{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1127","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1127,"authors_free":[{"id":1702,"entry_id":1127,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":10,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Booth, N.B.","free_first_name":"N.B.","free_last_name":"Booth","norm_person":{"id":10,"first_name":"N. B.","last_name":"Booth","full_name":"Booth, N. B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?","main_title":{"title":"Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?"},"abstract":"This article by N. B. Booth examines whether Zeno's arguments were a response to criticisms of Parmenides's principle \u201ethe One\u201c. Despite evidence that Zeno was concerned with defending Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c, his arguments about plurality seem to refute the \"ones\" of a plurality. One possible explanation is that Zeno's arguments were used to counter criticisms of Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c before he produced them. Plato's Parmenides includes a passage in which \"Zeno\" apologizes for his book on plurality, which has been interpreted as an answer to criticisms of Parmenides's theory, but Booth notes that Plato's characters are idealized and it is not certain that Zeno's arguments were a response to attacks. Booth looks at the arguments themselves for evidence and suggests that if some of Zeno's arguments against plural \"ones\" were valid against Parmenides's \u201eOne\u201c, it would be fair to infer that they were used by hostile critics and Zeno was throwing them back in their faces. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"1957","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Z24XRGSFJxejYPK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":10,"full_name":"Booth, N. B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1127,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"2","issue":"1","pages":"1-9"}},"sort":["Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1148","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1148,"authors_free":[{"id":1723,"entry_id":1148,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":148,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","free_first_name":"Michael J.","free_last_name":"Griffin","norm_person":{"id":148,"first_name":"Michael J.","last_name":"Griffin","full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1065676603","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\"","main_title":{"title":"What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\""},"abstract":"One of the more provocative mysteries of later ancient philosophy is how Porphyiy came \r\nto situate the Categories of Aristotle at the outset of the nascent Neoplatonic curriculum.\r\nAfter all, the Categories tends to strike modem readers as a temperamentally counter-Platonic work, in which Aristotle grants ontological priority to perceptible subjects over intelligible genera and species, and we are led to wonder how a Platonist would be \r\nmotivated to encourage its use as a general introduction to philosophy. The commentary \r\ntradition has left us with several layers of evidence for Porphyry's reasoning. First, in answer to the general question \"Why should a philosopher study the Categories?\" we have \r\nPorphyry's assertion that the ten Aristotelian schemata of predication carve the genera of \r\nbeing accurately at the joints (in Cat. 58,5-59,33), that this isomorphism between kind of simple referring terms and kinds of beings facilitates human knowledge, and that the \r\nphilosopher's path therefore begins from the correct inteipretation of the Categories (see for example T9-11, discussed below). Second, in response to the question 'Why is the Categories compatible with Platonism?\u2019, we have Porphyry\u2019s account that the Categories introduces the student to the study of referring terms, which refer primarily to perceptible beings; after we have grasped the correct application of language to perceptibles, \r\nhowever, we are prepared to 'ascend by analogy\u2019 to the study of intelligibles, which is \r\nPlato\u2019s ambit. But this pedagogical solution, while it jibes elegantly with Porphyry!s \r\ndecision to bracket metaphysical questions from introductory logic {cf. Isagoge 4,10-15, with Barnes 2003 ad loc.), also suggests a tension between two layers of Porphyry\u2019s thought about die Categories. On the one hand, we are motivated to read the treatise \r\nbecause its divisions ofmeaningful language exhaustively and accurately picture being; on the other hand, we acknowledge that the text has nothing to say about die most important kind of being, namely intelligible being. In other words, Porphyry\u2019s leading \r\nargument in favour of studying the Categories (its comprehensiveness) seems like a strange bedfellow for his leading argument in favour of its compatibility with Platonism \r\n(its restrictedness); and the source of this general tension is the first puzzle that I would like to explore in this essay. [Introduction, pp. 69 f.]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/E7XiS12GrRNsPr9","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":148,"full_name":"Griffin, Michael J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1148,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies","volume":"55","issue":"1","pages":"69-108"}},"sort":["What does Aristotle categorize? Semantics and the early peripatetic reading of the \"Categories\""]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1317","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1317,"authors_free":[{"id":1951,"entry_id":1317,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What is Platonism?","main_title":{"title":"What is Platonism?"},"abstract":"My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of \u201ctop-downism.\u201d So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there\r\nare at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be\r\nsimilarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Goxyyq1Id3kdZDT","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1317,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the History of Philosophy","volume":"43","issue":"3","pages":"253-276"}},"sort":["What is Platonism?"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"901","_score":null,"_source":{"id":901,"authors_free":[{"id":1330,"entry_id":901,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":121,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Foulkes, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Foulkes","norm_person":{"id":121,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Foulkes","full_name":"Foulkes, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/127222294","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Where was Simplicius?","main_title":{"title":"Where was Simplicius?"},"abstract":"In Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987, reviewed in JHS cx [1990] 244-45), the editor, Mme I. Hadot, in the first part of the biographical introduction, cites Agathias Hist. ii 31, 4. This is usually taken to show that the Neoplatonists, who had fled to the Persian court when Justinian closed down the Academy in 529, went back to Athens after 532. That view, she holds, rests on a misreading of the text (\u2026\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c6\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u1f24\u03b8\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f78\u03bd \u1f72\u03c6\u1fbf \u1f10\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u2013\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c3\u2026). However, she herself misconstrues \u1f10\u03c6\u1fbf \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u2013\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 as \u2018selon leur choix\u2019': that is, on returning from exile to their own accustomed places, these men should henceforth live without fear as they might choose. To yield that version, the Greek would have to be \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbf \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2. The actual expression means \u2018amongst themselves\u2019: they might philosophise, but not in public. That a touch of private heterodoxy amongst the learned few is harmless if it does not stir up the ignorant many was well understood, indeed explicitly so later, in Islam and mediaeval Christianity.","btype":3,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8tpRlB0YO8USEBq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":121,"full_name":"Foulkes, Paul","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":901,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"112","issue":"","pages":"143"}},"sort":["Where was Simplicius?"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"984","_score":null,"_source":{"id":984,"authors_free":[{"id":1485,"entry_id":984,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":219,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","free_first_name":"Theokritos","free_last_name":"Kouremenos","norm_person":{"id":219,"first_name":"Theokritos","last_name":"Kouremenos","full_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/113872224","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?","main_title":{"title":"Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?"},"abstract":"In Cael. 3.1 Aristotle argues against those who posit that all bodies are generated because they are made from, and dissolve into, \r\nplanes, namely Plato and perhaps other members of the Academy who subscribed to the Timaeus physics (cf. Simplicius, In Cael. \r\n561,8-11 [Heiberg]). ]). In his Timaeus Plato assigns to each of the \r\ntraditional Empedoclean elements a regular polyhedron: the tetra- hedron or pyramid to fire, the cube to earth, the octahedron to air and the icosahedron to water... [p. 328]","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xotNGBOXS7M4jeg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":219,"full_name":"Kouremenos, Theokritos","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":984,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"146","issue":"3\/4","pages":"328-345"}},"sort":["Why Does Plato's Element Theory Conflict With Mathematics (Arist. Cael. 299a2-6)?"]}