias 8 [291,2 K.])"]}
Title | Methods in examining sense-perception: John Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Laval théologique et philosophique |
Volume | 64 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 651-661 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper discusses the methods applied by Philoponus and Pseudo-Simplicius in commenting on Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception, and indicates their differences. Philoponus frequently employs medical theories and empirical material, mostly taken from Aristotle, to highlight not only the activities of the particular senses, but also a certain kind of awareness and the way we experience our inner states. By contrast, his Athenian contemporary Pseudo-Simplicius disregards such aspects altogether. His method is deductive: He relies on some general thesis, partly taken from Iamblichus, from which to derive theses on sense-perception. The emphasis falls on Philoponus’ doctrine since his reliance on medical views leads to an interesting blend of Platonic and medical/empirical theories. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Hp3HmG57KFdbOQW |
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Title | More on Zeno's "Forty logoi" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Illinois Classical Studies |
Volume | 15 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 23-37 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarrant, Harold |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1986), 35-41, John Dillon presents material from Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides in which he makes it clear that Proclus knew of a work purporting to be by Zeno, which contained forty logoi. This work was allegedly the one that "Zeno" had just read at the opening of the main narrative of Plato’s Parmenides (127c), and which Socrates subsequently challenges (127d-130a). Dillon presents the same material in his introduction to Proclus' In Parmenidem. Its relevance is no longer confined to the Neoplatonists, as Dillon believes that it is possible the Forty Logoi “at least contained genuine material, though perhaps worked over at a later date.” It threatens to have implications both for Eleatic studies and for the interpretation of the Parmenides itself. I believe that the issue must be tackled again, not merely because of Dillon’s judiciously aporetic conclusion, but because I fear that there are important points which have not yet been addressed. Firstly, from a passage not included in Dillon's survey but which seems to me to be relevant, it appears that the allegedly Zenonian work was known to much earlier, pre-Plotinian interpreters, who considered it important for the interpretation of the hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, at least down to 155e and possibly beyond. This increases the potential importance of the work, as well as marginally increasing its claim to be genuine; at least it was not a Neoplatonic forgery. Secondly, despite Proclus’ apparent familiarity with it, the work does not seem to clarify Plato's puzzling reference to the “first hypothesis of the first logos” at 127d7. One would have expected that consultation of the relevant text of Zeno would have done so, and this might be considered an obstacle to believing that the work is what it purports to be. Thirdly, there is a significant question of Proclus’ independence. There are some troubling features about the historical material in this commentary which are absent from his Timaeus commentary, for instance. Most relevant here is the rather scrappy way in which Parmenides himself has been quoted. On p. 665, the three short quotations from B8 are out of order; on p. 708, two of the same snippets from B8 have B5 (whose genuineness is less than certain) inserted between them. On p. 1152, we encounter seven tiny quotations, with the five from B8 this time being in the correct order, but with an impossible version of B3 inserted between B8.30 and B8.35-36; B4.1 then follows. The total number of lines quoted in whole or in part (excluding uncertain allusions) amounts to only 21 (9 of these from B8.25-36), but some lines appear three or more times (B8.4, 25, 29, 44). It is clear that Proclus remembered certain favorite phrases, and one doubts whether he was referring to any text, except possibly at p. 1134, where a passage of four lines is quoted. Even here, either Proclus or the scribes have failed us in the last line. Likewise, there is no need to suppose that he is referring at any point to the alleged work of Zeno. Certainly, he knows something about it, and he may well have had access to it and read it in the past. But I do not find anything in the text requiring that he consult the work as he writes. Furthermore, if we bear in mind that earlier interpreters had made use of the Forty Logoi, much of Proclus' material on the work could plausibly be attributed to borrowings from earlier commentaries. One commentary he certainly used is that of Plutarch of Athens, whose work on earlier interpreters Proclus evidently admired (p. 1061.18-20). We should not allow any admiration for Proclus as a philosopher, or even for the doxographic material in other commentaries, to lead us to suppose that his reports will be either original or reliable in this commentary. [introduction p. 23-24] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YLhtdTiVc9rnvdt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"408","_score":null,"_source":{"id":408,"authors_free":[{"id":546,"entry_id":408,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":122,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tarrant, Harold","free_first_name":"Harold","free_last_name":"Tarrant","norm_person":{"id":122,"first_name":"Harold ","last_name":"Tarrant","full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132040077","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"More on Zeno's \"Forty logoi\"","main_title":{"title":"More on Zeno's \"Forty logoi\""},"abstract":"In Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1986), 35-41, John Dillon presents material from Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides in which he makes it clear that Proclus knew of a work purporting to be by Zeno, which contained forty logoi. This work was allegedly the one that \"Zeno\" had just read at the opening of the main narrative of Plato\u2019s Parmenides (127c), and which Socrates subsequently challenges (127d-130a). Dillon presents the same material in his introduction to Proclus' In Parmenidem. Its relevance is no longer confined to the Neoplatonists, as Dillon believes that it is possible the Forty Logoi \u201cat least contained genuine material, though perhaps worked over at a later date.\u201d It threatens to have implications both for Eleatic studies and for the interpretation of the Parmenides itself.\r\n\r\nI believe that the issue must be tackled again, not merely because of Dillon\u2019s judiciously aporetic conclusion, but because I fear that there are important points which have not yet been addressed. Firstly, from a passage not included in Dillon's survey but which seems to me to be relevant, it appears that the allegedly Zenonian work was known to much earlier, pre-Plotinian interpreters, who considered it important for the interpretation of the hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, at least down to 155e and possibly beyond. This increases the potential importance of the work, as well as marginally increasing its claim to be genuine; at least it was not a Neoplatonic forgery.\r\n\r\nSecondly, despite Proclus\u2019 apparent familiarity with it, the work does not seem to clarify Plato's puzzling reference to the \u201cfirst hypothesis of the first logos\u201d at 127d7. One would have expected that consultation of the relevant text of Zeno would have done so, and this might be considered an obstacle to believing that the work is what it purports to be.\r\n\r\nThirdly, there is a significant question of Proclus\u2019 independence. There are some troubling features about the historical material in this commentary which are absent from his Timaeus commentary, for instance. Most relevant here is the rather scrappy way in which Parmenides himself has been quoted. On p. 665, the three short quotations from B8 are out of order; on p. 708, two of the same snippets from B8 have B5 (whose genuineness is less than certain) inserted between them. On p. 1152, we encounter seven tiny quotations, with the five from B8 this time being in the correct order, but with an impossible version of B3 inserted between B8.30 and B8.35-36; B4.1 then follows.\r\n\r\nThe total number of lines quoted in whole or in part (excluding uncertain allusions) amounts to only 21 (9 of these from B8.25-36), but some lines appear three or more times (B8.4, 25, 29, 44). It is clear that Proclus remembered certain favorite phrases, and one doubts whether he was referring to any text, except possibly at p. 1134, where a passage of four lines is quoted. Even here, either Proclus or the scribes have failed us in the last line. Likewise, there is no need to suppose that he is referring at any point to the alleged work of Zeno. Certainly, he knows something about it, and he may well have had access to it and read it in the past. But I do not find anything in the text requiring that he consult the work as he writes.\r\n\r\nFurthermore, if we bear in mind that earlier interpreters had made use of the Forty Logoi, much of Proclus' material on the work could plausibly be attributed to borrowings from earlier commentaries. One commentary he certainly used is that of Plutarch of Athens, whose work on earlier interpreters Proclus evidently admired (p. 1061.18-20). We should not allow any admiration for Proclus as a philosopher, or even for the doxographic material in other commentaries, to lead us to suppose that his reports will be either original or reliable in this commentary. [introduction p. 23-24]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YLhtdTiVc9rnvdt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":122,"full_name":"Tarrant, Harold ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":408,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Illinois Classical Studies","volume":"15","issue":"1","pages":"23-37"}},"sort":["More on Zeno's \"Forty logoi\""]}
Title | Much Ado About 'Nothing': μηδέν and τὸ μὴ ἐόν in Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Apeiron |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 87–104 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sanders, Katie R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is, to my knowledge, a universally accepted assumption among contemporary commentators that μηδέν, 'nothing,' and το μη ἔον, 'what-is-not,' function as synonyms in Parmenides' poem. In this paper, I focus primarily on the central role this supposed semantic equivalence plays in arguments supporting an emendation in line 12 of fragment B8. Despite this scholarly unanimity regarding the synonymy of these two Greek terms and the popularity of the emendation, I contend that we can make the best sense of Parmenides' argument in this and the surrounding lines precisely by retaining the manuscript reading and recognizing the difference in meaning between 'nothing' and 'what-is-not.' This claim, of course, also has broader implications for the interpretation of Parmenides' poem generally. [introduction p. 87-88] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/TyAsS6APM6xvpAp |
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Title | Musonius and Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1903 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 23-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mayor, John E.B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A new edition of the remains of Musonius is advertised; and indeed Peerlkamp's edition has long been out of date and is little known. In two interesting fragments (Stob. flor. 17 n. 43 Meineke, n. 42 Hense, and 18 n. 38 M, 37 H, 10. Stob. anthol. iii. 503, 523, Weidmann 1894), Hense illustrates some details from other authors but has missed the most comprehensive parallel, the commentary of Simplicius on Epictetus Enchiridion c. 46 (of Schweighäuser's edition c. 33 s. 7, Epict. iv. 427-8). [introduction p. 23] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cXhfxWvaVaNv6wx |
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Title | Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Phoenix |
Volume | 26 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 342-357 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Edmunds, Lowell |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In sum, the position of Democritus is decidedly against tyche (chance), and tyche is regarded as a subjective phenomenon. "Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness." There remains only one noteworthy fragment that mentions chance: "Daring is the beginning of action, but chance is responsible for the end." Since this fragment contradicts everything else Democritus says about chance, and since the form of Stobaeus' quotation obscures the reference of these words, we are entitled to ask whether we should think of this as Democritus' view of chance in general, or whether he was referring to persons who, contrary to the advice of his other sententiae on chance, relied on moderation and committed themselves to overreaching and tychistic projects. The note of moral exhortation suggests that man has a free choice between alternative ways of life, and thus that he is not in the grip of the original necessity which created the cosmos and him and endowed him with the arts. From the ethical point of view, man seems to emerge as an island of freedom—a floating island, perhaps, in a sea of necessity. If so, then Democritus' system is either dualistic or self-contradictory. However, the example of chance in the ethical thought of Democritus has shown how freedom, if it has any place at all in Democritus' system, should be understood. Man is free to trust to luck through willful disregard for or ignorance of the laws of nature, given by necessity. But he is powerless to change the facts of necessity, and from this point of view, his freedom is an illusion, like the appearance of color. His freedom is merely subjective and of infinite unconcern to the rest of the universe. The atomic theory, which accounted so well for the various appearances of the same phenomena to various people—tragedies and comedies are composed of the same alphabet—also accounted for a specious freedom. [conclusion p. 356-357] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NNiKvwijO2dtwFP |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"753","_score":null,"_source":{"id":753,"authors_free":[{"id":1118,"entry_id":753,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":80,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Edmunds, Lowell","free_first_name":"Lowell","free_last_name":"Edmunds","norm_person":{"id":80,"first_name":"Lowell","last_name":"Edmunds","full_name":"Edmunds, Lowell","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116147319X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists","main_title":{"title":"Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists"},"abstract":"In sum, the position of Democritus is decidedly against tyche (chance), and tyche is regarded as a subjective phenomenon. \"Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness.\" There remains only one noteworthy fragment that mentions chance: \"Daring is the beginning of action, but chance is responsible for the end.\" Since this fragment contradicts everything else Democritus says about chance, and since the form of Stobaeus' quotation obscures the reference of these words, we are entitled to ask whether we should think of this as Democritus' view of chance in general, or whether he was referring to persons who, contrary to the advice of his other sententiae on chance, relied on moderation and committed themselves to overreaching and tychistic projects.\r\n\r\nThe note of moral exhortation suggests that man has a free choice between alternative ways of life, and thus that he is not in the grip of the original necessity which created the cosmos and him and endowed him with the arts. From the ethical point of view, man seems to emerge as an island of freedom\u2014a floating island, perhaps, in a sea of necessity. If so, then Democritus' system is either dualistic or self-contradictory.\r\n\r\nHowever, the example of chance in the ethical thought of Democritus has shown how freedom, if it has any place at all in Democritus' system, should be understood. Man is free to trust to luck through willful disregard for or ignorance of the laws of nature, given by necessity. But he is powerless to change the facts of necessity, and from this point of view, his freedom is an illusion, like the appearance of color. His freedom is merely subjective and of infinite unconcern to the rest of the universe.\r\n\r\nThe atomic theory, which accounted so well for the various appearances of the same phenomena to various people\u2014tragedies and comedies are composed of the same alphabet\u2014also accounted for a specious freedom. [conclusion p. 356-357]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/NNiKvwijO2dtwFP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":80,"full_name":"Edmunds, Lowell","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":753,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phoenix","volume":"26","issue":"4","pages":"342-357"}},"sort":["Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists"]}
Title | Neoplatonic Elements in the "de Anima" Commentaries |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1976 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 21 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 64-87 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Most scholars who refer to the Greek commentators for help in the understanding of difficult Aristotelian texts seem to expect straightforward scholarly treatment of their problems. Not infrequently they are disappointed and complain about the irrelevance of the commentary they read, or inveigh against the incompetence of the commentators. Only Alexander is generally exempt from such censure, and that in itself is significant. For he is the only major commentator whose work survives in any considerable quantity who wrote before Neoplatonism. Shortly after Alexander, the kind of thought that is conveniently described by this label came to dominate Greek philosophy, and nearly all pagan philosophy and philosophical scholarship was pursued under its influence, if not by its active adherents. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that these facts are not trivial items of background interest but are fundamental to a proper assessment of the later commentators' opinions on points of Aristotelian scholarship. It is necessary to take account of the ideas and purpose of these commentators if one is to make any serious critical use of their work, and this cannot be done if one merely dips into their voluminous works in the hope of occasional enlightenment. That these men were swayed by their own opinions and preconceptions is perhaps obvious once stated. Even Simplicius, notwithstanding his reputation for careful scholarship, is no exception. Simplicius may have done us a great service by preserving fragments of the pre-Socratics, but he was nevertheless a man who entertained ideas which were not likely to lead to the correct interpretation of Aristotle, as Hicks for one saw—Ross, it seems, did not. In fact, one might go so far as to say that Simplicius was less well-fitted than some of the other commentators to give a good account of his subject. Those whose immediate reaction to such a statement is that it is grossly unfair to so fine a scholar might be disturbed by some of the material in the preface to Simplicius' De Anima commentary—as they would by that in Philoponus' as well—material which often escapes notice for the simple reason that one normally refers to these works for help with specific passages and does not read them as a whole. This is not to say that there are no obvious signs of what is going on in the body of the commentaries, for there certainly are. A case in point is Simplicius' claim in the De Caelo commentary (640.27–32) that Aristotle's criticisms of Plato are directed not against Plato himself but against those who failed to grasp Plato's real meaning. In the preface to the commentary on the Categories, Simplicius goes further and says that in dealing with Aristotle's attacks on Plato, one should not consider only the philosophers' language and complain about their discord, but rather one should concentrate on their thought and seek out their accord on most matters (In Cat. 7.29–32). Here we have two expressions of the normal Neoplatonic view that Plato and Aristotle were usually trying to say the same thing. This view can, of course, be traced back to the revival of positive teaching in the New Academy. This is not to say that no Neoplatonist was aware of the differences, and certain Aristotelian doctrines remained unacceptable. In the passage we have just mentioned, Simplicius talks about he en tois pleistois symphonia, and elsewhere he shows that he is alive to differences (e.g., In De Caelo 454.23 ff.), even if he does regard Aristotle as Plato's truest pupil (ib. 378.20 f.) or his best interpreter (In De An. 245.12). Philoponus, moreover, actually protested against the view that Aristotle's attacks on Plato's ideas were not directed at Plato himself, a view that seems to have had some currency (cf. De Aet. M. II.2 29.2–8 R). None the less, ever since Plotinus, whose adoption of much Aristotelian thought would be clear enough without Porphyry's explicit statement on the point (Vita Plot. 14.4 ff.), the new Platonism had been more or less Aristotelianized: the controversies about whether or not Aristotelian views could be accepted by Platonists which had been current in the Middle Platonic period were no longer live. By the time Simplicius and Philoponus composed their commentaries, Aristotle's philosophy had been used as the standard introduction to Plato for at least two centuries. The tendency among certain modern scholars to see Aristotle simply as a Platonist has a precedent in the activities of the Neoplatonists: in both cases, it depends on a somewhat special understanding of Plato. [introduction 64-66] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3j2gfRYnCCVhtJC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"612","_score":null,"_source":{"id":612,"authors_free":[{"id":867,"entry_id":612,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Elements in the \"de Anima\" Commentaries","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Elements in the \"de Anima\" Commentaries"},"abstract":"Most scholars who refer to the Greek commentators for help in the understanding of difficult Aristotelian texts seem to expect straightforward scholarly treatment of their problems. Not infrequently they are disappointed and complain about the irrelevance of the commentary they read, or inveigh against the incompetence of the commentators. Only Alexander is generally exempt from such censure, and that in itself is significant. For he is the only major commentator whose work survives in any considerable quantity who wrote before Neoplatonism.\r\n\r\nShortly after Alexander, the kind of thought that is conveniently described by this label came to dominate Greek philosophy, and nearly all pagan philosophy and philosophical scholarship was pursued under its influence, if not by its active adherents. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that these facts are not trivial items of background interest but are fundamental to a proper assessment of the later commentators' opinions on points of Aristotelian scholarship. It is necessary to take account of the ideas and purpose of these commentators if one is to make any serious critical use of their work, and this cannot be done if one merely dips into their voluminous works in the hope of occasional enlightenment.\r\n\r\nThat these men were swayed by their own opinions and preconceptions is perhaps obvious once stated. Even Simplicius, notwithstanding his reputation for careful scholarship, is no exception. Simplicius may have done us a great service by preserving fragments of the pre-Socratics, but he was nevertheless a man who entertained ideas which were not likely to lead to the correct interpretation of Aristotle, as Hicks for one saw\u2014Ross, it seems, did not. In fact, one might go so far as to say that Simplicius was less well-fitted than some of the other commentators to give a good account of his subject.\r\n\r\nThose whose immediate reaction to such a statement is that it is grossly unfair to so fine a scholar might be disturbed by some of the material in the preface to Simplicius' De Anima commentary\u2014as they would by that in Philoponus' as well\u2014material which often escapes notice for the simple reason that one normally refers to these works for help with specific passages and does not read them as a whole.\r\n\r\nThis is not to say that there are no obvious signs of what is going on in the body of the commentaries, for there certainly are. A case in point is Simplicius' claim in the De Caelo commentary (640.27\u201332) that Aristotle's criticisms of Plato are directed not against Plato himself but against those who failed to grasp Plato's real meaning.\r\n\r\nIn the preface to the commentary on the Categories, Simplicius goes further and says that in dealing with Aristotle's attacks on Plato, one should not consider only the philosophers' language and complain about their discord, but rather one should concentrate on their thought and seek out their accord on most matters (In Cat. 7.29\u201332). Here we have two expressions of the normal Neoplatonic view that Plato and Aristotle were usually trying to say the same thing.\r\n\r\nThis view can, of course, be traced back to the revival of positive teaching in the New Academy. This is not to say that no Neoplatonist was aware of the differences, and certain Aristotelian doctrines remained unacceptable. In the passage we have just mentioned, Simplicius talks about he en tois pleistois symphonia, and elsewhere he shows that he is alive to differences (e.g., In De Caelo 454.23 ff.), even if he does regard Aristotle as Plato's truest pupil (ib. 378.20 f.) or his best interpreter (In De An. 245.12).\r\n\r\nPhiloponus, moreover, actually protested against the view that Aristotle's attacks on Plato's ideas were not directed at Plato himself, a view that seems to have had some currency (cf. De Aet. M. II.2 29.2\u20138 R). None the less, ever since Plotinus, whose adoption of much Aristotelian thought would be clear enough without Porphyry's explicit statement on the point (Vita Plot. 14.4 ff.), the new Platonism had been more or less Aristotelianized: the controversies about whether or not Aristotelian views could be accepted by Platonists which had been current in the Middle Platonic period were no longer live.\r\n\r\nBy the time Simplicius and Philoponus composed their commentaries, Aristotle's philosophy had been used as the standard introduction to Plato for at least two centuries. The tendency among certain modern scholars to see Aristotle simply as a Platonist has a precedent in the activities of the Neoplatonists: in both cases, it depends on a somewhat special understanding of Plato. [introduction 64-66]","btype":3,"date":"1976","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3j2gfRYnCCVhtJC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":612,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"21","issue":"1","pages":"64-87"}},"sort":["Neoplatonic Elements in the \"de Anima\" Commentaries"]}
Title | Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on "Phantasia" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | The Review of Metaphysics |
Volume | 31 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 242-257 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The ancient commentaries on Aristotle have for the most part remained in that strange kind of no-man's land between Classical and Medieval studies that even now holds so many of the productions of later antiquity. On the whole it would be true to say that students of Neoplatonism?for the commentators were usually Neoplatonists ?prefer to occupy themselves with openly Neoplatonic writings. Modern Aristotelian scholars, on the other hand, tend to take very little account of the opinions of their ancient predecessors. In this way they differ from the Medie vals, both Christian and Moslem: as is well known, Aquinas instigated the translation of many of these commentaries by his fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke, while a century before, Averroes, the greatest of the Arabic commentators, had made ample use of at least the earlier Greek expositions. [Introduction, p. 242] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/xdGhkQhUkY7sWbE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"877","_score":null,"_source":{"id":877,"authors_free":[{"id":1288,"entry_id":877,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on \"Phantasia\"","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on \"Phantasia\""},"abstract":"The ancient commentaries on Aristotle have for the most part \r\nremained in that strange kind of no-man's land between Classical \r\nand Medieval studies that even now holds so many of the productions \r\nof later antiquity. On the whole it would be true to say that students \r\nof Neoplatonism?for the commentators were usually Neoplatonists \r\n?prefer to occupy themselves with openly Neoplatonic writings. \r\nModern Aristotelian scholars, on the other hand, tend to take very \r\nlittle account of the opinions of their ancient predecessors. In this \r\nway they differ from the Medie vals, both Christian and Moslem: as \r\nis well known, Aquinas instigated the translation of many of these \r\ncommentaries by his fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke, while a \r\ncentury before, Averroes, the greatest of the Arabic commentators, \r\nhad made ample use of at least the earlier Greek expositions. [Introduction, p. 242]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xdGhkQhUkY7sWbE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":877,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"31","issue":"2","pages":"242-257"}},"sort":["Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on \"Phantasia\""]}
Title | Neoplatonic Political Subjectivity? Prohairesis, to eph’ hēmīn, and Self-constitution in Simplicius’ Commentary on Epictetus’ Encheiridion |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2022 |
Journal | International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 152-177 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tim Riggs |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I argue that in his commentary on Epictetus’ Encheiridion, Simplicius derives a method by which his students can enter into the process of self-constitution, which is only achieved through completion of the study of Plato’s dialogues. The result of following the method is the attainment of a perspective consonant with the level of political virtue, which I call ‘political subjectivity’. This is a speculative interpretation of the effect the student would. experience in following the method, accomplished through analyses of Simplicius’ interpretation of Epictetus’ concept of to eph’ hēmīn and the related prohairesis. I complement this with an analysis of the metaphysical foundation Simplicius gives the method in light of Charles Taylor’s notion of ‘strong evaluation’. In this way, I show how Simplicius adapts these concepts to his Neoplatonic psychology and virtue theory to make the method serve as preparation for the development of virtue prior to study of Plato. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1aSuGa63BJmxeQ0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1595","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1595,"authors_free":[{"id":2795,"entry_id":1595,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tim Riggs","free_first_name":"Tim","free_last_name":"Riggs","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Political Subjectivity? Prohairesis, to eph\u2019 h\u0113m\u012bn, and Self-constitution in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Epictetus\u2019 Encheiridion ","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Political Subjectivity? Prohairesis, to eph\u2019 h\u0113m\u012bn, and Self-constitution in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Epictetus\u2019 Encheiridion "},"abstract":"I argue that in his commentary on Epictetus\u2019 Encheiridion, Simplicius derives a method by which his students can enter into the process of self-constitution, which is only achieved through completion of the study of Plato\u2019s dialogues. The result of following the method is the attainment of a perspective consonant with the level of political virtue, which I call \u2018political subjectivity\u2019. This is a speculative interpretation of the effect the student would. experience in following the method, accomplished through analyses of Simplicius\u2019 interpretation of Epictetus\u2019 concept of to eph\u2019 h\u0113m\u012bn and the related prohairesis. I complement this with an analysis of the metaphysical foundation Simplicius gives the method in light of Charles Taylor\u2019s notion of \u2018strong evaluation\u2019. In this way, I show how Simplicius adapts these concepts to his Neoplatonic psychology and virtue theory to make the method serve as preparation for the development of virtue prior to study of Plato. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2022","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1aSuGa63BJmxeQ0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1595,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition ","volume":"18","issue":"2","pages":"152-177"}},"sort":["Neoplatonic Political Subjectivity? Prohairesis, to eph\u2019 h\u0113m\u012bn, and Self-constitution in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Epictetus\u2019 Encheiridion "]}
Title | Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2004 |
Journal | Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie |
Volume | 29 |
Pages | 225-247 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Steel, Carlos , Helmig, Christoph |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dieser Artikel berichtete über weniger als zehn Jahre Forschung im Bereich des Neuplatonismus. Und doch ist es erfreulich festzustellen, wie viel seit Mitte der 90er Jahre zustande gekommen ist, auch wenn es für die Zukunft noch viel zu tun gibt. Die Aufgabe stellt sich in doppelter Hinsicht: philologisch und philosophisch. In erster Linie ist es notwendig, das so rasant angewachsene Interesse für die neuplatonische Philosophie dahingehend zu nutzen, dass die Editionen und kommentierten Übersetzungen wichtiger Texte weitergeführt werden. Das ist eine intensive, mühevolle und oft undankbare Arbeit, weil so etwas im heutigen „Forschungsklima“ nicht immer in ausreichendem Maße gewürdigt wird. Und dennoch bleibt es eine der drängendsten Aufgaben, und das umso mehr, weil wir befürchten müssen, dass die Kenntnis der alten Sprachen immer weiter zurückgeht. Wie im Mittelalter die antike Philosophie nur überleben und neuen Einfluss gewinnen konnte durch massive Übersetzungsaktivitäten (ins Arabische und Lateinische), so werden in diesem Jahrhundert – ob man es nun bedauert oder nicht – viele neuplatonische Autoren nur noch in Reihen wie „The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle“ oder in anderen Übersetzungen gelesen werden. Darum ist es wichtig, dass die Übersetzungen zuverlässig sind und auf guten Editionen fußen. Es wäre daher wünschenswert, dass gerade auch in Deutschland vermehrt zentrale Texte aus dem späteren Neuplatonismus übersetzt und kommentiert würden. Aber neben dieser Editions- und Übersetzungsarbeit sollte das eigentliche Ziel der Forschung eine philosophische Annäherung sein an diese große Tradition der Geistesgeschichte mit ihren vielfachen kulturellen Verzweigungen im Mittelalter (von Syrien über den Irak und Andalusien bis nach Köln), in der Renaissance und in der Neuzeit. Dabei müssen wir uns aber davor hüten, den Neuplatonismus allzu leicht mit Schwärmerei oder einer Art von Esoterik in Verbindung zu bringen. Er ist und bleibt vor allem eine Philosophie, auch wenn er eine Philosophie ist, die rational die Grenzen der Rationalität einsieht. Gerade in der deutschsprachigen Forschung haben wir schöne Beispiele für ein fruchtbares Zusammengehen von philologischer akribeia und philosophischer Annäherung. Ein Paradigma einer solchen Forschung am Neuplatonismus bleiben für uns die zahlreichen philosophisch anregenden Arbeiten von Werner Beierwaltes. [p. 246-247] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/J1gdFPhAmlKlP6l |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"481","_score":null,"_source":{"id":481,"authors_free":[{"id":651,"entry_id":481,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":652,"entry_id":481,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":146,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Helmig, Christoph","free_first_name":"Christoph","free_last_name":"Helmig","norm_person":{"id":146,"first_name":"Christoph","last_name":"Helmig","full_name":"Helmig, Christoph","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1107028760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II","main_title":{"title":"Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II"},"abstract":"Dieser Artikel berichtete \u00fcber weniger als zehn Jahre Forschung im Bereich des Neuplatonismus. Und doch ist es erfreulich festzustellen, wie viel seit Mitte der 90er Jahre zustande gekommen ist, auch wenn es f\u00fcr die Zukunft noch viel zu tun gibt. Die Aufgabe stellt sich in doppelter Hinsicht: philologisch und philosophisch.\r\n\r\nIn erster Linie ist es notwendig, das so rasant angewachsene Interesse f\u00fcr die neuplatonische Philosophie dahingehend zu nutzen, dass die Editionen und kommentierten \u00dcbersetzungen wichtiger Texte weitergef\u00fchrt werden. Das ist eine intensive, m\u00fchevolle und oft undankbare Arbeit, weil so etwas im heutigen \u201eForschungsklima\u201c nicht immer in ausreichendem Ma\u00dfe gew\u00fcrdigt wird. Und dennoch bleibt es eine der dr\u00e4ngendsten Aufgaben, und das umso mehr, weil wir bef\u00fcrchten m\u00fcssen, dass die Kenntnis der alten Sprachen immer weiter zur\u00fcckgeht.\r\n\r\nWie im Mittelalter die antike Philosophie nur \u00fcberleben und neuen Einfluss gewinnen konnte durch massive \u00dcbersetzungsaktivit\u00e4ten (ins Arabische und Lateinische), so werden in diesem Jahrhundert \u2013 ob man es nun bedauert oder nicht \u2013 viele neuplatonische Autoren nur noch in Reihen wie \u201eThe Ancient Commentators on Aristotle\u201c oder in anderen \u00dcbersetzungen gelesen werden. Darum ist es wichtig, dass die \u00dcbersetzungen zuverl\u00e4ssig sind und auf guten Editionen fu\u00dfen.\r\n\r\nEs w\u00e4re daher w\u00fcnschenswert, dass gerade auch in Deutschland vermehrt zentrale Texte aus dem sp\u00e4teren Neuplatonismus \u00fcbersetzt und kommentiert w\u00fcrden. Aber neben dieser Editions- und \u00dcbersetzungsarbeit sollte das eigentliche Ziel der Forschung eine philosophische Ann\u00e4herung sein an diese gro\u00dfe Tradition der Geistesgeschichte mit ihren vielfachen kulturellen Verzweigungen im Mittelalter (von Syrien \u00fcber den Irak und Andalusien bis nach K\u00f6ln), in der Renaissance und in der Neuzeit.\r\n\r\nDabei m\u00fcssen wir uns aber davor h\u00fcten, den Neuplatonismus allzu leicht mit Schw\u00e4rmerei oder einer Art von Esoterik in Verbindung zu bringen. Er ist und bleibt vor allem eine Philosophie, auch wenn er eine Philosophie ist, die rational die Grenzen der Rationalit\u00e4t einsieht.\r\n\r\nGerade in der deutschsprachigen Forschung haben wir sch\u00f6ne Beispiele f\u00fcr ein fruchtbares Zusammengehen von philologischer akribeia und philosophischer Ann\u00e4herung. Ein Paradigma einer solchen Forschung am Neuplatonismus bleiben f\u00fcr uns die zahlreichen philosophisch anregenden Arbeiten von Werner Beierwaltes. [p. 246-247]","btype":3,"date":"2004","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/J1gdFPhAmlKlP6l","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":146,"full_name":"Helmig, Christoph","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":481,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Allgemeine Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie","volume":"29","issue":"","pages":"225-247"}},"sort":["Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II"]}
Title | Neue Fragmente aus ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1941 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 76 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 225-250 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wilpert, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Fassen wir abschließend zusammen. Der Bericht des Sextus über die pythagoreische Lehre von der Zahl hat sich im wesentlichen als eine ziemlich lückenlose Wiedergabe von Gedanken herausgestellt, die der platonischen Altersvorlesung cÜber das Gute* entstammen4). Vergleiche mit anderen Textzeugnissen ließen erkennen, daß die Gedankenschritte in der Hauptsache treu bewahrt sind und größere Eingriffe in den Zusammenhang unterblieben sind. Damit haben wir aber an unserer Stelle einen Bericht über diese wichtige Vorlesung, der an Umfang6) alle bisher bekannten Texte übertrifft und uns nicht nur erlaubt, verschiedene schon bekannte Stücke in den Gedanken aufbau einzuordnen, sondern auch darüber hinaus neues Gedankengut eröffnet. [conclusion p. 250] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nEGFEAlUmyi99jc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"426","_score":null,"_source":{"id":426,"authors_free":[{"id":572,"entry_id":426,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":362,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wilpert, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Wilpert","norm_person":{"id":362,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Wilpert","full_name":"Wilpert, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/11739629X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neue Fragmente aus \u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u0391\u0393\u0391\u0398\u039f\u03a5","main_title":{"title":"Neue Fragmente aus \u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u0391\u0393\u0391\u0398\u039f\u03a5"},"abstract":"Fassen wir abschlie\u00dfend zusammen. Der Bericht des Sextus \u00fcber die \r\npythagoreische Lehre von der Zahl hat sich im wesentlichen als eine ziemlich \r\nl\u00fcckenlose Wiedergabe von Gedanken herausgestellt, die der platonischen \r\nAltersvorlesung c\u00dcber das Gute* entstammen4). Vergleiche mit anderen \r\nTextzeugnissen lie\u00dfen erkennen, da\u00df die Gedankenschritte in der Hauptsache \r\ntreu bewahrt sind und gr\u00f6\u00dfere Eingriffe in den Zusammenhang unterblieben \r\nsind. Damit haben wir aber an unserer Stelle einen Bericht \u00fcber diese wichtige \r\nVorlesung, der an Umfang6) alle bisher bekannten Texte \u00fcbertrifft und uns \r\nnicht nur erlaubt, verschiedene schon bekannte St\u00fccke in den Gedanken\u00ad\r\naufbau einzuordnen, sondern auch dar\u00fcber hinaus neues Gedankengut \r\ner\u00f6ffnet. [conclusion p. 250]","btype":3,"date":"1941","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nEGFEAlUmyi99jc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":362,"full_name":"Wilpert, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":426,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"76","issue":"3","pages":"225-250"}},"sort":["Neue Fragmente aus \u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u0391\u0393\u0391\u0398\u039f\u03a5"]}
Title | Nicolas, l'auteur du Sommaire de la philosophie d'Aristote : doutes sur son identité, sa datation, son origine |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 121 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 99-126 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fazzo, Silvia |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper discusses the attribution of the compendium De Philosophia Aristotelis to Nicolaus of Damascus the general historian (fl.: end 1st c. BC). By contrast, there are reasons to believe that the work was written by a Peripatetic Nicolaus between the 3rd and the 6th century, most likely from Syria in the 4th c. AD. Among the consequences: one piece of evidence for interest in a wide range of Aristotle's works already in the 1st century BC-lst century AD is removed; the supposedly earliest evidence for Metaphysics as the title of Aristotle's work is moved to a later date; the idea that Peripatetic activity more or less ceased with Alexander, Thémistius being the only exception, is weakened by another counter-example. On the contrary, a distinctively Peripatetic culture must have been still alive in Themistius' and Nicolas' time, when special tools were produced both for teaching activity and for the transmission of Aristotle's philosophy to later eras. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jxgfqFdijkuOVZK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"822","_score":null,"_source":{"id":822,"authors_free":[{"id":1223,"entry_id":822,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":77,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fazzo, Silvia","free_first_name":"Silvia","free_last_name":"Fazzo","norm_person":{"id":77,"first_name":"Silvia","last_name":"Fazzo","full_name":"Fazzo, Silvia","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nicolas, l'auteur du Sommaire de la philosophie d'Aristote : doutes sur son identit\u00e9, sa datation, son origine","main_title":{"title":"Nicolas, l'auteur du Sommaire de la philosophie d'Aristote : doutes sur son identit\u00e9, sa datation, son origine"},"abstract":"The paper discusses the attribution of the compendium De Philosophia Aristotelis to Nicolaus of Damascus the general historian (fl.: end 1st c. BC). By contrast, there are reasons to believe that the work was written by a Peripatetic Nicolaus between the 3rd and the 6th century, most likely from Syria in the 4th c. AD. Among the consequences: one piece of evidence for interest in a wide range of Aristotle's works already in the 1st century BC-lst century AD is removed; the supposedly earliest evidence for Metaphysics as the title of Aristotle's work is moved to a later date; the idea that Peripatetic activity more or less ceased with Alexander, Th\u00e9mistius being the only exception, is weakened by another counter-example. On the contrary, a distinctively Peripatetic culture must have been still alive in Themistius' and Nicolas' time, when special tools were produced both for teaching activity and for the transmission of Aristotle's philosophy to later eras. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxgfqFdijkuOVZK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":77,"full_name":"Fazzo, Silvia","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":822,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques ","volume":"121","issue":"1","pages":"99-126"}},"sort":["Nicolas, l'auteur du Sommaire de la philosophie d'Aristote : doutes sur son identit\u00e9, sa datation, son origine"]}
Title | Nikostratos der Platoniker |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1922 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 57 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 481-517 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Praechter, Karl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Als Beitrag zur Vor- und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Neu platonismus auf einem Teilgebiet seiner Lehre möchte [...] die vorliegende Untersuchung betrachtet werden. Ich selbst habe zu zeigen versucht, daß der alexandrinische Neuplatonismus keines wegs die Linie Plotin-Porphyrios-Iamblich fortsetzt, sondern an ein früheres Stadium platonischer Lehrentwicklung anschließt. [conclusion p. 517] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/VI1pJau1eYyh9C4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"775","_score":null,"_source":{"id":775,"authors_free":[{"id":1139,"entry_id":775,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":293,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Praechter, Karl","free_first_name":"Karl","free_last_name":"Praechter","norm_person":{"id":293,"first_name":"Karl","last_name":"Praechter","full_name":"Praechter, Karl","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/116278609","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nikostratos der Platoniker","main_title":{"title":"Nikostratos der Platoniker"},"abstract":"Als Beitrag zur Vor- und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Neu\u00ad\r\nplatonismus auf einem Teilgebiet seiner Lehre m\u00f6chte [...] die \r\nvorliegende Untersuchung betrachtet werden. Ich selbst habe zu \r\nzeigen versucht, da\u00df der alexandrinische Neuplatonismus keines\u00ad\r\nwegs die Linie Plotin-Porphyrios-Iamblich fortsetzt, sondern an ein \r\nfr\u00fcheres Stadium platonischer Lehrentwicklung anschlie\u00dft. [conclusion p. 517]","btype":3,"date":"1922","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/VI1pJau1eYyh9C4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":293,"full_name":"Praechter, Karl","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":775,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"57","issue":"4","pages":"481-517"}},"sort":["Nikostratos der Platoniker"]}
Title | Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato’s Conception of Not-Being |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2023 |
Journal | Méthexis |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 185-200 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Roberto Granieri |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius’ own philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kxUtLJkrkZD05av |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1588","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1588,"authors_free":[{"id":2787,"entry_id":1588,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Roberto Granieri","free_first_name":"Roberto","free_last_name":"Granieri","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato\u2019s Conception of Not-Being","main_title":{"title":"Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato\u2019s Conception of Not-Being"},"abstract":"In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato\u2019s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander\u2019s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato\u2019s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius\u2019 own philosophical background, notably in Damascius\u2019 De principiis. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2023","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kxUtLJkrkZD05av","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1588,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"M\u00e9thexis","volume":"35","issue":"1","pages":"185-200"}},"sort":["Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato\u2019s Conception of Not-Being"]}
Title | Note sulla chiusura della Scuola neoplatonica di Atene |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Schede Medievali |
Volume | 42 |
Pages | 53-95 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Napoli, Valerio |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Secondo la lettura di Alain De Libera, l’“esilio” dei filosofi in Persia non segna la chiusura del conflitto tra l’ellenismo e il cristianesimo né la fine della filosofia («la filosofia è tutt'altro che morta a quest’epoca»), ma, al contrario, rappresenta l’evento che dà avvio a un movimento di trasferimento o di transfert della scienza – una traslazione degli studi o dei centri di studio – che durerà fino alla fine del Medioevo. L’esilio in questione, con cui la filosofia emigra – o pensa di emigrare – dall’Impero bizantino all’Impero sassanide per poi ritornare nell’Impero bizantino (in una translatio da Atene in Persia e dalla Persia a Harràn), costituisce una delle varie translations studiorum che si verificano tra l’antichità e il Medioevo e segna il perdurare, nella città di Harràn, in territorio bizantino, della filosofia pagana. In ogni caso, è possibile notare che, con i filosofi menzionati da Agazia (e forse con altri della stessa epoca non coinvolti nell’avventura persiana), ci troviamo di fronte all’ultima generazione di spicco dei filosofi pagani. Qualunque sia stata l’attività filosofica svolta dai neoplatonici dopo il loro ritorno dalla Persia, a Harràn o in qualche altra località, si può comunque constatare che Damascio (il quale probabilmente scrisse le sue opere prima del 529) e, se si vuole, qualche altro pensatore contemporaneo costituiscono gli ultimi filosofi pagani di rilievo. «[...] De fait – dichiara con decisione Henri Dominique Saffrey – après l’époque de Justinien, il n’y a plus eu de philosophes païens. Simplicius et les quelques-uns de la génération qui le suit, furent les derniers». Il pensiero pagano continuerà a vivere – al di là della possibile attività della comunità neoplatonica harraniana – in Oriente e in Occidente, in una complessa e intricata trama di ricezioni, influssi, fruizioni, letture, trasformazioni e suggestioni, nell’ambito del pensiero successivo nelle sue articolazioni arabo-islamica, greco-bizantina, latino-occidentale e altre. [conclusion p. 94-95] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/UFh3Gu1utmqf1sN |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"949","_score":null,"_source":{"id":949,"authors_free":[{"id":1425,"entry_id":949,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":522,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Napoli, Valerio","free_first_name":"Valerio","free_last_name":"Napoli","norm_person":{"id":522,"first_name":"Valerio","last_name":"Napoli","full_name":"Napoli, Valerio","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Note sulla chiusura della Scuola neoplatonica di Atene","main_title":{"title":"Note sulla chiusura della Scuola neoplatonica di Atene"},"abstract":"Secondo la lettura di Alain De Libera, l\u2019\u201cesilio\u201d dei filosofi in Persia non segna la chiusura del conflitto tra l\u2019ellenismo e il cristianesimo n\u00e9 la fine della filosofia (\u00abla filosofia \u00e8 tutt'altro che morta a quest\u2019epoca\u00bb), ma, al contrario, rappresenta l\u2019evento che d\u00e0 avvio a un movimento di trasferimento o di transfert della scienza \u2013 una traslazione degli studi o dei centri di studio \u2013 che durer\u00e0 fino alla fine del Medioevo.\r\n\r\nL\u2019esilio in questione, con cui la filosofia emigra \u2013 o pensa di emigrare \u2013 dall\u2019Impero bizantino all\u2019Impero sassanide per poi ritornare nell\u2019Impero bizantino (in una translatio da Atene in Persia e dalla Persia a Harr\u00e0n), costituisce una delle varie translations studiorum che si verificano tra l\u2019antichit\u00e0 e il Medioevo e segna il perdurare, nella citt\u00e0 di Harr\u00e0n, in territorio bizantino, della filosofia pagana.\r\n\r\nIn ogni caso, \u00e8 possibile notare che, con i filosofi menzionati da Agazia (e forse con altri della stessa epoca non coinvolti nell\u2019avventura persiana), ci troviamo di fronte all\u2019ultima generazione di spicco dei filosofi pagani. Qualunque sia stata l\u2019attivit\u00e0 filosofica svolta dai neoplatonici dopo il loro ritorno dalla Persia, a Harr\u00e0n o in qualche altra localit\u00e0, si pu\u00f2 comunque constatare che Damascio (il quale probabilmente scrisse le sue opere prima del 529) e, se si vuole, qualche altro pensatore contemporaneo costituiscono gli ultimi filosofi pagani di rilievo.\r\n\r\n\u00ab[...] De fait \u2013 dichiara con decisione Henri Dominique Saffrey \u2013 apr\u00e8s l\u2019\u00e9poque de Justinien, il n\u2019y a plus eu de philosophes pa\u00efens. Simplicius et les quelques-uns de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui le suit, furent les derniers\u00bb. Il pensiero pagano continuer\u00e0 a vivere \u2013 al di l\u00e0 della possibile attivit\u00e0 della comunit\u00e0 neoplatonica harraniana \u2013 in Oriente e in Occidente, in una complessa e intricata trama di ricezioni, influssi, fruizioni, letture, trasformazioni e suggestioni, nell\u2019ambito del pensiero successivo nelle sue articolazioni arabo-islamica, greco-bizantina, latino-occidentale e altre. [conclusion p. 94-95]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/UFh3Gu1utmqf1sN","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":522,"full_name":"Napoli, Valerio","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":949,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Schede Medievali","volume":"42","issue":"","pages":"53-95"}},"sort":["Note sulla chiusura della Scuola neoplatonica di Atene"]}
Title | Note sur les observations astronomiques envoyées, dit-on, de Babylone en Grèce, par Callisthène, sur la demande d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1862 |
Journal | Revue Archéologique, Nouvelle Série |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 243-246 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Martin, Thomas Henri |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
L'importance du mémoire lu à l'Académie des inscriptions par M. Th. Henri Martin dans la séance du 21 février, et dont nous avons dit un mot dans le compte rendu des séances de l’Académie du mois dernier, nous engage à en donner un résumé plus complet. Plus, en effet, l’opinion soutenue par M. Vivien de Saint-Martin est séduisante au premier abord, plus il est nécessaire d’examiner avec soin les bases sur lesquelles elle repose. Or, M. Henri Martin conteste l’authenticité du chiffre 1903 et apporte à l’appui de sa conviction des arguments qui nous semblent très puissants. Il est donc de notre devoir de mettre nos lecteurs à même de juger la valeur des assertions de M. Henri Martin qui, si elles sont acceptées, ruinent complètement les conclusions de M. Vivien de Saint-Martin. [introduction p. 243] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/39NzQsbvM2BCm0e |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"905","_score":null,"_source":{"id":905,"authors_free":[{"id":2071,"entry_id":905,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":240,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Martin, Thomas Henri","free_first_name":"Thomas Henri","free_last_name":"Martin","norm_person":{"id":240,"first_name":"Thomas Henri","last_name":"Martin","full_name":"Martin, Thomas Henri","short_ident":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120769840","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Note sur les observations astronomiques envoy\u00e9es, dit-on, de Babylone en Gr\u00e8ce, par Callisth\u00e8ne, sur la demande d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Note sur les observations astronomiques envoy\u00e9es, dit-on, de Babylone en Gr\u00e8ce, par Callisth\u00e8ne, sur la demande d'Aristote"},"abstract":"L'importance du m\u00e9moire lu \u00e0 l'Acad\u00e9mie des inscriptions par M. Th. Henri Martin dans la s\u00e9ance du 21 f\u00e9vrier, et dont nous avons dit un mot dans le compte rendu des s\u00e9ances de l\u2019Acad\u00e9mie du mois dernier, nous engage \u00e0 en donner un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 plus complet. Plus, en effet, l\u2019opinion soutenue par M. Vivien de Saint-Martin est s\u00e9duisante au premier abord, plus il est n\u00e9cessaire d\u2019examiner avec soin les bases sur lesquelles elle repose.\r\n\r\nOr, M. Henri Martin conteste l\u2019authenticit\u00e9 du chiffre 1903 et apporte \u00e0 l\u2019appui de sa conviction des arguments qui nous semblent tr\u00e8s puissants. Il est donc de notre devoir de mettre nos lecteurs \u00e0 m\u00eame de juger la valeur des assertions de M. Henri Martin qui, si elles sont accept\u00e9es, ruinent compl\u00e8tement les conclusions de M. Vivien de Saint-Martin. [introduction p. 243]","btype":3,"date":"1862","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/39NzQsbvM2BCm0e","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":240,"full_name":"Martin, Thomas Henri","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":905,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Arch\u00e9ologique, Nouvelle S\u00e9rie","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"243-246"}},"sort":["Note sur les observations astronomiques envoy\u00e9es, dit-on, de Babylone en Gr\u00e8ce, par Callisth\u00e8ne, sur la demande d'Aristote"]}
Title | Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'de Caelo' d'Aristote |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1954 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 82 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 145-182 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Moraux, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Nous en revenons ainsi à une constatation formulée dans les premières pages de cette étude : la tradition manuscrite d'Aristote accessible aux commentateurs était incomparablement plus riche ou, du moins, plus diversifiée que notre tradition médiévale. Plusieurs rameaux de cette tradition sont morts sans quasi laisser de traces ; d'autres ne semblent plus avoir de descendants directs, mais certains de leurs éléments ont été sauvés, en partie grâce à des codices mixti, en partie grâce aux yqépexat et aux variantes des commentateurs. La tradition médiévale, avec son unité relative, semble donc bien représenter, par rapport à la richesse antérieure, un réel appauvrissement. Une sélection, accidentelle ou voulue, doit avoir rétréci, dans des proportions considérables, la variété des manuscrits en cours à l'époque de Simplicius. Quand, comment et pourquoi cette sélection s'est-elle opérée ? À combien d'ancêtres réels remontent nos manuscrits médiévaux ? Ce sont là des questions auxquelles je ne puis répondre, et je crois qu’on n’y pourra répondre avant d'avoir mené à bien, avec toutes les ressources de la paléographie, de la critique et de la codicologie, l'étude systématique de la tradition directe. [conclusion p. 182] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1cq99waVOBFt3tw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1208","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1208,"authors_free":[{"id":1789,"entry_id":1208,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":137,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Moraux, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Moraux","norm_person":{"id":137,"first_name":"Paul ","last_name":"Moraux","full_name":"Moraux, Paul ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117755591","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'de Caelo' d'Aristote","main_title":{"title":"Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'de Caelo' d'Aristote"},"abstract":"Nous en revenons ainsi \u00e0 une constatation formul\u00e9e dans les premi\u00e8res pages de cette \u00e9tude : la tradition manuscrite d'Aristote accessible aux commentateurs \u00e9tait incomparablement plus riche ou, du moins, plus diversifi\u00e9e que notre tradition m\u00e9di\u00e9vale. Plusieurs rameaux de cette tradition sont morts sans quasi laisser de traces ; d'autres ne semblent plus avoir de descendants directs, mais certains de leurs \u00e9l\u00e9ments ont \u00e9t\u00e9 sauv\u00e9s, en partie gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 des codices mixti, en partie gr\u00e2ce aux yq\u00e9pexat et aux variantes des commentateurs.\r\n\r\nLa tradition m\u00e9di\u00e9vale, avec son unit\u00e9 relative, semble donc bien repr\u00e9senter, par rapport \u00e0 la richesse ant\u00e9rieure, un r\u00e9el appauvrissement. Une s\u00e9lection, accidentelle ou voulue, doit avoir r\u00e9tr\u00e9ci, dans des proportions consid\u00e9rables, la vari\u00e9t\u00e9 des manuscrits en cours \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque de Simplicius.\r\n\r\nQuand, comment et pourquoi cette s\u00e9lection s'est-elle op\u00e9r\u00e9e ? \u00c0 combien d'anc\u00eatres r\u00e9els remontent nos manuscrits m\u00e9di\u00e9vaux ? Ce sont l\u00e0 des questions auxquelles je ne puis r\u00e9pondre, et je crois qu\u2019on n\u2019y pourra r\u00e9pondre avant d'avoir men\u00e9 \u00e0 bien, avec toutes les ressources de la pal\u00e9ographie, de la critique et de la codicologie, l'\u00e9tude syst\u00e9matique de la tradition directe. [conclusion p. 182]","btype":3,"date":"1954","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1cq99waVOBFt3tw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":137,"full_name":"Moraux, Paul ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1208,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"82","issue":"2","pages":"145-182"}},"sort":["Notes sur la tradition indirecte du 'de Caelo' d'Aristote"]}
Title | Nous and Two Kinds of Epistêmê in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 228-254 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zeev Perelmuter |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate “cognition according to the definition and through the elements,” and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is πιστήμη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for πιστήμη and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius' reading of “Socrates' Dream,” its place in the Theaetetus ' larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IHkwn4udUD0QWHq |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1593","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1593,"authors_free":[{"id":2793,"entry_id":1593,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Zeev Perelmuter","free_first_name":"Zeev","free_last_name":"Perelmuter","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Nous and Two Kinds of Epist\u00eam\u00ea in Aristotle\u2019s Posterior Analytics","main_title":{"title":"Nous and Two Kinds of Epist\u00eam\u00ea in Aristotle\u2019s Posterior Analytics"},"abstract":"Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate \u201ccognition according to the definition and through the elements,\u201d and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius' reading of \u201cSocrates' Dream,\u201d its place in the Theaetetus ' larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract] ","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IHkwn4udUD0QWHq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1593,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis ","volume":"55","issue":"3","pages":"228-254"}},"sort":["Nous and Two Kinds of Epist\u00eam\u00ea in Aristotle\u2019s Posterior Analytics"]}
Title | Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Ultimate Reality and Meaning |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 248-255 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Silvestre, Maria Luisa |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
That the world of Anaxagoras is without any soul entails that Nous is for him the ultimate reality. It is not the end of our life, but the origin of the world and of ourselves. It is that which brings life and at the same time that which gives human beings the possibility of knowing anything whatsoever. This is all that we can deduce from Plato and Aristotle's presentation of Anaxagoras' doctrine on Nous. Simplicius cites a passage in which we can see that Nous is infinite, has power over everything, and knows the past, the present, and even future time: While other things have a share of everything, Nous is infinite, self-governing, and has been mixed with nothing ... For it is the lightest of all things and the purest, and maintains complete understanding over everything and wields the greatest power. And Nous controls all, large and small, that has life ... and whatever sort of things were to be—what were and are no longer, what are, and what will be—Nous put all in order. (B12; Sider, 1981, p. 94). We are not sure if Anaxagoras' Nous really was all that Simplicius attributes to it, but there can be no doubt that Simplicius, like Plato and every other interpreter of Anaxagoras' Nous, agrees that Nous is the ultimate reality in Anaxagoras' philosophy. In our view, Anaxagoras' Nous can be described as a force originating in the interior of the All, which suddenly frees itself and introduces a movement that upsets, separates, aggregates, and distinguishes. Yet at the same time, it is a rational force of understanding, since its characteristic function—understanding—for Anaxagoras means nothing else but putting persons and things in their proper places in relation to each other. [conclusion p. 254-255] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/WLkg0ul3k8yw6Tq |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1524","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1524,"authors_free":[{"id":2649,"entry_id":1524,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":404,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","free_first_name":"Maria Luisa","free_last_name":"Silvestre","norm_person":{"id":404,"first_name":"Maria Luisa","last_name":"Silvestre","full_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158446594","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"That the world of Anaxagoras is without any soul entails that Nous is for him the ultimate reality. It is not the end of our life, but the origin of the world and of ourselves. It is that which brings life and at the same time that which gives human beings the possibility of knowing anything whatsoever. This is all that we can deduce from Plato and Aristotle's presentation of Anaxagoras' doctrine on Nous. Simplicius cites a passage in which we can see that Nous is infinite, has power over everything, and knows the past, the present, and even future time:\r\n\r\n While other things have a share of everything, Nous is infinite, self-governing, and has been mixed with nothing ... For it is the lightest of all things and the purest, and maintains complete understanding over everything and wields the greatest power. And Nous controls all, large and small, that has life ... and whatever sort of things were to be\u2014what were and are no longer, what are, and what will be\u2014Nous put all in order. (B12; Sider, 1981, p. 94).\r\n\r\nWe are not sure if Anaxagoras' Nous really was all that Simplicius attributes to it, but there can be no doubt that Simplicius, like Plato and every other interpreter of Anaxagoras' Nous, agrees that Nous is the ultimate reality in Anaxagoras' philosophy.\r\n\r\nIn our view, Anaxagoras' Nous can be described as a force originating in the interior of the All, which suddenly frees itself and introduces a movement that upsets, separates, aggregates, and distinguishes. Yet at the same time, it is a rational force of understanding, since its characteristic function\u2014understanding\u2014for Anaxagoras means nothing else but putting persons and things in their proper places in relation to each other. [conclusion p. 254-255]","btype":3,"date":" 1989","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/WLkg0ul3k8yw6Tq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":404,"full_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1524,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ultimate Reality and Meaning","volume":"12","issue":"4","pages":"248-255"}},"sort":["Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras"]}
Title | OMOΣE XΩΡEIN: Simplicius, Corollarium de loco 601.26–8 (Diels) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2011 |
Journal | Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 61 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 722-730 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gregoric, Pavel , Helmig, Christoph |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The upshot of this article is that the treatment of the phrase ὁμόσε χωρεῖν in LSJ can be supplemented as far as later (Neoplatonic) authors are concerned. We have seen that the translation ‘to come to issue’ for the metaphorical meaning of the phrase is ambiguous and needs to be qualified according to the context. While the expression usually betrays an adversative connotation – to counter or refute an argument – later (Neoplatonic) authors also used it in a more neutral sense (‘to come to grips with an argument’). More to the point, the phrase can also have a concessive connotation, implying a concession or acceptance. It is precisely this latter connotation that we find in Simplicius’ Corollary on Place 601.26–8. [conclusion, p. 730] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8hDZ2Sqz5SgPL6n |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"585","_score":null,"_source":{"id":585,"authors_free":[{"id":829,"entry_id":585,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":145,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gregoric, Pavel","free_first_name":"Pavel","free_last_name":"Gregoric","norm_person":{"id":145,"first_name":"Pavel","last_name":"Gregoric","full_name":"Gregoric, Pavel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":830,"entry_id":585,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":146,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Helmig, Christoph","free_first_name":"Chistoph","free_last_name":"Helmig","norm_person":{"id":146,"first_name":"Christoph","last_name":"Helmig","full_name":"Helmig, Christoph","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1107028760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"OMO\u03a3E X\u03a9\u03a1EIN: Simplicius, Corollarium de loco 601.26\u20138 (Diels)","main_title":{"title":"OMO\u03a3E X\u03a9\u03a1EIN: Simplicius, Corollarium de loco 601.26\u20138 (Diels)"},"abstract":"The upshot of this article is that the treatment of the phrase \u1f41\u03bc\u03cc\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd in LSJ can be supplemented as far as later (Neoplatonic) authors are concerned. We have seen that the translation \u2018to come to issue\u2019 for the metaphorical meaning of the phrase is ambiguous and needs to be qualified according to the context. While the expression usually betrays an adversative connotation \u2013 to counter or refute an argument \u2013 later (Neoplatonic) authors also used it in a more neutral sense (\u2018to come to grips with an argument\u2019). More to the point, the phrase can also have a \r\nconcessive connotation, implying a concession or acceptance. It is precisely this \r\nlatter connotation that we find in Simplicius\u2019 Corollary on Place 601.26\u20138. [conclusion, p. 730]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8hDZ2Sqz5SgPL6n","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":145,"full_name":"Gregoric, Pavel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":146,"full_name":"Helmig, Christoph","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":585,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Quarterly","volume":"61","issue":"2","pages":"722-730"}},"sort":["OMO\u03a3E X\u03a9\u03a1EIN: Simplicius, Corollarium de loco 601.26\u20138 (Diels)"]}
Title | On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1905 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 19 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 205 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Shorey, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Notes on On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/JJdmbGUh1TLKUrg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1019","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1019,"authors_free":[{"id":1535,"entry_id":1019,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":321,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Shorey, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Shorey","norm_person":{"id":321,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Shorey","full_name":"Shorey, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/101356426X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq","main_title":{"title":"On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq"},"abstract":"Notes on On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq.","btype":3,"date":"1905","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/JJdmbGUh1TLKUrg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":321,"full_name":"Shorey, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1019,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"19","issue":"4","pages":"205"}},"sort":["On Simplicius De Caelo, 476, 11 sqq"]}
Title | On Simplicius’ Life and Works: A Response to Hadot |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Aestimatio |
Volume | 12 |
Pages | 56-82 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text is a response to Ilsetraut Hadot's book, "Le néoplatonicien Simplicius à la lumière des recherches contem¬poraines. Un bilan critique," which provides a critical overview of scholarly research on the Neoplatonist Simplicius. The author critiques Hadot's approach, arguing that her use of the Neoplatonic curriculum and medieval testimonies is an unsafe guide for assessing Simplicius' life and works. The article concludes by thanking Hadot for her previous work on Simplicius and acknowledging the value of her contributions to the field. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/iph5X72ry3ZiZ9P |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1322","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1322,"authors_free":[{"id":1956,"entry_id":1322,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On Simplicius\u2019 Life and Works: A Response to Hadot","main_title":{"title":"On Simplicius\u2019 Life and Works: A Response to Hadot"},"abstract":"This text is a response to Ilsetraut Hadot's book, \"Le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des recherches contem\u00acporaines. Un bilan critique,\" which provides a critical overview of scholarly research on the Neoplatonist Simplicius. The author critiques Hadot's approach, arguing that her use of the Neoplatonic curriculum and medieval testimonies is an unsafe guide for assessing Simplicius' life and works. The article concludes by thanking Hadot for her previous work on Simplicius and acknowledging the value of her contributions to the field. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/iph5X72ry3ZiZ9P","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1322,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Aestimatio","volume":"12","issue":"","pages":"56-82"}},"sort":["On Simplicius\u2019 Life and Works: A Response to Hadot"]}
Title | On Some Epicurean and Lucretian Arguments for the Infinity of the Universe |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 421-427 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Avotins, Ivars |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As is well known, Epicurus and his followers held that the universe was infinite and that its two primary components, void and atoms, were each infinite. The void was infinite in extension, the atoms were infinite in number and their total was infinite also in extension.' The chief Epicurean proofs of these infinities are found in Epicurus, Ad Herod. 41-2, and in Lucretius 1. 951-1020. As far as I can see, both the commentators to these works and writers on Epicurean physics in general have neglected to take into account some material pertinent to these proofs, material found in Aristotle and especially in his commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Simplicius, and Philoponus.2 In this article I wish to compare this neglected information with the proofs of infinity found in Epicurus and Lucretius and to discuss their authorship. [p. 421] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ZJK8o9VUGwRqW5s |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1001","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1001,"authors_free":[{"id":1506,"entry_id":1001,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":38,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Avotins, Ivars","free_first_name":"Ivars","free_last_name":"Avotins","norm_person":{"id":38,"first_name":"Ivars","last_name":"Avotins","full_name":"Avotins, Ivars","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On Some Epicurean and Lucretian Arguments for the Infinity of the Universe","main_title":{"title":"On Some Epicurean and Lucretian Arguments for the Infinity of the Universe"},"abstract":"As is well known, Epicurus and his followers held that the universe was infinite and \r\nthat its two primary components, void and atoms, were each infinite. The void was \r\ninfinite in extension, the atoms were infinite in number and their total was infinite also \r\nin extension.' The chief Epicurean proofs of these infinities are found in Epicurus, Ad \r\nHerod. 41-2, and in Lucretius 1. 951-1020. As far as I can see, both the commentators \r\nto these works and writers on Epicurean physics in general have neglected to take into \r\naccount some material pertinent to these proofs, material found in Aristotle and \r\nespecially in his commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Simplicius, and \r\nPhiloponus.2 In this article I wish to compare this neglected information with the \r\nproofs of infinity found in Epicurus and Lucretius and to discuss their authorship. [p. 421]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ZJK8o9VUGwRqW5s","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":38,"full_name":"Avotins, Ivars","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1001,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"421-427"}},"sort":["On Some Epicurean and Lucretian Arguments for the Infinity of the Universe"]}
Title | On the Homocentric Spheres of Eudoxus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Archive for History of Exact Sciences |
Volume | 52 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 221-278 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Yavetz, Ido |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In 1877, Schiaparelli published a classic essay on the homocentric spheres of Eu- doxus. In the years that followed, it became the standard, definitive historical reconstruc- tion of Eudoxian planetary theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that the two texts on which Schiaparelli based his reconstruction do not lead in an unequivocal way to this interpretation, and that they actually accommodate alternative and equally plausible interpretations that possess a clear astronomical superiority compared to Schiaparelli's. One should not mistake all of this for a call to reject Schiaparelli's interpretation in favor of the new one. In particular, the alternative interpretation does not recommend itself as a historically more plausible basis for reconstructing Eudoxus's and Callippus's planetary theories merely because of its astronomical advantages. It does, however, suggest that the exclusivity traditionally awarded to Schiaparelli's reconstruction can no longer be maintained, and that the little historical evidence we do possess does not enable us to make a justifiable choice between the available alternatives. [Introduction, p. 221] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yDxuUa8nKX7GLiW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"838","_score":null,"_source":{"id":838,"authors_free":[{"id":1242,"entry_id":838,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":366,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Yavetz, Ido","free_first_name":"Ido","free_last_name":"Yavetz","norm_person":{"id":366,"first_name":" Ido","last_name":"Yavetz","full_name":"Yavetz, Ido","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1156978416","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On the Homocentric Spheres of Eudoxus","main_title":{"title":"On the Homocentric Spheres of Eudoxus"},"abstract":"In 1877, Schiaparelli published a classic essay on the homocentric spheres of Eu- \r\ndoxus. In the years that followed, it became the standard, definitive historical reconstruc- \r\ntion of Eudoxian planetary theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that the two texts \r\non which Schiaparelli based his reconstruction do not lead in an unequivocal way to \r\nthis interpretation, and that they actually accommodate alternative and equally plausible \r\ninterpretations that possess a clear astronomical superiority compared to Schiaparelli's. One should not mistake all of this for a call to reject Schiaparelli's interpretation in favor \r\nof the new one. In particular, the alternative interpretation does not recommend itself as a \r\nhistorically more plausible basis for reconstructing Eudoxus's and Callippus's planetary theories merely because of its astronomical advantages. It does, however, suggest that \r\nthe exclusivity traditionally awarded to Schiaparelli's reconstruction can no longer be \r\nmaintained, and that the little historical evidence we do possess does not enable us to \r\nmake a justifiable choice between the available alternatives. [Introduction, p. 221]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yDxuUa8nKX7GLiW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":366,"full_name":"Yavetz, Ido","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":838,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archive for History of Exact Sciences","volume":"52","issue":"3","pages":"221-278"}},"sort":["On the Homocentric Spheres of Eudoxus"]}
Title | Pagans vs. Christians in Late Neoplatonism: Simplicius and Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (forthcoming) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chase, Michael |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To characterize Simplicius' views of Philoponus in a nutshell, I can do no better than to cite a passage from Simplicius' commentary on the Categories (p. 7, 23-32 Kalbfleisch), in which the pagan philosopher sums up the qualities that a good commentator on Aristotle should possess: The worthy exegete of Aristotle's writings must not fall wholly short of the latter's greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have experience of everything the Philosopher has written and must be a connoisseur (epistēmōn) of Aristotle's stylistic habits. His judgment must be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher's school. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XhhKQngjLfncQW0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1260","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1260,"authors_free":[{"id":1842,"entry_id":1260,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":25,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chase, Michael","free_first_name":"Michael","free_last_name":"Chase","norm_person":{"id":25,"first_name":"Michael ","last_name":"Chase","full_name":"Chase, Michael ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1031917152","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Pagans vs. Christians in Late Neoplatonism: Simplicius and Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (forthcoming)","main_title":{"title":"Pagans vs. Christians in Late Neoplatonism: Simplicius and Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (forthcoming)"},"abstract":"To characterize Simplicius' views of Philoponus in a nutshell, I can do no better than to cite a passage from Simplicius' commentary on the Categories (p. 7, 23-32 Kalbfleisch), in which the pagan philosopher sums up the qualities that a good commentator on Aristotle should possess:\r\n\r\n The worthy exegete of Aristotle's writings must not fall wholly short of the latter's greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have experience of everything the Philosopher has written and must be a connoisseur (epist\u0113m\u014dn) of Aristotle's stylistic habits. His judgment must be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher's school. <The good exegete> must, I believe, not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter (lexis) of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (nous) and track down (anikhneuein) the harmony which reigns between them on the majority of points.\r\n\r\nI think it's safe to say that, in Simplicius' view, Philoponus fails to make the grade on all these points: he does not know Aristotle well, he lacks impartiality (although in his case it is not because he strives to prove that Aristotle is always right, but to prove that he is very often wrong), and above all, he insists on the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle, remaining at the level of the surface meaning of their texts and failing to discern the underlying harmony between the two great philosophers.\r\n\r\nI suspect Simplicius would also apply to Philoponus what he says shortly afterward in his Commentary on the Categories about the qualities required of a good philosophy student:\r\n\r\n He must, however, guard against disputatious twaddle (eristik\u00ea phluaria), into which many of those who frequent Aristotle tend to fall. Whereas the Philosopher endeavors to demonstrate everything by means of the irrefutable definitions of science, these smart-alecks (hoi peritt\u00f4s sophoi) have the habit of contradicting even what is obvious, blinding the eye of their souls. Against such people, it is enough to speak Aristotle's words: to wit, they need either sensation (aisth\u0113sis) or punishment. If they are being argumentative without having paid attention, it is perception they need. If, however, they have paid attention to the text but are trying to show off their discursive power, it is punishment they need.\r\n\r\nWe don't know what Philoponus's evaluation of Simplicius would have been, but I am pretty sure it would not have been flattering, either. [conclusion p. 23-24]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/XhhKQngjLfncQW0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":25,"full_name":"Chase, Michael ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["Pagans vs. Christians in Late Neoplatonism: Simplicius and Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (forthcoming)"]}
Title | Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs à une définition du temps dans le néoplatonisme tardif |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 455/459 |
Pages | 1-26 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ainsi, le concept de paralasis est profondément solidaire d’un thème qui est au cœur de la pensée de Damascius : la distinction entre ce qui est en train de se différencier et ce dont la différenciation est achevée. C’est aussi la distinction entre la procession et la conversion, entre la puissance et l’activité, entre la vie et l’intellect, entre le second diacosme (intelligible et intellectif) et le troisième (intellectif) : dans tous ces couples, le premier terme se distingue du second comme, dans Physique VI, « l’action de se mouvoir se distingue du mouvement accompli » (95). Aristote est la source avouée de Damascius, qui lui consacrait des cours (on sait par exemple que le premier livre du Commentaire de Simplicius au De Caelo a vraisemblablement été rédigé à partir de notes prises au cours de Damascius) (96) : il « pense le temps à la fois à partir du Parménide de Platon et à partir des livres IV et VI de la Physique d’Aristote. C’est à la lumière d’Aristote qu’il interprète Platon. C’est à Aristote lui-même qu’il emprunte les éléments de sa résolution des apories posées en Physique IV. Et la clé de sa doctrine du temps est à chercher en Physique VI » (97). Il faut ajouter immédiatement que c’est à partir de la pensée stoïcienne du temps que Damascius lit Physique VI et élabore sa théorie du « temps intégral ». Le « temps intégral », qui demeure « tout entier à la fois dans la subsistance », est pensé selon l’être-ensemble de ses parties. Analogue au maintenant diastèmatique, qui est partie et non limite du temps, il a pour image le présent de la danse, en qui passé et futur sont contenus et résorbés : bien qu’elle se déroute dans une succession, la danse est présentement en train d’être dansée (98), et c’est sur le même mode que le combat est lui aussi présent. La subsistance d’un tel présent se fonde sur l’unité d’une action en devenir, qui s’exprime par un verbe au présent extensif. L’influence du stoïcisme sur Damascius semble déterminante : on reconnaît sans peine dans ses analyses le présent étendu qui est le présent sensible de l’expérience pratique, celui en qui vient se loger une action comme « je marche » (action portée à élocution par un présent extensif) ; et son « temps intégral » n’est pas sans analogie avec le mode de présence de la période cosmique stoïcienne (99). À cette influence philosophique du stoïcisme, il faut ajouter son influence grammaticale. Damascius fut pendant neuf ans professeur de rhétorique. C’est sans aucun doute à cette longue pratique des textes et des mots qu’il faut rapporter l’attention extrême qu’il prête au langage, ainsi que la thématisation des problèmes du langage au sein même de sa pensée philosophique (100). C’est à une grammaire d’inspiration stoïcienne qu’il faut rapporter sa méthode d’exégèse, ou plutôt le contenu de son exégèse de Physique IV (221 a 6-9) : l’infinitif être, compris comme activité d’être, est envisagé dans l’extension aspectuelle, et Damascius le considère comme l’équivalent de paratasis tou einai. Cette explication de texte scrupuleuse, qui est bien dans la manière de Damascius, permet à celui-ci de proposer sa définition du temps, tout en soulignant sa fidélité par rapport à la double autorité d’Archytas et d’Aristote. [conclusion p. 23-25] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/LNb8H8UiMDNsVyS |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"713","_score":null,"_source":{"id":713,"authors_free":[{"id":1063,"entry_id":713,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition du temps dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme tardif","main_title":{"title":"Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition du temps dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme tardif"},"abstract":"Ainsi, le concept de paralasis est profond\u00e9ment solidaire d\u2019un th\u00e8me qui est au c\u0153ur de la pens\u00e9e de Damascius : la distinction entre ce qui est en train de se diff\u00e9rencier et ce dont la diff\u00e9renciation est achev\u00e9e. C\u2019est aussi la distinction entre la procession et la conversion, entre la puissance et l\u2019activit\u00e9, entre la vie et l\u2019intellect, entre le second diacosme (intelligible et intellectif) et le troisi\u00e8me (intellectif) : dans tous ces couples, le premier terme se distingue du second comme, dans Physique VI, \u00ab l\u2019action de se mouvoir se distingue du mouvement accompli \u00bb (95).\r\n\r\nAristote est la source avou\u00e9e de Damascius, qui lui consacrait des cours (on sait par exemple que le premier livre du Commentaire de Simplicius au De Caelo a vraisemblablement \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9dig\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de notes prises au cours de Damascius) (96) : il \u00ab pense le temps \u00e0 la fois \u00e0 partir du Parm\u00e9nide de Platon et \u00e0 partir des livres IV et VI de la Physique d\u2019Aristote. C\u2019est \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re d\u2019Aristote qu\u2019il interpr\u00e8te Platon. C\u2019est \u00e0 Aristote lui-m\u00eame qu\u2019il emprunte les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de sa r\u00e9solution des apories pos\u00e9es en Physique IV. Et la cl\u00e9 de sa doctrine du temps est \u00e0 chercher en Physique VI \u00bb (97).\r\n\r\nIl faut ajouter imm\u00e9diatement que c\u2019est \u00e0 partir de la pens\u00e9e sto\u00efcienne du temps que Damascius lit Physique VI et \u00e9labore sa th\u00e9orie du \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb. Le \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb, qui demeure \u00ab tout entier \u00e0 la fois dans la subsistance \u00bb, est pens\u00e9 selon l\u2019\u00eatre-ensemble de ses parties. Analogue au maintenant diast\u00e8matique, qui est partie et non limite du temps, il a pour image le pr\u00e9sent de la danse, en qui pass\u00e9 et futur sont contenus et r\u00e9sorb\u00e9s : bien qu\u2019elle se d\u00e9route dans une succession, la danse est pr\u00e9sentement en train d\u2019\u00eatre dans\u00e9e (98), et c\u2019est sur le m\u00eame mode que le combat est lui aussi pr\u00e9sent.\r\n\r\nLa subsistance d\u2019un tel pr\u00e9sent se fonde sur l\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u2019une action en devenir, qui s\u2019exprime par un verbe au pr\u00e9sent extensif. L\u2019influence du sto\u00efcisme sur Damascius semble d\u00e9terminante : on reconna\u00eet sans peine dans ses analyses le pr\u00e9sent \u00e9tendu qui est le pr\u00e9sent sensible de l\u2019exp\u00e9rience pratique, celui en qui vient se loger une action comme \u00ab je marche \u00bb (action port\u00e9e \u00e0 \u00e9locution par un pr\u00e9sent extensif) ; et son \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb n\u2019est pas sans analogie avec le mode de pr\u00e9sence de la p\u00e9riode cosmique sto\u00efcienne (99).\r\n\r\n\u00c0 cette influence philosophique du sto\u00efcisme, il faut ajouter son influence grammaticale. Damascius fut pendant neuf ans professeur de rh\u00e9torique. C\u2019est sans aucun doute \u00e0 cette longue pratique des textes et des mots qu\u2019il faut rapporter l\u2019attention extr\u00eame qu\u2019il pr\u00eate au langage, ainsi que la th\u00e9matisation des probl\u00e8mes du langage au sein m\u00eame de sa pens\u00e9e philosophique (100). C\u2019est \u00e0 une grammaire d\u2019inspiration sto\u00efcienne qu\u2019il faut rapporter sa m\u00e9thode d\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, ou plut\u00f4t le contenu de son ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de Physique IV (221 a 6-9) : l\u2019infinitif \u00eatre, compris comme activit\u00e9 d\u2019\u00eatre, est envisag\u00e9 dans l\u2019extension aspectuelle, et Damascius le consid\u00e8re comme l\u2019\u00e9quivalent de paratasis tou einai. Cette explication de texte scrupuleuse, qui est bien dans la mani\u00e8re de Damascius, permet \u00e0 celui-ci de proposer sa d\u00e9finition du temps, tout en soulignant sa fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 par rapport \u00e0 la double autorit\u00e9 d\u2019Archytas et d\u2019Aristote. [conclusion p. 23-25]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/LNb8H8UiMDNsVyS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":713,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques","volume":"96","issue":"455\/459","pages":"1-26"}},"sort":["Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition du temps dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme tardif"]}
Title | Parmenide neoplatonico: intorno a un nuovo studio sulla presenza di Parmenide nel commento alla Fisica di Simplicio (Book discussion of: Ivan A. Licciardi, Parmenide tràdito, Parmenide tradìto nel commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele (Symbolon 42), Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2016) |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | Méthexis |
Volume | 29 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 188-198 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hoine, Pieter d’ |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In conclusione, mi permetto ancora alcune osservazioni sulla forma di quest’opera. Benché Simplicio apprezzi la laconicità (cioè la famosa brachylogia) degli antichi, credo che nessuno abbia mai pensato che il commentatore tenti di imitarla. Anzi, i suoi commentari sono caratterizzati da una certa prolissità e da ripetizioni che non sempre sono necessitate da bisogni esegetici. Per di più, il filo conduttore delle sue analisi è spesso interrotto da discussioni dossografiche o da digressioni che sono sì interessanti, ma non sempre pertinenti all’esegesi del testo in considerazione. Temo che anche il commentario di Ivan Licciardi non sia del tutto privo di queste imperfezioni. Inoltre, penso che alcune scelte formali – come quella di presentare il greco non a fronte della traduzione, ma piuttosto di seguito, e quella di non usare note nella parte del commentario – non abbiano contribuito a rendere più facile la navigazione attraverso le ricche informazioni che questo libro offre. Sotto questi aspetti, il libro ha l’impronta di un’opera prima, ma va detto che nella sua premessa l’autore stesso se ne mostra ben conscio (p. 19). Esprimendo queste riserve, non ho l’intenzione di ridurre i meriti di questo studio né di sollevare dubbi sul contributo dato da questo libro alla nostra comprensione dei temi discussi. Il merito di questo libro è soprattutto quello di aver consentito una migliore comprensione del contesto storico e filosofico in cui e delle ragioni per cui Simplicio ci ha trasmesso Parmenide. Anche se questo libro può aiutare gli studiosi dei presocratici a contestualizzare la loro stessa interpretazione del filosofo di Elea, è soprattutto agli studi neoplatonici che l’autore contribuisce. Infatti, il Parmenide di Simplicio è innanzitutto un Parmenide neoplatonico. Il senso storico e critico moderno fanno sì che noi non abbiamo più a nostra disposizione quella chiave ermeneutica neoplatonica che consiste nel riferire contraddizioni apparenti a diversi piani della realtà presenti solo implicitamente nel pensiero degli autori che studiamo. Il nostro obiettivo non è più quello di difendere la fondamentale unità del pensiero antico contro i cristiani né quello di mostrare la verità eternamente infallibile del platonismo. Diversamente, pensiamo che sia più sensato rintracciare non solo i punti di accordo, ma anche le discordanze e le discontinuità nella storia del pensiero, in cui lo stesso Simplicio merita una posizione di rilievo. L’interpretazione simpliciana di Parmenide ha sì ‘salvato’ parecchie linee del Poema dall’oblio, ma il prezzo che l’Eleate ha pagato è stato quello di essere stato forzato, nelle parole di Licciardi, in una ‘griglia concettuale totalmente estranea alla logica del Poema’ (p. 43). L’ironia di questa vicenda è che sia stato proprio l’intento di Simplicio di coltivare l’amicizia con tutti i filosofi pagani ad averlo spinto, in fin dei conti, a tradire tutti. [conclusion p. 197-198] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AZQTPKFglABgm9k |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1484","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1484,"authors_free":[{"id":2569,"entry_id":1484,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":104,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoine, Pieter d\u2019","free_first_name":"Pieter d\u2019","free_last_name":"Hoine","norm_person":{"id":104,"first_name":"Pieter d' ","last_name":"Hoine","full_name":"Hoine, Pieter d' ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051361575","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenide neoplatonico: intorno a un nuovo studio sulla presenza di Parmenide nel commento alla Fisica di Simplicio (Book discussion of: Ivan A. Licciardi, Parmenide tr\u00e0dito, Parmenide trad\u00ecto nel commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele (Symbolon 42), Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2016)","main_title":{"title":"Parmenide neoplatonico: intorno a un nuovo studio sulla presenza di Parmenide nel commento alla Fisica di Simplicio (Book discussion of: Ivan A. Licciardi, Parmenide tr\u00e0dito, Parmenide trad\u00ecto nel commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele (Symbolon 42), Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2016)"},"abstract":"In conclusione, mi permetto ancora alcune osservazioni sulla forma di quest\u2019opera. Bench\u00e9 Simplicio apprezzi la laconicit\u00e0 (cio\u00e8 la famosa brachylogia) degli antichi, credo che nessuno abbia mai pensato che il commentatore tenti di imitarla. Anzi, i suoi commentari sono caratterizzati da una certa prolissit\u00e0 e da ripetizioni che non sempre sono necessitate da bisogni esegetici. Per di pi\u00f9, il filo conduttore delle sue analisi \u00e8 spesso interrotto da discussioni dossografiche o da digressioni che sono s\u00ec interessanti, ma non sempre pertinenti all\u2019esegesi del testo in considerazione.\r\n\r\nTemo che anche il commentario di Ivan Licciardi non sia del tutto privo di queste imperfezioni. Inoltre, penso che alcune scelte formali \u2013 come quella di presentare il greco non a fronte della traduzione, ma piuttosto di seguito, e quella di non usare note nella parte del commentario \u2013 non abbiano contribuito a rendere pi\u00f9 facile la navigazione attraverso le ricche informazioni che questo libro offre. Sotto questi aspetti, il libro ha l\u2019impronta di un\u2019opera prima, ma va detto che nella sua premessa l\u2019autore stesso se ne mostra ben conscio (p. 19).\r\n\r\nEsprimendo queste riserve, non ho l\u2019intenzione di ridurre i meriti di questo studio n\u00e9 di sollevare dubbi sul contributo dato da questo libro alla nostra comprensione dei temi discussi. Il merito di questo libro \u00e8 soprattutto quello di aver consentito una migliore comprensione del contesto storico e filosofico in cui e delle ragioni per cui Simplicio ci ha trasmesso Parmenide. Anche se questo libro pu\u00f2 aiutare gli studiosi dei presocratici a contestualizzare la loro stessa interpretazione del filosofo di Elea, \u00e8 soprattutto agli studi neoplatonici che l\u2019autore contribuisce.\r\n\r\nInfatti, il Parmenide di Simplicio \u00e8 innanzitutto un Parmenide neoplatonico. Il senso storico e critico moderno fanno s\u00ec che noi non abbiamo pi\u00f9 a nostra disposizione quella chiave ermeneutica neoplatonica che consiste nel riferire contraddizioni apparenti a diversi piani della realt\u00e0 presenti solo implicitamente nel pensiero degli autori che studiamo. Il nostro obiettivo non \u00e8 pi\u00f9 quello di difendere la fondamentale unit\u00e0 del pensiero antico contro i cristiani n\u00e9 quello di mostrare la verit\u00e0 eternamente infallibile del platonismo.\r\n\r\nDiversamente, pensiamo che sia pi\u00f9 sensato rintracciare non solo i punti di accordo, ma anche le discordanze e le discontinuit\u00e0 nella storia del pensiero, in cui lo stesso Simplicio merita una posizione di rilievo. L\u2019interpretazione simpliciana di Parmenide ha s\u00ec \u2018salvato\u2019 parecchie linee del Poema dall\u2019oblio, ma il prezzo che l\u2019Eleate ha pagato \u00e8 stato quello di essere stato forzato, nelle parole di Licciardi, in una \u2018griglia concettuale totalmente estranea alla logica del Poema\u2019 (p. 43).\r\n\r\nL\u2019ironia di questa vicenda \u00e8 che sia stato proprio l\u2019intento di Simplicio di coltivare l\u2019amicizia con tutti i filosofi pagani ad averlo spinto, in fin dei conti, a tradire tutti.\r\n[conclusion p. 197-198]","btype":3,"date":"2017","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AZQTPKFglABgm9k","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":104,"full_name":"Hoine, Pieter d' ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1484,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"M\u00e9thexis","volume":"29","issue":"1","pages":"188-198"}},"sort":["Parmenide neoplatonico: intorno a un nuovo studio sulla presenza di Parmenide nel commento alla Fisica di Simplicio (Book discussion of: Ivan A. Licciardi, Parmenide tr\u00e0dito, Parmenide trad\u00ecto nel commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele (Symbolon 42), Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2016)"]}
Title | Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford’s Fragment |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-14 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | McKirahan, Richard D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Having established the attributes of τὸ ἐόν in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that ‘you cannot know what is not...nor can you declare it’ (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8. He begins by stating (B8.34) that ‘what is to be thought of is the same as that on account of which the thought is’ and goes on to give an argument for that claim (B8.35-38a). He then (B8.38b-41) states as a consequence of the claim, that ‘it (that is, τὸ ἐόν) has been named all things that mortals, persuaded that they are real, have posited both to be generated and to perish, both to be and not, and to change place and alter bright color’. His treatment of these issues, which concern the relations among reality, thought, and language, is one of the most philosophically important parts of his work; it is arguably the very heart of his philosophy. It is also one of the most obscure. The philosophical difficulties are compounded by the facts that the Greek text is uncertain and its grammatical structure is hard to make out. One of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato’s Theaetetus and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line—a misquotation of the true version, or an altogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently. The first step towards understanding the passage is to establish the text of B8.38. Ideally such a text would have substantial support in the ancient sources, it would be a line of the dactylic hexameter verse in which Parmenides wrote, it would make grammatical sense, it would give a good philosophical sense in the place where it occurs, it would suit Parmenides’ manner of presenting his ideas and arguments, and it would make sense in relation to the rest of his philosophy. In part I, I survey the evidence for B8.38 and argue that if the version reported by Plato and his commentator is accepted as a separate fragment, then one of the metrically acceptable versions of the line preserved in the manuscripts of Simplicius is more strongly supported than has previously been thought and, in fact, from this point of view it becomes the leading candidate. In part II, I argue that this version can be read in a way that is philologically unobjectionable, and I propose a way of reading it that fits well with its context, is characteristic of Parmenides’ philosophical style, and gives at least as good philosophical sense as previous construals do. I also defend my interpretation against recent claims by Kingsley, Vlastos, and Mourelatos. Finally, in part III, I take up the question of Cornford’s fragment (as the line quoted by Plato and his commentator is known). I boost the alleged fragment’s claim to authenticity by proposing a new way to understand the text that makes the line metrically and philologically unobjectionable and presenting two ways of construing it that make philosophical sense and make claims that do not repeat what Parmenides says elsewhere but accord well with his views. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/SqC5oF6JPgbuN3v |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"989","_score":null,"_source":{"id":989,"authors_free":[{"id":1490,"entry_id":989,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":253,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","free_first_name":"Richard D.","free_last_name":"McKirahan","norm_person":{"id":253,"first_name":"Richard D.","last_name":"McKirahan","full_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131702254","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment","main_title":{"title":"Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment"},"abstract":"Having established the attributes of \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that \u2018you cannot know what is not...nor can you declare it\u2019 (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8. He begins by stating (B8.34) that \u2018what is to be thought of is the same as that on account of which the thought is\u2019 and goes on to give an argument for that claim (B8.35-38a). He then (B8.38b-41) states as a consequence of the claim, that \u2018it (that is, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd) has been named all things that mortals, persuaded that they are real, have posited both to be generated and to perish, both to be and not, and to change place and alter bright color\u2019. His treatment of these issues, which concern the relations among reality, thought, and language, is one of the most philosophically important parts of his work; it is arguably the very heart of his philosophy. It is also one of the most obscure. The philosophical difficulties are compounded by the facts that the Greek text is uncertain and its grammatical structure is hard to make out.\r\n\r\nOne of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato\u2019s Theaetetus and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line\u2014a misquotation of the true version, or an altogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently.\r\n\r\nThe first step towards understanding the passage is to establish the text of B8.38. Ideally such a text would have substantial support in the ancient sources, it would be a line of the dactylic hexameter verse in which Parmenides wrote, it would make grammatical sense, it would give a good philosophical sense in the place where it occurs, it would suit Parmenides\u2019 manner of presenting his ideas and arguments, and it would make sense in relation to the rest of his philosophy.\r\n\r\nIn part I, I survey the evidence for B8.38 and argue that if the version reported by Plato and his commentator is accepted as a separate fragment, then one of the metrically acceptable versions of the line preserved in the manuscripts of Simplicius is more strongly supported than has previously been thought and, in fact, from this point of view it becomes the leading candidate. In part II, I argue that this version can be read in a way that is philologically unobjectionable, and I propose a way of reading it that fits well with its context, is characteristic of Parmenides\u2019 philosophical style, and gives at least as good philosophical sense as previous construals do. I also defend my interpretation against recent claims by Kingsley, Vlastos, and Mourelatos.\r\n\r\nFinally, in part III, I take up the question of Cornford\u2019s fragment (as the line quoted by Plato and his commentator is known). I boost the alleged fragment\u2019s claim to authenticity by proposing a new way to understand the text that makes the line metrically and philologically unobjectionable and presenting two ways of construing it that make philosophical sense and make claims that do not repeat what Parmenides says elsewhere but accord well with his views. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/SqC5oF6JPgbuN3v","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":253,"full_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":989,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"30","issue":"1","pages":"1-14"}},"sort":["Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment"]}
