| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because humans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as sent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is reason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational capacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because hu\u00admans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as\u00ad\r\nsent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is \r\nreason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, \r\nand if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational \r\ncapacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":[2016]}
| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 37 |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EIKXB0T5OT2ezjh |
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| Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2000 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 18 |
| Pages | 320-356 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/j0udJ8WCs6KOIWe |
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| Title | Metacommentary |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 267-281 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Barnes, Jonathan |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
| [Conclusion, pp. 281 f.]: Simplicius is in the scholarly news;27 the Neoplatonists are making a comeback; and the Greek commentaries on Aristotle are submitting to renewed scholarly scrutiny and enjoying some little publicity.28 Students of Greek philosophy have always referred to Simplicius and his fellows; but they have usually read a page here and a paragraph there, and their primary interest in the works has been in their value as sources for earlier thought (for the Presocratics, for the Stoics). This approach to a text has its dangers; and it is an unqualified good that Simplicius’ works are now being studied hard for themselves and as wholes. The French metacommentary may be regarded, and should be welcomed, as a part of this enterprise. But I am, I suspect, not alone in hoping that the next nine fascicles may prove a touch more sprightly and a touch more lithe. |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/n1H4zCNUKsZGBoC |
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| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Volume | X |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
| Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretative methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field. [offical abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/McNZQQDOEYD4Ihz |
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| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Series | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/anTH9fx9QKBfykf |
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| Title | The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 175-189 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| n 19671 had only just begun to study Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion, and I had had at that time my first few doubts about whether Praechter’s views on the dogmatic position of Alexandrian Neo platonism were well founded.2 Praechter had at least formulated these views in the form of hypotheses, but despite his circumspection, they had quickly become unassailable certainties for historians, universally admired and accepted for over fifty years. It was just at this point that I came across the contribution of A. C. Lloyd, who dared to say3 that Praechter had misread or read too hastily the passages in Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus which referred to first principles, on which Praechter largely based his theory. It was Lloyd again, in the same paper,4 who put historians of philosophy on their guard against the tendency (likewise deriving from Praechter) to minimize, or even to refuse to acknowledge, the importance of the fact that for a long time all the Neoplatonists believed in a fundamental agreement between Plato’s philosophy and Aristotle’s. In my book Le Problème du néo platonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius’ I simply followed the track marked out by Lloyd. And even now, in the translation with com mentary of Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories which has been undertaken under my editorship,5 61 am attempting to carry further the critique of Praechter’s hypotheses which Lloyd began.This will also be the case in the present paper, which will bring out some of the results which might be reached by working on the Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. [pp. 175 f.] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XguF7or4lVRgRJ5 |
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It was just at this point that I \r\ncame across the contribution of A. C. Lloyd, who dared to say3 that \r\nPraechter had misread or read too hastily the passages in Simplicius\u2019 \r\ncommentary on Epictetus which referred to first principles, on which \r\nPraechter largely based his theory. It was Lloyd again, in the same \r\npaper,4 who put historians of philosophy on their guard against the tendency (likewise deriving from Praechter) to minimize, or even to \r\nrefuse to acknowledge, the importance of the fact that for a long time all \r\nthe Neoplatonists believed in a fundamental agreement between \r\nPlato\u2019s philosophy and Aristotle\u2019s. In my book Le Probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9o\u00ad\r\nplatonisme alexandrin: Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius\u2019 I simply followed the track \r\nmarked out by Lloyd. And even now, in the translation with com\u00ad\r\nmentary of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the Categories which has been \r\nundertaken under my editorship,5 61 am attempting to carry further the \r\ncritique of Praechter\u2019s hypotheses which Lloyd began.This will also be the case in the present paper, which will bring out \r\nsome of the results which might be reached by working on the \r\nNeoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. [pp. 175 f.]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/XguF7or4lVRgRJ5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":4,"full_name":"Hadot, Ilsetraut","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":640,"section_of":354,"pages":"175-189","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/anTH9fx9QKBfykf","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Nous pathêtikos in later Greek philosophy |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 191-205 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous poietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos never occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. 430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators subsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, even if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. Similarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in the pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous poietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, however, though the expression occurs in Aristotle’s De anima, its reference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often appears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do with the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous literature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous pathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This paper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- platonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and clarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PSQSiQsqV3rsx6F |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"894","_score":null,"_source":{"id":894,"authors_free":[{"id":1317,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1319,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1320,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy"},"abstract":"In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of \r\nT\u00fcbingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous \r\npoietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos \r\nnever occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. \r\n430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators \r\nsubsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, \r\neven if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. \r\nSimilarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in \r\nthe pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous \r\npoietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, \r\nhowever, though the expression occurs in Aristotle\u2019s De anima, its \r\nreference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often \r\nappears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do \r\nwith the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous \r\nliterature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous \r\npathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This \r\npaper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- \r\nplatonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and \r\nclarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PSQSiQsqV3rsx6F","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":894,"section_of":354,"pages":"191-205","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/anTH9fx9QKBfykf","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Aristotle’s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 1-7 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Kerferd, George B. