{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"729","_score":null,"_source":{"id":729,"authors_free":[{"id":1092,"entry_id":729,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":252,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McGinnis, Jon","free_first_name":"Jon","free_last_name":"McGinnis","norm_person":{"id":252,"first_name":"Jon","last_name":"McGinnis","full_name":"McGinnis, Jon","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/141369248","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian","main_title":{"title":"Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian"},"abstract":"Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controversy among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel intro- duction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2006","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3eYjGVkKe2HRkaK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":252,"full_name":"McGinnis, Jon","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":729,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"51","issue":"2","pages":"140-161"}},"sort":["Positioning Heaven: The Infidelity of a Faithful Aristotelian"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1077","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1077,"authors_free":[{"id":1632,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":12,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bossier, Fernand","free_first_name":"Fernand","free_last_name":"Bossier","norm_person":{"id":12,"first_name":"Fernand ","last_name":"Bossier","full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1017981663","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1633,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius"},"abstract":"What I want to do in this paper is to look at how Aristotle\u2019s successors treated some points in his discussions of reason, and in particular the discussion in the De anima. about their handling of relevant parts of the Nichomachaean Ethics we know very little, for unlike the De anima that treatise was not a major subject of study in the philosophical lectures and seminars of late antiquity. Though a commentary on some of it had been written by Aspasius, and notes by other, probably pre -Neoplatonic, hands survive, exposition of the Nicomachean Ethics seems to have been one of the gaps that the group of Aristotelians around Anna Comnena in twelfth-century Constantinople felt that they needed to fill. [pp. 104 f.]\r\nSource: https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/MADsskDf9a78Egx\r\n\u2022\tBossier, Fernand and Carlos Steel, 1972, \u201cPriscianus Lydus en de \u2018In de Anima\u2019 van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius\u201d, Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie, 34(4): 761\u2013822.\r\nAbstract: Dans cet article, nous avons essay\u00e9 d'examiner la valeur de l'attribution traditionnelle du commentaire In De Anima \u00e0 Simplicius. En comparant ce trait\u00e9 aux grands commentaires de Simplicius (sur les Cat\u00e9gories, la Physique et le De Caelo d'Aristote), nous avons \u00e9t\u00e9 en effet frapp\u00e9s par les divergences de style et de langue, ainsi que par la mani\u00e8re diff\u00e9rente de commenter. \r\nDans la premi\u00e8re partie, nous d\u00e9montrons que l'auteur du In De Anima a \u00e9crit \u00e9galement la Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, qui nous a \u00e9t\u00e9 transmise sous le nom de Priscien le Lydien. Dans le In De Anima, l'auteur renvoie \u00e0 une de ses \u0153uvres, qu'il appelle \"Epitom\u00e9 de la Physique de Th\u00e9ophraste\". En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, cette r\u00e9f\u00e9rence se rapporte \u00e0 un passage de la Metaphrase de Priscien, o\u00f9 la m\u00eame probl\u00e9matique est expos\u00e9e dans des termes identiques. - 2\u00b0 Une comparaison d\u00e9taill\u00e9e, qui porte sur l'ensemble des deux \u0153uvres, nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le une telle ressemblance de style et de pens\u00e9e - il y a m\u00eame des phrases \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s identiques - qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer que par l'hypoth\u00e8se de l'identit\u00e9 de l'auteur.\r\nDans la deuxi\u00e8me partie, nous essayons d'identifier l'auteur de ces deux \u0153uvres qui nous ont pourtant \u00e9t\u00e9 transmises sous deux noms diff\u00e9rents. L'\u00e9tude de la tradition directe et indirecte n'apporte gu\u00e8re de solution, puisque l'attribution des deux textes, l'un \u00e0 Simplicius, l'autre \u00e0 Priscien, y para\u00eet tr\u00e8s solide. Ce n'est donc que par une critique interne du In De Anima, notamment par la confrontation avec les commentaires de Simplicius, dont l'attribution est certaine, que la question pourra \u00eatre tranch\u00e9e.