Title | Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1967 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-5 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bicknell, Peter J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is commonly maintained that Melissus was the major forerunner of atomism. This has been argued on a number of grounds, one of these being that Leucippus reacted to a Melissean rather than a Parmenidean refutation of locomotion. In the following short paper I shall challenge this view and point out that not only is one other argument for Melissus' influence on atomism insecure, but that Theo- phrastus, our most important witness, unequivocally states that Leucippus opposed a pre-Melissean eleaticism. [p. 1] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ueYDjNWacYJ6N22 |
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Title | Parmenides, B 8. 4 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1970 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 20 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 32-34 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wilson, John Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The text of Parmenides 8. 4 is unusually corrupt. [p. 32] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ORpDAdKNKbMPRNA |
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Title | Parmenides, Fragment 10 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1968 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 629-631 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bicknell, Peter J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text is a critical analysis of the location of two fragments of the work of the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides. The author of the text suggests that the two fragments, VS 28 B 10 (Clement, Strom. 5, I38) and VS 28 B 11 (Simplicius, de Caelo 559, 20), are incorrectly placed together in Parmenides' Way of Seeming. The author argues that there is no evidence to suggest that the two fragments were meant to be together, and that they do not fit into the context of Parmenides' work. The author also suggests that VS 28 B 10 may not be Parmenidean at all, and discusses its possible attribution to Empedocles. The text concludes by considering the language and style of the two fragments, and their relationship to Parmenides' other works. [summary of the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/sgGCDPcG5fRkeId |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1124","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1124,"authors_free":[{"id":1700,"entry_id":1124,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":399,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","free_first_name":"Peter J.","free_last_name":"Bicknell","norm_person":{"id":399,"first_name":"Peter J.","last_name":"Bicknell","full_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1162157143","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenides, Fragment 10","main_title":{"title":"Parmenides, Fragment 10"},"abstract":"This text is a critical analysis of the location of two fragments of the work of the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides. The author of the text suggests that the two fragments, VS 28 B 10 (Clement, Strom. 5, I38) and VS 28 B 11 (Simplicius, de Caelo 559, 20), are incorrectly placed together in Parmenides' Way of Seeming. The author argues that there is no evidence to suggest that the two fragments were meant to be together, and that they do not fit into the context of Parmenides' work. The author also suggests that VS 28 B 10 may not be Parmenidean at all, and discusses its possible attribution to Empedocles. The text concludes by considering the language and style of the two fragments, and their relationship to Parmenides' other works. [summary of the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1968","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/sgGCDPcG5fRkeId","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":399,"full_name":"Bicknell, Peter J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1124,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"96","issue":"4","pages":"629-631"}},"sort":["Parmenides, Fragment 10"]}
Title | Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 113 |
Pages | 1-29 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Athanasiadē, Polymnia Nik. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The theme of this paper is intolerance: its manifestation in late antiquity towards the pagans of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the immediate reactions and long-term attitudes that it provoked in them. The reasons why, in spite of copious evidence, the persecution of the traditional cults and their adepts in the Roman Empire has never been viewed as such are obvious: on the one hand, no pagan church emerged out of the turmoil to canonize its dead and expound a theology of martyrdom, and on the other, whatever their conscious religious beliefs, late antique scholars, in their overwhelming majority, were formed in societies whose ethical foundations and logic are irreversibly Christian. Admittedly, a few facets of this complex subject, such as the closing of the Athenian Academy and the demolition of temples or their conversion into churches, have occasionally been touched upon; but pagan persecution in itself, in all its physical, artistic, social, political, intellectual, and psychological dimensions, has not yet formed the object of scholarly research. To illustrate the pressures wrought by intolerance upon late antique society, I have chosen a period of one hundred years spanning the life, testimony, and initiatives of Damascius. In the 460s, Neoplatonism, as a fairly standardized expression of pagan piety, still formed—despite occasional persecution—a generally accepted way of thinking and living in the Eastern Mediterranean; moreover, as epitomized by Proclus and Athens, it was a recognizably Greek way. By 560, on the other hand, as a result of Justinian's decree prohibiting the official propagation of the doctrine in Athens, its exponents, after various vicissitudes, had ended up in a frontier town, where their philosophy had become contaminated by local forms of thought and worship and was on the way to losing its Graeco-Roman relevance. The interaction and the resulting changes in late antiquity of a sociological force—intolerance—and of a Weltanschauung—Neoplatonism—is a complex phenomenon in which causes and effects are never clearly defined. In an attempt at clarifying this development (which lies at the heart of the transformation of the ancient into the medieval world), I have in what follows set the focus of the action against two contrasting backgrounds. The first consists of a selective study of violence in Alexandria between the fourth and the sixth centuries; the second is represented by an equally impressionistic account of the evolution of Neoplatonism at Harran between the sixth and the tenth centuries and its increasing relevance to the world. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mXGv9inyCKfn393 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1002","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1002,"authors_free":[{"id":1507,"entry_id":1002,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":520,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Athanasiad\u0113, Polymnia Nik.","free_first_name":"Polymnia Nik.","free_last_name":"Athanasiad\u0113","norm_person":{"id":520,"first_name":"Polymnia Nik.","last_name":"Athanasiad\u0113","full_name":"Athanasiad\u0113, Polymnia Nik.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131721933","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius","main_title":{"title":"Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius"},"abstract":"The theme of this paper is intolerance: its manifestation in late antiquity towards the pagans of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the immediate reactions and long-term attitudes that it provoked in them. The reasons why, in spite of copious evidence, the persecution of the traditional cults and their adepts in the Roman Empire has never been viewed as such are obvious: on the one hand, no pagan church emerged out of the turmoil to canonize its dead and expound a theology of martyrdom, and on the other, whatever their conscious religious beliefs, late antique scholars, in their overwhelming majority, were formed in societies whose ethical foundations and logic are irreversibly Christian. Admittedly, a few facets of this complex subject, such as the closing of the Athenian Academy and the demolition of temples or their conversion into churches, have occasionally been touched upon; but pagan persecution in itself, in all its physical, artistic, social, political, intellectual, and psychological dimensions, has not yet formed the object of scholarly research.\r\n\r\nTo illustrate the pressures wrought by intolerance upon late antique society, I have chosen a period of one hundred years spanning the life, testimony, and initiatives of Damascius. In the 460s, Neoplatonism, as a fairly standardized expression of pagan piety, still formed\u2014despite occasional persecution\u2014a generally accepted way of thinking and living in the Eastern Mediterranean; moreover, as epitomized by Proclus and Athens, it was a recognizably Greek way. By 560, on the other hand, as a result of Justinian's decree prohibiting the official propagation of the doctrine in Athens, its exponents, after various vicissitudes, had ended up in a frontier town, where their philosophy had become contaminated by local forms of thought and worship and was on the way to losing its Graeco-Roman relevance. The interaction and the resulting changes in late antiquity of a sociological force\u2014intolerance\u2014and of a Weltanschauung\u2014Neoplatonism\u2014is a complex phenomenon in which causes and effects are never clearly defined.\r\n\r\nIn an attempt at clarifying this development (which lies at the heart of the transformation of the ancient into the medieval world), I have in what follows set the focus of the action against two contrasting backgrounds. The first consists of a selective study of violence in Alexandria between the fourth and the sixth centuries; the second is represented by an equally impressionistic account of the evolution of Neoplatonism at Harran between the sixth and the tenth centuries and its increasing relevance to the world. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mXGv9inyCKfn393","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":520,"full_name":"Athanasiad\u0113, Polymnia Nik.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1002,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"113","issue":"","pages":"1-29"}},"sort":["Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius"]}
Title | Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1977 |
Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 8 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 173–187 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sambûrsqî, Šemûʾēl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Three basic notions characterize the physical world, namely space, time and matter, the first of which is usually held by scientists to be simpler than the other two. The history of physics and philosophy has shown, however, that even the concept of space abounds with difficulties, to which the doctrines of the later Neoplatonic philosophers form an impressive witness. It is proposed to give here a brief survey of the theories of topos, meaning variously “place” or “space”, from Iamblichus at the beginning of the fourth century to Simplicius in the middle of the sixth. Although most of their treatises were clad in the modest garb of commentaries on works by Plato or Aristotle, the ideas of these thinkers undoubtedly represent one of the peaks of sophistication and metaphysical acumen in the whole history of philosophy. The deliberations and inquiries of these philosophers on the concept of topos took place against a long historical background, spanning nearly a thousand years from the Presocratics to Plotinus. A short synopsis, however condensed, of the earlier developments of the concept will serve as a useful introduction, leading up to the period in which Iamblichus and his successors started to elaborate their ideas on topos. This summary will be concerned with merely the conceptual aspects of the subject and thus will not adhere to a strict chronological order. [introduction p. 173] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FmKjWoNccS499uH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1051","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1051,"authors_free":[{"id":1596,"entry_id":1051,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":308,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","free_first_name":"\u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","free_last_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","norm_person":{"id":308,"first_name":"\u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","last_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee","full_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120109794","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism","main_title":{"title":"Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism"},"abstract":"Three basic notions characterize the physical world, namely space, time and \r\nmatter, the first of which is usually held by scientists to be simpler than the \r\nother two. The history of physics and philosophy has shown, however, that \r\neven the concept of space abounds with difficulties, to which the doctrines of \r\nthe later Neoplatonic philosophers form an impressive witness. It is proposed \r\nto give here a brief survey of the theories of topos, meaning variously \u201cplace\u201d \r\nor \u201cspace\u201d, from Iamblichus at the beginning of the fourth century to \r\nSimplicius in the middle of the sixth. Although most of their treatises were \r\nclad in the modest garb of commentaries on works by Plato or Aristotle, the \r\nideas of these thinkers undoubtedly represent one of the peaks of sophistication \r\nand metaphysical acumen in the whole history of philosophy. The deliberations and inquiries of these philosophers on the concept of \r\ntopos took place against a long historical background, spanning nearly a \r\nthousand years from the Presocratics to Plotinus. A short synopsis, however \r\ncondensed, of the earlier developments of the concept will serve as a useful \r\nintroduction, leading up to the period in which Iamblichus and his successors \r\nstarted to elaborate their ideas on topos. This summary will be concerned with \r\nmerely the conceptual aspects of the subject and thus will not adhere to a \r\nstrict chronological order. [introduction p. 173]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FmKjWoNccS499uH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":308,"full_name":"Samb\u00fbrsq\u00ee, \u0160em\u00fb\u02be\u0113l","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1051,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"8","issue":"3","pages":"173\u2013187"}},"sort":["Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism"]}
Title | Plato as "Architect of Science" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 211-244 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Zhmud, Leonid |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The figure of the cordial host of the Academy, who invited the most gifted mathematicians and cultivated pure research, whose keen intellect was able, if not to solve the particular problem, then at least to show the method for its solution: this figure is quite familiar to students of Greek science. But was the Academy as such a center of scientific research, and did Plato really set for mathematicians and astronomers the problems they should study and methods they should use? Our sources tell about Plato's friendship or at least acquaintance with many brilliant mathematicians of his day (Theodorus, Archytas, Theaetetus), but they were never his pupils; rather, vice versa—he learned much from them and actively used this knowledge in developing his philosophy. There is no reliable evidence that Eudoxus, Menaechmus, Dinostratus, Theudius, and others, whom many scholars unite into the group of so-called "Academic mathematicians," ever were his pupils or close associates. Our analysis of the relevant passages (Eratosthenes' Platonicus, Sosigenes ap. Simplicius, Proclus' Catalogue of geometers, and Philodemus' History of the Academy, etc.) shows that the very tendency of portraying Plato as the architect of science goes back to the early Academy and is born out of interpretations of his dialogues. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/eZULGOyXyPzCdqW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"837","_score":null,"_source":{"id":837,"authors_free":[{"id":1241,"entry_id":837,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":368,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Zhmud, Leonid","free_first_name":"Leonid","free_last_name":"Zhmud","norm_person":{"id":368,"first_name":"Leonid","last_name":"Zhmud","full_name":"Zhmud, Leonid","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1028558643","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Plato as \"Architect of Science\"","main_title":{"title":"Plato as \"Architect of Science\""},"abstract":"The figure of the cordial host of the Academy, who invited the most gifted mathematicians and cultivated pure research, whose keen intellect was able, if not to solve the particular problem, then at least to show the method for its solution: this figure is quite familiar to students of Greek science. But was the Academy as such a center of scientific research, and did Plato really set for mathematicians and astronomers the problems they should study and methods they should use? Our sources tell about Plato's friendship or at least acquaintance with many brilliant mathematicians of his day (Theodorus, Archytas, Theaetetus), but they were never his pupils; rather, vice versa\u2014he learned much from them and actively used this knowledge in developing his philosophy.\r\n\r\nThere is no reliable evidence that Eudoxus, Menaechmus, Dinostratus, Theudius, and others, whom many scholars unite into the group of so-called \"Academic mathematicians,\" ever were his pupils or close associates. Our analysis of the relevant passages (Eratosthenes' Platonicus, Sosigenes ap. Simplicius, Proclus' Catalogue of geometers, and Philodemus' History of the Academy, etc.) shows that the very tendency of portraying Plato as the architect of science goes back to the early Academy and is born out of interpretations of his dialogues. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/eZULGOyXyPzCdqW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":368,"full_name":"Zhmud, Leonid","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":837,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"43","issue":"3","pages":"211-244"}},"sort":["Plato as \"Architect of Science\""]}
Title | Platon et Plotin sur la doctrine des parties de l'autre |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger |
Volume | 181 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 501-512 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | O'Brien, Denis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
La matière est-elle identique à V alterile ? » Plotin se pose cette question au commencement du dernier chapitre de son traité Sur la matière (Enn., II 4 [12] 16). « Plutôt non », répond-il. « Elle est en revanche identique à cette partie de Valtérité qui s'oppose aux êtres proprement dits. » En s'exprimant de la sorte, Plotin fait allusion à un passage du Sophiste (258 E 2-3). Son allusion suppose pourtant l'existence d'un texte qui n'est pas attesté dans les manuscrits. Cette différence textuelle implique un changement fonda- mental de doctrine, dont les éditeurs modernes ne se sont pas avisés. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pBX2hcvJiK520pk |
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Title | Plotin und Simplikios über die Kategorie des Wo |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 51 |
Pages | 7-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Strobel, Benedikt |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wir haben im vorhergehenden drei semantische Interpretationen von Lokativen – als Ortsbezeichnungen, als Bezeichnungen von einem in einem anderen und als Ausdrücke von Relationen – kennengelernt, mit denen Plotin in VI 1 [42] 14 gegen die aristotelische Annahme der Kategorie des Wo (πού) argumentiert und die drei verschiedene Bestimmungen des Wo einschließen: als Ort (τόπος), als eines in einem anderen (ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ) und als Beziehung zu einem Ort (σχέσις πρὸς τόπον). Dabei hat sich unter anderem gezeigt: (i) Weder diese Interpretationen noch die auf ihnen beruhenden Argumente überzeugen völlig, und Simplikios' Verteidigung der aristotelischen Annahme der Kategorie des Wo ist weitgehend erfolgreich, weist jedoch mit der These, dass Lokative nicht-reziproke Relationen ausdrücken, eine Schwachstelle auf. (ii) Plotins drittes, auf der Interpretation von Lokativen als Ausdrücke von Relationen beruhendes Argument überzeugt zwar letztlich nicht, weist jedoch auf ein ernsthaftes Problem für Aristoteles hin. (iii) Die in der antiken Philosophie weitverbreitete Auffassung, an einem Ort zu sein bedeute, von einem Körper umfasst zu werden, gründet in einem bestimmten Verständnis von Lokativen der Form ἐν τινι (z. B. ἐν Λύκειον und ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ). Dies bestätigt die zu Beginn aufgestellte These, dass die semantische Analyse von Lokativen Konsequenzen hat für die Wahl der Antwort darauf, was es heißt, an einem Ort zu sein, und was es heißt, der Ort von etwas zu sein. [introduction p. 30-31] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/aD2ORfI4GVXZhsH |
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Title | Plural Worlds in Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1994 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 115 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 485-506 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The ancients ascribed to Anaximander a belief in plural worlds, but the state of the evidence does not make it immediately clear whether these worlds are coexistent or successive. Zeller argued that they could not be coexistent, but his view was challenged by Burnet; yet Cornford, as Kirk puts it, "demonstrated that Burnet's argument . . . rested on a false assessment of the doxographic evidence on this point, as well as on the misinterpretation of several later Presocratics." So far so good, but Kirk goes further and contends not only that coexis- tent worlds have been wrongly assigned to Anaximander, as Zeller and Cornford have shown, but that successive worlds are also a doxo- graphic error; a similar view is argued by Kahn. In this essay I propose to scrutinize our evidence on Anaximander's plural worlds and to exam- ine, systematically and exhaustively, Kirk's and Kahn's criticism of this evidence-both as against the doxographic testimony and on its own merits. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kNyOiUMQDhQWBYi |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"596","_score":null,"_source":{"id":596,"authors_free":[{"id":847,"entry_id":596,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Plural Worlds in Anaximander","main_title":{"title":"Plural Worlds in Anaximander"},"abstract":"The ancients ascribed to Anaximander a belief in plural worlds, but the state of the evidence does not make it immediately clear whether these worlds are coexistent or successive. Zeller argued that they could not be coexistent, but his view was challenged by Burnet; yet Cornford, as Kirk puts it, \"demonstrated that Burnet's argument . . . rested on a false assessment of the doxographic evidence on this point, as well as on the misinterpretation of several later Presocratics.\" So far so good, but Kirk goes further and contends not only that coexis- tent worlds have been wrongly assigned to Anaximander, as Zeller and Cornford have shown, but that successive worlds are also a doxo- graphic error; a similar view is argued by Kahn. In this essay I propose to scrutinize our evidence on Anaximander's plural worlds and to exam- ine, systematically and exhaustively, Kirk's and Kahn's criticism of this evidence-both as against the doxographic testimony and on its own merits. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1994","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kNyOiUMQDhQWBYi","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":596,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"115","issue":"4","pages":"485-506"}},"sort":["Plural Worlds in Anaximander"]}
Title | Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 279-285 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Reesor, Margaret E. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The second category, poia, is the most puzzling of the four Stoic categories. The general term poion (qualified) included the koinos poion (generically qualified) and the idios poion (individually qualified), but the relationship between these two concepts is by no means clear. It is even more difficult to see how they were connected with the idia poiotes (particular quality) and the koine poiotis (common quality). In order to explain how the four terms were related, I shall undertake in this paper as thorough an investigation as possible of a diaeresis described by Boethius in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. Boethius outlines a diaeresis of possible and necessary propositions in Stoic philosophy. He writes: "They (the Stoics) divide propositions in this way: of propositions, they say, some are possible, others impossible; of the possible, some are necessary, others non-necessary; again, of the non-necessary, some are possible and others impossible, foolishly and recklessly deciding that the possible is both a genus and a species of the non-necessary." In the chart below, I have reconstructed this diaeresis, using the definitions of the terms and the examples given by Diogenes Laertius. [introduction p. 279] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DItDwer65QVZSCC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"859","_score":null,"_source":{"id":859,"authors_free":[{"id":1263,"entry_id":859,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":302,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","free_first_name":"Margaret E.","free_last_name":"Reesor","norm_person":{"id":302,"first_name":"Margaret E.","last_name":"Reesor","full_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy"},"abstract":"The second category, poia, is the most puzzling of the four Stoic categories. The general term poion (qualified) included the koinos poion (generically qualified) and the idios poion (individually qualified), but the relationship between these two concepts is by no means clear. It is even more difficult to see how they were connected with the idia poiotes (particular quality) and the koine poiotis (common quality).\r\n\r\nIn order to explain how the four terms were related, I shall undertake in this paper as thorough an investigation as possible of a diaeresis described by Boethius in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione.\r\n\r\nBoethius outlines a diaeresis of possible and necessary propositions in Stoic philosophy. He writes: \"They (the Stoics) divide propositions in this way: of propositions, they say, some are possible, others impossible; of the possible, some are necessary, others non-necessary; again, of the non-necessary, some are possible and others impossible, foolishly and recklessly deciding that the possible is both a genus and a species of the non-necessary.\"\r\n\r\nIn the chart below, I have reconstructed this diaeresis, using the definitions of the terms and the examples given by Diogenes Laertius. [introduction p. 279]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DItDwer65QVZSCC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":302,"full_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":859,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"17","issue":"3","pages":"279-285"}},"sort":["Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy"]}
Title | Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 18 |
Pages | 123-140 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chiaradonna, Riccardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Porphyry’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theories of genus and substantial predication is based on two related assumptions: That a clear separation exists between logic and metaphysics (= doctrine of transcendent realities). That there is a close relation between logic and physics. Since Porphyry’s physics is part of his ontology, logic and ontology (i.e., the logic and the ontology of the physical world) stand in close relation with each other. Porphyry only makes very partial references to metaphysics in his logical works. What I have argued is that Porphyry’s conception of genus in the Isagoge reflects the Platonic theory of the hierarchy of beings, since Porphyry presents his genus as an aph’ henos hierarchical relation. This, on the other hand, does not imply that Porphyry’s treatment of genus in the Isagoge refers to transcendent ante rem principles. Porphyry carefully introduces a doctrine in the Isagoge, the complete significance of which emerges in a different context: the ‘Porphyrean tree’ is thus a mere analogon of the Platonic hierarchy of beings. The presence of physical doctrines is far more essential to Porphyry’s views of universals and predication. Physical entities such as bodiless immanent forms provide real correlates for Porphyry’s universal predicates: Aristotle’s substantial predication ‘mirrors’ the relation between a particular and its immanent form. Physical forms are not outside the scope of logic; rather, they provide the ‘real’ foundation for Porphyry’s views on predication. Such a foundation is presented in an introductory way in Porphyry’s logical writings and is only made explicit in his more ‘systematic’ works. Iamblichus’ attitude is different in that his Platonizing of Aristotle’s logic is more direct and pervasive. Consequently, Iamblichus offers a Platonizing reading of the Aristotelian theory of substantial predication, which refers to ante rem genera and to the metaphysical relation of participation. Iamblichus is well aware that an ante rem form cannot be a universal synonymous predicate of its particular instantiations, and he conceives of substantial predication as a paronymous relation. Neither Porphyry nor Iamblichus believe that an ante rem form can be predicated synonymously of corporeal individuals. [conclusion p. 17-18] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/sra714DdTLHJIcS |
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Title | Porphyry's Isagoge and Early Greek Neoplatonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2018 |
Journal | Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medieval |
Volume | 43 |
Pages | 13-39 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chiaradonna, Riccardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper focuses on Porphyry’s Isagoge against the wider background of debates about genera and the hierarchy of being in early Neoplatonism from Plotinus to Iamblichus. Three works are considered: Porphyry’s Isagoge, Plotinus tripartite treatise On The Genera of Being (VI, 1-3 [42-44]), Iamblichus’ Reply to Porphyry (the so-called De Mysteriis). In addition to this, the discussion focuses on some passages on genus and predication from Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ lost commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories preserved in Simplicius. In his account of genus, Porphyry draws on Aristotle and apparently claims that an amended version of the genus/species relation is able to express the hierarchy of different levels of being. This view is different from that of Plotinus, who instead argues that intelligible and sensible beings are homonymous, as well as from that of Iamblichus, who rejects the existence of a common genus above intelligible and sensible beings, while emphasising the analogy subsisting between different levels in the hierarchy. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/duFoYG09YhVIWUx |
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Title | Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2006 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 51 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 140-161 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | McGinnis, Jon |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controversy among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel intro- duction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EODvwNwP7DcvnBH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"729","_score":null,"_source":{"id":729,"authors_free":[{"id":1092,"entry_id":729,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":252,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McGinnis, Jon","free_first_name":"Jon","free_last_name":"McGinnis","norm_person":{"id":252,"first_name":"Jon","last_name":"McGinnis","full_name":"McGinnis, Jon","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/141369248","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian","main_title":{"title":"Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian"},"abstract":"Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controversy among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel intro- duction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EODvwNwP7DcvnBH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":252,"full_name":"McGinnis, Jon","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":729,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"51","issue":"2","pages":"140-161"}},"sort":["Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian"]}
Title | Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the "de Anima" in the Tradition of Iamblichus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 58 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 510-530 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Perkams, Matthias |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It has been argued that Priscian of Lydia (around 530), to whom the manuscripts ascribe only two short treatises, is the author of an extended com- mentary on the De anima, which is transmitted under the name of Simplicius. Our analysis confirms this: Priscian's Metaphrase of Theophrastus' Physics is the text which the commentator mentions as his own work. Consequently, its author, Priscian, also wrote the De anima commentary. The parallels between both texts show that the commentator sometimes does not quote Iamblichus directly, but borrowed Iamblichean formulations from the Metaphrase. As for the dating of his works, a comparison with Damascius' writings makes it probable that his On principks is a terminus post quem for the De anima commentary and a terminus ante quern for the Metaphrase. It is likely that both works were composed before 529. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BTWKXjso1hvwiLb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1086","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1086,"authors_free":[{"id":1642,"entry_id":1086,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":283,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Perkams, Matthias","free_first_name":"Matthias","free_last_name":"Perkams","norm_person":{"id":283,"first_name":"Matthias","last_name":"Perkams","full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123439760","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the \"de Anima\" in the Tradition of Iamblichus","main_title":{"title":"Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the \"de Anima\" in the Tradition of Iamblichus"},"abstract":"It has been argued that Priscian of Lydia (around 530), to whom the manuscripts ascribe only two short treatises, is the author of an extended com- \r\nmentary on the De anima, which is transmitted under the name of Simplicius. Our analysis confirms this: Priscian's Metaphrase of Theophrastus' Physics is the text which the commentator mentions as his own work. Consequently, its author, Priscian, also wrote the De anima commentary. The parallels between both texts show that the commentator sometimes does not quote Iamblichus directly, but borrowed Iamblichean formulations from the Metaphrase. As for the dating of his works, a comparison with Damascius' writings makes it probable that his On principks is a terminus post quem for the De anima commentary and a terminus ante quern for the Metaphrase. It is likely that both works were composed before 529. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/BTWKXjso1hvwiLb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":283,"full_name":"Perkams, Matthias","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1086,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"58","issue":"4","pages":"510-530"}},"sort":["Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the \"de Anima\" in the Tradition of Iamblichus"]}
Title | Priscianus Lydus en de "In De Anima" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 34 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 761-822 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bossier, Fernand , Steel, Carlos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dans cet article, nous avons essayé d'examiner la valeur de l'attribution traditionnelle du commentaire In De Anima à Simplicius. En comparant ce traité aux grands commentaires de Simplicius (sur les Catégories, la Physique et le De Caelo d'Aristote), nous avons en effet été frappés par les divergences de style et de langue, ainsi que par la différente manière de commenter. Dans la première partie, nous démontrons que l'auteur de In D.A. a également écrit la Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, qui nous a été transmise sous le nom de Priscien le Lydien. 1° Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie à une de ses œuvres, qu'il appelle Epitomé de la Physique de Théophraste. En réalité, cette référence se rapporte à un passage de la Metaphrase de Priscien, où la même problématique est exposée dans des termes identiques. 2° Une comparaison détaillée portant sur l'ensemble des deux œuvres nous révèle une telle ressemblance de style et de pensée – il y a même des phrases à peu près identiques – qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer que par l'hypothèse de l'identité de l'auteur. Dans la deuxième partie, nous essayons d'identifier l'auteur de ces deux œuvres qui, pourtant, nous ont été transmises sous deux noms différents. L'étude de la tradition directe et indirecte n'apporte guère de solution, puisque l'attribution des deux textes, l'un à Simplicius, l'autre à Priscien, y paraît très solide. Ce n'est donc que par une critique interne de In D.A., notamment par la confrontation avec les commentaires de Simplicius, dont l'attribution est certaine, que la question pourra être tranchée. 1° Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie trois fois à son commentaire sur la Physique. Pourtant, il est bien difficile de retrouver dans le grand commentaire de Simplicius trois passages dont le contenu et surtout le vocabulaire prouvent que l'auteur s'y réfère. 2° Dans In D.A., on ne retrouve pas les traits caractéristiques de la méthode de commentaire de Simplicius, ni l'approche du texte par la documentation historique, ni les longues discussions avec les exégètes antérieurs, ni l'exposé prolixe et bien structuré. D'autre part, aucun des commentaires de Simplicius ne témoigne de la phraséologie tortueuse de notre œuvre, ni de ses formules stéréotypées. 3° La différence doctrinale est encore plus importante. Nulle part chez Simplicius n'apparaît la théorie de l'âme comme epistêmê, qui est si fondamentale dans In D.A. (epistêmê y est un concept-clé). Les rares digressions de In D.A. à propos de questions physiques et logiques ne correspondent pas aux exposés de Simplicius sur les mêmes problèmes. Ainsi, nous avons confronté la doctrine de la physis, de l'âme et de son automotion, et enfin le rapport entre le genre et les différences constitutives et diérétiques. De tout cela se dégage une telle divergence entre In D.A. et les autres commentaires qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer par une évolution chez Simplicius lui-même. In D.A. lui est donc faussement attribué ; et puisque nous avons établi que ce commentaire est du même auteur que la Metaphrase, nous pouvons conclure qu'il a été vraisemblablement écrit par Priscien le Lydien, un philosophe néoplatonicien dont nous savons seulement qu'il a accompagné Damascius et Simplicius en exil en exil en Perse. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/r917awdAL4tkrdc |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1077","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1077,"authors_free":[{"id":1632,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":12,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bossier, Fernand","free_first_name":"Fernand","free_last_name":"Bossier","norm_person":{"id":12,"first_name":"Fernand ","last_name":"Bossier","full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1017981663","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1633,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius"},"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous avons essay\u00e9 d'examiner la valeur de l'attribution traditionnelle du commentaire In De Anima \u00e0 Simplicius. En comparant ce trait\u00e9 aux grands commentaires de Simplicius (sur les Cat\u00e9gories, la Physique et le De Caelo d'Aristote), nous avons en effet \u00e9t\u00e9 frapp\u00e9s par les divergences de style et de langue, ainsi que par la diff\u00e9rente mani\u00e8re de commenter.\r\n\r\nDans la premi\u00e8re partie, nous d\u00e9montrons que l'auteur de In D.A. a \u00e9galement \u00e9crit la Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, qui nous a \u00e9t\u00e9 transmise sous le nom de Priscien le Lydien.\r\n1\u00b0 Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie \u00e0 une de ses \u0153uvres, qu'il appelle Epitom\u00e9 de la Physique de Th\u00e9ophraste. En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, cette r\u00e9f\u00e9rence se rapporte \u00e0 un passage de la Metaphrase de Priscien, o\u00f9 la m\u00eame probl\u00e9matique est expos\u00e9e dans des termes identiques.\r\n2\u00b0 Une comparaison d\u00e9taill\u00e9e portant sur l'ensemble des deux \u0153uvres nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le une telle ressemblance de style et de pens\u00e9e \u2013 il y a m\u00eame des phrases \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s identiques \u2013 qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer que par l'hypoth\u00e8se de l'identit\u00e9 de l'auteur.\r\n\r\nDans la deuxi\u00e8me partie, nous essayons d'identifier l'auteur de ces deux \u0153uvres qui, pourtant, nous ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transmises sous deux noms diff\u00e9rents. L'\u00e9tude de la tradition directe et indirecte n'apporte gu\u00e8re de solution, puisque l'attribution des deux textes, l'un \u00e0 Simplicius, l'autre \u00e0 Priscien, y para\u00eet tr\u00e8s solide. Ce n'est donc que par une critique interne de In D.A., notamment par la confrontation avec les commentaires de Simplicius, dont l'attribution est certaine, que la question pourra \u00eatre tranch\u00e9e.\r\n1\u00b0 Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie trois fois \u00e0 son commentaire sur la Physique. Pourtant, il est bien difficile de retrouver dans le grand commentaire de Simplicius trois passages dont le contenu et surtout le vocabulaire prouvent que l'auteur s'y r\u00e9f\u00e8re.\r\n2\u00b0 Dans In D.A., on ne retrouve pas les traits caract\u00e9ristiques de la m\u00e9thode de commentaire de Simplicius, ni l'approche du texte par la documentation historique, ni les longues discussions avec les ex\u00e9g\u00e8tes ant\u00e9rieurs, ni l'expos\u00e9 prolixe et bien structur\u00e9. D'autre part, aucun des commentaires de Simplicius ne t\u00e9moigne de la phras\u00e9ologie tortueuse de notre \u0153uvre, ni de ses formules st\u00e9r\u00e9otyp\u00e9es.\r\n3\u00b0 La diff\u00e9rence doctrinale est encore plus importante. Nulle part chez Simplicius n'appara\u00eet la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e2me comme epist\u00eam\u00ea, qui est si fondamentale dans In D.A. (epist\u00eam\u00ea y est un concept-cl\u00e9). Les rares digressions de In D.A. \u00e0 propos de questions physiques et logiques ne correspondent pas aux expos\u00e9s de Simplicius sur les m\u00eames probl\u00e8mes.\r\n\r\nAinsi, nous avons confront\u00e9 la doctrine de la physis, de l'\u00e2me et de son automotion, et enfin le rapport entre le genre et les diff\u00e9rences constitutives et di\u00e9r\u00e9tiques. De tout cela se d\u00e9gage une telle divergence entre In D.A. et les autres commentaires qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer par une \u00e9volution chez Simplicius lui-m\u00eame. In D.A. lui est donc faussement attribu\u00e9 ; et puisque nous avons \u00e9tabli que ce commentaire est du m\u00eame auteur que la Metaphrase, nous pouvons conclure qu'il a \u00e9t\u00e9 vraisemblablement \u00e9crit par Priscien le Lydien, un philosophe n\u00e9oplatonicien dont nous savons seulement qu'il a accompagn\u00e9 Damascius et Simplicius en exil en exil en Perse. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/r917awdAL4tkrdc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":12,"full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1077,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"34","issue":"4","pages":"761-822"}},"sort":["Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius"]}
Title | Proclus on Corporeal Space |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1994 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 76 |
Pages | 151 –167 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schrenk, Lawrence P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In his survey of ancient theories of space1 the Aristotelian commen- tator Simplicius considers the rather peculiar account offered by the Neoplatonic philosopher, Proclus.2 This philosopher's analysis of space3 is unique in that it contains the unusual claim that space is corporeal.4 In this paper, I shall explore this claim and argue that it is by no means as absurd as might at first appear. It results from a rea- soned attempt to develop a theory of space which meets the needs of Proclus' ontology of emanation. We shall begin by seeking a precise understanding of the assertion that space is a body (through an analysis of two detailed proofs Proclus offers in its support5) and then investi- gate the philosophical motives compelling him to make the claim by inquiring about the function of space in his comprehensive ontology. [Introduction, p. 151-152] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/es6VRskBGAHA2p5 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1033","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1033,"authors_free":[{"id":1564,"entry_id":1033,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":287,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schrenk, Lawrence P.","free_first_name":"Lawrence P.","free_last_name":"Schrenk","norm_person":{"id":287,"first_name":"Lawrence P.","last_name":"Schrenk","full_name":"Schrenk, Lawrence P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/114719551X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Proclus on Corporeal Space","main_title":{"title":"Proclus on Corporeal Space"},"abstract":"In his survey of ancient theories of space1 the Aristotelian commen-\r\ntator Simplicius considers the rather peculiar account offered by the\r\nNeoplatonic philosopher, Proclus.2 This philosopher's analysis of\r\nspace3 is unique in that it contains the unusual claim that space is corporeal.4 In this paper, I shall explore this claim and argue that it is\r\nby no means as absurd as might at first appear. It results from a rea-\r\nsoned attempt to develop a theory of space which meets the needs of\r\nProclus' ontology of emanation. We shall begin by seeking a precise\r\nunderstanding of the assertion that space is a body (through an analysis\r\nof two detailed proofs Proclus offers in its support5) and then investi-\r\ngate the philosophical motives compelling him to make the claim by\r\ninquiring about the function of space in his comprehensive ontology. [Introduction, p. 151-152]","btype":3,"date":"1994","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/es6VRskBGAHA2p5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":287,"full_name":"Schrenk, Lawrence P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1033,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"76","issue":"","pages":"151 \u2013167"}},"sort":["Proclus on Corporeal Space"]}
Title | Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter ("De mal. subs." 30-7) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 154-188 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Opsomer, Jan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In De malorum subsistentia chapters 30–37, Proclus criticizes the view that evil is to be identified with matter. His main target is Plotinus' account in Enn. 1.8 [51]. Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul, and that it is evil or a principle of evil. According to Proclus, matter is good because it is produced by the One. Plotinus' doctrine of matter as evil is the result of a different conception of emanation, according to which matter does not revert to its principle. Proclus claims that positing a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dualism or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus does not seem to escape the latter consequence if he is to remain committed to the Neoplatonic conception of causation. Plotinus equated matter with privation and said it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance, thus violating fundamental Aristotelian principles. Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy, as does Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories. It is possible that Iamblichus was the source of both Proclus and Simplicius, and that he was the originator of the parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Hey5Ym2eaERyB7G |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"864","_score":null,"_source":{"id":864,"authors_free":[{"id":1268,"entry_id":864,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":211,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Opsomer, Jan","free_first_name":"Jan","free_last_name":"Opsomer","norm_person":{"id":211,"first_name":"Jan","last_name":"Opsomer","full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1120966310","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (\"De mal. subs.\" 30-7)","main_title":{"title":"Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (\"De mal. subs.\" 30-7)"},"abstract":"In De malorum subsistentia chapters 30\u201337, Proclus criticizes the view that evil is to be identified with matter. His main target is Plotinus' account in Enn. 1.8 [51]. Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul, and that it is evil or a principle of evil. According to Proclus, matter is good because it is produced by the One.\r\n\r\nPlotinus' doctrine of matter as evil is the result of a different conception of emanation, according to which matter does not revert to its principle. Proclus claims that positing a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dualism or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus does not seem to escape the latter consequence if he is to remain committed to the Neoplatonic conception of causation.\r\n\r\nPlotinus equated matter with privation and said it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance, thus violating fundamental Aristotelian principles. Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy, as does Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories. It is possible that Iamblichus was the source of both Proclus and Simplicius, and that he was the originator of the parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Hey5Ym2eaERyB7G","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":211,"full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":864,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"46","issue":"2","pages":"154-188"}},"sort":["Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (\"De mal. subs.\" 30-7)"]}
Title | Pseudo-Simplicius (Review on Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13.) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 64 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 436-437 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Van Dusen, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Inferno IV, when Dante catches sight of him in a mild foyer to the spiraling pit of hell, Averroes is simply described as “he who made the great Comment.” But in Convivio IV, the only other place where Dante references him, Averroes is specifically “the Commentator on Aristotle’s De Anima III.” Dante wrote this in the first decade of the fourteenth century, when Averroes was still, in effect, the commentator on De Anima 3. But by the last decades of the fifteenth century, a Simplicius commentary on the De Anima was being circulated in Italy by émigrés from Constantinople. This commentary rapidly exerted an influence on figures like Pico della Mirandola and Agostino Nifo. It saw its first Greek edition in Venice in 1527, with a complete Latin translation appearing in 1543, also in Venice. As its first translator pointed out in his prefatory letter, Averroes now had a contender in this De Anima commentary. The title of a 1553 Latin translation left no doubt: Commentaria Simplicii Profundissimi & Acutissimi Philosophi in Tres Libros De Anima Aristotelis. By the end of the sixteenth century, this commentary had inspired a vocal coterie in Italy—the so-called sectatores Simplicii. Despite the fervor of these sectatores Simplicii, there is now a stable consensus that their De Anima commentary is pseudo-Simplician. S. has long been convinced that the work should be attributed to Priscian of Lydia; in this, he is preceded by Francesco Piccolomini, a sixteenth-century opponent of the simpliciani, who also put Priscian forward as the commentator. I. Hadot fiercely criticized this re-attribution in a 2002 article in Mnemosyne, “Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima”, and S. refers to the dispute in his introduction. He is sanguine: “As no other scholar apparently shares Hadot’s view, there is no need for further polemics” (p. 32 n. 6). Regardless of attribution, it is agreed that this De Anima commentary originated in Simplicius’ circles, that it represents “an original and personal engagement with Aristotle’s text” (p. 4), and that the commentator “uses various philological strategies to make sense of an obscure text” (p. 7). On this last point, S. is effusive: “Modern commentators could learn with profit from his attempts ‘to set right’ a difficult text ...without intervening with conjectures” (p. 7). The manuscript basis of S.’s translation is broader than that of M. Hayduck’s semi-critical Greek edition (1882), which has been faulted for collating only a single fourteenth-century manuscript (Laurentianus 85.21) and a single sixteenth-century edition of the commentary (Aldina). In preparing his translation, S. consulted another fourteenth-century manuscript (which shows emendations and annotations by Cardinal Bessarion) and a mid-fifteenth-century manuscript. Nevertheless, he is generous: “Hayduck was basically right: it is indeed possible to constitute a critical text with the Laurentianus and the Aldina” (p. 149). A concise list of S.’s proposed corrections to the Greek and reconstructions of outstanding lacunae is included at the back of the volume. S.’s is the final volume of the first-ever English translation of this De Anima commentary and gives us ps.-Simplicius on De Anima 3.6–13. The translation is nuanced and reliable, though at places the syntax could be smoothed out (“That also oysters have maturity and decline, all agree ...”, p. 101). The volume’s apparatus, credited to Arnis Ritups, is ample. And while ps.-Simplicius has never had English-speaking sectaries, his De Anima commentary was cited once by Bishop Berkeley and repeatedly by Lord Monboddo in the eighteenth century, while Thomas Taylor incorporated excerpts into the notes to his 1808 English translation of De Anima. In short, ps.-Simplicius’ Greek commentary has a place in the modern British reception of De Anima. The present translation should similarly inform contemporary work on De Anima and the Neoplatonists’ appropriation and transmission of Aristotle. Ps.-Simplicius’ text is, of course, too dense to reprise here, but there is much of interest in his negotiation of time-statements in the last pages of De Anima, since it is in these pages—not the last paragraphs of Physics 4—that Aristotle investigates the problematic link of “time” to the “soul.” (And when Plotinus takes up the question of time in Enneads 3.7, he—like contemporary philosophers—turns to Physics 4, not De Anima 3.) Those interested in Neoplatonic conceptions of time—and, more generally, in the concept of time in Late Antiquity—would do well to consult this commentary and the other surviving Greek commentaries on De Anima 3. There is a single, colorful passage that indicates how ps.-Simplicius’ commentary on the soul also opens onto the terrain of the body—sexuality, and so on—in Late Antiquity. In De Anima 3.9, Aristotle writes that “the heart” is moved when we think of menacing things, whereas “if the object is pleasant, some other part” is moved. It is a pleasure, then, to see ps.-Simplicius’ gloss: “The heart, for instance, may be set in movement among fearful things, and the generative organs (γεννητικὰ μόρια) upon the thought of sexual pleasure (ἀφροδισιαστικῶν ἡδονῶν)” (p. 102). This is doubtless the sense of Aristotle’s euphemistic text, and ps.-Simplicius sees the deeper import of sexual excitation with perfect clarity: “The intellect is not wholly master (οὐ τὸ ὅλον κύριος) of the movement of the living being” (p. 102). How far removed are we here from Augustine’s discussion of post-paradisiacal arousal in City of God against the Pagans? Or from Proclus’ refusal of a disciple who was “pursuing philosophy, but at the same time devoting his life to the pleasures below the belly (τὰς ὑπογαστρίους ἡδονάς),” as Damascius reports? The early modern sectatores Simplicii likely misattributed their De Anima commentary, but in this, they were correct: Averroes is not “the Commentator on Aristotle’s De Anima III.” Ps.-Simplicius’ reading of the book is still challenging and, at places, suddenly illuminating. And it is no small thing for us to now have access—in conscientious English and in full—to this methodical, lexically sensitive commentary on the soul from the immediate circle of the last representatives of a “Platonic succession” in Athens. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PvqFfr47EAUaMIW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1294","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1294,"authors_free":[{"id":1884,"entry_id":1294,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":74,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Van Dusen, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Van Dusen","norm_person":{"id":74,"first_name":"David ","last_name":"Van Dusen","full_name":"Van Dusen, David ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1066385637","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Pseudo-Simplicius (Review on Simplicius\u2019: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6\u201313.)","main_title":{"title":"Pseudo-Simplicius (Review on Simplicius\u2019: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6\u201313.)"},"abstract":"In Inferno IV, when Dante catches sight of him in a mild foyer to the spiraling pit of hell, Averroes is simply described as \u201che who made the great Comment.\u201d But in Convivio IV, the only other place where Dante references him, Averroes is specifically \u201cthe Commentator on Aristotle\u2019s De Anima III.\u201d Dante wrote this in the first decade of the fourteenth century, when Averroes was still, in effect, the commentator on De Anima 3. But by the last decades of the fifteenth century, a Simplicius commentary on the De Anima was being circulated in Italy by \u00e9migr\u00e9s from Constantinople. This commentary rapidly exerted an influence on figures like Pico della Mirandola and Agostino Nifo. It saw its first Greek edition in Venice in 1527, with a complete Latin translation appearing in 1543, also in Venice. As its first translator pointed out in his prefatory letter, Averroes now had a contender in this De Anima commentary. The title of a 1553 Latin translation left no doubt: Commentaria Simplicii Profundissimi & Acutissimi Philosophi in Tres Libros De Anima Aristotelis. By the end of the sixteenth century, this commentary had inspired a vocal coterie in Italy\u2014the so-called sectatores Simplicii.\r\n\r\nDespite the fervor of these sectatores Simplicii, there is now a stable consensus that their De Anima commentary is pseudo-Simplician. S. has long been convinced that the work should be attributed to Priscian of Lydia; in this, he is preceded by Francesco Piccolomini, a sixteenth-century opponent of the simpliciani, who also put Priscian forward as the commentator. I. Hadot fiercely criticized this re-attribution in a 2002 article in Mnemosyne, \u201cSimplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Anima\u201d, and S. refers to the dispute in his introduction. He is sanguine: \u201cAs no other scholar apparently shares Hadot\u2019s view, there is no need for further polemics\u201d (p. 32 n. 6). Regardless of attribution, it is agreed that this De Anima commentary originated in Simplicius\u2019 circles, that it represents \u201can original and personal engagement with Aristotle\u2019s text\u201d (p. 4), and that the commentator \u201cuses various philological strategies to make sense of an obscure text\u201d (p. 7). On this last point, S. is effusive: \u201cModern commentators could learn with profit from his attempts \u2018to set right\u2019 a difficult text ...without intervening with conjectures\u201d (p. 7).\r\n\r\nThe manuscript basis of S.\u2019s translation is broader than that of M. Hayduck\u2019s semi-critical Greek edition (1882), which has been faulted for collating only a single fourteenth-century manuscript (Laurentianus 85.21) and a single sixteenth-century edition of the commentary (Aldina). In preparing his translation, S. consulted another fourteenth-century manuscript (which shows emendations and annotations by Cardinal Bessarion) and a mid-fifteenth-century manuscript. Nevertheless, he is generous: \u201cHayduck was basically right: it is indeed possible to constitute a critical text with the Laurentianus and the Aldina\u201d (p. 149). A concise list of S.\u2019s proposed corrections to the Greek and reconstructions of outstanding lacunae is included at the back of the volume.\r\n\r\nS.\u2019s is the final volume of the first-ever English translation of this De Anima commentary and gives us ps.-Simplicius on De Anima 3.6\u201313. The translation is nuanced and reliable, though at places the syntax could be smoothed out (\u201cThat also oysters have maturity and decline, all agree ...\u201d, p. 101). The volume\u2019s apparatus, credited to Arnis Ritups, is ample. And while ps.-Simplicius has never had English-speaking sectaries, his De Anima commentary was cited once by Bishop Berkeley and repeatedly by Lord Monboddo in the eighteenth century, while Thomas Taylor incorporated excerpts into the notes to his 1808 English translation of De Anima. In short, ps.-Simplicius\u2019 Greek commentary has a place in the modern British reception of De Anima. The present translation should similarly inform contemporary work on De Anima and the Neoplatonists\u2019 appropriation and transmission of Aristotle.\r\n\r\nPs.-Simplicius\u2019 text is, of course, too dense to reprise here, but there is much of interest in his negotiation of time-statements in the last pages of De Anima, since it is in these pages\u2014not the last paragraphs of Physics 4\u2014that Aristotle investigates the problematic link of \u201ctime\u201d to the \u201csoul.\u201d (And when Plotinus takes up the question of time in Enneads 3.7, he\u2014like contemporary philosophers\u2014turns to Physics 4, not De Anima 3.) Those interested in Neoplatonic conceptions of time\u2014and, more generally, in the concept of time in Late Antiquity\u2014would do well to consult this commentary and the other surviving Greek commentaries on De Anima 3.\r\n\r\nThere is a single, colorful passage that indicates how ps.-Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the soul also opens onto the terrain of the body\u2014sexuality, and so on\u2014in Late Antiquity. In De Anima 3.9, Aristotle writes that \u201cthe heart\u201d is moved when we think of menacing things, whereas \u201cif the object is pleasant, some other part\u201d is moved. It is a pleasure, then, to see ps.-Simplicius\u2019 gloss: \u201cThe heart, for instance, may be set in movement among fearful things, and the generative organs (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1) upon the thought of sexual pleasure (\u1f00\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd)\u201d (p. 102). This is doubtless the sense of Aristotle\u2019s euphemistic text, and ps.-Simplicius sees the deeper import of sexual excitation with perfect clarity: \u201cThe intellect is not wholly master (\u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2) of the movement of the living being\u201d (p. 102). How far removed are we here from Augustine\u2019s discussion of post-paradisiacal arousal in City of God against the Pagans? Or from Proclus\u2019 refusal of a disciple who was \u201cpursuing philosophy, but at the same time devoting his life to the pleasures below the belly (\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2),\u201d as Damascius reports?\r\n\r\nThe early modern sectatores Simplicii likely misattributed their De Anima commentary, but in this, they were correct: Averroes is not \u201cthe Commentator on Aristotle\u2019s De Anima III.\u201d Ps.-Simplicius\u2019 reading of the book is still challenging and, at places, suddenly illuminating. And it is no small thing for us to now have access\u2014in conscientious English and in full\u2014to this methodical, lexically sensitive commentary on the soul from the immediate circle of the last representatives of a \u201cPlatonic succession\u201d in Athens. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PvqFfr47EAUaMIW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":74,"full_name":"Van Dusen, David ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1294,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"64","issue":"2","pages":"436-437"}},"sort":["Pseudo-Simplicius (Review on Simplicius\u2019: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6\u201313.)"]}
Title | Quelques exemples de scholies dans la tradition arabe des "Éléments" d'Euclide |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Revue d'histoire des sciences |
Volume | 56 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 293-321 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Djebbar, Ahmed |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
After describing two important sources of scholia, the manuscripts Teherán Malik 3586 and Leiden Or. 399/1, this article analyzes the different kinds of scholia found in these texts as well as in other mathematical writings of the Arab tradition of Euclid's Elements. The second part of the article provides a modern edition and French translation of some of these previously unpublished scholia. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Gv7BthgX2p0VabW |
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Title | Quotation in Greco-Roman contexts |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1995 |
Journal | Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident |
Volume | 17 |
Pages | 141-153 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Lloyd, Geoffrey |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The papers in this collection raise a variety of important issues and illustrate the complexity of the phenomena that "quotation" may cover. But for anyone attempting to bring to bear some of the ancient Greek and Latin data on this topic, one immediate problem must be confronted at the outset, namely the difference that different degrees of orality and literacy may make. The idea that there is a polar opposition between oral and literate societies (as a whole) has long ago been exploded (Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge 1977). Rather, there is a wide spectrum of degrees of orality and literacy. But in the comparative absence of writing and of written texts, what passes as a quotation, and the manner in which quotations are used, may well differ very markedly from the norms and uses practiced within communities of listeners and readers who are in a position to refer to written records. The myth of the Bagre, as Goody explained, is represented by the LoDagaa themselves as invariant: it is always, they insist, the same. Yet actual performances vary widely, as Goody's own transcriptions, carried out over a period of several decades and using different methods, prove conclusively. The most recent versions of the myth have been known to incorporate references to Goody and his tape recorder themselves. The development of literacy in ancient Greece is as controversial as the question of the role of oral performance in or behind the creation of the Homeric epics. The work of Milman Parry and A. B. Lord, comparing Greek and oral Balkan epic, accepted as orthodoxy in the 1960s, is nowadays problematized as often as it is cited as authoritative. For every Greek scholar who accepts that Homeric formulae have a mnemonic function in oral performance, there is another who insists not just on the literary, but the literate, craftsmanship of the Homeric use of repetition. Again, just how literate were those who lived at Athens in the 5th or 4th centuries BCE—the male citizens, their wives, let alone their slaves? Learning to read and write was represented, often with some pride, it seems, as part of the traditional education of well-born children, but how fluent in those two skills they were expected to become, or normally became, is another matter. The institution of ostracism seemingly implies the assumption that all citizens could write the name of the person they wanted to send into exile. But not everyone "wrote" their own ostrakon, as we can tell from the archaeological record, for some were evidently "mass-produced" for others' use. Yet while these and other issues are no closer to resolution now than they were when the literacy debate began in earnest, one feature of classical Greek culture that is generally agreed upon, and that is important for our purposes, is that, even when written texts were available for consultation, the usual mode of communication was oral. In Plato's Parmenides 127c-e, when Socrates meets Parmenides and Zeno on a visit to Athens and hears that Zeno has brought his book with him, Socrates asks him not to lend him the text but to read it out. The relevance of this to quotation is twofold. First, the criteria of accuracy in quotation are affected, and secondly, following on from that, we have to question whether what may look like a report of what someone "says" is indeed that, or merely, at most, an attribution of an idea or an opinion. Thus, when we find Plato "misquoting" Homer, there may be no fewer than four (by no means all mutually exclusive) reasons for this, over and above the possibility that our text of Plato is "corrupt": (1) Plato has misremembered: he is quoting from memory, but that is at fault. (2) He is deliberately misquoting and expects his readers/listeners to spot this immediately and to catch his drift—to understand the game that he, Plato, is playing with Homer. (3) He is deliberately misquoting but does not expect that to be picked up: he does not expect to be "caught out." I shall return to this third possibility later with the example of Galen. (4) He has a different text of Homer from ours. [introduction p. 141-142] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nlUVMDS4ArBBIez |
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But for anyone attempting to bring to bear some of the ancient Greek and Latin data on this topic, one immediate problem must be confronted at the outset, namely the difference that different degrees of orality and literacy may make.\r\n\r\nThe idea that there is a polar opposition between oral and literate societies (as a whole) has long ago been exploded (Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge 1977). Rather, there is a wide spectrum of degrees of orality and literacy. But in the comparative absence of writing and of written texts, what passes as a quotation, and the manner in which quotations are used, may well differ very markedly from the norms and uses practiced within communities of listeners and readers who are in a position to refer to written records. The myth of the Bagre, as Goody explained, is represented by the LoDagaa themselves as invariant: it is always, they insist, the same. Yet actual performances vary widely, as Goody's own transcriptions, carried out over a period of several decades and using different methods, prove conclusively. The most recent versions of the myth have been known to incorporate references to Goody and his tape recorder themselves.\r\n\r\nThe development of literacy in ancient Greece is as controversial as the question of the role of oral performance in or behind the creation of the Homeric epics. The work of Milman Parry and A. B. Lord, comparing Greek and oral Balkan epic, accepted as orthodoxy in the 1960s, is nowadays problematized as often as it is cited as authoritative. For every Greek scholar who accepts that Homeric formulae have a mnemonic function in oral performance, there is another who insists not just on the literary, but the literate, craftsmanship of the Homeric use of repetition.\r\n\r\nAgain, just how literate were those who lived at Athens in the 5th or 4th centuries BCE\u2014the male citizens, their wives, let alone their slaves? Learning to read and write was represented, often with some pride, it seems, as part of the traditional education of well-born children, but how fluent in those two skills they were expected to become, or normally became, is another matter. The institution of ostracism seemingly implies the assumption that all citizens could write the name of the person they wanted to send into exile. But not everyone \"wrote\" their own ostrakon, as we can tell from the archaeological record, for some were evidently \"mass-produced\" for others' use.\r\n\r\nYet while these and other issues are no closer to resolution now than they were when the literacy debate began in earnest, one feature of classical Greek culture that is generally agreed upon, and that is important for our purposes, is that, even when written texts were available for consultation, the usual mode of communication was oral. In Plato's Parmenides 127c-e, when Socrates meets Parmenides and Zeno on a visit to Athens and hears that Zeno has brought his book with him, Socrates asks him not to lend him the text but to read it out.\r\n\r\nThe relevance of this to quotation is twofold. First, the criteria of accuracy in quotation are affected, and secondly, following on from that, we have to question whether what may look like a report of what someone \"says\" is indeed that, or merely, at most, an attribution of an idea or an opinion.\r\n\r\nThus, when we find Plato \"misquoting\" Homer, there may be no fewer than four (by no means all mutually exclusive) reasons for this, over and above the possibility that our text of Plato is \"corrupt\":\r\n(1) Plato has misremembered: he is quoting from memory, but that is at fault.\r\n(2) He is deliberately misquoting and expects his readers\/listeners to spot this immediately and to catch his drift\u2014to understand the game that he, Plato, is playing with Homer.\r\n(3) He is deliberately misquoting but does not expect that to be picked up: he does not expect to be \"caught out.\" I shall return to this third possibility later with the example of Galen.\r\n(4) He has a different text of Homer from ours. [introduction p. 141-142]","btype":3,"date":"1995","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nlUVMDS4ArBBIez","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":234,"full_name":"Lloyd, Geoffrey","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1369,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Extr\u00eame-Orient Extr\u00eame-Occident","volume":"17","issue":"","pages":"141-153"}},"sort":["Quotation in Greco-Roman contexts"]}
Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 50 |
Pages | 237-288 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason. Ps.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will. On this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons. This account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions? You are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent. [conclusion p. 286] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason.\r\n\r\nPs.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will.\r\n\r\nOn this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons.\r\n\r\nThis account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions?\r\n\r\nYou are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent.\r\n[conclusion p. 286]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":["Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"]}
Title | Remarque complémentaire à mon article “Dans quel lieu le néoplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fondé son école de mathémathiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen?” |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 263-269 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Concerning the book by R. Arnzen Abū l-‘Abbās an-Nayrīzīs Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?) Simplicius’ Kommentar zu den Definitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I, the present paper off ers a survey of the way the late Neoplatonists used to conceive and compose their commentaries. Far from trying to be original, each commentary is largely based on the works of predecessors. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MJR57V7OQzq7spB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1179","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1179,"authors_free":[{"id":1753,"entry_id":1179,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Remarque compl\u00e9mentaire \u00e0 mon article \u201cDans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9mathiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?\u201d","main_title":{"title":"Remarque compl\u00e9mentaire \u00e0 mon article \u201cDans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9mathiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?\u201d"},"abstract":"Concerning the book by R. Arnzen Ab\u016b l-\u2018Abb\u0101s an-Nayr\u012bz\u012bs Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?) Simplicius\u2019 Kommentar zu den Definitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I, the present paper off ers a survey of the way the late Neoplatonists used to conceive and compose their commentaries. Far from trying to be original, each commentary is largely based on the works of predecessors. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MJR57V7OQzq7spB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1179,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"263-269"}},"sort":["Remarque compl\u00e9mentaire \u00e0 mon article \u201cDans quel lieu le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fond\u00e9 son \u00e9cole de math\u00e9mathiques, et o\u00f9 a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manich\u00e9en?\u201d"]}
Title | Repetitions in Empedokles |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1898 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 16-17 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fairbanks, Arthur |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The reader of Empedokles, as the text is restored by Stein, cannot fail to be struck by the repetition of certain phrases and lines. The recurrent use of convenient phrases is characteristic of the epic style which Empedokles affects, and in this way the repetition of many phrases is accounted for. The phrase all‘ age, ll. 19, 74, 96 (cf. 130, 262), will serve as an example. The first half of ll. 36, 61, 76, and the last half of ll. 112, 239, 140, are other illustrations of what may be expected in an 'epic' writer, and deserve no special consideration here. A second class of apparent repetitions may be dismissed with a word, namely the repetition of a line for emphasis, with distinct statement of the fact that it is repeated (e.g., ll. 60-62 repeated 75-77). It amounts to the same thing when a thesis is stated, and then repeated at the close of the discussion. In this way, I explain ll. 66 and 72. Thirdly, there are numerous passages that impress the reader as repetitions because they deal with much the same thought, although there is a studied effort to put this thought in different language. In ll. 173 and 248, the language of 67 and 116 almost reappears. Lines 69, 70 repeat the thought of 61-62 with intentional change of language. The fundamental thought of the poem is that all things on the earth are the product of four elements moved by two forces. The three parts of this thought appear again and again, but with intentional variation in language so as to prevent a sense of monotony. The list of things on the earth appears in lines 40 f., 105 f. (= 124 f.), 252 f., 383 f., 421 f. The four elements are mentioned in different terms many times: 33 f., 78, 130 f., 187, 197 f., (200), 204 f., 211, 215 f., 265 f., 333 f., 378 f. These repetitions, like those of the last group, are examples of a literary device appropriate to philosophic poetry. By means of it, the poet is able to enforce and bring home his thought without too much wearying his readers. There remains another class of repetitions which are due, as I believe, to a wrong reconstruction of the text, and it is with the purpose of eliminating the repetitions which belong to this class that I have instituted this study. 105-107 = 124-126. Lines 105-107 appear in Simplicius 7v 33, 15 and 34r 159, 22, and their position in this connection is confirmed by the quotation of 104-107 in Arist. Met. ii. 4, 1000a 29. On the other hand, the same lines after l. 123 are found only in Simplicius 34r 160, 6; the text here is somewhat uncertain, and the link with the preceding by the participle κτίοντε is rather artificial. Simplicius had quoted these lines less than half a page back, and it seems to me probable that the lines were inadvertently repeated here — possibly instead of some similar enumeration of things on the earth. 94(-95) = 108(-109) = 114(-115). Lines 94-95 are the fitting conclusion of the preceding discussion of the elements, but they have no meaning after 107. They stand in Simplicius 34r 159, 3 at the end of a long quotation, and it is not unlikely that they were repeated at the end of the next quotation (34r 159, 25) by the error either of Simplicius or of some copyist. The last half of 109 reads like a gloss that has been incorporated into the text. A negative argument of less weight for the omission of these lines (108-109) is the fact that they are omitted in Simpl. 7v 33, 17. The same lines appear in Simpl. 8r 33, 21. Here they are intimately connected with the two preceding lines, but their connection with the following lines is forced, and the following lines—as I shall hope to show—belong better in another connection. Accordingly, I propose to identify 114-115 with 94-95 and to insert 112-113 before 94-95. The order will then be 90-93, 112-113, 94-95 (= 114-115). The insertion of 112-113 between 93 and 94 is confirmed by the fact that 112-113 form the natural response to 93 and give a fitting introduction to 94-95. 67-68 = 116-117 (cf. 248). Lines 67-68 appear in this connection several times in Simplicius, and indeed 70-73 appear directly after 118 at Simpl. 8r 33, 26. Stein inserts Simpl. 8r 33, 26 as his line 69. My proposal is to insert both Simpl. 8r 33, 25 and 26 after 68, in which case there is no reason for regarding 116-117 as different from 67-68. So I would read 67-68, 118, 69-73. These two changes in the text of Simplicius, which cut out several repetitions, rest on the interpretation of Simpl. 8r 33, 19. Stein breaks this passage after 33, 25 and inserts 33, 26 as line 69. I propose to break it at the point where the meaning halts, namely after 33, 22; the first four lines I would place after 93 as I have suggested in the last paragraph but one, and the remainder after 66, as I have suggested in the last paragraph. 134 = 138. Line 134, which consists simply of the word sphairon, has no reason for existence; as the reference in Simpl. 258r may perfectly well apply to line 138. 3 = 228. The close resemblance between these two lines may be due to the restoration of 228. We may notice, however, merimnas (3, 45, 228) and deila (3, 53, 228, 343, 400, 441, 446) are favourite words with Empedokles, so that perhaps there is no reason to discredit line 228. In conclusion, I should like to suggest a slight emendation of line 85. The text of Simplicius at 34r 158, 24 reads met‘ osoisin (so aE; DE met‘ ossoisin); Preller suggests g‘ ossoisin; Panzerbieter, meth‘ oloisin. What is wanted is a reference to the four elements, with which Love works, though her activity cannot be discerned by mortal men. So I would suggest meta toisin, since tauta, tade, ta are commonly used to refer to the elements in the whole poem. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1EJm8S2SsGJjpTn |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"597","_score":null,"_source":{"id":597,"authors_free":[{"id":848,"entry_id":597,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":94,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fairbanks, Arthur","free_first_name":"Arthur","free_last_name":"Fairbanks","norm_person":{"id":94,"first_name":"Arthur ","last_name":"Fairbanks","full_name":"Fairbanks, Arthur ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157467903","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Repetitions in Empedokles","main_title":{"title":"Repetitions in Empedokles"},"abstract":"The reader of Empedokles, as the text is restored by Stein, cannot fail to be struck by the repetition of certain phrases and lines. The recurrent use of convenient phrases is characteristic of the epic style which Empedokles affects, and in this way the repetition of many phrases is accounted for. The phrase all\u2018 age, ll. 19, 74, 96 (cf. 130, 262), will serve as an example. The first half of ll. 36, 61, 76, and the last half of ll. 112, 239, 140, are other illustrations of what may be expected in an 'epic' writer, and deserve no special consideration here.\r\nA second class of apparent repetitions may be dismissed with a word, namely the repetition of a line for emphasis, with distinct statement of the fact that it is repeated (e.g., ll. 60-62 repeated 75-77). It amounts to the same thing when a thesis is stated, and then repeated at the close of the discussion. In this way, I explain ll. 66 and 72.\r\nThirdly, there are numerous passages that impress the reader as repetitions because they deal with much the same thought, although there is a studied effort to put this thought in different language. In ll. 173 and 248, the language of 67 and 116 almost reappears. Lines 69, 70 repeat the thought of 61-62 with intentional change of language. The fundamental thought of the poem is that all things on the earth are the product of four elements moved by two forces. The three parts of this thought appear again and again, but with intentional variation in language so as to prevent a sense of monotony.\r\nThe list of things on the earth appears in lines 40 f., 105 f. (= 124 f.), 252 f., 383 f., 421 f. The four elements are mentioned in different terms many times: 33 f., 78, 130 f., 187, 197 f., (200), 204 f., 211, 215 f., 265 f., 333 f., 378 f. These repetitions, like those of the last group, are examples of a literary device appropriate to philosophic poetry. By means of it, the poet is able to enforce and bring home his thought without too much wearying his readers.\r\nThere remains another class of repetitions which are due, as I believe, to a wrong reconstruction of the text, and it is with the purpose of eliminating the repetitions which belong to this class that I have instituted this study.\r\n105-107 = 124-126. Lines 105-107 appear in Simplicius 7v 33, 15 and 34r 159, 22, and their position in this connection is confirmed by the quotation of 104-107 in Arist. Met. ii. 4, 1000a 29. On the other hand, the same lines after l. 123 are found only in Simplicius 34r 160, 6; the text here is somewhat uncertain, and the link with the preceding by the participle \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5 is rather artificial. Simplicius had quoted these lines less than half a page back, and it seems to me probable that the lines were inadvertently repeated here \u2014 possibly instead of some similar enumeration of things on the earth.\r\n94(-95) = 108(-109) = 114(-115). Lines 94-95 are the fitting conclusion of the preceding discussion of the elements, but they have no meaning after 107. They stand in Simplicius 34r 159, 3 at the end of a long quotation, and it is not unlikely that they were repeated at the end of the next quotation (34r 159, 25) by the error either of Simplicius or of some copyist. The last half of 109 reads like a gloss that has been incorporated into the text. A negative argument of less weight for the omission of these lines (108-109) is the fact that they are omitted in Simpl. 7v 33, 17.\r\nThe same lines appear in Simpl. 8r 33, 21. Here they are intimately connected with the two preceding lines, but their connection with the following lines is forced, and the following lines\u2014as I shall hope to show\u2014belong better in another connection. Accordingly, I propose to identify 114-115 with 94-95 and to insert 112-113 before 94-95. The order will then be 90-93, 112-113, 94-95 (= 114-115). The insertion of 112-113 between 93 and 94 is confirmed by the fact that 112-113 form the natural response to 93 and give a fitting introduction to 94-95.\r\n67-68 = 116-117 (cf. 248). Lines 67-68 appear in this connection several times in Simplicius, and indeed 70-73 appear directly after 118 at Simpl. 8r 33, 26. Stein inserts Simpl. 8r 33, 26 as his line 69. My proposal is to insert both Simpl. 8r 33, 25 and 26 after 68, in which case there is no reason for regarding 116-117 as different from 67-68. So I would read 67-68, 118, 69-73.\r\nThese two changes in the text of Simplicius, which cut out several repetitions, rest on the interpretation of Simpl. 8r 33, 19. Stein breaks this passage after 33, 25 and inserts 33, 26 as line 69. I propose to break it at the point where the meaning halts, namely after 33, 22; the first four lines I would place after 93 as I have suggested in the last paragraph but one, and the remainder after 66, as I have suggested in the last paragraph.\r\n134 = 138. Line 134, which consists simply of the word sphairon, has no reason for existence; as the reference in Simpl. 258r may perfectly well apply to line 138.\r\n3 = 228. The close resemblance between these two lines may be due to the restoration of 228. We may notice, however, merimnas (3, 45, 228) and deila (3, 53, 228, 343, 400, 441, 446) are favourite words with Empedokles, so that perhaps there is no reason to discredit line 228.\r\nIn conclusion, I should like to suggest a slight emendation of line 85. The text of Simplicius at 34r 158, 24 reads met\u2018 osoisin (so aE; DE met\u2018 ossoisin); Preller suggests g\u2018 ossoisin; Panzerbieter, meth\u2018 oloisin. What is wanted is a reference to the four elements, with which Love works, though her activity cannot be discerned by mortal men. So I would suggest meta toisin, since tauta, tade, ta are commonly used to refer to the elements in the whole poem. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1898","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1EJm8S2SsGJjpTn","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":94,"full_name":"Fairbanks, Arthur ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":597,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"12","issue":"1","pages":"16-17"}},"sort":["Repetitions in Empedokles"]}
Title | Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius, Philoponus) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 260-264 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
With the publication of the above four volumes, there are now about twenty in the monumental series of translations Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, begun in 1987 under the editorial direction of Richard Sorabji. By my reckoning, the project is just about halfway completed. When all the volumes have appeared, perhaps by the end of the century, we shall have the first complete translation of the corpus of Aristotelian commentaries in any language. Reviewers of earlier volumes have been rightly fulsome in their praise for the general project. Many scholars have pointed out that during the period AD 200–600, commentaries on Aristotle and Plato comprised one of the principal genres of philosophy. Thus, the volumes in this series record far more than a mass of esoterica: they are actually a mine of some of the best philosophical thinking of the time. Even Plotinus, who was not primarily a commentator, structured many of his Enneads as virtual commentaries or meditations on passages of Plato and others. Since this huge project is not likely to be repeated in another modern language, the series will undoubtedly stand as one of the principal tools available to anyone who does not work comfortably in Greek but who wishes to acquire more than the most superficial knowledge of 400 years of philosophy. There are actually three main divisions of the commentaries contained in the great Berlin Academy edition. The first consists of the extensive and relatively straightforward commentaries up to about the fourth century AD. Among the commentators of this period, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who flourished in the early part of the third century AD, is clearly dominant. His understanding of Aristotle had an authoritative role for subsequent generations. His commentaries are the principal means for the revitalization of Peripatetic philosophy after its long period of desuetude, beginning even in the century after Aristotle himself. The second and largest part of the corpus contains the Neoplatonic commentaries up to AD 600. The two most important figures in this group are John Philoponus and Simplicius (both of whom flourished in the mid-sixth century AD). The label "Neoplatonism" is far from unambiguous, but here it refers to the view that the philosophy of Aristotle is basically in harmony with that of Plato. A proposition that Sorabji calls "perfectly crazy" was actually, as he says, philosophically fruitful. I do not think that the contention that Aristotle was in harmony with Plato on essential points is quite as crazy as Sorabji thinks, especially if we insist, as we must, that the Neoplatonists were referring to Plato as they understood him, not as we do. I must add that there are many scholars today—mostly in continental Europe rather than in Britain or North America—who think that the Neoplatonic understanding of Plato is itself worthy of serious attention. At any rate, although Alexander's commentaries are still among the most reliable guides to Aristotle's tortuous arguments, the commentaries of Philoponus and Simplicius, above all the others in that group, are the most consistently provocative. They are unique documents in the history of philosophy, full of surprising and challenging arguments. The third part, outside the purview of this review, contains the works of some of the eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantine commentators. This is material at the outermost reaches of the empire of Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not without interest, particularly as a counterbalance to the medieval Latin Christian interpretations of the Greeks. [introduction p. 260-261] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Ekcc0Hmw42Ha5F6 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"649","_score":null,"_source":{"id":649,"authors_free":[{"id":930,"entry_id":649,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius, Philoponus)","main_title":{"title":"Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius, Philoponus)"},"abstract":"With the publication of the above four volumes, there are now about twenty in the monumental series of translations Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, begun in 1987 under the editorial direction of Richard Sorabji. By my reckoning, the project is just about halfway completed. When all the volumes have appeared, perhaps by the end of the century, we shall have the first complete translation of the corpus of Aristotelian commentaries in any language. Reviewers of earlier volumes have been rightly fulsome in their praise for the general project. Many scholars have pointed out that during the period AD 200\u2013600, commentaries on Aristotle and Plato comprised one of the principal genres of philosophy. Thus, the volumes in this series record far more than a mass of esoterica: they are actually a mine of some of the best philosophical thinking of the time. Even Plotinus, who was not primarily a commentator, structured many of his Enneads as virtual commentaries or meditations on passages of Plato and others. Since this huge project is not likely to be repeated in another modern language, the series will undoubtedly stand as one of the principal tools available to anyone who does not work comfortably in Greek but who wishes to acquire more than the most superficial knowledge of 400 years of philosophy.\r\n\r\nThere are actually three main divisions of the commentaries contained in the great Berlin Academy edition. The first consists of the extensive and relatively straightforward commentaries up to about the fourth century AD. Among the commentators of this period, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who flourished in the early part of the third century AD, is clearly dominant. His understanding of Aristotle had an authoritative role for subsequent generations. His commentaries are the principal means for the revitalization of Peripatetic philosophy after its long period of desuetude, beginning even in the century after Aristotle himself.\r\n\r\nThe second and largest part of the corpus contains the Neoplatonic commentaries up to AD 600. The two most important figures in this group are John Philoponus and Simplicius (both of whom flourished in the mid-sixth century AD). The label \"Neoplatonism\" is far from unambiguous, but here it refers to the view that the philosophy of Aristotle is basically in harmony with that of Plato. A proposition that Sorabji calls \"perfectly crazy\" was actually, as he says, philosophically fruitful. I do not think that the contention that Aristotle was in harmony with Plato on essential points is quite as crazy as Sorabji thinks, especially if we insist, as we must, that the Neoplatonists were referring to Plato as they understood him, not as we do. I must add that there are many scholars today\u2014mostly in continental Europe rather than in Britain or North America\u2014who think that the Neoplatonic understanding of Plato is itself worthy of serious attention. At any rate, although Alexander's commentaries are still among the most reliable guides to Aristotle's tortuous arguments, the commentaries of Philoponus and Simplicius, above all the others in that group, are the most consistently provocative. They are unique documents in the history of philosophy, full of surprising and challenging arguments.\r\n\r\nThe third part, outside the purview of this review, contains the works of some of the eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantine commentators. This is material at the outermost reaches of the empire of Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not without interest, particularly as a counterbalance to the medieval Latin Christian interpretations of the Greeks. [introduction p. 260-261]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Ekcc0Hmw42Ha5F6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":649,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Philosophical Quarterly","volume":"45","issue":"1","pages":"260-264"}},"sort":["Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius, Philoponus)"]}
Title | Review of Baltussen 2008: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 3 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 158 –160 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dillon, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This is a most welcome book, by a scholar who has had much to do with Simplicius over the last decade or so, as part of the great Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project, initiated by Richard Sorabji (indeed it is to Sorabji that the book is dedicated). The fruits of this experience are evidenced on more or less every page. As B. remarks, it has not been customary hitherto to focus on the personality or methods of Simplicius himself, as opposed to his value as a source for previous figures, both commentators and original authors, such as the Presocratics—such would have been the attitude of the great Hermann Diels, for example, who edited the Physics Commentary, as well as making so much use of him for his Fragmente der Vorsokratiker and Doxographi Graeci. But undoubtedly, Simplicius merits some attention for himself. The book consists of six chapters, with an introduction and an epilogue. The introduction sets out the parameters of the problem: what should one expect in the way of philosophical attitudes from a late antique Platonist such as Simplicius, and how B. himself proposes to proceed in evaluating him. He emphasises that there are many ways in which this is something of a "work in progress," but he certainly provides enough material to give us a good idea of what Simplicius is up to. Above all, learned though he is, and copiously though he quotes his predecessors, we should not expect Simplicius to be in any anachronistic way an "objective" scholar. He is a Platonist, and his purpose is to assimilate Aristotle (and indeed the Presocratic philosophers) into the Platonist system. Ch. 1, ‘The Scholar and his Books’, introduces us to what is known of Simplicius’ life and education (with Ammonius in Alexandria and Damascius in Athens, in the early decades of the sixth century) and addresses the major problem of the location and circumstances in which he composed his vast commentaries—necessarily after the official closing of the Academy in 529, and the return of the philosophers, of whom he was one, from Persia in 531. The Harran hypothesis of Tardieu runs into the great problem of the availability of source materials in such a relatively outlying place, and B. is inclined to reject it. The alternative is a return to Athens, or possibly Alexandria, where at least there were good libraries. For one salient aspect of Simplicius’ work is his extraordinary range of reading, and his willingness to provide us with verbatim quotations from this, extending from Presocratics such as Parmenides, Melissus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, through immediate followers of Aristotle, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus, and then the great second-century A.D. Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, down to his Neoplatonic predecessors Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and his own teacher Damascius. B. devotes separate chapters to each of these categories of predecessor. Ch. 2, ‘Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom’, looks at his use of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras in particular, and makes various suggestions about his overall purposes in this. It is certainly notable that Simplicius favours verbatim quotation even of prose authors—in contrast, for example, to such a figure as Proclus, who prefers to paraphrase prose authors at least—but I think that I would rest content with Simplicius’ own explanation (and apologies for over-quotation!), that he was concerned to preserve as much as he could of sources that were becoming increasingly rare in his day. It does not mean that he is not prepared to distort their meaning in a Neoplatonic direction. Ch. 3, ‘Towards a Canon: The Early Peripatetics’, turns to a study of Theophrastus and Eudemus, and in particular their comments on, and adaptations of, Aristotle’s Physics. It is here, I fear, that one begins to realise that this is the sort of book that is best appreciated if one has the original works it is discussing at one’s elbow, as one generally does not—in this case, chiefly Simplicius’ vast Commentary on the Physics. However, B. undoubtedly gives a good account of how Simplicius uses Theophrastus, and particularly Eudemus, whom he actually refers to far more (132 references as against 37!), for the clarification of Aristotle’s doctrine. Ch. 4, ‘Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias’, deals with Alexander, who is indeed Simplicius’ chief authority—quoted or mentioned in all fully 1200 times, of which around 700 are in the Physics Commentary. Alexander is, for Simplicius, simply "the commentator," and is of basic importance to him. After giving a useful account of Alexander's own exegetical achievements, B. tries to draw up something of a typology of ways in which he is used by Simplicius (4.3): first, he can be used as simply a helpful source for understanding Aristotle; secondly, he can be quoted and criticised, on a matter of interpretation or doctrine; thirdly, he can be quoted in connection with a variant in the manuscript tradition. Of all these, he gives examples, emphasising how central Alexander is to the whole commentary tradition. Ch. 5, ‘Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration’, takes us through the later Platonist tradition of commentary, with a glance at the Middle Platonists, but focusing chiefly on Porphyry and Iamblichus, and the establishing of the "harmonising" interpretation of Aristotle of which Simplicius is the heir. The use of these Platonist predecessors is particularly notable in the case of the Categories Commentary, but it affects the others as well. Lastly, in Ch. 6, ‘Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology’, he deals with Simplicius’ fierce controversy with his Christian contemporary John Philoponus, as well as with his more civil criticisms of Alexander. The bitterness of his assaults on Philoponus does, as B. argues, bring home to us how far Simplicius is a heroic and tragic figure, trying to preserve and synthesise the whole of the Hellenic (I do wish we could give up the term "pagan"!) philosophical tradition in face of the ever more insistent Christian challenge, and composing his vast commentaries for a now largely imaginary coterie of students. An Epilogue resumes all these findings, and B. appends some useful appendices, including one listing the probable contents of Simplicius’ library, which certainly brings it home to us that these great works of his could not have been composed while wandering about the Syrian desert on the back of a camel. He really must have been back in Athens, with some access to the library of the Platonic School. At any rate, with this study, B. at last gives Simplicius something of his due as a scholar as well as a commentator. [the entire review p. 158-160] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/p1cPjdejj6J9LSt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"601","_score":null,"_source":{"id":601,"authors_free":[{"id":852,"entry_id":601,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":97,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dillon, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Dillon","norm_person":{"id":97,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Dillon","full_name":"Dillon, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123498058","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Baltussen 2008: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Review of Baltussen 2008: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator"},"abstract":"This is a most welcome book, by a scholar who has had much to do with Simplicius over the last decade or so, as part of the great Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project, initiated by Richard Sorabji (indeed it is to Sorabji that the book is dedicated). The fruits of this experience are evidenced on more or less every page. As B. remarks, it has not been customary hitherto to focus on the personality or methods of Simplicius himself, as opposed to his value as a source for previous figures, both commentators and original authors, such as the Presocratics\u2014such would have been the attitude of the great Hermann Diels, for example, who edited the Physics Commentary, as well as making so much use of him for his Fragmente der Vorsokratiker and Doxographi Graeci. But undoubtedly, Simplicius merits some attention for himself.\r\n\r\nThe book consists of six chapters, with an introduction and an epilogue. The introduction sets out the parameters of the problem: what should one expect in the way of philosophical attitudes from a late antique Platonist such as Simplicius, and how B. himself proposes to proceed in evaluating him. He emphasises that there are many ways in which this is something of a \"work in progress,\" but he certainly provides enough material to give us a good idea of what Simplicius is up to. Above all, learned though he is, and copiously though he quotes his predecessors, we should not expect Simplicius to be in any anachronistic way an \"objective\" scholar. He is a Platonist, and his purpose is to assimilate Aristotle (and indeed the Presocratic philosophers) into the Platonist system.\r\n\r\nCh. 1, \u2018The Scholar and his Books\u2019, introduces us to what is known of Simplicius\u2019 life and education (with Ammonius in Alexandria and Damascius in Athens, in the early decades of the sixth century) and addresses the major problem of the location and circumstances in which he composed his vast commentaries\u2014necessarily after the official closing of the Academy in 529, and the return of the philosophers, of whom he was one, from Persia in 531. The Harran hypothesis of Tardieu runs into the great problem of the availability of source materials in such a relatively outlying place, and B. is inclined to reject it. The alternative is a return to Athens, or possibly Alexandria, where at least there were good libraries.\r\n\r\nFor one salient aspect of Simplicius\u2019 work is his extraordinary range of reading, and his willingness to provide us with verbatim quotations from this, extending from Presocratics such as Parmenides, Melissus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, through immediate followers of Aristotle, such as Theophrastus and Eudemus, and then the great second-century A.D. Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, down to his Neoplatonic predecessors Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and his own teacher Damascius. B. devotes separate chapters to each of these categories of predecessor.\r\n\r\nCh. 2, \u2018Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom\u2019, looks at his use of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras in particular, and makes various suggestions about his overall purposes in this. It is certainly notable that Simplicius favours verbatim quotation even of prose authors\u2014in contrast, for example, to such a figure as Proclus, who prefers to paraphrase prose authors at least\u2014but I think that I would rest content with Simplicius\u2019 own explanation (and apologies for over-quotation!), that he was concerned to preserve as much as he could of sources that were becoming increasingly rare in his day. It does not mean that he is not prepared to distort their meaning in a Neoplatonic direction.\r\n\r\nCh. 3, \u2018Towards a Canon: The Early Peripatetics\u2019, turns to a study of Theophrastus and Eudemus, and in particular their comments on, and adaptations of, Aristotle\u2019s Physics. It is here, I fear, that one begins to realise that this is the sort of book that is best appreciated if one has the original works it is discussing at one\u2019s elbow, as one generally does not\u2014in this case, chiefly Simplicius\u2019 vast Commentary on the Physics. However, B. undoubtedly gives a good account of how Simplicius uses Theophrastus, and particularly Eudemus, whom he actually refers to far more (132 references as against 37!), for the clarification of Aristotle\u2019s doctrine.\r\n\r\nCh. 4, \u2018Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias\u2019, deals with Alexander, who is indeed Simplicius\u2019 chief authority\u2014quoted or mentioned in all fully 1200 times, of which around 700 are in the Physics Commentary. Alexander is, for Simplicius, simply \"the commentator,\" and is of basic importance to him. After giving a useful account of Alexander's own exegetical achievements, B. tries to draw up something of a typology of ways in which he is used by Simplicius (4.3): first, he can be used as simply a helpful source for understanding Aristotle; secondly, he can be quoted and criticised, on a matter of interpretation or doctrine; thirdly, he can be quoted in connection with a variant in the manuscript tradition. Of all these, he gives examples, emphasising how central Alexander is to the whole commentary tradition.\r\n\r\nCh. 5, \u2018Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration\u2019, takes us through the later Platonist tradition of commentary, with a glance at the Middle Platonists, but focusing chiefly on Porphyry and Iamblichus, and the establishing of the \"harmonising\" interpretation of Aristotle of which Simplicius is the heir. The use of these Platonist predecessors is particularly notable in the case of the Categories Commentary, but it affects the others as well.\r\n\r\nLastly, in Ch. 6, \u2018Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology\u2019, he deals with Simplicius\u2019 fierce controversy with his Christian contemporary John Philoponus, as well as with his more civil criticisms of Alexander. The bitterness of his assaults on Philoponus does, as B. argues, bring home to us how far Simplicius is a heroic and tragic figure, trying to preserve and synthesise the whole of the Hellenic (I do wish we could give up the term \"pagan\"!) philosophical tradition in face of the ever more insistent Christian challenge, and composing his vast commentaries for a now largely imaginary coterie of students.\r\n\r\nAn Epilogue resumes all these findings, and B. appends some useful appendices, including one listing the probable contents of Simplicius\u2019 library, which certainly brings it home to us that these great works of his could not have been composed while wandering about the Syrian desert on the back of a camel. He really must have been back in Athens, with some access to the library of the Platonic School.\r\n\r\nAt any rate, with this study, B. at last gives Simplicius something of his due as a scholar as well as a commentator. [the entire review p. 158-160]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/p1cPjdejj6J9LSt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":97,"full_name":"Dillon, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":601,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"3","issue":"2","pages":"158 \u2013160"}},"sort":["Review of Baltussen 2008: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator"]}