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| [Conclusion, p. 7]: id Aristotle envisage the same criticism as this of Parmenides? Some help here may be derived from a consideration of what Aristotle says in Metaph. i,986bi8-987a2. Aristotle clearly felt that one of his own greatest discoveries was the need for Matter as a substrate to explain how what is one in definition can come to appear or be seen as many in experience. It is perhaps with this in mind that he proceeds to speak in praise of Parmenides’ insight and declares of him that claiming that besides the existent nothing non-existent exists, he thinks that of necessity one thing exists, viz. the existent and nothing else ... But being forced to follow the observed facts, and supposing the existence of that which is one in definition, but more than one according to our sensations, he now posits two causes and two principles calling them hot and cold, i.e. fire and earth; of these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the non existent. (Trans. W. D. Ross) It should, I suggest, be apparent that this fits perfectly with what Aristotle says in the De caelo and with Simplicius’ approach. It may even in addition be a correct account of what Parmenides was saying, though now rephrased in Aristotle’s own language. But this is indeed another question. |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/W835pVoHs7zvZ2Q |
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| Title | Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3 |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 165-173 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in De anitna, 3 . 3 , is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle there seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind which cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought, a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call ‘imagination’, at least has a good deal in common with it; but tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is hard to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been a number of recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle’s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere.1 I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination; in all three cases the way they see Aristotle’s position is affected by the account of imagination which they themselves favour. [p. 165] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6y9e2bG9M7snije |
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| Title | Aristotle’s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 1-7 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Kerferd, George B. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
[Conclusion, p. 7]: id Aristotle envisage the same criticism as this of Parmenides? Some help here may be derived from a consideration of what Aristotle says in Metaph. i,986bi8-987a2. Aristotle clearly felt that one of his own greatest discoveries was the need for Matter as a substrate to explain how what is one in definition can come to appear or be seen as many in experience. It is perhaps with this in mind that he proceeds to speak in praise of Parmenides’ insight and declares of him that claiming that besides the existent nothing non-existent exists, he thinks that of necessity one thing exists, viz. the existent and nothing else ... But being forced to follow the observed facts, and supposing the existence of that which is one in definition, but more than one according to our sensations, he now posits two causes and two principles calling them hot and cold, i.e. fire and earth; of these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the non existent. (Trans. W. D. Ross) It should, I suggest, be apparent that this fits perfectly with what Aristotle says in the De caelo and with Simplicius’ approach. It may even in addition be a correct account of what Parmenides was saying, though now rephrased in Aristotle’s own language. But this is indeed another question. |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/W835pVoHs7zvZ2Q |
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| Title | Metacommentary |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 267-281 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Barnes, Jonathan |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
[Conclusion, pp. 281 f.]: Simplicius is in the scholarly news;27 the Neoplatonists are making a comeback; and the Greek commentaries on Aristotle are submitting to renewed scholarly scrutiny and enjoying some little publicity.28 Students of Greek philosophy have always referred to Simplicius and his fellows; but they have usually read a page here and a paragraph there, and their primary interest in the works has been in their value as sources for earlier thought (for the Presocratics, for the Stoics). This approach to a text has its dangers; and it is an unqualified good that Simplicius’ works are now being studied hard for themselves and as wholes. The French metacommentary may be regarded, and should be welcomed, as a part of this enterprise. But I am, I suspect, not alone in hoping that the next nine fascicles may prove a touch more sprightly and a touch more lithe. |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/n1H4zCNUKsZGBoC |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"646","_score":null,"_source":{"id":646,"authors_free":[{"id":924,"entry_id":646,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":416,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Barnes, Jonathan","free_first_name":"Jonathan","free_last_name":"Barnes","norm_person":{"id":416,"first_name":"Jonathan","last_name":"Barnes","full_name":"Barnes, Jonathan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134306627","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":925,"entry_id":646,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":415,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Annas, Julia","free_first_name":"Julia","free_last_name":"Annas","norm_person":{"id":415,"first_name":"Julia","last_name":"Annas","full_name":"Annas, Julia","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/112065120","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Metacommentary","main_title":{"title":"Metacommentary"},"abstract":"[Conclusion, pp. 281 f.]: Simplicius is in the scholarly news;27 the Neoplatonists are making a \r\ncomeback; and the Greek commentaries on Aristotle are submitting to \r\nrenewed scholarly scrutiny and enjoying some little publicity.28 \r\nStudents of Greek philosophy have always referred to Simplicius and \r\nhis fellows; but they have usually read a page here and a paragraph there, and their primary interest in the works has been in their value as \r\nsources for earlier thought (for the Presocratics, for the Stoics). This \r\napproach to a text has its dangers; and it is an unqualified good that \r\nSimplicius\u2019 works are now being studied hard for themselves and as \r\nwholes. The French metacommentary may be regarded, and should \r\nbe welcomed, as a part of this enterprise. But I am, I suspect, not alone \r\nin hoping that the next nine fascicles may prove a touch more sprightly \r\nand a touch more lithe.","btype":2,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/n1H4zCNUKsZGBoC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":416,"full_name":"Barnes, Jonathan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":415,"full_name":"Annas, Julia","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":646,"section_of":285,"pages":"267-281","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":285,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Annas1992","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1992","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1992","abstract":"","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/McNZQQDOEYD4Ihz","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":285,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"","volume":"X","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Metacommentary"]}
