{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"407","_score":null,"_source":{"id":407,"authors_free":[{"id":545,"entry_id":407,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Predication","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Predication"},"abstract":"This paper deals with Simplicius\u2019 discussion of Aristotle\u2019s account of predication in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Of particular interest is the relation between synonymous predication and essential predication. In Aristotle, as well as in Simplicius, both kinds of predication are closely connected. It has been argued in Aristotelian scholarship that, for Aristotle, synonymous predication yields essential predication. It has been equally argued that this assumption is compatible with Aristotle\u2019s theoretical framework, but if applied to Plato, would pose a problem for Plato. Simplicius\u2019 extensive discussion of both synonymous predication and essential predication suggests that he was aware of the deeper problem raised by the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication. In this paper, I will argue that Simplicius, by means of an original interpretation of the predicate, not only turns the assumption that synonymous predication yields essential predication into a supposition that is less problematic for Plato, but also creates a framework for a possible harmonization of Plato and Aristotle. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8YoeRxX8j2IaSIZ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":407,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"173-200"}},"sort":["Simplicius on Predication"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"977","_score":null,"_source":{"id":977,"authors_free":[{"id":1476,"entry_id":977,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)"},"abstract":"Aristotle in Physics 1,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate \"cognition according to the definition and through the elements,\" and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to recon struct Simplicius' reading of \"Socrates' Dream,\" its place in the Theaetetus larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. ","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hFUY0I2JzLFnSQG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":977,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"55","issue":"3","pages":"255-270"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"541","_score":null,"_source":{"id":541,"authors_free":[{"id":765,"entry_id":541,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":132,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gaskin, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Gaskin","norm_person":{"id":132,"first_name":"Richard ","last_name":"Gaskin","full_name":"Gaskin, Richard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1049853571","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28"},"abstract":"At Categories 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as \"Socrates is sitting,\" as what later writers were to call com- plexe significabilia, i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting. Simplicius' dis- cussion of this passage in his commentary on the Categories clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a complexe significabile in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the Categories text with the first chapter of De Interpretatione. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1998","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EaKnMBd1Vmh7E5T","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":132,"full_name":"Gaskin, Richard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":541,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"43","issue":"1","pages":"42\u201362"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Meaning of Sentences: A Commentary on \"In Cat.\" 396,30-397,28"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1145","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1145,"authors_free":[{"id":1718,"entry_id":1145,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change"},"abstract":"The ancient commentators\u2019 approach to Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f71) or a character (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1f75\u03c1) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (\u1f00\u03c0\u1f79\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus\u2019 Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus\u2019 construal of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EIKXB0T5OT2ezjh","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1145,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"37","issue":"","pages":"245-274"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"692","_score":null,"_source":{"id":692,"authors_free":[{"id":1030,"entry_id":692,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":4,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","free_first_name":"Ilsetraut","free_last_name":"Hadot","norm_person":{"id":4,"first_name":"Ilsetraut","last_name":"Hadot","full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/107415011","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's \"De Anima\" (CAG XI) : A Methodological Study","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's \"De Anima\" (CAG XI) : A Methodological Study"},"abstract":"This article represents a new contribution to the author's debate with C. Steel as to the authenticity of the Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, attributed by the manuscripts to the 6th-century A.D. Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius. On the basis of what he claims are stylistic and doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries, Steel has argued that the In DA cannot be by Simplicius, but is instead to be attributed to his contemporary Priscian of Lydia. In the present article, it is argued (1) that the alleged stylistic differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other commentaries can be explained by other considerations: in particular, the vocabulary and style of the Neoplatonist commentators is largely determined by the text commented upon, as well as the level of studies of the audience for whom each commentary is intended. (2) The alleged doctrinal differences between the In DA and Simplicius' other com- mentaries simply do not exist. Careful examination of Steel's arguments shows that they suffer from serious methodological flaws, including the failure to take into consideration Simplicius' Commentary on the Manual of Epictetus, and the ambiguity of Neoplatonic philosophical terminology. It is concluded that in the whole of Steel's argumentation, there is not one decisive argument which would allow us to conclude that the commentary on the De Anima, attributed by direct and indirect tradition to Simplicius, is inauthentic. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kB5BDlY4hvsJToF","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":692,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Mnemosyne, Fourth Series","volume":"55","issue":"2","pages":"159\u2013199"}},"sort":["Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's \"De Anima\" (CAG XI) : A Methodological Study"]}