Title | Review of Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sellars, J. T. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This book is the first monograph in English (or any other language) devoted to the Late Platonic commentator Simplicius. Its focus is on Simplicius' methodology as a commentator. It deals at length with Simplicius' engagements with other ancient philosophers, from the earliest Presocratics, through the Peripatetic tradition (Theophrastus, Alexander), to contemporaries such as John Philoponus. Who was Simplicius? He was a Neoplatonist working in the first decades of the sixth century AD under whose name five commentaries have come down to us from antiquity. These commentaries are on Aristotle's Physics, Categories, De Caelo, and De Anima, and the Enchiridion of Epictetus, although his authorship of the commentary on the De Anima has been a subject of scholarly debate. In these often lengthy commentaries, Simplicius quotes from a wide range of philosophical texts where he thinks it relevant to his discussion of Aristotle's text and, in the process, preserves fragments from a number of otherwise lost works. Simplicius' chief claim to fame, then, is that he has become a vital source for our knowledge of Presocratic philosophy. Without Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, our knowledge of early Greek philosophy would be significantly reduced. This is the standard line. We should all be thankful to Simplicius for his habit of quoting texts in full rather than merely naming them in passing. We are thankful. But is there any more to him? Is Simplicius himself an interesting or significant philosopher? Is there anything more to him beyond his role as a doxographical source? Baltussen, in devoting a monograph to him, thinks there is, but he is conscious many will not share that view. Consequently, his book opens with an apologetic and slightly defensive introduction in which he tries to make the case for reading Simplicius as more than merely a quarry from which to extract quotations. Part of the task includes a defense of Late Platonism (Baltussen deliberately avoids the usual label "Neoplatonism"), to which Simplicius adhered. We are encouraged to put our reservations to one side and reassess Simplicius afresh. The opening chapter introduces Simplicius' method and practice as a commentator. His commentaries differ from many other examples from late antiquity to the extent that they don't seem to be straightforward records of oral lectures taken "from the voice of" (apo phônês) the author. Instead, they are extended written works, conceived as textbooks for pagan teachers explicitly designed to preserve as much as possible of the pagan philosophical tradition—hence the extensive quotations. In these often lengthy texts, Simplicius explicitly rejects originality, but Baltussen argues that we ought not to take this at face value and that these expressions of modesty are, in part, made out of respect for his teachers. The second chapter deals with Simplicius' role as a source for the Presocratics. Baltussen welcomes Catherine Osborne's approach of reading fragments of the Presocratics within their doxographical context, as this adds to Simplicius' potential significance. What is important, of course, is to gain a sense of the motive and agenda of the doxographer. According to Baltussen, Simplicius' aim is to locate all of the Presocratics within a Late Platonic framework that emphasizes unity within the pagan philosophical tradition conceived as "a single venerable and ancient message." This may be so up to a point, but to what extent would Simplicius welcome Democritus (or Epicurus) into this unified tradition? It would have been interesting to hear more about those thinkers who don't neatly fit within this syncretized history of philosophy, precisely because the points of disagreement might help to bring Simplicius' own position into sharper focus. Baltussen raises the question of whether Simplicius had access to the works of Presocratics directly or merely to collections of excerpts but doesn't draw any firm conclusions either way. The third chapter turns to Simplicius' use of early Peripatetics such as Theophrastus and Eudemus. Baltussen argues that Simplicius took the early Peripatetics—and especially Theophrastus—very seriously in his exegeses of Aristotle because Theophrastus would have known Aristotle personally, giving his glosses an added authority. This is a departure from the attitudes of previous Platonic commentators on Aristotle. Although Simplicius shares the wider Late Platonic desire to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, there is also a strong desire to get Aristotle right, and no one is more likely to help in that task than Theophrastus. Baltussen suggests that we conceive Theophrastus himself as part of the Platonic commentary tradition, given his own comments on the Timaeus, but philosophical engagement with a previous author is not quite the same thing as commentary. The Peripatetic theme continues in the fourth chapter, which is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Baltussen offers a detailed and slightly labored analysis of the motivations behind Simplicius' regular and extensive quotation from Alexander, but the question seems relatively straightforward. Why did Simplicius make use of Alexander's commentaries on Aristotle in his own commentaries on Aristotle? Because Alexander has lots of interesting things to say about Aristotle. The focus here again is on form rather than content, methodology rather than philosophy. The fifth chapter examines the Platonic commentary tradition before Simplicius and discusses Simplicius' use of Plotinus and the Post-Plotinian tradition of harmonizing commentaries from Porphyry onwards. Simplicius' immediate teacher Ammonius is discussed briefly but deserves more attention. For instance, we were told in the opening chapter that Simplicius' rejection of originality was mere self-deprecation, but presumably that claim could be tested to some degree via a comparison between his own views and those of his teacher. The same goes for his later mentor Damascius. The final chapter turns to the theme of polemic and focuses its attention on Simplicius' exchanges with his arch-rival John Philoponus, another Platonic commentator, but also a Christian. Baltussen prefaces his discussion with an account of the tensions and hostilities between Christians and pagans in late antiquity. Once again, Simplicius is presented as the defender of an embattled pagan philosophical tradition, taking Philoponus to task for his attacks against Proclus and Aristotle in De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Proclum. Baltussen highlights the rhetorical aspects of Simplicius' polemics rather than the content of the dispute, so once more methodology is the principal focus. The intensity of Simplicius' personal references to Philoponus ("raving swine") is contrasted with his sober and respectful references to Alexander. An epilogue sums up the proceedings. One of the central themes to emerge from the book as a whole is the claim that, in order to understand what Simplicius is doing in his commentaries, we must take into account his commitment to pagan religion as well as philosophy. We should see the commentaries not merely as "scholarly schoolbooks" but rather as steps on a long road toward a more existential transformation. This religious dimension of Late Platonism should not be overlooked, Baltussen argues, if we want to understand properly what Simplicius is trying to achieve. The commentaries are his attempt to preserve the entire pagan philosophical and religious tradition within an increasingly hostile Christian world. On this final point, as well as a number of others, Baltussen sketches a broad context within which to think about what Simplicius is doing but there is much less in the way of detailed analysis of what he actually did do, what he argued for, or what philosophical positions he himself held. This is in part simply a reflection of the sheer length of the commentaries themselves and no one could offer a detailed analysis of their contents within the covers of a single volume. I said at the outset that five commentaries have come down to us under the name of Simplicius. Baltussen discusses only three of them. He puts to one side the De Anima commentary and he may well be right to do so, but it would have been nice to have seen a fuller discussion of the text and the question of its authorship.[2] He also more or less ignores the commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Although it does get the occasional mention (e.g. p. 43) Baltussen proceeds as if it doesn't exist, at one point writing 'all three extant commentaries' (p. 34). In his interesting attempt to reconstruct 'the library of Simplicius' (pp. 211-15), neither Epictetus nor Arrian get a mention. This is a great shame for a number of reasons. The in Ench. is unique as the only surviving commentary on a Stoic text to come down to us. Moreover, it is a commentary by a Late Platonist, and as a rule Late Platonists only wrote commentaries on Plato and Aristotle.[3] The way in which Late Platonists brought Aristotle into their curriculum is a well-worn subject, but the desire to bring in a Stoic text is quite unusual. It complicates Simplicius' activity as a commentator in a number of interesting and significant ways. Presumably Baltussen would argue that this is part of Simplicius' desire to unite and then preserve the entire pagan philosophical tradition in an increasingly hostile Christian world, but if that is the case then the in Ench. would form a potentially significant piece of evidence for Baltussen's thesis, one that has sadly been left out of the account. There is much in Baltussen's book that is of interest, but I'm not sure how far it goes in fleshing out a more rounded portrait of Simplicius. The focus of the volume throughout is squarely on Simplicius' use of other authors—i.e., his quotations—rather than Simplicius as an author or a philosopher in his own right. Baltussen consciously avoids discussing Simplicius qua philosopher on the basis that this has been done by others elsewhere. This is true to an extent, but what would be nice is a more synthetic volume that brings these discussions together in order to give us a complete picture. This book doesn't do that, although, to be fair, it doesn't ever claim to be trying to. What remains a desideratum, then, is a monograph that might combine Baltussen's methodological researches with an account of what is philosophically valuable in Simplicius. Most of my critical comments above have been asking for more discussion on various points, and no author can do everything in just one volume. I certainly hope that this book will encourage further work on Simplicius by both Baltussen and others that will help us to gain a fuller portrait of this still relatively neglected philosopher. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MiDP9FxKLHavo2S |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"904","_score":null,"_source":{"id":904,"authors_free":[{"id":1335,"entry_id":904,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":299,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sellars, J. T.","free_first_name":"J. T.","free_last_name":"Sellars","norm_person":{"id":299,"first_name":"J. T.","last_name":"Sellars","full_name":"Sellars, J. T.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1011826046","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Review of Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator"},"abstract":"This book is the first monograph in English (or any other language) devoted to the Late Platonic commentator Simplicius. Its focus is on Simplicius' methodology as a commentator. It deals at length with Simplicius' engagements with other ancient philosophers, from the earliest Presocratics, through the Peripatetic tradition (Theophrastus, Alexander), to contemporaries such as John Philoponus.\r\n\r\nWho was Simplicius? He was a Neoplatonist working in the first decades of the sixth century AD under whose name five commentaries have come down to us from antiquity. These commentaries are on Aristotle's Physics, Categories, De Caelo, and De Anima, and the Enchiridion of Epictetus, although his authorship of the commentary on the De Anima has been a subject of scholarly debate. In these often lengthy commentaries, Simplicius quotes from a wide range of philosophical texts where he thinks it relevant to his discussion of Aristotle's text and, in the process, preserves fragments from a number of otherwise lost works.\r\n\r\nSimplicius' chief claim to fame, then, is that he has become a vital source for our knowledge of Presocratic philosophy. Without Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, our knowledge of early Greek philosophy would be significantly reduced.\r\n\r\nThis is the standard line. We should all be thankful to Simplicius for his habit of quoting texts in full rather than merely naming them in passing. We are thankful. But is there any more to him? Is Simplicius himself an interesting or significant philosopher? Is there anything more to him beyond his role as a doxographical source? Baltussen, in devoting a monograph to him, thinks there is, but he is conscious many will not share that view. Consequently, his book opens with an apologetic and slightly defensive introduction in which he tries to make the case for reading Simplicius as more than merely a quarry from which to extract quotations. Part of the task includes a defense of Late Platonism (Baltussen deliberately avoids the usual label \"Neoplatonism\"), to which Simplicius adhered. We are encouraged to put our reservations to one side and reassess Simplicius afresh.\r\n\r\nThe opening chapter introduces Simplicius' method and practice as a commentator. His commentaries differ from many other examples from late antiquity to the extent that they don't seem to be straightforward records of oral lectures taken \"from the voice of\" (apo ph\u00f4n\u00eas) the author. Instead, they are extended written works, conceived as textbooks for pagan teachers explicitly designed to preserve as much as possible of the pagan philosophical tradition\u2014hence the extensive quotations. In these often lengthy texts, Simplicius explicitly rejects originality, but Baltussen argues that we ought not to take this at face value and that these expressions of modesty are, in part, made out of respect for his teachers.\r\n\r\nThe second chapter deals with Simplicius' role as a source for the Presocratics. Baltussen welcomes Catherine Osborne's approach of reading fragments of the Presocratics within their doxographical context, as this adds to Simplicius' potential significance. What is important, of course, is to gain a sense of the motive and agenda of the doxographer. According to Baltussen, Simplicius' aim is to locate all of the Presocratics within a Late Platonic framework that emphasizes unity within the pagan philosophical tradition conceived as \"a single venerable and ancient message.\" This may be so up to a point, but to what extent would Simplicius welcome Democritus (or Epicurus) into this unified tradition? It would have been interesting to hear more about those thinkers who don't neatly fit within this syncretized history of philosophy, precisely because the points of disagreement might help to bring Simplicius' own position into sharper focus. Baltussen raises the question of whether Simplicius had access to the works of Presocratics directly or merely to collections of excerpts but doesn't draw any firm conclusions either way.\r\n\r\nThe third chapter turns to Simplicius' use of early Peripatetics such as Theophrastus and Eudemus. Baltussen argues that Simplicius took the early Peripatetics\u2014and especially Theophrastus\u2014very seriously in his exegeses of Aristotle because Theophrastus would have known Aristotle personally, giving his glosses an added authority. This is a departure from the attitudes of previous Platonic commentators on Aristotle. Although Simplicius shares the wider Late Platonic desire to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, there is also a strong desire to get Aristotle right, and no one is more likely to help in that task than Theophrastus. Baltussen suggests that we conceive Theophrastus himself as part of the Platonic commentary tradition, given his own comments on the Timaeus, but philosophical engagement with a previous author is not quite the same thing as commentary.\r\n\r\nThe Peripatetic theme continues in the fourth chapter, which is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Baltussen offers a detailed and slightly labored analysis of the motivations behind Simplicius' regular and extensive quotation from Alexander, but the question seems relatively straightforward. Why did Simplicius make use of Alexander's commentaries on Aristotle in his own commentaries on Aristotle? Because Alexander has lots of interesting things to say about Aristotle. The focus here again is on form rather than content, methodology rather than philosophy.\r\n\r\nThe fifth chapter examines the Platonic commentary tradition before Simplicius and discusses Simplicius' use of Plotinus and the Post-Plotinian tradition of harmonizing commentaries from Porphyry onwards. Simplicius' immediate teacher Ammonius is discussed briefly but deserves more attention. For instance, we were told in the opening chapter that Simplicius' rejection of originality was mere self-deprecation, but presumably that claim could be tested to some degree via a comparison between his own views and those of his teacher. The same goes for his later mentor Damascius.\r\n\r\nThe final chapter turns to the theme of polemic and focuses its attention on Simplicius' exchanges with his arch-rival John Philoponus, another Platonic commentator, but also a Christian. Baltussen prefaces his discussion with an account of the tensions and hostilities between Christians and pagans in late antiquity. Once again, Simplicius is presented as the defender of an embattled pagan philosophical tradition, taking Philoponus to task for his attacks against Proclus and Aristotle in De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Proclum. Baltussen highlights the rhetorical aspects of Simplicius' polemics rather than the content of the dispute, so once more methodology is the principal focus. The intensity of Simplicius' personal references to Philoponus (\"raving swine\") is contrasted with his sober and respectful references to Alexander.\r\n\r\nAn epilogue sums up the proceedings. One of the central themes to emerge from the book as a whole is the claim that, in order to understand what Simplicius is doing in his commentaries, we must take into account his commitment to pagan religion as well as philosophy. We should see the commentaries not merely as \"scholarly schoolbooks\" but rather as steps on a long road toward a more existential transformation. This religious dimension of Late Platonism should not be overlooked, Baltussen argues, if we want to understand properly what Simplicius is trying to achieve. The commentaries are his attempt to preserve the entire pagan philosophical and religious tradition within an increasingly hostile Christian world. On this final point, as well as a number of others, Baltussen sketches a broad context within which to think about what Simplicius is\r\ndoing but there is much less in the way of detailed analysis of what he actually did do, what he argued for, or what philosophical\r\npositions he himself held. This is in part simply a reflection of the sheer length of the commentaries themselves and no one could\r\noffer a detailed analysis of their contents within the covers of a single volume.\r\nI said at the outset that five commentaries have come down to us under the name of Simplicius. Baltussen discusses only three of\r\nthem. He puts to one side the De Anima commentary and he may well be right to do so, but it would have been nice to have seen a\r\nfuller discussion of the text and the question of its authorship.[2] He also more or less ignores the commentary on the Enchiridion of\r\nEpictetus. Although it does get the occasional mention (e.g. p. 43) Baltussen proceeds as if it doesn't exist, at one point writing 'all\r\nthree extant commentaries' (p. 34). In his interesting attempt to reconstruct 'the library of Simplicius' (pp. 211-15), neither\r\nEpictetus nor Arrian get a mention. This is a great shame for a number of reasons. The in Ench. is unique as the only surviving\r\ncommentary on a Stoic text to come down to us. Moreover, it is a commentary by a Late Platonist, and as a rule Late Platonists only\r\nwrote commentaries on Plato and Aristotle.[3] The way in which Late Platonists brought Aristotle into their curriculum is a\r\nwell-worn subject, but the desire to bring in a Stoic text is quite unusual. It complicates Simplicius' activity as a commentator in a\r\nnumber of interesting and significant ways. Presumably Baltussen would argue that this is part of Simplicius' desire to unite and\r\nthen preserve the entire pagan philosophical tradition in an increasingly hostile Christian world, but if that is the case then the in\r\nEnch. would form a potentially significant piece of evidence for Baltussen's thesis, one that has sadly been left out of the account. There is much in Baltussen's book that is of interest, but I'm not sure how far it goes in fleshing out a more rounded portrait of Simplicius. The focus of the volume throughout is squarely on Simplicius' use of other authors\u2014i.e., his quotations\u2014rather than Simplicius as an author or a philosopher in his own right. Baltussen consciously avoids discussing Simplicius qua philosopher on the basis that this has been done by others elsewhere. This is true to an extent, but what would be nice is a more synthetic volume that brings these discussions together in order to give us a complete picture. This book doesn't do that, although, to be fair, it doesn't ever claim to be trying to.\r\n\r\nWhat remains a desideratum, then, is a monograph that might combine Baltussen's methodological researches with an account of what is philosophically valuable in Simplicius. Most of my critical comments above have been asking for more discussion on various points, and no author can do everything in just one volume. I certainly hope that this book will encourage further work on Simplicius by both Baltussen and others that will help us to gain a fuller portrait of this still relatively neglected philosopher. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MiDP9FxKLHavo2S","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":299,"full_name":"Sellars, J. T.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":904,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews","volume":"","issue":"","pages":""}},"sort":["Review of Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator"]}
Title | Review of Baltussen, Han: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | Aestimatio |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 210–224 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, Robert B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Philosophy and Exegesis in Simpliciusf a preparatory study for a history of the ancient philosophical commentary [224nnl0, 13], Han Baltussen addresses the ‘methodology’ of pagan antiquity’s last ma jor Platonist and its greatest philosophical scholar, Simplicius of Cili cia (AD ca 480- ca 540). What ‘methodology’ means can be best appreciated if the book’s general conclusions are first summarized. [introduction p. 210] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/oXKF0eqANW36ItV |
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Title | Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: Über die Zeit |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1983 |
Journal | The Classical Review, New Series |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 337-338 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Like a well-trained Neoplatonist commentator, Sonderegger outlines the skopos of his book on the first page. It is to consider Simplicius' thought about time and make it available to a wider audience (an audience that would, however, need to know Greek). His basis is the 28-page excursus at the end of Simplicius' commentary on Physics 4, known as the Corollarium de Tempore (hereafter, with S., CdT), to which, in the main body of the book, he attends with the minimum of excursions. This is partly dictated by his announced interest in Simplicius himself rather than his relation to other thinkers: as he rightly says, that cannot be treated until it is clear what Simplicius himself thought. In the present state of work on late Neoplatonism, this is not a trivial point. Sonderegger's aims have produced a very different book from the little-noticed work of H. Meyer, Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles über die Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969). Meyer's book is more philosophical and also differs in that his purpose was primarily to understand Aristotle, with no notion of being exoteric. Of this book, Sonderegger takes virtually no account, on the grounds that its presuppositions are very different from his own. What Sonderegger has given us is a very detailed and careful descriptive analysis of CdT, with special attention to the organization of the discussions (pp. 38–139), preceded by an introduction on Simplicius' Physics commentary, his excursuses, and Neoplatonism in general, and followed by some 30 pages of translation and 20 of appendices. These include a table of the uses and contexts of key terms in CdT, examinations of the extent and authenticity of quotations from Ps.-Archytas, Iamblichus, and Damascius, and a translation of Simplicius In Categorias 356.8–25, which contains in nuce much of the thought of CdT. Sonderegger is clearly aware that Simplicius wrote commentaries to expound his own philosophy, yet he tends to exaggerate the difference in thought rather than merely presentation, which might be expected in CdT and the analogous digressions on chance and place, as opposed to those parts of the commentary that start from specific lemmata. Even if CdT is more connected, it still proceeds largely by discussing quoted texts, and, as Sonderegger reminds us, Simplicius' aim is always to arrive at his own view of time. That, he claims, will help us to understand Aristotle (773.12–14): one recalls uneasily the project of expounding the De anima while following Iamblichus (In De an. 1.18–20). Sonderegger perhaps underestimates the extent to which Simplicius saw himself as engaged in the same enterprise as Aristotle—and Plato. Though he can cite texts for Simplicius' awareness of the difference between what he and Aristotle say, it does not always follow that Simplicius saw the difference between what he and Aristotle think. The texts Sonderegger quotes at p. 25 n.50 rather point out that Aristotle's intentions are the same, even if his language is not. Thus, 356.31 ff. clearly shows that Simplicius thinks the views on time (chronos) of Aristotle and hoi Neoteroi (the Neoplatonists) are not different. Conversely, in his sketch of the Neoplatonist background, which, as he says, constantly appears in Simplicius' commentary, Sonderegger is inclined to underplay divergences. It is only in the broadest sense true that the outlines of Simplicius' Neoplatonism were determined by Plotinus. The qualification that he liked to attach himself to Iamblichus and used terminology that can be traced back to Proclus is more important. The extent of Proclus' influence is thoroughly documented by I. Hadot, Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris, 1978), cited on p. 26 n. 51. I cannot understand the arguments here (29–35) that, for Simplicius, the hypostases are somehow unreal. This is conducted in terms drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, which, to an English-speaking reader, are not immediately illuminating. Incidentally, diakrisis is not an entity. To treat it as if it were is a kind of hyper-Neoplatonic realism: the meaning of "differentiation" is normally adequate. On time itself, there is a major difference between Plotinus and his post-Iamblichean successors on a point which concerns Sonderegger throughout: the invention of a further type of time that almost becomes a separate hypostasis. This is the psychic time that Simplicius calls protos chronos, as opposed to ordinary physical time on the one hand and aion on the other. The exposition and defense of this first time is the main aim of CdT. It is even more clearly a product of late Neoplatonic triadic thinking than Sonderegger's discussion (69–74) shows. If there is a triad of things permanent and ungenerated, permanent and generated, impermanent and generated, a mediating time is required for the second member of the triad. That this is Simplicius' thinking is shown by the way he has opposed aion as adiakritos and physical time as ho en ti thesei theôrmenos (784.34 ff.), a relation justifying, if not requiring, a higher time. The most notable recasting of Aristotle in Neoplatonist terms is the transformation of his definition into metron tou kata to einai rhontos (not quite "Mass des Seins des Physischen"), which, for all his concern to show that Simplicius distinguishes between Aristotle's views and his own, Sonderegger seems inclined to accept (cf. esp. 43 f. and 138). The translation aims at utility rather than elegance. Its value is greater at a time when interest in the thought of late antiquity is spreading among the wholly or nearly Greekless. Translations are increasingly called for. But who would translate the 1,366 pages of Simplicius' Physics commentary, or, indeed, publish the translation? [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ZCYOjLO9LGrxQNt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"770","_score":null,"_source":{"id":770,"authors_free":[{"id":1134,"entry_id":770,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: \u00dcber die Zeit","main_title":{"title":"Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: \u00dcber die Zeit"},"abstract":"Like a well-trained Neoplatonist commentator, Sonderegger outlines the skopos of his book on the first page. It is to consider Simplicius' thought about time and make it available to a wider audience (an audience that would, however, need to know Greek). His basis is the 28-page excursus at the end of Simplicius' commentary on Physics 4, known as the Corollarium de Tempore (hereafter, with S., CdT), to which, in the main body of the book, he attends with the minimum of excursions. This is partly dictated by his announced interest in Simplicius himself rather than his relation to other thinkers: as he rightly says, that cannot be treated until it is clear what Simplicius himself thought. In the present state of work on late Neoplatonism, this is not a trivial point.\r\n\r\nSonderegger's aims have produced a very different book from the little-noticed work of H. Meyer, Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles \u00fcber die Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969). Meyer's book is more philosophical and also differs in that his purpose was primarily to understand Aristotle, with no notion of being exoteric. Of this book, Sonderegger takes virtually no account, on the grounds that its presuppositions are very different from his own. What Sonderegger has given us is a very detailed and careful descriptive analysis of CdT, with special attention to the organization of the discussions (pp. 38\u2013139), preceded by an introduction on Simplicius' Physics commentary, his excursuses, and Neoplatonism in general, and followed by some 30 pages of translation and 20 of appendices. These include a table of the uses and contexts of key terms in CdT, examinations of the extent and authenticity of quotations from Ps.-Archytas, Iamblichus, and Damascius, and a translation of Simplicius In Categorias 356.8\u201325, which contains in nuce much of the thought of CdT.\r\n\r\nSonderegger is clearly aware that Simplicius wrote commentaries to expound his own philosophy, yet he tends to exaggerate the difference in thought rather than merely presentation, which might be expected in CdT and the analogous digressions on chance and place, as opposed to those parts of the commentary that start from specific lemmata. Even if CdT is more connected, it still proceeds largely by discussing quoted texts, and, as Sonderegger reminds us, Simplicius' aim is always to arrive at his own view of time. That, he claims, will help us to understand Aristotle (773.12\u201314): one recalls uneasily the project of expounding the De anima while following Iamblichus (In De an. 1.18\u201320). Sonderegger perhaps underestimates the extent to which Simplicius saw himself as engaged in the same enterprise as Aristotle\u2014and Plato.\r\n\r\nThough he can cite texts for Simplicius' awareness of the difference between what he and Aristotle say, it does not always follow that Simplicius saw the difference between what he and Aristotle think. The texts Sonderegger quotes at p. 25 n.50 rather point out that Aristotle's intentions are the same, even if his language is not. Thus, 356.31 ff. clearly shows that Simplicius thinks the views on time (chronos) of Aristotle and hoi Neoteroi (the Neoplatonists) are not different. Conversely, in his sketch of the Neoplatonist background, which, as he says, constantly appears in Simplicius' commentary, Sonderegger is inclined to underplay divergences. It is only in the broadest sense true that the outlines of Simplicius' Neoplatonism were determined by Plotinus. The qualification that he liked to attach himself to Iamblichus and used terminology that can be traced back to Proclus is more important.\r\n\r\nThe extent of Proclus' influence is thoroughly documented by I. Hadot, Le Probl\u00e8me du N\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin: Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius (Paris, 1978), cited on p. 26 n. 51. I cannot understand the arguments here (29\u201335) that, for Simplicius, the hypostases are somehow unreal. This is conducted in terms drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, which, to an English-speaking reader, are not immediately illuminating. Incidentally, diakrisis is not an entity. To treat it as if it were is a kind of hyper-Neoplatonic realism: the meaning of \"differentiation\" is normally adequate.\r\n\r\nOn time itself, there is a major difference between Plotinus and his post-Iamblichean successors on a point which concerns Sonderegger throughout: the invention of a further type of time that almost becomes a separate hypostasis. This is the psychic time that Simplicius calls protos chronos, as opposed to ordinary physical time on the one hand and aion on the other. The exposition and defense of this first time is the main aim of CdT. It is even more clearly a product of late Neoplatonic triadic thinking than Sonderegger's discussion (69\u201374) shows.\r\n\r\nIf there is a triad of things permanent and ungenerated, permanent and generated, impermanent and generated, a mediating time is required for the second member of the triad. That this is Simplicius' thinking is shown by the way he has opposed aion as adiakritos and physical time as ho en ti thesei the\u00f4rmenos (784.34 ff.), a relation justifying, if not requiring, a higher time. The most notable recasting of Aristotle in Neoplatonist terms is the transformation of his definition into metron tou kata to einai rhontos (not quite \"Mass des Seins des Physischen\"), which, for all his concern to show that Simplicius distinguishes between Aristotle's views and his own, Sonderegger seems inclined to accept (cf. esp. 43 f. and 138).\r\n\r\nThe translation aims at utility rather than elegance. Its value is greater at a time when interest in the thought of late antiquity is spreading among the wholly or nearly Greekless. Translations are increasingly called for. But who would translate the 1,366 pages of Simplicius' Physics commentary, or, indeed, publish the translation? [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ZCYOjLO9LGrxQNt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":770,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review, New Series","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"337-338"}},"sort":["Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: \u00dcber die Zeit"]}
Title | Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 110 |
Pages | 244–245 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dillon, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius is a man who might seem destined forever to be used simply as a source for other thinkers, without being given much credit for thinking himself. After all, his surviving works are overtly commentaries on one work or another (overwhelmingly of Aristotle)—though, in fact, small bits of more original work are embedded in these, such as the Corollaries on Space and Time in the Physics commentary. He is also a man of exemplary modesty about his own contributions, always making clear his debts to previous authorities, quoting his sources to an extent unusual in Neoplatonist circles (or indeed in the ancient world in general). It was therefore a happy idea of Mme. Hadot to call together a conference of distinguished Neoplatonists to honor Simplicius and to produce this impressive volume as a result. The work is divided into four (unequal) parts: A biographical introduction A series of essays on doctrinal and methodological questions A shorter section on textual problems A pair of essays on Simplicius' Nachleben All are of interest and importance. First, we have an essay by Ilsetraut Hadot herself (depending in one important respect on the essay of Michel Tardieu, which follows it) on the chronology of Simplicius' life and works. Tardieu, by a fine piece of detective work (Simplicius et les calendriers de Harran), argues with at least great probability that when Simplicius returned with the other philosophers from Persia in 532, it was not to Athens or any other major center but rather to the town of Harran (Carrhae) in Osrhoene. There, a tradition of non-conformist Christianity was tolerant of philosophy, and it is likely where he composed most, if not all, of his commentaries. Certain remarks Simplicius makes in In Phys. 874.23 ff., about the four different calendars "we" use, seem to require his presence at the only known place where four calendars were simultaneously in use, as we know from later Arab sources. The central part of the collection comprises six essays on aspects of doctrine: Two by Philippe Hoffmann (Categories et langage selon Simplicius: on the purpose (skopos) of Aristotle's Categories and an analysis of Simplicius’ invective against John Philoponus) One by Henry Blumenthal on the doctrine of the De Anima commentary of Simplicius (if it is indeed by Simplicius) One by Concetta Luna on Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary One by Richard Sorabji on Simplicius: Prime Matter as Extension One by Nestor-Luis Cordero on Simplicius et l'école éléate Hoffmann's studies frame this central portion of the work. His first examines Simplicius' account of the skopos of Aristotle's Categories, showing how Simplicius, following Porphyry, views the Categories as addressing "utterances" (phonai), "things" (pragmata, onta), "concepts" (noemata), or all of these. Simplicius interprets the study of language, particularly its primary constituents, as a preparation for the soul’s ascent to the noetic world—a higher interpretation inherited from Iamblichus. In his second study, Hoffmann examines Simplicius' strategies of polemic and invective against Philoponus, particularly in the De Caelo, and Simplicius' view of the higher purpose of studying celestial matters. For Simplicius, even prosaic texts like the Categories could become an elevating and prayerful experience. Sorabji, in an elegant contribution, shows how Simplicius solves a problem bequeathed by Aristotle by identifying prime matter with extension, which Aristotle did not do. Cordero challenges the idea of an Eleatic "school" while listing Simplicius’ quotations of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. Blumenthal discusses Simplicius’ doctrine of the soul, though his uncertainty about the authorship of the De Anima commentary (potentially by Priscian) limits the analysis. Luna traces Iamblichean roots in Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary. The final sections include discussions of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius, with contributions by Ilsetraut Hadot, Leonardo Taran, and Dieter Harlfinger. Taran critiques Diels’ edition of Simplicius' Physics commentary, showing its deficiencies due to reliance on unreliable collations and limited understanding of Neoplatonic doctrine. Harlfinger analyzes contamination in the manuscript tradition of the commentary on Books I-IV. The collection concludes with two papers on Simplicius’ influence in the medieval West, one by Fernand Boissier on Latin translations and the influence of the In De Caelo commentary and another by Pierre Hadot on the survival of the Manuel d'Épictète commentary in the 15th to 17th centuries. Overall, this collection has given Simplicius much of his due as a major commentator and preserver of earlier Greek philosophy. While only three papers—those by Blumenthal, Luna, and Sorabji—discuss any distinctive doctrines of Simplicius, this is perhaps reasonable given that he does not claim originality. Most of what seems distinctive likely goes back to Iamblichus or Syrianus/Proclus. Yet, it might one day be possible to produce a focused volume on his doctrinal innovations. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hje0CYeAY915LhU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"708","_score":null,"_source":{"id":708,"authors_free":[{"id":1056,"entry_id":708,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":97,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dillon, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Dillon","norm_person":{"id":97,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Dillon","full_name":"Dillon, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123498058","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa \tsurvie","main_title":{"title":"Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa \tsurvie"},"abstract":"Simplicius is a man who might seem destined forever to be used simply as a source for other thinkers, without being given much credit for thinking himself. After all, his surviving works are overtly commentaries on one work or another (overwhelmingly of Aristotle)\u2014though, in fact, small bits of more original work are embedded in these, such as the Corollaries on Space and Time in the Physics commentary. He is also a man of exemplary modesty about his own contributions, always making clear his debts to previous authorities, quoting his sources to an extent unusual in Neoplatonist circles (or indeed in the ancient world in general).\r\n\r\nIt was therefore a happy idea of Mme. Hadot to call together a conference of distinguished Neoplatonists to honor Simplicius and to produce this impressive volume as a result. The work is divided into four (unequal) parts:\r\n\r\n A biographical introduction\r\n A series of essays on doctrinal and methodological questions\r\n A shorter section on textual problems\r\n A pair of essays on Simplicius' Nachleben\r\n\r\nAll are of interest and importance.\r\n\r\nFirst, we have an essay by Ilsetraut Hadot herself (depending in one important respect on the essay of Michel Tardieu, which follows it) on the chronology of Simplicius' life and works. Tardieu, by a fine piece of detective work (Simplicius et les calendriers de Harran), argues with at least great probability that when Simplicius returned with the other philosophers from Persia in 532, it was not to Athens or any other major center but rather to the town of Harran (Carrhae) in Osrhoene. There, a tradition of non-conformist Christianity was tolerant of philosophy, and it is likely where he composed most, if not all, of his commentaries. Certain remarks Simplicius makes in In Phys. 874.23 ff., about the four different calendars \"we\" use, seem to require his presence at the only known place where four calendars were simultaneously in use, as we know from later Arab sources.\r\n\r\nThe central part of the collection comprises six essays on aspects of doctrine:\r\n\r\n Two by Philippe Hoffmann (Categories et langage selon Simplicius: on the purpose (skopos) of Aristotle's Categories and an analysis of Simplicius\u2019 invective against John Philoponus)\r\n One by Henry Blumenthal on the doctrine of the De Anima commentary of Simplicius (if it is indeed by Simplicius)\r\n One by Concetta Luna on Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary\r\n One by Richard Sorabji on Simplicius: Prime Matter as Extension\r\n One by Nestor-Luis Cordero on Simplicius et l'\u00e9cole \u00e9l\u00e9ate\r\n\r\nHoffmann's studies frame this central portion of the work. His first examines Simplicius' account of the skopos of Aristotle's Categories, showing how Simplicius, following Porphyry, views the Categories as addressing \"utterances\" (phonai), \"things\" (pragmata, onta), \"concepts\" (noemata), or all of these. Simplicius interprets the study of language, particularly its primary constituents, as a preparation for the soul\u2019s ascent to the noetic world\u2014a higher interpretation inherited from Iamblichus. In his second study, Hoffmann examines Simplicius' strategies of polemic and invective against Philoponus, particularly in the De Caelo, and Simplicius' view of the higher purpose of studying celestial matters. For Simplicius, even prosaic texts like the Categories could become an elevating and prayerful experience.\r\n\r\nSorabji, in an elegant contribution, shows how Simplicius solves a problem bequeathed by Aristotle by identifying prime matter with extension, which Aristotle did not do. Cordero challenges the idea of an Eleatic \"school\" while listing Simplicius\u2019 quotations of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. Blumenthal discusses Simplicius\u2019 doctrine of the soul, though his uncertainty about the authorship of the De Anima commentary (potentially by Priscian) limits the analysis. Luna traces Iamblichean roots in Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary.\r\n\r\nThe final sections include discussions of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius, with contributions by Ilsetraut Hadot, Leonardo Taran, and Dieter Harlfinger. Taran critiques Diels\u2019 edition of Simplicius' Physics commentary, showing its deficiencies due to reliance on unreliable collations and limited understanding of Neoplatonic doctrine. Harlfinger analyzes contamination in the manuscript tradition of the commentary on Books I-IV.\r\n\r\nThe collection concludes with two papers on Simplicius\u2019 influence in the medieval West, one by Fernand Boissier on Latin translations and the influence of the In De Caelo commentary and another by Pierre Hadot on the survival of the Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te commentary in the 15th to 17th centuries.\r\n\r\nOverall, this collection has given Simplicius much of his due as a major commentator and preserver of earlier Greek philosophy. While only three papers\u2014those by Blumenthal, Luna, and Sorabji\u2014discuss any distinctive doctrines of Simplicius, this is perhaps reasonable given that he does not claim originality. Most of what seems distinctive likely goes back to Iamblichus or Syrianus\/Proclus. Yet, it might one day be possible to produce a focused volume on his doctrinal innovations. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hje0CYeAY915LhU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":97,"full_name":"Dillon, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":708,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"110","issue":"","pages":"244\u2013245"}},"sort":["Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa \tsurvie"]}
Title | Review of Hadot, I.: Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète, Tome I |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | The Classical Review, New Series |
Volume | 52 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 377-378 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In 1996, Ilsetraut Hadot published the first-ever full critical edition of the Greek text of Simplicius' commentary on Epictetus' Encheiridion (I. Hadot, Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epictète [Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1996]). The volume reviewed here is the first half of an editio minor of that text. It also contains a largely new introduction, written for a more general audience than the detailed scholarly introduction of the editio maior, and a translation equipped with notes. These notes follow the format of recent Budé editions of Neoplatonic texts, offering much helpful explanation with useful references to parallel passages in other Neoplatonic authors but inconveniently divided between the bottom of the page and the end of the volume. All Neoplatonic commentaries are discursive, and those of Simplicius are among the most discursive. It takes 130 pages of this volume for Simplicius to reach Chapter 20 of Epictetus' short work. However, as with many Neoplatonic commentaries, the interest of this one does not lie in what it tells us about Epictetus—whose philosophy Simplicius misunderstood in some important respects, as Hadot points out in her introduction (pp. ci–cxvii). Rather, it is worth reading for what it tells us about Simplicius' own philosophical views. It is unusual among Neoplatonic commentaries in dealing with an ethical text, and the discussions of τὰ Ἐφ' ἡμῖν (what is within our power) and the spiritual exercises recommended by Epictetus are of considerable interest. Hadot's introduction offers an updated version of her views on Simplicius' life, work, and philosophical system; a chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching; an account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines; and a short history of the text. Finally, there is an appendix on Fate, Providence, and human freedom in Neoplatonism, which covers Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus, as well as Simplicius. Of these, the account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines and the appendix are entirely new, while the chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching is an updated and lightly revised version of a chapter from her book, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris, 1978). The first two chapters of the introduction repeat, in a clear and accessible form, views she has already published elsewhere and is well known for. She reiterates her now largely accepted demonstration that Simplicius' philosophical system is essentially the same as that of Damascius—not, as Praechter thought, a simplified Alexandrian system—and, more controversially, continues to maintain, with Tardieu, that his commentaries were written in Harran after 532. The chapter on the history of the text abbreviates the longer account in the editio maior and explains the principles of the editio minor, acknowledging the help of Concetta Luna in simplifying the apparatus. A small number of readings that differ from those of the editio maior are indicated in a footnote on p. cxxvi. Hadot's translation is divided into sections with helpful headings and subheadings, and, together with her full notes, provides a great deal of assistance in understanding Simplicius' text. This volume deserves a warm welcome as a further installment in the enormous contribution Hadot has made to the understanding of Simplicius over many years. It is to be hoped that it will not be too long before the second volume appears to complement it. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lwxAqvhdfMDm8ss |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1020","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1020,"authors_free":[{"id":1536,"entry_id":1020,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":43,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","free_first_name":"Anne D.","free_last_name":"Sheppard","norm_person":{"id":43,"first_name":"Anne D.","last_name":"Sheppard","full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158024592","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Hadot, I.: Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te, Tome I","main_title":{"title":"Review of Hadot, I.: Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te, Tome I"},"abstract":"In 1996, Ilsetraut Hadot published the first-ever full critical edition of the Greek text of Simplicius' commentary on Epictetus' Encheiridion (I. Hadot, Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epict\u00e8te [Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1996]). The volume reviewed here is the first half of an editio minor of that text. It also contains a largely new introduction, written for a more general audience than the detailed scholarly introduction of the editio maior, and a translation equipped with notes. These notes follow the format of recent Bud\u00e9 editions of Neoplatonic texts, offering much helpful explanation with useful references to parallel passages in other Neoplatonic authors but inconveniently divided between the bottom of the page and the end of the volume.\r\n\r\nAll Neoplatonic commentaries are discursive, and those of Simplicius are among the most discursive. It takes 130 pages of this volume for Simplicius to reach Chapter 20 of Epictetus' short work. However, as with many Neoplatonic commentaries, the interest of this one does not lie in what it tells us about Epictetus\u2014whose philosophy Simplicius misunderstood in some important respects, as Hadot points out in her introduction (pp. ci\u2013cxvii). Rather, it is worth reading for what it tells us about Simplicius' own philosophical views. It is unusual among Neoplatonic commentaries in dealing with an ethical text, and the discussions of \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f18\u03c6' \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd (what is within our power) and the spiritual exercises recommended by Epictetus are of considerable interest.\r\n\r\nHadot's introduction offers an updated version of her views on Simplicius' life, work, and philosophical system; a chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching; an account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines; and a short history of the text. Finally, there is an appendix on Fate, Providence, and human freedom in Neoplatonism, which covers Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus, as well as Simplicius. Of these, the account of Simplicius' reception of Stoic doctrines and the appendix are entirely new, while the chapter on the Commentary's place in Neoplatonic teaching is an updated and lightly revised version of a chapter from her book, Le probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9oplatonisme alexandrin. Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius (Paris, 1978).\r\n\r\nThe first two chapters of the introduction repeat, in a clear and accessible form, views she has already published elsewhere and is well known for. She reiterates her now largely accepted demonstration that Simplicius' philosophical system is essentially the same as that of Damascius\u2014not, as Praechter thought, a simplified Alexandrian system\u2014and, more controversially, continues to maintain, with Tardieu, that his commentaries were written in Harran after 532. The chapter on the history of the text abbreviates the longer account in the editio maior and explains the principles of the editio minor, acknowledging the help of Concetta Luna in simplifying the apparatus. A small number of readings that differ from those of the editio maior are indicated in a footnote on p. cxxvi.\r\n\r\nHadot's translation is divided into sections with helpful headings and subheadings, and, together with her full notes, provides a great deal of assistance in understanding Simplicius' text. This volume deserves a warm welcome as a further installment in the enormous contribution Hadot has made to the understanding of Simplicius over many years. It is to be hoped that it will not be too long before the second volume appears to complement it. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lwxAqvhdfMDm8ss","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":43,"full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1020,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review, New Series","volume":"52","issue":"2","pages":"377-378"}},"sort":["Review of Hadot, I.: Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te, Tome I"]}
Title | Review of Hagen, C. (tr.): Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 7 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1995 |
Journal | The Classical Review, New Series |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 464-465 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Smith, Andrew |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The seventh book of Aristotle's Physics was as problematic in antiquity as it is today. Modern scholars have found its place and role in the Physics as a whole difficult to define. Its content seems to be superseded by the apparently more cogent arguments of Book Eight for an unmoved mover. Eudemus seems to have rejected it as spurious, as his version of the Physics omitted this book, and Themistius omits the first chapter and skims over the rest. Alexander thought the arguments were rather formal, while Simplicius finds them weak. The latter, to whom we are indebted for much of our information about ancient attitudes toward the book, thought it was written earlier than Book Eight, which then replaced it. None of this is simplified by the existence of two versions for at least the first three chapters. Nevertheless, Simplicius took the book seriously enough to write an 85-page commentary on it. Simplicius, in fact, frequently suggests the important contribution of the arguments in Book Seven to their continuation in Book Eight (cf. H., p. 103 n. 16, who also notes how Simplicius elsewhere refers to Book Seven rather than to Book Eight for the important theme of the mover). In this, Simplicius anticipates, in a way, the important recent work of Robert Wardy (The Chain of Change: A Study of Aristotle's Physics VII, Cambridge, 1990), who has reinstated the independent value of Book Seven as a preparation for the later book and not infrequently alludes to Simplicius. Not the least merit of H.'s notes is the full use he makes of Wardy's work. H.'s translation is marked by the care and clarity we have come to expect from this series. There are frequent pointers in the text to clarify the occurrence of Greek technical terms. This is aided by a full English-Greek glossary and a Greek-English index, in addition to a 16-page subject index. The notes, which are gathered in some 30 pages at the end rather than printed at the foot of the page as in earlier volumes, seem more extensive, while the new format allows for longer individual notes. Space is not squandered, and much useful material and insightful commentary can be found in these pages. In addition to helping relate Simplicius' interpretations to the text of Aristotle, H. is also attentive to Simplicius' Neoplatonic concerns. Simplicius, for example, is clearly puzzled as to what entities in the Neoplatonic world Aristotle's concepts might apply. Initially, he interprets Aristotle's analysis of "internal movement" as soul moving body, where something is seen to move but we cannot point to the mover (1038, 1f.). Later, he restricts this to the soul alone, citing Phaedrus 245c8, but finally decides to use the common Neoplatonic strategy of restricting Aristotle's analysis to the sublunar world. In fact, Simplicius is groping toward an understanding of the contribution of the argument in Book Seven to the unmoved mover of Book Eight. He points to the connection by narrowing the meaning of Aristotle's "first moved mover" to "something first imparting motion which is no longer being moved itself by another" (1047, 15). (Aristotle's first mover in Book Seven, though not moved by another, is nevertheless in motion.) At the same time, Simplicius is quite clear that Aristotle is not referring to a cosmic mover here. Thus, at 1048, 15f., he distinguishes "the very first, unmoved cause of motion" and the "proximate mover," which he thinks Aristotle is referring to in Book Seven. H.'s notes not only clarify Simplicius' interpretation of the Aristotelian text but also aid our understanding of Simplicius' creative philosophical concerns. This translation, therefore, will be of use to those with Neoplatonic as well as Aristotelian interests. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qOElwVrkx2iCYIO |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"847","_score":null,"_source":{"id":847,"authors_free":[{"id":1251,"entry_id":847,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":232,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Smith, Andrew","free_first_name":"Andrew","free_last_name":"Smith","norm_person":{"id":232,"first_name":"Andrew","last_name":"Smith","full_name":"Smith, Andrew","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122322606","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Hagen, C. (tr.): Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 7","main_title":{"title":"Review of Hagen, C. (tr.): Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 7"},"abstract":"The seventh book of Aristotle's Physics was as problematic in antiquity as it is today. Modern scholars have found its place and role in the Physics as a whole difficult to define. Its content seems to be superseded by the apparently more cogent arguments of Book Eight for an unmoved mover. Eudemus seems to have rejected it as spurious, as his version of the Physics omitted this book, and Themistius omits the first chapter and skims over the rest. Alexander thought the arguments were rather formal, while Simplicius finds them weak. The latter, to whom we are indebted for much of our information about ancient attitudes toward the book, thought it was written earlier than Book Eight, which then replaced it.\r\n\r\nNone of this is simplified by the existence of two versions for at least the first three chapters. Nevertheless, Simplicius took the book seriously enough to write an 85-page commentary on it. Simplicius, in fact, frequently suggests the important contribution of the arguments in Book Seven to their continuation in Book Eight (cf. H., p. 103 n. 16, who also notes how Simplicius elsewhere refers to Book Seven rather than to Book Eight for the important theme of the mover). In this, Simplicius anticipates, in a way, the important recent work of Robert Wardy (The Chain of Change: A Study of Aristotle's Physics VII, Cambridge, 1990), who has reinstated the independent value of Book Seven as a preparation for the later book and not infrequently alludes to Simplicius.\r\n\r\nNot the least merit of H.'s notes is the full use he makes of Wardy's work. H.'s translation is marked by the care and clarity we have come to expect from this series. There are frequent pointers in the text to clarify the occurrence of Greek technical terms. This is aided by a full English-Greek glossary and a Greek-English index, in addition to a 16-page subject index. The notes, which are gathered in some 30 pages at the end rather than printed at the foot of the page as in earlier volumes, seem more extensive, while the new format allows for longer individual notes. Space is not squandered, and much useful material and insightful commentary can be found in these pages.\r\n\r\nIn addition to helping relate Simplicius' interpretations to the text of Aristotle, H. is also attentive to Simplicius' Neoplatonic concerns. Simplicius, for example, is clearly puzzled as to what entities in the Neoplatonic world Aristotle's concepts might apply. Initially, he interprets Aristotle's analysis of \"internal movement\" as soul moving body, where something is seen to move but we cannot point to the mover (1038, 1f.). Later, he restricts this to the soul alone, citing Phaedrus 245c8, but finally decides to use the common Neoplatonic strategy of restricting Aristotle's analysis to the sublunar world.\r\n\r\nIn fact, Simplicius is groping toward an understanding of the contribution of the argument in Book Seven to the unmoved mover of Book Eight. He points to the connection by narrowing the meaning of Aristotle's \"first moved mover\" to \"something first imparting motion which is no longer being moved itself by another\" (1047, 15). (Aristotle's first mover in Book Seven, though not moved by another, is nevertheless in motion.) At the same time, Simplicius is quite clear that Aristotle is not referring to a cosmic mover here. Thus, at 1048, 15f., he distinguishes \"the very first, unmoved cause of motion\" and the \"proximate mover,\" which he thinks Aristotle is referring to in Book Seven.\r\n\r\nH.'s notes not only clarify Simplicius' interpretation of the Aristotelian text but also aid our understanding of Simplicius' creative philosophical concerns. This translation, therefore, will be of use to those with Neoplatonic as well as Aristotelian interests. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1995","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qOElwVrkx2iCYIO","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":232,"full_name":"Smith, Andrew","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":847,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review, New Series","volume":"45","issue":"2","pages":"464-465"}},"sort":["Review of Hagen, C. (tr.): Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 7"]}
Title | Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 62 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 465-467 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Thanks to the Ancient Commentators project, almost all of Simplicius' commentaries are now translated. This volume completes the gigantic On Aristotle's Physics. Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides). In Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements. In Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition. This volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately. As to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues. T. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments). The translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios). Now for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither "mental" nor "intellectual" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai hênôtai kata Anaxagoran ta eidê kai amphô dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms. H. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou mê ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1). One could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit. Finally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Postérité de l'Être. Simplicius interprète de Parménide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Empédocle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here. With its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1465","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1465,"authors_free":[{"id":2538,"entry_id":1465,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3\u20134","main_title":{"title":"Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3\u20134"},"abstract":"Thanks to the Ancient Commentators project, almost all of Simplicius' commentaries are now translated. This volume completes the gigantic On Aristotle's Physics. Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides).\r\nIn Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements.\r\nIn Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition.\r\nThis volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately.\r\nAs to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues.\r\nT. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments).\r\nThe translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios).\r\nNow for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither \"mental\" nor \"intellectual\" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai h\u00ean\u00f4tai kata Anaxagoran ta eid\u00ea kai amph\u00f4 dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms.\r\nH. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou m\u00ea ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1).\r\nOne could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit.\r\nFinally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00catre. Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here.\r\nWith its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels.\r\n[author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1465,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"62","issue":"2","pages":"465-467"}},"sort":["Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3\u20134"]}
Title | Review of Rescigno, A. 2004: Alessandro di Afrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del Primo Libro |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Bryn Mawr Classical Review |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 38 |
Pages | 750 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, Robert B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It is a sure sign that a field in classical studies is maturing when the fragments of its authors come in for close scrutiny. Where the Greek Aristotelian commentators are concerned, the way was pointed, in this as in so many other areas, by the late Paul Moraux, who in his early and epochal study of Alexander of Aphrodisias's psychological works included an appendix of selected fragments of this commentator's lost exegesis of Aristotle's De animaJ Later he reconstructed thefragments of the same philosopher's treatment of the Posterior Analytics.2 More recently, Arabists in particular have worked on fragments of Alexander's commentaries on the Physics and De generatione et corruptione, while Moraux in the posthumously published third volume of his Aristotelismus surveyed the fragments of several of the lost commentaries.3 One of these was the commentary on the De caelo, the first part of which Andrea Rescigno, in the first of two projected volumes, has now treated exhaustively in his edition of the fragments of the commentary on Book 1. [introduction p. 1] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4vzysjSHY0mmOvC |
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Title | Review of Stevens: Postérité de l'être: Simplicius interprète de Parménide |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | The Classical Review |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 454 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wright, M.R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The Review: Stevens sets out to clarify Parmenides' philosophy with an analysis of Simplicius' presentation of his fragments and the related contextual exposition. This is a complex task, for twelve centuries separate Simplicius from the Presocratics, and, although generous beyond his needs in the length of Eleatic quotation, Simplicius is only too ready to enlist Parmenides as an earlier witness to the Platonic and Neoplatonic interpretations that pervade his commentary on Aristotelian texts. A further complication is that the order imposed by Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo is at variance with the sequence of Eleatic argument. S.'s cahier is much too brief for the subject matter involved. He has one chapter each on Parmenides' Aletheia and Doxa, sandwiched between a brief introduction and conclusion. There is an Appendix, more than half the length of what has preceded, which consists of a translation into French (without the Greek text but with some annotation) of relevant sections from Simplicius' Phys. 28-180, 243-244, and DC 556-560. An Index of the fragments of Parmenides cited in these two works is added, along with a short bibliography. Interspersed in the text are tables giving Greek words from Simplicius, their French translation, and a brief justification. The point of these is obscure, and, since they are hard to follow in the absence of a continuous text, the result may appear arbitrary, e.g., τελέον at Phys. 29.10 as "parfait," τέλος in the next line as "accomplissement," but τέλειον further down as "fin." Translation of Eleatic texts in general looks easier in French than English, with "il" conveniently ambiguous for Greek masculine, neuter, or impersonal subjects, and "l’Etant" and "l’être" (with and without capitals) for ontological terminology. The main problem with S.'s study is the level of scholarship involved and consequently the readership targeted. There are a number of ways of tackling the subject, none of which S. holds to consistently. One is a straightforward introduction to reading Parmenides' lines in their Simplicius context, and sometimes S. is writing in this way. The first chapter, for example, starts with a straightforward narrative of the "signs" for the Aletheia, and the second with the usual listing of different views on the status of the Doxa. Simplicius' position on both these topics is given, but without any explanation of the Neoplatonic terms (like "Étante-Un") that are used. Secondly, there is a scholarly monograph struggling to emerge. The reader can suddenly be involved in a sophisticated comparison of Parmenides' concept of τελέον with ἄπειρον in Melissus, or in textual exegesis, or in studying the relevance of the first two hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides, or the exact meaning of ἀπατήλων in B 8.52. But thirdly, what is needed, as S. indicates in the subtitle, is a full and detailed discussion of Simplicius as an interpreter of Parmenides. This could usefully tackle Simplicius' reasons for finding Parmenides compatible with both Plato and Aristotle, the particular readings (or re-readings) of all four ancient authors that might be involved in the exercise, what traps might thereby be set in the path of those who are tracking the original Parmenides, and what implications would then arise for Simplicius' treatment of other Presocratics. All this is yet to be done. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6R2tnf8PGMB9Dbj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"421","_score":null,"_source":{"id":421,"authors_free":[{"id":564,"entry_id":421,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":365,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wright, M.R.","free_first_name":"M.R.","free_last_name":"Wright","norm_person":{"id":365,"first_name":"M. R.","last_name":"Wright","full_name":"Wright, M. R.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174111304","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00eatre: Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide","main_title":{"title":"Review of Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00eatre: Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide"},"abstract":"The Review: Stevens sets out to clarify Parmenides' philosophy with an analysis of Simplicius' presentation of his fragments and the related contextual exposition. This is a complex task, for twelve centuries separate Simplicius from the Presocratics, and, although generous beyond his needs in the length of Eleatic quotation, Simplicius is only too ready to enlist Parmenides as an earlier witness to the Platonic and Neoplatonic interpretations that pervade his commentary on Aristotelian texts.\r\n\r\nA further complication is that the order imposed by Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo is at variance with the sequence of Eleatic argument. S.'s cahier is much too brief for the subject matter involved. He has one chapter each on Parmenides' Aletheia and Doxa, sandwiched between a brief introduction and conclusion. There is an Appendix, more than half the length of what has preceded, which consists of a translation into French (without the Greek text but with some annotation) of relevant sections from Simplicius' Phys. 28-180, 243-244, and DC 556-560. An Index of the fragments of Parmenides cited in these two works is added, along with a short bibliography. Interspersed in the text are tables giving Greek words from Simplicius, their French translation, and a brief justification. The point of these is obscure, and, since they are hard to follow in the absence of a continuous text, the result may appear arbitrary, e.g., \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd at Phys. 29.10 as \"parfait,\" \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 in the next line as \"accomplissement,\" but \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd further down as \"fin.\"\r\n\r\nTranslation of Eleatic texts in general looks easier in French than English, with \"il\" conveniently ambiguous for Greek masculine, neuter, or impersonal subjects, and \"l\u2019Etant\" and \"l\u2019\u00eatre\" (with and without capitals) for ontological terminology.\r\n\r\nThe main problem with S.'s study is the level of scholarship involved and consequently the readership targeted. There are a number of ways of tackling the subject, none of which S. holds to consistently. One is a straightforward introduction to reading Parmenides' lines in their Simplicius context, and sometimes S. is writing in this way. The first chapter, for example, starts with a straightforward narrative of the \"signs\" for the Aletheia, and the second with the usual listing of different views on the status of the Doxa. Simplicius' position on both these topics is given, but without any explanation of the Neoplatonic terms (like \"\u00c9tante-Un\") that are used.\r\n\r\nSecondly, there is a scholarly monograph struggling to emerge. The reader can suddenly be involved in a sophisticated comparison of Parmenides' concept of \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd with \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd in Melissus, or in textual exegesis, or in studying the relevance of the first two hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides, or the exact meaning of \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd in B 8.52. But thirdly, what is needed, as S. indicates in the subtitle, is a full and detailed discussion of Simplicius as an interpreter of Parmenides. This could usefully tackle Simplicius' reasons for finding Parmenides compatible with both Plato and Aristotle, the particular readings (or re-readings) of all four ancient authors that might be involved in the exercise, what traps might thereby be set in the path of those who are tracking the original Parmenides, and what implications would then arise for Simplicius' treatment of other Presocratics. All this is yet to be done.","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6R2tnf8PGMB9Dbj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":365,"full_name":"Wright, M. R.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":421,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"42","issue":"2","pages":"454"}},"sort":["Review of Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00eatre: Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide"]}
Title | Review of: Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8. Translated by David Blank. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 5. Translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Revue Philosophique de Louvain Année |
Volume | 98 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 358-359 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solère, Jean-Luc |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
À la collection dirigée par R. Sorabji, sont venus s'ajouter les trois volumes ici signalés. Comme le remarque un des traducteurs, Simplicius n'est pas toujours plus clair qu'Aristote. Mais ces textes sont d'inépuisables mines d'information pour l'étude de la philosophie antique, et ces traductions accompagnées de notes sont de précieux instruments. On remarquera spécialement, dans le commentaire du livre II de la Physique, les discussions sur la différence entre nature et âme, sur l'intelligence des animaux ; dans le commentaire du livre V, celle sur le changement dans les catégories autres que substance, qualité, quantité et lieu. Quant à Ammonius, nous possédons nombre de reflets de son enseignement oral (apo phônês) dans les transcriptions effectuées par ses élèves des explications d'autres ouvrages d'Aristote, mais celle du Péri Hermeneias est le seul des commentaires du maître alexandrin, à nous parvenu, qui soit de sa propre main. Il n'a donc pas les caractères un peu mécaniques de la lecture scolaire (skholia), mais possède une élaboration littéraire plus poussée (celle qui convient aux hupomnêmata). Cependant, Ammonius, fils d'Hermeias, doit sans doute le fond de son interprétation à l'enseignement qu'il a reçu à Athènes de son propre professeur, Proclus, dont il aurait rédigé les leçons comme feront ses disciples pour les siennes. Cette transmission scolaire était aussi une affaire de famille, car la mère d'Ammonius, Aedesia, était une parente de Syrianus, le maître de Proclus et d'Hermeias. Cela n'empêche pas une distance critique, puisque les vues de Syrianus sur la négation indéterminée sont réfutées. Néanmoins, son commentaire est directement utile pour l'explication du chapitre 14, généralement omis parce que considéré comme inauthentique, au moins depuis Porphyre. Le commentaire de ce dernier, justement, a joué aussi un grand rôle dans l'exégèse des néoplatoniciens tardifs. Bien que perdu, des passages peuvent être reconstitués par recoupement avec le commentaire de Boèce, qui en dépend aussi. Étant donné que Porphyre citait non seulement des interprètes d'Aristote comme Alexandre d'Aphrodise, mais aussi des traités stoïciens, l'entreprise est d'importance pour l'histoire de la sémantique et de la logique. Le commentaire d'Ammonius est conduit du point de vue néoplatonicien, qui postule une harmonie entre les philosophies d'Aristote et de Platon. C'est ici aussi une gageure, puisque pour le Stagirite les noms sont imposés par convention, alors que d'après le Cratyle, le fondement de leur signification est naturel. Conformément aux règles de la collection, on trouve dans chaque volume des glossaires grec-anglais et anglais-grec, un index des passages cités et un index verborum. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CoYcyNe9f3pbpI7 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1478","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1478,"authors_free":[{"id":2559,"entry_id":1478,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":547,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sol\u00e8re, Jean-Luc","free_first_name":"Jean-Luc","free_last_name":"Sol\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":547,"first_name":"Jean-Luc","last_name":"Sol\u00e8re","full_name":"Sol\u00e8re, Jean-Luc","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/103699290X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8. Translated by David Blank. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 5. Translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8. Translated by David Blank. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 5. Translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner"},"abstract":"\u00c0 la collection dirig\u00e9e par R. Sorabji, sont venus s'ajouter les trois volumes ici signal\u00e9s. Comme le remarque un des traducteurs, Simplicius n'est pas toujours plus clair qu'Aristote. Mais ces textes sont d'in\u00e9puisables mines d'information pour l'\u00e9tude de la philosophie antique, et ces traductions accompagn\u00e9es de notes sont de pr\u00e9cieux instruments.\r\n\r\nOn remarquera sp\u00e9cialement, dans le commentaire du livre II de la Physique, les discussions sur la diff\u00e9rence entre nature et \u00e2me, sur l'intelligence des animaux ; dans le commentaire du livre V, celle sur le changement dans les cat\u00e9gories autres que substance, qualit\u00e9, quantit\u00e9 et lieu.\r\n\r\nQuant \u00e0 Ammonius, nous poss\u00e9dons nombre de reflets de son enseignement oral (apo ph\u00f4n\u00eas) dans les transcriptions effectu\u00e9es par ses \u00e9l\u00e8ves des explications d'autres ouvrages d'Aristote, mais celle du P\u00e9ri Hermeneias est le seul des commentaires du ma\u00eetre alexandrin, \u00e0 nous parvenu, qui soit de sa propre main. Il n'a donc pas les caract\u00e8res un peu m\u00e9caniques de la lecture scolaire (skholia), mais poss\u00e8de une \u00e9laboration litt\u00e9raire plus pouss\u00e9e (celle qui convient aux hupomn\u00eamata).\r\n\r\nCependant, Ammonius, fils d'Hermeias, doit sans doute le fond de son interpr\u00e9tation \u00e0 l'enseignement qu'il a re\u00e7u \u00e0 Ath\u00e8nes de son propre professeur, Proclus, dont il aurait r\u00e9dig\u00e9 les le\u00e7ons comme feront ses disciples pour les siennes. Cette transmission scolaire \u00e9tait aussi une affaire de famille, car la m\u00e8re d'Ammonius, Aedesia, \u00e9tait une parente de Syrianus, le ma\u00eetre de Proclus et d'Hermeias. Cela n'emp\u00eache pas une distance critique, puisque les vues de Syrianus sur la n\u00e9gation ind\u00e9termin\u00e9e sont r\u00e9fut\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nN\u00e9anmoins, son commentaire est directement utile pour l'explication du chapitre 14, g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement omis parce que consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme inauthentique, au moins depuis Porphyre. Le commentaire de ce dernier, justement, a jou\u00e9 aussi un grand r\u00f4le dans l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se des n\u00e9oplatoniciens tardifs. Bien que perdu, des passages peuvent \u00eatre reconstitu\u00e9s par recoupement avec le commentaire de Bo\u00e8ce, qui en d\u00e9pend aussi.\r\n\r\n\u00c9tant donn\u00e9 que Porphyre citait non seulement des interpr\u00e8tes d'Aristote comme Alexandre d'Aphrodise, mais aussi des trait\u00e9s sto\u00efciens, l'entreprise est d'importance pour l'histoire de la s\u00e9mantique et de la logique. Le commentaire d'Ammonius est conduit du point de vue n\u00e9oplatonicien, qui postule une harmonie entre les philosophies d'Aristote et de Platon. C'est ici aussi une gageure, puisque pour le Stagirite les noms sont impos\u00e9s par convention, alors que d'apr\u00e8s le Cratyle, le fondement de leur signification est naturel.\r\n\r\nConform\u00e9ment aux r\u00e8gles de la collection, on trouve dans chaque volume des glossaires grec-anglais et anglais-grec, un index des passages cit\u00e9s et un index verborum. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CoYcyNe9f3pbpI7","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":547,"full_name":"Sol\u00e8re, Jean-Luc","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1478,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de Louvain Ann\u00e9e","volume":"98","issue":"2","pages":"358-359"}},"sort":["Review of: Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8. Translated by David Blank. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 5. Translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner"]}
Title | Review of: Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | The Classical World |
Volume | 104 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 117-118 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Menn, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Most people who have heard of Simplicius know two things about him: he was a very learned man who included many quotations and reports of others' views in his writing, thus becoming one of our main sources for the pre-Socratics; but, unfortunately, he was a Neoplatonist, and his testimony is therefore to some degree suspect. So Simplicius has been studied more for the sake of assessing testimony about earlier philosophers than for his own sake; this is the first full-scale monograph on Simplicius in English, although virtually simultaneous with Pantelis Golitsis' Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d'Aristote: tradition et innovation (Berlin, 2008). Simplicius, however, is not so neglected or undervalued as this might suggest: his projects of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle (and sometimes other philosophers), and of defending pagan philosophy against Christian attacks (leading to his polemics against Philoponus), have been much studied both by Anglophone scholars around Richard Sorabji and by Francophone scholars around Ilsetraut Hadot and Philippe Hoffmann. "Neoplatonist" is no longer an insult, and it now seems normal that in later antiquity reading and commenting on Plato and Aristotle should also be a way of doing philosophy. If Simplicius' religious and harmonistic aims, and his scholarly methods, are not ours, we are interested in alternatives to our own way of doing things. But we have lacked a systematic study of Simplicius' methods in his commentaries, and of his strategies for using authors besides Plato and Aristotle (not just the pre-Socratics, but also Theophrastus and Eudemus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and Proclus and his school, whom Baltussen discusses in turn). Baltussen's aims are laudable, but his book is not a safe guide; Golitsis, while not comprehensive, is much better. Baltussen pursues some good questions: why does Simplicius quote so much (just to save the texts from the wave of Christian barbarism?), what are his sources, and how does he handle so much information? (Actually, Simplicius discusses no more writers than Proclus, but he cites verbatim much more, and tries to go beyond secondary sources.) Baltussen needlessly defends Simplicius against the bizarre idea that he knew the pre-Socratics only through Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, it is true that Simplicius sometimes uses secondary sources, and also that Alexander was very important for him. Baltussen says that "overall Simplicius considered [Alexander a] reliable guide and interpreter... Disagreement is expressed in muted form and head-on confrontation is rare" (192). This both understates and overstates Simplicius' relation to Alexander and misses his method as a commentator. Simplicius' Physics and De Caelo commentaries are in effect metacommentaries on Alexander's lost commentaries (his Categories commentary starts instead from Porphyry and Iamblichus). One important hermeneutic principle for Simplicius is that each treatise must have a single primary object (skopos), such that everything else it discusses is discussed on account of some relation to that object. Baltussen discusses this principle but misleadingly. On p. 117, he has Simplicius attribute to Alexander (top of the page) the view that the skopos of the De Caelo is the world, and (lower down) the view that it is the four elements; attribute to Iamblichus the view that it is the universe; and Simplicius himself endorse the view that it is "both the universe... and the four elements." In fact, Simplicius attributes to Iamblichus the view that it is only the fifth (heavenly) body, and to Alexander the view that it is both the world and the five simple bodies. Simplicius himself says that the skopos is just the five simple bodies. The mistake is particularly serious because Baltussen suggests that Simplicius does not really make up his mind and opts for plural skopoi, when Simplicius emphatically insists that each treatise must have a single skopos and criticizes Alexander for breaking that rule. (On p. 36, Baltussen seems to suggest that Simplicius took the single-skopos rule from Alexander, but in the passage he cites Simplicius is criticizing Alexander.) On p. 23 and 158, Syrianus (died ca. 437 A.D.) is listed among Simplicius' teachers. On p. 81, the inset translation of In Physica 161.23-162.2 turns the text into nonsense, taking proéchthēsan (from proagō) as if it were from a compound of achthomai ("am grieved") and misunderstanding Simplicius' term proéchthēsan ("charitable interpretation"). (Baltussen doesn't usually quote the Greek, so the reader must be on guard.) On p. 190 (and 175), he turns Simplicius' comments on constructing an equilateral triangle into a discussion of the first postulate, to draw a straight line. He notes skeptically that Simplicius "mentions a work 'On Prayer' by Aristotle... in which he claims that Aristotle knew of a transcendent intellect" (182), but On Prayer is well-attested, and of course Aristotle believed in a transcendent intellect; Simplicius' audacious claim in this passage is that Aristotle, like Plato, believed in a divine first principle above intellect and being. Baltussen's discussions of Philoponus and Christianity are particularly misleading. On p. 185, he cites Leslie MacCoull as putting some of Philoponus' arguments in the context of "the theological debate among Arrianists [sic]", but Philoponus was a Monophysite, the Arians had nothing to do with it, and MacCoull does not say they did. Baltussen also speaks here of Philoponus' aims in his "polemic with Simplicius," but there seems to be no evidence that Philoponus knew of Simplicius' existence. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nycXB8DgJkcMbQt |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"978","_score":null,"_source":{"id":978,"authors_free":[{"id":1477,"entry_id":978,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator"},"abstract":"Most people who have heard of Simplicius know two things about him: he was a very learned man who included many quotations and reports of others' views in his writing, thus becoming one of our main sources for the pre-Socratics; but, unfortunately, he was a Neoplatonist, and his testimony is therefore to some degree suspect. So Simplicius has been studied more for the sake of assessing testimony about earlier philosophers than for his own sake; this is the first full-scale monograph on Simplicius in English, although virtually simultaneous with Pantelis Golitsis' Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon \u00e0 la \"Physique\" d'Aristote: tradition et innovation (Berlin, 2008).\r\n\r\nSimplicius, however, is not so neglected or undervalued as this might suggest: his projects of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle (and sometimes other philosophers), and of defending pagan philosophy against Christian attacks (leading to his polemics against Philoponus), have been much studied both by Anglophone scholars around Richard Sorabji and by Francophone scholars around Ilsetraut Hadot and Philippe Hoffmann. \"Neoplatonist\" is no longer an insult, and it now seems normal that in later antiquity reading and commenting on Plato and Aristotle should also be a way of doing philosophy. If Simplicius' religious and harmonistic aims, and his scholarly methods, are not ours, we are interested in alternatives to our own way of doing things. But we have lacked a systematic study of Simplicius' methods in his commentaries, and of his strategies for using authors besides Plato and Aristotle (not just the pre-Socratics, but also Theophrastus and Eudemus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and Proclus and his school, whom Baltussen discusses in turn).\r\n\r\nBaltussen's aims are laudable, but his book is not a safe guide; Golitsis, while not comprehensive, is much better. Baltussen pursues some good questions: why does Simplicius quote so much (just to save the texts from the wave of Christian barbarism?), what are his sources, and how does he handle so much information? (Actually, Simplicius discusses no more writers than Proclus, but he cites verbatim much more, and tries to go beyond secondary sources.) Baltussen needlessly defends Simplicius against the bizarre idea that he knew the pre-Socratics only through Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, it is true that Simplicius sometimes uses secondary sources, and also that Alexander was very important for him. Baltussen says that \"overall Simplicius considered [Alexander a] reliable guide and interpreter... Disagreement is expressed in muted form and head-on confrontation is rare\" (192). This both understates and overstates Simplicius' relation to Alexander and misses his method as a commentator.\r\n\r\nSimplicius' Physics and De Caelo commentaries are in effect metacommentaries on Alexander's lost commentaries (his Categories commentary starts instead from Porphyry and Iamblichus). One important hermeneutic principle for Simplicius is that each treatise must have a single primary object (skopos), such that everything else it discusses is discussed on account of some relation to that object. Baltussen discusses this principle but misleadingly. On p. 117, he has Simplicius attribute to Alexander (top of the page) the view that the skopos of the De Caelo is the world, and (lower down) the view that it is the four elements; attribute to Iamblichus the view that it is the universe; and Simplicius himself endorse the view that it is \"both the universe... and the four elements.\"\r\n\r\nIn fact, Simplicius attributes to Iamblichus the view that it is only the fifth (heavenly) body, and to Alexander the view that it is both the world and the five simple bodies. Simplicius himself says that the skopos is just the five simple bodies. The mistake is particularly serious because Baltussen suggests that Simplicius does not really make up his mind and opts for plural skopoi, when Simplicius emphatically insists that each treatise must have a single skopos and criticizes Alexander for breaking that rule. (On p. 36, Baltussen seems to suggest that Simplicius took the single-skopos rule from Alexander, but in the passage he cites Simplicius is criticizing Alexander.)\r\n\r\nOn p. 23 and 158, Syrianus (died ca. 437 A.D.) is listed among Simplicius' teachers. On p. 81, the inset translation of In Physica 161.23-162.2 turns the text into nonsense, taking pro\u00e9chth\u0113san (from proag\u014d) as if it were from a compound of achthomai (\"am grieved\") and misunderstanding Simplicius' term pro\u00e9chth\u0113san (\"charitable interpretation\"). (Baltussen doesn't usually quote the Greek, so the reader must be on guard.)\r\n\r\nOn p. 190 (and 175), he turns Simplicius' comments on constructing an equilateral triangle into a discussion of the first postulate, to draw a straight line. He notes skeptically that Simplicius \"mentions a work 'On Prayer' by Aristotle... in which he claims that Aristotle knew of a transcendent intellect\" (182), but On Prayer is well-attested, and of course Aristotle believed in a transcendent intellect; Simplicius' audacious claim in this passage is that Aristotle, like Plato, believed in a divine first principle above intellect and being.\r\n\r\nBaltussen's discussions of Philoponus and Christianity are particularly misleading. On p. 185, he cites Leslie MacCoull as putting some of Philoponus' arguments in the context of \"the theological debate among Arrianists [sic]\", but Philoponus was a Monophysite, the Arians had nothing to do with it, and MacCoull does not say they did. Baltussen also speaks here of Philoponus' aims in his \"polemic with Simplicius,\" but there seems to be no evidence that Philoponus knew of Simplicius' existence. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nycXB8DgJkcMbQt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":978,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical World","volume":"104","issue":"1","pages":"117-118"}},"sort":["Review of: Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator"]}
Title | Review of: Dorotheus, Guilelmus (trans.), Simplicius Commentarium in decem Categorias Aristotelis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Versiones Latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum, Bd. 8) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 262-263 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Summerell, Orrin Finn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lxHRful4FTiSy2L |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1476","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1476,"authors_free":[{"id":2557,"entry_id":1476,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":546,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Summerell, Orrin Finn","free_first_name":"Orrin Finn","free_last_name":"Summerell","norm_person":{"id":546,"first_name":"Orrin Finn","last_name":"Summerell","full_name":"Summerell, Orrin Finn","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142836877","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Dorotheus, Guilelmus (trans.), Simplicius Commentarium in decem Categorias Aristotelis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Versiones Latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum, Bd. 8)","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Dorotheus, Guilelmus (trans.), Simplicius Commentarium in decem Categorias Aristotelis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Versiones Latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum, Bd. 8)"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lxHRful4FTiSy2L","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":546,"full_name":"Summerell, Orrin Finn","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1476,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Antike und Mittelalter","volume":"5","issue":"1","pages":"262-263"}},"sort":["Review of: Dorotheus, Guilelmus (trans.), Simplicius Commentarium in decem Categorias Aristotelis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Versiones Latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum, Bd. 8)"]}
Title | Review of: Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. London, Duckworth, 2008 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 72 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 193 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Janssens, Jules L. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius van Silicia (ong. 480-540 n.Chr.) is de laatste der antieke 'commentatoren'. Zijn oeuvre wordt vooral (om niet te zeggen haast uitsluitend) gewaardeerd als bron voor de kennis van vroegere Griekse denkers (van wie de werken niet zelden verloren gegaan zijn en enkel Simplicius getuigenis aflegt). Dit wekt de indruk dat Simplicius geen echt filosofisch project had. Op magistrale wijze toont Baltussen aan dat dit geenszins zo is. Het belang van Simplicius' commentaren overschrijdt ruim de functie van kennisgeving van het vroegere Griekse denken. Zij getuigen immers van een speciale exegetische en didactische werkwijze. Bovendien vertegenwoordigen zij een bijzondere fase in de interpretatie van Plato en Aristoteles. Ook vormen zij de overgang van de oudheid naar de middeleeuwen. Deze basiskenmerken worden grondig uitgewerkt in het boek. Een goed idee van de uitzonderlijke rijkdom aan geciteerde bronnen in Simplicius' diverse werken krijgt de lezer dankzij een overzichtstabel (p. 30). De vijf beginselen van Simplicius' exegetische methode (zoals door hemzelf verwoord in zijn commentaar op de Categorieën) worden nader toegelicht (met onder meer aandacht voor het kritisch vergelijken van handschriften en voor de diverse wijzen van citeren). In Simplicius' opvatting is de studie van Aristoteles duidelijk propedeutisch aan die van Plato (enkel deze laatste laat toe de goddelijke waarheid te bereiken). Tot slot verschijnt Simplicius als de laatste verwoorder van een heidense theologie; in die zin is zijn verwerping van Philoponus niet zozeer het resultaat van een polemische ingesteldheid, maar veeleer de uitdrukking van een godsdienstige motivatie. Van groot belang is ook dat Simplicius' werken losstaan van enige onderwijsopdracht en dat de synthese tussen de verschillende bronnen die hij opstelt, gevoerd wordt in propria voce, niet apo phonis. Deze grondideeën worden rijkelijk geïllustreerd via een overzicht van Simplicius' interpretatie van de Griekse filosofie vóór hem (hoofdstukken 2-5). Achtereenvolgens worden de presocratici, de peripatetici, Alexander van Afrodisias en de platonische commentatoren behandeld. Van de vele belangwekkende gedachten die Baltussen formuleert, vermeld ik graag de volgende: het Griekse denken wordt volgens Simplicius gekenmerkt door één grote eenheid (betekenisvol hiervoor is zijn karakterisering van de presocratici als platonici avant la lettre); Simplicius vertoont duidelijk syncretistische neigingen; Alexander van Afrodisias is een belangrijke externe stem voor het uitdiepen van het harmonisatieproces tussen Aristoteles' en Plato's denken, dat zo kenmerkend is voor het latere platonisme; filosoferen betekent voor Simplicius geen zoektocht naar originaliteit, maar het beantwoorden van teksten, waaraan een autoriteitswaarde werd toegekend; de mogelijkheid dat Simplicius rechtstreeks toegang had tot Plotinus' Enneaden, maar waarschijnlijk niet tot Syrianus' werk. Het lijdt geen twijfel dat Baltussen met zijn studie baanbrekend werk heeft geleverd. Hij toont op overtuigende wijze aan dat Simplicius meer was dan een 'archivaris'. Hij was daadwerkelijk een 'filosoof met een project'. De grote lijnen hiervan worden in dit boek meesterlijk uitgetekend. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/xYsHY65rt8Xj8n3 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1360","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1360,"authors_free":[{"id":2036,"entry_id":1360,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":205,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Janssens, Jules L.","free_first_name":"Jules L.","free_last_name":"Janssens","norm_person":{"id":205,"first_name":"Jules L.","last_name":"Janssens","full_name":"Janssens, Jules L.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/139312471","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. London, Duckworth, 2008","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. London, Duckworth, 2008"},"abstract":"Simplicius van Silicia (ong. 480-540 n.Chr.) is de laatste der antieke 'commentatoren'. Zijn oeuvre wordt vooral (om niet te zeggen haast uitsluitend) gewaardeerd als bron voor de kennis van vroegere Griekse denkers (van wie de werken niet zelden verloren gegaan zijn en enkel Simplicius getuigenis aflegt). Dit wekt de indruk dat Simplicius geen echt filosofisch project had. Op magistrale wijze toont Baltussen aan dat dit geenszins zo is. Het belang van Simplicius' commentaren overschrijdt ruim de functie van kennisgeving van het vroegere Griekse denken. Zij getuigen immers van een speciale exegetische en didactische werkwijze. Bovendien vertegenwoordigen zij een bijzondere fase in de interpretatie van Plato en Aristoteles. Ook vormen zij de overgang van de oudheid naar de middeleeuwen.\r\n\r\nDeze basiskenmerken worden grondig uitgewerkt in het boek. Een goed idee van de uitzonderlijke rijkdom aan geciteerde bronnen in Simplicius' diverse werken krijgt de lezer dankzij een overzichtstabel (p. 30). De vijf beginselen van Simplicius' exegetische methode (zoals door hemzelf verwoord in zijn commentaar op de Categorie\u00ebn) worden nader toegelicht (met onder meer aandacht voor het kritisch vergelijken van handschriften en voor de diverse wijzen van citeren). In Simplicius' opvatting is de studie van Aristoteles duidelijk propedeutisch aan die van Plato (enkel deze laatste laat toe de goddelijke waarheid te bereiken). Tot slot verschijnt Simplicius als de laatste verwoorder van een heidense theologie; in die zin is zijn verwerping van Philoponus niet zozeer het resultaat van een polemische ingesteldheid, maar veeleer de uitdrukking van een godsdienstige motivatie. Van groot belang is ook dat Simplicius' werken losstaan van enige onderwijsopdracht en dat de synthese tussen de verschillende bronnen die hij opstelt, gevoerd wordt in propria voce, niet apo phonis.\r\n\r\nDeze grondidee\u00ebn worden rijkelijk ge\u00efllustreerd via een overzicht van Simplicius' interpretatie van de Griekse filosofie v\u00f3\u00f3r hem (hoofdstukken 2-5). Achtereenvolgens worden de presocratici, de peripatetici, Alexander van Afrodisias en de platonische commentatoren behandeld. Van de vele belangwekkende gedachten die Baltussen formuleert, vermeld ik graag de volgende: het Griekse denken wordt volgens Simplicius gekenmerkt door \u00e9\u00e9n grote eenheid (betekenisvol hiervoor is zijn karakterisering van de presocratici als platonici avant la lettre); Simplicius vertoont duidelijk syncretistische neigingen; Alexander van Afrodisias is een belangrijke externe stem voor het uitdiepen van het harmonisatieproces tussen Aristoteles' en Plato's denken, dat zo kenmerkend is voor het latere platonisme; filosoferen betekent voor Simplicius geen zoektocht naar originaliteit, maar het beantwoorden van teksten, waaraan een autoriteitswaarde werd toegekend; de mogelijkheid dat Simplicius rechtstreeks toegang had tot Plotinus' Enneaden, maar waarschijnlijk niet tot Syrianus' werk.\r\n\r\nHet lijdt geen twijfel dat Baltussen met zijn studie baanbrekend werk heeft geleverd. Hij toont op overtuigende wijze aan dat Simplicius meer was dan een 'archivaris'. Hij was daadwerkelijk een 'filosoof met een project'. De grote lijnen hiervan worden in dit boek meesterlijk uitgetekend.\r\n[the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xYsHY65rt8Xj8n3","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":205,"full_name":"Janssens, Jules L.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1360,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"72","issue":"1","pages":"193"}},"sort":["Review of: Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. London, Duckworth, 2008"]}
Title | Review of: I. Hadot, Le néoplatonicien Simplicius à la lumière des recherches contemporaines |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Studia graeco-arabica |
Volume | 5 |
Pages | 385-388 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Chemi, Germana |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