\r\nDans le In De Anima, l'auteur renvoie trois fois \u00e0 son commentaire sur la Physique. Pourtant, il est bien difficile de retrouver dans le grand commentaire de Simplicius trois passages dont le contenu et surtout le vocabulaire prouvent que l'auteur s'y r\u00e9f\u00e8re. - 2\u00b0 Dans le In De Anima, on ne retrouve pas les traits caract\u00e9ristiques de la m\u00e9thode de commenter de Simplicius, ni l'approche du texte par la documentation historique, ni les longues discussions avec les ex\u00e9g\u00e8tes ant\u00e9rieurs, ni l'expos\u00e9 prolixe et bien structur\u00e9 ; d'autre part, aucun des commentaires de Simplicius ne t\u00e9moigne de la phras\u00e9ologie tortueuse de notre \u0153uvre, ni de ses formules st\u00e9r\u00e9otyp\u00e9es. - 3\u00b0 La diff\u00e9rence doctrinale est encore plus importante. Nulle part chez Simplicius n'appara\u00eet la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e2me comme \"\u00e9manation\", qui est si fondamentale dans le In De Anima (\"\u00e9manation\" y est un concept-cl\u00e9). Les rares digressions du In De Anima \u00e0 propos de questions physiques et logiques ne correspondent pas aux expos\u00e9s de Simplicius sur les m\u00eames probl\u00e8mes. Ainsi, nous avons confront\u00e9 la doctrine de la \"physis\", de l'\u00e2me et de son \"automotion\", et enfin le rapport entre le \"genre\" et les diff\u00e9rences \"constitutives\" et \"di\u00e9r\u00e9tiques\". De tout cela se d\u00e9gage une telle divergence entre le In De Anima et les autres commentaires qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer par une \u00e9volution chez Simplicius lui-m\u00eame. Le In De Anima lui est donc faussement attribu\u00e9 ; et puisque nous avons \u00e9tabli que ce commentaire est du m\u00eame auteur que la Metaphrase, nous pouvons conclure qu'il a \u00e9t\u00e9 vraisemblablement \u00e9crit par Priscien le Lydien, un philosophe n\u00e9oplatonicien dont nous savons seulement qu'il a accompagn\u00e9 Damascius et Simplicius en exil en Perse.\r\n[author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ufNuMRxWJbAzWRP","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":12,"full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1077,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"34","issue":"4","pages":"761-822"}},"sort":["Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"864","_score":null,"_source":{"id":864,"authors_free":[{"id":1268,"entry_id":864,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":211,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Opsomer, Jan","free_first_name":"Jan","free_last_name":"Opsomer","norm_person":{"id":211,"first_name":"Jan","last_name":"Opsomer","full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1120966310","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (\"De mal. subs.\" 30-7)","main_title":{"title":"Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (\"De mal. subs.\" 30-7)"},"abstract":"In De malorum subsistentia chs 30-7, Proclus criticizes the view that evil is to be identified with matter. His main target is Plotinus' account in Enn. 1,8 [51]. Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul, and that it is evil or a principle of evil. According to Proclus, matter is good, because it is produced \r\nby the One. Plotinus' doctrine of matter-evil is the result of a different conception of emanation, according to which matter does not revert to its principle. Proclus claims that to posit a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dualism, or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus does not seem to be able to escape the latter consequence, if he is to remain committed to the Neoplatonic conception of causation. Plotinus equated matter with privation and said it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance, thus violating fundamental Aristotelian tenets. Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy, as does Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories. It is possible that Iamblichus was the source of both Proclus and Simplicius, and that he was the originator of the parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments. [Author\u2019s abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/gqfBrMY4Rb14VQA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":211,"full_name":"Opsomer, Jan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":864,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"46","issue":"2","pages":"154-188"}},"sort":["Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (\"De mal. subs.\" 30-7)"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"756","_score":null,"_source":{"id":756,"authors_free":[{"id":1121,"entry_id":756,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":64,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Djebbar, Ahmed","free_first_name":"Ahmed","free_last_name":"Djebbar","norm_person":{"id":64,"first_name":"Ahmed","last_name":"Djebbar","full_name":"Djebbar, Ahmed","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/143395904","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Quelques exemples de scholies dans la tradition arabe des \"\u00c9l\u00e9ments\" d'Euclide","main_title":{"title":"Quelques exemples de scholies dans la tradition arabe des \"\u00c9l\u00e9ments\" d'Euclide"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"2003","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EBbtQw69clAwZZN","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":64,"full_name":"Djebbar, Ahmed","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":756,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue d'histoire des sciences","volume":"56","issue":"2","pages":"293-321"}},"sort":["Quelques exemples de scholies dans la tradition arabe des \"\u00c9l\u00e9ments\" d'Euclide"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because hu\u00admans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as\u00ad\r\nsent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is \r\nreason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, \r\nand if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational \r\ncapacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":["Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"]}