| Title | Nous pathêtikos in later Greek philosophy |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 191-205 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous poietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos never occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. 430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators subsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, even if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. Similarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in the pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous poietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, however, though the expression occurs in Aristotle’s De anima, its reference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often appears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do with the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous literature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous pathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This paper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- platonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and clarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PSQSiQsqV3rsx6F |
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| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Volume | X |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretative methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field. [offical abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/McNZQQDOEYD4Ihz |
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| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Series | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/anTH9fx9QKBfykf |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"354","_score":null,"_source":{"id":354,"authors_free":[{"id":460,"entry_id":354,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":461,"entry_id":354,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","main_title":{"title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition"},"abstract":"","btype":4,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/anTH9fx9QKBfykf","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition"]}
| Title | Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3 |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 165-173 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in De anitna, 3 . 3 , is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle there seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind which cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought, a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call ‘imagination’, at least has a good deal in common with it; but tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is hard to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been a number of recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle’s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere.1 I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination; in all three cases the way they see Aristotle’s position is affected by the account of imagination which they themselves favour. [p. 165] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6y9e2bG9M7snije |
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| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because humans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as sent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is reason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational capacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD |
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| Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2000 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 18 |
| Pages | 320-356 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/j0udJ8WCs6KOIWe |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"414","_score":null,"_source":{"id":414,"authors_free":[{"id":555,"entry_id":414,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":280,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Osborne, Catherine","free_first_name":"Catherine","free_last_name":"Osborne","norm_person":{"id":280,"first_name":"Catherine","last_name":"Rowett","full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142220116","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg","main_title":{"title":"Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg"},"abstract":"Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi\u2019s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 \r\nthat a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the \r\nauspices of the Biblioth\u00e8que Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless\u2014-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication\u20141 propose \r\nto begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among \r\nthe undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/j0udJ8WCs6KOIWe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":280,"full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":414,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"18","issue":"","pages":"320-356"}},"sort":["Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg"]}
| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 37 |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EIKXB0T5OT2ezjh |
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| Title | The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 175-189 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
n 19671 had only just begun to study Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion, and I had had at that time my first few doubts about whether Praechter’s views on the dogmatic position of Alexandrian Neo platonism were well founded.2 Praechter had at least formulated these views in the form of hypotheses, but despite his circumspection, they had quickly become unassailable certainties for historians, universally admired and accepted for over fifty years. It was just at this point that I came across the contribution of A. C. Lloyd, who dared to say3 that Praechter had misread or read too hastily the passages in Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus which referred to first principles, on which Praechter largely based his theory. It was Lloyd again, in the same paper,4 who put historians of philosophy on their guard against the tendency (likewise deriving from Praechter) to minimize, or even to refuse to acknowledge, the importance of the fact that for a long time all the Neoplatonists believed in a fundamental agreement between Plato’s philosophy and Aristotle’s. In my book Le Problème du néo platonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius’ I simply followed the track marked out by Lloyd. And even now, in the translation with com mentary of Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories which has been undertaken under my editorship,5 61 am attempting to carry further the critique of Praechter’s hypotheses which Lloyd began.This will also be the case in the present paper, which will bring out some of the results which might be reached by working on the Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. [pp. 175 f.] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/XguF7or4lVRgRJ5 |
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It was just at this point that I \r\ncame across the contribution of A. C. Lloyd, who dared to say3 that \r\nPraechter had misread or read too hastily the passages in Simplicius\u2019 \r\ncommentary on Epictetus which referred to first principles, on which \r\nPraechter largely based his theory. It was Lloyd again, in the same \r\npaper,4 who put historians of philosophy on their guard against the tendency (likewise deriving from Praechter) to minimize, or even to \r\nrefuse to acknowledge, the importance of the fact that for a long time all \r\nthe Neoplatonists believed in a fundamental agreement between \r\nPlato\u2019s philosophy and Aristotle\u2019s. In my book Le Probl\u00e8me du n\u00e9o\u00ad\r\nplatonisme alexandrin: Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius\u2019 I simply followed the track \r\nmarked out by Lloyd. And even now, in the translation with com\u00ad\r\nmentary of Simplicius\u2019 commentary on the Categories which has been \r\nundertaken under my editorship,5 61 am attempting to carry further the \r\ncritique of Praechter\u2019s hypotheses which Lloyd began.This will also be the case in the present paper, which will bring out \r\nsome of the results which might be reached by working on the \r\nNeoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. 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