L’A. présente en ce volume un bilan raisonné des recherches contemporaines concernant la vie et l’œuvre du néoplatonicien Simplicius, ainsi que des études sur sa réception dans le monde arabe. Le volume contient aussi deux contributions de Ph. Vallat portant respectivement sur la biographie de Simplicius (p. 102-129) et sur la réception arabe de son commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote (p. 241-264). La première section (Biographie, p. 13-134), qui fait suite à la préface (p. 11-12), concerne la biographie de Simplicius. Cette partie du volume aborde les sujets suivants : le nom de Simplicius (p. 13-14), son origine et sa formation (p. 14-16), le milieu culturel d’Alexandrie à l’époque de ses études avec Ammonius (p. 16-17), le départ d’Athènes (p. 17-19), l’exil en Perse (p. 23-24) et la question du lieu où Simplicius et ses collègues se seraient rendus après avoir quitté la cour de Chosroès Ier (p. 25-129). Cette section s’achève par un sommaire général (p. 130-133) et trois épigrammes que l’A. attribue à Simplicius (p. 133-134). La deuxième section (Les œuvres conservées sauf In Phys. et In De Caelo, p. 135-266) concerne les commentaires de Simplicius sur le Manuel d’Épictète (p. 148-181), sur le De Anima (p. 182-228) et sur les Catégories d’Aristote (p. 228-266). L’A. introduit son analyse de ces trois ouvrages par un aperçu général sur la datation des commentaires de Simplicius (p. 135-148) : conformément à la thèse déjà avancée dans ses travaux antérieurs, elle considère les commentaires de Simplicius comme ayant tous été écrits après l’exil en Perse. La troisième section (Les œuvres partiellement ou entièrement perdues, p. 267-283) a pour objet les textes suivants, que l’A. attribue à Simplicius : un commentaire aux Éléments d’Euclide, un commentaire sur le Phédon (p. 267-269), un épitomé de la Physique de Théophraste (p. 269), un commentaire sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote (p. 269-277), un commentaire sur La secte pythagoricienne de Jamblique (p. 277-278), un commentaire sur les Météorologiques d’Aristote (p. 279-280), un commentaire sur l’Ars oratoria d’Hermogène (p. 280-282) et un traité sur les syllogismes (p. 282). Suivent enfin un Épilogue (p. 285-288) et une bibliographie (p. 289-311). [introduction p. 385] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dB50Tmjq5TVAe1v |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1310","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1310,"authors_free":[{"id":1936,"entry_id":1310,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":99,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chemi, Germana","free_first_name":"Germana","free_last_name":"Chemi","norm_person":{"id":99,"first_name":"Germana","last_name":"Chemi","full_name":"Chemi, Germana","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: I. Hadot, Le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des recherches contemporaines","main_title":{"title":"Review of: I. Hadot, Le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des recherches contemporaines"},"abstract":"L\u2019A. pr\u00e9sente en ce volume un bilan raisonn\u00e9 des recherches contemporaines concernant la vie et l\u2019\u0153uvre du n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius, ainsi que des \u00e9tudes sur sa r\u00e9ception dans le monde arabe. Le volume contient aussi deux contributions de Ph. Vallat portant respectivement sur la biographie de Simplicius (p. 102-129) et sur la r\u00e9ception arabe de son commentaire aux Cat\u00e9gories d\u2019Aristote (p. 241-264).\r\n\r\nLa premi\u00e8re section (Biographie, p. 13-134), qui fait suite \u00e0 la pr\u00e9face (p. 11-12), concerne la biographie de Simplicius. Cette partie du volume aborde les sujets suivants : le nom de Simplicius (p. 13-14), son origine et sa formation (p. 14-16), le milieu culturel d\u2019Alexandrie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de ses \u00e9tudes avec Ammonius (p. 16-17), le d\u00e9part d\u2019Ath\u00e8nes (p. 17-19), l\u2019exil en Perse (p. 23-24) et la question du lieu o\u00f9 Simplicius et ses coll\u00e8gues se seraient rendus apr\u00e8s avoir quitt\u00e9 la cour de Chosro\u00e8s Ier (p. 25-129). Cette section s\u2019ach\u00e8ve par un sommaire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral (p. 130-133) et trois \u00e9pigrammes que l\u2019A. attribue \u00e0 Simplicius (p. 133-134).\r\n\r\nLa deuxi\u00e8me section (Les \u0153uvres conserv\u00e9es sauf In Phys. et In De Caelo, p. 135-266) concerne les commentaires de Simplicius sur le Manuel d\u2019\u00c9pict\u00e8te (p. 148-181), sur le De Anima (p. 182-228) et sur les Cat\u00e9gories d\u2019Aristote (p. 228-266). L\u2019A. introduit son analyse de ces trois ouvrages par un aper\u00e7u g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sur la datation des commentaires de Simplicius (p. 135-148) : conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la th\u00e8se d\u00e9j\u00e0 avanc\u00e9e dans ses travaux ant\u00e9rieurs, elle consid\u00e8re les commentaires de Simplicius comme ayant tous \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9crits apr\u00e8s l\u2019exil en Perse.\r\n\r\nLa troisi\u00e8me section (Les \u0153uvres partiellement ou enti\u00e8rement perdues, p. 267-283) a pour objet les textes suivants, que l\u2019A. attribue \u00e0 Simplicius : un commentaire aux \u00c9l\u00e9ments d\u2019Euclide, un commentaire sur le Ph\u00e9don (p. 267-269), un \u00e9pitom\u00e9 de la Physique de Th\u00e9ophraste (p. 269), un commentaire sur la M\u00e9taphysique d\u2019Aristote (p. 269-277), un commentaire sur La secte pythagoricienne de Jamblique (p. 277-278), un commentaire sur les M\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques d\u2019Aristote (p. 279-280), un commentaire sur l\u2019Ars oratoria d\u2019Hermog\u00e8ne (p. 280-282) et un trait\u00e9 sur les syllogismes (p. 282).\r\n\r\nSuivent enfin un \u00c9pilogue (p. 285-288) et une bibliographie (p. 289-311).\r\n[introduction p. 385]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dB50Tmjq5TVAe1v","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":99,"full_name":"Chemi, Germana","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1310,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"385-388"}},"sort":["Review of: I. Hadot, Le n\u00e9oplatonicien Simplicius \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des recherches contemporaines"]}
Title | Review of: Ilsetraut Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme Alexandrin, Hiéroclès et Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | Dutch |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Volume | 42 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 606-608 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Steel, Carlos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The whole review: In een historisch overzicht van de antieke wijsbegeerte wordt doorgaans, wanneer over het Neoplatonisme gehandeld wordt, een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de 'school' van Athene en die van Alexandrië. Dit onderscheid gaat terug op de bekende studies van K. Praechter (1910-12). Volgens deze geleerde zou er een opvallend doctrineel verschil bestaan tussen beide richtingen in het latere Neoplatonisme. In Alexandrië zou de invloed van de christelijke omgeving zo groot geweest zijn dat de heidense filosofen zich verplicht zagen bepaalde wijzigingen in de doctrine aan te brengen. Het Neoplatonisme vertoont hier niet de complexe structuur die kenmerkend is voor het Atheense speculatieve denken (cf. de hiërarchie van de goddelijke principes zoals die door Proclus ontwikkeld is); het geeft een eenvoudiger verklaring van de leer waarbij dikwijls teruggegrepen wordt naar het Midden-Platonisme (vóór Plotinus); op sommige gebieden (zoals de scheppingsleer) benadert het christelijke standpunten. Deze originaliteit van het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme komt het duidelijkst tot uiting in het œuvre van Hierocles (eerste helft 5de eeuw) en in de commentaar van Simplicius (eerste helft 6de eeuw) op Epictetus. Deze visie van Praechter werd kritiekloos overgenomen in talrijke studies over deze periode. Zo verscheen in 1976 nog een boek over Hierocles (Th. Kobusch, Studien zur Philosophie des Hierokles von Alexandrien, München) waarin de thesis verdedigd wordt dat Hierocles' filosofie „vermittelt“ tussen het Christendom en het „excessieve“ Neoplatonisme zoals het vooral door Proclus uitgewerkt is. „Die Interpretation ergab dass die Hierokleische Philosophie im wesentlichen auf vorneuplatonischer Basis beruht“ (Besluit, p. 193). Het boek van Mme Hadot, die sinds jaren een uitgave voorbereidt van Simplicius' commentaar op Epictetus, komt tot een conclusie die precies het tegenovergestelde beweert. Op grond van een nieuwe lectuur van Hierocles en Simplicius toont zij aan dat de hypothese van Praechter over het latere Neoplatonisme totaal ongegrond is; er bestaat geen enkel doctrineel verschil tussen het Atheense en het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme: „l'évolution du néoplatonisme s'est poursuivie d'une manière homogène“. Het is verkeerd Hierocles of Simplicius vanuit het Midden-Platonisme te willen interpreteren: hun uiteenzetting veronderstelt de ontwikkeling van het latere Neoplatonisme, wat kan geïllustreerd worden door talrijke parallelle passages met Iamblichus en Proclus, en zelfs – voor Simplicius – met Damascius. In het eerste deel van dit boek worden de historische gegevens over beide filosofen onderzocht. Het tweede deel onderzoekt in welke mate zij kunnen beschouwd worden als vertegenwoordigers van een originele Alexandrijnse traditie. Achtereenvolgens worden bestudeerd: de theologie van Simplicius in het Epictetus-commentaar, de opvattingen van Hierocles over de ontwikkeling van het Platonisme, over de materie, over de demiurg en de schepping, over de voorzienigheid en het noodlot. In het derde deel volgen enige capita selecta betreffende de commentaar van Simplicius (o.a. zijn leer over de ziel). Uit al deze analyses komt de auteur tot het besluit dat er geen enkele doctrinaire divergentie aan te wijzen is ten opzichte van de Atheense school. Wel geven beide werken – de commentaar van Hierocles op Pythagoras en die van Simplicius op Epictetus – een eenvoudiger en minder complexe versie van het Neoplatonisme. Dit kan echter verklaard worden door het feit dat beide commentaren bedoeld waren als inleidingen en gericht tot beginnelingen in de school. In een appendix gaat de auteur uitvoerig in op een artikel dat ik zelf samen met F. Bossier in dit tijdschrift gepubliceerd heb (1972, 761-822) over de authenticiteit van de De Anima-commentaar die aan Simplicius wordt toegeschreven. Alhoewel zij onze conclusie aanvaardt – het werk is waarschijnlijk door Priscianus Lydus geschreven – toch meent zij dat er geen enkel doctrineel verschil met de authentieke Simplicius kan aangewezen worden. Haar argumenten lijken ons soms erg zwak: het is echter niet mogelijk om hierover in deze recensie polemiek te voeren. Slechts één ding: indien men aanvaardt dat de In de Anima door iemand anders geschreven is dan Simplicius, waarom is het dan zo nodig te beklemtonen dat zijn opvattingen over de ziel in niets van die van Simplicius verschillen? Dit bezwaar geldt ook voor het gehele werk. Terecht wijst de auteur op de continuïteit die er bestond tussen de school van Athene en die van Alexandrië (zoals dit o.m. tot uiting komt in de veelvuldige persoonlijke relaties van docenten en studenten). Het lijkt ons echter overdreven elk doctrineel verschil tussen beide scholen te ontkennen. De ontwikkeling binnen het latere Neoplatonisme was zeker niet zo homogeen als mevrouw Hadot beweert. Reeds ten tijde van Plotinus bestonden er belangrijke controversen over de doctrine, en die discussies werden verder gezet in de latere school. Indien men de originaliteit van de Alexandrijnse school in vraag stelt, dan volstaat het niet Hierocles en één werk van Simplicius te onderzoeken. Men zou er ook de andere filosofen uit de school moeten bij betrekken, voornamelijk Ammonius. Men kan moeilijk betwisten dat het Neoplatonisme dat door Ammonius uiteengezet werd nogal verschillend is van het systeem van Damascius. En is het ook niet opvallend dat Simplicius, die zowel bij Ammonius als Damascius studeerde, dikwijls afstand neemt van de al te speculatieve beschouwingen van Iamblichus en Damascius? Het boek van mevrouw Hadot is, zoals de auteur zelf toegeeft, vooral polemisch van aard: zij weerlegt hypothesen en interpretaties die niet op de teksten gegrond zijn. Door een nauwkeurige analyse van de teksten ontmaskert zij het stereotiepe beeld dat men over het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme geeft. Haar studie is zo een waardevolle bijdrage tot beter inzicht in deze laatste ontwikkeling van het antieke denken. [p. 606-608] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lIWBQQ2Q5dbWMLm |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"484","_score":null,"_source":{"id":484,"authors_free":[{"id":659,"entry_id":484,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ilsetraut Hadot, Le probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin, Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ilsetraut Hadot, Le probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin, Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius"},"abstract":"The whole review: In een historisch overzicht van de antieke wijsbegeerte wordt doorgaans, wanneer over het Neoplatonisme gehandeld wordt, een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de 'school' van Athene en die van Alexandri\u00eb. Dit onderscheid gaat terug op de bekende studies van K. Praechter (1910-12). Volgens deze geleerde zou er een opvallend doctrineel verschil bestaan tussen beide richtingen in het latere Neoplatonisme. In Alexandri\u00eb zou de invloed van de christelijke omgeving zo groot geweest zijn dat de heidense filosofen zich verplicht zagen bepaalde wijzigingen in de doctrine aan te brengen.\r\n\r\nHet Neoplatonisme vertoont hier niet de complexe structuur die kenmerkend is voor het Atheense speculatieve denken (cf. de hi\u00ebrarchie van de goddelijke principes zoals die door Proclus ontwikkeld is); het geeft een eenvoudiger verklaring van de leer waarbij dikwijls teruggegrepen wordt naar het Midden-Platonisme (v\u00f3\u00f3r Plotinus); op sommige gebieden (zoals de scheppingsleer) benadert het christelijke standpunten. Deze originaliteit van het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme komt het duidelijkst tot uiting in het \u0153uvre van Hierocles (eerste helft 5de eeuw) en in de commentaar van Simplicius (eerste helft 6de eeuw) op Epictetus.\r\n\r\nDeze visie van Praechter werd kritiekloos overgenomen in talrijke studies over deze periode. Zo verscheen in 1976 nog een boek over Hierocles (Th. Kobusch, Studien zur Philosophie des Hierokles von Alexandrien, M\u00fcnchen) waarin de thesis verdedigd wordt dat Hierocles' filosofie \u201evermittelt\u201c tussen het Christendom en het \u201eexcessieve\u201c Neoplatonisme zoals het vooral door Proclus uitgewerkt is. \u201eDie Interpretation ergab dass die Hierokleische Philosophie im wesentlichen auf vorneuplatonischer Basis beruht\u201c (Besluit, p. 193).\r\n\r\nHet boek van Mme Hadot, die sinds jaren een uitgave voorbereidt van Simplicius' commentaar op Epictetus, komt tot een conclusie die precies het tegenovergestelde beweert. Op grond van een nieuwe lectuur van Hierocles en Simplicius toont zij aan dat de hypothese van Praechter over het latere Neoplatonisme totaal ongegrond is; er bestaat geen enkel doctrineel verschil tussen het Atheense en het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme: \u201el'\u00e9volution du n\u00e9oplatonisme s'est poursuivie d'une mani\u00e8re homog\u00e8ne\u201c.\r\n\r\nHet is verkeerd Hierocles of Simplicius vanuit het Midden-Platonisme te willen interpreteren: hun uiteenzetting veronderstelt de ontwikkeling van het latere Neoplatonisme, wat kan ge\u00efllustreerd worden door talrijke parallelle passages met Iamblichus en Proclus, en zelfs \u2013 voor Simplicius \u2013 met Damascius.\r\n\r\nIn het eerste deel van dit boek worden de historische gegevens over beide filosofen onderzocht. Het tweede deel onderzoekt in welke mate zij kunnen beschouwd worden als vertegenwoordigers van een originele Alexandrijnse traditie. Achtereenvolgens worden bestudeerd: de theologie van Simplicius in het Epictetus-commentaar, de opvattingen van Hierocles over de ontwikkeling van het Platonisme, over de materie, over de demiurg en de schepping, over de voorzienigheid en het noodlot. In het derde deel volgen enige capita selecta betreffende de commentaar van Simplicius (o.a. zijn leer over de ziel).\r\n\r\nUit al deze analyses komt de auteur tot het besluit dat er geen enkele doctrinaire divergentie aan te wijzen is ten opzichte van de Atheense school. Wel geven beide werken \u2013 de commentaar van Hierocles op Pythagoras en die van Simplicius op Epictetus \u2013 een eenvoudiger en minder complexe versie van het Neoplatonisme. Dit kan echter verklaard worden door het feit dat beide commentaren bedoeld waren als inleidingen en gericht tot beginnelingen in de school.\r\n\r\nIn een appendix gaat de auteur uitvoerig in op een artikel dat ik zelf samen met F. Bossier in dit tijdschrift gepubliceerd heb (1972, 761-822) over de authenticiteit van de De Anima-commentaar die aan Simplicius wordt toegeschreven. Alhoewel zij onze conclusie aanvaardt \u2013 het werk is waarschijnlijk door Priscianus Lydus geschreven \u2013 toch meent zij dat er geen enkel doctrineel verschil met de authentieke Simplicius kan aangewezen worden.\r\n\r\nHaar argumenten lijken ons soms erg zwak: het is echter niet mogelijk om hierover in deze recensie polemiek te voeren. Slechts \u00e9\u00e9n ding: indien men aanvaardt dat de In de Anima door iemand anders geschreven is dan Simplicius, waarom is het dan zo nodig te beklemtonen dat zijn opvattingen over de ziel in niets van die van Simplicius verschillen?\r\n\r\nDit bezwaar geldt ook voor het gehele werk. Terecht wijst de auteur op de continu\u00efteit die er bestond tussen de school van Athene en die van Alexandri\u00eb (zoals dit o.m. tot uiting komt in de veelvuldige persoonlijke relaties van docenten en studenten). Het lijkt ons echter overdreven elk doctrineel verschil tussen beide scholen te ontkennen.\r\n\r\nDe ontwikkeling binnen het latere Neoplatonisme was zeker niet zo homogeen als mevrouw Hadot beweert. Reeds ten tijde van Plotinus bestonden er belangrijke controversen over de doctrine, en die discussies werden verder gezet in de latere school. Indien men de originaliteit van de Alexandrijnse school in vraag stelt, dan volstaat het niet Hierocles en \u00e9\u00e9n werk van Simplicius te onderzoeken. Men zou er ook de andere filosofen uit de school moeten bij betrekken, voornamelijk Ammonius.\r\n\r\nMen kan moeilijk betwisten dat het Neoplatonisme dat door Ammonius uiteengezet werd nogal verschillend is van het systeem van Damascius. En is het ook niet opvallend dat Simplicius, die zowel bij Ammonius als Damascius studeerde, dikwijls afstand neemt van de al te speculatieve beschouwingen van Iamblichus en Damascius?\r\n\r\nHet boek van mevrouw Hadot is, zoals de auteur zelf toegeeft, vooral polemisch van aard: zij weerlegt hypothesen en interpretaties die niet op de teksten gegrond zijn. Door een nauwkeurige analyse van de teksten ontmaskert zij het stereotiepe beeld dat men over het Alexandrijnse Neoplatonisme geeft. Haar studie is zo een waardevolle bijdrage tot beter inzicht in deze laatste ontwikkeling van het antieke denken. [p. 606-608]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lIWBQQ2Q5dbWMLm","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":484,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"42","issue":"3","pages":"606-608"}},"sort":["Review of: Ilsetraut Hadot, Le probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin, Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius"]}
Title | Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, préface par Ph. Hoffmann |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 33 |
Pages | 115-128 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un résumé analytique du texte de Simplicius. À défaut d’une traduction complète (qui est annoncée aux éditions des Belles Lettres), il s’agit là d’un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses. Simplicius n’a ni le prestige d’un Proclus ni l’audace philosophique d’un Damascius. Sans doute son rôle de Commentateur d’Aristote est à la fois la cause de sa relégation et le cœur de son originalité. Contraint de suivre la logique d’un texte différent de celle du système qui lui sert de grille d’analyse, il tire de cette lecture systématique des éléments qu’il doit harmoniser avec l’orthodoxie néoplatonicienne. À cet égard, la question de l’infini est symptomatique de sa méthode, puisqu’elle montre de quelle façon se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristotélicien et de la toile de fond néoplatonicienne : Simplicius évince l’ἄπειρον du sensible, pour le réserver à l’intelligible, mais il retient un procès à l’infini, τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n’admet pas simplement un « bon » et un « mauvais » infini, l’un qui vaudrait dans l’intelligible, l’autre qui en serait l’image sensible et dégradée. Il pose plutôt une forme positive de l’infinité dans le sensible même. On peut dès lors remercier Ph. Soulier d’avoir fait la pleine lumière sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les dernières pages du néoplatonisme tardo-antique, c’est-à-dire d’avoir exposé avec une telle minutie comment l’analyse de la Physique permettait de déployer les propriétés de l’infini qui étaient caractéristiques du sensible, en accord avec la thèse néoplatonicienne la plus autorisée. [conclusion p. 127-128] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"406","_score":null,"_source":{"id":406,"authors_free":[{"id":2456,"entry_id":406,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann"},"abstract":"Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 analytique du texte de Simplicius. \u00c0 d\u00e9faut d\u2019une traduction compl\u00e8te (qui est annonc\u00e9e aux \u00e9ditions des Belles Lettres), il s\u2019agit l\u00e0 d\u2019un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses.\r\n\r\nSimplicius n\u2019a ni le prestige d\u2019un Proclus ni l\u2019audace philosophique d\u2019un Damascius. Sans doute son r\u00f4le de Commentateur d\u2019Aristote est \u00e0 la fois la cause de sa rel\u00e9gation et le c\u0153ur de son originalit\u00e9. Contraint de suivre la logique d\u2019un texte diff\u00e9rent de celle du syst\u00e8me qui lui sert de grille d\u2019analyse, il tire de cette lecture syst\u00e9matique des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qu\u2019il doit harmoniser avec l\u2019orthodoxie n\u00e9oplatonicienne.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la question de l\u2019infini est symptomatique de sa m\u00e9thode, puisqu\u2019elle montre de quelle fa\u00e7on se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristot\u00e9licien et de la toile de fond n\u00e9oplatonicienne : Simplicius \u00e9vince l\u2019\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd du sensible, pour le r\u00e9server \u00e0 l\u2019intelligible, mais il retient un proc\u00e8s \u00e0 l\u2019infini, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u1fbd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n\u2019admet pas simplement un \u00ab bon \u00bb et un \u00ab mauvais \u00bb infini, l\u2019un qui vaudrait dans l\u2019intelligible, l\u2019autre qui en serait l\u2019image sensible et d\u00e9grad\u00e9e. Il pose plut\u00f4t une forme positive de l\u2019infinit\u00e9 dans le sensible m\u00eame.\r\n\r\nOn peut d\u00e8s lors remercier Ph. Soulier d\u2019avoir fait la pleine lumi\u00e8re sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les derni\u00e8res pages du n\u00e9oplatonisme tardo-antique, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire d\u2019avoir expos\u00e9 avec une telle minutie comment l\u2019analyse de la Physique permettait de d\u00e9ployer les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s de l\u2019infini qui \u00e9taient caract\u00e9ristiques du sensible, en accord avec la th\u00e8se n\u00e9oplatonicienne la plus autoris\u00e9e.\r\n[conclusion p. 127-128]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":406,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"33","issue":"","pages":"115-128"}},"sort":["Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann"]}
Title | Review of: Place, Void, and Eternity. Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void. Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World. By Philoponus and Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | The Philosophical Review |
Volume | 102 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 89-91 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ide, Harry A. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This volume is one of a series of translations of later ancient philosophy, edited by Richard Sorabji. These works have never been translated into modern European languages, although there are Renaissance Latin editions of many of them. Earlier volumes in the series include other works by Simplicius and Philoponus, as well as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Dexippus. These names are not now household names among philosophers, but work prompted and generated by this series will probably result in their receiving the increased attention and respect they deserve. John Philoponus, a sixth-century Christian, may be the best known of these authors among the general philosophical community. For more than a century, historians of science have known that he was an important influence on Galileo. This volume makes some of his important texts available in English. The first part comprises two selections from Philoponus's commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which are self-contained essays on place and void. The second part consists of selections from an attack against Philoponus by Simplicius, a non-Christian Neoplatonist contemporary with Philoponus. In these selections, Simplicius reports and responds to Philoponus's arguments that the world can perish. Simplicius took these arguments from a treatise of Philoponus's that no longer exists. The volume includes the extensive subject and word indices that are standard in this series, and brief introductions to each of the parts. In Physics 4, Aristotle argues that a body's place cannot be the three-dimensional extension within its boundaries, but must be the two-dimensional boundaries. Philoponus argues against Aristotle that place must be three-dimensional. He argues, for example, from wine's bursting a wineskin when it ferments: if there were no three-dimensional extension, it would not need a larger one. This is connected to the existence of void, since Aristotle argues against void because it relies on three-dimensional place. Philoponus correspondingly claims that void is in some sense possible (although it can't occur). His Corollary on Void attempts to prove against Aristotle that motion is possible even if there is a void, and that motion in fact requires void. Aristotle suggests that an object moving in a void would move instantaneously, which is impossible. Philoponus responds that bodies' speed is determined not only by external resistance, but also by their internal impetus. Even in an actually existing vacuum, the internal impetus would still cause only a finite speed. And void is required for motion, since bodies can move only if they have a three-dimensional extension to move into. So, although a three-dimensional extension without any body never actually occurs, there must be a three-dimensional extension separate from body. In the arguments of Simplicius translated in the second part, Philoponus is represented as first arguing for the Aristotelian conclusion that no finite body has an infinite capacity (dunamis), and then inferring that no finite body, including the universe, can exist forever. Simplicius responds that Philoponus overlooks an option—the universe might be able to be moved forever without having an infinite capacity to move itself—and that Philoponus wrongly assumes that something must have an infinite capacity to be infinite, while infinity simply involves a never-ending series of finite steps. In a further series of arguments, Simplicius has Philoponus argue that the capacity of the world must be finite in its own nature, although God apparently could keep the world in existence forever. Sorabji argues in his introduction that Simplicius misses the point of the qualification and thereby misdirects his criticisms. Philoponus, Sorabji suggests, rightly insists that the world's own nature would still be finite. This volume is well translated and well produced. It contains material that is historically important. Anyone interested in the history of science or the development of our understanding of place, void, and eternity will find it interesting and useful. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6Z4EGDinHRCTNE1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"740","_score":null,"_source":{"id":740,"authors_free":[{"id":1103,"entry_id":740,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":230,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ide, Harry A.","free_first_name":"Harry A.","free_last_name":"Ide","norm_person":{"id":230,"first_name":"Harry A.","last_name":"Ide","full_name":"Ide, Harry A.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Place, Void, and Eternity. Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void. Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World. By Philoponus and Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Place, Void, and Eternity. Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void. Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World. By Philoponus and Simplicius"},"abstract":"This volume is one of a series of translations of later ancient philosophy, edited by Richard Sorabji. These works have never been translated into modern European languages, although there are Renaissance Latin editions of many of them. Earlier volumes in the series include other works by Simplicius and Philoponus, as well as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Dexippus. These names are not now household names among philosophers, but work prompted and generated by this series will probably result in their receiving the increased attention and respect they deserve.\r\n\r\nJohn Philoponus, a sixth-century Christian, may be the best known of these authors among the general philosophical community. For more than a century, historians of science have known that he was an important influence on Galileo. This volume makes some of his important texts available in English.\r\n\r\nThe first part comprises two selections from Philoponus's commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which are self-contained essays on place and void. The second part consists of selections from an attack against Philoponus by Simplicius, a non-Christian Neoplatonist contemporary with Philoponus. In these selections, Simplicius reports and responds to Philoponus's arguments that the world can perish. Simplicius took these arguments from a treatise of Philoponus's that no longer exists. The volume includes the extensive subject and word indices that are standard in this series, and brief introductions to each of the parts.\r\n\r\nIn Physics 4, Aristotle argues that a body's place cannot be the three-dimensional extension within its boundaries, but must be the two-dimensional boundaries. Philoponus argues against Aristotle that place must be three-dimensional. He argues, for example, from wine's bursting a wineskin when it ferments: if there were no three-dimensional extension, it would not need a larger one. This is connected to the existence of void, since Aristotle argues against void because it relies on three-dimensional place. Philoponus correspondingly claims that void is in some sense possible (although it can't occur). His Corollary on Void attempts to prove against Aristotle that motion is possible even if there is a void, and that motion in fact requires void. Aristotle suggests that an object moving in a void would move instantaneously, which is impossible. Philoponus responds that bodies' speed is determined not only by external resistance, but also by their internal impetus. Even in an actually existing vacuum, the internal impetus would still cause only a finite speed. And void is required for motion, since bodies can move only if they have a three-dimensional extension to move into. So, although a three-dimensional extension without any body never actually occurs, there must be a three-dimensional extension separate from body.\r\n\r\nIn the arguments of Simplicius translated in the second part, Philoponus is represented as first arguing for the Aristotelian conclusion that no finite body has an infinite capacity (dunamis), and then inferring that no finite body, including the universe, can exist forever. Simplicius responds that Philoponus overlooks an option\u2014the universe might be able to be moved forever without having an infinite capacity to move itself\u2014and that Philoponus wrongly assumes that something must have an infinite capacity to be infinite, while infinity simply involves a never-ending series of finite steps.\r\n\r\nIn a further series of arguments, Simplicius has Philoponus argue that the capacity of the world must be finite in its own nature, although God apparently could keep the world in existence forever. Sorabji argues in his introduction that Simplicius misses the point of the qualification and thereby misdirects his criticisms. Philoponus, Sorabji suggests, rightly insists that the world's own nature would still be finite.\r\n\r\nThis volume is well translated and well produced. It contains material that is historically important. Anyone interested in the history of science or the development of our understanding of place, void, and eternity will find it interesting and useful. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6Z4EGDinHRCTNE1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":230,"full_name":"Ide, Harry A.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":740,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Philosophical Review","volume":"102","issue":"1","pages":"89-91"}},"sort":["Review of: Place, Void, and Eternity. Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void. Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World. By Philoponus and Simplicius"]}
Title | Review of: Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5, translated by J.O.Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Bryn Mawr Classical Review |
Volume | 3 |
Issue | 19 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hankey, Wayne J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This welcome volume is yet another in the important series The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Edited by Richard Sorabji, about 30 volumes have now been published (they are not numbered). As in all the volumes, Sorabji’s General Introduction is reprinted as an appendix (pp. 151-160), though its accompanying lists, both of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, in the Berlin edition of Hermann Diels, and of English translations of the ancient commentators, are found only in the first of the translations: Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (1987). Uniformly with the series, there are, as well as the translation (here in 110 pages), a short introduction (here in two parts: one by Peter Lautner, who did the notes, and the other by J.O. Urmson, who translated the text), a list of textual emendations, extensive notes (305 in fact, compensating for the shortness of the introduction), an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and indices of names and subjects. Other compensations for the regrettable shortness of the introduction are the affiliated publications from the Cornell University Press: Sorabji's Time, Creation and the Continuum (1983), his Matter, Space and Motion (1988), and the collections of articles Sorabji has edited: Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (1987), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (1990). These are indispensable for negotiating Lautner’s notes. Also useful on the Aristotelian tradition and the place of Simplicius in it is a new collection of articles edited by Sorabji but published by the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London in 1997: Aristotle and After. Understanding the character and significance of what Simplicius is doing here, especially of his very consequential modifications of Aristotle, requires consultation with excellent but inconvenient endnotes and with their references to this and other, less accessible, literature. As a result, In Physics 5 and its companion volumes are for well-formed scholars with first-class university libraries at their disposal. With this volume, we near the completion within this series of the translation of Simplicius' enormous commentary on the Physics. It joins, of Simplicius, the Corollaries on Place and Time, On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, and On Aristotle's Physics 2, 4, 6, 7; all of which have appeared since 1989. They manifest in the English-speaking world a renewed scholarly and philosophical interest in Simplicius, which has produced translations, editions, and research by American, Belgian, English, French, German, and Italian scholars. Their work and projects were collected in Simplicius: sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie (1987), edited by Ilsetraut Hadot. Indeed, a contributor to that collection, Leonardo Tarán, promises us a new edition of the Greek text of the commentary on the Physics as well as another translation of it. Another contributor, Philippe Hoffmann, is reediting the commentary on the De Caelo. The renewed labor on the commentaries is justified by those who undertake it. The first place to find this is in Sorabji's General Introduction, which, beyond indicating the influence of the Neoplatonic commentaries, calls them "incomparable guides to Aristotle" (p. 159). A claim he supports by reference to the "minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus" possessed and conveyed by the commentators. In his article for the French colloque, Tarán maintained that Simplicius' commentary on the Physics remains the best commentary on that work "even today" (p. 247). Since her Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (1978), Ilsetraut Hadot has defended Simplicius and the commentators of the Athenian Neoplatonic school from denigrating comparisons with the production of the Alexandrines. She demonstrates that Praechter was wrong in supposing the Alexandrian commentaries to have been more devoted to the vrai sens of Aristotle in contrast to their own Neoplatonic philosophical projects. In fact, the commentaries of both schools were produced within a tradition initiated by Porphyry and were required by the essential role Aristotle's writings played in teaching. The value of the commentary may be diminished by the service given to such Neoplatonic scholastic projects as the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle, but Hadot’s demonstrations elevate Simplicius by diminishing the preeminence given to the Alexandrines. In a review in this journal (BMCR 97.9.24), Richard Todd produced good reasons for choosing, as the place to begin among the older scholarship on Aristotle, the Renaissance commentaries of Jacobus Zabarella or Julius Pacius, but still, he would have these Renaissance humanists bring readers back to Simplicius. By the Renaissance, his commentaries, lost to the Latins until the 13th century, were well known and highly respected. So none will deny the enormous importance of Simplicius' commentary. Beyond its illumination of Aristotle, its application and defense of the Neoplatonic interpretative framework is skillful and creative. Moreover, it is the great treasury for our knowledge of previous Greek physics from the Pre-Socratics onward and of the commentaries before his own. Both of these he preserves by quotation, often at greater length than his argument requires, as if Simplicius, like Boethius, saw himself preserving a disappearing heritage in a darkening age. Much of In Physics 5 is a dialogue with Alexander of Aphrodisias, and enormous passages of his commentary are reproduced. They remind us of one of the essential tasks of scholarship that has only begun and will be assisted by this translation. Since so much of what we know about natural philosophy before Simplicius is dependent on him, we need to deepen our understanding of his thinking to consider how his selection and reproduction shape our knowledge of ancient philosophy. The conservative labor was successful; evidently, the commentary of Simplicius survived and carried his past with it. In consequence, another reason for the great importance of this work is its influence. His understanding of Aristotle constituted an essential element in the thinking of the Arabic Neoplatonists and, from the 13th century on, his comments were communicated to the Latin West in their treatises and in their own commentaries on Aristotle's texts, as well as through direct translations from the Greek by Latins like William of Moerbeke. Thus, he reached the scholastics of the medieval West. The conscientious continuation by Simplicius of the great Neoplatonic enterprise of reconciling Plato and Aristotle helped determine the Latin understanding of Aristotle. Moreover, ideas of his own, developed in that context, became fruitful again as Aristotelian physics was transformed in the construction of modern natural philosophies. Simplicius was with Damascius and the other pagan philosophers who headed east after Justinian closed the Academy in Athens. He probably composed this, and his other Aristotelian commentaries, in the remote city of Harran (Carrhae). Whatever the activity of the philosophers gathered there, as distinct from his predecessors like Themistius or contemporaries like Philoponus the Christian, Simplicius' commentaries no longer show characteristics marking them as having been developed as lectures. Evidence points to composition after 538, and Peter Lautner shows that at least part of the commentary on the Physics was written before the commentary on the Categories. Simplicius assiduously carries forward the reconciliation of Aristotle with Plato. Whether, with Sorabji, we call this project "perfectly crazy" (p. 156), we will agree it stimulates Simplicius to his greatest creativity. Here the philosophical commentator is moved by his religion. Since Porphyry, and fervently with Iamblichus, Proclus, and their successors, piety in respect to the old gods demanded that the unity of that by which they revealed themselves and their cosmos be exhibited. Further, defending the Hellenic spiritual tradition against its critics and effectively marshaling its forces against the Christian enemy required this unification. Simplicius helps work through completely what the Neoplatonic reconciliations and unifications require. He assists with its momentous move from substance to subjectivity. For what it furthers and transmits in this greatest of Western transformations, his commentary is philosophically important. Those who have made it more accessible are to be thanked. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/gUxdRzi2BGcl9jH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1347","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1347,"authors_free":[{"id":2002,"entry_id":1347,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":167,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","free_first_name":"Wayne J.","free_last_name":"Hankey","norm_person":{"id":167,"first_name":" Wayne J.","last_name":"Hankey","full_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054015821","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5, translated by J.O.Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5, translated by J.O.Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle"},"abstract":"This welcome volume is yet another in the important series The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Edited by Richard Sorabji, about 30 volumes have now been published (they are not numbered). As in all the volumes, Sorabji\u2019s General Introduction is reprinted as an appendix (pp. 151-160), though its accompanying lists, both of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, in the Berlin edition of Hermann Diels, and of English translations of the ancient commentators, are found only in the first of the translations: Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (1987).\r\n\r\nUniformly with the series, there are, as well as the translation (here in 110 pages), a short introduction (here in two parts: one by Peter Lautner, who did the notes, and the other by J.O. Urmson, who translated the text), a list of textual emendations, extensive notes (305 in fact, compensating for the shortness of the introduction), an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and indices of names and subjects.\r\n\r\nOther compensations for the regrettable shortness of the introduction are the affiliated publications from the Cornell University Press: Sorabji's Time, Creation and the Continuum (1983), his Matter, Space and Motion (1988), and the collections of articles Sorabji has edited: Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (1987), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (1990). These are indispensable for negotiating Lautner\u2019s notes. Also useful on the Aristotelian tradition and the place of Simplicius in it is a new collection of articles edited by Sorabji but published by the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London in 1997: Aristotle and After.\r\n\r\nUnderstanding the character and significance of what Simplicius is doing here, especially of his very consequential modifications of Aristotle, requires consultation with excellent but inconvenient endnotes and with their references to this and other, less accessible, literature. As a result, In Physics 5 and its companion volumes are for well-formed scholars with first-class university libraries at their disposal.\r\n\r\nWith this volume, we near the completion within this series of the translation of Simplicius' enormous commentary on the Physics. It joins, of Simplicius, the Corollaries on Place and Time, On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, and On Aristotle's Physics 2, 4, 6, 7; all of which have appeared since 1989. They manifest in the English-speaking world a renewed scholarly and philosophical interest in Simplicius, which has produced translations, editions, and research by American, Belgian, English, French, German, and Italian scholars. Their work and projects were collected in Simplicius: sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa survie (1987), edited by Ilsetraut Hadot. Indeed, a contributor to that collection, Leonardo Tar\u00e1n, promises us a new edition of the Greek text of the commentary on the Physics as well as another translation of it. Another contributor, Philippe Hoffmann, is reediting the commentary on the De Caelo.\r\n\r\nThe renewed labor on the commentaries is justified by those who undertake it. The first place to find this is in Sorabji's General Introduction, which, beyond indicating the influence of the Neoplatonic commentaries, calls them \"incomparable guides to Aristotle\" (p. 159). A claim he supports by reference to the \"minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus\" possessed and conveyed by the commentators.\r\n\r\nIn his article for the French colloque, Tar\u00e1n maintained that Simplicius' commentary on the Physics remains the best commentary on that work \"even today\" (p. 247). Since her Le Probl\u00e8me du N\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin: Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius (1978), Ilsetraut Hadot has defended Simplicius and the commentators of the Athenian Neoplatonic school from denigrating comparisons with the production of the Alexandrines. She demonstrates that Praechter was wrong in supposing the Alexandrian commentaries to have been more devoted to the vrai sens of Aristotle in contrast to their own Neoplatonic philosophical projects. In fact, the commentaries of both schools were produced within a tradition initiated by Porphyry and were required by the essential role Aristotle's writings played in teaching. The value of the commentary may be diminished by the service given to such Neoplatonic scholastic projects as the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle, but Hadot\u2019s demonstrations elevate Simplicius by diminishing the preeminence given to the Alexandrines.\r\n\r\nIn a review in this journal (BMCR 97.9.24), Richard Todd produced good reasons for choosing, as the place to begin among the older scholarship on Aristotle, the Renaissance commentaries of Jacobus Zabarella or Julius Pacius, but still, he would have these Renaissance humanists bring readers back to Simplicius. By the Renaissance, his commentaries, lost to the Latins until the 13th century, were well known and highly respected.\r\n\r\nSo none will deny the enormous importance of Simplicius' commentary. Beyond its illumination of Aristotle, its application and defense of the Neoplatonic interpretative framework is skillful and creative. Moreover, it is the great treasury for our knowledge of previous Greek physics from the Pre-Socratics onward and of the commentaries before his own. Both of these he preserves by quotation, often at greater length than his argument requires, as if Simplicius, like Boethius, saw himself preserving a disappearing heritage in a darkening age. Much of In Physics 5 is a dialogue with Alexander of Aphrodisias, and enormous passages of his commentary are reproduced. They remind us of one of the essential tasks of scholarship that has only begun and will be assisted by this translation. Since so much of what we know about natural philosophy before Simplicius is dependent on him, we need to deepen our understanding of his thinking to consider how his selection and reproduction shape our knowledge of ancient philosophy.\r\n\r\nThe conservative labor was successful; evidently, the commentary of Simplicius survived and carried his past with it. In consequence, another reason for the great importance of this work is its influence. His understanding of Aristotle constituted an essential element in the thinking of the Arabic Neoplatonists and, from the 13th century on, his comments were communicated to the Latin West in their treatises and in their own commentaries on Aristotle's texts, as well as through direct translations from the Greek by Latins like William of Moerbeke. Thus, he reached the scholastics of the medieval West.\r\n\r\nThe conscientious continuation by Simplicius of the great Neoplatonic enterprise of reconciling Plato and Aristotle helped determine the Latin understanding of Aristotle. Moreover, ideas of his own, developed in that context, became fruitful again as Aristotelian physics was transformed in the construction of modern natural philosophies.\r\n\r\nSimplicius was with Damascius and the other pagan philosophers who headed east after Justinian closed the Academy in Athens. He probably composed this, and his other Aristotelian commentaries, in the remote city of Harran (Carrhae). Whatever the activity of the philosophers gathered there, as distinct from his predecessors like Themistius or contemporaries like Philoponus the Christian, Simplicius' commentaries no longer show characteristics marking them as having been developed as lectures. Evidence points to composition after 538, and Peter Lautner shows that at least part of the commentary on the Physics was written before the commentary on the Categories.\r\n\r\nSimplicius assiduously carries forward the reconciliation of Aristotle with Plato. Whether, with Sorabji, we call this project \"perfectly crazy\" (p. 156), we will agree it stimulates Simplicius to his greatest creativity. Here the philosophical commentator is moved by his religion. Since Porphyry, and fervently with Iamblichus, Proclus, and their successors, piety in respect to the old gods demanded that the unity of that by which they revealed themselves and their cosmos be exhibited. Further, defending the Hellenic spiritual tradition against its critics and effectively marshaling its forces against the Christian enemy required this unification.\r\n\r\nSimplicius helps work through completely what the Neoplatonic reconciliations and unifications require. He assists with its momentous move from substance to subjectivity. For what it furthers and transmits in this greatest of Western transformations, his commentary is philosophically important. Those who have made it more accessible are to be thanked. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/gUxdRzi2BGcl9jH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":167,"full_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1347,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bryn Mawr Classical Review","volume":"3","issue":"19","pages":""}},"sort":["Review of: Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5, translated by J.O.Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle"]}
Title | Review of: Tardieu 1990: Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore à Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Mnemosyne |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 572–575 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mansfeld, Jaap |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A learned book that reads like a novel. It contains fascinating new information on the late Neoplatonists. "Paysages reliques" refers to exceptionally rare landscapes or, rather, sites in an otherwise overwhelmingly Christianized world where pagan divinities are still present. In the first chapter, T. reconstructs the pilgrimage of Isidorus and Damascius to Bostra, and from Bostra to a site in Syria east of Gadara, where they believed the waters of Styx could be seen. These waters were still venerated by the local population in the old pagan way. Commenting on the fragments of Damascius' Life of Isidorus pertaining to this trip, T., among other things, shows in what ways the description of the numinous site was idealized and how it echoes descriptions in Homer, Plato, and others of similar entrances to the netherworld. In the second chapter, T. offers a marvelous history of navigation on the Tigris, from Assyrian times until just before World War II, by means of the so-called kālek, a wooden construction kept afloat by inflated animal skins (e.g., sheep skins). He does so because an absolutely unique reference to this means of transport is found in Simplicius’ In De Caelo 525.10–3 Heiberg, who, explaining a point made by Aristotle, tells us that inflated skins are capable of supporting heavy loads (... ?? ?pe?????? ?a? ??? ?at? t?? ????a? p?ta???). This is the Habur, a tributary of the Euphrates. In chapter 3, T. attempts to ferret out the implications of this statement. Several of the numerous sources of this river, mentioned by the elder Pliny and Aelianus, were believed to be sacred to the Syrian goddess and venerated by the local population; the Syrian goddess, in turn, was supposed to be the equivalent of Hera. T. also reproduces descriptions of these sites by later visitors who wrote in Arabic. In antiquity, travel on the Habur was possible by means of small kāleks. T. hypothesizes (without direct evidence) that Simplicius visited these sources for religious and philosophical reasons and that, in fact, his trip was a pilgrimage comparable to that of Isidorus and Damascius one century earlier. After his visit to the sources, Simplicius could have traveled downstream by kālek himself. T. argues (pp. 130 ff.) that this journey has nothing to do with the famous story of the sojourn of the seven philosophers in Persia after the closing of the Academy by Julian. He assumes that not the whole group of seven philosophers mentioned by Agathias (Hist. II c. 30–31 Keydell), but only Damascius, "métaphysicien globe-trotter au service du paganisme," went to Persia in 531, was received by the king of kings, and secured the inclusion of the famous clause in the peace treaty permitting pagan philosophers to live according to their own ways. T.’s argument seems to be that Agathias (our only source, however) was biased and that Simplicius would have mentioned the kāleks of the Tigris if he had made the journey downriver to the Persian capital himself. The sources of the Habur are three days by foot to the east of Harran (better known to classicists as Carrhae), an important city near the Persian frontier and perhaps the last stronghold of paganism in the Greco-Roman world. In a paper published in 1986, T. convincingly argued that the so-called Sabians of Harran, who were visited by al-Mas‘udi around 940 and whose main doctrine is described in a fragment of al-Kindi, were (Neo-)Platonists. He assumed that Harran was the safe haven granted to the philosophers after the treaty of 532 and that it was there, not in Athens, that Simplicius wrote his great commentaries on Aristotle. In a second paper published the following year, T. proved that of the four calendars mentioned in Simpl. In Phys. 875.19 ff. Diels, three were actually used simultaneously in Harran and only there, whereas the first listed (the Athenian) must have been observed in the Platonic school. In chapter 4 of the present book ("D'un commentaire à l'autre"), T. is able to add to the circumstantial evidence supporting the hypothesis that Simplicius lived and wrote in Harran after 532. First, at In Phys. 684.35 ff., he points out that many people crossed rivers using inflated animal skins, as indeed they did in the regions of the Habur and the Tigris (typically one skin per person). Secondly, at In Cat. 358.12 ff. Busse, his examples of compound nouns with a single meaning are Hierapolis and Agathodaimon; these are unparalleled elsewhere. T. plausibly argues (pp. 153 ff.) that the city in question is Hierapolis in Syria, two days by foot west of Harran. Agathodaimon is Hermes' divine teacher in the Corpus Hermeticum. T. points out (pp. 158 ff.) that the pagans of Harran, according to a fragment of al-Kindi, possessed Hermetic writings. Al-Sarahsi, who transmits this information, adds that they venerated Agathodaimon. Thirdly, a passage at In Phys. 641.33 ff. allows T. to argue that Simplicius refers here to a Hermetic identification of the Syrian goddess Atargatis with Isis. T.'s main argument, presented with admirable clarity, is on the whole convincing. That we are now much better informed about the ways in which Greek philosophy reached the Arabs is a major step forward. Yet one should keep in mind that nothing so far is known of a Neoplatonist school or tradition at Harran before Simplicius, and that there is a considerable gap between him and the Platonists visited by al-Mas‘udi several centuries later. Though continuity is plausible, evidence is lacking. Perhaps T. could have said more about Hermetism at Harran, which was presumably incorporated into Neoplatonism. M. Grignaschi has argued that what he calls a late Greek "epistolary novel" (5th century), containing an exchange of letters between Alexander and Aristotle, was amplified and revised by what he terms (on what appears to be thin evidence) a follower of Hermes who wrote in Arabic in the 7th–8th century at Harran. An investigation by a qualified Orientalist (why not T. himself?) into the relation between the traditions studied by Grignaschi and the facts unearthed by T. may produce surprising results—or so one surmises. [the entire review] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fu8N5kakur5o7NI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1010","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1010,"authors_free":[{"id":1524,"entry_id":1010,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":29,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","free_first_name":"Jaap","free_last_name":"Mansfeld","norm_person":{"id":29,"first_name":"Jaap","last_name":"Mansfeld","full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119383217","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Tardieu 1990: Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore \u00e0 Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Tardieu 1990: Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore \u00e0 Simplicius"},"abstract":"A learned book that reads like a novel. It contains fascinating new information on the late Neoplatonists. \"Paysages reliques\" refers to exceptionally rare landscapes or, rather, sites in an otherwise overwhelmingly Christianized world where pagan divinities are still present. In the first chapter, T. reconstructs the pilgrimage of Isidorus and Damascius to Bostra, and from Bostra to a site in Syria east of Gadara, where they believed the waters of Styx could be seen. These waters were still venerated by the local population in the old pagan way. Commenting on the fragments of Damascius' Life of Isidorus pertaining to this trip, T., among other things, shows in what ways the description of the numinous site was idealized and how it echoes descriptions in Homer, Plato, and others of similar entrances to the netherworld.\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter, T. offers a marvelous history of navigation on the Tigris, from Assyrian times until just before World War II, by means of the so-called k\u0101lek, a wooden construction kept afloat by inflated animal skins (e.g., sheep skins). He does so because an absolutely unique reference to this means of transport is found in Simplicius\u2019 In De Caelo 525.10\u20133 Heiberg, who, explaining a point made by Aristotle, tells us that inflated skins are capable of supporting heavy loads (... ?? ?pe?????? ?a? ??? ?at? t?? ????a? p?ta???). This is the Habur, a tributary of the Euphrates. In chapter 3, T. attempts to ferret out the implications of this statement. Several of the numerous sources of this river, mentioned by the elder Pliny and Aelianus, were believed to be sacred to the Syrian goddess and venerated by the local population; the Syrian goddess, in turn, was supposed to be the equivalent of Hera. T. also reproduces descriptions of these sites by later visitors who wrote in Arabic. In antiquity, travel on the Habur was possible by means of small k\u0101leks. T. hypothesizes (without direct evidence) that Simplicius visited these sources for religious and philosophical reasons and that, in fact, his trip was a pilgrimage comparable to that of Isidorus and Damascius one century earlier. After his visit to the sources, Simplicius could have traveled downstream by k\u0101lek himself.\r\n\r\nT. argues (pp. 130 ff.) that this journey has nothing to do with the famous story of the sojourn of the seven philosophers in Persia after the closing of the Academy by Julian. He assumes that not the whole group of seven philosophers mentioned by Agathias (Hist. II c. 30\u201331 Keydell), but only Damascius, \"m\u00e9taphysicien globe-trotter au service du paganisme,\" went to Persia in 531, was received by the king of kings, and secured the inclusion of the famous clause in the peace treaty permitting pagan philosophers to live according to their own ways. T.\u2019s argument seems to be that Agathias (our only source, however) was biased and that Simplicius would have mentioned the k\u0101leks of the Tigris if he had made the journey downriver to the Persian capital himself.\r\n\r\nThe sources of the Habur are three days by foot to the east of Harran (better known to classicists as Carrhae), an important city near the Persian frontier and perhaps the last stronghold of paganism in the Greco-Roman world. In a paper published in 1986, T. convincingly argued that the so-called Sabians of Harran, who were visited by al-Mas\u2018udi around 940 and whose main doctrine is described in a fragment of al-Kindi, were (Neo-)Platonists. He assumed that Harran was the safe haven granted to the philosophers after the treaty of 532 and that it was there, not in Athens, that Simplicius wrote his great commentaries on Aristotle. In a second paper published the following year, T. proved that of the four calendars mentioned in Simpl. In Phys. 875.19 ff. Diels, three were actually used simultaneously in Harran and only there, whereas the first listed (the Athenian) must have been observed in the Platonic school.\r\n\r\nIn chapter 4 of the present book (\"D'un commentaire \u00e0 l'autre\"), T. is able to add to the circumstantial evidence supporting the hypothesis that Simplicius lived and wrote in Harran after 532. First, at In Phys. 684.35 ff., he points out that many people crossed rivers using inflated animal skins, as indeed they did in the regions of the Habur and the Tigris (typically one skin per person). Secondly, at In Cat. 358.12 ff. Busse, his examples of compound nouns with a single meaning are Hierapolis and Agathodaimon; these are unparalleled elsewhere. T. plausibly argues (pp. 153 ff.) that the city in question is Hierapolis in Syria, two days by foot west of Harran. Agathodaimon is Hermes' divine teacher in the Corpus Hermeticum. T. points out (pp. 158 ff.) that the pagans of Harran, according to a fragment of al-Kindi, possessed Hermetic writings. Al-Sarahsi, who transmits this information, adds that they venerated Agathodaimon. Thirdly, a passage at In Phys. 641.33 ff. allows T. to argue that Simplicius refers here to a Hermetic identification of the Syrian goddess Atargatis with Isis.\r\n\r\nT.'s main argument, presented with admirable clarity, is on the whole convincing. That we are now much better informed about the ways in which Greek philosophy reached the Arabs is a major step forward. Yet one should keep in mind that nothing so far is known of a Neoplatonist school or tradition at Harran before Simplicius, and that there is a considerable gap between him and the Platonists visited by al-Mas\u2018udi several centuries later. Though continuity is plausible, evidence is lacking. Perhaps T. could have said more about Hermetism at Harran, which was presumably incorporated into Neoplatonism. M. Grignaschi has argued that what he calls a late Greek \"epistolary novel\" (5th century), containing an exchange of letters between Alexander and Aristotle, was amplified and revised by what he terms (on what appears to be thin evidence) a follower of Hermes who wrote in Arabic in the 7th\u20138th century at Harran. An investigation by a qualified Orientalist (why not T. himself?) into the relation between the traditions studied by Grignaschi and the facts unearthed by T. may produce surprising results\u2014or so one surmises. [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fu8N5kakur5o7NI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":29,"full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1010,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne","volume":"46","issue":"4","pages":"572\u2013575"}},"sort":["Review of: Tardieu 1990: Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore \u00e0 Simplicius"]}
Title | Review of: Thiel 1999: Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Mnemosyne |
Volume | 54 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 482–500 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Luna, Concetta |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This is an extensive review of R. Thiel’s monograph Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen. The author of the review, C. Luna, reproduces the book’s discussion of the location where Neoplatonic philosophers settled after leaving Athens due to the ban on pagan philosophy in 529 AD. They went to Persia and later returned to the Byzantine Empire after the peace treaty was signed. The only known historical account of their location is from Agathias, who states that they were attracted to the wisdom of King Chosroes and stayed at his court. However, they eventually left and, using a clause in the peace treaty, returned to the Byzantine Empire without having to renounce their philosophical or religious beliefs. The text examines two hypotheses as to where they went: Athens or Alexandria, but a new hypothesis is presented based on Simplicius' texts that the philosophers settled in Harran, a city close to the Persian border. The text also discusses the possibility of Simplicius returning to Athens, Alexandria, or Harran. Thiel, believes it is unlikely the philosophers went to Alexandria because the patriarch of the city would not have allowed them to continue their philosophical and anti-Christian activities. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/MDj448FZ9whVcZN |
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Title | Review: Bowen, A.C., Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Studia graeco-arabica |
Volume | 6 |
Pages | 294-301 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | D'Ancona Costa, Cristina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Within the history of the reception of ancient cosmology in later ages, Aristotle’s De Caelo plays an important role. Simplicius’ work on the planets and their motions is devoted to a specific point in the late antique exegesis of this Aristotelian treatise, namely the problem of planetary motions and the solution to it provided by Simplicius (d. 555 AD) in his commentary on De Caelo. Planetary motions indeed pose a problem for him: while throughout his commentary he is committed to showing that Aristotle’s description of the heavens is the correct one, on this particular issue he substitutes Ptolemy’s system for Aristotle’s (pp. 84-86). Bowen focuses on Simplicius’ “preference for post-Aristotelian planetary hypotheses” (p. 51) and questions the reason for this. For Bowen, the answer lies in the well-known debate on the nature of the heavens that arose in the first half of the 6th century between Simplicius and Philoponus. Challenged by Philoponus in a lost work—whose main, though not exclusive, source of knowledge for us is Simplicius himself—the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity and divinity of the heavens was defended by Simplicius in his commentary on De Caelo, where he also directed harsh criticisms at Philoponus. In Bowen’s book, four introductory chapters (pp. 27-93) precede the translation of Simplicius’ In De Caelo II, 10-12 (= pp. 470.29-510.35 Heiberg), followed by a series of comments on selected topics (pp. 201-98). Figures and tables are provided at the end of the introduction (pp. 22-25) and between the translation and the comments (pp. 181-97). Bowen frames much of his discussion against the backdrop of Simplicius’ struggle against Philoponus. Chapter One opens with the claim: “The great digression at the end of Simplicius’ In De Caelo 2.12 [492.25-510.35] is an apologia precipitated by Philoponus, the renegade Platonist, and his attack on Aristotle’s arguments for a fifth simple body, aether” (p. 27). Even though Philoponus’ rejection of Aristotelian cosmology is not explicitly mentioned in Simplicius’ commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12, Bowen considers it Simplicius’ real target. Philoponus’ attack on the theory of the aether and its movement lies in the background of what, at first glance, appears to be a highly specialized discussion of the difficulties in the homocentric theory and an excursus on their solutions. Bowen’s interpretation centers on the idea that Simplicius was well aware of the limitations of the homocentric theory. Faced with Philoponus’ objections, he sought a solution that was compatible with his own assumption of the circular and, consequently, eternal motion of the heavens. Philoponus’ main objection is as follows: if it were true that the entire cosmos rotates about its center, then the planets should not exhibit rotations about their own axes, nor should they have apogees and perigees—an argument that, according to Bowen, Simplicius could only agree with. In fact, this was precisely the reason he sided with Ptolemy. However, Simplicius could by no means endorse the general conclusion Philoponus drew from this, namely that there is no aether endowed with circular, eternal motion. Bowen argues that Philoponus’ criticism “brings to the fore two points against Aristotle,” namely the rotation of the planets about their axes and their apogees and perigees, “in which he sides with Philoponus.” The danger here is heresy: Simplicius is now obliged to show that his agreement with Philoponus does not lead to Philoponus’ blasphemous conclusion (p. 28), hence the subtitle of Bowen’s book, In Defense of a Heresy. This reconstruction hinges on linking Simplicius’ statements in his commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12—especially in the section labeled “digression”—to Philoponus. As Bowen puts it, “The digression is the apologia in full” (p. 64). As noted earlier, this long passage, which concludes Simplicius’ commentary on De Caelo II, 12, addresses difficulties in the cosmic model presented in Metaphysics XII 8, where all the spheres rotate around the Earth, the center of the universe (pp. 14, 92). However, Bowen maintains that, beyond its explicit content, the “digression” is in reality a response to Philoponus. The latter is not mentioned directly; instead, Simplicius presents Xenarchus’ objections and counters them with the arguments developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Only after addressing these objections, “long after Philoponus’ objections to the Aristotelian aether have been answered, does Simplicius again take up, without mentioning Philoponus, the question of the homocentric planetary theory (...). So the astronomical digression (παρέκβασις) at the close of In De Caelo 2.12 is, logically speaking, a part of Simplicius’ attempt to deal with Philoponus” (p. 15). [introduction p. 294-295] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PxYyMRyYuxV6BPl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1410","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1410,"authors_free":[{"id":2205,"entry_id":1410,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":60,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"D'Ancona Costa, Cristina","free_first_name":"D'Ancona Costa","free_last_name":"Cristina","norm_person":{"id":60,"first_name":"Cristina","last_name":"D'Ancona Costa","full_name":"D'Ancona Costa, Cristina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/138912297","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review: Bowen, A.C., Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy","main_title":{"title":"Review: Bowen, A.C., Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy"},"abstract":"Within the history of the reception of ancient cosmology in later ages, Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo plays an important role. Simplicius\u2019 work on the planets and their motions is devoted to a specific point in the late antique exegesis of this Aristotelian treatise, namely the problem of planetary motions and the solution to it provided by Simplicius (d. 555 AD) in his commentary on De Caelo. Planetary motions indeed pose a problem for him: while throughout his commentary he is committed to showing that Aristotle\u2019s description of the heavens is the correct one, on this particular issue he substitutes Ptolemy\u2019s system for Aristotle\u2019s (pp. 84-86). Bowen focuses on Simplicius\u2019 \u201cpreference for post-Aristotelian planetary hypotheses\u201d (p. 51) and questions the reason for this.\r\n\r\nFor Bowen, the answer lies in the well-known debate on the nature of the heavens that arose in the first half of the 6th century between Simplicius and Philoponus. Challenged by Philoponus in a lost work\u2014whose main, though not exclusive, source of knowledge for us is Simplicius himself\u2014the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity and divinity of the heavens was defended by Simplicius in his commentary on De Caelo, where he also directed harsh criticisms at Philoponus.\r\n\r\nIn Bowen\u2019s book, four introductory chapters (pp. 27-93) precede the translation of Simplicius\u2019 In De Caelo II, 10-12 (= pp. 470.29-510.35 Heiberg), followed by a series of comments on selected topics (pp. 201-98). Figures and tables are provided at the end of the introduction (pp. 22-25) and between the translation and the comments (pp. 181-97). Bowen frames much of his discussion against the backdrop of Simplicius\u2019 struggle against Philoponus. Chapter One opens with the claim:\r\n\r\n \u201cThe great digression at the end of Simplicius\u2019 In De Caelo 2.12 [492.25-510.35] is an apologia precipitated by Philoponus, the renegade Platonist, and his attack on Aristotle\u2019s arguments for a fifth simple body, aether\u201d (p. 27).\r\n\r\nEven though Philoponus\u2019 rejection of Aristotelian cosmology is not explicitly mentioned in Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12, Bowen considers it Simplicius\u2019 real target. Philoponus\u2019 attack on the theory of the aether and its movement lies in the background of what, at first glance, appears to be a highly specialized discussion of the difficulties in the homocentric theory and an excursus on their solutions.\r\n\r\nBowen\u2019s interpretation centers on the idea that Simplicius was well aware of the limitations of the homocentric theory. Faced with Philoponus\u2019 objections, he sought a solution that was compatible with his own assumption of the circular and, consequently, eternal motion of the heavens. Philoponus\u2019 main objection is as follows: if it were true that the entire cosmos rotates about its center, then the planets should not exhibit rotations about their own axes, nor should they have apogees and perigees\u2014an argument that, according to Bowen, Simplicius could only agree with. In fact, this was precisely the reason he sided with Ptolemy. However, Simplicius could by no means endorse the general conclusion Philoponus drew from this, namely that there is no aether endowed with circular, eternal motion.\r\n\r\nBowen argues that Philoponus\u2019 criticism \u201cbrings to the fore two points against Aristotle,\u201d namely the rotation of the planets about their axes and their apogees and perigees, \u201cin which he sides with Philoponus.\u201d The danger here is heresy: Simplicius is now obliged to show that his agreement with Philoponus does not lead to Philoponus\u2019 blasphemous conclusion (p. 28), hence the subtitle of Bowen\u2019s book, In Defense of a Heresy.\r\n\r\nThis reconstruction hinges on linking Simplicius\u2019 statements in his commentary on De Caelo II, 10-12\u2014especially in the section labeled \u201cdigression\u201d\u2014to Philoponus. As Bowen puts it, \u201cThe digression is the apologia in full\u201d (p. 64). As noted earlier, this long passage, which concludes Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De Caelo II, 12, addresses difficulties in the cosmic model presented in Metaphysics XII 8, where all the spheres rotate around the Earth, the center of the universe (pp. 14, 92). However, Bowen maintains that, beyond its explicit content, the \u201cdigression\u201d is in reality a response to Philoponus. The latter is not mentioned directly; instead, Simplicius presents Xenarchus\u2019 objections and counters them with the arguments developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias.\r\n\r\nOnly after addressing these objections, \u201clong after Philoponus\u2019 objections to the Aristotelian aether have been answered, does Simplicius again take up, without mentioning Philoponus, the question of the homocentric planetary theory (...). So the astronomical digression (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ad\u03ba\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) at the close of In De Caelo 2.12 is, logically speaking, a part of Simplicius\u2019 attempt to deal with Philoponus\u201d (p. 15). [introduction p. 294-295]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PxYyMRyYuxV6BPl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":60,"full_name":"D'Ancona Costa, Cristina","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1410,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"6","issue":"","pages":"294-301"}},"sort":["Review: Bowen, A.C., Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy"]}
Title | Review: Urmson, trans. Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5,10-14 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1993 |
Journal | Canadian Philosophical Reviews |
Volume | 13 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 277-279 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Keyser, Paul T. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
J. O. Urmson, trans. Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5, 10-14. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992. Pp. 225,US $47.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2817-3).This latest addition to the series of translations of Late Antique philosophy edited by Sorabji is a companion to Urmson’s translation of Simplicius’ Corollaries on Place and Time and so includes only Simplicius on Aristotle on Place and Time. Thus, an important gap, Simplicius on Aristotle’s Physics 4.6-9 (the void), which one hopes will soon be filled. Urmson departs rarely and moderately from the text of H. Diels CAG 9 (1882) and supplies few notes (some by Sorabji), in keeping with the aim of the series to make the philoso phy accessible in a modem language (191-200). A brief bibliography (188-90) is provided, an English-Greek glossary (201-3), and a more useful Greek-Eng- lish glossary and index (204-220), though unfonmately the Greek is tran scribed. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/98eQM267fD6P4f9 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"254","_score":null,"_source":{"id":254,"authors_free":[{"id":323,"entry_id":254,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":45,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Keyser, Paul T. ","free_first_name":"Paul T.","free_last_name":"Keyser","norm_person":{"id":45,"first_name":"Paul T. ","last_name":"Keyser","full_name":"Keyser, Paul T. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1050677153","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review: Urmson, trans. Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5,10-14","main_title":{"title":"Review: Urmson, trans. Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5,10-14"},"abstract":"J. O. Urmson, trans.\r\nSimplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5, 10-14.\r\nIthaca: Cornell University Press 1992. Pp. 225,US $47.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2817-3).This latest addition to the series of translations of Late Antique philosophy \r\nedited by Sorabji is a companion to Urmson\u2019s translation of Simplicius\u2019 \r\nCorollaries on Place and Time and so includes only Simplicius on Aristotle \r\non Place and Time. Thus, an important gap, Simplicius on Aristotle\u2019s Physics \r\n4.6-9 (the void), which one hopes will soon be filled. Urmson departs rarely \r\nand moderately from the text of H. Diels CAG 9 (1882) and supplies few notes \r\n(some by Sorabji), in keeping with the aim of the series to make the philoso\u00ad\r\nphy accessible in a modem language (191-200). A brief bibliography (188-90) \r\nis provided, an English-Greek glossary (201-3), and a more useful Greek-Eng- \r\nlish glossary and index (204-220), though unfonmately the Greek is tran\u00ad\r\nscribed. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1993","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/98eQM267fD6P4f9","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":45,"full_name":"Keyser, Paul T. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":{"id":254,"pubplace":"","publisher":"Cornell University Press","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":null,"valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":{"id":254,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Canadian Philosophical Reviews","volume":"13","issue":"5","pages":"277-279"}},"sort":["Review: Urmson, trans. Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 4.1-5,10-14"]}
Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 18 |
Pages | 320-356 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QrDNAw4eAA3LZ35 |
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Title | Self-motion according to Iamblichus |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 259-290 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Opsomer, Jan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the “changing self”. Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1Kioea09D5a6jXo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1093","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1093,"authors_free":[{"id":1651,"entry_id":1093,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":211,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Opsomer, Jan","free_first_name":"Jan","free_last_name":"Opsomer","norm_person":{"id":211,"first_name":"Jan","last_name":"Opsomer","full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1120966310","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Self-motion according to Iamblichus","main_title":{"title":"Self-motion according to Iamblichus"},"abstract":"Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the \u201cchanging self\u201d. Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1Kioea09D5a6jXo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":211,"full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1093,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"259-290"}},"sort":["Self-motion according to Iamblichus"]}
Title | Semence, vertu formatrice et intellect agent chez Nicolò Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-latine et la renaissance des commentateurs grecs |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Early Science and Medicine |
Volume | 12 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 134-165 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hiro, Harai |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The treatise On Formative Power (Venice, 1506) of Ferrara's emblematic medical humanist, Nicolo Leoniceno (1428-1524), is the one of the first embryological monographs of the Renaissance. It shows, at the same time, the continuity of medi eval Arabo-Latin tradition and the new elements brought by Renaissance medical humanism, namely through the use of the ancient Greek commentators of Aristotle like Simplicius. Thus this treatise stands at the crossroad of these two currents. The present study analyses the range of Leoniceno's philosophical discussion, determines its exact sources and brings to light premises for the early modern development of the concept of formative force, which will end up in the theory of "plastic nature" at the heart of the Scientific Revolution. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Bqb94gvDLPcl42S |
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Title | Simpl. in Aristot. de Caelo p. 370, 29 ff. H |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1924 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 59 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 118-119 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Praechter, Karl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Dieser Beitrag untersucht einen zentralen Passus aus den Schriften des Neuplatonikers Simplikios, der für seine polemische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum von besonderem Interesse ist. Anhand der Überlieferung bei Heiberg wird die Bedeutung der Formulierung διαβεβλαμμένοι („verwirrt“ oder „zerfallen“) im Kontext der Darstellung christlicher Vorstellungen von Himmel und Gottheit analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Simplikios die Christen als unter dem Einfluss falscher metaphysischer Annahmen stehend betrachtet, was ihn dazu veranlasst, ihre Auffassung vom Himmel als Sitz Gottes zu kritisieren. Darüber hinaus wird ein intertextueller Bezug zu Heraklit (fr. 96 Diels) aufgezeigt, der für das Verständnis der Stelle essenziell ist. Die Argumentation von Simplikios reiht sich in die breitere neuplatonische Kritik an der christlichen Theologie ein, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Verehrung des toten Christus und den Gräberkult. Diese Analyse trägt zur Erhellung der spätantiken Debatten zwischen Neuplatonikern und Christen bei und verdeutlicht zugleich die methodischen Herausforderungen bei der Interpretation antiker philosophischer Texte. [derived from the whole text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GHLXvIo8dgtPSpy |
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Title | Simplicio, Isnardi, la logica e il contesto |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Rivista di storia della filosofia |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 737-751 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mignucci, Mario |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Mi sia consentita un’ultima osservazione prima di concludere. M.I.P. ritiene che non ci sia ombra di dubbio sul fatto che i dogmatici menzionati nel passo di Sesto siano gli Stoici. Nel mio lavoro ero molto più cauto e devo dire che lo sono ancora, dato che l’argomento terminologico addotto da M.I.P. in favore dell’identificazione è tutt’altro che convincente. Dalla semplice presenza di espressioni quali pros ti pôs echonta e hyparxis non si può inferire che il contenuto delle proposizioni in cui compaiono sia da attribuire agli Stoici. Ciò non tanto perché non è escluso che queste espressioni si trovassero già nella letteratura precedente, ma perché ai tempi di Sesto esse erano probabilmente entrate nella koine terminologica delle scuole e costituivano un patrimonio comune del linguaggio della filosofia. In effetti, Sesto non esita in [a] ad usare la contrapposizione stoica mentale-esistente per esprimere la sua tesi sulla natura della dimostrazione, una tesi che nessuno Stoico avrebbe potuto condividere. La stessa definizione di relativo attribuita da Sesto ai dogmatici potrebbe essere stata una versione della definizione peripatetica più o meno accettata da tutti. Quello che forse fa pensare che i dogmatici siano gli Stoici è che l’argomentazione di Sesto contro la dimostrazione di cui il passo che stiamo discutendo è una parte sembra essere prevalentemente diretta contro questa scuola. Ma anche se riconosciamo che i dogmatici in questione sono gli Stoici, ben poco si può ricavare dal testo di Sesto e non certo tutto quello che M.I.P. crede di scorgervi. Che cosa devo dire a conclusione? M.I.P. è una seria e profonda studiosa della filosofia antica. Dai suoi libri ho imparato moltissimo e le sono sinceramente grato per quei tesori di sapere che ella vi ha profuso e dei quali io e molti altri abbiamo potuto approfittare. Come tutti gli studiosi che lavorano e si impegnano attivamente nella ricerca, ella commette talvolta errori interpretativi. Perché si ostina a difenderli quando sono insostenibili? [conclusion p. 750-751] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YEvGYWS60aSUdHT |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"619","_score":null,"_source":{"id":619,"authors_free":[{"id":875,"entry_id":619,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":259,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mignucci, Mario","free_first_name":"Mario","free_last_name":"Mignucci","norm_person":{"id":259,"first_name":"Mignucci","last_name":"Mario","full_name":"Mignucci, Mario","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1194188885","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicio, Isnardi, la logica e il contesto","main_title":{"title":"Simplicio, Isnardi, la logica e il contesto"},"abstract":"Mi sia consentita un\u2019ultima osservazione prima di concludere. M.I.P. ritiene che non ci sia ombra di dubbio sul fatto che i dogmatici menzionati nel passo di Sesto siano gli Stoici. Nel mio lavoro ero molto pi\u00f9 cauto e devo dire che lo sono ancora, dato che l\u2019argomento terminologico addotto da M.I.P. in favore dell\u2019identificazione \u00e8 tutt\u2019altro che convincente.\r\n\r\nDalla semplice presenza di espressioni quali pros ti p\u00f4s echonta e hyparxis non si pu\u00f2 inferire che il contenuto delle proposizioni in cui compaiono sia da attribuire agli Stoici. Ci\u00f2 non tanto perch\u00e9 non \u00e8 escluso che queste espressioni si trovassero gi\u00e0 nella letteratura precedente, ma perch\u00e9 ai tempi di Sesto esse erano probabilmente entrate nella koine terminologica delle scuole e costituivano un patrimonio comune del linguaggio della filosofia.\r\n\r\nIn effetti, Sesto non esita in [a] ad usare la contrapposizione stoica mentale-esistente per esprimere la sua tesi sulla natura della dimostrazione, una tesi che nessuno Stoico avrebbe potuto condividere. La stessa definizione di relativo attribuita da Sesto ai dogmatici potrebbe essere stata una versione della definizione peripatetica pi\u00f9 o meno accettata da tutti.\r\n\r\nQuello che forse fa pensare che i dogmatici siano gli Stoici \u00e8 che l\u2019argomentazione di Sesto contro la dimostrazione di cui il passo che stiamo discutendo \u00e8 una parte sembra essere prevalentemente diretta contro questa scuola. Ma anche se riconosciamo che i dogmatici in questione sono gli Stoici, ben poco si pu\u00f2 ricavare dal testo di Sesto e non certo tutto quello che M.I.P. crede di scorgervi.\r\n\r\nChe cosa devo dire a conclusione? M.I.P. \u00e8 una seria e profonda studiosa della filosofia antica. Dai suoi libri ho imparato moltissimo e le sono sinceramente grato per quei tesori di sapere che ella vi ha profuso e dei quali io e molti altri abbiamo potuto approfittare. Come tutti gli studiosi che lavorano e si impegnano attivamente nella ricerca, ella commette talvolta errori interpretativi. Perch\u00e9 si ostina a difenderli quando sono insostenibili? [conclusion p. 750-751]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YEvGYWS60aSUdHT","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":259,"full_name":"Mignucci, Mario","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":619,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista di storia della filosofia","volume":"46","issue":"4","pages":"737-751"}},"sort":["Simplicio, Isnardi, la logica e il contesto"]}
Title | Simplicio, gli stoici e le categorie |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | Rivista di storia della filosofia |
Volume | 41 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 3-18 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Isnardi Parente, Margherita |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius, In Arist. Categ.,165, 32 sqq. Kalbfleisch, give us an example of the Stoic theory of the categories which seems to be inconsistent with the better known chrysippean theory of the ‘quadri¬partite division’. In Simplicius’ statement we find a first diaeresis (kath’hautá/prós ti) and a second division or hypodiaeresis (‘differentiated relations’ and ‘simple dispositions’ or correlations). Such a division follows a rather platonic-academic schematisms, and — as in Xenocratean or Hermodorean classification of being — the concept of relation occupies in it a privilegiate place. Instead of speaking simply of a continuity between Academy and Stoa, we can more probably hypothize a change in the development of the Stoic theory. The concept of ‘relation’ has an increas¬ing importance after Chrysippus, with the elaboration, by Antipater of Tarsus, of the concept of héxis and hektón; whereas the concept of quality — which is regarded, from Zeno to Chrysippus, as a corporeal entity, substratum, pneuma — is profoundly altered by the introduction of the new concept of ‘incorporeal qualities’. Perhaps later Stoics approached Academic thought in their attempt of a new kind of division, in order to find a better ontological status for ‘relation’ and ‘incorporeity’. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zjhuwrqRYr6pD6m |
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Title | Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (μορφή) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2018 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 29 |
Pages | 59 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schwark, Marina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The present article examines how Simplicius and Iamblichus conceive of the quality shape (μορφή) and its relation to other qualities. As Simplicius’ commentary on Categories 8 shows, Simplicius follows Iamblichus in almost all aspects of his analysis. In particular,Simplicius shares Iamblichus’ assumption that shape is ultimately caused by intelligibleprinciples. Yet, Simplicius departs from Iamblichus’ position by asserting that shape isconstituted by figure, color, and perhaps even other qualities. Iamblichus opposes thisview, presumably because he takes it to interfere with his own metaphysical explanationof shape. Simplicius, however, suggests that his claim is in accord with Iamblichus’assumptions. In his attempt to harmonize the ’constitution thesis with Iamblichus’theory of intelligible principles, Simplicius relies on the notion of σύλληψισς. He argues that shape as a common conjunction (κοινὴ σύλληψις) includes, the other qualities inquestion, albeit as its parts or elements different from itself. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vLFTw1MUlOcJyPx |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1144","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1144,"authors_free":[{"id":1717,"entry_id":1144,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":289,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schwark, Marina","free_first_name":"Marina","free_last_name":"Schwark","norm_person":{"id":289,"first_name":"Marina","last_name":"Schwark","full_name":"Schwark, Marina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f75)","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f75)"},"abstract":"The present article examines how Simplicius and Iamblichus conceive of the quality shape (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f75) and its relation to other qualities. As Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Categories 8 shows, Simplicius follows Iamblichus in almost all aspects of his analysis. In particular,Simplicius shares Iamblichus\u2019 assumption that shape is ultimately caused by intelligibleprinciples. Yet, Simplicius departs from Iamblichus\u2019 position by asserting that shape isconstituted by figure, color, and perhaps even other qualities. Iamblichus opposes thisview, presumably because he takes it to interfere with his own metaphysical explanationof shape. Simplicius, however, suggests that his claim is in accord with Iamblichus\u2019assumptions. In his attempt to harmonize the \u2019constitution thesis with Iamblichus\u2019theory of intelligible principles, Simplicius relies on the notion of \u03c3\u1f7b\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c3\u03c2. He argues that shape as a common conjunction (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03c3\u1f7b\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2) includes, the other qualities inquestion, albeit as its parts or elements different from itself. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vLFTw1MUlOcJyPx","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":289,"full_name":"Schwark, Marina","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1144,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"29","issue":"","pages":"59"}},"sort":["Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f75)"]}
Title | Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Vivarium |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 24-53 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Côté, Antoine |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities (epitedeioteis ) in his commen- tary on Aristotles Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristode, James s doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinián and Boethian convictions. Central to Jamess procedure is his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that "everything that is moved is moved by another". James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/B1zH6E24s1mChA1 |
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Title | Simplicius and the Early History of Greek Planetary Theory |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Perspectives on Science |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 155–167 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bowen, Alan C. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In earlier work, Bernard R. Goldstein and the present author have intro- duced a procedural rule for historical inquiry, which requires that one take pains to establish the credibility of any citation of ancient thought by later writers in antiquity through a process of veriªcation. In this paper, I shall apply what I call the Rule of Ancient Citations to Simplicius’ interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks in Meta . 8, which is the primary point of departure for the modern understanding of Greek planetary theory. I ªrst sketch several lines of argument that lead me to conclude that Simplicius’ interpretation should not be accepted because it assumes a concern with planetary phenomena unknown to the Greeks before the late 2nd and early 1st centuries bc. Then, after showing that there is a fairly well deªned range of readings of Aris- totle’s remarks more in keeping with what we actually know of astronomy in the 5th and 4th centuries bc, I conclude that neither Aristotle’s report about the Eudoxan and Callippan accounts of the celestial motions nor Simplicius’ interpretation of this report is a good starting point for our understanding of early Greek planetary theory. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nWG5h8vz9dCXgZc |
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Title | Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Antiquorum Philosophial |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 121-136 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper, I have made the case for the position that Simplicius is more independent as a philosophical writer than modern scholarship has allowed. As soon as he became used as a source for Presocratic philosophy, attention was deflected from his own contributions to the philosophical debate. In broad terms, Simplicius remains loyal to his teachers, but it would be wrong to see him as a mindless copyist or a slavish collector of doxai. This means that there is room for changing our view of him. Late Platonism may have formed a united front, but this does not preclude critical reading and assessment of previous views and disagreements among themselves. I have attempted to illustrate the extent to which Simplicius found fault with and criticized his fellow Platonists and other commentators. That this was not always done by head-on confrontation may be explained by the historical situation he found himself in: firstly, he had to cope with an immensely learned and copious tradition, a task which he took on with considerable courage and resourcefulness; secondly, he was forced to choose a defensive line of argument with respect to the presentation of pagan philosophy in a world that had been taken over by Christianity. This circumstance contributed importantly to his predicament and the ensuing strategy. As I concluded in my summing up of his methodology: "In trying to defend the Platonist point of view in contradistinction to the Christian outlook, he uses polemic to persuade and refute, and comprehensive exegesis to clarify and proselytize." The extent to which he is seen to dissent would need further confirmation, but the preliminary evidence suggests that it is in proportion to the difficult balancing act forced upon him by his historical position. Philosophically, he is a seventh-generation Platonist since Plotinus taught his new doctrine, and ideologically, he finds himself "surrounded" by an increasingly hostile world. Given the sheer amount of material canvassed and processed, it is a miracle he managed to express a personal view at all. As the works stand, he does so cautiously and judiciously. In his modus operandi, he comes close to the ideal commentator outlined in In Cat. 7.23–32, with the added bonus that he offers quotations to support his arguments. A partial explanation for his "cautious" comments, offered as muted disagreement, could be that criticizing fellow Platonists too strongly might weaken one’s overall position. A final peculiarity also hints at his ability to take a more objective stance: Simplicius occasionally adopts a detached view of the Platonists, referring to them as "the Platonists do this or that," as if he were not to be counted among them. This coincides with his unusually comprehensive scope of source analysis, an approach which was bound to produce tensions and hence difficulties in presenting a unified picture of the philosophical tradition, whether it was meant to be Greek (a wide perspective) or Platonist (a narrow perspective). It can be concluded, therefore, that respect for authority can go hand in hand with criticism and dissent in Simplicius, without jeopardizing the fundamental tenets of Platonism. [conclusion p. 133] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YpEQGyC0xI7815g |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"966","_score":null,"_source":{"id":966,"authors_free":[{"id":1451,"entry_id":966,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority"},"abstract":"In this paper, I have made the case for the position that Simplicius is more independent as a philosophical writer than modern scholarship has allowed. As soon as he became used as a source for Presocratic philosophy, attention was deflected from his own contributions to the philosophical debate. In broad terms, Simplicius remains loyal to his teachers, but it would be wrong to see him as a mindless copyist or a slavish collector of doxai. This means that there is room for changing our view of him. Late Platonism may have formed a united front, but this does not preclude critical reading and assessment of previous views and disagreements among themselves. I have attempted to illustrate the extent to which Simplicius found fault with and criticized his fellow Platonists and other commentators.\r\n\r\nThat this was not always done by head-on confrontation may be explained by the historical situation he found himself in: firstly, he had to cope with an immensely learned and copious tradition, a task which he took on with considerable courage and resourcefulness; secondly, he was forced to choose a defensive line of argument with respect to the presentation of pagan philosophy in a world that had been taken over by Christianity. This circumstance contributed importantly to his predicament and the ensuing strategy. As I concluded in my summing up of his methodology: \"In trying to defend the Platonist point of view in contradistinction to the Christian outlook, he uses polemic to persuade and refute, and comprehensive exegesis to clarify and proselytize.\"\r\n\r\nThe extent to which he is seen to dissent would need further confirmation, but the preliminary evidence suggests that it is in proportion to the difficult balancing act forced upon him by his historical position. Philosophically, he is a seventh-generation Platonist since Plotinus taught his new doctrine, and ideologically, he finds himself \"surrounded\" by an increasingly hostile world. Given the sheer amount of material canvassed and processed, it is a miracle he managed to express a personal view at all. As the works stand, he does so cautiously and judiciously. In his modus operandi, he comes close to the ideal commentator outlined in In Cat. 7.23\u201332, with the added bonus that he offers quotations to support his arguments.\r\n\r\nA partial explanation for his \"cautious\" comments, offered as muted disagreement, could be that criticizing fellow Platonists too strongly might weaken one\u2019s overall position. A final peculiarity also hints at his ability to take a more objective stance: Simplicius occasionally adopts a detached view of the Platonists, referring to them as \"the Platonists do this or that,\" as if he were not to be counted among them. This coincides with his unusually comprehensive scope of source analysis, an approach which was bound to produce tensions and hence difficulties in presenting a unified picture of the philosophical tradition, whether it was meant to be Greek (a wide perspective) or Platonist (a narrow perspective).\r\n\r\nIt can be concluded, therefore, that respect for authority can go hand in hand with criticism and dissent in Simplicius, without jeopardizing the fundamental tenets of Platonism. [conclusion p. 133]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YpEQGyC0xI7815g","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":966,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Antiquorum Philosophial","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"121-136"}},"sort":["Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority"]}
Title | Simplicius de anima 146. 21 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1922 |
Journal | Classical Philology |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 143-144 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Shorey, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Note on Simplicius de anima 146. 21 |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pOLcHui33vJaEz1 |
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Title | Simplicius et le “lieu”. À propos d’une nouvelle édition du Corollarium de loco |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Revue des Études Grecques |
Volume | 127 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 119-175 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis , Hoffmann, Philippe |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The digression labelled “Corollarium de loco” by Hermann Diels in his edition of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, IX, Berlin 1882) is a key text in the debate - often referred to by specialists as magna quaestio - generated by an apparent lack of consistency between Aristotle’s definition of ‘place’ (topos) as “the first unmoved boundary of the surrounding body” (Phys. IV, 4, 212 a 20-21) and his assertion that the Heaven moves in a circle while not being ‘somewhere’, since it is not surrounded by any body that would be exterior to it. Following the steps of his master Damascius, and at the end of a long discussion initiated by Neoplatonists after Plotinus (principally by Iamblichus, Proclus and Syrianus), Simplicius replaces Aristotle’s definition with a new definition of place as a “gathering (or uniting) measure” (metron sunagôgon), which is one of the four “measures” (number, size, place, time) or gathering powers that protect the intelligible and sensible entities against the dangers of the dispersion related to the procession of reality. This doctrine places physics in a decidedly theological perspective since, in last analysis, these uniting powers derive from the One or Good per se. Our understanding of this crucial text for our knowledge of the Neoplatonic philosophy of Nature will be improved thanks to a new critical edition (with French translation and notes), to be published soon in the collection “Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca and Byzantina” (by Walter de Gruyter) under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of Bcrlin-Brandenburg. The new edition is based not only on a fresh collation of the two manuscripts used by Diels (Marciani graeci 227 and 229) but also on a Moscow manuscript (Mosquensis Muz. 3649) unknown to the German scholar, since it belonged during the nineteenth century to a private Russian collection. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CopNdLIRs5QEoZb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1321","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1321,"authors_free":[{"id":1955,"entry_id":1321,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2378,"entry_id":1321,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius et le \u201clieu\u201d. \u00c0 propos d\u2019une nouvelle \u00e9dition du Corollarium de loco","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius et le \u201clieu\u201d. \u00c0 propos d\u2019une nouvelle \u00e9dition du Corollarium de loco"},"abstract":"The digression labelled \u201cCorollarium de loco\u201d by Hermann Diels in his edition of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, IX, Berlin 1882) is a key text in the debate - often referred to by specialists as magna quaestio - generated by an apparent lack of consistency between Aristotle\u2019s definition of \u2018place\u2019 (topos) as \u201cthe first unmoved boundary \r\nof the surrounding body\u201d (Phys. IV, 4, 212 a 20-21) and his assertion that the Heaven moves in a circle while not being \u2018somewhere\u2019, since it is not surrounded by any body that would be exterior to it. Following the steps of his master Damascius, and at the end of a long discussion initiated by Neoplatonists after Plotinus (principally by Iamblichus, Proclus and Syrianus), Simplicius replaces Aristotle\u2019s definition with a new definition of place as a \u201cgathering (or uniting) measure\u201d (metron sunag\u00f4gon), which is one of the four \u201cmeasures\u201d (number, size, place, time) or gathering powers that protect the intelligible and sensible \r\nentities against the dangers of the dispersion related to the procession of reality. This doctrine places physics in a decidedly theological perspective since, in last analysis, these uniting powers derive from the One or Good per se. Our under\u00adstanding of this crucial text for our knowledge of the Neoplatonic philosophy of \r\nNature will be improved thanks to a new critical edition (with French translation and notes), to be published soon in the collection \u201cCommentaria in Aristotelem Graeca and Byzantina\u201d (by Walter de Gruyter) under the auspices of the Academy \r\nof Sciences of Bcrlin-Brandenburg. The new edition is based not only on a fresh collation of the two manuscripts used by Diels (Marciani graeci 227 and 229) but also on a Moscow manuscript (Mosquensis Muz. 3649) unknown to the Ger\u00adman scholar, since it belonged during the nineteenth century to a private Russian \r\ncollection. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CopNdLIRs5QEoZb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1321,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques ","volume":"127","issue":"1","pages":"119-175"}},"sort":["Simplicius et le \u201clieu\u201d. \u00c0 propos d\u2019une nouvelle \u00e9dition du Corollarium de loco"]}
Title | Simplicius on Categories 1a16–17 and 1b25–27: An Examination of the Interests of Ancient and Modern Commentary on the Categories |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
Volume | 4 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 73-99 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Almeida, Joseph |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
We may gather these observations into several points. First, Simplicius’s commentary on the Categories shows, not surprisingly, the influence of the great Neoplatonic spiritual odyssey of return to first principles. The final prayer offered at the termination of his commentary is a stunning testimony to the power which this spiritual program exerted on the ancient commentators: "I stop my discourse, invoking the Guardians of the Logoi to grant me a more accurate understanding of these matters and to favor me with this understanding as a viaticum toward higher contemplations and to provide me leisure from the distractions of life." For Simplicius, commentary on Aristotle could never be wholly separated from this overarching spiritual purpose. In at least one of the passages considered above, this influence manifested itself in an attempt to elucidate Aristotle’s text as the lesser mysteries on route to the higher. As this program and its consequences are central to the business of Neoplatonic commentary on the Categories, so it is, in its central impetus, irrelevant to the interests of the modern program of solving the problem of the Categories. Second, Simplicius was a happy heir of a long tradition, part of which conditioned commentators to see the Categories as a text for beginners in philosophy. Embracing this teaching, Simplicius does not hesitate to deflect certain difficulties presented by the text with appeal to the elementary nature of the Categories, content to leave a real solution to more advanced speculations elsewhere. When modern interest is focused on just such a problem, such a treatment is of little value. Third, the same tradition obligates Simplicius to harmonize Aristotle with Plato. At least in the example considered above, the reconciliation can involve certain abstruse points of Neoplatonic philosophy. Such commentary is no doubt of great value to students of Neoplatonism but will generally miss the mark set by the interests of modern inquiry. These three points appear relatively secure and of universal application to the body of ancient commentary on the Categories. There is, however, a fourth point, to be stated cautiously because of the limited data examined. When Simplicius spoke directly to the passages in question in Cat. 1a16–17 and 1b25–27, he did not seem to appreciate the issues which interested modern readers of the Categories—namely, that the doctrine of simple expressions presents a philosophical theory in need of expansion and illumination, a problem to be solved in relation to a theory of categories in general rather than a solution to be applied to questions concerning the identity and nature of the Aristotelian categories in particular. This is not to say that a modern reader will never find anywhere in Simplicius a discussion corresponding to his interest, but that in all likelihood it would be serendipitous and peripheral to Simplicius’s own primary interest in the Categories. These observations warrant the conclusion that there is indeed a separation between the interests of the ancient and modern commentators on the Categories. In its strong form, the conclusion is that the separation is absolute. This is in accord with Praechter’s position in his classic review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (i.e., that the commentaries will prove to be essentially of historic value): “[They will be] invaluable for the history of the Greek language, for the lexicon as well as for the grammar”; “[They will be invaluable] for understanding how ancient philosophy was able to fulfill the vast cultural mission which befell it in antiquity as sovereign in the realm of Weltanschauung, and in the Middle Ages as the ‘handmaiden of theology.’” Even Sorabji, who seems to regard the independent philosophical value of the commentaries more highly than Praechter, recommends them to students of Aristotle with a note of caution: “The distorting Neoplatonist context... does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The commentators... have minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus... Moreover, commentators are enjoined neither to accept nor to reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one’s attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences, and ideas in Aristotle which one could easily have passed over... The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would on his own.” Although this is a more positive view of the substantive content of the commentaries, the illumination of sentences and ideas still does not address the needs of the kind of modern inquiry exemplified in our discussion. Because the conclusion is drawn from limited data—namely, a close reading of about sixty pages of the Berlin text of Simplicius on the Categories—it must remain tentative and provisional. However, truth to be told, the tremendous effort involved in reading even cursorily just one of the ancient commentaries on the Categories, let alone with an eye to the intersection between Neoplatonic and modern interest, may leave the matter open for quite some time. [conclusion p. 97-99] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/OzmApALBY8ZdgnX |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1499","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1499,"authors_free":[{"id":2602,"entry_id":1499,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":557,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Almeida, Joseph","free_first_name":"Joseph","free_last_name":"Almeida","norm_person":{"id":557,"first_name":"Joseph","last_name":"Almeida","full_name":"Almeida, Joseph","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Categories 1a16\u201317 and 1b25\u201327: An Examination of the Interests of Ancient and Modern Commentary on the Categories","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Categories 1a16\u201317 and 1b25\u201327: An Examination of the Interests of Ancient and Modern Commentary on the Categories"},"abstract":"We may gather these observations into several points.\r\n\r\nFirst, Simplicius\u2019s commentary on the Categories shows, not surprisingly, the influence of the great Neoplatonic spiritual odyssey of return to first principles. The final prayer offered at the termination of his commentary is a stunning testimony to the power which this spiritual program exerted on the ancient commentators:\r\n\r\n \"I stop my discourse, invoking the Guardians of the Logoi to grant me a more accurate understanding of these matters and to favor me with this understanding as a viaticum toward higher contemplations and to provide me leisure from the distractions of life.\"\r\n\r\nFor Simplicius, commentary on Aristotle could never be wholly separated from this overarching spiritual purpose. In at least one of the passages considered above, this influence manifested itself in an attempt to elucidate Aristotle\u2019s text as the lesser mysteries on route to the higher. As this program and its consequences are central to the business of Neoplatonic commentary on the Categories, so it is, in its central impetus, irrelevant to the interests of the modern program of solving the problem of the Categories.\r\n\r\nSecond, Simplicius was a happy heir of a long tradition, part of which conditioned commentators to see the Categories as a text for beginners in philosophy. Embracing this teaching, Simplicius does not hesitate to deflect certain difficulties presented by the text with appeal to the elementary nature of the Categories, content to leave a real solution to more advanced speculations elsewhere. When modern interest is focused on just such a problem, such a treatment is of little value.\r\n\r\nThird, the same tradition obligates Simplicius to harmonize Aristotle with Plato. At least in the example considered above, the reconciliation can involve certain abstruse points of Neoplatonic philosophy. Such commentary is no doubt of great value to students of Neoplatonism but will generally miss the mark set by the interests of modern inquiry.\r\n\r\nThese three points appear relatively secure and of universal application to the body of ancient commentary on the Categories. There is, however, a fourth point, to be stated cautiously because of the limited data examined. When Simplicius spoke directly to the passages in question in Cat. 1a16\u201317 and 1b25\u201327, he did not seem to appreciate the issues which interested modern readers of the Categories\u2014namely, that the doctrine of simple expressions presents a philosophical theory in need of expansion and illumination, a problem to be solved in relation to a theory of categories in general rather than a solution to be applied to questions concerning the identity and nature of the Aristotelian categories in particular.\r\n\r\nThis is not to say that a modern reader will never find anywhere in Simplicius a discussion corresponding to his interest, but that in all likelihood it would be serendipitous and peripheral to Simplicius\u2019s own primary interest in the Categories.\r\n\r\nThese observations warrant the conclusion that there is indeed a separation between the interests of the ancient and modern commentators on the Categories. In its strong form, the conclusion is that the separation is absolute. This is in accord with Praechter\u2019s position in his classic review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (i.e., that the commentaries will prove to be essentially of historic value):\r\n\r\n \u201c[They will be] invaluable for the history of the Greek language, for the lexicon as well as for the grammar\u201d;\r\n \u201c[They will be invaluable] for understanding how ancient philosophy was able to fulfill the vast cultural mission which befell it in antiquity as sovereign in the realm of Weltanschauung, and in the Middle Ages as the \u2018handmaiden of theology.\u2019\u201d\r\n\r\nEven Sorabji, who seems to regard the independent philosophical value of the commentaries more highly than Praechter, recommends them to students of Aristotle with a note of caution:\r\n\r\n \u201cThe distorting Neoplatonist context... does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The commentators... have minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus... Moreover, commentators are enjoined neither to accept nor to reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one\u2019s attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences, and ideas in Aristotle which one could easily have passed over... The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would on his own.\u201d\r\n\r\nAlthough this is a more positive view of the substantive content of the commentaries, the illumination of sentences and ideas still does not address the needs of the kind of modern inquiry exemplified in our discussion.\r\n\r\nBecause the conclusion is drawn from limited data\u2014namely, a close reading of about sixty pages of the Berlin text of Simplicius on the Categories\u2014it must remain tentative and provisional. However, truth to be told, the tremendous effort involved in reading even cursorily just one of the ancient commentaries on the Categories, let alone with an eye to the intersection between Neoplatonic and modern interest, may leave the matter open for quite some time.\r\n[conclusion p. 97-99]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/OzmApALBY8ZdgnX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":557,"full_name":"Almeida, Joseph","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1499,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"4","issue":"2","pages":"73-99"}},"sort":["Simplicius on Categories 1a16\u201317 and 1b25\u201327: An Examination of the Interests of Ancient and Modern Commentary on the Categories"]}
Title | Simplicius on Empedocles: A note on his Commentary in Phys. 157.25–161.20 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2024 |
Journal | Shagi/Steps |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 183-196 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Anna Afonasina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The present study attempts to show what influence a commentary can have on the formation of ideas about a preceding philosophical tradition. A case in point is Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s “Physics” and on fragments of Empedocles’ poem. The selected passage, though small in size, is quite remarkable in terms of content and the way Simplicius deals with it. With regard to content, we are dealing here with one of the fundamental problematic plots of Empedocles’ philosophy about the alternate rule of Love and Strife. But Simplicius adds to this his own view of Empedocles’ philosophy, dictated by his desire to harmonize the views of all the pagan philosophers and place them within a single consistent scheme. Simplicius wanted to counterpose something to Christianity, which was gaining in strength, and to show that all Greek philosophy developed along a certain path and contains no internal disagreements. On the one hand, Simplicius has preserved for us very valuable material — fairly lengthy sections of the text of Empedocles’ poem. On the other hand, wishing to implement his program, Simplicius chose those fragments of the poem that fit well into it. Therefore, the question arises whether we should take into account the context in which the fragments are quoted, or simply extract from the general body of the commentary those fragments of Empedocles’ poem that we need and consider them independently? [author's abstrac] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GQwsce7zWyeDLxe |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1580","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1580,"authors_free":[{"id":2761,"entry_id":1580,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Anna Afonasina","free_first_name":"Anna ","free_last_name":"Afonasina","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Empedocles: A note on his Commentary in Phys. 157.25\u2013161.20","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Empedocles: A note on his Commentary in Phys. 157.25\u2013161.20"},"abstract":"The present study attempts to show what influence a\r\ncommentary can have on the formation of ideas about a preceding\r\nphilosophical tradition. A case in point is Simplicius\u2019 commentary\r\non Aristotle\u2019s \u201cPhysics\u201d and on fragments of Empedocles\u2019 poem.\r\nThe selected passage, though small in size, is quite remarkable in\r\nterms of content and the way Simplicius deals with it. With regard\r\nto content, we are dealing here with one of the fundamental problematic\r\nplots of Empedocles\u2019 philosophy about the alternate rule of\r\nLove and Strife. But Simplicius adds to this his own view of Empedocles\u2019\r\nphilosophy, dictated by his desire to harmonize the views of\r\nall the pagan philosophers and place them within a single consistent\r\nscheme. Simplicius wanted to counterpose something to Christianity,\r\nwhich was gaining in strength, and to show that all Greek\r\nphilosophy developed along a certain path and contains no internal\r\ndisagreements. On the one hand, Simplicius has preserved for us\r\nvery valuable material \u2014 fairly lengthy sections of the text of Empedocles\u2019\r\npoem. On the other hand, wishing to implement his program,\r\nSimplicius chose those fragments of the poem that fit well\r\ninto it. Therefore, the question arises whether we should take into\r\naccount the context in which the fragments are quoted, or simply\r\nextract from the general body of the commentary those fragments\r\nof Empedocles\u2019 poem that we need and consider them independently? [author's abstrac]","btype":3,"date":"2024","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GQwsce7zWyeDLxe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1580,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Shagi\/Steps","volume":"10","issue":"2","pages":"183-196"}},"sort":["Simplicius on Empedocles: A note on his Commentary in Phys. 157.25\u2013161.20"]}
Title | Simplicius on Predication |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2015 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 173-200 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hauer, Mareike |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper deals with Simplicius’ discussion of Aristotle’s account of predication in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Of particular interest is the relation between synonymous predication and essential predication. In Aristotle, as well as in Simplicius, both kinds of predication are closely connected. It has been argued in Aristotelian scholarship that, for Aristotle, synonymous predication yields essential predication. It has been equally argued that this assumption is compatible with Aristotle’s theoretical framework, but if applied to Plato, would pose a problem for Plato. Simplicius’ extensive discussion of both synonymous predication and essential predication suggests that he was aware of the deeper problem raised by the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication. In this paper, I will argue that Simplicius, by means of an original interpretation of the predicate, not only turns the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication into a supposition that is less problematic for Plato, but also creates a framework for a possible harmonization of Plato and Aristotle. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/yxvHetwfUgsPb6f |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"407","_score":null,"_source":{"id":407,"authors_free":[{"id":545,"entry_id":407,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Predication","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Predication"},"abstract":"This paper deals with Simplicius\u2019 discussion of Aristotle\u2019s account of predication in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Of particular interest is the relation between synonymous predication and essential predication. In Aristotle, as well as in Simplicius, both kinds of predication are closely connected. It has been argued in Aristotelian scholarship that, for Aristotle, synonymous predication yields essential predication. It has been equally argued that this assumption is compatible with Aristotle\u2019s theoretical framework, but if applied to Plato, would pose a problem for Plato. Simplicius\u2019 extensive discussion of both synonymous predication and essential predication suggests that he was aware of the deeper problem raised by the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication. In this paper, I will argue that Simplicius, by means of an original interpretation of the predicate, not only turns the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication into a supposition that is less problematic for Plato, but also creates a framework for a possible harmonization of Plato and Aristotle. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/yxvHetwfUgsPb6f","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":407,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"173-200"}},"sort":["Simplicius on Predication"]}
Title | Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 43 |
Pages | 366-375 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius’ view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Phiioponus' account of these proofs. Specifically. I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Phiioponus, he conceives of the argument that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato’s un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Phiioponus’ account of tekmeriodic proofs grants. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kTidRDQtummkQxv |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1152","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1152,"authors_free":[{"id":1727,"entry_id":1152,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs"},"abstract":"In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius\u2019 view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Phiioponus' account of these proofs. Specifically. I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Phiioponus, he conceives of the argu\u00adment that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato\u2019s un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Phiioponus\u2019 account of tekmeriodic proofs grants. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kTidRDQtummkQxv","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1152,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"43","issue":"","pages":"366-375"}},"sort":["Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs"]}
Title | Simplicius on the "Theaetetus" ("In Physica" 17,38-18,23 Diels) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2010 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 255-270 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Menn, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle in Physics 1,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate "cognition according to the definition and through the elements," and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is ἐπιστήμη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for ἐπιστήμη and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to recon struct Simplicius' reading of "Socrates' Dream," its place in the Theaetetus larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dEWYys9PQqr0WtF |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"977","_score":null,"_source":{"id":977,"authors_free":[{"id":1476,"entry_id":977,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)"},"abstract":"Aristotle in Physics 1,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate \"cognition according to the definition and through the elements,\" and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to recon struct Simplicius' reading of \"Socrates' Dream,\" its place in the Theaetetus larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dEWYys9PQqr0WtF","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":977,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"55","issue":"3","pages":"255-270"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)"]}
Title | Simplicius on the Individuation of Material Substances |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2019 |
Journal | Elenchos |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 401-429 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Schwark, Marina |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In his commentary on Physics I 9, Simplicius claims that individual forms individuate matter. Given that in the same text he calls the immanent form ‘universal,’it seems reasonable to conclude that the individual forms are individual instances of one universal species–form. However, Simplicius also mentions accidental properties that are peculiar to form rather than to matter. On the basis of Simplicius’ commentaries on the Categories and on the Physics, I argue that the individuating accidents are not part of the individual forms, but that each individual’s form coordinates the individual’s accidental features. By belonging to a certain species, the individual form sets limits as to which accidents a matter–form compound can assume. This approach enables Simplicius to combine hylomorphism with a theory of individuation through properties. Furthermore, in his commentary on De Caelo I 9 Simplicius explains the uniqueness of each individual’s conglomeration of properties in light of his Neoplatonic cosmology: each individual corresponds to an individual cosmic disposition that determines its characteristic features. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/cpvCFatZj4VcLdC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1377","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1377,"authors_free":[{"id":2121,"entry_id":1377,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":289,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schwark, Marina","free_first_name":"Marina","free_last_name":"Schwark","norm_person":{"id":289,"first_name":"Marina","last_name":"Schwark","full_name":"Schwark, Marina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Individuation of Material Substances","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Individuation of Material Substances"},"abstract":"In his commentary on Physics I 9, Simplicius claims that individual forms individuate matter. Given that in the same text he calls the immanent form \u2018universal,\u2019it seems reasonable to conclude that the individual forms are individual instances of one universal species\u2013form. However, Simplicius also mentions accidental properties that are peculiar to form rather than to matter. On the basis of Simplicius\u2019 commentaries on the Categories and on the Physics, I argue that the individuating\r\naccidents are not part of the individual forms, but that each individual\u2019s form coordinates the individual\u2019s accidental features. By belonging to a certain species, the individual form sets limits as to which accidents a matter\u2013form compound can\r\nassume. This approach enables Simplicius to combine hylomorphism with a theory\r\nof individuation through properties. Furthermore, in his commentary on De Caelo I 9 Simplicius explains the uniqueness of each individual\u2019s conglomeration of properties in light of his Neoplatonic cosmology: each individual corresponds to an individual cosmic disposition that determines its characteristic features. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2019","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cpvCFatZj4VcLdC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":289,"full_name":"Schwark, Marina","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1377,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos","volume":"40","issue":"2","pages":"401-429"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Individuation of Material Substances"]}
Title | Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on "In Cat." 396,30-397,28 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 42–62 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gaskin, Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
At Categories 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as "Socrates is sitting," as what later writers were to call com- plexe significabilia, i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting. Simplicius' dis- cussion of this passage in his commentary on the Categories clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a complexe significabile in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the Categories text with the first chapter of De Interpretatione. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kZ57g1oWG2ekeHe |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"541","_score":null,"_source":{"id":541,"authors_free":[{"id":765,"entry_id":541,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":132,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gaskin, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Gaskin","norm_person":{"id":132,"first_name":"Richard ","last_name":"Gaskin","full_name":"Gaskin, Richard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1049853571","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28"},"abstract":"At Categories 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as \"Socrates is sitting,\" as what later writers were to call com- plexe significabilia, i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting. Simplicius' dis- cussion of this passage in his commentary on the Categories clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a complexe significabile in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the Categories text with the first chapter of De Interpretatione. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kZ57g1oWG2ekeHe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":132,"full_name":"Gaskin, Richard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":541,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"43","issue":"1","pages":"42\u201362"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28"]}
Title | Simplicius on the Principal Meaning of Physis in Aristotle's Physics II. 1-3 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2019 |
Journal | Analogia |
Volume | 7 |
Issue | Byzantine Aristotle |
Pages | 43-82 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Mouzala, Melina G. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
At the beginning of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics II.2, Simplicius attempts to reveal the principal meaning of physis, that which in his view is preeminent above all others presented by Aristotle in Physics II.1. Through the arguments he uses to show what the principal meaning of physis is, we are also able to better understand the other meanings. These other meanings are, on the one hand, those which are discovered in the light of Simplicius’ insightful reading of it. Simplicius appears to recognize—or at least to be conscious of the fact—that this part of his Commentary constitutes an autonomous analysis and explanation of the different meanings of physis, which sets out to reveal its concealed principal meaning. My aim in this paper is to show that in his comments on Physics II.1, Simplicius is trying to offer an exegesis of the Aristotelian arguments, while in his comments regarding the beginning of Physics II.2, he proceeds to a bold reading of what Aristotle has said in chapter one. He does this by giving his own interpretation of the meaning of physis, within the frame which Aristotle had already sketched out in the previous chapter, but also by deviating to some extent from Aristotle. For Simplicius, the principal, albeit concealed, meaning of physis, within the Aristotelian philosophical framework, lies in the idea that nature is a sort of propensity for being moved and a sort of life, to wit, the lowest sort of life (eschatê zôê). [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BnCCI5k1m32XM47 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1541","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1541,"authors_free":[{"id":2691,"entry_id":1541,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mouzala, Melina G. ","free_first_name":"Melina G.","free_last_name":"Mouzala","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Principal Meaning of Physis in Aristotle's Physics II. 1-3","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Principal Meaning of Physis in Aristotle's Physics II. 1-3"},"abstract":"At the beginning of his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics II.2, Simplicius attempts to reveal the principal meaning of physis, that which in his view is preeminent above all others presented by Aristotle in Physics II.1. Through the arguments he uses to show what the principal meaning of physis is, we are also able to better understand the other meanings. These other meanings are, on the one hand, those which are discovered in the light of Simplicius\u2019 insightful reading of it. Simplicius appears to recognize\u2014or at least to be conscious of the fact\u2014that this part of his Commentary constitutes an autonomous analysis and explanation of the different meanings of physis, which sets out to reveal its concealed principal meaning.\r\n\r\nMy aim in this paper is to show that in his comments on Physics II.1, Simplicius is trying to offer an exegesis of the Aristotelian arguments, while in his comments regarding the beginning of Physics II.2, he proceeds to a bold reading of what Aristotle has said in chapter one. He does this by giving his own interpretation of the meaning of physis, within the frame which Aristotle had already sketched out in the previous chapter, but also by deviating to some extent from Aristotle. For Simplicius, the principal, albeit concealed, meaning of physis, within the Aristotelian philosophical framework, lies in the idea that nature is a sort of propensity for being moved and a sort of life, to wit, the lowest sort of life (eschat\u00ea z\u00f4\u00ea). [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2019","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/BnCCI5k1m32XM47","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1541,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Analogia","volume":"7","issue":"Byzantine Aristotle","pages":"43-82"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Principal Meaning of Physis in Aristotle's Physics II. 1-3"]}
Title | Simplicius on the Relation between Quality and Qualified |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Méthexis |
Volume | 28 |
Pages | 111-140 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hauer, Mareike |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius claims in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categoriesthat quality is prior to the qualified according to nature. However, in an interesting passage in the same commentary, Simplicius describes the relation between quality and qualified in such a way that it strongly suggests an ontological simultaneity. The aim of this paper is to clarify Simplicius' notion of natural priority and to investigate the extent to which the assumption of a natural priority of the quality over the qualified is compatible with the assumption of a co-existence of quality and qualified. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DTcssHAheWWZmpg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"387","_score":null,"_source":{"id":387,"authors_free":[{"id":506,"entry_id":387,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Relation between Quality and Qualified","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Relation between Quality and Qualified"},"abstract":"Simplicius claims in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categoriesthat quality is prior to the qualified according to nature. However, in an interesting passage in the same com\u00admentary, Simplicius describes the relation between quality and qualified in such a way that it strongly suggests an ontological simultaneity. The aim of this paper is to clarify Simplicius' notion of natural priority and to investigate the extent to which the as\u00adsumption of a natural priority of the quality over the qualified is compatible with the assumption of a co-existence of quality and qualified. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DTcssHAheWWZmpg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":387,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"M\u00e9thexis","volume":"28","issue":"","pages":"111-140"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Relation between Quality and Qualified"]}
Title | Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima" (CAG XI) : A Methodological Study |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 159–199 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article represents a new contribution to the author's debate with C. Steel as to the authenticity of the Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, attributed by the manuscripts to the 6th-century A.D. Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius. On the basis of what he claims are stylistic and doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries, Steel has argued that the In DA cannot be by Simplicius, but is instead to be attributed to his contemporary Priscian of Lydia. In the present article, it is argued (1) that the alleged stylistic differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries can be explained by other considerations: in particular, the vocabulary and style of the Neoplatonist commentators is largely determined by the text commented upon, as well as the level of studies of the audience for whom each commentary is intended. (2) The alleged doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other com- mentaries simply do not exist. Careful examination of Steel's arguments shows that they suffer from serious methodological flaws, including the failure to take into consideration Simplicius' Commentary on the Manual of Epictetus, and the ambiguity of Neoplatonic philosophical terminology. It is concluded that in the whole of Steel's argumentation, there is not one decisive argument which would allow us to conclude that the commentary on the De Anima, attributed by direct and indirect tradition to Simplicius, is inauthentic. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BFVk6vhtz2ul08p |
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Title | Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: An Important Contribution to the History of the Ancient |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2004 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 147 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 408-420 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In the first place, the survey of the commentaries on the Categories with which Simplicius provides us, as well as the examination undertaken by J. M. Dillon of the fragments of Iamblichus’ commentaries on Plato’s dialogues, show as clearly as possible that the form of the continuous commentary was utilized by the Neoplatonists right from the start, and that it therefore was not introduced by Syrianus. Secondly, an attentive comparison between those Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories that have come down to us proves that a genuine doctrinal continuity existed from Porphyry to Simplicius. In addition, I consider it likely that an analogous continuity with regard to the tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle also existed in the Neoplatonic commentaries on the Metaphysics, of which only that of Syrianus (partial), and that of Asclepius-Ammonius (partial) have come down to us, whereas those of Porphyry and Iamblichus are lost, but attested, and that Syrianus’ attitude, which he manifests in the introduction to his commentary on book My the Metaphysics, is therefore no more original than his use of the form of the continuous commentary. In conclusion, Syrianus was certainly a great philosopher, but, as far as the precise points dealt with in this article are concerned, he was not the innovator he has been made out to be. [conclusion, p. 419-420] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/iOqb6gj8D2LqZxB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"638","_score":null,"_source":{"id":638,"authors_free":[{"id":904,"entry_id":638,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: An Important Contribution to the History of the Ancient","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: An Important Contribution to the History of the Ancient"},"abstract":"In the first place, the survey of the commentaries on the Categories with which Simplicius provides us, as well as the examination undertaken by J. M. Dillon of the fragments of Iamblichus\u2019 commentaries on Plato\u2019s dialogues, show as clearly as possible that the form of the continuous commentary was utilized by the Neoplatonists right from the start, and that it therefore was not introduced by Syrianus. Secondly, an attentive comparison between those Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories that have come down to us proves that a genuine doctrinal continuity existed from Porphyry to Simplicius. In addition, I consider it likely that an analogous continuity with regard to the tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle also existed in the Neoplatonic commentaries on the Metaphysics, of which only that of Syrianus (partial), and that of Asclepius-Ammonius (partial) have come down to us, whereas those of Porphyry and Iamblichus are lost, but attested, and that Syrianus\u2019 attitude, which he manifests in the introduction to his commentary on book My the Metaphysics, is therefore no more original than his use of the form of the continuous commentary. In conclusion, Syrianus was certainly a great philosopher, but, as far as the precise points dealt with in this article are concerned, he was not the innovator he has been made out to be. [conclusion, p. 419-420]","btype":3,"date":"2004","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/iOqb6gj8D2LqZxB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":638,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"147","issue":"3\/4","pages":"408-420"}},"sort":["Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: An Important Contribution to the History of the Ancient"]}
Title | Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Antiquorum Philosophia |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 101-119 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Barney, Rachel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I have tried to make the case for two claims. First, we can do better than to speak of Simplicius as simply being committed to "the" Neoplatonic project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius’ project is a very distinctive one, and, properly speaking, it is not to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Nor, on the other hand, is it to harmonize the whole of pagan wisdom, or even the whole of Greek philosophy. Rather, it is to vindicate the unity of a certain dominant, broadly Platonic philosophical tradition, which importantly includes Aristotle, the Presocratics, and, to a lesser extent, the Stoics, in order to better defend that tradition against Christian attack. The scope, methods, and spirit of this project are all modeled on Aristotle’s own treatment of his predecessors, including an expansive but not unreasonable version of the principle of charity. Second, I have tried to bring out that projects of harmonization in philosophy have a perennial attraction for philosophers and interpreters alike, and not only for those who are antecedently committed to a canon of conflicting authorities. Projects of harmonization come in many guises and range across a spectrum from the primarily philosophical to the purely exegetical. Simplicius comes close to the latter extreme: his persona and methods are, in fact, strikingly close to those of a familiar sort of modern scholar, notwithstanding the strong philosophical commitments that inform his project. Finally, I would suggest that this self-appointed role as exegete is, more than anything else, an expression of Simplicius’ self-conscious belatedness. With a few exceptions, such as the residual puzzles about place and time addressed in the Corollaries, Simplicius’ work shows us what it is like to do philosophy after all the philosophical problems have been solved. All that remains open to him is the essentially interpretive work of showing how the correct solutions fit together. [conclusion p. 117-118] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bBLV4U0YGAzXs7u |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"825","_score":null,"_source":{"id":825,"authors_free":[{"id":1226,"entry_id":825,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":418,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Barney, Rachel","free_first_name":"Rachel","free_last_name":"Barney","norm_person":{"id":418,"first_name":"Rachel","last_name":"Barney","full_name":"Barney, Rachel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/17355959X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority"},"abstract":"I have tried to make the case for two claims. First, we can do better than to speak of Simplicius as simply being committed to \"the\" Neoplatonic project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius\u2019 project is a very distinctive one, and, properly speaking, it is not to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Nor, on the other hand, is it to harmonize the whole of pagan wisdom, or even the whole of Greek philosophy. Rather, it is to vindicate the unity of a certain dominant, broadly Platonic philosophical tradition, which importantly includes Aristotle, the Presocratics, and, to a lesser extent, the Stoics, in order to better defend that tradition against Christian attack. The scope, methods, and spirit of this project are all modeled on Aristotle\u2019s own treatment of his predecessors, including an expansive but not unreasonable version of the principle of charity.\r\n\r\nSecond, I have tried to bring out that projects of harmonization in philosophy have a perennial attraction for philosophers and interpreters alike, and not only for those who are antecedently committed to a canon of conflicting authorities. Projects of harmonization come in many guises and range across a spectrum from the primarily philosophical to the purely exegetical. Simplicius comes close to the latter extreme: his persona and methods are, in fact, strikingly close to those of a familiar sort of modern scholar, notwithstanding the strong philosophical commitments that inform his project. Finally, I would suggest that this self-appointed role as exegete is, more than anything else, an expression of Simplicius\u2019 self-conscious belatedness. With a few exceptions, such as the residual puzzles about place and time addressed in the Corollaries, Simplicius\u2019 work shows us what it is like to do philosophy after all the philosophical problems have been solved. All that remains open to him is the essentially interpretive work of showing how the correct solutions fit together. [conclusion p. 117-118]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bBLV4U0YGAzXs7u","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":418,"full_name":"Barney, Rachel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":825,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Antiquorum Philosophia","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"101-119"}},"sort":["Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority"]}
Title | Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 1 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences |
Volume | 4 |
Pages | 23-58 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bowen, Alan C. , Simplicius |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
If there is a single text that has proven to be the bedrock for the modern understanding of early Greek astronomy, it is Simplicius’ commentary on Book 2, Chapter 12 of Aristotle’s treatise De caelo. Simplicius’ remarks, which are effectively an elaboration of what he supposes Aristotle to mean in Metaphysics Λ 8, are almost always accepted as gospel in their broad outlines. Take any recent history of early Greek astronomy you please, and you will find that its author immediately turns to Simplicius as the source clarifying what Aristotle writes in this chapter of his Metaphysics. Indeed, the main challenge scholars perceive in Simplicius’ commentary is to tease out and reconstruct the underlying mathematical theory that would make it all ‘true.’ Such naïveté is breathtaking. Few who read Simplicius and understand his historiographical project—a search for a truth that Aristotle’s text is supposed to embody rather than a study of the text itself on its own terms—would elevate him to a position of such unquestioned authority. And those who have reflected on the often intractable problems in assessing the truth of ancient reports or testimonia in the sciences will quite naturally decline to take Simplicius at his word in this matter. I recognize, of course, that it is customary to detect errors in Simplicius’ account and to attribute them either to Aristotle or to Simplicius; but this, I fear, typically amounts to little more than a demonstration that we moderns can be speciously clever while taking what Simplicius writes for granted. I have written at length elsewhere that Simplicius’ comments on De caelo 2.12 do not constitute an account of what Aristotle meant in Metaphysics Λ 8 that we should accept today as properly historical. There is, after all, no extant Greek or Latin text written before the late second century BCE that shows any knowledge of the planetary phenomena of station and retrogradation, which are so central to Simplicius’ commentary. There are also ample signs that Simplicius’ remarks about the history of early astronomy are not a report but a reconstruction occasioned by what Aristotle writes in Metaphysics Λ 8 and the need to explain why the homocentric planetary theory outlined there was later abandoned by Aristotelians. Moreover, Metaphysics Λ 8 is itself underdetermined so far as its presentation of this homocentric theory goes. Indeed, there are other interpretations of this presentation that fit far better than Simplicius’ with what we can find elsewhere in Aristotle’s writings and in documents by other writers of the fourth century. That scholars today persist in reading Metaphysics Λ 8 and other early texts as indicating knowledge of the planetary stations and retrogradations is a puzzle. One only wishes, when these scholars have elaborated their interpretations of Metaphysics Λ 8 and of the other related texts written before the late second century that concern planetary motions, that they would not stop here as if their work as historians were done. Obviously, it will not be enough if they simply adduce relevant testimonia by later ancient writers. Not only are these testimonia few in number and dated to a time after the characteristic planetary motions were duly understood, they typically prove on critical examination to be either ambiguous or anachronistic in the same way as Simplicius’ account is. Consequently, any appeal to such testimonia without critical argument in defense of their historical validity is pointless. Indeed, the burden must fall on these scholars to demonstrate that Metaphysics Λ 8 and the other early texts must be read in this way. For, absent such proof, all one has is the fallacy of imputing to a writer the perceived consequences of what he writes. Of course, making such a proof will be hard work. Even those sharing the general view that the Greeks of the fourth century were aware of planetary stations and retrogradations do not agree about how these phenomena were understood or explained. In addition, there are my own arguments not only that these texts may be read without supposing such knowledge but also that they should be read without such a supposition, given the contemporaneous evidence of astronomical theory. And finally, there is the largely unrecognized problem that, even if Simplicius’ history of astronomy in Aristotle’s time is anachronistic, it has a simpler interpretation than the one first propounded in the 19th century by Schiaparelli and elaborated to this day. Granted, these scholars may wish to excuse themselves from the charge of wrongly imputing to Simplicius what they perceive as the real meaning of his text, by claiming that Simplicius is preserving material from earlier sources that he does not understand. But should historians today assent to reading an ancient commentary in a way that makes the commentator irrelevant, and should they do this in the expectation that the interpretation offered reflects the thought of some putative source from whom nothing survives for confirmation? My own view is that compounding such a misreading of an ancient literary genre with such untestable faith—or, if you will, unassailable credulity—may have numerous outcomes, but historical knowledge will not be one of them. Few modern historians have examined what Simplicius actually writes—the great tendency is to rely on some learned summary such as that supplied by Heath, who makes accessible in English the pioneering work of Schiaparelli. Accordingly, I here present Simplicius’ account of Metaphysics Λ 8 so that readers may begin to get their own sense of what is at issue. To this end, I have translated Heiberg’s edition of Simplicius’ commentary on the three narrowly astronomical chapters of the De caelo and have supplied my translation with annotation intended primarily to clarify the technical, scientific meaning. Given the exigencies of publication, this annotated translation will come in two parts. The first, presented here, is devoted to Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 2.10–11. These chapters in the De caelo raise stock issues in astronomy; and it is valuable, I think, for readers interested in Simplicius’ account of planetary theory in 2.12 to see and assess just how he deals with them. Indeed, not only does Simplicius’ commentary on 2.10–11 show him drawing on a tradition of technical writing for novices and philosophers that goes back to Geminus and Cleomedes, it also shows him going astray on fundamental points in elementary mathematics. And this is surely important for our interpretation of his commentary on 2.12. The annotation itself is, as I have said, intended to assist the reader with information that may be needed to make sense of the text. My main aim is to allow access to Simplicius that is as little encumbered by my interpretative intrusion as is feasible, since my hope in this publication is that the reader will confront Simplicius for himself, by himself, so far as this is possible in a translation. Thus, I do not engage in the details of the interpretations offered by those who assume that the early Greeks were aware of the planetary phenomena so central to Simplicius’ account of Metaphysics Λ 8. Still, there is a question about just how much annotation is needed by readers of this journal, and I hope that I have not erred too much in following my natural disposition to say less. Simplicius’ Greek is typical of scholastic commentary: elliptical, crabbed, and technical. I have tried to deal with this by supplying in square brackets what is missing whenever this seemed necessary or likely to make the meaning easier for the reader to grasp. At the same time, I have tried, so far as is reasonable and within my ability, to capture Simplicius’ technical vocabulary and to preserve the logical structure of his sentences. This translation has benefited greatly from the generous criticism of earlier versions offered by Bernard R. Goldstein and Robert B. Todd: they have saved me from numerous mistakes and infelicities, and I am most pleased to acknowledge this. Finally, I am very pleased to record my gratitude to Ken Saito, the Managing Editor of SCIAMVS, for his unflagging interest in this project and his encouragement as I pursued it. That my annotated translation appears in SCIAMVS is ample proof of his very kind support and his patience with a historian whose sense of time seems limited to the past. [introduction p. 23-26] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/skKbEWtOO6LigIs |
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","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140052720","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2601,"entry_id":1479,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":62,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Simplicius","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":62,"first_name":"Cilicius","last_name":"Simplicius ","full_name":"Simplicius Cilicius","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118642421","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 1","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 1"},"abstract":"If there is a single text that has proven to be the bedrock for the modern understanding of early Greek astronomy, it is Simplicius\u2019 commentary on Book 2, Chapter 12 of Aristotle\u2019s treatise De caelo. Simplicius\u2019 remarks, which are effectively an elaboration of what he supposes Aristotle to mean in Metaphysics \u039b 8, are almost always accepted as gospel in their broad outlines. Take any recent history of early Greek astronomy you please, and you will find that its author immediately turns to Simplicius as the source clarifying what Aristotle writes in this chapter of his Metaphysics.\r\n\r\nIndeed, the main challenge scholars perceive in Simplicius\u2019 commentary is to tease out and reconstruct the underlying mathematical theory that would make it all \u2018true.\u2019 Such na\u00efvet\u00e9 is breathtaking. Few who read Simplicius and understand his historiographical project\u2014a search for a truth that Aristotle\u2019s text is supposed to embody rather than a study of the text itself on its own terms\u2014would elevate him to a position of such unquestioned authority. And those who have reflected on the often intractable problems in assessing the truth of ancient reports or testimonia in the sciences will quite naturally decline to take Simplicius at his word in this matter.\r\n\r\nI recognize, of course, that it is customary to detect errors in Simplicius\u2019 account and to attribute them either to Aristotle or to Simplicius; but this, I fear, typically amounts to little more than a demonstration that we moderns can be speciously clever while taking what Simplicius writes for granted.\r\n\r\nI have written at length elsewhere that Simplicius\u2019 comments on De caelo 2.12 do not constitute an account of what Aristotle meant in Metaphysics \u039b 8 that we should accept today as properly historical. There is, after all, no extant Greek or Latin text written before the late second century BCE that shows any knowledge of the planetary phenomena of station and retrogradation, which are so central to Simplicius\u2019 commentary. There are also ample signs that Simplicius\u2019 remarks about the history of early astronomy are not a report but a reconstruction occasioned by what Aristotle writes in Metaphysics \u039b 8 and the need to explain why the homocentric planetary theory outlined there was later abandoned by Aristotelians. Moreover, Metaphysics \u039b 8 is itself underdetermined so far as its presentation of this homocentric theory goes. Indeed, there are other interpretations of this presentation that fit far better than Simplicius\u2019 with what we can find elsewhere in Aristotle\u2019s writings and in documents by other writers of the fourth century.\r\n\r\nThat scholars today persist in reading Metaphysics \u039b 8 and other early texts as indicating knowledge of the planetary stations and retrogradations is a puzzle. One only wishes, when these scholars have elaborated their interpretations of Metaphysics \u039b 8 and of the other related texts written before the late second century that concern planetary motions, that they would not stop here as if their work as historians were done. Obviously, it will not be enough if they simply adduce relevant testimonia by later ancient writers. Not only are these testimonia few in number and dated to a time after the characteristic planetary motions were duly understood, they typically prove on critical examination to be either ambiguous or anachronistic in the same way as Simplicius\u2019 account is. Consequently, any appeal to such testimonia without critical argument in defense of their historical validity is pointless.\r\n\r\nIndeed, the burden must fall on these scholars to demonstrate that Metaphysics \u039b 8 and the other early texts must be read in this way. For, absent such proof, all one has is the fallacy of imputing to a writer the perceived consequences of what he writes. Of course, making such a proof will be hard work. Even those sharing the general view that the Greeks of the fourth century were aware of planetary stations and retrogradations do not agree about how these phenomena were understood or explained. In addition, there are my own arguments not only that these texts may be read without supposing such knowledge but also that they should be read without such a supposition, given the contemporaneous evidence of astronomical theory.\r\n\r\nAnd finally, there is the largely unrecognized problem that, even if Simplicius\u2019 history of astronomy in Aristotle\u2019s time is anachronistic, it has a simpler interpretation than the one first propounded in the 19th century by Schiaparelli and elaborated to this day. Granted, these scholars may wish to excuse themselves from the charge of wrongly imputing to Simplicius what they perceive as the real meaning of his text, by claiming that Simplicius is preserving material from earlier sources that he does not understand. But should historians today assent to reading an ancient commentary in a way that makes the commentator irrelevant, and should they do this in the expectation that the interpretation offered reflects the thought of some putative source from whom nothing survives for confirmation?\r\n\r\nMy own view is that compounding such a misreading of an ancient literary genre with such untestable faith\u2014or, if you will, unassailable credulity\u2014may have numerous outcomes, but historical knowledge will not be one of them.\r\n\r\nFew modern historians have examined what Simplicius actually writes\u2014the great tendency is to rely on some learned summary such as that supplied by Heath, who makes accessible in English the pioneering work of Schiaparelli. Accordingly, I here present Simplicius\u2019 account of Metaphysics \u039b 8 so that readers may begin to get their own sense of what is at issue.\r\n\r\nTo this end, I have translated Heiberg\u2019s edition of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the three narrowly astronomical chapters of the De caelo and have supplied my translation with annotation intended primarily to clarify the technical, scientific meaning.\r\n\r\nGiven the exigencies of publication, this annotated translation will come in two parts. The first, presented here, is devoted to Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 2.10\u201311. These chapters in the De caelo raise stock issues in astronomy; and it is valuable, I think, for readers interested in Simplicius\u2019 account of planetary theory in 2.12 to see and assess just how he deals with them. Indeed, not only does Simplicius\u2019 commentary on 2.10\u201311 show him drawing on a tradition of technical writing for novices and philosophers that goes back to Geminus and Cleomedes, it also shows him going astray on fundamental points in elementary mathematics. And this is surely important for our interpretation of his commentary on 2.12.\r\n\r\nThe annotation itself is, as I have said, intended to assist the reader with information that may be needed to make sense of the text. My main aim is to allow access to Simplicius that is as little encumbered by my interpretative intrusion as is feasible, since my hope in this publication is that the reader will confront Simplicius for himself, by himself, so far as this is possible in a translation.\r\n\r\nThus, I do not engage in the details of the interpretations offered by those who assume that the early Greeks were aware of the planetary phenomena so central to Simplicius\u2019 account of Metaphysics \u039b 8. Still, there is a question about just how much annotation is needed by readers of this journal, and I hope that I have not erred too much in following my natural disposition to say less.\r\n\r\nSimplicius\u2019 Greek is typical of scholastic commentary: elliptical, crabbed, and technical. I have tried to deal with this by supplying in square brackets what is missing whenever this seemed necessary or likely to make the meaning easier for the reader to grasp. At the same time, I have tried, so far as is reasonable and within my ability, to capture Simplicius\u2019 technical vocabulary and to preserve the logical structure of his sentences.\r\n\r\nThis translation has benefited greatly from the generous criticism of earlier versions offered by Bernard R. Goldstein and Robert B. Todd: they have saved me from numerous mistakes and infelicities, and I am most pleased to acknowledge this.\r\n\r\nFinally, I am very pleased to record my gratitude to Ken Saito, the Managing Editor of SCIAMVS, for his unflagging interest in this project and his encouragement as I pursued it. That my annotated translation appears in SCIAMVS is ample proof of his very kind support and his patience with a historian whose sense of time seems limited to the past. [introduction p. 23-26]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/skKbEWtOO6LigIs","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":16,"full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":62,"full_name":"Simplicius Cilicius","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1479,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences","volume":"4","issue":"","pages":"23-58"}},"sort":["Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 1"]}
Title | Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 2 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2008 |
Journal | SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences |
Volume | 9 |
Pages | 25-131 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bowen, Alan C. , Simplicius |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This completes my translation of the narrowly astronomical sections of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo, which first appeared in SCIAMVS 4 (2003), 23–58. Its aim, as before, is to provide the reader with a suitably annotated rendering of Simplicius’ text that will facilitate addressing critical questions regarding the nature, construction, and historical value of Simplicius’ commentary, especially as it pertains to the history of earlier Greek astronomical theorizing. In completing this project, I have relied strictly on modern editions of Aristotle’s De caelo in presenting the lemmata in full and have relegated comments about any differences with Simplicius’ abbreviated lemmata to footnotes. After all, given that we have only Simplicius’ lemmata and not the full text of the De caelo that he used, there seems little sense in presenting Aristotle’s text in full while combining it with readings from Simplicius’ text, thereby implying a text that does not exist. At the same time, I have preserved the fact that the text quoted or paraphrased in the commentary proper sometimes differs from the text found in the lemmata. Thus, the lemmata presented here differ from those offered by Ian Mueller (2005), since he revises the received text of the De caelo in light of Simplicius’ text and removes any differences between Simplicius’ lemmata and his quotations and paraphrases. For the modern text of Aristotle’s De caelo, my primary source is Paul Moraux’s edition, as it makes extensive use of the indirect tradition in establishing Aristotle’s text. Moreover, as before, I have used Heiberg’s 1894 edition for the text of Simplicius’ commentary. However, caveat lector: this edition has recently been criticized for its reliance on the 1540 edition of the Latin translation of In De caelo made by William of Moerbeke in the 13th century. Additionally, arguments have been made for the importance of the recently discovered translation of De caelo 2 and related passages from Simplicius by Robert Grosseteste in establishing Simplicius’ text. Regrettably, there is only a proper edition thus far of Moerbeke’s translation of Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 1; and, though it has certainly proved useful, we must all await the publication of the edition of Moerbeke’s version of Simplicius’ In De caelo 2. This forthcoming edition, as I understand, will account for both of Moerbeke’s translations of Simplicius’ astronomical digression in his commentary on 2.12. As for Grosseteste’s translation, though there is apparently a typescript edition by the late Fernand Bossier, it seems to be privately circulated, and so far, I have been unable to obtain a copy. Next, in interpreting the syntax and meaning of Simplicius’ Greek, I have used terminology that remains faithful to our ancient sources while also being familiar to historians of science, ensuring an accurate rendering of the technical language that Simplicius employs (and sometimes misuses) in the course of his philosophical and astronomical interpretations. As before, the line numbers in the margins of the translation indicate the line in which the first word of the corresponding line in Heiberg’s text appears. The result is not exact in terms of the actual line count, but it should suffice to allow readers to move between my translation and Simplicius’ text if they so wish. Finally, I have supplied extensive footnotes and comments to explicate the many issues that readers should understand in order to assess the nature of Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 2.12. Readers may well disagree with my claims and arguments; however, I trust that this annotation will at least help them avoid missteps—mine included. What I have not done, however, is address the voluminous literature offering reconstructions of the system of homocentric spheres that Simplicius describes in the great astronomical digression concluding his commentary on 2.12. As in Part 1, my overriding aim is to provide only such annotation as allows readers to engage with Simplicius’ testimony directly, without obscuring it beneath layers of learned interpretation and speculation. My hope is that this approach will encourage readers to assess such reconstructions critically. Admittedly, this aim aligns with my own conclusion that such reconstructions, which trace back to Schiaparelli in the 19th century and were largely codified by Heath (1913), must today be seen as an egregious example of how scholars and their communities project their own perspectives onto the past. Moreover, this approach fits with my conviction that Simplicius’ commentary on De caelo 2.10–12 is historically significant in its own right as a witness to concerns in late antiquity about the nature and foundations of astronomical knowledge. Accordingly, I have limited my remarks on these reconstructions to instances where proponents make claims about the meaning of Simplicius’ Greek or critique his interpretations. For the most part, I have set aside alternative reconstructions proposed by Maula (1974), Heglmeier (1996), Mendell (1998, 2000), and Yavetz (1998, 2001, 2003). For further details on the principles underlying this translation and the format of its presentation, I urge the reader to consult Part 1, especially pages 25–26. [introduction p. 25-27] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/bK5nxtsNqCbstdI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1480","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1480,"authors_free":[{"id":2561,"entry_id":1480,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":16,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bowen, Alan C.","free_first_name":"Alan C.","free_last_name":"Bowen","norm_person":{"id":16,"first_name":"Bowen C.","last_name":"Bowen","full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. 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Its aim, as before, is to provide the reader with a suitably annotated rendering of Simplicius\u2019 text that will facilitate addressing critical questions regarding the nature, construction, and historical value of Simplicius\u2019 commentary, especially as it pertains to the history of earlier Greek astronomical theorizing.\r\n\r\nIn completing this project, I have relied strictly on modern editions of Aristotle\u2019s De caelo in presenting the lemmata in full and have relegated comments about any differences with Simplicius\u2019 abbreviated lemmata to footnotes. After all, given that we have only Simplicius\u2019 lemmata and not the full text of the De caelo that he used, there seems little sense in presenting Aristotle\u2019s text in full while combining it with readings from Simplicius\u2019 text, thereby implying a text that does not exist. At the same time, I have preserved the fact that the text quoted or paraphrased in the commentary proper sometimes differs from the text found in the lemmata. Thus, the lemmata presented here differ from those offered by Ian Mueller (2005), since he revises the received text of the De caelo in light of Simplicius\u2019 text and removes any differences between Simplicius\u2019 lemmata and his quotations and paraphrases.\r\n\r\nFor the modern text of Aristotle\u2019s De caelo, my primary source is Paul Moraux\u2019s edition, as it makes extensive use of the indirect tradition in establishing Aristotle\u2019s text. Moreover, as before, I have used Heiberg\u2019s 1894 edition for the text of Simplicius\u2019 commentary. However, caveat lector: this edition has recently been criticized for its reliance on the 1540 edition of the Latin translation of In De caelo made by William of Moerbeke in the 13th century. Additionally, arguments have been made for the importance of the recently discovered translation of De caelo 2 and related passages from Simplicius by Robert Grosseteste in establishing Simplicius\u2019 text. Regrettably, there is only a proper edition thus far of Moerbeke\u2019s translation of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 1; and, though it has certainly proved useful, we must all await the publication of the edition of Moerbeke\u2019s version of Simplicius\u2019 In De caelo 2. This forthcoming edition, as I understand, will account for both of Moerbeke\u2019s translations of Simplicius\u2019 astronomical digression in his commentary on 2.12.\r\n\r\nAs for Grosseteste\u2019s translation, though there is apparently a typescript edition by the late Fernand Bossier, it seems to be privately circulated, and so far, I have been unable to obtain a copy.\r\n\r\nNext, in interpreting the syntax and meaning of Simplicius\u2019 Greek, I have used terminology that remains faithful to our ancient sources while also being familiar to historians of science, ensuring an accurate rendering of the technical language that Simplicius employs (and sometimes misuses) in the course of his philosophical and astronomical interpretations. As before, the line numbers in the margins of the translation indicate the line in which the first word of the corresponding line in Heiberg\u2019s text appears. The result is not exact in terms of the actual line count, but it should suffice to allow readers to move between my translation and Simplicius\u2019 text if they so wish.\r\n\r\nFinally, I have supplied extensive footnotes and comments to explicate the many issues that readers should understand in order to assess the nature of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 2.12. Readers may well disagree with my claims and arguments; however, I trust that this annotation will at least help them avoid missteps\u2014mine included. What I have not done, however, is address the voluminous literature offering reconstructions of the system of homocentric spheres that Simplicius describes in the great astronomical digression concluding his commentary on 2.12.\r\n\r\nAs in Part 1, my overriding aim is to provide only such annotation as allows readers to engage with Simplicius\u2019 testimony directly, without obscuring it beneath layers of learned interpretation and speculation. My hope is that this approach will encourage readers to assess such reconstructions critically. Admittedly, this aim aligns with my own conclusion that such reconstructions, which trace back to Schiaparelli in the 19th century and were largely codified by Heath (1913), must today be seen as an egregious example of how scholars and their communities project their own perspectives onto the past.\r\n\r\nMoreover, this approach fits with my conviction that Simplicius\u2019 commentary on De caelo 2.10\u201312 is historically significant in its own right as a witness to concerns in late antiquity about the nature and foundations of astronomical knowledge. Accordingly, I have limited my remarks on these reconstructions to instances where proponents make claims about the meaning of Simplicius\u2019 Greek or critique his interpretations. For the most part, I have set aside alternative reconstructions proposed by Maula (1974), Heglmeier (1996), Mendell (1998, 2000), and Yavetz (1998, 2001, 2003).\r\n\r\nFor further details on the principles underlying this translation and the format of its presentation, I urge the reader to consult Part 1, especially pages 25\u201326. [introduction p. 25-27]","btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/bK5nxtsNqCbstdI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":16,"full_name":"Bowen, Alan C. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":62,"full_name":"Simplicius Cilicius","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1480,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"SCIAMVS: Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences","volume":"9","issue":"","pages":"25-131"}},"sort":["Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle, De Caelo 2.10-12: An Annotated Translation, Part 2"]}
Title | Simplicius’s Proof of Euclid’s Parallels Postulate |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1969 |
Journal | Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes |
Volume | 32 |
Pages | 1-24 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sabra, A. I. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A commentary by Simplicius on the premises to Book I of Euclid’s Elements survives in an Arabic translation, of which the author and the exact date of execution are unknown. The translation is reproduced by the ninth-century mathematician al-Fadl ibn Hâtim al-Nayrîzî in the course of his own commentary on the Elements. Of Nayrîzî’s commentary, which is based on the earlier translation of the Elements by al-Hajjâj ibn Yûsuf ibn Matar, we have only one manuscript copy at Leiden and Gerard of Cremona’s Latin translation, both of which have been published. The passages quoted by Nayrîzî, owing to their extensiveness and consecutive order, would strongly lead one to assume that they together make up the whole of Simplicius’s text. In what follows, however, I shall argue that they suffer from at least one important omission: a proof by Simplicius himself of Euclid’s parallels postulate. Since the omission occurs both in the Leiden manuscript and in Gerard’s translation, it cannot simply be an accidental feature of the former. My argument will consist in (i) citing evidence (Document I) to the effect that such a proof was known to some Arabic mathematicians, and (ii) producing a hitherto unnoticed text (Document II), which, in the light of the evidence cited, may well be taken to be the missing proof. In addition, I shall show how Simplicius’s proof entered Arabic discussions on parallels, first, by being made subject to criticism (Document I), and then by being incorporated into a new proof, which was designed to take that criticism into account (Document III). The title of Simplicius’s work in question appears in the Arabic sources in slightly different forms. Nayrîzî concludes the last citation from that work with the following words: “There end the matters which Simplicius has put forward in the commentary to the musädara of Euclid for the first part of the book of Elements.” The word musädara has here something a little unexpected about it. Usually, as in translations of Euclid and Aristotle, it corresponds to the Greek αἴτημα (aitêma), and it is used in this sense in the body of Simplicius’s commentary itself. (The Arabic verb sädara appropriately means “to demand.” Musädara: demanding, or that [proposition] which is demanded.) But the commentary is not restricted to the αἰτήματα (postulates) at the beginning of the Elements, but also treats of the common notions (κοιναί ἔννοιαι: 'ulüm muta‘ärafa) and the definitions (ὅροι: hudüd). Could musädara be used here in a general sense that covers all three groups of Euclid’s premises? Such a hypothesis would derive at least partial support from a statement in Proclus that some ancient writers applied the term αἴτημα to axioms (or common notions) as well as to postulates. Proclus quotes Archimedes as an example. In agreement with this usage, the titles of at least two Arabic works on geometry employ the plural musädarät as a collective term for the axioms, definitions, and postulates. It was probably this sense that the eleventh-century scholar Abü cAbd Allah al-Khwarizmï had in mind when he gave the following explanation in his Keys of the Sciences: “al-musädara are those premises of the question which are put at the beginning of a book or chapter of geometry.” The tenth-century bibliographer Ibn al-Nadïm gives a somewhat different version of the title of Simplicius’s book: “A commentary on the sadr of the book of Euclid, which is the introduction to geometry.” Sadr means fore-part or front and is frequently used to refer to the introductory part of a book; it might have rendered the Greek προοίμιον (prooimion). The latter part in this version, “which is the introduction to geometry,” looks like a description of the book supplied, perhaps, by Ibn al-Nadïm himself, but it may also have been an alternative title of the book. Nayrîzî’s version of the title agrees with Khwarizmï’s definition in applying the singular musädara to a multitude of premises, but we shall see that the thirteenth-century author of Document I cites the same title with musädarät in the plural. Simplicius prefaces his comments on the individual postulates of Euclid with a long passage on the meaning and function of postulates in general. It will be useful to quote this passage here in full, since it is one of the channels through which Greek discussions of mathematical methodology were transmitted to the Islamic world—particularly discussions connected with the question of parallels. [introduction p. 1-2] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DNibNx7ADIjjT3W |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1055","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1055,"authors_free":[{"id":1602,"entry_id":1055,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":396,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sabra, A. I.","free_first_name":"A. I.","free_last_name":"Sabra","norm_person":{"id":396,"first_name":"A. I.","last_name":"Sabra","full_name":"Sabra, A. I.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1023667843","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius\u2019s Proof of Euclid\u2019s Parallels Postulate","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius\u2019s Proof of Euclid\u2019s Parallels Postulate"},"abstract":"A commentary by Simplicius on the premises to Book I of Euclid\u2019s Elements survives in an Arabic translation, of which the author and the exact date of execution are unknown. The translation is reproduced by the ninth-century mathematician al-Fadl ibn H\u00e2tim al-Nayr\u00eez\u00ee in the course of his own commentary on the Elements. Of Nayr\u00eez\u00ee\u2019s commentary, which is based on the earlier translation of the Elements by al-Hajj\u00e2j ibn Y\u00fbsuf ibn Matar, we have only one manuscript copy at Leiden and Gerard of Cremona\u2019s Latin translation, both of which have been published.\r\n\r\nThe passages quoted by Nayr\u00eez\u00ee, owing to their extensiveness and consecutive order, would strongly lead one to assume that they together make up the whole of Simplicius\u2019s text. In what follows, however, I shall argue that they suffer from at least one important omission: a proof by Simplicius himself of Euclid\u2019s parallels postulate. Since the omission occurs both in the Leiden manuscript and in Gerard\u2019s translation, it cannot simply be an accidental feature of the former. My argument will consist in (i) citing evidence (Document I) to the effect that such a proof was known to some Arabic mathematicians, and (ii) producing a hitherto unnoticed text (Document II), which, in the light of the evidence cited, may well be taken to be the missing proof. In addition, I shall show how Simplicius\u2019s proof entered Arabic discussions on parallels, first, by being made subject to criticism (Document I), and then by being incorporated into a new proof, which was designed to take that criticism into account (Document III).\r\n\r\nThe title of Simplicius\u2019s work in question appears in the Arabic sources in slightly different forms. Nayr\u00eez\u00ee concludes the last citation from that work with the following words: \u201cThere end the matters which Simplicius has put forward in the commentary to the mus\u00e4dara of Euclid for the first part of the book of Elements.\u201d The word mus\u00e4dara has here something a little unexpected about it. Usually, as in translations of Euclid and Aristotle, it corresponds to the Greek \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 (ait\u00eama), and it is used in this sense in the body of Simplicius\u2019s commentary itself. (The Arabic verb s\u00e4dara appropriately means \u201cto demand.\u201d Mus\u00e4dara: demanding, or that [proposition] which is demanded.) But the commentary is not restricted to the \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 (postulates) at the beginning of the Elements, but also treats of the common notions (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9: 'ul\u00fcm muta\u2018\u00e4rafa) and the definitions (\u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9: hud\u00fcd). Could mus\u00e4dara be used here in a general sense that covers all three groups of Euclid\u2019s premises?\r\n\r\nSuch a hypothesis would derive at least partial support from a statement in Proclus that some ancient writers applied the term \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 to axioms (or common notions) as well as to postulates. Proclus quotes Archimedes as an example. In agreement with this usage, the titles of at least two Arabic works on geometry employ the plural mus\u00e4dar\u00e4t as a collective term for the axioms, definitions, and postulates. It was probably this sense that the eleventh-century scholar Ab\u00fc cAbd Allah al-Khwarizm\u00ef had in mind when he gave the following explanation in his Keys of the Sciences: \u201cal-mus\u00e4dara are those premises of the question which are put at the beginning of a book or chapter of geometry.\u201d\r\n\r\nThe tenth-century bibliographer Ibn al-Nad\u00efm gives a somewhat different version of the title of Simplicius\u2019s book: \u201cA commentary on the sadr of the book of Euclid, which is the introduction to geometry.\u201d Sadr means fore-part or front and is frequently used to refer to the introductory part of a book; it might have rendered the Greek \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bf\u03af\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd (prooimion). The latter part in this version, \u201cwhich is the introduction to geometry,\u201d looks like a description of the book supplied, perhaps, by Ibn al-Nad\u00efm himself, but it may also have been an alternative title of the book. Nayr\u00eez\u00ee\u2019s version of the title agrees with Khwarizm\u00ef\u2019s definition in applying the singular mus\u00e4dara to a multitude of premises, but we shall see that the thirteenth-century author of Document I cites the same title with mus\u00e4dar\u00e4t in the plural.\r\n\r\nSimplicius prefaces his comments on the individual postulates of Euclid with a long passage on the meaning and function of postulates in general. It will be useful to quote this passage here in full, since it is one of the channels through which Greek discussions of mathematical methodology were transmitted to the Islamic world\u2014particularly discussions connected with the question of parallels. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"1969","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DNibNx7ADIjjT3W","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":396,"full_name":"Sabra, A. I.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1055,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes","volume":"32","issue":"","pages":"1-24"}},"sort":["Simplicius\u2019s Proof of Euclid\u2019s Parallels Postulate"]}
Title | Simplikios in der arabischen Überlieferung |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Der Islam; Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients |
Volume | 59 |
Pages | 6-31 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gätje, Helmut |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wenn Simplikios in der philosophischen Tradition des Islams nicht zu einer so festen Größe geworden ist wie Alexander von Aphrodisias oder Themistios, so hängt das mit der historischen Stellung dieser Exegeten innerhalb der peripatetischen Schule zusammen. Ihnen gegenüber ist Simplikios nachgeboren. Auf der anderen Seite hat aber offenbar sein Zeitgenosse Johannes Philoponos, dem freilich im islamischen Bereich zu Unrecht eine Reihe medizinischer Werke zugeschrieben wurden, einen größeren Widerhall gefunden, was wiederum mit Ausgangspunkt und Wegen der Überlieferung zusammenhängt. Wenn man dem Urteil Praechters folgt und in Simplikios einen der bedeutendsten Kommentatoren des Altertums sieht, so stehen diese Bewertung des Simplikios und seine Wirkung im Islam nicht im rechten Verhältnis zueinander. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nULzjIVmZSFqXQi |
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Title | Simplikios, czytelnik Epikteta |
Type | Article |
Language | Polish |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 3-4 |
Pages | 35-43 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Łapiński, Krzysztof |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius, the Neoplatonic philosopher, and commentator from late antiquity, devoted one of his commentaries to Epictetus’ Enchiridion. In the article, the author posed the question about the place of the text by the Stoic writer within the whole Neoplatonic education system. In addition, he asked to what extent the act of commenting on Epictetus’ work could be conceived by Simplicius as a kind of spiritual exercise. In the second part of the article, the hypothesis by M. Tardieu and I. Hadot is presented, suggesting that the city of Harran could be regarded as the possible place of exile where the group of philosophers settled after the Platonic Academy had been closed. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/VGw8HfmmOi2CqbW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1139","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1139,"authors_free":[{"id":1713,"entry_id":1139,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":235,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski, Krzysztof","free_first_name":"Krzysztof","free_last_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski","norm_person":{"id":235,"first_name":"Krzysztof","last_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski","full_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski, Krzysztof","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1155501799","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplikios, czytelnik Epikteta","main_title":{"title":"Simplikios, czytelnik Epikteta"},"abstract":"Simplicius, the Neoplatonic philosopher, and commentator from late antiquity, devoted one of his commentaries to Epictetus\u2019 Enchiridion. In the article, the author posed the question about the place of the text by the Stoic writer within the whole Neoplatonic education system. In addition, he asked to what extent the act of commenting on Epictetus\u2019 work could be conceived by Simplicius as a kind of spiritual exercise. In the second part of the article, the hypothesis by M. Tardieu and I. Hadot is presented, suggesting that the city of Harran could be regarded as the possible place of exile where the group of philosophers settled after the Platonic Academy had been closed. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"Polish","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/VGw8HfmmOi2CqbW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":235,"full_name":"\u0141api\u0144ski, Krzysztof","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1139,"section_of":346,"pages":"35-43","is_catalog":null,"book":null},"article":{"id":1139,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Przegl\u0105d Filozoficzno-Literacki","volume":"40","issue":"3-4","pages":"35-43"}},"sort":["Simplikios, czytelnik Epikteta"]}
Title | Simplikios: Wstęp do Komentarza do Encheiridionu Epikteta (wybór) |
Type | Article |
Language | Polish |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki |
Volume | 40 |
Issue | 3-4 |
Pages | 45-49 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Łapiński, Krzysztof |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The translation includes an introduction to the Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion. The author of the commentary explains to whom is the work of Epictetus addressed, what is the scope o f the Enchiridion, the meaning of the title and the literary genre to which it belongs. The supposed audience is the reader who wants to live in accordance with reason on the level of ethical and political virtues. Such a reader ought to internalize Epictetus’ teaching and appeal to it in the challenging moments of life. The Stoic content has been enriched with the Platonic teaching drawn from Alcibiades I about relationship between the soul and the body. The first Polish translation of Simplicius’ text has been based on the Ilsetraut Hadot’s edition. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PcngrYGo5jPGQtC |
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Title | Sinfonia dei Presocratici. Su due παρεκβάσεις in Simplicio (in PHYS. 6.31–8.15 e 28.32–37.9) |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2019 |
Journal | Epekeina. International Journal of Ontology History and Critics |
Volume | 10 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-32 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Licciardi, Ivan Adriano |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Osserviamo, a bilancio finale, quanto segue: Simplicio affida a due digressioni di In Physica I la sua veduta complessiva sui Presocratici. Mentre Aristotele, nella sua ricostruzione storico-dialettica, inserisce i predecessori dentro griglie concettuali nelle quali le posizioni vengono poste come contraddittorie fra di loro, Simplicio muove invece dal presupposto che la filosofia dei Presocratici nel suo complesso sia in realtà unitaria, armonica e coerente. Ma Simplicio, a differenza dello Stagirita, opera alla fine del mondo antico, e la sua necessità fu innanzitutto quella di tramandare ai posteri la tradizione antica affinché tale patrimonio non andasse disperso. Trattasi, qui, non di una necessità archeologica o erudita, bensì filosofica e ideologica a un tempo. Occorreva, peraltro, tramandare questo patrimonio come un che di armonico, unitario e intimamente coerente a un grado almeno paritetico rispetto a un’altra tradizione, quella cristiana, che dopo le incertezze e le transizioni che avevano caratterizzato il suo affacciarsi alla storia mondiale, aveva ormai consolidato il suo apparato dogmatico (specialmente dopo i concili di Efeso, Nicea e Calcedonia) e aveva dato concretezza strategica al suo piano di espansione e diffusione per il tramite di adeguati strumenti politici (editti di Milano e Tessalonica) atti a imporsi definitivamente quale visione dominante nell’Occidente alla fine del mondo antico. Lo strumentario di cui si serve Simplicio è un ampio ricorso alla citazione diretta dei predecessori, congiuntamente a un trattamento mirante a “limare” le differenze che intercorrono fra loro e ad accentuarne i tratti comuni. La cornice teorica che accoglie questo tipo di operazione, in buona sostanza una “platonizzazione” di tutti i Presocratici, è il neoplatonismo, della cui tradizione Simplicio è l’ultimo erede pagano. Vale la pena, a tal proposito, sottolineare un ultimo fatto: quando Simplicio fa riferimento a una tradizione filosofica unitaria e coerente, che dalle origini giunge fino al suo tempo, egli non qualifica siffatta tradizione come platonica, bensì come antica. Si tratta di un fatto che solo apparentemente contraddice quanto abbiamo asserito, e cioè che la teoria della συμφωνία dei Presocratici scaturisca da un’interpretazione, fondamentalmente, neoplatonica. Il riferirsi, da parte di Simplicio, a una tradizione indeterminata di veteres non andrà interpretato come uno sbiadimento della consapevolezza di possedere un’identità e un’eredità storica e filosofica ben determinata (che, fondamentalmente, è quella del neoplatonismo ateniese), bensì come testimonianza di un passaggio storico ormai avvenuto. Questo passaggio storico consiste in questo: Simplicio non opera in un contesto quale quello dell’età classica, in cui l’Accademia e il Peripato si contendevano l’egemonia filosofica e culturale ateniese, e non opera nemmeno, a seguire, in un contesto paragonabile al periodo successivo alla morte di Alessandro Magno, in cui il pensiero greco si trova disperso nei rivoli delle αἱρέσεις ellenistiche e in cui una delle cifre dominanti è costituita da un agonismo che non sembra avere mai fine. Il contesto storico in cui opera Simplicio è, diversamente, quello della fine di un mondo, quello pagano, a cui ne sta per subentrare un altro, quello della Christianitas. Non si tratta più, in sostanza, di affermare il primato di una scuola o di una tradizione di pensiero rispetto ad altre tradizioni che non appartengono a quella platonica, perché le priorità, adesso, sono mutate. In questo passaggio epocale, la proposta filosofica e culturale di Simplicio sembra consistere, in altre parole, in una sorta di panellenismo filosofico. Come Isocrate, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Persiani, aveva cercato di superare i contrasti fra le varie πόλεις, cercando di radunare le loro energie e di riunirle politicamente sotto l’egemonia ateniese, così Simplicio, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Cristiani, mira a superare i contrasti e le divergenze fra le varie tradizioni di pensiero, dichiarandoli apparenti, e teorizza, appunto, la loro συμφωνία, sotto l’egemonia platonica. L’ermeneutica che caratterizza il procedere di Simplicio è segnata, in particolare, dalla coppia concettuale “enigma/chiarezza”. Secondo il Commentatore, il secondo modulo espressivo appartiene in modo eminente a Platone (e in parte anche ad Aristotele), mentre il primo ai Presocratici, e in particolare a Parmenide, Empedocle e i Pitagorici. Sarebbe proprio la modalità espressiva enigmatica, per Simplicio, la causa principale dei fraintendimenti che avrebbero condotto alcuni a concepire i Presocratici in agonismo fra di loro, proprio come vorrebbe lasciar intendere certa dossografia cristiana. La classificazione simpliciana dei Presocratici (che, come si è visto, è una tripartizione) è funzionale, però, solo a una migliore comprensione delle ragioni della loro profonda unità. Conformemente all’uso tecnico e tardo settecentesco del termine «sinfonia», possiamo dire che nell’ottica di Simplicio la filosofia dei Presocratici fu una sinfonia nel senso di un brano composto da più movimenti – più propriamente una “sonata per orchestra”: ἡ παλαιὰ φιλοσοφία μένει ἀνέλεγκτος. [conclusion p. 29-32] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/d1OxzfD4Xu8EZnr |
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Mentre Aristotele, nella sua ricostruzione storico-dialettica, inserisce i predecessori dentro griglie concettuali nelle quali le posizioni vengono poste come contraddittorie fra di loro, Simplicio muove invece dal presupposto che la filosofia dei Presocratici nel suo complesso sia in realt\u00e0 unitaria, armonica e coerente. Ma Simplicio, a differenza dello Stagirita, opera alla fine del mondo antico, e la sua necessit\u00e0 fu innanzitutto quella di tramandare ai posteri la tradizione antica affinch\u00e9 tale patrimonio non andasse disperso.\r\n\r\nTrattasi, qui, non di una necessit\u00e0 archeologica o erudita, bens\u00ec filosofica e ideologica a un tempo. Occorreva, peraltro, tramandare questo patrimonio come un che di armonico, unitario e intimamente coerente a un grado almeno paritetico rispetto a un\u2019altra tradizione, quella cristiana, che dopo le incertezze e le transizioni che avevano caratterizzato il suo affacciarsi alla storia mondiale, aveva ormai consolidato il suo apparato dogmatico (specialmente dopo i concili di Efeso, Nicea e Calcedonia) e aveva dato concretezza strategica al suo piano di espansione e diffusione per il tramite di adeguati strumenti politici (editti di Milano e Tessalonica) atti a imporsi definitivamente quale visione dominante nell\u2019Occidente alla fine del mondo antico.\r\n\r\nLo strumentario di cui si serve Simplicio \u00e8 un ampio ricorso alla citazione diretta dei predecessori, congiuntamente a un trattamento mirante a \u201climare\u201d le differenze che intercorrono fra loro e ad accentuarne i tratti comuni. La cornice teorica che accoglie questo tipo di operazione, in buona sostanza una \u201cplatonizzazione\u201d di tutti i Presocratici, \u00e8 il neoplatonismo, della cui tradizione Simplicio \u00e8 l\u2019ultimo erede pagano. Vale la pena, a tal proposito, sottolineare un ultimo fatto: quando Simplicio fa riferimento a una tradizione filosofica unitaria e coerente, che dalle origini giunge fino al suo tempo, egli non qualifica siffatta tradizione come platonica, bens\u00ec come antica.\r\n\r\nSi tratta di un fatto che solo apparentemente contraddice quanto abbiamo asserito, e cio\u00e8 che la teoria della \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 dei Presocratici scaturisca da un\u2019interpretazione, fondamentalmente, neoplatonica. Il riferirsi, da parte di Simplicio, a una tradizione indeterminata di veteres non andr\u00e0 interpretato come uno sbiadimento della consapevolezza di possedere un\u2019identit\u00e0 e un\u2019eredit\u00e0 storica e filosofica ben determinata (che, fondamentalmente, \u00e8 quella del neoplatonismo ateniese), bens\u00ec come testimonianza di un passaggio storico ormai avvenuto.\r\n\r\nQuesto passaggio storico consiste in questo: Simplicio non opera in un contesto quale quello dell\u2019et\u00e0 classica, in cui l\u2019Accademia e il Peripato si contendevano l\u2019egemonia filosofica e culturale ateniese, e non opera nemmeno, a seguire, in un contesto paragonabile al periodo successivo alla morte di Alessandro Magno, in cui il pensiero greco si trova disperso nei rivoli delle \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 ellenistiche e in cui una delle cifre dominanti \u00e8 costituita da un agonismo che non sembra avere mai fine.\r\n\r\nIl contesto storico in cui opera Simplicio \u00e8, diversamente, quello della fine di un mondo, quello pagano, a cui ne sta per subentrare un altro, quello della Christianitas. Non si tratta pi\u00f9, in sostanza, di affermare il primato di una scuola o di una tradizione di pensiero rispetto ad altre tradizioni che non appartengono a quella platonica, perch\u00e9 le priorit\u00e0, adesso, sono mutate.\r\n\r\nIn questo passaggio epocale, la proposta filosofica e culturale di Simplicio sembra consistere, in altre parole, in una sorta di panellenismo filosofico. Come Isocrate, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Persiani, aveva cercato di superare i contrasti fra le varie \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, cercando di radunare le loro energie e di riunirle politicamente sotto l\u2019egemonia ateniese, cos\u00ec Simplicio, al fine di proseguire la lotta contro i Cristiani, mira a superare i contrasti e le divergenze fra le varie tradizioni di pensiero, dichiarandoli apparenti, e teorizza, appunto, la loro \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, sotto l\u2019egemonia platonica.\r\n\r\nL\u2019ermeneutica che caratterizza il procedere di Simplicio \u00e8 segnata, in particolare, dalla coppia concettuale \u201cenigma\/chiarezza\u201d. Secondo il Commentatore, il secondo modulo espressivo appartiene in modo eminente a Platone (e in parte anche ad Aristotele), mentre il primo ai Presocratici, e in particolare a Parmenide, Empedocle e i Pitagorici.\r\n\r\nSarebbe proprio la modalit\u00e0 espressiva enigmatica, per Simplicio, la causa principale dei fraintendimenti che avrebbero condotto alcuni a concepire i Presocratici in agonismo fra di loro, proprio come vorrebbe lasciar intendere certa dossografia cristiana. La classificazione simpliciana dei Presocratici (che, come si \u00e8 visto, \u00e8 una tripartizione) \u00e8 funzionale, per\u00f2, solo a una migliore comprensione delle ragioni della loro profonda unit\u00e0.\r\n\r\nConformemente all\u2019uso tecnico e tardo settecentesco del termine \u00absinfonia\u00bb, possiamo dire che nell\u2019ottica di Simplicio la filosofia dei Presocratici fu una sinfonia nel senso di un brano composto da pi\u00f9 movimenti \u2013 pi\u00f9 propriamente una \u201csonata per orchestra\u201d: \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\r\n[conclusion p. 29-32]","btype":3,"date":"2019","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/d1OxzfD4Xu8EZnr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1554,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Epekeina. International Journal of Ontology History and Critics","volume":"10","issue":"1","pages":"1-32"}},"sort":["Sinfonia dei Presocratici. Su due \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b2\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in Simplicio (in PHYS. 6.31\u20138.15 e 28.32\u201337.9)"]}
Title | Some Concepts in Physical Theory in John Philoponus' Aristotelian Commentaries |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1980 |
Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
Volume | 24 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 151-170 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Todd, Robert B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I have tried, then, to establish the significance of some ideas in Philoponus' commentaries that, in different ways, reveal this commentator's individuality. Individuality is not, of course, the same as originality, and indeed both my examples have shown how dependent Philoponus was on the many philosophical sources that converge in his commentaries. But this very complexity, at times reaching an eclectic inconsistency, is what makes the Aristotelian exegetical tradition in antiquity worth continued study. At their best, these commentaries involve the interaction between, on the one hand, an inventive commentator with prejudices of his own and, on the other hand, a mass of inherited material. The result may not always illuminate Aristotle, but it will invariably shed light on the continuity of the Greek philosophical tradition in late antiquity. [conclusion p. 170] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6cdjUb25vOM63SC |
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Title | Some Problems in Anaximander |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1955 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 1/2 |
Pages | 21-38 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kirk, G.S. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
These considerations indicate that we are not entitled to automatically assume that prose works written in Ionia in the sixth or early fifth century were still available in their entirety to Theophrastus. In the case of Anaximander, I would suggest that what Theophrastus might have had in front of him was not a complete book but a collection of extracts, in which emphasis was laid upon astronomy, meteorology, and anthropogony rather than upon the nature and significance of to apeiron, which might always have seemed confusing. In respect to his arche, indeed, Anaximander must assuredly have been considered obsolete and unimportant by the end of the fifth century. The extant fragment could be quoted by Theophrastus, of course, because it really came among the cosmological-meteorological extracts. [introduction p. 38] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/2A18YiMysdkpynh |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"737","_score":null,"_source":{"id":737,"authors_free":[{"id":1100,"entry_id":737,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":216,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kirk, G.S.","free_first_name":"G.S.","free_last_name":"Kirk","norm_person":{"id":216,"first_name":"G. S.","last_name":"Kirk","full_name":"Kirk, G. S.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Some Problems in Anaximander","main_title":{"title":"Some Problems in Anaximander"},"abstract":"These considerations indicate that we are not entitled to automatically assume that prose works written in Ionia in the sixth or early fifth century were still available in their entirety to Theophrastus. In the case of Anaximander, I would suggest that what Theophrastus might have had in front of him was not a complete book but a collection of extracts, in which emphasis was laid upon astronomy, meteorology, and anthropogony rather than upon the nature and significance of to apeiron, which might always have seemed confusing.\r\n\r\nIn respect to his arche, indeed, Anaximander must assuredly have been considered obsolete and unimportant by the end of the fifth century. The extant fragment could be quoted by Theophrastus, of course, because it really came among the cosmological-meteorological extracts. [introduction p. 38]","btype":3,"date":"1955","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/2A18YiMysdkpynh","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":216,"full_name":"Kirk, G. S.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":737,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"5","issue":"1\/2","pages":"21-38"}},"sort":["Some Problems in Anaximander"]}
Title | Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1978 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 106 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 73-99 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarán, Leonardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Modern scholarship since the middle of the last century has generally accepted it as an established fact that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of words or names (onomata) in relation to the concepts they express and that he gave definitions of homonyma and synonyma only in reference to words and their meanings. That is to say, for him, homonyma and synonyma are properties of linguistic terms and not of things, whereas for Aristotle, especially in the first chapter of the Categories, they are properties of things. In 1904, E. Hambruch attempted to show that sometimes Aristotle himself uses synonyma in the Speusippean sense just outlined and that in so doing, he was influenced by Speusippus. This thesis of Hambruch has been accepted by several scholars, including Lang, Stenzel, and Cherniss. Although some doubts about its soundness were expressed from different perspectives, it was only in 1971 that Mr. Jonathan Barnes made a systematic assault on it. Barnes contends, first, that Speusippus’s conception of homonyma and synonyma is essentially the same as that of Aristotle, with the slight differences between their respective definitions being trivial, and second, that even though Aristotle occasionally uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of linguistic terms, this is because Aristotle's use of these words is not as rigid as the Categories might suggest. Barnes argues that Aristotle could not have been influenced by Speusippus, because Speusippus conceived homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, and, in any case, if influence were assumed, it could as well have been Aristotle influencing Speusippus. Though I believe Barnes’ two main contentions are mistaken, I am here mainly concerned with the first part of his thesis. If he were right in believing that, for Speusippus, homonyma and synonyma are properties of things and not of names or linguistic terms, then Hambruch’s notion that Speusippus influenced Aristotle when the latter uses synonymon as a property of names would be wrong, even if Barnes were mistaken in his analysis of the Aristotelian passages he reviews in the second part of his paper. On the other hand, if Speusippus's classification is truly of onomata, then, since Barnes himself admits that Aristotle sometimes uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of names, the influence of Speusippus on Aristotle is at least possible. It becomes plausible and probable—regardless of the relative chronology of their respective works—when it is seen, as I shall try to show, that in some cases, Aristotle is in fact attacking doctrines that presuppose a use of homonyma and synonyma such as can be ascribed to Speusippus or is using synonymon in the Speusippean sense, different from Aristotle's own notion of synonymous words. [introduction p. 73-75] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/DXL3umbA2JfHxYC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"843","_score":null,"_source":{"id":843,"authors_free":[{"id":1247,"entry_id":843,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":330,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo","free_first_name":"Leonardo","free_last_name":"Tar\u00e1n","norm_person":{"id":330,"first_name":"Tar\u00e1n","last_name":" Leonardo ","full_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1168065100","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy","main_title":{"title":"Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy"},"abstract":"Modern scholarship since the middle of the last century has generally accepted it as an established fact that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of words or names (onomata) in relation to the concepts they express and that he gave definitions of homonyma and synonyma only in reference to words and their meanings. That is to say, for him, homonyma and synonyma are properties of linguistic terms and not of things, whereas for Aristotle, especially in the first chapter of the Categories, they are properties of things.\r\n\r\nIn 1904, E. Hambruch attempted to show that sometimes Aristotle himself uses synonyma in the Speusippean sense just outlined and that in so doing, he was influenced by Speusippus. This thesis of Hambruch has been accepted by several scholars, including Lang, Stenzel, and Cherniss. Although some doubts about its soundness were expressed from different perspectives, it was only in 1971 that Mr. Jonathan Barnes made a systematic assault on it. Barnes contends, first, that Speusippus\u2019s conception of homonyma and synonyma is essentially the same as that of Aristotle, with the slight differences between their respective definitions being trivial, and second, that even though Aristotle occasionally uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of linguistic terms, this is because Aristotle's use of these words is not as rigid as the Categories might suggest. Barnes argues that Aristotle could not have been influenced by Speusippus, because Speusippus conceived homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, and, in any case, if influence were assumed, it could as well have been Aristotle influencing Speusippus.\r\n\r\nThough I believe Barnes\u2019 two main contentions are mistaken, I am here mainly concerned with the first part of his thesis. If he were right in believing that, for Speusippus, homonyma and synonyma are properties of things and not of names or linguistic terms, then Hambruch\u2019s notion that Speusippus influenced Aristotle when the latter uses synonymon as a property of names would be wrong, even if Barnes were mistaken in his analysis of the Aristotelian passages he reviews in the second part of his paper.\r\n\r\nOn the other hand, if Speusippus's classification is truly of onomata, then, since Barnes himself admits that Aristotle sometimes uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of names, the influence of Speusippus on Aristotle is at least possible. It becomes plausible and probable\u2014regardless of the relative chronology of their respective works\u2014when it is seen, as I shall try to show, that in some cases, Aristotle is in fact attacking doctrines that presuppose a use of homonyma and synonyma such as can be ascribed to Speusippus or is using synonymon in the Speusippean sense, different from Aristotle's own notion of synonymous words. [introduction p. 73-75]","btype":3,"date":"1978","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DXL3umbA2JfHxYC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":330,"full_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":843,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"106","issue":"1","pages":"73-99"}},"sort":["Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy"]}
Title | Stoici e Peripatetici su agire, patire e movimento: la testimonianza di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2023 |
Journal | Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico |
Volume | 44 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 333-365 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Giuseppe Nastasi |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories contains the most extended testimony about the Stoic conception of acting (ποιεῖν) and undergoing (πάσχειν). Simplicius ascribed to the Stoics the idea that acting and undergoing are to be reduced to the movement. To this opinion Simplicius opposed the Aristotelian view according to which acting and undergoing are two different categories. In this paper I intend to outline the original Stoic position comparing the reportage of Simplicius with other Stoic sources. Later, I will deal with Boethus’ defense of the distinction between the categories of acting and undergoing. I will argue that Boethus directly reacted against the Stoic opinion reformulating it in Aristotelian language. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8cin65Qpb0Uymcj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1599","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1599,"authors_free":[{"id":2799,"entry_id":1599,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Giuseppe Nastasi","free_first_name":"Giuseppe","free_last_name":" Nastasi","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Stoici e Peripatetici su agire, patire e movimento: la testimonianza di Simplicio","main_title":{"title":"Stoici e Peripatetici su agire, patire e movimento: la testimonianza di Simplicio"},"abstract":"Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories contains the most extended testimony about the Stoic conception of acting (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd) and undergoing (\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd). Simplicius ascribed to the Stoics the idea that acting and undergoing are to be reduced to the movement. To this opinion Simplicius opposed the Aristotelian view according to which acting and undergoing are two different categories. In this paper I intend to outline the original Stoic position comparing the reportage of Simplicius with other Stoic sources. Later, I will deal with Boethus\u2019 defense of the distinction between the categories of acting and undergoing. I will argue that Boethus directly reacted against the Stoic opinion reformulating it in Aristotelian language. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2023","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8cin65Qpb0Uymcj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1599,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico ","volume":"44","issue":"2","pages":"333-365"}},"sort":["Stoici e Peripatetici su agire, patire e movimento: la testimonianza di Simplicio"]}
Title | Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy: Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 85-98 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sotiria Triantari |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Was the Byzantine thinker Nicephorus Blemmydes directly influenced in his views about human “proairesis” by the Stoic Epictetus or did he take over his views from the Neoplatonic Simplicius? After exploring Blemmydes’ reception of Epictetus, one can say that Blemmydes drew elements in a brief treatise under the title “De virtute et ascesi” from the mainly Neoplatonic Simplicius, who commented on the handbook by the Stoic Epictetus. Blemmydes, following Simplicius identifies “φ’ μν” with “aftexousion” and he designates “proairesis” as an activity, which emanates from “aftexousion”. Blemmydes shows the moral power of “proairesis” as a transforming factor of human existence and the mediatory factor to the dialectical relation between man and God. For the completion of the study, the following sources have been used: Blemmydes’ De virtute et ascesi, Epictetus’ Handbook, and Neoplatonic Simplicius’ commentaries on the Handbook. I specifically focus on the views of Aristotle, Epictetus, and Neoplatonic Simplicius about “proairesis” and compare the views of Blemmydes to Simplicius’ ideas. I conclude that Blemmydes drew ideas from Simplicius, with regard to human “proairesis” and in the context of the practising and cultivating virtues in everyday life. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/L5aG4m1stEAka7L |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1596","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1596,"authors_free":[{"id":2796,"entry_id":1596,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sotiria Triantari","free_first_name":"Sotiria","free_last_name":"Triantari","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy: Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes","main_title":{"title":"Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy: Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes"},"abstract":"Was the Byzantine thinker Nicephorus Blemmydes directly influenced in his views about human \u201cproairesis\u201d by the Stoic Epictetus or did he take over his views from the Neoplatonic Simplicius? After exploring Blemmydes\u2019 reception of Epictetus, one can say that Blemmydes drew elements in a brief treatise under the title \u201cDe virtute et ascesi\u201d from the mainly Neoplatonic Simplicius, who commented on the handbook by the Stoic Epictetus. Blemmydes, following Simplicius identifies \u201c\u03c6\u2019 \u03bc\u03bd\u201d with \u201caftexousion\u201d and he designates \u201cproairesis\u201d as an activity, which emanates from \u201caftexousion\u201d. Blemmydes shows the moral power of \u201cproairesis\u201d as a transforming factor of human existence and the mediatory factor to the dialectical relation between man and God. For the completion of the study, the following sources have been used: Blemmydes\u2019 De virtute et ascesi, Epictetus\u2019 Handbook, and Neoplatonic Simplicius\u2019 commentaries on the Handbook. I specifically focus on the views of Aristotle, Epictetus, and Neoplatonic Simplicius about \u201cproairesis\u201d and compare the views of Blemmydes to Simplicius\u2019 ideas. I conclude that Blemmydes drew ideas from Simplicius, with regard to human \u201cproairesis\u201d and in the context of the practising and cultivating virtues in everyday life. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/L5aG4m1stEAka7L","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1596,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"17","issue":"1","pages":"85-98"}},"sort":["Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy: Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes"]}
Title | Studi recenti sulla vita e l'opera di Simplicio |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 1988 |
Journal | Studi Classici e Orientali |
Volume | 38 |
Pages | 331–346 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Linguiti, Alessandro |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I commentatori neoplatonici di Aristotele sono stati probabilmente gli ultimi a beneficiare del generale risveglio d’interesse per il neoplatonismo che, manifestatosi a partire dal secondo dopoguerra, sta divenendo sempre più evidente negli ultimi anni. Per lungo tempo, come è stato osservato, essi hanno occupato una sorta di terra di nessuno tra la filosofia antica e quella medievale. Inoltre, gli studiosi di neoplatonismo hanno preferito concentrare la loro attenzione sulle opere teoriche originali piuttosto che sui commentari, mentre i moderni interpreti di Aristotele, a differenza di quelli medievali, arabi o cristiani, hanno generalmente trascurato il commento greco, interpellandolo perlopiù su questioni particolari e circoscritte, e quasi mai esaminandolo nel suo impianto generale. Anche Simplicio ha condiviso questa sorte, e se il suo nome suona più familiare di quello di altri autori neoplatonici, ciò è dovuto essenzialmente all’importanza della sua testimonianza sulla scuola eleatica e all’interesse suscitato dalle dottrine contenute nel Corollario sul tempo: due elementi tutto sommato marginali ai fini di una valutazione complessiva del suo pensiero. Negli ultimi tempi, tuttavia, il panorama si sta modificando. Basti pensare, ad esempio, al libro di Ilsetraut Hadot sul neoplatonismo alessandrino apparso dieci anni fa, o a un convegno tenutosi a Parigi nell’autunno del 1985, con il patrocinio del Centre de recherche sur les œuvres et la pensée de Simplicius. Questo evento ha confermato la serietà dell’intento di leggere oggi i commentari neoplatonici come opere filosofiche a sé stanti, dotate di una propria coerenza interna e di un’autonoma responsabilità teorica. Gli atti del convegno, curati da Ilsetraut Hadot, sono stati pubblicati nel 1987: le relazioni presentate sono state distribuite in quattro sezioni, riguardanti rispettivamente le vicende biografiche di Simplicio, gli aspetti dottrinali dell’opera, le questioni attinenti alla trasmissione dei testi e la fortuna dell’autore nell’arco di tempo compreso tra il XIII e il XVII secolo. [introduction p. 331-332] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6LG7LMnxCvxF7RE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"871","_score":null,"_source":{"id":871,"authors_free":[{"id":1280,"entry_id":871,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":250,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Linguiti, Alessandro","free_first_name":"Alessandro","free_last_name":"Linguiti","norm_person":{"id":250,"first_name":"Alessandro","last_name":"Linguiti","full_name":"Linguiti, Alessandro","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137059574","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Studi recenti sulla vita e l'opera di Simplicio","main_title":{"title":"Studi recenti sulla vita e l'opera di Simplicio"},"abstract":"I commentatori neoplatonici di Aristotele sono stati probabilmente gli ultimi a beneficiare del generale risveglio d\u2019interesse per il neoplatonismo che, manifestatosi a partire dal secondo dopoguerra, sta divenendo sempre pi\u00f9 evidente negli ultimi anni. Per lungo tempo, come \u00e8 stato osservato, essi hanno occupato una sorta di terra di nessuno tra la filosofia antica e quella medievale. Inoltre, gli studiosi di neoplatonismo hanno preferito concentrare la loro attenzione sulle opere teoriche originali piuttosto che sui commentari, mentre i moderni interpreti di Aristotele, a differenza di quelli medievali, arabi o cristiani, hanno generalmente trascurato il commento greco, interpellandolo perlopi\u00f9 su questioni particolari e circoscritte, e quasi mai esaminandolo nel suo impianto generale.\r\n\r\nAnche Simplicio ha condiviso questa sorte, e se il suo nome suona pi\u00f9 familiare di quello di altri autori neoplatonici, ci\u00f2 \u00e8 dovuto essenzialmente all\u2019importanza della sua testimonianza sulla scuola eleatica e all\u2019interesse suscitato dalle dottrine contenute nel Corollario sul tempo: due elementi tutto sommato marginali ai fini di una valutazione complessiva del suo pensiero.\r\n\r\nNegli ultimi tempi, tuttavia, il panorama si sta modificando. Basti pensare, ad esempio, al libro di Ilsetraut Hadot sul neoplatonismo alessandrino apparso dieci anni fa, o a un convegno tenutosi a Parigi nell\u2019autunno del 1985, con il patrocinio del Centre de recherche sur les \u0153uvres et la pens\u00e9e de Simplicius. Questo evento ha confermato la seriet\u00e0 dell\u2019intento di leggere oggi i commentari neoplatonici come opere filosofiche a s\u00e9 stanti, dotate di una propria coerenza interna e di un\u2019autonoma responsabilit\u00e0 teorica.\r\n\r\nGli atti del convegno, curati da Ilsetraut Hadot, sono stati pubblicati nel 1987: le relazioni presentate sono state distribuite in quattro sezioni, riguardanti rispettivamente le vicende biografiche di Simplicio, gli aspetti dottrinali dell\u2019opera, le questioni attinenti alla trasmissione dei testi e la fortuna dell\u2019autore nell\u2019arco di tempo compreso tra il XIII e il XVII secolo.\r\n[introduction p. 331-332]","btype":3,"date":"1988","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6LG7LMnxCvxF7RE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":250,"full_name":"Linguiti, Alessandro","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":871,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studi Classici e Orientali","volume":"38","issue":"","pages":"331\u2013346"}},"sort":["Studi recenti sulla vita e l'opera di Simplicio"]}
Title | Studies in Xenophanes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Harvard Studies in Classical Philology |
Volume | 93 |
Pages | 103-167 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Here, our reconstruction of Theophrastus' account can be regarded as complete: we have determined his general approach to Xenophanes' twofold teaching and dwelt on the main points of his report on Xenophanes' monistic doctrine. The examination of Xenophanes' cosmological conception, however interesting and desirable, is a separate task which should be left for another opportunity. After such a lengthy discussion, one should perhaps briefly recapitulate the results arrived at, and the best way to do this seems to be to present the Theophrastean account in the form of the ordered series of statements reconstructed above. In this list, the sources from which a given statement is excerpted or on the basis of which it is formulated are referred to by the name of the author and the page and line(s) of the Diels-Kranz edition. Statements and parts of statements that are purely conjectural are italicized. [Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18] Xenophanes of Colophon, who pursued a certain way of his own different from [that of] all those spoken of beforehand [i.e., the Milesians], allows neither coming-to-be nor destruction but says that the whole is eternally selfsame. [Simpl.; 121.28] He says that this One and Whole is God, saying thus (fr. 23). [Simpl.; 121.27-28] The mention of this Xenophanean opinion rather belongs to a study other than that concerned with natural philosophy [that is, in that concerned with first philosophy]. He says that God is ungenerated and eternal, which he proves as follows: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.18-20] had it [the Whole or God] come to be, it is necessary for it not to be before this; but not being, it can never come to be: neither nought can produce anything nor can anything come to be by the agency of nought. That God is one, he proves so: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.23-24] among gods, there can be no supremacy, for it does not suit the divine holiness that God should be under lordship; but were there many gods, there would be lords and subjects among them (perhaps also: or all of them would be lords of each other). [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.24-25; 122.3-6] He does not say whether God is finite or infinite. Nor does he say [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.25; 122.3-6] whether he is moved or unmoved. But [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.6-9] actually, he conceives of God as unmoved, for he calls him eternally selfsame and says (fr. 26). He says that God is thoroughly seeing, hearing, and thinking (fr. 24). He demonstrates this in the following way: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.25-26] God is altogether free from any want; but had he seen, heard, and thought only in one part of him, he would be in want of these in another part; hence he sees, hears, and thinks wholly and not in one or another part of himself. [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.13-14] And he says that God governs all things by his mind, saying (fr. 25). [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.20-21; Aristocles; 126.6-8] Thus he throws out sense-perceptions while trusting logos alone. [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18; Theophr. ap. Alex.; 219.31-33] The other way, that of accounting for the coming-to-be of existing things, he dismisses, declaring such accounts to be no more than opinion deprived of any certainty, saying this in such words (fr. 34). Nevertheless, he proposes some such opinion which he himself seems to adjudge plausible, as his own words show (fr. 35). [Theophr. ap. Alex; 219.31-33] But Parmenides, who came after him, took both ways [i.e., that of Xenophanes and that of the Milesians, cf. (1)]. For indeed, he both says that the whole is eternal and tries to account for the coming-to-be of existing things, not however thinking about both [ways] alike, but according to truth assuming the whole to be one, ungenerated, and spherical, while according to the opinion of the many, accounting for the coming-to-be of perceptible things by positing two principles: fire and earth, etc. This reconstructed account represents that of the first book of the Physical Opinions. Indeed, (1) is the counterpart of (14), which is explicitly related by Alexander to the first book. (2)–(10) also belong there, for they either come from Simplicius' report or correct and complement it where it is wrong or incomplete, while this report itself comes from the first book of the Physical Opinions. If Theophrastus' account was as I suggest, it seems to have been of great accuracy. True, it misrepresents Xenophanes' position in that his epistemic approach is interpreted in terms of the contrast logos:aistheseis, but this is the only major misinterpretation I can find in the account. On the whole, this is a precise report that moreover does not show any tendency to assimilate Xenophanes' teaching to that of Parmenides. Yet it would be hard to point out even one important Parmenidean doctrine which is not, in one way or another, rooted in Xenophanes' teaching. Such is, first and foremost, the Parmenidean idea of the intelligible unity of the sensible manifold, which in Xenophanes himself was, as we have suggested, the development of one of the facets of Anaximander's Apeiron. This is the view of unity as one of two aspects—true, the most essential, significant, and sublime—but nevertheless one aspect only of reality, complementary to its other aspect, that of the manifold. [conclusion p. 163-167] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H8YttvfJXlsVkrJ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"748","_score":null,"_source":{"id":748,"authors_free":[{"id":1113,"entry_id":748,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Studies in Xenophanes","main_title":{"title":"Studies in Xenophanes"},"abstract":"Here, our reconstruction of Theophrastus' account can be regarded as complete: we have determined his general approach to Xenophanes' twofold teaching and dwelt on the main points of his report on Xenophanes' monistic doctrine. The examination of Xenophanes' cosmological conception, however interesting and desirable, is a separate task which should be left for another opportunity. After such a lengthy discussion, one should perhaps briefly recapitulate the results arrived at, and the best way to do this seems to be to present the Theophrastean account in the form of the ordered series of statements reconstructed above. In this list, the sources from which a given statement is excerpted or on the basis of which it is formulated are referred to by the name of the author and the page and line(s) of the Diels-Kranz edition. Statements and parts of statements that are purely conjectural are italicized.\r\n\r\n [Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18] Xenophanes of Colophon, who pursued a certain way of his own different from [that of] all those spoken of beforehand [i.e., the Milesians], allows neither coming-to-be nor destruction but says that the whole is eternally selfsame.\r\n [Simpl.; 121.28] He says that this One and Whole is God, saying thus (fr. 23).\r\n [Simpl.; 121.27-28] The mention of this Xenophanean opinion rather belongs to a study other than that concerned with natural philosophy [that is, in that concerned with first philosophy].\r\n He says that God is ungenerated and eternal, which he proves as follows: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.18-20] had it [the Whole or God] come to be, it is necessary for it not to be before this; but not being, it can never come to be: neither nought can produce anything nor can anything come to be by the agency of nought.\r\n That God is one, he proves so: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.23-24] among gods, there can be no supremacy, for it does not suit the divine holiness that God should be under lordship; but were there many gods, there would be lords and subjects among them (perhaps also: or all of them would be lords of each other).\r\n [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.24-25; 122.3-6] He does not say whether God is finite or infinite.\r\n Nor does he say [on the basis of Simpl.; 121.25; 122.3-6] whether he is moved or unmoved.\r\n But [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.6-9] actually, he conceives of God as unmoved, for he calls him eternally selfsame and says (fr. 26).\r\n He says that God is thoroughly seeing, hearing, and thinking (fr. 24). He demonstrates this in the following way: [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.25-26] God is altogether free from any want; but had he seen, heard, and thought only in one part of him, he would be in want of these in another part; hence he sees, hears, and thinks wholly and not in one or another part of himself.\r\n [on the basis of Simpl.; 122.13-14] And he says that God governs all things by his mind, saying (fr. 25).\r\n [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.20-21; Aristocles; 126.6-8] Thus he throws out sense-perceptions while trusting logos alone.\r\n [on the basis of Ps.-Plut.; 122.15-18; Theophr. ap. Alex.; 219.31-33] The other way, that of accounting for the coming-to-be of existing things, he dismisses, declaring such accounts to be no more than opinion deprived of any certainty, saying this in such words (fr. 34).\r\n Nevertheless, he proposes some such opinion which he himself seems to adjudge plausible, as his own words show (fr. 35).\r\n [Theophr. ap. Alex; 219.31-33] But Parmenides, who came after him, took both ways [i.e., that of Xenophanes and that of the Milesians, cf. (1)]. For indeed, he both says that the whole is eternal and tries to account for the coming-to-be of existing things, not however thinking about both [ways] alike, but according to truth assuming the whole to be one, ungenerated, and spherical, while according to the opinion of the many, accounting for the coming-to-be of perceptible things by positing two principles: fire and earth, etc.\r\n\r\nThis reconstructed account represents that of the first book of the Physical Opinions. Indeed, (1) is the counterpart of (14), which is explicitly related by Alexander to the first book. (2)\u2013(10) also belong there, for they either come from Simplicius' report or correct and complement it where it is wrong or incomplete, while this report itself comes from the first book of the Physical Opinions.\r\n\r\nIf Theophrastus' account was as I suggest, it seems to have been of great accuracy. True, it misrepresents Xenophanes' position in that his epistemic approach is interpreted in terms of the contrast logos:aistheseis, but this is the only major misinterpretation I can find in the account. On the whole, this is a precise report that moreover does not show any tendency to assimilate Xenophanes' teaching to that of Parmenides.\r\n\r\nYet it would be hard to point out even one important Parmenidean doctrine which is not, in one way or another, rooted in Xenophanes' teaching. Such is, first and foremost, the Parmenidean idea of the intelligible unity of the sensible manifold, which in Xenophanes himself was, as we have suggested, the development of one of the facets of Anaximander's Apeiron. This is the view of unity as one of two aspects\u2014true, the most essential, significant, and sublime\u2014but nevertheless one aspect only of reality, complementary to its other aspect, that of the manifold.\r\n[conclusion p. 163-167]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H8YttvfJXlsVkrJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":748,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Harvard Studies in Classical Philology","volume":"93","issue":"","pages":"103-167"}},"sort":["Studies in Xenophanes"]}
Title | Sur la période finale de la philosophie grecque |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1896 |
Journal | Revue philosophique de la France et de L'Étranger |
Volume | 42 |
Pages | 266-287 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tannery, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Les historiens de la philosophie grecque ont pris, entre autres, deux habitudes : la première est de passer sous silence tout personnage reconnu comme chrétien, quand bien même ses écrits suivraient la tradition des maîtres païens ; la seconde est d'adopter comme limite inférieure la date de la fermeture, par Justinien, de l'école d'Athènes en 529. C'est ainsi qu'Édouard Zeller, pour ne citer que son exemple, ne consacre pas une ligne de son texte à Jean Philopon, dont cependant il invoque assez souvent dans ses notes les commentaires sur Aristote ; c'est ainsi encore qu'il parle de Simplicius avant de raconter l'exode en Perse des philosophes d'Athènes, quoique, avec son exactitude ordinaire, il ait soin de remarquer que les ouvrages les plus importants du dernier diadochos sont postérieurs à 529. Ces indications suffisent à montrer que les deux errements que j'ai signalés et qui, à première vue, ne semblent avoir rien de commun, se rattachent cependant à une même opinion, aussi généralement reçue qu'elle est probablement difficile à ébranler. Cette opinion est que le travail, si considérable pourtant, des commentateurs d'Aristote est, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, tout à fait négligeable vis-à-vis de l'œuvre des néoplatoniciens. Je ne veux nullement contester que le mouvement intellectuel dont on rattache l'origine à Ammonius Saccas soit le seul courant qui, en dehors du christianisme, ait, à cette époque de décadence, persisté avec une réelle originalité, malgré le flot montant d'une nouvelle religion, apportant avec elle d'autres solutions aux problèmes métaphysiques, introduisant d'autres habitudes d'esprit, d'autres modes de raisonnement. Je considère également comme tout à fait rationnel de séparer en principe l'histoire de la philosophie ancienne et celle de la philosophie chrétienne, quoique, à partir du IVᵉ siècle, les représentants de cette dernière aient certainement été à la hauteur de leurs rivaux païens ; les influences réciproques que les uns ont pu exercer sur les autres sont en effet beaucoup trop faibles pour qu'il y ait intérêt à lier intimement l'étude des deux camps ennemis. Il n'y a cependant pas là, évidemment, des raisons suffisantes soit pour négliger l'étude des commentateurs d'Aristote postérieurs à Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, soit pour faire rentrer cette étude dans celle du néoplatonisme, en écartant les chrétiens comme Jean Philopon. L'œuvre de ces commentateurs a en effet une importance historique bien supérieure à celle de l'école de Plotin ; quoique cette dernière n'ait nullement été inconnue des Arabes, ni des scolastiques du Moyen Âge, ses doctrines n'ont plus joué, à partir du VIᵉ siècle de notre ère, qu'un rôle passablement insignifiant, sauf le mouvement factice qui s'est produit un moment en leur faveur à la Renaissance. Depuis lors, l'intérêt qu'elles ont provoqué, notamment dans notre siècle, est d'un ordre purement historique. On doit affirmer au contraire que ce sont les commentateurs anciens d'Aristote qui ont décidé le succès des doctrines de leur maître chez les Arabes et, dès lors, par contre-coup, dans l'Occident latin. D'autre part, un fait méconnu, je crois, jusqu'à présent, mais que je me propose particulièrement de mettre en lumière, à savoir qu'après Ammonius, fils d'Hermias, l'école d'Alexandrie est devenue chrétienne, mais qu'on n'en a pas moins continué à y professer la philosophie aristotélique jusqu'à l'invasion arabe, ce fait, dis-je, avait naturellement amené une adaptation de cette philosophie à une religion monothéiste enseignant la création. Cette circonstance ne laissait pour ainsi dire aucune liberté de choix aux Arabes ; en même temps que les écrits des commentateurs idolâtres ou non, constituant un corps de doctrine complet, ils rencontraient, soit en Égypte, soit chez les Syriaques ou les Arméniens, une tradition vivante pour l'enseignement aristotélique aux fidèles d'une religion tout à fait semblable à la leur. Beaucoup moins originaux, comme penseurs ou comme savants, qu'on l'a supposé sans un examen approfondi, ils ne pouvaient que se mettre à la même école, et ils ne surent guère s'en affranchir. Avant donc les Arabes, avant nos scolastiques de l'Occident latin, les commentateurs grecs d'Aristote ont créé la méthode exégétique, signalé les points de controverse, indiqué des solutions qui se sont perpétuées. Ils n'ont pas été seulement des précurseurs, mais bien de véritables maîtres, dont l'influence a persisté jusqu'au XVIIIᵉ siècle. [introduction p. 266-268] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zOpjj1OBM4BnCRa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"476","_score":null,"_source":{"id":476,"authors_free":[{"id":642,"entry_id":476,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":329,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tannery, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Tannery","norm_person":{"id":329,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Tannery","full_name":"Tannery, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117201065","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Sur la p\u00e9riode finale de la philosophie grecque","main_title":{"title":"Sur la p\u00e9riode finale de la philosophie grecque"},"abstract":"Les historiens de la philosophie grecque ont pris, entre autres, deux habitudes : la premi\u00e8re est de passer sous silence tout personnage reconnu comme chr\u00e9tien, quand bien m\u00eame ses \u00e9crits suivraient la tradition des ma\u00eetres pa\u00efens ; la seconde est d'adopter comme limite inf\u00e9rieure la date de la fermeture, par Justinien, de l'\u00e9cole d'Ath\u00e8nes en 529.\r\n\r\nC'est ainsi qu'\u00c9douard Zeller, pour ne citer que son exemple, ne consacre pas une ligne de son texte \u00e0 Jean Philopon, dont cependant il invoque assez souvent dans ses notes les commentaires sur Aristote ; c'est ainsi encore qu'il parle de Simplicius avant de raconter l'exode en Perse des philosophes d'Ath\u00e8nes, quoique, avec son exactitude ordinaire, il ait soin de remarquer que les ouvrages les plus importants du dernier diadochos sont post\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 529.\r\n\r\nCes indications suffisent \u00e0 montrer que les deux errements que j'ai signal\u00e9s et qui, \u00e0 premi\u00e8re vue, ne semblent avoir rien de commun, se rattachent cependant \u00e0 une m\u00eame opinion, aussi g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement re\u00e7ue qu'elle est probablement difficile \u00e0 \u00e9branler. Cette opinion est que le travail, si consid\u00e9rable pourtant, des commentateurs d'Aristote est, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, tout \u00e0 fait n\u00e9gligeable vis-\u00e0-vis de l'\u0153uvre des n\u00e9oplatoniciens.\r\n\r\nJe ne veux nullement contester que le mouvement intellectuel dont on rattache l'origine \u00e0 Ammonius Saccas soit le seul courant qui, en dehors du christianisme, ait, \u00e0 cette \u00e9poque de d\u00e9cadence, persist\u00e9 avec une r\u00e9elle originalit\u00e9, malgr\u00e9 le flot montant d'une nouvelle religion, apportant avec elle d'autres solutions aux probl\u00e8mes m\u00e9taphysiques, introduisant d'autres habitudes d'esprit, d'autres modes de raisonnement.\r\n\r\nJe consid\u00e8re \u00e9galement comme tout \u00e0 fait rationnel de s\u00e9parer en principe l'histoire de la philosophie ancienne et celle de la philosophie chr\u00e9tienne, quoique, \u00e0 partir du IV\u1d49 si\u00e8cle, les repr\u00e9sentants de cette derni\u00e8re aient certainement \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 la hauteur de leurs rivaux pa\u00efens ; les influences r\u00e9ciproques que les uns ont pu exercer sur les autres sont en effet beaucoup trop faibles pour qu'il y ait int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 lier intimement l'\u00e9tude des deux camps ennemis.\r\n\r\nIl n'y a cependant pas l\u00e0, \u00e9videmment, des raisons suffisantes soit pour n\u00e9gliger l'\u00e9tude des commentateurs d'Aristote post\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, soit pour faire rentrer cette \u00e9tude dans celle du n\u00e9oplatonisme, en \u00e9cartant les chr\u00e9tiens comme Jean Philopon.\r\n\r\nL'\u0153uvre de ces commentateurs a en effet une importance historique bien sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle de l'\u00e9cole de Plotin ; quoique cette derni\u00e8re n'ait nullement \u00e9t\u00e9 inconnue des Arabes, ni des scolastiques du Moyen \u00c2ge, ses doctrines n'ont plus jou\u00e9, \u00e0 partir du VI\u1d49 si\u00e8cle de notre \u00e8re, qu'un r\u00f4le passablement insignifiant, sauf le mouvement factice qui s'est produit un moment en leur faveur \u00e0 la Renaissance. Depuis lors, l'int\u00e9r\u00eat qu'elles ont provoqu\u00e9, notamment dans notre si\u00e8cle, est d'un ordre purement historique.\r\n\r\nOn doit affirmer au contraire que ce sont les commentateurs anciens d'Aristote qui ont d\u00e9cid\u00e9 le succ\u00e8s des doctrines de leur ma\u00eetre chez les Arabes et, d\u00e8s lors, par contre-coup, dans l'Occident latin.\r\n\r\nD'autre part, un fait m\u00e9connu, je crois, jusqu'\u00e0 pr\u00e9sent, mais que je me propose particuli\u00e8rement de mettre en lumi\u00e8re, \u00e0 savoir qu'apr\u00e8s Ammonius, fils d'Hermias, l'\u00e9cole d'Alexandrie est devenue chr\u00e9tienne, mais qu'on n'en a pas moins continu\u00e9 \u00e0 y professer la philosophie aristot\u00e9lique jusqu'\u00e0 l'invasion arabe, ce fait, dis-je, avait naturellement amen\u00e9 une adaptation de cette philosophie \u00e0 une religion monoth\u00e9iste enseignant la cr\u00e9ation.\r\n\r\nCette circonstance ne laissait pour ainsi dire aucune libert\u00e9 de choix aux Arabes ; en m\u00eame temps que les \u00e9crits des commentateurs idol\u00e2tres ou non, constituant un corps de doctrine complet, ils rencontraient, soit en \u00c9gypte, soit chez les Syriaques ou les Arm\u00e9niens, une tradition vivante pour l'enseignement aristot\u00e9lique aux fid\u00e8les d'une religion tout \u00e0 fait semblable \u00e0 la leur.\r\n\r\nBeaucoup moins originaux, comme penseurs ou comme savants, qu'on l'a suppos\u00e9 sans un examen approfondi, ils ne pouvaient que se mettre \u00e0 la m\u00eame \u00e9cole, et ils ne surent gu\u00e8re s'en affranchir.\r\n\r\nAvant donc les Arabes, avant nos scolastiques de l'Occident latin, les commentateurs grecs d'Aristote ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 la m\u00e9thode ex\u00e9g\u00e9tique, signal\u00e9 les points de controverse, indiqu\u00e9 des solutions qui se sont perp\u00e9tu\u00e9es. Ils n'ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9 seulement des pr\u00e9curseurs, mais bien de v\u00e9ritables ma\u00eetres, dont l'influence a persist\u00e9 jusqu'au XVIII\u1d49 si\u00e8cle. [introduction p. 266-268]","btype":3,"date":"1896","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zOpjj1OBM4BnCRa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":329,"full_name":"Tannery, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":476,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue philosophique de la France et de L'\u00c9tranger","volume":"42","issue":"","pages":"266-287"}},"sort":["Sur la p\u00e9riode finale de la philosophie grecque"]}
Title | Sur les pas d'un pèlerin païen à travers la Syrie chrétienne: À propos du livre de Michel Tardieu |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1994 |
Journal | Syria |
Volume | 71 |
Issue | 1/2 |
Pages | 217-226 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bauzou, Thomas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This à propos to the book Les paysages reliques. Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore à Simplicius by Michel Tardieu discusses how Tardieu's book collects and comments on previously unknown fragments by Damascius and Simplicius, the last pagan intellectuals of a region that was in the process of complete Christianisation. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tBLkmMKD3Nol362 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1121","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1121,"authors_free":[{"id":1695,"entry_id":1121,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":419,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bauzou, Thomas","free_first_name":"Thomas","free_last_name":"Bauzou","norm_person":{"id":419,"first_name":"Thomas","last_name":"Bauzou","full_name":"Bauzou, Thomas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1137532572","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Sur les pas d'un p\u00e8lerin pa\u00efen \u00e0 travers la Syrie chr\u00e9tienne: \u00c0 propos du livre de Michel Tardieu","main_title":{"title":"Sur les pas d'un p\u00e8lerin pa\u00efen \u00e0 travers la Syrie chr\u00e9tienne: \u00c0 propos du livre de Michel Tardieu"},"abstract":"This \u00e0 propos to the book Les paysages reliques. Routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore \u00e0 Simplicius by Michel Tardieu discusses how Tardieu's book collects and comments on previously unknown fragments by Damascius and Simplicius, the last pagan intellectuals of a region that was in the process of complete Christianisation. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1994","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tBLkmMKD3Nol362","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":419,"full_name":"Bauzou, Thomas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1121,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Syria","volume":"71","issue":"1\/2","pages":"217-226"}},"sort":["Sur les pas d'un p\u00e8lerin pa\u00efen \u00e0 travers la Syrie chr\u00e9tienne: \u00c0 propos du livre de Michel Tardieu"]}
Title | The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
Volume | 2 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 7-23 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
All students of the history of philosophy are apt to be seduced by linearity. What I mean is this. Naturally, we read the texts of the history of philosophy in the chronological order in which they were written. So, for example, we read Aristotle after we read Plato. And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the “influence” of the earlier philosopher on the later or the “development” of the philosopher’s views. The employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment’s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect. Thus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another. Consider “development.” The perfectly anodyne sense of this term—namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought—is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato’s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought—apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none—you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change. I am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato’s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a “phase” after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful. The reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato. The reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an “objective and unbiased” account of the “development” of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called “the exegete of the Platonic revelation,” namely, Plotinus. Simplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy “in” the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle’s remark in Physics—that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature—puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides. Let us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato. As I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle’s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle’s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy. Instead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1510","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1510,"authors_free":[{"id":2623,"entry_id":1510,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism","main_title":{"title":"The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism"},"abstract":"All students of the history of philosophy are apt to be seduced by linearity. What I mean is this. Naturally, we read the texts of the history of philosophy in the chronological order in which they were written. So, for example, we read Aristotle after we read Plato. And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the \u201cinfluence\u201d of the earlier philosopher on the later or the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the philosopher\u2019s views.\r\n\r\nThe employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment\u2019s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect.\r\n\r\nThus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another.\r\n\r\nConsider \u201cdevelopment.\u201d The perfectly anodyne sense of this term\u2014namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought\u2014is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato\u2019s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought\u2014apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none\u2014you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change.\r\n\r\nI am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato\u2019s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a \u201cphase\u201d after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful.\r\n\r\nThe reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato.\r\n\r\nThe reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an \u201cobjective and unbiased\u201d account of the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called \u201cthe exegete of the Platonic revelation,\u201d namely, Plotinus.\r\n\r\nSimplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy \u201cin\u201d the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle\u2019s remark in Physics\u2014that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature\u2014puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides.\r\n\r\nLet us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato.\r\n\r\nAs I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy.\r\n\r\nInstead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1510,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"2","issue":"4","pages":"7-23"}},"sort":["The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism"]}
Title | The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2020 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-22 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gabor, Gary |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The traditional ascription of the Neoplatonic commentary on the De Anima to Simplicius has prominently been disputed by Carlos Steel and Fernand Bossier, along with J.O. Urmson and Francesco Piccolomini, among others. Citing problems with terminology, diction, cross-references, doctrine, and other features, these authors have argued that the commentary cannot have been composed by Simplicius and that Priscian of Lydia is a favored alternative. In this paper, I present some new arguments for why the traditional attribution to Simplicius is, in fact, the correct one. In particular, while addressing some of the terminological facts that have also been discussed by Christina Luna, Peter Lautner, Patricia Huby, and Philippe Vallat, among others, I offer a more secure basis for identifying the author of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius than has so far been proposed. In place of the disputes regarding terminology, which the debate has largely centered upon, I argue that certain unique and characteristic interpretive procedures, which one only finds in the undisputed Simplician works, allow us to identify the authorship of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius securely. Further, comparison of these methodological features with the extant works of Priscian rules out the possibility of his authorship of the commentary. I also provide some suggestions for resolving a few remaining issues of cross-reference between the De Anima commentary and the rest of Simplicius’s work. Finally, I conclude with some words on how that particular form of harmonization pursued by Simplicius’s contemporaries differs from both that of the De Anima commentary as well as his other works. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pVUbfH8m3jQVsKw |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1466","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1466,"authors_free":[{"id":2539,"entry_id":1466,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":106,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gabor, Gary","free_first_name":"Gary","free_last_name":"Gabor","norm_person":{"id":106,"first_name":"Gary","last_name":"Gabor ","full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima","main_title":{"title":"The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima"},"abstract":"The traditional ascription of the Neoplatonic commentary on the De Anima to Sim\u00adplicius has prominently been disputed by Carlos Steel and Fernand Bossier, along with J.O. Urmson and Francesco Piccolomini, among others. Citing problems with terminology, diction, cross-references, doctrine, and other features, these authors have argued that the commentary cannot have been composed by Simplicius and that Priscian of Lydia is a favored alternative. In this paper, I present some new arguments for why the traditional attribution to Simplicius is, in fact, the correct one. In particular, while addressing some of the terminological facts that have also been discussed by Christina Luna, Peter Lautner, Patricia Huby, and Philippe Vallat, among others, I offer a more secure basis for identifying the author of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius than has so far been proposed. In place of the disputes regarding terminology, which the debate has largely centered upon, I argue that certain unique and characteristic interpretive procedures, which one only finds in the undisputed Simplician works, allow us to identify the authorship of the De Anima commentary with Simplicius securely. Further, comparison of these methodological features with the extant works of Priscian rules out the possibility of his authorship of the commentary. I also provide some suggestions for resolving a few remaining issues of cross-reference between the De Anima commentary and the rest of Simplicius\u2019s work. Finally, I conclude with some words on how that particular form of harmonization pursued by Simplicius\u2019s contemporaries differs from both that of the De Anima commentary as well as his other works. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2020","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pVUbfH8m3jQVsKw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":106,"full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1466,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"35","issue":"1","pages":"1-22"}},"sort":["The Authorship of the Pseudo-Simplician Neoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima"]}
Title | The Cosmology of Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1986 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 107 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 303-317 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Finkelberg, Aryeh |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Our main source of information about the cosmological component of Parmenides’ doctrine of Opinion —apart from the first three and a half abstruse lines of fr. 12 — is Aetius’ account. This, however, is generally regarded as confused, garbled and incompatible with fr. 12. The reconstruction of Parmenides’ cosmology is thus considered a hopeless task, for “it must inevitably be based on many conjectures.” I, however, cannot accept this conclusion, for, as I argue below, it is possible to provide a reasonably intelligible account of Aetius’ report (except for the corrupt sentence about the goddess) which is also compatible with fr. 12, provided, of course, that we are not bent upon proving our sources incompatible, but rather seek to reconcile them. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3OYYrw5qTwsrSkx |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"548","_score":null,"_source":{"id":548,"authors_free":[{"id":772,"entry_id":548,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Cosmology of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"The Cosmology of Parmenides"},"abstract":"Our main source of information about the cosmological compo\u00adnent of Parmenides\u2019 doctrine of Opinion \u2014apart from the first three and a half abstruse lines of fr. 12 \u2014 is Aetius\u2019 account. This, however, is generally regarded as confused, garbled and incompatible with fr. 12. The reconstruction of Parmenides\u2019 cosmology is thus considered a hope\u00adless task, for \u201cit must inevitably be based on many conjectures.\u201d I, however, cannot accept this conclusion, for, as I argue below, it is possible to provide a reasonably intelligible account of Aetius\u2019 report (except for the corrupt sentence about the goddess) which is also com\u00adpatible with fr. 12, provided, of course, that we are not bent upon prov\u00ading our sources incompatible, but rather seek to reconcile them. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3OYYrw5qTwsrSkx","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":548,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"107","issue":"3","pages":"303-317"}},"sort":["The Cosmology of Parmenides"]}
Title | The End of Aristotle's on Prayer |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 106 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 110-113 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rist, John M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Jean Pépin recently devoted a lengthy study to Aristotle's On Prayer. There is good reason to think that the work never existed. On Prayer is listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotle's writings (5.22) and in the Vita Hesychii. The only other evidence for its existence is a passage of Simplicius that tells us that at the end of On Prayer, Aristotle says clearly that God is either mind or somehow beyond mind (ἢ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ). The claim that God is beyond mind is unique in an unemended Aristotelian text, but the notion would be acceptable to Simplicius both because, as a Neoplatonist, he would believe it to be true, and because as a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle, he would be happy to find evidence of the basic philosophical harmony of Aristotle and Plato. Our problem, therefore, is to see why Simplicius thought that Aristotle held this view. The immediate answer is that he thought he had found it in a text of Aristotle's called On Prayer (or perhaps more likely in an anthology of Aristotelian material claiming that this was Aristotle's view in such a work). But if there was no such work On Prayer, how could Simplicius (or his source) think there was, and what is the actual source of the apparent fragment that claims that for Aristotle, God might be "beyond mind"? It is possible to understand how Simplicius was misled. There is a Latin work in two chapters called De Bona Fortuna. It is composed of Magna Moralia 2.8 and Eudemian Ethics 8.2. Of the 56 surviving manuscripts of De Bona Fortuna, the earliest datable version is Vat. Lat. 2083, of the year 1284. The producer of this text is unknown. De Bona Fortuna is not an excerpt from existing Latin translations of Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics, because although Bartholomew of Messina translated the Magna Moralia between 1258 and 1266, and although a Greek manuscript of the Eudemian Ethics may have been known in Messina before 1250, there are no medieval Latin translations of the Eudemian Ethics as a whole; indeed, the only other section of the text translated is E.E. 8.3. The original sources of De Bona Fortuna were known to at least some of those who copied it in Latin, but the work itself is a direct translation from Greek. So, unless the translator also both excerpted and combined the two parts of the De Bona Fortuna himself, and showed no concern for the fact that the rest of the Eudemian Ethics was still untranslated, and perhaps even still unknown (which is highly unlikely), he must have used a Greek original of De Bona Fortuna in the form of a separate treatise composed of M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2. The title of the treatise, presumably, was the Greek equivalent of De Bona Fortuna, that is, Περὶ Εὐτυχίας. We have no means of telling when it was assembled, but there is no reason why it should not be ancient and indeed have been available to Simplicius or (if Simplicius is quoting an anthology of some sort) to his source. E.E. 8.2 (1248A28) unemended, reads as follows: Τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπισημότερον εἴποι τις ἢ θεὸς. Spengel added the words καὶ νοῦ after εἴποι, following the reading et intellectu found in De Bona Fortuna. Thus, the Greek original of De Bona Fortuna read: Τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπισημότερον εἴποι καὶ νοῦ πάλιν θεὸς. Thus, in Περὶ Εὐτυχίας, God is greater than mind. Admittedly, Περὶ Εὐτυχίας did not say that God is "beyond mind" (ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ), only that he is greater than mind. But in Platonic or Neopythagorean writings of late antiquity, these phrases are virtually interchangeable. The most striking evidence is from Plotinus, who uses ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ dozens of times and also gives the best examples of the One being "greater (κρείττων)" than mind (5.3.14.16-18, 5.3.16.38, 5.3.17.1-3). Simplicius thought he knew about an Aristotelian text On Prayer (Περὶ Εὐχῆς). Let us suppose that he had direct or indirect access to a work originally called On Good Fortune (Περὶ Εὐτυχίας). The corruption of Εὐτυχίας to Εὐχῆς is easy. In this text, Simplicius found the remark that God is "greater than mind." There is no reason to assume that Simplicius is quoting On Good Fortune verbatim. For Simplicius, as a Neoplatonist, to say that God is "greater than mind" is the same as to say that he is "beyond (ἐπέκεινα) mind." The use of ἐπέκεινα in this way derives, of course, from Neoplatonic, Middle Platonic, and Neopythagorean interpretations of Plato's Republic 509B. Let us therefore posit the following sequence of events. A Greek text, including (but not necessarily restricted to) M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2, is compiled and originally entitled Περὶ Εὐτυχίας. It comes to contain, at some point, an un-Aristotelian phrase (absent from the original text of the E.E. and based on a misinterpretation of that text) saying that God is "greater than mind." The title of the work is at some stage corrupted: Περὶ Εὐτυχίας becomes Περὶ Εὐχῆς. Simplicius either reads it under this title or, more likely, finds it so cited by an excerpter or commentator of Platonizing tendencies. Either Simplicius or the excerpter paraphrases κρείττον τοῦ νοῦ as ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ. Hence, our alleged fragment of Aristotle's work On Prayer, found in Simplicius, is really a corrupted fragment of Περὶ Εὐτυχίας, a work whose origin is lost but which reaches Simplicius, or becomes known to him, through the medium of a Platonizing tradition. The date of the original compilation Περὶ Εὐτυχίας remains unknown, but it must have been early enough for its title, in a mistaken form, to have found its way onto the lists of Aristotle's writings. The corruption of the title was probably achieved by a librarian's error long before the crucial phrase καὶ νοῦ (absent, as we have seen, from the Eudemian Ethics) was imported into the text itself. This can hardly have occurred before the revival of Neopythagoreanism, that is, before the second century B.C. It is not impossible that it was post-Plotinian. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7iwkew2wm2p3qeo |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"858","_score":null,"_source":{"id":858,"authors_free":[{"id":1262,"entry_id":858,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":303,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rist, John M.","free_first_name":"John M.","free_last_name":"Rist","norm_person":{"id":303,"first_name":"John M.","last_name":"Rist","full_name":"Rist, John M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137060440","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The End of Aristotle's on Prayer","main_title":{"title":"The End of Aristotle's on Prayer"},"abstract":"Jean P\u00e9pin recently devoted a lengthy study to Aristotle's On Prayer. There is good reason to think that the work never existed. On Prayer is listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotle's writings (5.22) and in the Vita Hesychii. The only other evidence for its existence is a passage of Simplicius that tells us that at the end of On Prayer, Aristotle says clearly that God is either mind or somehow beyond mind (\u1f22 \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6).\r\n\r\nThe claim that God is beyond mind is unique in an unemended Aristotelian text, but the notion would be acceptable to Simplicius both because, as a Neoplatonist, he would believe it to be true, and because as a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle, he would be happy to find evidence of the basic philosophical harmony of Aristotle and Plato. Our problem, therefore, is to see why Simplicius thought that Aristotle held this view. The immediate answer is that he thought he had found it in a text of Aristotle's called On Prayer (or perhaps more likely in an anthology of Aristotelian material claiming that this was Aristotle's view in such a work).\r\n\r\nBut if there was no such work On Prayer, how could Simplicius (or his source) think there was, and what is the actual source of the apparent fragment that claims that for Aristotle, God might be \"beyond mind\"? It is possible to understand how Simplicius was misled.\r\n\r\nThere is a Latin work in two chapters called De Bona Fortuna. It is composed of Magna Moralia 2.8 and Eudemian Ethics 8.2. Of the 56 surviving manuscripts of De Bona Fortuna, the earliest datable version is Vat. Lat. 2083, of the year 1284. The producer of this text is unknown. De Bona Fortuna is not an excerpt from existing Latin translations of Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics, because although Bartholomew of Messina translated the Magna Moralia between 1258 and 1266, and although a Greek manuscript of the Eudemian Ethics may have been known in Messina before 1250, there are no medieval Latin translations of the Eudemian Ethics as a whole; indeed, the only other section of the text translated is E.E. 8.3.\r\n\r\nThe original sources of De Bona Fortuna were known to at least some of those who copied it in Latin, but the work itself is a direct translation from Greek. So, unless the translator also both excerpted and combined the two parts of the De Bona Fortuna himself, and showed no concern for the fact that the rest of the Eudemian Ethics was still untranslated, and perhaps even still unknown (which is highly unlikely), he must have used a Greek original of De Bona Fortuna in the form of a separate treatise composed of M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2.\r\n\r\nThe title of the treatise, presumably, was the Greek equivalent of De Bona Fortuna, that is, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. We have no means of telling when it was assembled, but there is no reason why it should not be ancient and indeed have been available to Simplicius or (if Simplicius is quoting an anthology of some sort) to his source.\r\n\r\nE.E. 8.2 (1248A28) unemended, reads as follows: \u03a4\u03af \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2. Spengel added the words \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 after \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9, following the reading et intellectu found in De Bona Fortuna. Thus, the Greek original of De Bona Fortuna read: \u03a4\u03af \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2. Thus, in \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, God is greater than mind.\r\n\r\nAdmittedly, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 did not say that God is \"beyond mind\" (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6), only that he is greater than mind. But in Platonic or Neopythagorean writings of late antiquity, these phrases are virtually interchangeable. The most striking evidence is from Plotinus, who uses \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 dozens of times and also gives the best examples of the One being \"greater (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd)\" than mind (5.3.14.16-18, 5.3.16.38, 5.3.17.1-3).\r\n\r\nSimplicius thought he knew about an Aristotelian text On Prayer (\u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2). Let us suppose that he had direct or indirect access to a work originally called On Good Fortune (\u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2). The corruption of \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 to \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 is easy. In this text, Simplicius found the remark that God is \"greater than mind.\" There is no reason to assume that Simplicius is quoting On Good Fortune verbatim. For Simplicius, as a Neoplatonist, to say that God is \"greater than mind\" is the same as to say that he is \"beyond (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1) mind.\"\r\n\r\nThe use of \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 in this way derives, of course, from Neoplatonic, Middle Platonic, and Neopythagorean interpretations of Plato's Republic 509B.\r\n\r\nLet us therefore posit the following sequence of events. A Greek text, including (but not necessarily restricted to) M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2, is compiled and originally entitled \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. It comes to contain, at some point, an un-Aristotelian phrase (absent from the original text of the E.E. and based on a misinterpretation of that text) saying that God is \"greater than mind.\" The title of the work is at some stage corrupted: \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 becomes \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2.\r\n\r\nSimplicius either reads it under this title or, more likely, finds it so cited by an excerpter or commentator of Platonizing tendencies. Either Simplicius or the excerpter paraphrases \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 as \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6. Hence, our alleged fragment of Aristotle's work On Prayer, found in Simplicius, is really a corrupted fragment of \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, a work whose origin is lost but which reaches Simplicius, or becomes known to him, through the medium of a Platonizing tradition.\r\n\r\nThe date of the original compilation \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 remains unknown, but it must have been early enough for its title, in a mistaken form, to have found its way onto the lists of Aristotle's writings. The corruption of the title was probably achieved by a librarian's error long before the crucial phrase \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 (absent, as we have seen, from the Eudemian Ethics) was imported into the text itself. This can hardly have occurred before the revival of Neopythagoreanism, that is, before the second century B.C. It is not impossible that it was post-Plotinian. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7iwkew2wm2p3qeo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":303,"full_name":"Rist, John M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":858,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"106","issue":"1","pages":"110-113"}},"sort":["The End of Aristotle's on Prayer"]}
Title | The End of the Ancient Universities |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1966 |
Journal | Journal of World History |
Volume | 10 |
Pages | 653-673 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Cameron, Alan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Strictliy speaking, there were no universities in the Ancient World,if by university we understand a corporate institution offering avariety of courses and granting degrees in the way modern univer sities do. There were, however, university towns, Rome, Constantinople, Athens, Alexandria, Bordeaux, with established chairs, where the leading teachers of the day lectured to classes drawn from all over the Empire. And so many of the ideas we associate with a university were both present and fostered in this atmosphere, that it would clearly he pedantic to avoid using the term. But there were significant differences nonetheless.Not least, each professor in these university towns was independent of, and indeed a rival of, every other professor there. In every city of the Empire except Constantinople, and not there till 425, it was possible for freelance teachers to set up in opposition lo holders of the established chairs (and sometimes entice away their pupils, too). Even holders of the chairs competed with each other for pupils. It was normal for students to sign on with just one professor, and attend his courses alone. Indeed, the rivalry between professors was transmitted to their pupils. Up to a point competion was natural and healthy enough. But by the period that forms the subject of this paper, the fourth to sixth centuries A.D., it far exceeded that point, and cannot but have impaired both the proficiency and the standing of the profession. [Introduction, pp. 653 f.] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/NfGl20qhKYCdDTy |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1048","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1048,"authors_free":[{"id":1593,"entry_id":1048,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":20,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cameron, Alan","free_first_name":"Alan","free_last_name":"Cameron","norm_person":{"id":20,"first_name":"Alan","last_name":"Cameron","full_name":"Cameron, Alan ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/143568914","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The End of the Ancient Universities","main_title":{"title":"The End of the Ancient Universities"},"abstract":"Strictliy speaking, there were no universities in the Ancient World,if by university we understand a corporate institution offering avariety of courses and granting degrees in the way modern univer\u00ad\r\nsities do.\r\nThere were, however, university towns, Rome, Constantinople, \r\nAthens, Alexandria, Bordeaux, with established chairs, where the leading \r\nteachers of the day lectured to classes drawn from all over the Empire. \r\nAnd so many of the ideas we associate with a university were both present \r\nand fostered in this atmosphere, that it would clearly he pedantic to avoid \r\nusing the term. But there were significant differences nonetheless.Not least, each professor in these university towns was independent \r\nof, and indeed a rival of, every other professor there. In every city of the \r\nEmpire except Constantinople, and not there till 425, it was possible for \r\nfreelance teachers to set up in opposition lo holders of the established \r\nchairs (and sometimes entice away their pupils, too). Even holders of the \r\nchairs competed with each other for pupils. It was normal for students to \r\nsign on with just one professor, and attend his courses alone. Indeed, the \r\nrivalry between professors was transmitted to their pupils. Up to a point competion was natural and healthy enough. But by the period that\r\nforms the subject of this paper, the fourth to sixth centuries A.D., it\r\nfar exceeded that point, and cannot but have impaired both the \r\nproficiency and the standing of the profession. [Introduction, pp. 653 f.]","btype":3,"date":"1966","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/NfGl20qhKYCdDTy","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":20,"full_name":"Cameron, Alan ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1048,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of World History","volume":"10","issue":"","pages":"653-673"}},"sort":["The End of the Ancient Universities"]}
Title | The Framework of Greek Cosmology |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1961 |
Journal | The Review of Metaphysics |
Volume | 14 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 676-684 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Robinson, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
A striking phenomenon of recent years (and one not without its significance for the historian of contemporary philosophy) has been the appearance of a substantial body of work on the early Greek philosophers. Most of this work is characterized by a new approach to the subject, an approach marked on the one hand by greater attention to the fragments themselves as opposed to the doxographic materials, and on the other hand by a more vigorous analysis of the relation of the language of the fragments to the wider non-philosophic context from which it was in so many instances borrowed. Charles Kahn's recent study, beautifully printed and bound by the Columbia University Press, is a worthy contribution to this growing body of literature and bears the impress of its characteristic method. The single remaining fragment of Anaximander is not discussed until it has been firmly fixed in its historical context by a thoroughgoing consideration of the classical conception of the four elements; and one of the most striking features of this consideration is the use made by the author of the extensive body of Greek medical writings known as the Hippocratic Corpus. It was W. A. Heidel who first called attention to the extraordinary value of these writings—the only complete scientific treatises to have come down to us from the early period—for the elucidation of Greek thought. Since then, this material has been referred to more and more frequently by students of the early Greek philosophers, and the tendency is strikingly evidenced in the present study. The use of this material is not without its difficulties. The treatises which form the Hippocratic Corpus are not the work of a single individual, and there is abundant evidence that they were written over a period of at least two hundred years. It is, therefore, essential, in attempting to reconstruct the scientific worldview of the early period, that we rely so far as possible on treatises belonging to this period. Unfortunately, in the present state of Hippocratic studies, it is impossible to date these works with any exactitude. On the other hand, certain of them belong pretty clearly to the fifth century; and it seems fairly well established that the view of the constitution of man which most of them assume dates from the time of Alcmaeon, who flourished around the turn of the century. Since this view is based upon an analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, the processes involved in sickness and health reflect on a small scale the greater processes which constitute the life of the cosmos as a whole; thus, indirectly, these treatises illuminate in striking ways aspects of the larger worldview implicit in the fragments of the early cosmologists, but obscured by the fewness of these fragments and the imperfect state in which they have been preserved. In the present study, they are used to illuminate just such obscurities. [introduction p. 676-677] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hN9oPATyWj4WjP6 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"857","_score":null,"_source":{"id":857,"authors_free":[{"id":1261,"entry_id":857,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":304,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Robinson, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":304,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Robinson","full_name":"Robinson, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Framework of Greek Cosmology","main_title":{"title":"The Framework of Greek Cosmology"},"abstract":"A striking phenomenon of recent years (and one not without its significance for the historian of contemporary philosophy) has been the appearance of a substantial body of work on the early Greek philosophers. Most of this work is characterized by a new approach to the subject, an approach marked on the one hand by greater attention to the fragments themselves as opposed to the doxographic materials, and on the other hand by a more vigorous analysis of the relation of the language of the fragments to the wider non-philosophic context from which it was in so many instances borrowed. Charles Kahn's recent study, beautifully printed and bound by the Columbia University Press, is a worthy contribution to this growing body of literature and bears the impress of its characteristic method.\r\n\r\nThe single remaining fragment of Anaximander is not discussed until it has been firmly fixed in its historical context by a thoroughgoing consideration of the classical conception of the four elements; and one of the most striking features of this consideration is the use made by the author of the extensive body of Greek medical writings known as the Hippocratic Corpus. It was W. A. Heidel who first called attention to the extraordinary value of these writings\u2014the only complete scientific treatises to have come down to us from the early period\u2014for the elucidation of Greek thought. Since then, this material has been referred to more and more frequently by students of the early Greek philosophers, and the tendency is strikingly evidenced in the present study.\r\n\r\nThe use of this material is not without its difficulties. The treatises which form the Hippocratic Corpus are not the work of a single individual, and there is abundant evidence that they were written over a period of at least two hundred years. It is, therefore, essential, in attempting to reconstruct the scientific worldview of the early period, that we rely so far as possible on treatises belonging to this period. Unfortunately, in the present state of Hippocratic studies, it is impossible to date these works with any exactitude. On the other hand, certain of them belong pretty clearly to the fifth century; and it seems fairly well established that the view of the constitution of man which most of them assume dates from the time of Alcmaeon, who flourished around the turn of the century.\r\n\r\nSince this view is based upon an analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, the processes involved in sickness and health reflect on a small scale the greater processes which constitute the life of the cosmos as a whole; thus, indirectly, these treatises illuminate in striking ways aspects of the larger worldview implicit in the fragments of the early cosmologists, but obscured by the fewness of these fragments and the imperfect state in which they have been preserved. In the present study, they are used to illuminate just such obscurities. [introduction p. 676-677]","btype":3,"date":"1961","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hN9oPATyWj4WjP6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":304,"full_name":"Robinson, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":857,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"14","issue":"4","pages":"676-684"}},"sort":["The Framework of Greek Cosmology"]}
Title | The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1927 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 21 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 133-141 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Leon, Philip |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Anaxagoras does indeed, as he has been said to do, represent the culminating point of the enquiry into the one bto-tv. That simple enquiry for a simple unity becomes curiously complex, just because of the very simplicity and the thorough-going and uncompromising nature of Anaxagoras' logical mind. It has with him reached a stage where it must become transformed and pass on the one hand into logic in Plato, into the enquiry about the nature of predication through Gorgias and Antisthenes, and on the other hand into metaphysics, the theory of ideas, also in Plato. This central position of Anaxagoras is made clear by the passage discussed, according to which, I think, in considering the 'homoiomeries,' we should look upon parts as 'homoiomerous' primarily to the whole i~c6otov, and only secondarily to subordinate wholes. Indeed, it is implied in Anaxagoras' principle that there are only two entities which are properly wholes, the 0c0/cpo and voDv^. To call anything else a whole is more or less arbitrary, a principle not unworthy of the most thorough-going of modern absolutists. [Conclusion, p. 141] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qJGkpDhgqeYGAi8 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"733","_score":null,"_source":{"id":733,"authors_free":[{"id":1096,"entry_id":733,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":245,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Leon, Philip","free_first_name":"Philip","free_last_name":"Leon","norm_person":{"id":245,"first_name":"Philip","last_name":"Leon","full_name":"Leon, Philip","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"Anaxagoras does indeed, as he has been said to do, represent the \r\nculminating point of the enquiry into the one bto-tv. That simple enquiry \r\nfor a simple unity becomes curiously complex, just because of the very \r\nsimplicity and the thorough-going and uncompromising nature of Anaxagoras' \r\nlogical mind. It has with him reached a stage where it must become \r\ntransformed and pass on the one hand into logic in Plato, into the enquiry \r\nabout the nature of predication through Gorgias and Antisthenes, and on the \r\nother hand into metaphysics, the theory of ideas, also in Plato. This central \r\nposition of Anaxagoras is made clear by the passage discussed, according \r\nto which, I think, in considering the 'homoiomeries,' we should look upon \r\nparts as 'homoiomerous' primarily to the whole i~c6otov, and only secondarily \r\nto subordinate wholes. Indeed, it is implied in Anaxagoras' principle that \r\nthere are only two entities which are properly wholes, the 0c0\/cpo and voDv^. To call anything else a whole is more or less arbitrary, a principle not \r\nunworthy of the most thorough-going of modern absolutists. [Conclusion, p. 141]","btype":3,"date":"1927","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qJGkpDhgqeYGAi8","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":245,"full_name":"Leon, Philip","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":733,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"21","issue":"3\/4","pages":"133-141"}},"sort":["The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras"]}
Title | The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1979 |
Journal | The Monist |
Volume | 62 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 30–42 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bormann, Karl |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were—as is well known—interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem.Regarding the one being, there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the esse copulae or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being ("Sein des Seienden"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical demography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the First part, the aletheia. We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately; in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part. [Introduction, p. 30] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KVjmlyMlPhuG3iK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1078","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1078,"authors_free":[{"id":1634,"entry_id":1078,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":11,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bormann, Karl ","free_first_name":"Karl","free_last_name":"Bormann","norm_person":{"id":11,"first_name":"Karl ","last_name":"Bormann","full_name":"Bormann, Karl ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119138816","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius"},"abstract":"The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were\u2014as is well known\u2014interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem.Regarding the one being, there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the esse copulae or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being (\"Sein des Seienden\"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical demography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the First part, the aletheia. We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately; in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part. [Introduction, p. 30]","btype":3,"date":"1979","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KVjmlyMlPhuG3iK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":11,"full_name":"Bormann, Karl ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1078,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Monist","volume":"62","issue":"1","pages":"30\u201342"}},"sort":["The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius"]}
Title | The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle’s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
Volume | 4 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 99-112 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gabor, Gary |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Susanne Bobzien recently described “the volumes of the Greek commentators on Aristotle’s logical works” as “monumental” but “rarely creative.” While to a certain degree accurate, Bobzien’s assessment obscures the occasional flashes of innovation in these works. I intend to explore one such example here—the question of what justification, if any, late ancient philosophers gave for Aristotle’s ten categories. This topic would also animate later interpreters of Aristotle, sometimes with positive and sometimes more critical results. Kant, for instance, rejected Aristotle’s list for what he perceived as its capricious and arbitrary nature, arguing that Aristotle “had no principle” and merely “rounded them up as he stumbled upon them.” In fact, Kant was neither the first nor the last to perceive that Aristotle’s account of the categories needed some sort of justification. The existence of rival categorial schemes, in particular, demands it. In the ancient world, the Stoics provided a fourfold series of categories, and Plato provided a fivefold set of greatest kinds in the Sophist. More recently, E. J. Lowe has defended another fourfold Aristotelian-inspired ontology as fundamental. For Platonists of late antiquity, the question of justification for Aristotle’s categories had special force following Plotinus’s analysis and critique of them, along with the Stoic, Platonic, and other accounts in Enneads 6.1–2. Plotinus’s student Porphyry later defended and commented on Aristotle’s Categories, and Iamblichus reinterpreted and included the Categories in the philosophical curriculum that was to remain standard in the Neoplatonic schools for several centuries. For the Neoplatonic commentators working in these schools, one of the first questions raised in their commentaries was the justification that could be given to Aristotle’s tenfold scheme. I shall examine two such justifications: those given by Ammonius Hermiae, scholarch of the Platonist school in Alexandria, Egypt, during the second half of the fifth century AD, and his student Simplicius, the last great commentator in the Athenian Academy before its closure by Emperor Justinian in AD 529. Ammonius’s account of the categories is relatively simple, while Simplicius’s is more complex. Both, however, argue for a justification of the ten categories presented by Aristotle as in some sense a correct list. By comparing the two accounts, one can discern a distinct development in Neoplatonic justifications of Aristotle’s categories. [introduction p. 99-101] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mg1q6H4L6heepIU |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"918","_score":null,"_source":{"id":918,"authors_free":[{"id":1357,"entry_id":918,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":106,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gabor, Gary","free_first_name":"Gary","free_last_name":"Gabor","norm_person":{"id":106,"first_name":"Gary","last_name":"Gabor ","full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle\u2019s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle\u2019s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius"},"abstract":"Susanne Bobzien recently described \u201cthe volumes of the Greek commentators on Aristotle\u2019s logical works\u201d as \u201cmonumental\u201d but \u201crarely creative.\u201d While to a certain degree accurate, Bobzien\u2019s assessment obscures the occasional flashes of innovation in these works. I intend to explore one such example here\u2014the question of what justification, if any, late ancient philosophers gave for Aristotle\u2019s ten categories.\r\n\r\nThis topic would also animate later interpreters of Aristotle, sometimes with positive and sometimes more critical results. Kant, for instance, rejected Aristotle\u2019s list for what he perceived as its capricious and arbitrary nature, arguing that Aristotle \u201chad no principle\u201d and merely \u201crounded them up as he stumbled upon them.\u201d In fact, Kant was neither the first nor the last to perceive that Aristotle\u2019s account of the categories needed some sort of justification. The existence of rival categorial schemes, in particular, demands it. In the ancient world, the Stoics provided a fourfold series of categories, and Plato provided a fivefold set of greatest kinds in the Sophist. More recently, E. J. Lowe has defended another fourfold Aristotelian-inspired ontology as fundamental.\r\n\r\nFor Platonists of late antiquity, the question of justification for Aristotle\u2019s categories had special force following Plotinus\u2019s analysis and critique of them, along with the Stoic, Platonic, and other accounts in Enneads 6.1\u20132. Plotinus\u2019s student Porphyry later defended and commented on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, and Iamblichus reinterpreted and included the Categories in the philosophical curriculum that was to remain standard in the Neoplatonic schools for several centuries.\r\n\r\nFor the Neoplatonic commentators working in these schools, one of the first questions raised in their commentaries was the justification that could be given to Aristotle\u2019s tenfold scheme. I shall examine two such justifications: those given by Ammonius Hermiae, scholarch of the Platonist school in Alexandria, Egypt, during the second half of the fifth century AD, and his student Simplicius, the last great commentator in the Athenian Academy before its closure by Emperor Justinian in AD 529.\r\n\r\nAmmonius\u2019s account of the categories is relatively simple, while Simplicius\u2019s is more complex. Both, however, argue for a justification of the ten categories presented by Aristotle as in some sense a correct list. By comparing the two accounts, one can discern a distinct development in Neoplatonic justifications of Aristotle\u2019s categories. [introduction p. 99-101]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mg1q6H4L6heepIU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":106,"full_name":"Gabor, Gary ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":918,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"4","issue":"2","pages":"99-112"}},"sort":["The Justification and Derivation of Aristotle\u2019s Categories in Ammonius and Simplicius"]}
Title | The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Ancient World |
Volume | 33 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 45–69 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Walker, Joel Thomas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As a series of recent retrospectives makes clear, the study of late antiquity has witnessed dramatic growth during the past twenty years, with increasing signs of formal recognition during the 1990s. This rapid expansion has been accompanied by an implicit debate over the most useful chronological and geographical boundaries for the emergent field. Although the "world of late antiquity" ostensibly includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East, the current shape of the field, as defined especially by conferences and publications, remains heavily weighted towards the Mediterranean world of the Roman Empire and its successor states in western Europe. Many recent discussions of the "late antique world" are, in fact, studies of late Roman history that make little attempt to incorporate regions east of the Euphrates. Integrating the Sasanian Empire into the study of late antiquity will be a difficult task. A variety of obstacles, outlined in section II above, beset the study of Sasanian history, and substantial linguistic barriers limit access to the Sasanian world for scholars trained in the Greco-Roman sources. Modern political geography has also proved to be a major barrier for historians and archaeologists interested in regions "east of Byzantium." In the current gap between Sasanian and late Roman history, however, lies also much potential for future research. To develop a more interdisciplinary vision of late antiquity, scholars will need to explore more closely the connections and contrasts between the worlds of Byzantium and Sasanian Iran. Some progress in this direction has been made in the fields of military, diplomatic, and economic history; far more work needs to be done in the areas of cultural and intellectual history, not least the history of philosophy. The recent collapse of the Soviet Union during the late 1980s has reminded us how quickly changes in contemporary geography can lead to comparable shifts in the conceptualization of historical geography. The world of late antiquity may also look very different, if and when more scholars have greater access to travel, teach, and again conduct archaeological fieldwork in Iraq, Iran, and neighboring countries. The emergence of the field of late antiquity represents a major opportunity for Sasanian history, precisely because it invites us to look across the traditional disciplinary division between Mediterranean and Near Eastern history. Modern interpretations of the philosophers’ journey to the court of Khosrow Anoshirvan in 531/532 C.E. reveal how often this disciplinary division has obscured the richness of intellectual life at the late Sasanian court, as well as the intensity of its contacts with Greek and Syrian intellectuals. From Gibbon through Bury and down to Alan Cameron’s influential article on the "Closing of the Academy," there has been a strong tendency among Greco-Roman historians to give too much credence to Agathias’ hostile depiction of Sasanian philhellenism. Near Eastern historians, such as Rawlinson and Christensen, and the occasional Byzantinist such as Jean-François Duneau, have offered more optimistic readings of Khosrow’s philosophical patronage, but without sufficient attention to the tensions involved in the Sasanian encounter with Hellenism. The task that lies ahead, building on the work of Michel Tardieu, is to explain the precise quality of Sasanian Hellenism, its social and political context, cultural milieu, and intellectual legacy. The career of Uranius, and the modern debate over the peregrinations of Damascius, prove that this investigation must include not only Athens, Alexandria, and Constantinople, but also Ctesiphon, Harran, and Gondishapur. Khosrow’s patronage of Greek philosophers thus reveals the advantages, indeed the necessity, of a world of late antiquity that includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East. [conclusion p. 67-69] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/AVLAM9PVkGxCgRz |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"446","_score":null,"_source":{"id":446,"authors_free":[{"id":598,"entry_id":446,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":355,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Walker, Joel Thomas","free_first_name":"Joel Thomas","free_last_name":"Walker","norm_person":{"id":355,"first_name":"Joel Thomas","last_name":"Walker","full_name":"Walker, Joel Thomas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131718118","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran","main_title":{"title":"The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran"},"abstract":"As a series of recent retrospectives makes clear, the study of late antiquity has witnessed dramatic growth during the past twenty years, with increasing signs of formal recognition during the 1990s. This rapid expansion has been accompanied by an implicit debate over the most useful chronological and geographical boundaries for the emergent field. Although the \"world of late antiquity\" ostensibly includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East, the current shape of the field, as defined especially by conferences and publications, remains heavily weighted towards the Mediterranean world of the Roman Empire and its successor states in western Europe. Many recent discussions of the \"late antique world\" are, in fact, studies of late Roman history that make little attempt to incorporate regions east of the Euphrates.\r\n\r\nIntegrating the Sasanian Empire into the study of late antiquity will be a difficult task. A variety of obstacles, outlined in section II above, beset the study of Sasanian history, and substantial linguistic barriers limit access to the Sasanian world for scholars trained in the Greco-Roman sources. Modern political geography has also proved to be a major barrier for historians and archaeologists interested in regions \"east of Byzantium.\" In the current gap between Sasanian and late Roman history, however, lies also much potential for future research. To develop a more interdisciplinary vision of late antiquity, scholars will need to explore more closely the connections and contrasts between the worlds of Byzantium and Sasanian Iran. Some progress in this direction has been made in the fields of military, diplomatic, and economic history; far more work needs to be done in the areas of cultural and intellectual history, not least the history of philosophy. The recent collapse of the Soviet Union during the late 1980s has reminded us how quickly changes in contemporary geography can lead to comparable shifts in the conceptualization of historical geography. The world of late antiquity may also look very different, if and when more scholars have greater access to travel, teach, and again conduct archaeological fieldwork in Iraq, Iran, and neighboring countries.\r\n\r\nThe emergence of the field of late antiquity represents a major opportunity for Sasanian history, precisely because it invites us to look across the traditional disciplinary division between Mediterranean and Near Eastern history. Modern interpretations of the philosophers\u2019 journey to the court of Khosrow Anoshirvan in 531\/532 C.E. reveal how often this disciplinary division has obscured the richness of intellectual life at the late Sasanian court, as well as the intensity of its contacts with Greek and Syrian intellectuals. From Gibbon through Bury and down to Alan Cameron\u2019s influential article on the \"Closing of the Academy,\" there has been a strong tendency among Greco-Roman historians to give too much credence to Agathias\u2019 hostile depiction of Sasanian philhellenism. Near Eastern historians, such as Rawlinson and Christensen, and the occasional Byzantinist such as Jean-Fran\u00e7ois Duneau, have offered more optimistic readings of Khosrow\u2019s philosophical patronage, but without sufficient attention to the tensions involved in the Sasanian encounter with Hellenism. The task that lies ahead, building on the work of Michel Tardieu, is to explain the precise quality of Sasanian Hellenism, its social and political context, cultural milieu, and intellectual legacy. The career of Uranius, and the modern debate over the peregrinations of Damascius, prove that this investigation must include not only Athens, Alexandria, and Constantinople, but also Ctesiphon, Harran, and Gondishapur. Khosrow\u2019s patronage of Greek philosophers thus reveals the advantages, indeed the necessity, of a world of late antiquity that includes the whole of the Sasanian and early Islamic Near East. [conclusion p. 67-69]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AVLAM9PVkGxCgRz","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":355,"full_name":"Walker, Joel Thomas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":446,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ancient World","volume":"33","issue":"1","pages":"45\u201369"}},"sort":["The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome and Iran"]}
Title | The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1968 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 18 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 70-75 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Coxon, Allan D. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The critical text of the first four books of Simplicius’ commentary on the Physics, which was published by Diels in Berlin in 1882 and serves as the foundation for the text of many fragments of the Presocratics, was based on collations by Vitelli of three manuscripts (DEF) and of a fragment of Book I in a copy made by the scribe of E, which Diels refers to as Ea. Besides these, Diels lists a considerable number of later manuscripts, which I have examined and found justifiably ignored in his critical apparatus. The total number of manuscripts listed by Diels of some part of Books I-VIII is 44; a further 25 not mentioned by Diels are listed in A. Wartelle’s "Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d’Aristote et de ses commentateurs" (Belles Lettres, 1963). I shall argue that Diels seriously underrated both the value of F and the probability of contamination between his manuscripts, and consequently, his text of some fragments of the Presocratics rests on a false foundation. However, it should be said at the outset that Diels’s understanding of Presocratic thought prevented him from going far wrong in the readings he adopted and printed. [Introduction, p. 70] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/SYzieZXh14vSvjP |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1283","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1283,"authors_free":[{"id":1872,"entry_id":1283,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":57,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coxon, Allan D.","free_first_name":"Allan D. ","free_last_name":"Coxon","norm_person":{"id":57,"first_name":"Allan D.","last_name":"Coxon","full_name":"Coxon, Allan D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1053041829","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv","main_title":{"title":"The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv"},"abstract":"The critical text of the first four books of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the Physics, which was published by Diels in Berlin in 1882 and serves as the foundation for the text of many fragments of the Presocratics, was based on collations by Vitelli of three manuscripts (DEF) and of a fragment of Book I in a copy made by the scribe of E, which Diels refers to as Ea. Besides these, Diels lists a considerable number of later manuscripts, which I have examined and found justifiably ignored in his critical apparatus. The total number of manuscripts listed by Diels of some part of Books I-VIII is 44; a further 25 not mentioned by Diels are listed in A. Wartelle\u2019s \"Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d\u2019Aristote et de ses commentateurs\" (Belles Lettres, 1963). I shall argue that Diels seriously underrated both the value of F and the probability of contamination between his manuscripts, and consequently, his text of some fragments of the Presocratics rests on a false foundation. However, it should be said at the outset that Diels\u2019s understanding of Presocratic thought prevented him from going far wrong in the readings he adopted and printed. [Introduction, p. 70]","btype":3,"date":"1968","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/SYzieZXh14vSvjP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":57,"full_name":"Coxon, Allan D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1283,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"18","issue":"1","pages":"70-75 "}},"sort":["The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv"]}
Title | The Nature of Zeno's Argument against Plurality in DK 29 B 1 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1972 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 17 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 40-52 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Abraham, William E. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius has preserved (Phys. 140, 34) a Zenonian argument purporting to show that if an object of positive magnitude has parts from which it derives its size, then any such object must be at once of infinite magnitude and zero magnitude. This surprising consequence is based upon a construction which Zeno makes, but his argument is widely thought to be grossly fallacious. Most often he is supposed to have misunderstood the arithmetic of his own construction. Evidently, any such charge must be premised on some view of the particular nature of the sequence to which Zeno's construction gives rise. I seek to develop a view that Zeno's argument is in fact free from fallacy, and offer reason to fear that his real argument has usually been missed. [p. 40] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QHBs8Wv701RyPQh |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"780","_score":null,"_source":{"id":780,"authors_free":[{"id":1145,"entry_id":780,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":3,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Abraham, William E.","free_first_name":"William E.","free_last_name":"Abraham","norm_person":{"id":3,"first_name":"William E.","last_name":"Abraham","full_name":"Abraham, William E.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1120967007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Nature of Zeno's Argument against Plurality in DK 29 B 1","main_title":{"title":"The Nature of Zeno's Argument against Plurality in DK 29 B 1"},"abstract":"Simplicius has preserved (Phys. 140, 34) a Zenonian argument purporting to show that if an object of positive magnitude has parts from \r\nwhich it derives its size, then any such object must be at once of \r\ninfinite magnitude and zero magnitude. This surprising consequence \r\nis based upon a construction which Zeno makes, but his argument is \r\nwidely thought to be grossly fallacious. Most often he is supposed to \r\nhave misunderstood the arithmetic of his own construction. Evidently, \r\nany such charge must be premised on some view of the particular \r\nnature of the sequence to which Zeno's construction gives rise. I seek \r\nto develop a view that Zeno's argument is in fact free from fallacy, \r\nand offer reason to fear that his real argument has usually been missed. [p. 40]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QHBs8Wv701RyPQh","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":3,"full_name":"Abraham, William E.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":780,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"17","issue":"1","pages":"40-52"}},"sort":["The Nature of Zeno's Argument against Plurality in DK 29 B 1"]}
Title | The Neoplatonic One and Plato’s Parmenides |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1962 |
Journal | Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association |
Volume | 93 |
Pages | 389–401 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rist, John M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
As long ago as 1928, Professor E. R. Dodds demonstrated the dependence of the One of Plotinus on an interpretation of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. His demonstration has been universally accepted. But Dodds not only showed the dependence of Plotinus on the Parmenides but also offered an account of the history of the doctrine of the One between the late fourth century B.C. and the third century A.D. His view is that the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides were already treated in what we should call a Neoplatonic fashion by Moderatus, a Neopythagorean of the second half of the first century A.D.; further, that Moderatus was not the originator of this interpretation, whose origins can, in fact, be traced back through Eudorus (ca. 25 B.C.) and the Neopythagoreans of his day to the Old Academy. Though Dodds is somewhat unclear at this point, he seems to suggest that already before the time of Eudorus, the Parmenides was being interpreted in Neopythagorean fashion. In order to check this derivation, we should look at the three stages of it in detail. These stages are the Neopythagoreanism of Moderatus, the theories of Eudorus, and those of Speusippus and the Old Academy in general. In opposition to Professor A. H. Armstrong, who used to hold that the One of Speusippus was less than Being, rather than "beyond Being," Dr. Ph. Merlan has recently shown that the Aristotelian texts on which Armstrong's account was based are better interpreted in the light of chapter four of Iamblichus' De communi mathematica scientia. Merlan shows that the system of Speusippus is not an "evolutionary" one, and that Speusippus' One is beyond Being. Yet the system of Speusippus is a dualism; his One is not the cause of all and is thus, as we shall see, unlike the Neopythagorean One which Dodds regards as proto-Neoplatonic. We may therefore leave Speusippus aside. His One can have affected Neoplatonism only very indirectly, if at all. [introduction p. 389-390] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/n0sauehAwynXB03 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1058","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1058,"authors_free":[{"id":1607,"entry_id":1058,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":303,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rist, John M.","free_first_name":"John M.","free_last_name":"Rist","norm_person":{"id":303,"first_name":"John M.","last_name":"Rist","full_name":"Rist, John M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137060440","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Neoplatonic One and Plato\u2019s Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"The Neoplatonic One and Plato\u2019s Parmenides"},"abstract":"As long ago as 1928, Professor E. R. Dodds demonstrated the dependence of the One of Plotinus on an interpretation of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. His demonstration has been universally accepted. But Dodds not only showed the dependence of Plotinus on the Parmenides but also offered an account of the history of the doctrine of the One between the late fourth century B.C. and the third century A.D. His view is that the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides were already treated in what we should call a Neoplatonic fashion by Moderatus, a Neopythagorean of the second half of the first century A.D.; further, that Moderatus was not the originator of this interpretation, whose origins can, in fact, be traced back through Eudorus (ca. 25 B.C.) and the Neopythagoreans of his day to the Old Academy.\r\n\r\nThough Dodds is somewhat unclear at this point, he seems to suggest that already before the time of Eudorus, the Parmenides was being interpreted in Neopythagorean fashion. In order to check this derivation, we should look at the three stages of it in detail. These stages are the Neopythagoreanism of Moderatus, the theories of Eudorus, and those of Speusippus and the Old Academy in general.\r\n\r\nIn opposition to Professor A. H. Armstrong, who used to hold that the One of Speusippus was less than Being, rather than \"beyond Being,\" Dr. Ph. Merlan has recently shown that the Aristotelian texts on which Armstrong's account was based are better interpreted in the light of chapter four of Iamblichus' De communi mathematica scientia. Merlan shows that the system of Speusippus is not an \"evolutionary\" one, and that Speusippus' One is beyond Being. Yet the system of Speusippus is a dualism; his One is not the cause of all and is thus, as we shall see, unlike the Neopythagorean One which Dodds regards as proto-Neoplatonic.\r\n\r\nWe may therefore leave Speusippus aside. His One can have affected Neoplatonism only very indirectly, if at all. [introduction p. 389-390]","btype":3,"date":"1962","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/n0sauehAwynXB03","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":303,"full_name":"Rist, John M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1058,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association","volume":"93","issue":"","pages":"389\u2013401"}},"sort":["The Neoplatonic One and Plato\u2019s Parmenides"]}
Title | The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One' |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1928 |
Journal | Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 22 |
Issue | 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1928), |
Pages | 129–142 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dodds, Eric R. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelli- gently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development there are still lamentable lacunae. Three errors in particular have in the past prevented a proper appreciation of Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy. When this false trail was at length abandoned the fashion for orientalizing explanations persisted in another guise: to the earliest historians of Neo- platonism, Simon and Vacherot, the school of Plotinus was (in defiance of geographical facts) 'the school of Alexandria,' and its inspiration was mainly Egyptian. Vacherot says of Neoplatonism that it is 'essentially and radically oriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure.' Few would be found to-day to subscribe to so sweeping a pronouncement; but the existence of an important oriental element in Plotinus' thought is still affirmed by many French and German writers. [introduction p. 129] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/2WBu4QLsdoPjbaC |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"554","_score":null,"_source":{"id":554,"authors_free":[{"id":783,"entry_id":554,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":65,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dodds, Eric R. ","free_first_name":"Eric R. ","free_last_name":"Dodds","norm_person":{"id":65,"first_name":"Eric R. ","last_name":"Dodds","full_name":"Dodds, Eric R. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123026288","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One' ","main_title":{"title":"The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One' "},"abstract":"The last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelli- \r\ngently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development \r\nthere are still lamentable lacunae. Three errors in particular have in the past \r\nprevented a proper appreciation of Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy. When this false trail was at length abandoned the fashion for orientalizing \r\nexplanations persisted in another guise: to the earliest historians of Neo- \r\nplatonism, Simon and Vacherot, the school of Plotinus was (in defiance of \r\ngeographical facts) 'the school of Alexandria,' and its inspiration was mainly \r\nEgyptian. Vacherot says of Neoplatonism that it is 'essentially and radically \r\noriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure.' \r\nFew would be found to-day to subscribe to so sweeping a pronouncement; but \r\nthe existence of an important oriental element in Plotinus' thought is still \r\naffirmed by many French and German writers. [introduction p. 129]","btype":3,"date":"1928","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/2WBu4QLsdoPjbaC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":65,"full_name":"Dodds, Eric R. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":554,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Classical Quarterly","volume":"22","issue":"3\/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1928),","pages":"129\u2013142"}},"sort":["The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One' "]}
Title | The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | The Review of Metaphysics |
Volume | 59 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 287-311 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hubler, J. Noel |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle's brief consideration of self-perception engaged in an extensive discussion of the problem, offering various interpretations of apperception from the second to sixth century. The commentators modeled their explanation of self-awareness in perception on their understanding of the nature of knowledge in general and their notion of what the core meaning of truth was. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XGXaGpEPq3YahVv |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1354","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1354,"authors_free":[{"id":2028,"entry_id":1354,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":199,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hubler, J. Noel","free_first_name":"J. Noel","free_last_name":"Hubler","norm_person":{"id":199,"first_name":"J. Noel","last_name":"Hubler","full_name":"Hubler, J. Noel","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/188463461","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle","main_title":{"title":"The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle"},"abstract":"The ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle's brief consideration of self-perception engaged in an extensive discussion of the problem, offering various interpretations of apperception from the second to sixth century. The commentators modeled their explanation of self-awareness in perception on their understanding of the nature of knowledge in general and their notion of what the core meaning of truth was. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/XGXaGpEPq3YahVv","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":199,"full_name":"Hubler, J. Noel","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1354,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"59","issue":"2","pages":"287-311"}},"sort":["The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle"]}
Title | The Presidential Address: Analyses of Matter, Ancient and Modern |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1985 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series |
Volume | 86 |
Pages | 1-22 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Sorabji, Richard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
I want to draw attention to two recurrent themes in the analysis of matter or body. The first theme is the idea that body is extension endowed with properties. To explain this, I shall go back as far as a famous text in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book 7, Chapter 3. Aristotle is here discussing matter in a rather special sense. He does not mean by 'matter' what we might mean, namely, body. He means rather the subject of the properties in a body. The table in front of me may be made of wood. From one point of view, the wood might be thought of as a subject which carries the properties of the table—its rectilinearity, its hardness, its brownness. But according to one persuasive interpretation, Aristotle is looking for the most fundamental subject of properties in a body. He calls it the first subject (hupokeimenon proton, 1029a1-2). The wood of the table is made up of the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water—and these might be thought of as a more fundamental subject carrying the properties of the wood. But the most fundamental subject would be one which carried the properties of the four elements: hot, cold, fluid, and dry. This first subject is referred to by commentators as first or prime matter. [introduction p. 1] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Dk2wV9MF91LwVgZ |
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Title | The Presocratics in the doxographical tradition. Sources, controversies, and current research |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Studia Humaniora Tartuensia |
Volume | 6 |
Issue | 6 |
Pages | 1-26 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I present a synthetic overview of recent and ongoing research in the field of doxography, that is, the study of the nature, transmission and interrelations of sources for ancient Greek philosophy. The latest revisions of the theory of Hermann Diels (Doxographi Graeci 1879) regarding the historiography ought to be known more widely, as they still influence our understanding of the Presocratics and their reception. The scholarly study on the compilations of Greek philosophical views from Hellenistic and later periods has received a major boost by the first of a projected three-volume study by Mansfeld and Runia (1997). Taking their work as a firm basis I also describe my own work in this area and how it can be related to, and fitted into, this trend by outlining how two important sources for the historiography of Greek philosophy, Theo-phrastus (4th–3rd c. BCE) and Simplicius (early 6th c. AD) stand in a special relation to each other and form an important strand in the doxographical tradition. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/OYlxoMJYDjcTIPa |
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Title | The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres. From the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1962 |
Journal | Dumbarton Oaks Papers |
Volume | 16 |
Pages | 65-93 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wolfson, Harry Austryn |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Kepler, who, as we all know, lived under the new heaven created by Copernicus, discusses the question whether the planets are moved by Intelligences or by souls or by nature. His consideration of Intelligences as possible movers of the planets refers to a view held by those who in the Middle Ages lived under the old Ptolemaic heaven, the term Intelligences being, by a complexity of miscegenation, a descendant of what Aristotle describes as incorporeal substances. His consideration of souls or nature as possible movers of the planets touches upon a topic which was made into a problem b y the Byzantine Greek commentators of Aristotle.In this paper I shall try to show how the Byzantine commentators, in their study of the text of Aristotle, were confronted with a certain problem, how they solved that problem, and how their solution of that problem led to other problems and solutions, all of which lingered in philosophic literature down to Kepler. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/caDB4W1yStAKWKj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"422","_score":null,"_source":{"id":422,"authors_free":[{"id":565,"entry_id":422,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":412,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wolfson, Harry Austryn","free_first_name":"Harry Austryn","free_last_name":"Wolfson","norm_person":{"id":412,"first_name":"Harry Austryn","last_name":"Wolfson","full_name":"Wolfson, Harry Austryn","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123348323","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres. From the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler","main_title":{"title":"The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres. From the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler"},"abstract":"Kepler, who, as we all know, lived under the new heaven created by Copernicus, discusses the question whether the planets are moved by Intelligences or by souls or by nature. His consideration of Intelligences \r\nas possible movers of the planets refers to a view held by those who in the Middle Ages lived under the old Ptolemaic heaven, the term Intelligences being, by a complexity of miscegenation, a descendant of what Aristotle describes as \r\nincorporeal substances. His consideration of souls or nature as possible movers of the planets touches upon a topic which was made into a problem b y the \r\nByzantine Greek commentators of Aristotle.In this paper I shall try to show how the Byzantine commentators, in their study of the text of Aristotle, were confronted with a certain problem, how they solved that problem, and how their solution of that problem led to other \r\nproblems and solutions, all of which lingered in philosophic literature down to Kepler. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1962","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/caDB4W1yStAKWKj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":412,"full_name":"Wolfson, Harry Austryn","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":422,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Dumbarton Oaks Papers","volume":"16","issue":"","pages":"65-93"}},"sort":["The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres. From the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler"]}
Title | The Reception of Parmenides' Poetry in Antiquity |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1998 |
Journal | Studii Clasice |
Volume | 34-36 |
Pages | 5-27 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Popa, Tiberiu M. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/3N33QXJQ7geQuqf |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"409","_score":null,"_source":{"id":409,"authors_free":[{"id":547,"entry_id":409,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":510,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Popa, Tiberiu M.","free_first_name":"Tiberiu M.","free_last_name":"Popa","norm_person":{"id":510,"first_name":"Tiberiu M.","last_name":"Popa","full_name":"Popa, Tiberiu M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/135018498","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Reception of Parmenides' Poetry in Antiquity","main_title":{"title":"The Reception of Parmenides' Poetry in Antiquity"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3N33QXJQ7geQuqf","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":510,"full_name":"Popa, Tiberiu M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":409,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studii Clasice","volume":"34-36","issue":"","pages":"5-27"}},"sort":["The Reception of Parmenides' Poetry in Antiquity"]}
Title | The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2009 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 54 |
Issue | 4/5 |
Pages | 371-389 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Eunyoung Ju, Anna |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Scholars have long recognised the interest of the Stoics' thought on geometrical limits, both as a specific topic in their physics and within the context of the school's ontological taxonomy. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct their discussion fully. The sources we do have on Stoic geometrical themes are highly polemical, tending to reveal a disagreement as to whether limit is to be understood as a mere concept, as a body or as an incorporeal. In my view, this disagreement held among the historical Stoics, rather than simply reflecting a doxographical divergence in transmission. This apparently Stoic disagreement has generated extensive debate, in which there is still no consensus as to a standard Stoic doctrine of limit. The evidence is thin, and little of it refers in detail to specific texts, especially from the school's founders. But in its overall features the evidence suggests that Posidonius and Cleomedes differed from their Stoic precursors on this topic. There are also grounds for believing that some degree of disagreement obtained between the early Stoics over the metaphysical status of shape. Assuming the Stoics did so disagree, the principal question in the scholarship on Stoic ontology is whether there were actually positions that might be called "standard" within Stoicism on the topic of limit. In attempting to answer this question, my discussion initially sets out to illuminate certain features of early Stoic thinking about limit, and then takes stock of the views offered by late Stoics, notably Posidonius and Cleomedes. Attention to Stoic arguments suggests that the school's founders developed two accounts of shape: on the one hand, as a thought-construct, and, on the other, as a body. In an attempt to resolve the crux bequeathed to them, the school's successors suggested that limits are incorporeal. While the authorship of this last notion cannot be securely identified on account of the absence of direct evidence, it may be traced back to Posidonius, and it went on to have subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, namely in Cleomedes' astronomy. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H3kH3u3PbGnOPyE |
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Title | The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles: Some Preliminary Remarks |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 52 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 525-544 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | van der Ben, Nicolaas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
It will have become clear, I hope, that the amount of work that has yet to be done on this newly published papyrus is enormous. Surely it is early days to draw any conclusions. The work in terms of a scholarly debate has not even started yet. However, some remarks may perhaps be made. (1) The text in the physical sense of the word is in a poor state, obviously. (2) The text in the abstract sense, too, is of poor quality; and all the signs are that no proper edition was ever made of Empedocles' text. (3) As far as we are able to discern the contents of the lines discussed, it must be said that they do not appear to be particularly revealing. They start with 8 lines which seem to be somewhat repetitive and of a transitionary nature. Next, there are 16 lines which somehow deal with the Sphairos; although, of course, they constitute a welcome addition to fr. 35DK (quoted by Simplicius), the latter passage is still the more informative one. Finally, there are 10 lines in which the pupil is urged to see for himself the great explanatory force of the theory, which is restated in pregnant form. To put it differently and more poignantly, these 34 lines do not offer us the treatment of any one particular subject. Just think how much our understanding of Empedocles would have been enhanced if we had been able to read, say, his cosmology, or physiology of the sense-organs, or of the intellectual functions; or a detailed description of the assimilation of food and growth, or of fertilization! A similar disappointment surrounds the other ensembles: b partly coincides with 76DK, c with 20DK, and d with (a repeat of) fr. 139DK: welcome and interesting though the additional information provided by them often is, here, too, there is no treatment of a particular subject matter unknown, or insufficiently known, to us previously. To return to ensemble a, it should be noted that most of it, viz. ?(i)6-?(ii)29, 33 lines in all, was omitted by Simplicius, who quoted very extensively from this section of the poem. The reason why he refrained from copying these 33 lines may well have been, I think, that he deemed them to contain little that had not been said equally well or even better in the other extensive passages he had copied from Empedocles. Are there no saving graces? Yes, of course, there are. The first is that we have a better perspective on the transmission of Empedocles' text, tantalizingly blurred though it is bound to remain. It may now be suspected that many of the corruptions in our text are not due to errors made by medieval scribes, but had already entered the text in antiquity itself. I am referring particularly to the deep corruptions which seem due to extensive tampering and appear to exhibit a certain pattern. And since corruptions of this kind appear well-represented even in Aristotle's quotations, their source must date back to a very early time indeed. The second gain, finally, is, I think, the most important of all, viz. the fact that we now know line 300; and, by simple calculation, that the 35 lines of fr. 17DK extend from line 232 through 266. So the absolute position of the 69 lines 232 through 300 is now known. The value of this piece of information can hardly be overestimated. It will have a beneficial effect on literally all the fragments. After all, the average size of Empedocles' fragments is a mere three lines, hardly enough, in many cases, to arrive at any compelling interpretation. Starting from the text of lines 232-300, one will be able to establish the relative positions of many fragments with a large degree of certainty (decreasing, of course, as the distance to 232 or 300 increases). The result will be that many fragments will draw closer together and constitute one another's context, so to speak. Our interpretations will be based on much firmer foundations. [conclusion p. 543-544] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/BcAsTrl3xWnFgU9 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"453","_score":null,"_source":{"id":453,"authors_free":[{"id":609,"entry_id":453,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":422,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","free_first_name":"Nicolaas","free_last_name":"van der Ben","norm_person":{"id":422,"first_name":"Nicolaas","last_name":"van der Ben","full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles: Some Preliminary Remarks","main_title":{"title":"The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles: Some Preliminary Remarks"},"abstract":"It will have become clear, I hope, that the amount of work that has yet to be done on this newly published papyrus is enormous. Surely it is early days to draw any conclusions. The work in terms of a scholarly debate has not even started yet. However, some remarks may perhaps be made. (1) The text in the physical sense of the word is in a poor state, obviously. (2) The text in the abstract sense, too, is of poor quality; and all the signs are that no proper edition was ever made of Empedocles' text. (3) As far as we are able to discern the contents of the lines discussed, it must be said that they do not appear to be particularly revealing. They start with 8 lines which seem to be somewhat repetitive and of a transitionary nature. Next, there are 16 lines which somehow deal with the Sphairos; although, of course, they constitute a welcome addition to fr. 35DK (quoted by Simplicius), the latter passage is still the more informative one. Finally, there are 10 lines in which the pupil is urged to see for himself the great explanatory force of the theory, which is restated in pregnant form.\r\n\r\nTo put it differently and more poignantly, these 34 lines do not offer us the treatment of any one particular subject. Just think how much our understanding of Empedocles would have been enhanced if we had been able to read, say, his cosmology, or physiology of the sense-organs, or of the intellectual functions; or a detailed description of the assimilation of food and growth, or of fertilization! A similar disappointment surrounds the other ensembles: b partly coincides with 76DK, c with 20DK, and d with (a repeat of) fr. 139DK: welcome and interesting though the additional information provided by them often is, here, too, there is no treatment of a particular subject matter unknown, or insufficiently known, to us previously.\r\n\r\nTo return to ensemble a, it should be noted that most of it, viz. ?(i)6-?(ii)29, 33 lines in all, was omitted by Simplicius, who quoted very extensively from this section of the poem. The reason why he refrained from copying these 33 lines may well have been, I think, that he deemed them to contain little that had not been said equally well or even better in the other extensive passages he had copied from Empedocles.\r\n\r\nAre there no saving graces? Yes, of course, there are. The first is that we have a better perspective on the transmission of Empedocles' text, tantalizingly blurred though it is bound to remain. It may now be suspected that many of the corruptions in our text are not due to errors made by medieval scribes, but had already entered the text in antiquity itself. I am referring particularly to the deep corruptions which seem due to extensive tampering and appear to exhibit a certain pattern. And since corruptions of this kind appear well-represented even in Aristotle's quotations, their source must date back to a very early time indeed.\r\n\r\nThe second gain, finally, is, I think, the most important of all, viz. the fact that we now know line 300; and, by simple calculation, that the 35 lines of fr. 17DK extend from line 232 through 266. So the absolute position of the 69 lines 232 through 300 is now known. The value of this piece of information can hardly be overestimated. It will have a beneficial effect on literally all the fragments. After all, the average size of Empedocles' fragments is a mere three lines, hardly enough, in many cases, to arrive at any compelling interpretation. Starting from the text of lines 232-300, one will be able to establish the relative positions of many fragments with a large degree of certainty (decreasing, of course, as the distance to 232 or 300 increases). The result will be that many fragments will draw closer together and constitute one another's context, so to speak. Our interpretations will be based on much firmer foundations. [conclusion p. 543-544]","btype":3,"date":"1999","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/BcAsTrl3xWnFgU9","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":422,"full_name":"van der Ben, Nicolaas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":453,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"52","issue":"5","pages":"525-544"}},"sort":["The Strasbourg Papyrus of Empedocles: Some Preliminary Remarks"]}
Title | The Synonymy of Homonyms |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1999 |
Journal | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie |
Volume | 81 |
Pages | 268–289 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Flannery, Kevin L. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Is the homonym-synonym paradox important enough to force this emendation? I think that it is. If considering the two definitions in conjunction -the definition of homonyms and that of synonyms - it turns out that homonyms qua homonyms are not homonyms and, therefore, that only qua not homonyms are homonyms homonyms, that is a problem. We can resolve the paradox by breaking the conjunction - i. e., by severing the interdependence between the two definitions by eliminating tas ouisas from the first. Would Aristotle have anticipated the paradox and set out his definitions so as to avoid it? We do not have to go so far. We need only believe that, when initially conceiving Cat. i, he had a consistent set of ideas in mind. That is, we need only believe that he had in mind a position that would not lead to the type of problems that typically arise when two definitions are interdependent. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7UMy6i0NWqhhPbZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"547","_score":null,"_source":{"id":547,"authors_free":[{"id":771,"entry_id":547,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":114,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Flannery, Kevin L.","free_first_name":"Kevin L.","free_last_name":"Flannery","norm_person":{"id":114,"first_name":"Kevin L.","last_name":"Flannery","full_name":"Flannery, Kevin L.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/104462485X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Synonymy of Homonyms","main_title":{"title":"The Synonymy of Homonyms"},"abstract":"Is the homonym-synonym paradox important enough to force this emen\u00addation? I think that it is. If considering the two definitions in conjunction -the definition of homonyms and that of synonyms - it turns out that homo\u00adnyms qua homonyms are not homonyms and, therefore, that only qua not homonyms are homonyms homonyms, that is a problem. We can resolve the paradox by breaking the conjunction - i. e., by severing the interdepen\u00addence between the two definitions by eliminating tas ouisas from the first. Would Aristotle have anticipated the paradox and set out his definitions so as to avoid it? We do not have to go so far. We need only believe that, when initially conceiving Cat. i, he had a consistent set of ideas in mind. That is, we need only believe that he had in mind a position that would not lead to the type of problems that typically arise when two definitions are interdependent. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1999","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7UMy6i0NWqhhPbZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":114,"full_name":"Flannery, Kevin L.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":547,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie","volume":"81","issue":"","pages":"268\u2013289"}},"sort":["The Synonymy of Homonyms"]}
Title | The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1971 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 16 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 116-141 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them. Accounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that "all is one." The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and "ridiculous" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean "One." In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that "there are many" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more "ridiculous" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory. It is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (tôn symbebêkotôn ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack. Scholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fränkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fränkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called "easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades." Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)—the exuberance of the "youthful" Protagoras being an exception—and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor. But it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fränkel's doubts "as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity." For these doubts apply even farther than Fränkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the ὑποθέσεις in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device—especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1016","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1016,"authors_free":[{"id":1532,"entry_id":1016,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined","main_title":{"title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined"},"abstract":"This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them.\r\nAccounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that \"all is one.\" The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and \"ridiculous\" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean \"One.\" In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that \"there are many\" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more \"ridiculous\" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory.\r\nIt is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (t\u00f4n symbeb\u00eakot\u00f4n ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack.\r\nScholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fr\u00e4nkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fr\u00e4nkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called \"easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades.\" Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)\u2014the exuberance of the \"youthful\" Protagoras being an exception\u2014and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor.\r\nBut it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fr\u00e4nkel's doubts \"as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity.\" For these doubts apply even farther than Fr\u00e4nkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device\u2014especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1016,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"16","issue":"2","pages":"116-141"}},"sort":["The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined"]}
Title | The Trouble with Fragrance |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1990 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 35 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 290-302 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Ellis, John |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
By 'in a subject' I mean what (a) is in something, not as a part, and (b) cannot exist separately from what it is in. (Aristotle, Categories 1a24-5) These lines have been extensively discussed in recent years. The crux of the debate is whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties. On the "traditional" interpretation, a property is in an individual thing as in a subject, say, Socrates, only if it cannot exist apart from Socrates. This implies that the properties of an individual thing are peculiar to it or non-sharable, in the sense that they cannot be in any other thing. The particular white in Socrates, for example, ceases to exist when he gets a tan. It does not move on to inhere in Callias or any other subject, nor is the white in Callias numerically the same white as the white in Socrates. Although both are white, perhaps even the same shade of white, nonetheless, they are numerically distinct particulars inhering in different individual things. Many recent commentators have tried to "rescue" Aristotle from the alleged commitment to such Stoutian particulars. Their strategy has been to weaken (b) so that the particular inherent property is not existentially dependent on the very particular substance it inheres in. G.E.L. Owen opened the debate by arguing that (b) can mean "cannot exist without something to contain it," and thus Aristotle is only committed to the view that particular properties need some substance or other in order to exist. A particular white, for example, would be a particular shade of white, which could, of course, be exemplified by more than one particular substance. The task I’ve set for myself in this paper is not to argue for either the weak or the strong interpretation of inherence in Aristotle. That is already a well-trodden path. Instead, I shall look at what the ancient commentators on Aristotle had to say on the subject. Which interpretation, the strong or the weak, do they support? My strategy is to focus on one of the many problems they consider, that of fragrance, and to see if their treatment of it yields an answer. The fragrance problem attacks the basis of Aristotle's ontology—the distinction between substance and accident. Didn’t Aristotle say that accidents cannot exist apart from that in which they inhere? But fragrances seem to travel to us from their subjects, and aren’t they accidents? In the attempts, from Porphyry (232–309 AD) to Elias (fl. 541), to save Aristotle’s ontology from this objection, we shall find, I hope to show, an interesting development in the complexity of the discussions. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the problem, the discussions move into psychological theory, and we find that, in order for his ontology to be saved, Aristotle’s psychological theory must be deepened. Concluding Remarks There seems to be a clear development in the way the commentators construed "in a subject." Starting with Porphyry’s tense solution, it is possible to see a gradual movement away from that solution and the weak construal it implies, toward the stronger reading implied by the other solutions. Ammonius introduces an alternative, the effluence solution, albeit without indicating his preference. His students, Philoponus and Simplicius, add further developments or modifications to his view: Simplicius, by rejecting the tense solution and offering new alternatives; and Philoponus, by turning the discussion more toward psychology and revealing both the conflict between the effluence and diosmic theories and his preference for the latter. This shift in the discussion toward psychology is evidenced by Olympiodorus, who responds to the fragrance problem only with alternative psychological theories, making no mention of the tense solution. Finally, Elias, although mentioning the tense solution, devotes most of his energy to evaluating the alternative psychological answers to the fragrance problem. [introduction p. 290-291; conclusion p. 302] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/HQWPG36viwyMCbr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"751","_score":null,"_source":{"id":751,"authors_free":[{"id":1116,"entry_id":751,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":81,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ellis, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Ellis","norm_person":{"id":81,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Ellis","full_name":"Ellis, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Trouble with Fragrance","main_title":{"title":"The Trouble with Fragrance"},"abstract":"By 'in a subject' I mean what (a) is in something, not as a part, and (b) cannot exist separately from what it is in. (Aristotle, Categories 1a24-5)\r\n\r\nThese lines have been extensively discussed in recent years. The crux of the debate is whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties. On the \"traditional\" interpretation, a property is in an individual thing as in a subject, say, Socrates, only if it cannot exist apart from Socrates. This implies that the properties of an individual thing are peculiar to it or non-sharable, in the sense that they cannot be in any other thing. The particular white in Socrates, for example, ceases to exist when he gets a tan. It does not move on to inhere in Callias or any other subject, nor is the white in Callias numerically the same white as the white in Socrates. Although both are white, perhaps even the same shade of white, nonetheless, they are numerically distinct particulars inhering in different individual things.\r\n\r\nMany recent commentators have tried to \"rescue\" Aristotle from the alleged commitment to such Stoutian particulars. Their strategy has been to weaken (b) so that the particular inherent property is not existentially dependent on the very particular substance it inheres in. G.E.L. Owen opened the debate by arguing that (b) can mean \"cannot exist without something to contain it,\" and thus Aristotle is only committed to the view that particular properties need some substance or other in order to exist. A particular white, for example, would be a particular shade of white, which could, of course, be exemplified by more than one particular substance.\r\n\r\nThe task I\u2019ve set for myself in this paper is not to argue for either the weak or the strong interpretation of inherence in Aristotle. That is already a well-trodden path. Instead, I shall look at what the ancient commentators on Aristotle had to say on the subject. Which interpretation, the strong or the weak, do they support? My strategy is to focus on one of the many problems they consider, that of fragrance, and to see if their treatment of it yields an answer.\r\n\r\nThe fragrance problem attacks the basis of Aristotle's ontology\u2014the distinction between substance and accident. Didn\u2019t Aristotle say that accidents cannot exist apart from that in which they inhere? But fragrances seem to travel to us from their subjects, and aren\u2019t they accidents? In the attempts, from Porphyry (232\u2013309 AD) to Elias (fl. 541), to save Aristotle\u2019s ontology from this objection, we shall find, I hope to show, an interesting development in the complexity of the discussions. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the problem, the discussions move into psychological theory, and we find that, in order for his ontology to be saved, Aristotle\u2019s psychological theory must be deepened.\r\nConcluding Remarks\r\n\r\nThere seems to be a clear development in the way the commentators construed \"in a subject.\" Starting with Porphyry\u2019s tense solution, it is possible to see a gradual movement away from that solution and the weak construal it implies, toward the stronger reading implied by the other solutions. Ammonius introduces an alternative, the effluence solution, albeit without indicating his preference. His students, Philoponus and Simplicius, add further developments or modifications to his view: Simplicius, by rejecting the tense solution and offering new alternatives; and Philoponus, by turning the discussion more toward psychology and revealing both the conflict between the effluence and diosmic theories and his preference for the latter.\r\n\r\nThis shift in the discussion toward psychology is evidenced by Olympiodorus, who responds to the fragrance problem only with alternative psychological theories, making no mention of the tense solution. Finally, Elias, although mentioning the tense solution, devotes most of his energy to evaluating the alternative psychological answers to the fragrance problem. [introduction p. 290-291; conclusion p. 302]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HQWPG36viwyMCbr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":81,"full_name":"Ellis, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":751,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"35","issue":"3","pages":"290-302"}},"sort":["The Trouble with Fragrance"]}
Title | The Unity of Empedocles' Thought |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1949 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 70 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 142-158 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Long, Herbert S. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper I shall first state the problem of the unity of Empedocles' thought, then consider two difficulties in the way of a solution and the effect that not observing them has had, and finally propose and attempt to justify what appears to me to be a reasonable explanation of the problem. [p. 142] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XFRsopl0nu5E6SQ |
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Title | The notion of ἐπιτηδειότης in Simplicius' discussion of quality |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2016 |
Journal | Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale |
Volume | 27 |
Pages | 65-83 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hauer, Mareike |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper deals with the meaning and function of epitêdeiotês in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, particularly in chapter 8, the discussion of the category of quality. Based on the question as to whether Simplicius uses epitêdeiotês as a technical term or as a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of dynamis, different passages of chapter 8 will be analyzed and compared with Aristotle's discussion of dynamis. It will be argued that Simplicius distinguishes between two senses of epitêdeiotês, one of which can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of dynamis; the other sense, however, differs from the Aristotelian notion of dynamis and, instead, appears to be in agreement with the use of epitêdeiotês in the theory of participation established by Simplicius' Neoplatonic predecessors. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/uZGcu7N3ynTApz0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1150","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1150,"authors_free":[{"id":1725,"entry_id":1150,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in Simplicius' discussion of quality","main_title":{"title":"The notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in Simplicius' discussion of quality"},"abstract":"This paper deals with the meaning and function of epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, particularly in chapter 8, the discussion of the category of quality. Based on the question as to whether Simplicius uses epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas as a technical term or as a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of dynamis, different passages of chapter 8 will be analyzed and compared with Aristotle's discussion of dynamis. It will be argued that Simplicius distinguishes between two senses of epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas, one of which can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of dynamis; the other sense, however, differs from the Aristotelian notion of dynamis and, instead, appears to be in agreement with the use of epit\u00eadeiot\u00eas in the theory of participation established by Simplicius' Neoplatonic predecessors. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/uZGcu7N3ynTApz0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1150,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"27","issue":"","pages":"65-83"}},"sort":["The notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in Simplicius' discussion of quality"]}
Title | The text of Simplicius’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics and the question of supralinear omicron in Greek manuscripts |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | Revue d’histoire des textes |
Volume | 9 |
Pages | 351-358 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Tarán, Leonardo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper tries to establish that supralinear omicron is not, as most elementary introductions to Greek paleography have it, a simple abbreviation for the ending omicron-sigma. Rather, it was originally a symbol for suspension that later medieval scribes used also for other subordinated purposes which are impossible to classify. Some examples will be given in what follows. For a long time this interpretation had seemed so obvious to me that during a 1985 colloquium on Simplicius in Paris, it surprised me that some members of the audience objected that supralinear omicron is simply an abbreviation for omicron-sigma. As this occurred during my discussion of a passage of Simplicius’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, and as several of my examples come from that work, it is convenient to give a list of the manuscripts used by Diels and also of additional prim ary witnesses either rejected by, or not known to him. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/euNEGjD514bsBaT |
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Title | The Ṣābians of Ḥarrān and the Classical Tradition |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | International Journal of the Classical Tradition |
Volume | 9 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 8-35 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Pingree, David |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article addresses questions concerning the characteristics of the paganism of Harran, its eclectic sources, and its development by examining the relationships - real, possible, and fictitious - of various personalities with the city of Harran from Assyrian times till the Mongol attack in 1271. It is suggested that the Sabians used Neoplatonism, which, if Tardieu's analysis is correct, they originally learned from Simplicius, to develop, explain, and justify their practice of astral magic, and that their interest in the Greek astronomy and astrology that astral magic required served to maintain the study and to preserve the texts of these sciences during the centuries in which they were ignored in Byzantium. It is further shown that the Greek philosophical and scientific material available to them was mingled with elements from ancient Mesopotamia, India, Iran, Judaism, and Egypt to form a syncretic system of belief that they could claim to be mankind's original and authentic religion. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Jdb3AO475p5h4e0 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1212","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1212,"authors_free":[{"id":1794,"entry_id":1212,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":292,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Pingree, David","free_first_name":"David","free_last_name":"Pingree","norm_person":{"id":292,"first_name":"David","last_name":"Pingree","full_name":"Pingree, David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The \u1e62\u0101bians of \u1e24arr\u0101n and the Classical Tradition","main_title":{"title":"The \u1e62\u0101bians of \u1e24arr\u0101n and the Classical Tradition"},"abstract":"This article addresses questions concerning the characteristics of the paganism of Harran, its eclectic sources, and its development by examining the relationships - real, possible, and fictitious - of various personalities with the city of Harran from Assyrian times till the Mongol attack in 1271. It is suggested that the Sabians used Neoplatonism, which, if Tardieu's analysis is correct, they originally learned from Simplicius, to develop, explain, and justify their practice of astral magic, and that their interest in the Greek astronomy and astrology that astral magic required served to maintain the study and to preserve the texts of these sciences during the centuries in which they were ignored in Byzantium. It is further shown that the Greek philosophical and scientific material available to them was mingled with elements from ancient Mesopotamia, India, Iran, Judaism, and Egypt to form a syncretic system of belief that they could claim to be mankind's original and authentic religion. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Jdb3AO475p5h4e0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":292,"full_name":"Pingree, David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1212,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"International Journal of the Classical Tradition","volume":"9","issue":"1","pages":"8-35"}},"sort":["The \u1e62\u0101bians of \u1e24arr\u0101n and the Classical Tradition"]}
Title | Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios Physikkommentar |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1989 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 117 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 288-303 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Wiesner, Jürgen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Für die Tradierung der umstrittenen Xenophanes-Prädikate ergibt sich also folgendes Bild: Theophrasts Urteil, dass Xenophanes sein Prinzip weder eindeutig als begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder eindeutig als bewegt noch unbewegt benannt habe, schließt referierende Einzelangaben über diese uneinheitlichen Lehrmeinungen des Kolophoniers nicht aus. Das negative „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Urteil Theophrasts ist in der Vorlage von MXG und Simplikios (In Phys. 22,30–23,9) später missverstanden worden: Für den dort vorliegenden positiven „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Ausschluss (das Prinzip sei weder begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder bewegt noch unbewegt) wurde eine auf späteren Konzepten beruhende Begründung hinzugefügt. Simplikios hat sich von der Quelle, die ihm und MXG vorlag, irreführen lassen und die äußerlich gleichlautende Auskunft Theophrasts, die er In Phys. 22,26 zitiert, in ihrem wahren Gehalt verkannt. Daher hat er die Argumentation, die aus der mit MXG gemeinsamen Quelle stammt und die gar nicht zu Theophrasts negativem Urteil passt, ab 22,31 folgen lassen. Die Lehrmeinung vom begrenzten, kugeligen Gott gelangte von Theophrast in die Doxographie und zu Alexander. Auch Simplikios kennt eine solche Konzeption aus dem Eresier (In Phys. 28,4 ff.). Er unternimmt eine Harmonisierung des „begrenzt“ mit der „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Bestimmung (29,7 ff.). Da er bei Theophrast sowohl die (von ihm fälschlich als positiver Ausschluss verstandene) „οὔτε-οὔτε“-Bestimmung als auch das einfache Prädikat „begrenzt“ las, könnte er sogar durch den Eresier zu seiner Harmonisierung angeregt worden sein. [conclusion p. 302-303] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GgDE7e58wFISvqX |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"835","_score":null,"_source":{"id":835,"authors_free":[{"id":1239,"entry_id":835,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":75,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wiesner, J\u00fcrgen","free_first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","free_last_name":"Wiesner","norm_person":{"id":75,"first_name":"J\u00fcrgen","last_name":"Wiesner","full_name":"Wiesner, J\u00fcrgen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/140610847","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios Physikkommentar","main_title":{"title":"Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios Physikkommentar"},"abstract":"F\u00fcr die Tradierung der umstrittenen Xenophanes-Pr\u00e4dikate ergibt sich also folgendes Bild:\r\n\r\n Theophrasts Urteil, dass Xenophanes sein Prinzip weder eindeutig als begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder eindeutig als bewegt noch unbewegt benannt habe, schlie\u00dft referierende Einzelangaben \u00fcber diese uneinheitlichen Lehrmeinungen des Kolophoniers nicht aus.\r\n\r\n Das negative \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Urteil Theophrasts ist in der Vorlage von MXG und Simplikios (In Phys. 22,30\u201323,9) sp\u00e4ter missverstanden worden: F\u00fcr den dort vorliegenden positiven \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Ausschluss (das Prinzip sei weder begrenzt noch unbegrenzt, weder bewegt noch unbewegt) wurde eine auf sp\u00e4teren Konzepten beruhende Begr\u00fcndung hinzugef\u00fcgt.\r\n\r\n Simplikios hat sich von der Quelle, die ihm und MXG vorlag, irref\u00fchren lassen und die \u00e4u\u00dferlich gleichlautende Auskunft Theophrasts, die er In Phys. 22,26 zitiert, in ihrem wahren Gehalt verkannt. Daher hat er die Argumentation, die aus der mit MXG gemeinsamen Quelle stammt und die gar nicht zu Theophrasts negativem Urteil passt, ab 22,31 folgen lassen.\r\n\r\n Die Lehrmeinung vom begrenzten, kugeligen Gott gelangte von Theophrast in die Doxographie und zu Alexander. Auch Simplikios kennt eine solche Konzeption aus dem Eresier (In Phys. 28,4 ff.). Er unternimmt eine Harmonisierung des \u201ebegrenzt\u201c mit der \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Bestimmung (29,7 ff.). Da er bei Theophrast sowohl die (von ihm f\u00e4lschlich als positiver Ausschluss verstandene) \u201e\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5-\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5\u201c-Bestimmung als auch das einfache Pr\u00e4dikat \u201ebegrenzt\u201c las, k\u00f6nnte er sogar durch den Eresier zu seiner Harmonisierung angeregt worden sein. [conclusion p. 302-303]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GgDE7e58wFISvqX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":75,"full_name":"Wiesner, J\u00fcrgen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":835,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"117","issue":"3","pages":"288-303"}},"sort":["Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios Physikkommentar"]}
Title | Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1953 |
Journal | Harvard Studies in Classical Philology |
Volume | 61 |
Pages | 85-156 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | McDiarmid, John B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In sum, the fragments considered disclose no evidence that Theophrastus employed his knowledge of the Presocratics in such a way as to exercise independent judgment about them. Despite his apparent investigation of the original texts, his accounts are in all essentials simply repetitions of some of the interpretations that he found in Aristotle and have, therefore, the same deficiencies. Further, by his method of selection and adaptation, he has frequently misrepresented his source and has exaggerated the faults present in it. It must be concluded that, with regard to the Presocratic causes at least, he is a thoroughly biased witness and is even less trustworthy than Aristotle. [conclusion p. 133] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EubtCOWFaqns9Pq |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"991","_score":null,"_source":{"id":991,"authors_free":[{"id":1492,"entry_id":991,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":251,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McDiarmid, John B.","free_first_name":"John B.","free_last_name":"McDiarmid","norm_person":{"id":251,"first_name":"John B.","last_name":"McDiarmid","full_name":"McDiarmid, John B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1200165888","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes","main_title":{"title":"Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes"},"abstract":"In sum, the fragments considered disclose no evidence that Theophrastus employed his knowledge of the Presocratics in such a way as to exercise independent judgment about them. Despite his apparent investigation of the original texts, his accounts are in all essentials simply repetitions of some of the interpretations that he found in Aristotle and have, therefore, the same deficiencies. Further, by his method of selection and adaptation, he has frequently misrepresented his source and has exaggerated the faults present in it. It must be concluded that, with regard to the Presocratic causes at least, he is a thoroughly biased witness and is even less trustworthy than Aristotle. [conclusion p. 133]","btype":3,"date":"1953","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EubtCOWFaqns9Pq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":251,"full_name":"McDiarmid, John B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":991,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Harvard Studies in Classical Philology","volume":"61","issue":"","pages":"85-156"}},"sort":["Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes"]}
Title | Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories: His following of Simplicius |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Dionysius |
Volume | 20 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hankey, Wayne J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Following Simplicius, Thomas set up the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical viae as complementary oppositions each of which contributed to the truth. Thomas also followed Simplicius in discerning differences between the hermeneutic methods of the two great schools. He reproduced the history of philosophy of Simplicius as soon as he had his commentaries, agreed with many of his conciliating judgments, and used the same reconciling logical figures. He does not identify himself as a Peripatetic or as a Platonist. However, when he agrees that Aristotle’s way of reasoning, per viam motus, to the existence of separate substances is manifestior et certior, he is sitting in judgment with, not against, Simplicius. For both the sixth and the thirteenth century commentators, Plato and Aristotle are assimilated to each other in various ways, and the real possibility of any beginning except that from the sensible is excluded. Thomas’ hermeneutic is that of the Platonic tradition in late Antiquity – Thomas certainly thought that the truth was veiled under poetic and symbolic language and judged this to be essential for revealing the truth to humans. Consistently with this approach, in the exposition of the De Caelo, Aquinas goes so far with Simplicius as to find “something divine (fabula aliquid divinum continet)” in the myth that Atlas holds up the heavens.106 He would seem, thus, to be on his way to the reconciliation of religious as well as of philosophical traditions. If this should, in fact, be his intent, Thomas would be following Simplicius and his Neoplatonic predecessors in their deepest purposes. This Christian priest, friar, and saint would have placed himself with the “divine” Proclus among the successors of Plato. [Conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YjEdDURMoq0kV8j |
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Title | Three Thêtas in the "Empédocle de Strasbourg" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Mnemosyne, Fourth Series |
Volume | 54 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 78-84 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Algra, Keimpe A. , Mansfeld, Jaap |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
We conclude that we cannot, merely on the basis of the Strasbourg fragments, confidently assign to the physical poem the gruesome fragment (now plus its new context) Stein and Diels assigned to the Purifications. Until further evidence turns up, only a non liquet is feasible, and we should keep open the possibility that we are dealing with "Zwei Empedocle de Strasbourg." The 6s in the papyrus fragments discussed above are simply wrong. The slightly bizarre interpretation based on them may be abandoned. [conclusion p. 81] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/K3k0s0RXMbEYW6J |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"779","_score":null,"_source":{"id":779,"authors_free":[{"id":1143,"entry_id":779,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":28,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Algra, Keimpe A.","free_first_name":"Keimpe A.","free_last_name":"Algra","norm_person":{"id":28,"first_name":"Keimpe A.","last_name":"Algra","full_name":"Algra, Keimpe A.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/115110992","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1144,"entry_id":779,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":29,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","free_first_name":"Jaap","free_last_name":"Mansfeld","norm_person":{"id":29,"first_name":"Jaap","last_name":"Mansfeld","full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119383217","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Three Th\u00eatas in the \"Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg\"","main_title":{"title":"Three Th\u00eatas in the \"Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg\""},"abstract":"We conclude that we cannot, merely on the basis of the Strasbourg fragments, confidently assign to the physical poem the gruesome fragment (now plus its new context) Stein and Diels assigned to the Purifications. Until further evidence turns up, only a non liquet is feasible, and we should keep open the possibility that we are dealing with \"Zwei Empedocle de Strasbourg.\" The 6s in the papyrus fragments discussed above are simply wrong. The slightly bizarre interpretation based on them may be abandoned. [conclusion p. 81]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/K3k0s0RXMbEYW6J","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":28,"full_name":"Algra, Keimpe A.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":29,"full_name":"Mansfeld, Jaap","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":779,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"54","issue":"1","pages":"78-84"}},"sort":["Three Th\u00eatas in the \"Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg\""]}
Title | Théodoret, Graec. Aff. Cur., IV. 12 et l’ordre des fragments de Théophraste issus de Simplicius In Phys. p. 22-28 |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Journal | Unpublished |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Journée, Gérard |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This text discusses the comparison between the fragments of Hippasus and Heraclitus by Theodoret of Cyrus. The similarities between the two texts suggest that they have a common source, which is probably Theophrastus. This observation confirms Theophrastus' use of systematic categories, including unity and plurality, motion, limitation and restriction. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/qVCQ9YhZlvKeI75 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1361","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1361,"authors_free":[{"id":2037,"entry_id":1361,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":206,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Journ\u00e9e, G\u00e9rard","free_first_name":"G\u00e9rard","free_last_name":"Journ\u00e9e","norm_person":{"id":206,"first_name":"G\u00e9rard ","last_name":"Journ\u00e9e","full_name":"Journ\u00e9e, G\u00e9rard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Th\u00e9odoret, Graec. Aff. Cur., IV. 12 et l\u2019ordre des fragments de Th\u00e9ophraste issus de Simplicius In Phys. p. 22-28","main_title":{"title":"Th\u00e9odoret, Graec. Aff. Cur., IV. 12 et l\u2019ordre des fragments de Th\u00e9ophraste issus de Simplicius In Phys. p. 22-28"},"abstract":"This text discusses the comparison between the fragments of Hippasus and Heraclitus by Theodoret of Cyrus. The similarities between the two texts suggest that they have a common source, which is probably Theophrastus. This observation confirms Theophrastus' use of systematic categories, including unity and plurality, motion, limitation and restriction. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/qVCQ9YhZlvKeI75","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":206,"full_name":"Journ\u00e9e, G\u00e9rard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1361,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Unpublished","volume":"","issue":"","pages":""}},"sort":["Th\u00e9odoret, Graec. Aff. Cur., IV. 12 et l\u2019ordre des fragments de Th\u00e9ophraste issus de Simplicius In Phys. p. 22-28"]}
Title | Time, Perpetuity and Eternity in Late Antique Platonism |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | KronoScope |
Volume | 5 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 213-235 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Siniossoglou, Nikētas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper focuses on the late antique conception of time, eternity and perpetual duration and examines the relation between these concepts and Plato’s cosmology. By exploring the controversy between pagan philosophers (Proclus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus) and Christian writers (Aeneas of Gaza, Zacharias of Mytilene, Philoponus) in respect to the interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus, I argue that the Neoplatonic doctrine of the perpetuity (ἀïδιότης) of the world derives from a) the intellectual paradigm presupposed by the conceptual framework of late antiquity and b) the commentators’ principal concern for a coherent conception of Platonic cosmology essentially free from internal contradictions. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/a8bG1lq3yiz1Bl1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1017","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1017,"authors_free":[{"id":1533,"entry_id":1017,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":319,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Siniossoglou, Nik\u0113tas","free_first_name":"Nik\u0113tas","free_last_name":"Siniossoglou","norm_person":{"id":319,"first_name":"Nik\u0113tas","last_name":"Siniossoglou","full_name":"Siniossoglou, Nik\u0113tas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1116027585","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Time, Perpetuity and Eternity in Late Antique Platonism","main_title":{"title":"Time, Perpetuity and Eternity in Late Antique Platonism"},"abstract":"This paper focuses on the late antique conception of time, eternity and perpetual duration and examines the relation between these concepts and Plato\u2019s cosmology. By exploring the controversy between pagan philosophers (Proclus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus) and Christian writers (Aeneas of Gaza, Zacharias of Mytilene, Philoponus) in respect to the interpretation of Plato\u2019s Timaeus, I argue that the Neoplatonic doctrine of the perpetuity (\u1f00\u00ef\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2) of the world derives from a) the intellectual paradigm presupposed by the conceptual framework of late antiquity and b) the commentators\u2019 principal concern for a coherent conception of Platonic cosmology essentially free from internal contradictions. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/a8bG1lq3yiz1Bl1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":319,"full_name":"Siniossoglou, Nik\u0113tas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1017,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"KronoScope","volume":"5","issue":"2","pages":"213-235"}},"sort":["Time, Perpetuity and Eternity in Late Antique Platonism"]}
Title | Traces d’un commentaire de Simplicius sur la Métaphysique à Byzance? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques |
Volume | 84 |
Pages | 275–284 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rashed, Marwan |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Concluons. Étant donné que : la mention de Simplicius dans le Parisinus graecus 1853 est unique, son argument contredit les théories aristotéliciennes, son argument contredit l’interprétation qu’en donne Simplicius, son argument contredit les théories de Damascius et de Jamblique, sa conclusion est renfermée dans une paraphrase connue de In Phys., nous sommes contraints de rejeter l’idée, pourtant assez séduisante, qu’il pouvait y avoir des traces d’un commentaire de Simplicius à la Métaphysique dans le monde byzantin. Les érudits savaient tout au plus que l’auteur du commentaire au De anima, qu’ils pensaient être Simplicius, en avait écrit un. [conclusion p. 284] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ckn1Q6xi6bdiKcz |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1060","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1060,"authors_free":[{"id":1609,"entry_id":1060,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"Marwan","free_last_name":"Rashed","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Traces d\u2019un commentaire de Simplicius sur la M\u00e9taphysique \u00e0 Byzance?","main_title":{"title":"Traces d\u2019un commentaire de Simplicius sur la M\u00e9taphysique \u00e0 Byzance?"},"abstract":"Concluons. \u00c9tant donn\u00e9 que :\r\n\r\n la mention de Simplicius dans le Parisinus graecus 1853 est unique,\r\n son argument contredit les th\u00e9ories aristot\u00e9liciennes,\r\n son argument contredit l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation qu\u2019en donne Simplicius,\r\n son argument contredit les th\u00e9ories de Damascius et de Jamblique,\r\n sa conclusion est renferm\u00e9e dans une paraphrase connue de In Phys.,\r\n\r\nnous sommes contraints de rejeter l\u2019id\u00e9e, pourtant assez s\u00e9duisante, qu\u2019il pouvait y avoir des traces d\u2019un commentaire de Simplicius \u00e0 la M\u00e9taphysique dans le monde byzantin. Les \u00e9rudits savaient tout au plus que l\u2019auteur du commentaire au De anima, qu\u2019ils pensaient \u00eatre Simplicius, en avait \u00e9crit un. [conclusion p. 284]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ckn1Q6xi6bdiKcz","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1060,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de sciences philosophiques et th\u00e9ologiques","volume":"84","issue":"","pages":"275\u2013284"}},"sort":["Traces d\u2019un commentaire de Simplicius sur la M\u00e9taphysique \u00e0 Byzance?"]}
Title | Un commentaire perpétuel de Georges Pachymère à la Physique d'Aristote, faussement attribué à Michel Psellos |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2007 |
Journal | Byzantinische Zeitschrift |
Volume | 100 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 637-676 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Golitsis, Pantelis |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Récapitulons l'essentiel des raisonnements philologiques qui nous ont permis de restituer le véritable auteur du commentaire, qui dorénavant doit être attribué à Georges Pachymère. Nous avons vu que l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite qui attribue le commentaire à Psellos descend d'un ancêtre commun, l'Ambrosianus H 44 sup., écrit à la fin du XIVᵉ siècle. Celui-ci remonte pourtant à un archétype, écrit vers l'an 1300 et aujourd'hui perdu (l'Escorialensis D. IV. 24), dans lequel le commentaire figurait sous le nom de Pachymère, ainsi que nous avons pu le montrer grâce au Vindobonensis phil. gr. 248 et à des témoignages du XVIᵉ siècle. Cet archétype de l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite du commentaire a été copié sur le Laurentianus plut. 87,5, autographe stricto sensu de Pachymère, dont il se servait pour assurer son enseignement de la Physique. [Conclusion, p. 676] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/VvESFt1BJvfvNnQ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"536","_score":null,"_source":{"id":536,"authors_free":[{"id":758,"entry_id":536,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un commentaire perp\u00e9tuel de Georges Pachym\u00e8re \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote, faussement attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 Michel Psellos","main_title":{"title":"Un commentaire perp\u00e9tuel de Georges Pachym\u00e8re \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote, faussement attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 Michel Psellos"},"abstract":"R\u00e9capitulons l'essentiel des raisonnements philologiques qui nous ont permis de restituer le v\u00e9ritable auteur du commentaire, qui dor\u00e9navant doit \u00eatre attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 Georges Pachym\u00e8re.\r\n\r\nNous avons vu que l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite qui attribue le commentaire \u00e0 Psellos descend d'un anc\u00eatre commun, l'Ambrosianus H 44 sup., \u00e9crit \u00e0 la fin du XIV\u1d49 si\u00e8cle. Celui-ci remonte pourtant \u00e0 un arch\u00e9type, \u00e9crit vers l'an 1300 et aujourd'hui perdu (l'Escorialensis D. IV. 24), dans lequel le commentaire figurait sous le nom de Pachym\u00e8re, ainsi que nous avons pu le montrer gr\u00e2ce au Vindobonensis phil. gr. 248 et \u00e0 des t\u00e9moignages du XVI\u1d49 si\u00e8cle.\r\n\r\nCet arch\u00e9type de l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite du commentaire a \u00e9t\u00e9 copi\u00e9 sur le Laurentianus plut. 87,5, autographe stricto sensu de Pachym\u00e8re, dont il se servait pour assurer son enseignement de la Physique.\r\n\r\n[Conclusion, p. 676]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/VvESFt1BJvfvNnQ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":536,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Byzantinische Zeitschrift ","volume":"100","issue":"2","pages":"637-676"}},"sort":["Un commentaire perp\u00e9tuel de Georges Pachym\u00e8re \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote, faussement attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 Michel Psellos"]}
Title | Un commentario alessandrino al «De caelo» di Aristotele |
Type | Article |
Language | Italian |
Date | 2013 |
Journal | Athenaeum: Studi di letteratura e Storia dell'antichità |
Volume | 101 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 479-516 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rescigno, Andrea |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IR153pEdP84QTiX |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"810","_score":null,"_source":{"id":810,"authors_free":[{"id":1200,"entry_id":810,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":500,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rescigno, Andrea","free_first_name":"Andrea","free_last_name":"Rescigno","norm_person":{"id":500,"first_name":"Andrea","last_name":"Rescigno","full_name":"Rescigno, Andrea","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un commentario alessandrino al \u00abDe caelo\u00bb di Aristotele","main_title":{"title":"Un commentario alessandrino al \u00abDe caelo\u00bb di Aristotele"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"2013","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IR153pEdP84QTiX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":500,"full_name":"Rescigno, Andrea","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":810,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Athenaeum: Studi di letteratura e Storia dell'antichit\u00e0","volume":"101","issue":"2","pages":"479-516"}},"sort":["Un commentario alessandrino al \u00abDe caelo\u00bb di Aristotele"]}
Title | Un philosophe plus poète (Simplicius, "Com. in Ar. Phys." 24, 20 / DK 12 A 9) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
Volume | 30 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 3-22 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Santoro, Fernando |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This paper is about the meaning and implications for Presocratics' modern exegesis of a comment made by Simplicius about the vocabulary of a passage from Anaximander, which he has just quoted. Simplicius says that Anaximander wrote his sentence about the nature of beings in more poetic terms: ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτά λέγων. In their remarks on the passage, Nietzsche and Heidegger not only drew attention to the words and thought of Anaximander but also made us look at that simple comment, that "hiccup" of thought in Simplicius. What is it for a philosopher to speak in a more poetic way? We propose to understand that it does not imply the use of images or allegories but a very original way of interacting and thinking in universal terms. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CVvGQIdFa7rcFRB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"856","_score":null,"_source":{"id":856,"authors_free":[{"id":1260,"entry_id":856,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":310,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Santoro, Fernando","free_first_name":"Fernando","free_last_name":"Santoro","norm_person":{"id":310,"first_name":"Fernando","last_name":"Santoro","full_name":"Santoro, Fernando","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1060236362","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un philosophe plus po\u00e8te (Simplicius, \"Com. in Ar. Phys.\" 24, 20 \/ DK 12 A 9)","main_title":{"title":"Un philosophe plus po\u00e8te (Simplicius, \"Com. in Ar. Phys.\" 24, 20 \/ DK 12 A 9)"},"abstract":"This paper is about the meaning and implications for Presocratics' modern exegesis of a comment made by Simplicius about the vocabulary of a passage from Anaximander, which he has just quoted. Simplicius says that Anaximander wrote his sentence about the nature of beings in more poetic terms: \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd.\r\n\r\nIn their remarks on the passage, Nietzsche and Heidegger not only drew attention to the words and thought of Anaximander but also made us look at that simple comment, that \"hiccup\" of thought in Simplicius.\r\n\r\nWhat is it for a philosopher to speak in a more poetic way? We propose to understand that it does not imply the use of images or allegories but a very original way of interacting and thinking in universal terms. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CVvGQIdFa7rcFRB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":310,"full_name":"Santoro, Fernando","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":856,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"30","issue":"1","pages":"3-22"}},"sort":["Un philosophe plus po\u00e8te (Simplicius, \"Com. in Ar. Phys.\" 24, 20 \/ DK 12 A 9)"]}
Title | Un vers méconnu des Oracles Chaldaïques dans Simplicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (p. 375. 9 ss. Heib) |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1948 |
Journal | Symbolae Osloenses |
Volume | 26 |
Pages | 75–77 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Festugière, André-Jean |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Il avait semblé à Kroll (p. 24) que ce diaphragme était dit doué d’intelligence parce qu’il était dérivé du feu intelligent, et qu’il avait pour rôle de séparer les transmundana des mundana. Il apparaît maintenant, grâce au texte probant de Simplicius, qu’il est dit intelligent en vertu de l’antique association des phrenes avec le nous et qu’il a pour rôle tout à la fois de séparer et de réunir les deux premiers feux-intellects.² Cette doctrine offre de curieuses ressemblances avec le pneuma unifiant de la théologie chrétienne. Il vaudrait la peine de rechercher si c’est à la théologie orthodoxe ou à quelqu’une des sectes gnostiques³ que l’auteur des Oracula l’a empruntée. [conclusion p. 77] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GUbjWMoCMaLBH5d |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"549","_score":null,"_source":{"id":549,"authors_free":[{"id":773,"entry_id":549,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":112,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Festugi\u00e8re, Andr\u00e9-Jean","free_first_name":"Andr\u00e9-Jean","free_last_name":"Festugi\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":112,"first_name":"Andr\u00e9-Jean","last_name":"Festugi\u00e8re","full_name":"Festugi\u00e8re, Andr\u00e9-Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117758256","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Un vers m\u00e9connu des Oracles Chalda\u00efques dans Simplicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (p. 375. 9 ss. Heib)","main_title":{"title":"Un vers m\u00e9connu des Oracles Chalda\u00efques dans Simplicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (p. 375. 9 ss. Heib)"},"abstract":"Il avait sembl\u00e9 \u00e0 Kroll (p. 24) que ce diaphragme \u00e9tait dit dou\u00e9 d\u2019intelligence parce qu\u2019il \u00e9tait d\u00e9riv\u00e9 du feu intelligent, et qu\u2019il avait pour r\u00f4le de s\u00e9parer les transmundana des mundana. Il appara\u00eet maintenant, gr\u00e2ce au texte probant de Simplicius, qu\u2019il est dit intelligent en vertu de l\u2019antique association des phrenes avec le nous et qu\u2019il a pour r\u00f4le tout \u00e0 la fois de s\u00e9parer et de r\u00e9unir les deux premiers feux-intellects.\u00b2\r\n\r\nCette doctrine offre de curieuses ressemblances avec le pneuma unifiant de la th\u00e9ologie chr\u00e9tienne. Il vaudrait la peine de rechercher si c\u2019est \u00e0 la th\u00e9ologie orthodoxe ou \u00e0 quelqu\u2019une des sectes gnostiques\u00b3 que l\u2019auteur des Oracula l\u2019a emprunt\u00e9e.\r\n[conclusion p. 77]","btype":3,"date":"1948","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GUbjWMoCMaLBH5d","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":112,"full_name":"Festugi\u00e8re, Andr\u00e9-Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":549,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Symbolae Osloenses","volume":"26","issue":"","pages":"75\u201377"}},"sort":["Un vers m\u00e9connu des Oracles Chalda\u00efques dans Simplicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (p. 375. 9 ss. Heib)"]}
Title | Unbeachtete Zitate und doxographische Nachrichten in der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 148 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 202-219 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Scholten, Clemens |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi (aetm.) des Johannes Philoponos aus der Zeit bald nach 529 n. Chr. gibt es, über eine Reihe von bereits näher beleuchteten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten hinaus, eine größere Anzahl von bisher unbeachteten doxographischen Materialien, Paraphrasen und/oder Zitaten aus verlorenen Schriften antiker Autoren. Unter quellenkritischen und doxographischen Gesichtspunkten im engeren Sinn ist aetm. noch nicht eigens untersucht worden. Das wird sicherlich damit zu tun haben, dass die Erforschung der doxographischen Überlieferung vor gut hundert Jahren ihren Schwerpunkt auf die vorplatonische Tradition setzte und unter diesem Gesichtspunkt aetm. offenbar zu vernachlässigen glaubte, zumal H. Rabe als Herausgeber von aetm. in seinen Fußnoten die Textnachweise aus den großen Dichtern und Philosophen wie Homer, Platon, Aristoteles, Plotin usw., soweit möglich, zuverlässig geführt hat. Möglicherweise ist daran auch die Einschätzung des letzten Rezensenten der Rabeschen Edition aus dem Jahre 1901 nicht unbeteiligt, der aetm. für unergiebig im Hinblick auf verlorene Quellen hielt und meinte, aetm. habe lediglich bekanntes Material zu bieten. Aber es gab damals schon andere Stimmen. Bemerkenswerterweise hatte ein Jahr zuvor Wendland in seiner Rezension anders geurteilt. Ebenso forderte Gudeman in seinem RE-Artikel „Johannes Philoponos“ aus dem Jahre 1915 die Aufarbeitung der Quellenfrage. Bei diesem Desiderat ist es allerdings bis heute geblieben. In größerem Umfang sind lediglich die Teile des Quellenmaterials aus aetm. behandelt worden, die für die Timaios-Kommentierung in der Zeit vor Proklos von Belang sind. Es handelt sich besonders um Texte aus den Timaios-Kommentaren des Calvisios Tauros und Porphyrios, die im Rahmen der Sichtung der erhaltenen Stücke aus dem Timaios-Kommentar des Porphyrios zusammengestellt wurden oder bei der Untersuchung der Weltentstehungslehren, wie sie im Rahmen der Exegese des Timaios entwickelt wurden, behandelt worden sind. Auf Proklos-Texte hat Beutler in seinem RE-Artikel hingewiesen, allerdings einiges übersehen. Bereits verifiziert sind ein Zitat aus dem fünften Buch des Timaios-Kommentars des Proklos in aetm. 9,11 (364,5–365,3), die von Johannes Philoponos häufig erwähnte, paraphrasierte oder zitierte Schrift des Proklos Untersuchung der Einwände des Aristoteles gegen den platonischen Timaios (Ἐπἱσκέψις τῶν πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀντιρρηθέντων oder Ὁ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τιμαίου πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην λόγος), die Proklos in seinem Timaios-Kommentar selbst erwähnt und die daher älter als der Kommentar sein dürfte, sowie die Proklos-Schrift Zehn Aporien hinsichtlich der Vorsehung, die Beutler als erster kurz vorgestellt hat und die Boese, Dornseiff und Feldbusch zu größeren Teilen in Texten späterer Autoren wiedergefunden haben. Ein längeres Zitat aus Galens Schrift Über den Beweis ist schon zwei Jahre, bevor Rabe aetm. ediert hat, notiert worden. Eine vollständige Sichtung und Zusammenstellung aller in aetm. benutzten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten gibt es bis jetzt nicht. Die unbeachteten Quellenstücke und doxographischen Nachrichten, die bei der Arbeit an der Übersetzung von aetm. auffielen, sollen im Folgenden vorgestellt werden. [introduction p. 202-204] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9laXIov8GbXAA3T |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1034","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1034,"authors_free":[{"id":1565,"entry_id":1034,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":286,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Scholten, Clemens","free_first_name":"Clemens","free_last_name":"Scholten","norm_person":{"id":286,"first_name":"Clemens","last_name":"Scholten","full_name":"Scholten, Clemens","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/115572538","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Unbeachtete Zitate und doxographische Nachrichten in der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos","main_title":{"title":"Unbeachtete Zitate und doxographische Nachrichten in der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos"},"abstract":"In der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi (aetm.) des Johannes Philoponos aus der Zeit bald nach 529 n. Chr. gibt es, \u00fcber eine Reihe von bereits n\u00e4her beleuchteten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten hinaus, eine gr\u00f6\u00dfere Anzahl von bisher unbeachteten doxographischen Materialien, Paraphrasen und\/oder Zitaten aus verlorenen Schriften antiker Autoren. Unter quellenkritischen und doxographischen Gesichtspunkten im engeren Sinn ist aetm. noch nicht eigens untersucht worden. Das wird sicherlich damit zu tun haben, dass die Erforschung der doxographischen \u00dcberlieferung vor gut hundert Jahren ihren Schwerpunkt auf die vorplatonische Tradition setzte und unter diesem Gesichtspunkt aetm. offenbar zu vernachl\u00e4ssigen glaubte, zumal H. Rabe als Herausgeber von aetm. in seinen Fu\u00dfnoten die Textnachweise aus den gro\u00dfen Dichtern und Philosophen wie Homer, Platon, Aristoteles, Plotin usw., soweit m\u00f6glich, zuverl\u00e4ssig gef\u00fchrt hat.\r\n\r\nM\u00f6glicherweise ist daran auch die Einsch\u00e4tzung des letzten Rezensenten der Rabeschen Edition aus dem Jahre 1901 nicht unbeteiligt, der aetm. f\u00fcr unergiebig im Hinblick auf verlorene Quellen hielt und meinte, aetm. habe lediglich bekanntes Material zu bieten.\r\n\r\nAber es gab damals schon andere Stimmen. Bemerkenswerterweise hatte ein Jahr zuvor Wendland in seiner Rezension anders geurteilt. Ebenso forderte Gudeman in seinem RE-Artikel \u201eJohannes Philoponos\u201c aus dem Jahre 1915 die Aufarbeitung der Quellenfrage. Bei diesem Desiderat ist es allerdings bis heute geblieben.\r\n\r\nIn gr\u00f6\u00dferem Umfang sind lediglich die Teile des Quellenmaterials aus aetm. behandelt worden, die f\u00fcr die Timaios-Kommentierung in der Zeit vor Proklos von Belang sind. Es handelt sich besonders um Texte aus den Timaios-Kommentaren des Calvisios Tauros und Porphyrios, die im Rahmen der Sichtung der erhaltenen St\u00fccke aus dem Timaios-Kommentar des Porphyrios zusammengestellt wurden oder bei der Untersuchung der Weltentstehungslehren, wie sie im Rahmen der Exegese des Timaios entwickelt wurden, behandelt worden sind.\r\n\r\nAuf Proklos-Texte hat Beutler in seinem RE-Artikel hingewiesen, allerdings einiges \u00fcbersehen. Bereits verifiziert sind ein Zitat aus dem f\u00fcnften Buch des Timaios-Kommentars des Proklos in aetm. 9,11 (364,5\u2013365,3), die von Johannes Philoponos h\u00e4ufig erw\u00e4hnte, paraphrasierte oder zitierte Schrift des Proklos Untersuchung der Einw\u00e4nde des Aristoteles gegen den platonischen Timaios (\u1f18\u03c0\u1f31\u03c3\u03ba\u03ad\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03a4\u03af\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd oder \u1f49 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f08\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), die Proklos in seinem Timaios-Kommentar selbst erw\u00e4hnt und die daher \u00e4lter als der Kommentar sein d\u00fcrfte, sowie die Proklos-Schrift Zehn Aporien hinsichtlich der Vorsehung, die Beutler als erster kurz vorgestellt hat und die Boese, Dornseiff und Feldbusch zu gr\u00f6\u00dferen Teilen in Texten sp\u00e4terer Autoren wiedergefunden haben.\r\n\r\nEin l\u00e4ngeres Zitat aus Galens Schrift \u00dcber den Beweis ist schon zwei Jahre, bevor Rabe aetm. ediert hat, notiert worden. Eine vollst\u00e4ndige Sichtung und Zusammenstellung aller in aetm. benutzten Quellen und doxographischen Nachrichten gibt es bis jetzt nicht.\r\n\r\nDie unbeachteten Quellenst\u00fccke und doxographischen Nachrichten, die bei der Arbeit an der \u00dcbersetzung von aetm. auffielen, sollen im Folgenden vorgestellt werden. [introduction p. 202-204]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9laXIov8GbXAA3T","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":286,"full_name":"Scholten, Clemens","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1034,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"148","issue":"2","pages":"202-219"}},"sort":["Unbeachtete Zitate und doxographische Nachrichten in der Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos"]}
Title | War Platons Vorlesung "das Gute" einmalig? |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1968 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 96 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 705-709 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Merlan, Philip |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die Frage wurde kürzlich von Krämer auf Grundlage einer Sprachanalyse der nunmehr wohl jedem an griechischer Philosophie Interessierten bekannten Aristoxenos-Stelle verneint. Im Folgenden wird versucht, zu beweisen, dass die Frage zu bejahen ist. Wie Krämer die Aristoxenos-Stelle versteht, lässt sich am besten durch eine Art Paraphrase darstellen: „Ich werde lieber, so sagt Aristoxenos, im Vorhinein den Gang meiner Untersuchung angeben, damit es uns nicht geht wie nach einer von Aristoteles oft erzählten Geschichte den meisten Hörern des platonischen Vorlesungskurses Das Gute. So oft er denselben ansagte, ging jeder hin in der Annahme, er werde etwas über Dinge hören, die üblicherweise für menschliche Güter gehalten werden, wie Reichtum, Gesundheit und Stärke, und in der Hauptsache über irgendein Glück wundersamster Art. Als aber die Auseinandersetzung immer wieder auf Mathematisches, Zahlen, Geometrie und Astronomie hinauslief, kam es ihnen—ich glaub’s schon—höchst absonderlich vor. In der Folge war das Ende des Kurses immer wieder, dass ein Teil der Hörer das ganze Ding für bedeutungslos ansah, ein anderer es nachteilig kritisierte. Und warum? Weil sie, statt sich zu erkundigen, um was es sich handeln würde, mit offenen Mündern hinzugehen pflegten, indem sie nur das Wort 'gut' aufgeschnappt hatten.“ Hat meine Paraphrase den Sinn der krämerschen Interpretation richtig getroffen, so hätte also Aristoxenos berichten wollen, dass, so oft Platon seinen Vorlesungskursus Das Gute anzusagen pflegte, sich immer wieder dasselbe ergab: Vom Titel Das Gute (der immer wiederholt wurde) angezogen, finden sich Hörer ein, von denen dann die meisten sich enttäuscht oder getäuscht fühlen. Ich will nicht sagen, dass dies unmöglich ist; aber es werden doch viele empfinden, dass das ganze Geschichtchen seinen Sinn verliert, wenn es sich nicht um ein einmaliges Ereignis handelt. [introduction p. 44-45] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1i5nYpcy51Bvdbu |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"976","_score":null,"_source":{"id":976,"authors_free":[{"id":1475,"entry_id":976,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":258,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Merlan, Philip","free_first_name":"Philip","free_last_name":"Merlan","norm_person":{"id":258,"first_name":"Philip","last_name":"Merlan","full_name":"Merlan, Philip","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/128860502","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"War Platons Vorlesung \"das Gute\" einmalig?","main_title":{"title":"War Platons Vorlesung \"das Gute\" einmalig?"},"abstract":"Die Frage wurde k\u00fcrzlich von Kr\u00e4mer auf Grundlage einer Sprachanalyse der nunmehr wohl jedem an griechischer Philosophie Interessierten bekannten Aristoxenos-Stelle verneint. Im Folgenden wird versucht, zu beweisen, dass die Frage zu bejahen ist.\r\n\r\nWie Kr\u00e4mer die Aristoxenos-Stelle versteht, l\u00e4sst sich am besten durch eine Art Paraphrase darstellen:\r\n\r\n\u201eIch werde lieber, so sagt Aristoxenos, im Vorhinein den Gang meiner Untersuchung angeben, damit es uns nicht geht wie nach einer von Aristoteles oft erz\u00e4hlten Geschichte den meisten H\u00f6rern des platonischen Vorlesungskurses Das Gute. So oft er denselben ansagte, ging jeder hin in der Annahme, er werde etwas \u00fcber Dinge h\u00f6ren, die \u00fcblicherweise f\u00fcr menschliche G\u00fcter gehalten werden, wie Reichtum, Gesundheit und St\u00e4rke, und in der Hauptsache \u00fcber irgendein Gl\u00fcck wundersamster Art.\r\n\r\nAls aber die Auseinandersetzung immer wieder auf Mathematisches, Zahlen, Geometrie und Astronomie hinauslief, kam es ihnen\u2014ich glaub\u2019s schon\u2014h\u00f6chst absonderlich vor. In der Folge war das Ende des Kurses immer wieder, dass ein Teil der H\u00f6rer das ganze Ding f\u00fcr bedeutungslos ansah, ein anderer es nachteilig kritisierte. Und warum? Weil sie, statt sich zu erkundigen, um was es sich handeln w\u00fcrde, mit offenen M\u00fcndern hinzugehen pflegten, indem sie nur das Wort 'gut' aufgeschnappt hatten.\u201c\r\n\r\nHat meine Paraphrase den Sinn der kr\u00e4merschen Interpretation richtig getroffen, so h\u00e4tte also Aristoxenos berichten wollen, dass, so oft Platon seinen Vorlesungskursus Das Gute anzusagen pflegte, sich immer wieder dasselbe ergab: Vom Titel Das Gute (der immer wiederholt wurde) angezogen, finden sich H\u00f6rer ein, von denen dann die meisten sich entt\u00e4uscht oder get\u00e4uscht f\u00fchlen.\r\n\r\nIch will nicht sagen, dass dies unm\u00f6glich ist; aber es werden doch viele empfinden, dass das ganze Geschichtchen seinen Sinn verliert, wenn es sich nicht um ein einmaliges Ereignis handelt. [introduction p. 44-45]","btype":3,"date":"1968","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1i5nYpcy51Bvdbu","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":258,"full_name":"Merlan, Philip","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":976,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"96","issue":"5","pages":"705-709"}},"sort":["War Platons Vorlesung \"das Gute\" einmalig?"]}
Title | Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus: Eine Nachprüfung der Empedokles-Doxographie |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1965 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 93 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 7-33 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hölscher, Uvo |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Über die Periodenlehre des Empedokles hat sich bislang noch keine Einigkeit hergestellt. Zwar darin stimmen alle überein, dass nach der Vorstellung des Empedokles die Welt einem periodischen Entstehen und Vergehen unterworfen sei, doch wie das im Einzelnen gedacht war, ist umstritten. Die verbreitetere Auffassung scheint sich am engsten an Aristoteles anzulehnen. Nach ihr würde sich der Kreislauf in vier Phasen abspielen: zwei Zeiten der Bewegung, getrennt je durch Zeiten der Ruhe. Ausgehend von der vollkommenen Einheit der Elemente im Sphairos (I), würde man mit einer Phase der allmählichen Scheidung zu rechnen haben (II), die in einer völligen Trennung der Elemente ihre zeitweilige Ruhe fände (III), bis diese durch eine neue Phase der Wiedervereinigung (IV) in die Einheit des Sphairos zurückkehrten. In jeder der beiden Bewegungsphasen würde sich eine Welt bilden. Aber schon die Frage, in welcher der beiden: auf dem Wege zur Trennung oder auf der Rückkehr zur Einheit, wir mit unserer jetzigen Welt uns befinden, lässt sich offenbar durch einfache Berufung auf Aristoteles nicht entscheiden. Das Missliche bleibt nämlich, dass die beiden Bewegungen in je nur einer Richtung laufen, in fortschreitender Trennung oder fortschreitender Einigung, jede ausgeführte Kosmogonie aber auf beides angewiesen scheint, indem die Weltordnung im Großen zwar durch Trennung geschehen kann, aber die Bildung des Lebens nur durch Verbindung. Alle Versuche, sich eine ganze Welt bloß aus zunehmender Scheidung – oder Verbindung – der Elemente entstehend zu denken, enden in Ungereimtheiten. So ist man genötigt, die Bewegungen in sich wiederum zu teilen: in eine Zeit, in der noch die Kraft der Einigung, und eine andere, in der schon die Kraft der Trennung vorherrschte – und umgekehrt –, sodass aus den vier Phasen im Grunde sechs werden. Aber auch damit gewinnt man kein Bild, das einen überzeugen könnte. Denn da immerhin die Kosmogonie, als die Sonderung der großen Weltteile, der Zoogonie, als der Verbindung der Elemente im Kleinen, vorausgehen musste, wäre sie, im Verlauf der fortschreitenden Trennung, gerade einer ersten Phase zuzuschreiben, in der die Kraft der Trennung noch schwach ist, dagegen die Erzeugung des Lebens der anderen Phase, in der sie die Oberhand gewinnt – was offenbar widersinnig ist. Versucht man aber, sich die Möglichkeiten in der rückläufigen Bewegung auszudenken, so werden die Schwierigkeiten noch größer: die Kraft der Trennung, allmählich abnehmend, würde in einer Phase wirken, in der sie die Elemente bereits getrennt vorfände; die kosmische Verteilung der Massen wäre als ein Vorgang der Vereinigung zu erklären, der in einer Phase stattfände, wo die Kraft der Vereinigung noch gering ist, während ihre wachsende Übermacht die von ihr selbst geschaffene Verteilung wieder zerstören würde. Auch dies ist nicht weniger widersinnig als das erste, und es kann nur als eine Ausrede erscheinen, wenn uns versichert wird, eine Welt bilde sich eben jeweils in dem mittleren Punkt der Bewegungen, wo die beiden Kräfte einander das Gleichgewicht halten. Es war darum ein entscheidender Gewinn, als v. Arnim sich von der Vierphasentheorie trennte. Tatsächlich gibt es kein Zeugnis, das uns die Annahme eines Ruhezustands der getrennten Elemente sicherte. Verzichtet man auf ihn, so rücken die beiden Phasen der wachsenden Trennung und der wachsenden Mischung der Elemente zusammen, und man wird in der ersten die Kosmogonie, in der zweiten die Zoogonie beschrieben finden. Indessen bringt auch diese Auffassung manche Misslichkeit mit sich. Aristoteles unterscheidet zwischen zwei Weltzeiten, einer der Liebe und einer des Streites, und die Zeit des Streites ist die unsere, während die der Liebe zurückliegt. Das Schema nach v. Arnim würde das Umgekehrte zeigen. Freilich könnte man, obschon künstlich genug, auch von der Zeit der Trennung aus, über den Ruhezustand im Sphairos rückwärts, auf den Endzustand der vorigen Welt als die Zeit der Liebe zurückblicken; aber man würde sich in der Zeit der Scheidung von Himmel und Erde, nicht in der des organischen Lebens befinden. Und kann Aristoteles die gesamte Weltzeit, von der Entstehung aus dem Sphairos bis zum Untergang im Sphairos, so in zwei Hälften teilen, dass er – in dieser Reihenfolge – von der Vereinigung des Vielen zu Einem durch die Liebe und „dann wieder“ Trennung des Einen in Vieles durch den Streit redet, und von den Ruhezuständen dazwischen? Als ob der Übergang von der Kosmogonie zur Entstehung des Lebens ein größerer Einschnitt wäre als die völlige Weltvernichtung im Sphairos? Kann er sagen – wie er es tut –: Empedokles lässt die Kosmogonie durch Liebe aus? Als ob eine solche, neben der Kosmogonie durch den Streit, von der Konsequenz des Systems eigentlich gefordert wäre? Ich halte es auch hier für einen Fehler, dass man zu geradewegs auf die Rekonstruktion des empedokleischen Systems aus war und dazu Zeugnisse und Fragmente, wie es sich bot, verwendete und zu vereinigen trachtete, anstatt bei den Zwischenfragen zu verweilen: Was hat sich Aristoteles, was seine Kommentatoren vorgestellt, und welches waren die Zeugnisse, die ihnen zur Hand waren? Auf die eigenen Auffassungen der Letzteren kann allerdings auch hier nur so weit eingegangen werden, als sie der Klärung der aristotelischen dienen – obschon Simplikios wichtig genug wäre, da seine neuplatonische Deutung des Sphairos und des Kosmos, als die intelligible und die sinnliche Welt, die Anschauung des Periodischen im Grunde ausschließt. Aber die Äußerungen des Aristoteles verdienen neu geprüft zu werden. [introduction p. 7-9] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/R2gNRYN2KFgYLw8 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1353","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1353,"authors_free":[{"id":2027,"entry_id":1353,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":198,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","free_first_name":"Uvo","free_last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","norm_person":{"id":198,"first_name":"Uvo","last_name":"H\u00f6lscher","full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118705571","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus: Eine Nachpr\u00fcfung der Empedokles-Doxographie","main_title":{"title":"Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus: Eine Nachpr\u00fcfung der Empedokles-Doxographie"},"abstract":"\u00dcber die Periodenlehre des Empedokles hat sich bislang noch keine Einigkeit hergestellt. Zwar darin stimmen alle \u00fcberein, dass nach der Vorstellung des Empedokles die Welt einem periodischen Entstehen und Vergehen unterworfen sei, doch wie das im Einzelnen gedacht war, ist umstritten.\r\n\r\nDie verbreitetere Auffassung scheint sich am engsten an Aristoteles anzulehnen. Nach ihr w\u00fcrde sich der Kreislauf in vier Phasen abspielen: zwei Zeiten der Bewegung, getrennt je durch Zeiten der Ruhe. Ausgehend von der vollkommenen Einheit der Elemente im Sphairos (I), w\u00fcrde man mit einer Phase der allm\u00e4hlichen Scheidung zu rechnen haben (II), die in einer v\u00f6lligen Trennung der Elemente ihre zeitweilige Ruhe f\u00e4nde (III), bis diese durch eine neue Phase der Wiedervereinigung (IV) in die Einheit des Sphairos zur\u00fcckkehrten. In jeder der beiden Bewegungsphasen w\u00fcrde sich eine Welt bilden. Aber schon die Frage, in welcher der beiden: auf dem Wege zur Trennung oder auf der R\u00fcckkehr zur Einheit, wir mit unserer jetzigen Welt uns befinden, l\u00e4sst sich offenbar durch einfache Berufung auf Aristoteles nicht entscheiden.\r\n\r\nDas Missliche bleibt n\u00e4mlich, dass die beiden Bewegungen in je nur einer Richtung laufen, in fortschreitender Trennung oder fortschreitender Einigung, jede ausgef\u00fchrte Kosmogonie aber auf beides angewiesen scheint, indem die Weltordnung im Gro\u00dfen zwar durch Trennung geschehen kann, aber die Bildung des Lebens nur durch Verbindung. Alle Versuche, sich eine ganze Welt blo\u00df aus zunehmender Scheidung \u2013 oder Verbindung \u2013 der Elemente entstehend zu denken, enden in Ungereimtheiten. So ist man gen\u00f6tigt, die Bewegungen in sich wiederum zu teilen: in eine Zeit, in der noch die Kraft der Einigung, und eine andere, in der schon die Kraft der Trennung vorherrschte \u2013 und umgekehrt \u2013, sodass aus den vier Phasen im Grunde sechs werden. Aber auch damit gewinnt man kein Bild, das einen \u00fcberzeugen k\u00f6nnte. Denn da immerhin die Kosmogonie, als die Sonderung der gro\u00dfen Weltteile, der Zoogonie, als der Verbindung der Elemente im Kleinen, vorausgehen musste, w\u00e4re sie, im Verlauf der fortschreitenden Trennung, gerade einer ersten Phase zuzuschreiben, in der die Kraft der Trennung noch schwach ist, dagegen die Erzeugung des Lebens der anderen Phase, in der sie die Oberhand gewinnt \u2013 was offenbar widersinnig ist.\r\n\r\nVersucht man aber, sich die M\u00f6glichkeiten in der r\u00fcckl\u00e4ufigen Bewegung auszudenken, so werden die Schwierigkeiten noch gr\u00f6\u00dfer: die Kraft der Trennung, allm\u00e4hlich abnehmend, w\u00fcrde in einer Phase wirken, in der sie die Elemente bereits getrennt vorf\u00e4nde; die kosmische Verteilung der Massen w\u00e4re als ein Vorgang der Vereinigung zu erkl\u00e4ren, der in einer Phase stattf\u00e4nde, wo die Kraft der Vereinigung noch gering ist, w\u00e4hrend ihre wachsende \u00dcbermacht die von ihr selbst geschaffene Verteilung wieder zerst\u00f6ren w\u00fcrde. Auch dies ist nicht weniger widersinnig als das erste, und es kann nur als eine Ausrede erscheinen, wenn uns versichert wird, eine Welt bilde sich eben jeweils in dem mittleren Punkt der Bewegungen, wo die beiden Kr\u00e4fte einander das Gleichgewicht halten.\r\n\r\nEs war darum ein entscheidender Gewinn, als v. Arnim sich von der Vierphasentheorie trennte. Tats\u00e4chlich gibt es kein Zeugnis, das uns die Annahme eines Ruhezustands der getrennten Elemente sicherte. Verzichtet man auf ihn, so r\u00fccken die beiden Phasen der wachsenden Trennung und der wachsenden Mischung der Elemente zusammen, und man wird in der ersten die Kosmogonie, in der zweiten die Zoogonie beschrieben finden.\r\n\r\nIndessen bringt auch diese Auffassung manche Misslichkeit mit sich. Aristoteles unterscheidet zwischen zwei Weltzeiten, einer der Liebe und einer des Streites, und die Zeit des Streites ist die unsere, w\u00e4hrend die der Liebe zur\u00fcckliegt. Das Schema nach v. Arnim w\u00fcrde das Umgekehrte zeigen. Freilich k\u00f6nnte man, obschon k\u00fcnstlich genug, auch von der Zeit der Trennung aus, \u00fcber den Ruhezustand im Sphairos r\u00fcckw\u00e4rts, auf den Endzustand der vorigen Welt als die Zeit der Liebe zur\u00fcckblicken; aber man w\u00fcrde sich in der Zeit der Scheidung von Himmel und Erde, nicht in der des organischen Lebens befinden. Und kann Aristoteles die gesamte Weltzeit, von der Entstehung aus dem Sphairos bis zum Untergang im Sphairos, so in zwei H\u00e4lften teilen, dass er \u2013 in dieser Reihenfolge \u2013 von der Vereinigung des Vielen zu Einem durch die Liebe und \u201edann wieder\u201c Trennung des Einen in Vieles durch den Streit redet, und von den Ruhezust\u00e4nden dazwischen? Als ob der \u00dcbergang von der Kosmogonie zur Entstehung des Lebens ein gr\u00f6\u00dferer Einschnitt w\u00e4re als die v\u00f6llige Weltvernichtung im Sphairos? Kann er sagen \u2013 wie er es tut \u2013: Empedokles l\u00e4sst die Kosmogonie durch Liebe aus? Als ob eine solche, neben der Kosmogonie durch den Streit, von der Konsequenz des Systems eigentlich gefordert w\u00e4re?\r\n\r\nIch halte es auch hier f\u00fcr einen Fehler, dass man zu geradewegs auf die Rekonstruktion des empedokleischen Systems aus war und dazu Zeugnisse und Fragmente, wie es sich bot, verwendete und zu vereinigen trachtete, anstatt bei den Zwischenfragen zu verweilen: Was hat sich Aristoteles, was seine Kommentatoren vorgestellt, und welches waren die Zeugnisse, die ihnen zur Hand waren? Auf die eigenen Auffassungen der Letzteren kann allerdings auch hier nur so weit eingegangen werden, als sie der Kl\u00e4rung der aristotelischen dienen \u2013 obschon Simplikios wichtig genug w\u00e4re, da seine neuplatonische Deutung des Sphairos und des Kosmos, als die intelligible und die sinnliche Welt, die Anschauung des Periodischen im Grunde ausschlie\u00dft. Aber die \u00c4u\u00dferungen des Aristoteles verdienen neu gepr\u00fcft zu werden. [introduction p. 7-9]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/R2gNRYN2KFgYLw8","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":198,"full_name":"H\u00f6lscher, Uvo","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1353,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"93","issue":"1","pages":"7-33"}},"sort":["Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus: Eine Nachpr\u00fcfung der Empedokles-Doxographie"]}
Title | Wenn der Steuermann ruft..." (Epiktet, Encheiridion 7) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2022 |
Journal | Hyperboreus |
Volume | 28 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 111-122 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Krämer, Benedikt |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Die vorliegende Betrachtung hat eine Interpretation angeboten, die sich eng an den Wortlaut von Kapitel 7 des Encheiridion hält. Demnach beschreibt Epiktet in der Tat zwei verschiedene Lebenssituationen zweier Menschen (oder desselben Menschen in unterschiedlichen Lebensphasen). Im ersten Fall thematisiert Epiktet die schicksalsbedingte Veränderung der Peristasen, der man entweder freiwillig oder unter Zwang Folge leisten kann. Im zweiten Fall kündigt der Ruf des Steuermanns den bevorstehenden Tod an. Das verbindende Element der Lebensbeschreibungen ist die stoische Spannungslehre. Der tugendhafte Mensch richtet sich in allen Situationen und bei allen Entscheidungen auf Gott aus und erhöht so den Tonos seines seelischen Pneumas. Im zweiten Fall spricht Epiktet aus seiner eigenen persönlichen Religiosität heraus psychagogisch wirksam die persönliche Religiosität des Lesers an. Wer den seelischen Tonos und die aufmerksame Ausrichtung auf Gott auch im fortgeschrittenen Alter bewahrt, wird den Tod – für eine gewisse Zeit – überdauern und eine Gemeinschaft mit Gott erleben. [conclusion p. 120-121] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/zHBaqqHklM9rLNZ |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1555","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1555,"authors_free":[{"id":2718,"entry_id":1555,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kr\u00e4mer, Benedikt","free_first_name":"Benedikt","free_last_name":"Kr\u00e4mer","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Wenn der Steuermann ruft...\" (Epiktet, Encheiridion 7)","main_title":{"title":"Wenn der Steuermann ruft...\" (Epiktet, Encheiridion 7)"},"abstract":"Die vorliegende Betrachtung hat eine Interpretation angeboten, die sich eng an den Wortlaut von Kapitel 7 des Encheiridion h\u00e4lt. Demnach beschreibt Epiktet in der Tat zwei verschiedene Lebenssituationen zweier Menschen (oder desselben Menschen in unterschiedlichen Lebensphasen).\r\n\r\nIm ersten Fall thematisiert Epiktet die schicksalsbedingte Ver\u00e4nderung der Peristasen, der man entweder freiwillig oder unter Zwang Folge leisten kann. Im zweiten Fall k\u00fcndigt der Ruf des Steuermanns den bevorstehenden Tod an.\r\n\r\nDas verbindende Element der Lebensbeschreibungen ist die stoische Spannungslehre. Der tugendhafte Mensch richtet sich in allen Situationen und bei allen Entscheidungen auf Gott aus und erh\u00f6ht so den Tonos seines seelischen Pneumas.\r\n\r\nIm zweiten Fall spricht Epiktet aus seiner eigenen pers\u00f6nlichen Religiosit\u00e4t heraus psychagogisch wirksam die pers\u00f6nliche Religiosit\u00e4t des Lesers an. Wer den seelischen Tonos und die aufmerksame Ausrichtung auf Gott auch im fortgeschrittenen Alter bewahrt, wird den Tod \u2013 f\u00fcr eine gewisse Zeit \u2013 \u00fcberdauern und eine Gemeinschaft mit Gott erleben.\r\n[conclusion p. 120-121]","btype":3,"date":"2022","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/zHBaqqHklM9rLNZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1555,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hyperboreus","volume":"28","issue":"1","pages":"111-122"}},"sort":["Wenn der Steuermann ruft...\" (Epiktet, Encheiridion 7)"]}
Title | Were Aristotle's Intentions in writing the De Anima Forgotten in Late Antiquity? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Journal | Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale |
Volume | 8 |
Pages | 143–157 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In general we have to conclude that while the whole "Philoponus” commentary may include a number of explicit references to the biological writings, and while the real Philoponus may often refer to medical and scientific issues, there is no systematic bias towards explaining the contents of the De anima in terms of them. There is, however, just as in the Ps-Simplicius commentary, enough said about such matters, and enough reference made to other parts of the biological corpus, to show that the commentators were still aware of the original intentions of the work — or, at the very least, behaved as if they were — even if they did not always feel bound by them. That awareness was to survive into the Middle Ages as well. [Conclusion, p. 157] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IJsW8b6iPwteKXr |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"893","_score":null,"_source":{"id":893,"authors_free":[{"id":1316,"entry_id":893,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Were Aristotle's Intentions in writing the De Anima Forgotten in Late Antiquity?","main_title":{"title":"Were Aristotle's Intentions in writing the De Anima Forgotten in Late Antiquity?"},"abstract":"In general we have to conclude that while the whole \"Philoponus\u201d commentary may include a number of explicit references to the biological writings, and while the real Philoponus may often refer to medical and scientific issues, there is no systematic bias towards explaining the contents of the De anima in terms of them. There is, however, just as in the Ps-Simplicius commentary, enough said about such matters, and \r\nenough reference made to other parts of the biological corpus, to show that the commentators were still aware of the original intentions of the work \u2014 or, at the very least, behaved as if they were \u2014 even if they did not always feel bound by them. That awareness was to survive into the Middle Ages as well. [Conclusion, p. 157]","btype":3,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IJsW8b6iPwteKXr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":893,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"143\u2013157"}},"sort":["Were Aristotle's Intentions in writing the De Anima Forgotten in Late Antiquity?"]}
Title | Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1957 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 2 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-9 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Booth, N.B. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
This article by N. B. Booth examines whether Zeno's arguments were a response to criticisms of Parmenides's principle „the One“. Despite evidence that Zeno was concerned with defending Parmenides's „One“, his arguments about plurality seem to refute the "ones" of a plurality. One possible explanation is that Zeno's arguments were used to counter criticisms of Parmenides's „One“ before he produced them. Plato's Parmenides includes a passage in which "Zeno" apologizes for his book on plurality, which has been interpreted as an answer to criticisms of Parmenides's theory, but Booth notes that Plato's characters are idealized and it is not certain that Zeno's arguments were a response to attacks. Booth looks at the arguments themselves for evidence and suggests that if some of Zeno's arguments against plural "ones" were valid against Parmenides's „One“, it would be fair to infer that they were used by hostile critics and Zeno was throwing them back in their faces. [introduction] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FZ61i36oW94Hvew |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1127","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1127,"authors_free":[{"id":1702,"entry_id":1127,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":10,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Booth, N.B.","free_first_name":"N.B.","free_last_name":"Booth","norm_person":{"id":10,"first_name":"N. B.","last_name":"Booth","full_name":"Booth, N. B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?","main_title":{"title":"Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?"},"abstract":"This article by N. B. Booth examines whether Zeno's arguments were a response to criticisms of Parmenides's principle \u201ethe One\u201c. Despite evidence that Zeno was concerned with defending Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c, his arguments about plurality seem to refute the \"ones\" of a plurality. One possible explanation is that Zeno's arguments were used to counter criticisms of Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c before he produced them. Plato's Parmenides includes a passage in which \"Zeno\" apologizes for his book on plurality, which has been interpreted as an answer to criticisms of Parmenides's theory, but Booth notes that Plato's characters are idealized and it is not certain that Zeno's arguments were a response to attacks. Booth looks at the arguments themselves for evidence and suggests that if some of Zeno's arguments against plural \"ones\" were valid against Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c, it would be fair to infer that they were used by hostile critics and Zeno was throwing them back in their faces. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1957","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FZ61i36oW94Hvew","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":10,"full_name":"Booth, N. B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1127,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"2","issue":"1","pages":"1-9"}},"sort":["Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?"]}
Title | What Has Aristotelian Dialectic to Offer a Neoplatonist? A Possible Sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius on the Categories 12,10-13,12 |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 6 |
Pages | 173-185 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Griffin, Michael J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Simplicius in Cat. 12,10-13,12 presents an interesting justifijication for the study of Aristotle’s Categories, based in Neoplatonic psychology and metaphysics. I suggest that this passage could be regarded as a testimonium to Iamblichus’ reasons for endorsing Porphyry’s selection of the Categories as an introductory text of Platonic philosophy. These Iamblichean arguments, richly grounded in Neoplatonic metaphysics and psychology, may have exercised an influence comparable to Porphyry’s. [authors abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FkVb1TMzAG6AZ5E |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"937","_score":null,"_source":{"id":937,"authors_free":[{"id":1390,"entry_id":937,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":148,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","free_first_name":"Michael J.","free_last_name":"Griffin","norm_person":{"id":148,"first_name":"Michael J.","last_name":"Griffin","full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1065676603","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What Has Aristotelian Dialectic to Offer a Neoplatonist? A Possible Sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius on the Categories 12,10-13,12","main_title":{"title":"What Has Aristotelian Dialectic to Offer a Neoplatonist? A Possible Sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius on the Categories 12,10-13,12"},"abstract":"Simplicius in Cat. 12,10-13,12 presents an interesting justif\u0133ication for the study of Aristotle\u2019s Categories, based in Neoplatonic psychology and metaphysics. I suggest that this passage could be regarded as a testimonium to Iamblichus\u2019 reasons for endorsing Porphyry\u2019s selection of the Categories as an introductory text of Platonic philosophy. These Iamblichean arguments, richly grounded in Neoplatonic metaphysics and psychology, may have exercised an influence comparable to Porphyry\u2019s. [authors abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FkVb1TMzAG6AZ5E","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":148,"full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":937,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"6","issue":"","pages":"173-185"}},"sort":["What Has Aristotelian Dialectic to Offer a Neoplatonist? A Possible Sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius on the Categories 12,10-13,12"]}
Title | What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the "Categories" |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies |
Volume | 55 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 69-108 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Griffin, Michael J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Through this sketch of the evidence, I hope to have suggested that there is, in any case, more to the bipartite theory than a compendious treatment or compression of the tripartite material by Porphyry, and that attention should be drawn to it as a separate and distinct layer of the tradition. I have also explored some of the ways in which both layers may be seen as predating Porphyry, while Porphyry’s approach to the Categories in the shorter commentary could be seen as building on an earlier source. As to our first mystery—the role of the Categories in the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, both first-century and Neoplatonic—I would like to offer a few concluding reflections on the theory itself. To be significant, a verbal expression must have an extension that qualifies as ὄν (Porph. In Cat. 90,30-91,12 – T17; as this passage shows, the extension might be infinite). If Busse is right to read ἕκαστον κατὰ ἀριθμὸν σημαίνει <ἕν> τῶν ὄντων (“each numerically distinct expression signifies one of the beings”) around 58,5-15 (T9), I think we are not merely dealing with the Stoic view that there are “somethings” that do not subsist—occasionally compared to Meinong's distinction of bestehen and existieren as represented by Bertrand Russell—but an even stronger view, akin to Owen’s positive reading of the Parmenidean maxim that “what can be spoken and thought must exist” (B2). That sort of intuition, though pre-Platonic, was always part of the Platonic tradition. Perhaps it is not so surprising, then, that we find friendly Platonist and Neopythagorean treatments in the earliest layer of the exegetical stratigraphy of the Categories, and that Porphyry should find it a suitable cornerstone around which to build later Neoplatonic ontology. The bipartite theory that I have described looks like an extensional theory of signification—as Porphyry’s language in T17 might seem to suggest, the meaning of a predicate F amounts to the set of objects said to be F. We might call this kind of view nominalist, and not very much in the spirit of Platonism as we usually conceive it. But there are also examples in the Arabic tradition that draw on the Posterior Analytics for a kind of Platonic view about the existence of eternal natures. For example (see Adamson, “Knowledge of Universals”), the tenth-century logician Ibn ʿAdī maintained that (1) terms in syllogisms directly refer (have some existing extension), (2) following the Post. An., demonstrative knowledge is never of the transient, unlimited particulars, and (3) nonetheless, demonstrative knowledge occurs; from these points, he was led to maintain that there are eternal, unchanging objects of reference. If this conclusion could be referred to as essential Platonism, then as Adamson puts it, “to some extent, Aristotle’s own words invited the Platonizing.” It seems to me compatible with Alexander’s view, if I understand his De anima rightly (especially around p. 90), that there are eternal natures that may or may not be predicated of many particulars, a view about which Sharples has also written. My suggestion here, then, is just that the interpretation of the Organon that facilitates this line of thinking goes back to a very early layer of commentary on the Categories. Modern philosophy arguably also provides examples of how a theory of direct reference can inspire different flavors of almost Platonic realism, especially when the observable infinity of particular objects of acquaintance is coupled with the observed feasibility of human knowledge. Bertrand Russell in 1945 criticized Porphyry’s work on the Categories (which he had, I suppose, indirectly) by wielding the same weapons that had served against his interpretation of Meinong in 1904. Russell credited Porphyry’s alleged misreading of Aristotle with the excessively “metaphysical” temper of subsequent logic (HWP 1945:472), including entrenched realism about genera and species and “endless bad metaphysics about unity” (198). But it was the early Russell himself who, in 1903, made every denoting phrase directly denote an existing entity and argued that “anything that can be mentioned is sure to be a term...” that has unity and in some sense exists (43). In fact, Russell was led by his pre-1905 account of denoting to frame the problem of knowledge in terms strikingly similar to our bipartite theory (see T27a): the “inmost secret of our power to deal with infinity” lies in the fact that “an infinitely complex object... can certainly not be manipulated by the human intelligence; but infinite collections, owing to the notion of denoting, can be manipulated.” Russell later eliminated (what he took to be) the Meinongian plurality of denoted beings implied by his own earlier logical realism, using his theory of descriptions as an instrument; thus the later Russell, who still maintained that “we could not acquire knowledge of absolute particulars,” came to hold that our words denote just adjectives or relations (T27b). Porphyry—and arguably many Peripatetics before him—took an analogous temperament in precisely the opposite direction. Both held, in their own way, that an ideal language would carve nature at the joints; and the semantic building blocks of Porphyry's ideal language, as I have suggested here, were rooted in a long tradition of Peripatetic thought about what Aristotle’s Categories categorize, and in particular how unity could be imposed on plurality to make sense of the world. But whereas Russell’s language ultimately aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, a Moorean world of common sense and acquaintance, Porphyry’s categorical language aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, the world of the Enneads and the existence of some eternal natures. Peripatetic and Porphyrian logicism was not Russell’s, and a similar interest in the ontological implications of their logical apparatus led to very different results at the dawn of analytic philosophy and at the dawn of Neoplatonism: by dispensing with several components of Aristotle’s theory of predication that Porphyry had held to be central, Russell had toppled the giant from whose shoulders Porphyry had spied (and at any rate hoped to teach his pupils to spy) Plotinus’s ontology. [conclusion p. 90-92] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/0V3z3uBVFDC712w |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1148","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1148,"authors_free":[{"id":1723,"entry_id":1148,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":148,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","free_first_name":"Michael J.","free_last_name":"Griffin","norm_person":{"id":148,"first_name":"Michael J.","last_name":"Griffin","full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1065676603","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\"","main_title":{"title":"What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\""},"abstract":"Through this sketch of the evidence, I hope to have suggested that there is, in any case, more to the bipartite theory than a compendious treatment or compression of the tripartite material by Porphyry, and that attention should be drawn to it as a separate and distinct layer of the tradition. I have also explored some of the ways in which both layers may be seen as predating Porphyry, while Porphyry\u2019s approach to the Categories in the shorter commentary could be seen as building on an earlier source.\r\nAs to our first mystery\u2014the role of the Categories in the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, both first-century and Neoplatonic\u2014I would like to offer a few concluding reflections on the theory itself. To be significant, a verbal expression must have an extension that qualifies as \u1f44\u03bd (Porph. In Cat. 90,30-91,12 \u2013 T17; as this passage shows, the extension might be infinite). If Busse is right to read \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9 <\u1f15\u03bd> \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd (\u201ceach numerically distinct expression signifies one of the beings\u201d) around 58,5-15 (T9), I think we are not merely dealing with the Stoic view that there are \u201csomethings\u201d that do not subsist\u2014occasionally compared to Meinong's distinction of bestehen and existieren as represented by Bertrand Russell\u2014but an even stronger view, akin to Owen\u2019s positive reading of the Parmenidean maxim that \u201cwhat can be spoken and thought must exist\u201d (B2). That sort of intuition, though pre-Platonic, was always part of the Platonic tradition.\r\nPerhaps it is not so surprising, then, that we find friendly Platonist and Neopythagorean treatments in the earliest layer of the exegetical stratigraphy of the Categories, and that Porphyry should find it a suitable cornerstone around which to build later Neoplatonic ontology.\r\nThe bipartite theory that I have described looks like an extensional theory of signification\u2014as Porphyry\u2019s language in T17 might seem to suggest, the meaning of a predicate F amounts to the set of objects said to be F. We might call this kind of view nominalist, and not very much in the spirit of Platonism as we usually conceive it. But there are also examples in the Arabic tradition that draw on the Posterior Analytics for a kind of Platonic view about the existence of eternal natures.\r\nFor example (see Adamson, \u201cKnowledge of Universals\u201d), the tenth-century logician Ibn \u02bfAd\u012b maintained that (1) terms in syllogisms directly refer (have some existing extension), (2) following the Post. An., demonstrative knowledge is never of the transient, unlimited particulars, and (3) nonetheless, demonstrative knowledge occurs; from these points, he was led to maintain that there are eternal, unchanging objects of reference. If this conclusion could be referred to as essential Platonism, then as Adamson puts it, \u201cto some extent, Aristotle\u2019s own words invited the Platonizing.\u201d\r\nIt seems to me compatible with Alexander\u2019s view, if I understand his De anima rightly (especially around p. 90), that there are eternal natures that may or may not be predicated of many particulars, a view about which Sharples has also written. My suggestion here, then, is just that the interpretation of the Organon that facilitates this line of thinking goes back to a very early layer of commentary on the Categories.\r\nModern philosophy arguably also provides examples of how a theory of direct reference can inspire different flavors of almost Platonic realism, especially when the observable infinity of particular objects of acquaintance is coupled with the observed feasibility of human knowledge.\r\nBertrand Russell in 1945 criticized Porphyry\u2019s work on the Categories (which he had, I suppose, indirectly) by wielding the same weapons that had served against his interpretation of Meinong in 1904. Russell credited Porphyry\u2019s alleged misreading of Aristotle with the excessively \u201cmetaphysical\u201d temper of subsequent logic (HWP 1945:472), including entrenched realism about genera and species and \u201cendless bad metaphysics about unity\u201d (198).\r\nBut it was the early Russell himself who, in 1903, made every denoting phrase directly denote an existing entity and argued that \u201canything that can be mentioned is sure to be a term...\u201d that has unity and in some sense exists (43).\r\nIn fact, Russell was led by his pre-1905 account of denoting to frame the problem of knowledge in terms strikingly similar to our bipartite theory (see T27a): the \u201cinmost secret of our power to deal with infinity\u201d lies in the fact that \u201can infinitely complex object... can certainly not be manipulated by the human intelligence; but infinite collections, owing to the notion of denoting, can be manipulated.\u201d\r\nRussell later eliminated (what he took to be) the Meinongian plurality of denoted beings implied by his own earlier logical realism, using his theory of descriptions as an instrument; thus the later Russell, who still maintained that \u201cwe could not acquire knowledge of absolute particulars,\u201d came to hold that our words denote just adjectives or relations (T27b).\r\nPorphyry\u2014and arguably many Peripatetics before him\u2014took an analogous temperament in precisely the opposite direction. Both held, in their own way, that an ideal language would carve nature at the joints; and the semantic building blocks of Porphyry's ideal language, as I have suggested here, were rooted in a long tradition of Peripatetic thought about what Aristotle\u2019s Categories categorize, and in particular how unity could be imposed on plurality to make sense of the world.\r\nBut whereas Russell\u2019s language ultimately aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, a Moorean world of common sense and acquaintance, Porphyry\u2019s categorical language aimed to talk about, and gain certainty about, the world of the Enneads and the existence of some eternal natures.\r\nPeripatetic and Porphyrian logicism was not Russell\u2019s, and a similar interest in the ontological implications of their logical apparatus led to very different results at the dawn of analytic philosophy and at the dawn of Neoplatonism: by dispensing with several components of Aristotle\u2019s theory of predication that Porphyry had held to be central, Russell had toppled the giant from whose shoulders Porphyry had spied (and at any rate hoped to teach his pupils to spy) Plotinus\u2019s ontology.\r\n [conclusion p. 90-92]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/0V3z3uBVFDC712w","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":148,"full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1148,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies","volume":"55","issue":"1","pages":"69-108"}},"sort":["What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\""]}
Title | What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 80 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 261-287 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Baltzly, Dirk |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In this paper, I consider Proclus’ arguments against Aristotle on the composition of the heavens from the fifth element, the aether. Proclus argues for the Platonic view (Timaeus 40a) that the heavenly bodies are composed of all four elements, with fire predominating. I think that his discussion exhibits all the methodological features that we find admirable in Aristotle’s largely a priori proto-science. Proclus’ treatment of the question in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus also provides the fullest statement of a neoplatonic alternative to the Aristotelian theory of the elements. As such, it forms a significant part of a still largely underappreciated neoplatonic legacy to the history of science. [authors abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/tOMemjPbvEoCytl |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"962","_score":null,"_source":{"id":962,"authors_free":[{"id":1444,"entry_id":962,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":107,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltzly, Dirk","free_first_name":"Dirk","free_last_name":"Baltzly","norm_person":{"id":107,"first_name":"Dirk","last_name":"Baltzly","full_name":"Baltzly, Dirk","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1150414960","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element","main_title":{"title":"What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element"},"abstract":"In this paper, I consider Proclus\u2019 arguments against Aristotle on the composition of the \r\nheavens from the fifth element, the aether. Proclus argues for the Platonic view (Timaeus \r\n40a) that the heavenly bodies are composed of all four elements, with fire predominating. \r\nI think that his discussion exhibits all the methodological features that we find admirable \r\nin Aristotle\u2019s largely a priori proto-science. Proclus\u2019 treatment of the question in his \r\ncommentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus also provides the fullest statement of a neoplatonic \r\nalternative to the Aristotelian theory of the elements. As such, it forms a significant part of \r\na still largely underappreciated neoplatonic legacy to the history of science. [authors abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tOMemjPbvEoCytl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":107,"full_name":"Baltzly, Dirk","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":962,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Australasian Journal of Philosophy","volume":"80","issue":"3","pages":"261-287"}},"sort":["What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element"]}
Title | What is Platonism? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Journal of the History of Philosophy |
Volume | 43 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 253-276 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of “top-downism.” So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there are at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be similarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1317","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1317,"authors_free":[{"id":1951,"entry_id":1317,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What is Platonism?","main_title":{"title":"What is Platonism?"},"abstract":"My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of \u201ctop-downism.\u201d So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there\r\nare at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be\r\nsimilarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1317,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the History of Philosophy","volume":"43","issue":"3","pages":"253-276"}},"sort":["What is Platonism?"]}
Title | Where to Live the Philosophical Life in the Sixth Century? Damascius, Simplicius, and the Return from Persia |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 285-315 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Watts, Edward Jay |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The closing of the Neoplatonic school in Athens by Justinian in 532 was not the end of classical philosophy, for when they returned to the Empire from Persia two years later the philosophers did not need to reconstitute the school at Harran or at any particular city in order to continue their philosophical activities. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EoZ3BSOdBPuEnet |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"441","_score":null,"_source":{"id":441,"authors_free":[{"id":593,"entry_id":441,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":357,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","free_first_name":"Edward Jay","free_last_name":"Watts","norm_person":{"id":357,"first_name":"Edward Jay","last_name":"Watts","full_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131826530","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Where to Live the Philosophical Life in the Sixth Century? Damascius, Simplicius, and the Return from Persia","main_title":{"title":"Where to Live the Philosophical Life in the Sixth Century? Damascius, Simplicius, and the Return from Persia"},"abstract":"The closing of the Neoplatonic school in Athens by Justinian in 532 was not the end of classical philosophy, for when they returned to the Empire from Persia two years later the philosophers did not need to reconstitute the school at Harran or at any particular city in order to continue their philosophical activities. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EoZ3BSOdBPuEnet","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":357,"full_name":"Watts, Edward Jay","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":441,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies","volume":"45","issue":"3","pages":"285-315"}},"sort":["Where to Live the Philosophical Life in the Sixth Century? Damascius, Simplicius, and the Return from Persia"]}
Title | Where was Simplicius? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1992 |
Journal | The Journal of Hellenic Studies |
Volume | 112 |
Pages | 143 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Foulkes, Paul |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987, reviewed in JHS cx [1990] 244–45), the editor, Mme I. Hadot, in the first part of the biographical introduction, cites Agathias Hist. ii 31.4. This is usually taken to show that the Neoplatonists, who had fled to the Persian court when Justinian closed down the Academy in 529, went back to Athens after 532. That view, she holds, rests on a misreading of the text. However, she herself misconstrues kath’ heautous as "selon leur choix": that is, on returning from exile to their own accustomed places, these men should henceforth live without fear as they might choose. To yield that version, the Greek would have to be kath’ autous. The actual expression means "amongst themselves": they might philosophize, but not in public. That a touch of private heterodoxy amongst the learned few is harmless if it does not stir up the ignorant many was well understood, indeed explicitly so later, in Islam and medieval Christianity. Where, then, did the returned exiles settle? We do not know. That the Persian king sought to ensure protection for them in their previous habitat neither shows nor refutes that they went back there or to any other nameable place. Mme Hadot certainly cannot well enlist M. Tardieu’s inference, in the second part of the introduction, from Simplicius on the four calendars (Comm. in Arist. Graeca x 875.19–22). Simplicius there states that "we |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/YllEyDkwMYgJ7Wa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"901","_score":null,"_source":{"id":901,"authors_free":[{"id":1330,"entry_id":901,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":121,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Foulkes, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Foulkes","norm_person":{"id":121,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Foulkes","full_name":"Foulkes, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/127222294","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Where was Simplicius?","main_title":{"title":"Where was Simplicius?"},"abstract":"In Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987, reviewed in JHS cx [1990] 244\u201345), the editor, Mme I. Hadot, in the first part of the biographical introduction, cites Agathias Hist. ii 31.4. This is usually taken to show that the Neoplatonists, who had fled to the Persian court when Justinian closed down the Academy in 529, went back to Athens after 532. That view, she holds, rests on a misreading of the text. However, she herself misconstrues kath\u2019 heautous as \"selon leur choix\": that is, on returning from exile to their own accustomed places, these men should henceforth live without fear as they might choose. To yield that version, the Greek would have to be kath\u2019 autous. The actual expression means \"amongst themselves\": they might philosophize, but not in public.\r\n\r\nThat a touch of private heterodoxy amongst the learned few is harmless if it does not stir up the ignorant many was well understood, indeed explicitly so later, in Islam and medieval Christianity.\r\n\r\nWhere, then, did the returned exiles settle? We do not know. That the Persian king sought to ensure protection for them in their previous habitat neither shows nor refutes that they went back there or to any other nameable place.\r\n\r\nMme Hadot certainly cannot well enlist M. Tardieu\u2019s inference, in the second part of the introduction, from Simplicius on the four calendars (Comm. in Arist. Graeca x 875.19\u201322). Simplicius there states that \"we <humans> posit the beginning of the year\" (h\u00eameis de h\u00eameras poioumetha arch\u00eas eniautou) to fall at four times, namely the summer solstice, as at Athens; the autumnal equinox, as in the then province of Asia; the winter solstice, as with the Romans; or the vernal equinox, as with the Arabs and Damascenes.\r\n\r\nIn context, Simplicius here contrasts beginnings that are natural (physei) and imposed (thesei). Adding the sentence before and after the one on the four types of year, the passage runs thus: \"As regards time, flow, or becoming, the natural beginning comes first. We ourselves put the beginning of the year at (1) or (2) or (3) or (4). Likewise, those who say that a month begins at full moon or new moon will be imposing this.\" The passage figures in his comments on Arist. Ph. 226b34\u2013227a10, on consecutiveness.\r\n\r\nSimplicius never says that all four types of year were in use at one place, nor does his text imply it. Of the two solstitial years, Academics would use the summer one from tradition, while the winter one is Roman imperial. The equinoctial years were used in the areas stated.\r\n\r\nIf the equinoctial and Roman calendars existed together in some place where the Neoplatonists did settle, then in that place there must have been four calendars. Clearly, though, the reverse inference is invalid: that the four calendars co-existed does not prove the presence of Neoplatonists. The Athenian calendar may have existed there for other reasons: its being there is necessary, but not sufficient, for the Neoplatonists\u2019 presence.\r\n\r\nAs to Harran (Carrhae), which Tardieu argues is where Simplicius settled, Arab sources confirm that the equinoctial calendars and the Roman one did exist there. We have no independent evidence that the Athenian one did. We have only Simplicius\u2019 statement, if he was at Harran. That, however, is precisely what must be established. To cite the four-calendar passage as proof that he was, begs the question and ignores the context.\r\n\r\nWhere Simplicius wrote his commentaries thus remains unclear, for lack of evidence. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YllEyDkwMYgJ7Wa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":121,"full_name":"Foulkes, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":901,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"112","issue":"","pages":"143"}},"sort":["Where was Simplicius?"]}
Title | Which ‘Athenodorus’ commented on Aristotle's "Categories"? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2013 |
Journal | The Classical Quarterly |
Volume | 63 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 199-208 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Griffin, Michael J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The principate of Augustus coincided with a surge of interest in the short Aristotelian treatise which we now entitle Categories, contributing to its later installation at the outset of the philosophical curriculum and its traditional function as an introduction to logic. Thanks in part to remarks made by Plutarch (Sulla 26.1–2) and Porphyry (Vita Plotini 24.7), the origin of this interest has often been traced to Andronicus of Rhodes: his catalogue (πίνακες) and publication of the Aristotelian corpus began with the Categories and may have drawn fresh attention to a previously obscure treatise. But the later Neoplatonic sources name several other philosophers who also discussed the Categories and played an important role in crafting its interpretation during the first centuries of our era. For example, the Neoplatonist Simplicius discusses the views of Stoics and Platonists who questioned the Categories’ value as a treatment of grammar or ontology, while others defended its usefulness as an introduction to logic. These early debates, as these later sources suggest, exercised a lasting influence on the shape of subsequent philosophy and philosophical education within and beyond the Aristotelian tradition. In this note, I would like to revisit the identity of one of the Categories’ earliest critics, a Stoic identified only as ‘Athenodorus’ in the pages of Dexippus, Porphyry, and Simplicius. There is a strong consensus identifying this ‘Athenodorus’ with Athenodorus Calvus, a tutor of Octavian and correspondent of Cicero, roughly contemporary with Andronicus of Rhodes. I want to suggest several reasons for reconsidering this identification. In particular, I want to argue that a certain Athenodorus mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (7.68) is, on philosophical grounds, a compelling candidate for identification with the critic of the Categories, and that Diogenes’ Athenodorus is relatively unlikely to be Calvus. As an alternative to Calvus, I tentatively advance the possibility that our Athenodorus may belong to a generation of Stoic philosophers who conducted work on the Categories in the Hellenistic period, prior to the activity of Andronicus in the first century, and under the title Before the Topics (see Simpl. in Cat. 379.9, who observes that Andronicus of Rhodes was aware of this title and rejected it). Such a story runs counter to the older consensus, now considerably less certain, that Andronicus was the first philosopher to draw serious attention to the Categories after it had languished for centuries out of circulation. Instead, we might regard Andronicus’ relocation of the text to the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum under the new title Categories as a relatively late chapter in an ongoing tradition of commentary and polemic. In what follows, I suggest some possible motives for Andronicus’ relocation of the Categories, if it can be viewed as a response to earlier criticism. [introduction p. 199-200] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/IbfU0uOFgfzLjDG |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"821","_score":null,"_source":{"id":821,"authors_free":[{"id":1222,"entry_id":821,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":148,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","free_first_name":"Michael J.","free_last_name":"Griffin","norm_person":{"id":148,"first_name":"Michael J.","last_name":"Griffin","full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1065676603","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Which \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 commented on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?","main_title":{"title":"Which \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 commented on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?"},"abstract":"The principate of Augustus coincided with a surge of interest in the short Aristotelian treatise which we now entitle Categories, contributing to its later installation at the outset of the philosophical curriculum and its traditional function as an introduction to logic. Thanks in part to remarks made by Plutarch (Sulla 26.1\u20132) and Porphyry (Vita Plotini 24.7), the origin of this interest has often been traced to Andronicus of Rhodes: his catalogue (\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c2) and publication of the Aristotelian corpus began with the Categories and may have drawn fresh attention to a previously obscure treatise. But the later Neoplatonic sources name several other philosophers who also discussed the Categories and played an important role in crafting its interpretation during the first centuries of our era. For example, the Neoplatonist Simplicius discusses the views of Stoics and Platonists who questioned the Categories\u2019 value as a treatment of grammar or ontology, while others defended its usefulness as an introduction to logic. These early debates, as these later sources suggest, exercised a lasting influence on the shape of subsequent philosophy and philosophical education within and beyond the Aristotelian tradition.\r\n\r\nIn this note, I would like to revisit the identity of one of the Categories\u2019 earliest critics, a Stoic identified only as \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 in the pages of Dexippus, Porphyry, and Simplicius. There is a strong consensus identifying this \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 with Athenodorus Calvus, a tutor of Octavian and correspondent of Cicero, roughly contemporary with Andronicus of Rhodes. I want to suggest several reasons for reconsidering this identification. In particular, I want to argue that a certain Athenodorus mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (7.68) is, on philosophical grounds, a compelling candidate for identification with the critic of the Categories, and that Diogenes\u2019 Athenodorus is relatively unlikely to be Calvus. As an alternative to Calvus, I tentatively advance the possibility that our Athenodorus may belong to a generation of Stoic philosophers who conducted work on the Categories in the Hellenistic period, prior to the activity of Andronicus in the first century, and under the title Before the Topics (see Simpl. in Cat. 379.9, who observes that Andronicus of Rhodes was aware of this title and rejected it).\r\n\r\nSuch a story runs counter to the older consensus, now considerably less certain, that Andronicus was the first philosopher to draw serious attention to the Categories after it had languished for centuries out of circulation. Instead, we might regard Andronicus\u2019 relocation of the text to the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum under the new title Categories as a relatively late chapter in an ongoing tradition of commentary and polemic. In what follows, I suggest some possible motives for Andronicus\u2019 relocation of the Categories, if it can be viewed as a response to earlier criticism. [introduction p. 199-200]","btype":3,"date":"2013","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/IbfU0uOFgfzLjDG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":148,"full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":821,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"63","issue":"1","pages":"199-208"}},"sort":["Which \u2018Athenodorus\u2019 commented on Aristotle's \"Categories\"?"]}
Title | Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)? |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2003 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
Volume | 146 |
Issue | 3/4 |
Pages | 328-345 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kouremenos, Theokritos |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In Cael. 3.1 Aristotle argues against those who posit that all bodies are generated because they are made from, and dissolve into, planes, namely Plato and perhaps other members of the Academy who subscribed to the Timaeus physics (cf. Simplicius, In Cael. 561,8-11 [Heiberg]). In his Timaeus Plato assigns to each of the traditional Empedoclean elements a regular polyhedron: the tetrahedron or pyramid to fire, the cube to earth, the octahedron to air, and the icosahedron to water. Each regular polyhedron can be anachronistically called a molecule of the element in question, and, as is suggested by the analogy between the regular solids and molecules, Plato also posits that the regular polyhedra are made from 'atoms': the faces of the tetrahedron, octahedron, and icosahedron are made from scalene right-angled triangles, whose hypotenuses are double the length of the smaller sides, whereas the faces of the cube consist of isosceles right-angled triangles. Since fire, air, and water consist of polyhedral molecules whose elementary constituents are of the same type, they can freely change into one another. Any of these three elements turns into another when its molecules break down into their elementary constituents, and these building blocks recombine into molecules of another element. Aristotle has in mind the reshuffling of elementary triangles when he refers to all bodies being made from, and dissolving into, planes. His first objection to this fundamental assumption in Plato's element theory is set out in Cael. 299a2-6: as is easily seen, constructing bodies from planes runs counter to mathematics whose 'hypotheses' should be accepted, unless one comes up with something more convincing. Contrary to Aristotle's claim, it is not easy to see why Plato's element theory runs counter to mathematics because it constructs the polyhedral molecules from the triangular planes in the faces of these molecules. Aristotle presumably implies that this violates some mathematical 'hypotheses' which should be better left as they stand but does not explain what the 'hypotheses' in question are. Nor is it any clearer whether Plato commits himself to the rejection of these 'hypotheses' or some aspect of Plato's element theory entails their rejection by Aristotle's own lights. I will attempt to answer these questions after a critique of Simplicius who identifies the hypotheses in Cael. 299a2-6 with the Euclidean definitions of point, line, and plane but also thinks that Aristotle sets out further mathematical objections to Plato's element theory in Cael. 299a6-11: contrary to the commentator, there is only one such objection in Cael. 299a6-11, namely that Plato's element theory introduces indivisible lines, and, as is suggested by an allusion to Cael. 299a2-6 in the treatise On Indivisible Lines, the same objection is also implicit in Cael. 299a2-6. That in this passage Plato's element theory is said to conflict with mathematics because it entails the existence of indivisible lines is borne out not only by Cael. 299a6-11 but also by 299a13-17. After interpreting the 'hypotheses' in Cael. 299a2-6 consistently with this fact, I will show that, when Aristotle charges Plato with introducing various sorts of indivisibles in his element theory, he actually brings out the untenability of this theory by arguing that Plato ought to introduce such entities which are, though, ruled out by mathematics. Aristotle's implicit objection in Cael. 299a2-6 follows from a similar argument which I will attempt to reconstruct in the final sections of this paper. [introduction p. 328-329] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/9EHiPSWuW9oh0c4 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"984","_score":null,"_source":{"id":984,"authors_free":[{"id":1485,"entry_id":984,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":219,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","free_first_name":"Theokritos","free_last_name":"Kouremenos","norm_person":{"id":219,"first_name":"Theokritos","last_name":"Kouremenos","full_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/113872224","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?","main_title":{"title":"Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?"},"abstract":"In Cael. 3.1 Aristotle argues against those who posit that all bodies are generated because they are made from, and dissolve into, planes, namely Plato and perhaps other members of the Academy who subscribed to the Timaeus physics (cf. Simplicius, In Cael. 561,8-11 [Heiberg]). In his Timaeus Plato assigns to each of the traditional Empedoclean elements a regular polyhedron: the tetrahedron or pyramid to fire, the cube to earth, the octahedron to air, and the icosahedron to water. Each regular polyhedron can be anachronistically called a molecule of the element in question, and, as is suggested by the analogy between the regular solids and molecules, Plato also posits that the regular polyhedra are made from 'atoms': the faces of the tetrahedron, octahedron, and icosahedron are made from scalene right-angled triangles, whose hypotenuses are double the length of the smaller sides, whereas the faces of the cube consist of isosceles right-angled triangles.\r\n\r\nSince fire, air, and water consist of polyhedral molecules whose elementary constituents are of the same type, they can freely change into one another. Any of these three elements turns into another when its molecules break down into their elementary constituents, and these building blocks recombine into molecules of another element. Aristotle has in mind the reshuffling of elementary triangles when he refers to all bodies being made from, and dissolving into, planes. His first objection to this fundamental assumption in Plato's element theory is set out in Cael. 299a2-6: as is easily seen, constructing bodies from planes runs counter to mathematics whose 'hypotheses' should be accepted, unless one comes up with something more convincing.\r\n\r\nContrary to Aristotle's claim, it is not easy to see why Plato's element theory runs counter to mathematics because it constructs the polyhedral molecules from the triangular planes in the faces of these molecules. Aristotle presumably implies that this violates some mathematical 'hypotheses' which should be better left as they stand but does not explain what the 'hypotheses' in question are. Nor is it any clearer whether Plato commits himself to the rejection of these 'hypotheses' or some aspect of Plato's element theory entails their rejection by Aristotle's own lights. I will attempt to answer these questions after a critique of Simplicius who identifies the hypotheses in Cael. 299a2-6 with the Euclidean definitions of point, line, and plane but also thinks that Aristotle sets out further mathematical objections to Plato's element theory in Cael. 299a6-11: contrary to the commentator, there is only one such objection in Cael. 299a6-11, namely that Plato's element theory introduces indivisible lines, and, as is suggested by an allusion to Cael. 299a2-6 in the treatise On Indivisible Lines, the same objection is also implicit in Cael. 299a2-6.\r\n\r\nThat in this passage Plato's element theory is said to conflict with mathematics because it entails the existence of indivisible lines is borne out not only by Cael. 299a6-11 but also by 299a13-17. After interpreting the 'hypotheses' in Cael. 299a2-6 consistently with this fact, I will show that, when Aristotle charges Plato with introducing various sorts of indivisibles in his element theory, he actually brings out the untenability of this theory by arguing that Plato ought to introduce such entities which are, though, ruled out by mathematics. Aristotle's implicit objection in Cael. 299a2-6 follows from a similar argument which I will attempt to reconstruct in the final sections of this paper. [introduction p. 328-329]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9EHiPSWuW9oh0c4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":219,"full_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":984,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"146","issue":"3\/4","pages":"328-345"}},"sort":["Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?"]}
Title | Xenarchus, Alexander, and Simplicius on Simple Motions, Bodies and Magnitudes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2002 |
Journal | Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies |
Volume | 46 |
Pages | 19-42 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Hankinson, Robert J. |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Aristotle accounted for the fundamental dynamics of the cosmos in terms of the tendencies of the various elements to distinct types of natural motions, and (in the case of the sublunary elements) to rest in their natural places. In so doing, he introduced a fifth element, the ether, with a natural and unceasing tendency to revolve, as the matter for the heavenly bodies. This paper deals with some of the objections raised to this model, and to its conceptual underpinnings, raised by Xenarchus of Seleuceia, an unorthodox Peripatetic of the 1 st century BC, and of the attempts of later philosophers to rebut them. In so doing it casts light on a little-known, but historically important and interesting, episode in the development of physical dynamics. [Author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CTZqeCQH7oDhwXB |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"576","_score":null,"_source":{"id":576,"authors_free":[{"id":818,"entry_id":576,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":168,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hankinson, Robert J.","free_first_name":"Robert J.","free_last_name":"Hankinson","norm_person":{"id":168,"first_name":"Robert J.","last_name":"Hankinson","full_name":"Hankinson, Robert J.","short_ident":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/129477370","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Xenarchus, Alexander, and Simplicius on Simple Motions, Bodies and Magnitudes","main_title":{"title":"Xenarchus, Alexander, and Simplicius on Simple Motions, Bodies and Magnitudes"},"abstract":"Aristotle accounted for the fundamental dynamics of the cosmos in terms of the tendencies of the various elements to distinct types of natural motions, and (in the case of the sublunary elements) to rest in their natural places. In so doing, he introduced a fifth element, the ether, with a natural and unceasing tendency to revolve, as the matter for the heavenly bodies. This paper deals with some of the objections raised to this model, and to its conceptual underpinnings, raised by Xenarchus of Seleuceia, an unorthodox Peripatetic of the 1 st century BC, and of the attempts of later philosophers to rebut them. In so doing it casts light on a little-known, but historically important and interesting, episode in the development of physical dynamics. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CTZqeCQH7oDhwXB","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":168,"full_name":"Hankinson, Robert J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":576,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies","volume":"46","issue":"","pages":"19-42"}},"sort":["Xenarchus, Alexander, and Simplicius on Simple Motions, Bodies and Magnitudes"]}
Title | Y a-t-Il des catégories stoïciennes? |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 1991 |
Journal | Revue Internationale de Philosophie |
Volume | 45 |
Issue | 178 (3) |
Pages | 220-244 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Duhot, Jean-Joël |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Il n'y a donc pas de catégories stoïciennes. Le substrat, le tel, l'étant en quelque manière et l'étant en quelque manière relatif tracent une sorte de vecteur ontologique qui traverse chaque être. Ces quatre concepts n'indiquent pas des états ou des niveaux d'être, ils permettent d'articuler, à des niveaux différents, l'unité et la multiplicité, l'identité et la différence, le corps et l'incorporel, à l'intérieur ou à propos de chaque être. Ils ne visent pas à décrire de façon exhaustive les niveaux possibles de l'être, auquel cas ils auraient été plus nombreux. Ils constituent donc non pas une description, un tableau, mais un outil : ce sont des concepts opératoires grâce auxquels se résolvent les problèmes de l'un et du multiple. Ils sont au service d'une ontologie qui relie chaque être à l'essence unique que constitue la matière première. C'est sans doute leur caractère opératoire et non descriptif qui explique que les genres stoïciens ne soient pas aussi nombreux que les niveaux de cette échelle de l'être qu'on peut en déduire. L'objet du Portique n'était pas de dresser un inventaire ontologique mais de disposer des outils nécessaires au fonctionnement de l'ontologie, c'est-à-dire permettant de rattacher toute multiplicité à une unité et tout être à une essence, en l'occurrence l'Essence qu'est ὑποστασία, et ces outils, qui sont les quatre genres, n'ont pas à être plus nombreux en vertu d'un simple principe d'économie. Ici encore par conséquent la comparaison avec les catégories aristotéliciennes est trompeuse : les catégories visent à l'exhaustivité dans le cadre d'une ontologie descriptive horizontale, les genres stoïciens, qui apparaissent évidemment sur ce plan très lacunaires, ne sont pas moins exhaustifs, mais comme instruments d'une ontologie opératoire verticale. Et en tant qu'instruments d'une ontologie, il était logique qu'ils fussent aussi peu nombreux que possible, d'où découle leur polyvalence, ou, si on préfère, leur ambiguïté. [conclusion p. 243-244] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/KbIXmexaLDoeiRj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"599","_score":null,"_source":{"id":599,"authors_free":[{"id":850,"entry_id":599,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":72,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Duhot, Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","free_first_name":"Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","free_last_name":"Duhot","norm_person":{"id":72,"first_name":"Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","last_name":"Duhot","full_name":"Duhot, Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1048420493","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Y a-t-Il des cat\u00e9gories sto\u00efciennes?","main_title":{"title":"Y a-t-Il des cat\u00e9gories sto\u00efciennes?"},"abstract":"Il n'y a donc pas de cat\u00e9gories sto\u00efciennes. Le substrat, le tel, l'\u00e9tant en quelque mani\u00e8re et l'\u00e9tant en quelque mani\u00e8re relatif tracent une sorte de vecteur ontologique qui traverse chaque \u00eatre. Ces quatre concepts n'indiquent pas des \u00e9tats ou des niveaux d'\u00eatre, ils permettent d'articuler, \u00e0 des niveaux diff\u00e9rents, l'unit\u00e9 et la multiplicit\u00e9, l'identit\u00e9 et la diff\u00e9rence, le corps et l'incorporel, \u00e0 l'int\u00e9rieur ou \u00e0 propos de chaque \u00eatre. Ils ne visent pas \u00e0 d\u00e9crire de fa\u00e7on exhaustive les niveaux possibles de l'\u00eatre, auquel cas ils auraient \u00e9t\u00e9 plus nombreux.\r\n\r\nIls constituent donc non pas une description, un tableau, mais un outil : ce sont des concepts op\u00e9ratoires gr\u00e2ce auxquels se r\u00e9solvent les probl\u00e8mes de l'un et du multiple. Ils sont au service d'une ontologie qui relie chaque \u00eatre \u00e0 l'essence unique que constitue la mati\u00e8re premi\u00e8re.\r\n\r\nC'est sans doute leur caract\u00e8re op\u00e9ratoire et non descriptif qui explique que les genres sto\u00efciens ne soient pas aussi nombreux que les niveaux de cette \u00e9chelle de l'\u00eatre qu'on peut en d\u00e9duire. L'objet du Portique n'\u00e9tait pas de dresser un inventaire ontologique mais de disposer des outils n\u00e9cessaires au fonctionnement de l'ontologie, c'est-\u00e0-dire permettant de rattacher toute multiplicit\u00e9 \u00e0 une unit\u00e9 et tout \u00eatre \u00e0 une essence, en l'occurrence l'Essence qu'est \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, et ces outils, qui sont les quatre genres, n'ont pas \u00e0 \u00eatre plus nombreux en vertu d'un simple principe d'\u00e9conomie.\r\n\r\nIci encore par cons\u00e9quent la comparaison avec les cat\u00e9gories aristot\u00e9liciennes est trompeuse : les cat\u00e9gories visent \u00e0 l'exhaustivit\u00e9 dans le cadre d'une ontologie descriptive horizontale, les genres sto\u00efciens, qui apparaissent \u00e9videmment sur ce plan tr\u00e8s lacunaires, ne sont pas moins exhaustifs, mais comme instruments d'une ontologie op\u00e9ratoire verticale. Et en tant qu'instruments d'une ontologie, il \u00e9tait logique qu'ils fussent aussi peu nombreux que possible, d'o\u00f9 d\u00e9coule leur polyvalence, ou, si on pr\u00e9f\u00e8re, leur ambigu\u00eft\u00e9. [conclusion p. 243-244]","btype":3,"date":"1991","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KbIXmexaLDoeiRj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":72,"full_name":"Duhot, Jean-Jo\u00ebl ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":599,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Internationale de Philosophie","volume":"45","issue":"178 (3)","pages":"220-244"}},"sort":["Y a-t-Il des cat\u00e9gories sto\u00efciennes?"]}
Title | Zeno of Elea's Argument from Bisection: Newly Discovered Evidence in a Hebrew Translation of Averroes |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2001 |
Journal | Aleph |
Volume | 1 |
Pages | 285-293 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Glasner, Ruth |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
To conclude, in the Hebrew version of Averroes' long commentary on the Physics, comment 1.30, we find what seems to be Alexander's version of Zeno's argument ek tes dichotomias against plurality. Averroes interprets Zeno's argument as contradicting Parmenides', thus drawing attention to a problem that is latent in Simplicius' commentary. [conclusion, p. 293] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/vuPTw5sFrUNAd8H |
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Title | Zeno of Elea's Attacks on Plurality |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1942 |
Journal | The American Journal of Philology |
Volume | 63 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 1-25 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fraenkel, Hermann |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
In recent decades students of mathematics, philosophy, and the classics have again and again raised their voices 1 to vindicate the serious importance of Zeno's paradoxes of motion (Vorsokr.2 29 A 25-28 - Lee,3 nos. 19-36), not even excluding the Stadium. No longer can the problem implied in the paradoxes be disposed of by simply pointing out that time and space are equally divisible. The question which is at the bottom of all four of them is far more profound. [...] Fur- thermore, it has been shown that Aristotle, when qriticizing the paradoxes, was not concerned conscientiously to adjust his objec- tions to that which the historical Zeno had tried to prove, or rather disprove. [...] If it is thus established that Zeno's syllogisms must not necessarily be condemned as a futile play of dialectics 6 and that Aristotle's censure fails to do Zeno justice, a road seems to be open to a full rehabilitation and, perhaps, glorification. But one doubt remains. How adequately did the real Zeno actually deal with the problems he had in hand? And how sincere was he about them? [pp. 1 f.] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kQhlQX6rXg7NB8Y |
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Title | Zeno on Plurality |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 1982 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 27 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 223-238 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Makin, Stephen |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
We want to discuss some Eleatic arguments against plurality, which are of interest both in themselves and as precursors of Atomist thought. The arguments to be considered are from Zeno. We will have two guides in interpreting the arguments. First, they should be such that Atomist theory provides a plausible response to them; second, they should pose no threat to the Eleatic theory. [introduction p. 223] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/wOq1opqPtXhX1E6 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"730","_score":null,"_source":{"id":730,"authors_free":[{"id":1093,"entry_id":730,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":460,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Makin, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Makin","norm_person":{"id":460,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Makin","full_name":"Makin, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zeno on Plurality","main_title":{"title":"Zeno on Plurality"},"abstract":" We want to \r\ndiscuss some Eleatic arguments against plurality, which are of interest \r\nboth in themselves and as precursors of Atomist thought. The arguments to \r\nbe considered are from Zeno. \r\nWe will have two guides in interpreting the arguments. First, they should \r\nbe such that Atomist theory provides a plausible response to them; second, \r\nthey should pose no threat to the Eleatic theory. [introduction p. 223]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/wOq1opqPtXhX1E6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":460,"full_name":"Makin, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":730,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"27","issue":"3","pages":"223-238"}},"sort":["Zeno on Plurality"]}
Title | Zu Aristoteles’ Rezeption der vorsokratischen Prinzipienlehren (Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26). Teil 2 (Themistios, Philoponos, Simplikios) |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2012 |
Journal | EOS |
Volume | 99 |
Pages | 67-89 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Marcinkowska-Rosół, Maria |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The paper presents an examination of the Aristotelian classification of the natural philosophers in Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26. It focuses on the exgesis of this passage found in the commentarys on the Physics by Themsitios (In Ph. 5,2. 13. 9-28), Philoponus (In Ph. 86. 19-94. 16) and Simplicius (In Ph. 148. 25-161. 20). The ancient interpretations are discussed, evaluated and compared with the modern readings of the Aristotelian text. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pSayJ4y8SwOz6eb |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1481","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1481,"authors_free":[{"id":2563,"entry_id":1481,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":548,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Marcinkowska-Ros\u00f3\u0142, Maria","free_first_name":"Maria","free_last_name":"Marcinkowska-Ros\u00f3\u0142,","norm_person":{"id":548,"first_name":"Maria","last_name":"Marcinkowska-Ros\u00f3\u0142","full_name":"Marcinkowska-Ros\u00f3\u0142, Maria","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/141413786","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zu Aristoteles\u2019 Rezeption der vorsokratischen Prinzipienlehren (Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26). Teil 2 (Themistios, Philoponos, Simplikios)","main_title":{"title":"Zu Aristoteles\u2019 Rezeption der vorsokratischen Prinzipienlehren (Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26). Teil 2 (Themistios, Philoponos, Simplikios)"},"abstract":"The paper presents an examination of the Aristotelian classification of the natural philosophers in Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26. It focuses on the exgesis of this passage found in the commentarys on the Physics by Themsitios (In Ph. 5,2. 13. 9-28), Philoponus (In Ph. 86. 19-94. 16) and Simplicius (In Ph. 148. 25-161. 20). The ancient interpretations are discussed, evaluated and compared with the modern readings of the Aristotelian text. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pSayJ4y8SwOz6eb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":548,"full_name":"Marcinkowska-Ros\u00f3\u0142, Maria","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1481,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"EOS","volume":"99","issue":"","pages":"67-89"}},"sort":["Zu Aristoteles\u2019 Rezeption der vorsokratischen Prinzipienlehren (Ph. I 4, 187 a 12-26). Teil 2 (Themistios, Philoponos, Simplikios)"]}
Title | Zum Problem der Gattung des Seienden bei Marius Victorinus und im antiken Neuplatonismus |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2017 |
Journal | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (Neue Folge) |
Volume | 160 |
Pages | 161-193 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Němec, Václav |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The article is concerned with the problem of the genus of being in Neoplatonism. Specifically, it focuses on Pierre Hadot’s hypothesis, according to which some Neoplatonic authors, such as Porphyry, and under his influence Marius Victorinus and Dexippus, presupposed a common genus of being or substance in the Aristotelian sense, encompassing various ontological levels of the Platonic universe, namely the intelligible and sensible being or substance. A comprehensive analysis of relevant texts of Neoplatonic interpreters of and commentators on Aristotle’s writings shows that Hadot’s hypothesis is not tenable. In fact, Neoplatonists from Plotinus to Porphyry and Dexippus to Simplicius presupposed one genus of intelligible substance, which is the source of being for every other substance, including the sensible substance. Nevertheless, the intelligible substance or being is the "highest genus" only in the sense of Plato’s Sophist, and not in the sense of Aristotle’s Categories. Accordingly, the relationship between the highest "genus" and other "arts" of substance is not regarded as one of synonymy but as one of homonymy. More precisely, this is not homonymy "by chance" but homonymy "by intention," which can be specified as homonymy "based on analogy," "based on derivation from a single source," or "based on relation to a single thing." Moreover, the author argues that the crucial passage from Victorinus’s Against Arius Ib, which Hadot considered the main basis for his hypothesis, allows an alternative reading that is fully in accordance with the Neoplatonic doctrine as reconstructed in the article. [author's abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/1R6jT31lIQv4mO1 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1403","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1403,"authors_free":[{"id":2188,"entry_id":1403,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":380,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"N\u011bmec, V\u00e1clav","free_first_name":"V\u00e1clav","free_last_name":"N\u011bmec","norm_person":{"id":380,"first_name":"V\u00e1clav","last_name":"N\u011bmec","full_name":"N\u011bmec, V\u00e1clav","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/121953627X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zum Problem der Gattung des Seienden bei Marius Victorinus und im antiken Neuplatonismus","main_title":{"title":"Zum Problem der Gattung des Seienden bei Marius Victorinus und im antiken Neuplatonismus"},"abstract":"The article is concerned with the problem of the genus of being in Neoplatonism. Specifically, it focuses on Pierre Hadot\u2019s hypothesis, according to which some Neoplatonic authors, such as Porphyry, and under his influence Marius Victorinus and Dexippus, presupposed a common genus of being or substance in the Aristotelian sense, encompassing various ontological levels of the Platonic universe, namely the intelligible and sensible being or substance.\r\n\r\nA comprehensive analysis of relevant texts of Neoplatonic interpreters of and commentators on Aristotle\u2019s writings shows that Hadot\u2019s hypothesis is not tenable. In fact, Neoplatonists from Plotinus to Porphyry and Dexippus to Simplicius presupposed one genus of intelligible substance, which is the source of being for every other substance, including the sensible substance. Nevertheless, the intelligible substance or being is the \"highest genus\" only in the sense of Plato\u2019s Sophist, and not in the sense of Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Accordingly, the relationship between the highest \"genus\" and other \"arts\" of substance is not regarded as one of synonymy but as one of homonymy. More precisely, this is not homonymy \"by chance\" but homonymy \"by intention,\" which can be specified as homonymy \"based on analogy,\" \"based on derivation from a single source,\" or \"based on relation to a single thing.\"\r\n\r\nMoreover, the author argues that the crucial passage from Victorinus\u2019s Against Arius Ib, which Hadot considered the main basis for his hypothesis, allows an alternative reading that is fully in accordance with the Neoplatonic doctrine as reconstructed in the article. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2017","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1R6jT31lIQv4mO1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":380,"full_name":"N\u011bmec, V\u00e1clav","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1403,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie (Neue Folge)","volume":"160","issue":"","pages":"161-193"}},"sort":["Zum Problem der Gattung des Seienden bei Marius Victorinus und im antiken Neuplatonismus"]}
Title | Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des griechischen wissenschaftlichen Kommentars |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1932 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 67 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 397-412 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Geffcken, Johannes |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ich habe hier versucht, auf engem Raum die Entstehung des Kommentars als solchen zu skizzieren, einige seiner Erscheinungsformen zu würdigen, ein paar Höchstleistungen zu werten. Gerade Entwicklungslinien darf auch auf diesem Gebiet kein Besonnener suchen oder gar „aufzeigen“; jedes Phänomen, auch in der Welt des Geistes, mag es auch noch so einfacher Struktur sein, verdankt seinen Ursprung einer Reihe von schaffenden Kräften. Auch der antike Kommentar ist aus dem Zusammenwirken verschiedener Faktoren erwachsen. Ein Kraftzentrum aber bildeten der Platonismus und der ältere Peripatos; beide, besonders letzterer, schufen die Stimmung für solche Unternehmungen, sie erzogen das Gewissen des Gelehrten. Das Genie der großen Alexandriner musste sich dann vielfach eigene Wege bahnen. Aber in allen wirklich wissenschaftlichen Kommentaren, die wir kennen, lebt der echte Geist der Aristotelischen Schule. Eine wirkliche Geschichte des antiken Kommentars scheint auch mir unbedingt notwendig. Es wird sich dabei herausstellen, wann sich ein äußeres Schema entwickelt hat und welche Kontinuität auch hier wieder wahrnehmbar ist. Umso kraftvoller aber werden sich von der überlieferten Form die Individuen der Forscher und auch Denker abheben. [conclusion p. 411-412] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Y56uK7HVPYJ1WSa |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1314","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1314,"authors_free":[{"id":1948,"entry_id":1314,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":126,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Geffcken, Johannes","free_first_name":"Johannes","free_last_name":"Geffcken","norm_person":{"id":126,"first_name":"Johannes","last_name":"Geffcken","full_name":"Geffcken, Johannes","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/120376644","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des griechischen wissenschaftlichen Kommentars","main_title":{"title":"Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des griechischen wissenschaftlichen Kommentars"},"abstract":"Ich habe hier versucht, auf engem Raum die Entstehung des Kommentars als solchen zu skizzieren, einige seiner Erscheinungsformen zu w\u00fcrdigen, ein paar H\u00f6chstleistungen zu werten. Gerade Entwicklungslinien darf auch auf diesem Gebiet kein Besonnener suchen oder gar \u201eaufzeigen\u201c; jedes Ph\u00e4nomen, auch in der Welt des Geistes, mag es auch noch so einfacher Struktur sein, verdankt seinen Ursprung einer Reihe von schaffenden Kr\u00e4ften. Auch der antike Kommentar ist aus dem Zusammenwirken verschiedener Faktoren erwachsen.\r\n\r\nEin Kraftzentrum aber bildeten der Platonismus und der \u00e4ltere Peripatos; beide, besonders letzterer, schufen die Stimmung f\u00fcr solche Unternehmungen, sie erzogen das Gewissen des Gelehrten. Das Genie der gro\u00dfen Alexandriner musste sich dann vielfach eigene Wege bahnen. Aber in allen wirklich wissenschaftlichen Kommentaren, die wir kennen, lebt der echte Geist der Aristotelischen Schule.\r\n\r\nEine wirkliche Geschichte des antiken Kommentars scheint auch mir unbedingt notwendig. Es wird sich dabei herausstellen, wann sich ein \u00e4u\u00dferes Schema entwickelt hat und welche Kontinuit\u00e4t auch hier wieder wahrnehmbar ist. Umso kraftvoller aber werden sich von der \u00fcberlieferten Form die Individuen der Forscher und auch Denker abheben. [conclusion p. 411-412]","btype":3,"date":"1932","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Y56uK7HVPYJ1WSa","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":126,"full_name":"Geffcken, Johannes","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1314,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"67","issue":"4","pages":"397-412"}},"sort":["Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des griechischen wissenschaftlichen Kommentars"]}
Title | Zur Methodik antiker Exegese |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1974 |
Journal | Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der Älteren Kirche |
Volume | 65 |
Pages | 121-138 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Dörrie, Heinrich |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Der Artikel behandelt die Exegese antiker Texte und beginnt mit einem Fokus auf die Auslegung Homers. Die homerischen Epen wurden für mehr als 1000 Jahre als Quelle für Bildung und Literatur betrachtet und waren daher von großer Bedeutung für die antike Exegese. Obwohl sich die Sprache, die Werte und die mythologischen Überzeugungen von antiken Texten von der modernen Welt unterscheiden, blieben sie von Bedeutung. Die allegorische Auslegung Homers war ein Schlüsselthema, das später auch auf die christliche Exegese angewendet wurde. Die antike Exegese befasste sich nicht nur mit literarischen Werken, sondern auch mit Orakeln, Sprichwörtern und Riten. Die Methode der antiken Exegese wurde in Alexandrien von den Philologen auf wenige, einfache Fakten reduziert, aber im Allgemeinen blieb sie kontinuierlich und bestätigte das Bildungserbe, auf das sie zurückgriff. Die christliche Exegese wurde stark von der vorausgehenden antiken Exegese beeinflusst, insbesondere von der stoischen Exegese, die Werkzeuge zur Interpretation von Texten bereitstellte. Die Artikel erörtert die Kontinuität der Exegese im Laufe der Jahrhunderte und betont, dass antike Exegese ein Bildungserbe darstellt, das über Jahrhunderte hinweg bewahrt wurde. [introduction/conclusion] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/pWm7MqqJ0rmmM7F |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1293","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1293,"authors_free":[{"id":1882,"entry_id":1293,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":69,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich","free_first_name":"Heinrich","free_last_name":"D\u00f6rrie","norm_person":{"id":69,"first_name":"Heinrich ","last_name":"D\u00f6rrie","full_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118526375","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zur Methodik antiker Exegese","main_title":{"title":"Zur Methodik antiker Exegese"},"abstract":"Der Artikel behandelt die Exegese antiker Texte und beginnt mit einem Fokus auf die Auslegung Homers. Die homerischen Epen wurden f\u00fcr mehr als 1000 Jahre als Quelle f\u00fcr Bildung und Literatur betrachtet und waren daher von gro\u00dfer Bedeutung f\u00fcr die antike Exegese. Obwohl sich die Sprache, die Werte und die mythologischen \u00dcberzeugungen von antiken Texten von der modernen Welt unterscheiden, blieben sie von Bedeutung. Die allegorische Auslegung Homers war ein Schl\u00fcsselthema, das sp\u00e4ter auch auf die christliche Exegese angewendet wurde. Die antike Exegese befasste sich nicht nur mit literarischen Werken, sondern auch mit Orakeln, Sprichw\u00f6rtern und Riten. Die Methode der antiken Exegese wurde in Alexandrien von den Philologen auf wenige, einfache Fakten reduziert, aber im Allgemeinen blieb sie kontinuierlich und best\u00e4tigte das Bildungserbe, auf das sie zur\u00fcckgriff. Die christliche Exegese wurde stark von der vorausgehenden antiken Exegese beeinflusst, insbesondere von der stoischen Exegese, die Werkzeuge zur Interpretation von Texten bereitstellte. Die Artikel er\u00f6rtert die Kontinuit\u00e4t der Exegese im Laufe der Jahrhunderte und betont, dass antike Exegese ein Bildungserbe darstellt, das \u00fcber Jahrhunderte hinweg bewahrt wurde. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1974","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pWm7MqqJ0rmmM7F","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":69,"full_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1293,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Zeitschrift f\u00fcr die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der \u00c4lteren Kirche","volume":"65","issue":"","pages":"121-138"}},"sort":["Zur Methodik antiker Exegese"]}
Title | Échelle de la nature et division des mouvements chez Aristote et les stoïciens |
Type | Article |
Language | French |
Date | 2005 |
Journal | Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale |
Volume | 4 |
Pages | 537-556 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Bénatoui͏̈l, Thomas |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
The stoic scala naturae was based, among other things, on a division of natural movements, which this paper studies in order to understand the way in which stoicism approached Nature and its empirical diversity. First, I argue against David Hahm's interpretation that movement «through» (dia) oneself is not on a par with the other natural movements: far from being specific to stones or elements, it designates the movement which is specifically produced by the nature of a thing or being. The aristotelian and stoic analysis of self-movement are then shown to share their basic principles but to lead to diverging approaches of Nature: whereas Aristotle looks for the origin and causes of natural movements, the Stoics offer a taxonomy of visible movements. [Author’s abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FNx2a2OooxZH2YG |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"832","_score":null,"_source":{"id":832,"authors_free":[{"id":1236,"entry_id":832,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":414,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l, Thomas","free_first_name":"Thomas","free_last_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l","norm_person":{"id":414,"first_name":"Thomas","last_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l","full_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l, Thomas","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/143798405","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u00c9chelle de la nature et division des mouvements chez Aristote et les sto\u00efciens","main_title":{"title":"\u00c9chelle de la nature et division des mouvements chez Aristote et les sto\u00efciens"},"abstract":"The stoic scala naturae was based, among other things, on a division of natural movements, which this paper studies in order to understand the way in which stoicism approached Nature and its empirical diversity. First, I argue against David Hahm's interpretation that movement \u00abthrough\u00bb (dia) oneself is not on a par with the other natural movements: far from being specific to stones or elements, it designates the movement which is specifically produced by the nature of a thing or being. The aristotelian and stoic analysis of self-movement are then shown to share their basic principles but to lead to diverging approaches of Nature: whereas Aristotle looks for the origin and causes of natural movements, the Stoics offer a taxonomy of visible movements. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FNx2a2OooxZH2YG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":414,"full_name":"B\u00e9natoui\u034f\u0308l, Thomas","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":832,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale","volume":"4","issue":"","pages":"537-556"}},"sort":["\u00c9chelle de la nature et division des mouvements chez Aristote et les sto\u00efciens"]}
Title | ΕΝΝΟHΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ und ΟΥΣΙΩΔΗΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ als exegetisches Begriffspaar |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 2000 |
Journal | Philologus |
Volume | 144 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 45-61 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist es, ausgehend von zwei Texten, der Herkunft und Funktion des Begriffspaares "ennoésmatikos" und "ousiódés logos" nachzugehen, das gebraucht wird, um zwei grundsätzliche Definitionsarten zu charakterisieren [authors abstract] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/H34bvyQPUF08vgR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"886","_score":null,"_source":{"id":886,"authors_free":[{"id":1305,"entry_id":886,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":218,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve","free_first_name":"Paraskeve","free_last_name":"Kotzia-Panteli","norm_person":{"id":218,"first_name":"Paraskeve","last_name":"Kotzia-Panteli","full_name":"Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1171363621","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u0395\u039d\u039d\u039fH\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0399\u039a\u039f\u03a3 und \u039f\u03a5\u03a3\u0399\u03a9\u0394\u0397\u03a3 \u039b\u039f\u0393\u039f\u03a3 als exegetisches Begriffspaar","main_title":{"title":"\u0395\u039d\u039d\u039fH\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0399\u039a\u039f\u03a3 und \u039f\u03a5\u03a3\u0399\u03a9\u0394\u0397\u03a3 \u039b\u039f\u0393\u039f\u03a3 als exegetisches Begriffspaar"},"abstract":"Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist es, ausgehend von zwei Texten, der Herkunft und Funktion des Begriffspaares \"enno\u00e9smatikos\" und \"ousi\u00f3d\u00e9s logos\" nachzugehen, das gebraucht wird, um zwei grunds\u00e4tzliche Definitionsarten zu charakterisieren [authors abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H34bvyQPUF08vgR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":218,"full_name":"Kotzia-Panteli, Paraskeve ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":886,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Philologus","volume":"144","issue":"1","pages":"45-61"}},"sort":["\u0395\u039d\u039d\u039fH\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0399\u039a\u039f\u03a3 und \u039f\u03a5\u03a3\u0399\u03a9\u0394\u0397\u03a3 \u039b\u039f\u0393\u039f\u03a3 als exegetisches Begriffspaar"]}
Title | ΟΜΟΥ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΗΝ |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1971 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 99 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 246-248 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rösler, Wolfgang |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Wie alle umfangreicheren Fragmente der Abhandlung Περί φύσεως des Anaxagoras ist auch Fragment 1 (VS 59 B 1) durch den Kommentar des Simplikios zur aristotelischen Physik überliefert. Simplikios hatte die Möglichkeit, ein Exemplar der Schrift des ionischen Philosophen zu benutzen. In seiner ganzen Länge erscheint das Fragment, dessen Stellung am Anfang des Buches ausdrücklich bezeugt ist, nur einmal (155, 26); daneben gibt es weitere Passagen, in denen lediglich der einleitende Satz bzw. dessen Beginn zitiert wird. Ein Überblick zeigt, dass zwischen den einzelnen Zitaten Unterschiede in der Wortstellung bestehen. Deshalb soll im Folgenden der Versuch unternommen werden, die ursprüngliche Anordnung in der Textvorlage des Simplikios zu rekonstruieren. Bekanntlich wird der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras seit Platon in der griechischen Literatur häufig zitiert. Untersucht man jedoch die entsprechenden Stellen – mit Ausnahme derer bei Simplikios – auf ihren Wert als Zeugen für den genauen Wortlaut des Anaxagoras-Textes, so zeigt sich ihre Bedeutungslosigkeit rasch. Platon und Aristoteles zitieren nicht direkt aus dem Buch des Anaxagoras, was auch ihrer sonst geübten Praxis bei der Wiedergabe fremder Meinungen widerspräche, sondern paraphrasieren frei nach dem Gedächtnis. Die beiden Zitate bei Platon bieten zwar eine einheitliche Wortstellung (ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα), doch fehlt jeweils ἦν. In einem Fall (Gorg. 465d) sind die Worte des Anaxagoras sogar völlig in die betreffende Satzkonstruktion eingegangen. Letzteres trifft auch auf viele der Zitate bei Aristoteles zu, die im Übrigen Unterschiede in der Wortfolge zeigen und häufig unvollständig sind. Wie bei Platon umfassen auch die Zitate bei Aristoteles lediglich den unmittelbaren Beginn des Einleitungssatzes. Nur einmal (Met. 1056b 29) erscheint auch der folgende Satzabschnitt (bis πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότης, wobei diese beiden Substantive bei Aristoteles allerdings im Dativ stehen). Auch dieses Zitat besteht jedoch nur aus insgesamt neun Wörtern und konnte daher leicht aus dem Gedächtnis niedergeschrieben werden. Noch geringeren Quellenwert haben die Zitate bei späteren Autoren, da diese ihre Kenntnis Platon, Aristoteles oder einer ihrerseits aus zweiter Hand schöpfenden doxographischen Vorlage verdankten oder die Einleitungsworte des Anaxagoras, die im Laufe der Zeit regelrecht zur παροιμία wurden, überhaupt nur vom Hörensagen kannten. In der Wortstellung treten fast alle denkbaren Variationen auf, kein Zitat reicht über den unmittelbaren Anfang der Schrift Περί φύσεως hinaus. Als Grundlage der Rekonstruktion bleiben somit nur die Passagen bei Simplikios. Wie eingangs bemerkt, wird Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar nur an einer Stelle (155, 26) in seiner Gesamtheit zitiert, während die übrigen Zitate nur den Anfang wiedergeben; im günstigsten Fall reichen sie (wie schon bei Aristoteles) bis σμικρότης. Nun bietet 155, 26 eine Wortstellung, die nur bei Simplikios und im Physik-Kommentar nur hier begegnet, nämlich ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν. Angesichts der Isoliertheit dieser Version trugen H. Diels und W. Kranz, die Herausgeber der Vorsokratiker-Fragmente, keine Bedenken, sich an dieser Stelle über die Überlieferung hinwegzusetzen und für χρήματα πάντα die seit Platon häufig vorkommende Wortfolge πάντα χρήματα in den Text aufzunehmen, die im Übrigen auch in den Kurzzitaten bei Simplikios die Regel ist. Dennoch ist nicht daran zu zweifeln, dass der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras gerade in 155, 26 richtig wiedergegeben ist. Denn nur hier im Physik-Kommentar zitiert Simplikios nachweislich unmittelbar aus seinem Anaxagoras-Text, den er für die übrigen Zitate ihrer Kürze wegen nicht eigens einsah. Dass er in diesen Fällen die geläufige, freilich unkorrekte Wortfolge übernahm, kann nicht verwundern, zumal sie auch in der von ihm kommentierten Schrift des Aristoteles erschien. Diese Auswertung der Zitate von Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar des Simplikios wird dadurch gesichert, dass in einer anderen Abhandlung desselben Autors, im Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo (608, 21), ein zweites Mal der Anfang der Schrift Περί φύσεως in der Version ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν zitiert wird. Entscheidend ist, dass es sich auch in diesem Fall um ein so langes Zitat handelt (bis σμικρότης), dass Simplikios dafür eigens im Anaxagoras-Text nachschlagen musste. [the entire text] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/JNAa63ZtXiLxTdb |
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Simplikios hatte die M\u00f6glichkeit, ein Exemplar der Schrift des ionischen Philosophen zu benutzen. In seiner ganzen L\u00e4nge erscheint das Fragment, dessen Stellung am Anfang des Buches ausdr\u00fccklich bezeugt ist, nur einmal (155, 26); daneben gibt es weitere Passagen, in denen lediglich der einleitende Satz bzw. dessen Beginn zitiert wird.\r\n\r\nEin \u00dcberblick zeigt, dass zwischen den einzelnen Zitaten Unterschiede in der Wortstellung bestehen. Deshalb soll im Folgenden der Versuch unternommen werden, die urspr\u00fcngliche Anordnung in der Textvorlage des Simplikios zu rekonstruieren.\r\n\r\nBekanntlich wird der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras seit Platon in der griechischen Literatur h\u00e4ufig zitiert. Untersucht man jedoch die entsprechenden Stellen \u2013 mit Ausnahme derer bei Simplikios \u2013 auf ihren Wert als Zeugen f\u00fcr den genauen Wortlaut des Anaxagoras-Textes, so zeigt sich ihre Bedeutungslosigkeit rasch. Platon und Aristoteles zitieren nicht direkt aus dem Buch des Anaxagoras, was auch ihrer sonst ge\u00fcbten Praxis bei der Wiedergabe fremder Meinungen widerspr\u00e4che, sondern paraphrasieren frei nach dem Ged\u00e4chtnis.\r\n\r\nDie beiden Zitate bei Platon bieten zwar eine einheitliche Wortstellung (\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1), doch fehlt jeweils \u1f26\u03bd. In einem Fall (Gorg. 465d) sind die Worte des Anaxagoras sogar v\u00f6llig in die betreffende Satzkonstruktion eingegangen. Letzteres trifft auch auf viele der Zitate bei Aristoteles zu, die im \u00dcbrigen Unterschiede in der Wortfolge zeigen und h\u00e4ufig unvollst\u00e4ndig sind. Wie bei Platon umfassen auch die Zitate bei Aristoteles lediglich den unmittelbaren Beginn des Einleitungssatzes. Nur einmal (Met. 1056b 29) erscheint auch der folgende Satzabschnitt (bis \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, wobei diese beiden Substantive bei Aristoteles allerdings im Dativ stehen). Auch dieses Zitat besteht jedoch nur aus insgesamt neun W\u00f6rtern und konnte daher leicht aus dem Ged\u00e4chtnis niedergeschrieben werden.\r\n\r\nNoch geringeren Quellenwert haben die Zitate bei sp\u00e4teren Autoren, da diese ihre Kenntnis Platon, Aristoteles oder einer ihrerseits aus zweiter Hand sch\u00f6pfenden doxographischen Vorlage verdankten oder die Einleitungsworte des Anaxagoras, die im Laufe der Zeit regelrecht zur \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 wurden, \u00fcberhaupt nur vom H\u00f6rensagen kannten. In der Wortstellung treten fast alle denkbaren Variationen auf, kein Zitat reicht \u00fcber den unmittelbaren Anfang der Schrift \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 hinaus.\r\n\r\nAls Grundlage der Rekonstruktion bleiben somit nur die Passagen bei Simplikios. Wie eingangs bemerkt, wird Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar nur an einer Stelle (155, 26) in seiner Gesamtheit zitiert, w\u00e4hrend die \u00fcbrigen Zitate nur den Anfang wiedergeben; im g\u00fcnstigsten Fall reichen sie (wie schon bei Aristoteles) bis \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. Nun bietet 155, 26 eine Wortstellung, die nur bei Simplikios und im Physik-Kommentar nur hier begegnet, n\u00e4mlich \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f26\u03bd.\r\n\r\nAngesichts der Isoliertheit dieser Version trugen H. Diels und W. Kranz, die Herausgeber der Vorsokratiker-Fragmente, keine Bedenken, sich an dieser Stelle \u00fcber die \u00dcberlieferung hinwegzusetzen und f\u00fcr \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 die seit Platon h\u00e4ufig vorkommende Wortfolge \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 in den Text aufzunehmen, die im \u00dcbrigen auch in den Kurzzitaten bei Simplikios die Regel ist. Dennoch ist nicht daran zu zweifeln, dass der Anfang der Schrift des Anaxagoras gerade in 155, 26 richtig wiedergegeben ist.\r\n\r\nDenn nur hier im Physik-Kommentar zitiert Simplikios nachweislich unmittelbar aus seinem Anaxagoras-Text, den er f\u00fcr die \u00fcbrigen Zitate ihrer K\u00fcrze wegen nicht eigens einsah. Dass er in diesen F\u00e4llen die gel\u00e4ufige, freilich unkorrekte Wortfolge \u00fcbernahm, kann nicht verwundern, zumal sie auch in der von ihm kommentierten Schrift des Aristoteles erschien.\r\n\r\nDiese Auswertung der Zitate von Fragment 1 im Physik-Kommentar des Simplikios wird dadurch gesichert, dass in einer anderen Abhandlung desselben Autors, im Kommentar zu Aristoteles' De caelo (608, 21), ein zweites Mal der Anfang der Schrift \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 in der Version \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f26\u03bd zitiert wird. Entscheidend ist, dass es sich auch in diesem Fall um ein so langes Zitat handelt (bis \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2), dass Simplikios daf\u00fcr eigens im Anaxagoras-Text nachschlagen musste. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/JNAa63ZtXiLxTdb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":383,"full_name":"R\u00f6sler, Wolfgang","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":774,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"99","issue":"2","pages":"246-248"}},"sort":["\u039f\u039c\u039f\u03a5 \u03a7\u03a1\u0397\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u0391 \u03a0\u0391\u039d\u03a4\u0391 \u0397\u039d"]}
Title | ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΥ. Aristot. Phys. B 4-6 |
Type | Article |
Language | German |
Date | 1875 |
Journal | Hermes |
Volume | 9 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 425-470 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Torstrik, Adolf |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
Werfen wir nun noch einen Blick auf den zurückgelegten Weg, so finden wir in dieser Abhandlung eine solche Masse von Verderbnis, wie kaum in irgendeinem anderen Teil gleichen Umfangs der aristotelischen Schriften. Und hier handelt es sich keineswegs um jene harmlosen Verschreibungen und Auslassungen, die sich hier wie überall finden; auch nicht bloß um einen so plumpen und gemeinen Fälscher, der zu drei verschiedenen Malen dem Aristoteles sein exô und entos aufdrängt, das hier lediglich nichts zu schaffen hat, einen Mann von der Geistesrichtung etwa des Straton; nein, bis ins Herz des Begriffs ist die Fälschung gedrungen durch die, welche dem Aristoteles die Meinung zuschrieben, zufällig sei das, was auch ein Werk des Verstandes oder der Natur sein könnte. Andererseits fanden wir gewisse Unvollkommenheiten, welche uns die Vermutung nahelegten, Aristoteles habe zwar den ganzen architektonischen Bau angelegt und den größten Teil auch ausgeführt, einige kleine Teile aber nur für sich durch ein memento angedeutet, welche Teile dann von dem, der dieses Werk herausgegeben hat – also doch wohl Eudemus – nicht immer zum Besten ausgeführt worden seien. Dies verdient Nachsicht, umso eher, als wir an der frommsten Gewissenhaftigkeit des Herausgebers nicht zweifeln können: hat er uns doch sogar an zwei Stellen einen Einblick in die Art gewährt, wie Aristoteles arbeitete, indem er uns zwei Fassungen desselben Gedankens überliefert hat, die er in den Papieren des Meisters vorgefunden hat. Es schließen sich diese doppelten Fassungen den übrigen an, die uns in der Psychologie, der Metaphysik und so vielen anderen Schriften erhalten sind; Tatsachen, die ihre volle Würdigung erst dann finden werden, wenn es sich einst darum handeln wird, die Geschichte des aristotelischen Textes zu schreiben. Aber nicht für den Philologen allein, auch für den Philosophen hat diese Abhandlung des Aristoteles hohe Bedeutung. Sicher geleitet an der Hand der griechischen Sprache, welche mit der zartesten Auffassung aller Schattierungen, die in der Erscheinungswelt des Menschenlebens spielen – wie man dies besonders in der Ethik erkennt – einen metaphysischen Tiefsinn verbindet, die sie zu mehr als zum vollkommensten Werkzeug der Philosophie macht, die sie in dieser selbst zum Ariadnefaden machte, ist es dem Aristoteles gelungen, durch die Entwicklung eines unscheinbaren und von den spekulativen Philosophen meistens auf die Seite geschobenen Begriffs dem Materialismus einen Streich zu versetzen, den er nicht verwinden wird, ohne sich mit dem, was in aller Erscheinung das Offenbarste ist, in Widerspruch zu setzen. Dies Offensichtliche, das a-lêthes, ist der Zweck; und wir sehen denn auch, dass die Materialisten aller Zeiten den Zweck am meisten bekämpfen. Mit Recht: hebt ihn auf, und ihr habt das aition kath' hauto aufgehoben und den göttlichen Kosmos in den wüsten Strudel sich sinnlos befehdender Kräfte gerissen. Dinos basileuei. [conclusion p. 469-470] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Sg8QDCMsdh5qIuI |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"841","_score":null,"_source":{"id":841,"authors_free":[{"id":1245,"entry_id":841,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":342,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Torstrik, Adolf","free_first_name":"Adolf","free_last_name":"Torstrik","norm_person":{"id":342,"first_name":"Adolf","last_name":"Torstrik","full_name":"Torstrik, Adolf","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117407224","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u03a5\u03a7\u0397\u03a3 \u039a\u0391\u0399 \u03a4\u039f\u03a5 \u0391\u03a5\u03a4\u039f\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u039f\u03a5. Aristot. Phys. B 4-6","main_title":{"title":"\u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u03a5\u03a7\u0397\u03a3 \u039a\u0391\u0399 \u03a4\u039f\u03a5 \u0391\u03a5\u03a4\u039f\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u039f\u03a5. Aristot. Phys. B 4-6"},"abstract":"Werfen wir nun noch einen Blick auf den zur\u00fcckgelegten Weg, so finden wir in dieser Abhandlung eine solche Masse von Verderbnis, wie kaum in irgendeinem anderen Teil gleichen Umfangs der aristotelischen Schriften. Und hier handelt es sich keineswegs um jene harmlosen Verschreibungen und Auslassungen, die sich hier wie \u00fcberall finden; auch nicht blo\u00df um einen so plumpen und gemeinen F\u00e4lscher, der zu drei verschiedenen Malen dem Aristoteles sein ex\u00f4 und entos aufdr\u00e4ngt, das hier lediglich nichts zu schaffen hat, einen Mann von der Geistesrichtung etwa des Straton; nein, bis ins Herz des Begriffs ist die F\u00e4lschung gedrungen durch die, welche dem Aristoteles die Meinung zuschrieben, zuf\u00e4llig sei das, was auch ein Werk des Verstandes oder der Natur sein k\u00f6nnte.\r\n\r\nAndererseits fanden wir gewisse Unvollkommenheiten, welche uns die Vermutung nahelegten, Aristoteles habe zwar den ganzen architektonischen Bau angelegt und den gr\u00f6\u00dften Teil auch ausgef\u00fchrt, einige kleine Teile aber nur f\u00fcr sich durch ein memento angedeutet, welche Teile dann von dem, der dieses Werk herausgegeben hat \u2013 also doch wohl Eudemus \u2013 nicht immer zum Besten ausgef\u00fchrt worden seien. Dies verdient Nachsicht, umso eher, als wir an der frommsten Gewissenhaftigkeit des Herausgebers nicht zweifeln k\u00f6nnen: hat er uns doch sogar an zwei Stellen einen Einblick in die Art gew\u00e4hrt, wie Aristoteles arbeitete, indem er uns zwei Fassungen desselben Gedankens \u00fcberliefert hat, die er in den Papieren des Meisters vorgefunden hat. Es schlie\u00dfen sich diese doppelten Fassungen den \u00fcbrigen an, die uns in der Psychologie, der Metaphysik und so vielen anderen Schriften erhalten sind; Tatsachen, die ihre volle W\u00fcrdigung erst dann finden werden, wenn es sich einst darum handeln wird, die Geschichte des aristotelischen Textes zu schreiben.\r\n\r\nAber nicht f\u00fcr den Philologen allein, auch f\u00fcr den Philosophen hat diese Abhandlung des Aristoteles hohe Bedeutung. Sicher geleitet an der Hand der griechischen Sprache, welche mit der zartesten Auffassung aller Schattierungen, die in der Erscheinungswelt des Menschenlebens spielen \u2013 wie man dies besonders in der Ethik erkennt \u2013 einen metaphysischen Tiefsinn verbindet, die sie zu mehr als zum vollkommensten Werkzeug der Philosophie macht, die sie in dieser selbst zum Ariadnefaden machte, ist es dem Aristoteles gelungen, durch die Entwicklung eines unscheinbaren und von den spekulativen Philosophen meistens auf die Seite geschobenen Begriffs dem Materialismus einen Streich zu versetzen, den er nicht verwinden wird, ohne sich mit dem, was in aller Erscheinung das Offenbarste ist, in Widerspruch zu setzen.\r\n\r\nDies Offensichtliche, das a-l\u00eathes, ist der Zweck; und wir sehen denn auch, dass die Materialisten aller Zeiten den Zweck am meisten bek\u00e4mpfen. Mit Recht: hebt ihn auf, und ihr habt das aition kath' hauto aufgehoben und den g\u00f6ttlichen Kosmos in den w\u00fcsten Strudel sich sinnlos befehdender Kr\u00e4fte gerissen. Dinos basileuei. [conclusion p. 469-470]","btype":3,"date":"1875","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Sg8QDCMsdh5qIuI","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":342,"full_name":"Torstrik, Adolf","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":841,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"9","issue":"4","pages":"425-470"}},"sort":["\u03a0\u0395\u03a1\u0399 \u03a4\u03a5\u03a7\u0397\u03a3 \u039a\u0391\u0399 \u03a4\u039f\u03a5 \u0391\u03a5\u03a4\u039f\u039c\u0391\u03a4\u039f\u03a5. Aristot. Phys. B 4-6"]}
Title | ‘Simplicius’ (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller) |
Type | Article |
Language | English |
Date | 2014 |
Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
Volume | 8 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 113-114 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Fleet, Barrie |
Editor(s) | |
Translator(s) |
At the outset of Physics 1, Aristotle states that systematic knowledge of natural things and their changing character derives from a group of "principles (arkhai), causes (aitia), or elements (stoikheiai)." In this first book, he does not formally distinguish between these three terms, focusing instead on principles, although later commentators went to great lengths to formalize distinctions among them. Books 1 and 2 of Physics are devoted to seeking out the principles of change within the realm of natural science. Aristotle begins with commonly accepted propositions, “constantly appealing to what is ordinarily said or thought” (W. Charlton, Aristotle’s Physics I, II, Oxford, 1970, xi). Aristotle posits axiomatically that the principles of change in natural bodies are inherent in what comes into being from them, that they do not arise from one another or from external things, but that all things originate from these principles. He seeks to identify the rationally distinguishable factors inherent in the world of physical change. In chapters 1–4, he briefly reviews earlier theorists, such as Parmenides and Melissus, who posited a single principle and denied qualitative change, thereby placing themselves outside the scope of Aristotle’s inquiry. Aristotle concludes that principles must be multiple, either finite or infinite in number. The Neoplatonists, in general, prioritize Aristotle for questions of natural science and Plato for metaphysics. Book 1 of Physics straddles these two domains, and Simplicius, a 6th-century AD commentator, is eager throughout to demonstrate the harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius appeals particularly to Phaedo, Sophist, Philebus, Phaedrus, and Timaeus to suggest that many of Aristotle’s ideas were anticipated by Plato. In chapter 5, Aristotle asserts that everyone agrees the opposites (ta enantia) are principles, though there is considerable variation regarding what these opposites, as primary principles of physical change, are. Aristotle's approach differs from Plato’s Argument from Opposites in Phaedo. He reduces physical change to an underlying matter and, rather than a pair of opposites, considers the presence or absence of an opposite. The absence is redefined as "privation" (sterêsis) of a form, with a possible critique of John Philoponus—though this is contested by Sorabji (Introduction, pp. 4–7). Simplicius provides a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s arguments, distinguishing between primary and secondary principles, substance and contraries, per accidens and per se, and potential and actual—though M. suggests (n. 16) that at least once “Simplicius has no clue.” Simplicius draws parallels between Aristotelian matter and Plato’s Receptacle in Timaeus and the great-and-small in Philebus. He defines matter explicitly at 230,22 and finds congruence between Plato and Aristotle regarding the distinction between the first form, which is genuinely separate, and the natural form immanent in individual compound objects, which perishes with the compound. Simplicius uses Aristotle’s discussion of privation in chapters 7–9 to defend Plato against the charge of giving undue credence to Parmenides' unitary concept of Being. He extensively quotes Sophist to show that Plato recognized but did not emphasize privation, opting instead to discuss the presence or absence of form. Where Aristotle uses privation, Plato prefers the concept of "the other." Simplicius concludes that Plato and Aristotle are not in conflict regarding principles: Plato sought the per se causes of being that are elemental and inherent, while Aristotle sought causes of change, including privation as a per accidens cause. Simplicius frequently cites other commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, offering a dense and complex analysis that illuminates not only Aristotle’s text but also its reception by a Neoplatonist of the 6th century AD. This edition, translated by four contributors with glossaries by Sebastian Gertz and editorial notes by Richard Sorabji, provides accurate and fluent translations with minimal errors, despite being a collective effort. However, a more detailed note on logos, often left untranslated, would be valuable. Note 252 on p. 155 repeats paragraph 3 of the Introduction (p. 11). Overall, this translation is a significant contribution to Aristotelian studies. [The entire review p. 113-114] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nqkDsZcyl8kNw0V |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"594","_score":null,"_source":{"id":594,"authors_free":[{"id":845,"entry_id":594,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":117,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fleet, Barrie","free_first_name":"Barrie","free_last_name":"Fleet","norm_person":{"id":117,"first_name":"Barrie","last_name":"Fleet","full_name":"Fleet, Barrie","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172866235","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)","main_title":{"title":"\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)"},"abstract":"At the outset of Physics 1, Aristotle states that systematic knowledge of natural things and their changing character derives from a group of \"principles (arkhai), causes (aitia), or elements (stoikheiai).\" In this first book, he does not formally distinguish between these three terms, focusing instead on principles, although later commentators went to great lengths to formalize distinctions among them. Books 1 and 2 of Physics are devoted to seeking out the principles of change within the realm of natural science. Aristotle begins with commonly accepted propositions, \u201cconstantly appealing to what is ordinarily said or thought\u201d (W. Charlton, Aristotle\u2019s Physics I, II, Oxford, 1970, xi).\r\n\r\nAristotle posits axiomatically that the principles of change in natural bodies are inherent in what comes into being from them, that they do not arise from one another or from external things, but that all things originate from these principles. He seeks to identify the rationally distinguishable factors inherent in the world of physical change. In chapters 1\u20134, he briefly reviews earlier theorists, such as Parmenides and Melissus, who posited a single principle and denied qualitative change, thereby placing themselves outside the scope of Aristotle\u2019s inquiry. Aristotle concludes that principles must be multiple, either finite or infinite in number.\r\n\r\nThe Neoplatonists, in general, prioritize Aristotle for questions of natural science and Plato for metaphysics. Book 1 of Physics straddles these two domains, and Simplicius, a 6th-century AD commentator, is eager throughout to demonstrate the harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius appeals particularly to Phaedo, Sophist, Philebus, Phaedrus, and Timaeus to suggest that many of Aristotle\u2019s ideas were anticipated by Plato.\r\n\r\nIn chapter 5, Aristotle asserts that everyone agrees the opposites (ta enantia) are principles, though there is considerable variation regarding what these opposites, as primary principles of physical change, are. Aristotle's approach differs from Plato\u2019s Argument from Opposites in Phaedo. He reduces physical change to an underlying matter and, rather than a pair of opposites, considers the presence or absence of an opposite. The absence is redefined as \"privation\" (ster\u00easis) of a form, with a possible critique of John Philoponus\u2014though this is contested by Sorabji (Introduction, pp. 4\u20137). Simplicius provides a detailed analysis of Aristotle\u2019s arguments, distinguishing between primary and secondary principles, substance and contraries, per accidens and per se, and potential and actual\u2014though M. suggests (n. 16) that at least once \u201cSimplicius has no clue.\u201d\r\n\r\nSimplicius draws parallels between Aristotelian matter and Plato\u2019s Receptacle in Timaeus and the great-and-small in Philebus. He defines matter explicitly at 230,22 and finds congruence between Plato and Aristotle regarding the distinction between the first form, which is genuinely separate, and the natural form immanent in individual compound objects, which perishes with the compound.\r\n\r\nSimplicius uses Aristotle\u2019s discussion of privation in chapters 7\u20139 to defend Plato against the charge of giving undue credence to Parmenides' unitary concept of Being. He extensively quotes Sophist to show that Plato recognized but did not emphasize privation, opting instead to discuss the presence or absence of form. Where Aristotle uses privation, Plato prefers the concept of \"the other.\" Simplicius concludes that Plato and Aristotle are not in conflict regarding principles: Plato sought the per se causes of being that are elemental and inherent, while Aristotle sought causes of change, including privation as a per accidens cause.\r\n\r\nSimplicius frequently cites other commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, offering a dense and complex analysis that illuminates not only Aristotle\u2019s text but also its reception by a Neoplatonist of the 6th century AD.\r\n\r\nThis edition, translated by four contributors with glossaries by Sebastian Gertz and editorial notes by Richard Sorabji, provides accurate and fluent translations with minimal errors, despite being a collective effort. However, a more detailed note on logos, often left untranslated, would be valuable. Note 252 on p. 155 repeats paragraph 3 of the Introduction (p. 11). Overall, this translation is a significant contribution to Aristotelian studies. [The entire review p. 113-114]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nqkDsZcyl8kNw0V","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":117,"full_name":"Fleet, Barrie","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":594,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"8","issue":"1","pages":"113-114"}},"sort":["\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)"]}