| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason. Ps.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will. On this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons. This account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions? You are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent. [conclusion p. 286] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y |
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| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | Brad Inwood |
| Translator(s) |
| The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. In the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers’ mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof. Corresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle’s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus’ distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations. The first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes. Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7). How to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius’ and the other late commentators’ discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius’ discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates. In the second section, I turn to Simplicius’ criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates. In light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius’ discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination. In conclusion, I show that Simplicius’ conception of relations originates in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and in Damascius’ account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius’ motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. [introduction p. 245-248] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR |
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Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac) or a character (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus\u2019 construal of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives.\r\n\r\nIn the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers\u2019 mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof.\r\n\r\nCorresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus\u2019 distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations.\r\n\r\nThe first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes.\r\n\r\nPlotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7).\r\n\r\nHow to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius\u2019 and the other late commentators\u2019 discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius\u2019 discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn the second section, I turn to Simplicius\u2019 criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius\u2019 discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination.\r\n\r\nIn conclusion, I show that Simplicius\u2019 conception of relations originates in Proclus\u2019 commentary on Plato\u2019s Parmenides and in Damascius\u2019 account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius\u2019 motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. [introduction p. 245-248]","btype":2,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1145,"section_of":1602,"pages":"245-274","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1602,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"bibliography","type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Inwood2009","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2009","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"One of the leading series on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy presents outstanding new work in the field. The volumes feature original essays on a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient philosophy, from its earliest beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. It is anonymously peer-reviewed and appears twice a year.\r\n\r\nThe series was founded in 1983, and in 2016 published its 50th volume. The series format was chosen so that it might include essays of more substantial length than is customarily allowed in journals, as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Past editors include Julia Annas, Christopher Taylor, David Sedley, Brad Inwood, and Victor Caston. The current editor, as of July 2022, is Rachana Kamtekar. [official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":1602,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Oxford University Press","series":"","volume":"XXXVII","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":{"id":1145,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"37","issue":"","pages":"245-274"}},"sort":[2009]}
| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Volume | XXXVII |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Brad Inwood |
| Translator(s) |
| One of the leading series on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy presents outstanding new work in the field. The volumes feature original essays on a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient philosophy, from its earliest beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. It is anonymously peer-reviewed and appears twice a year. The series was founded in 1983, and in 2016 published its 50th volume. The series format was chosen so that it might include essays of more substantial length than is customarily allowed in journals, as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Past editors include Julia Annas, Christopher Taylor, David Sedley, Brad Inwood, and Victor Caston. The current editor, as of July 2022, is Rachana Kamtekar. [official abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR |
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| Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2000 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 18 |
| Pages | 320-356 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QrDNAw4eAA3LZ35 |
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| Title | Metacommentary |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 267-281 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Barnes, Jonathan |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
| Simplicius is in the scholarly news; the Neoplatonists are making a comeback; and the Greek commentaries on Aristotle are submitting to renewed scholarly scrutiny and enjoying some little publicity. Students of Greek philosophy have always referred to Simplicius and his fellows; but they have usually read a page here and a paragraph there, and their primary interest in the works has been in their value as sources for earlier thought (for the Presocratics, for the Stoics). This approach to a text has its dangers; and it is an unqualified good that Simplicius’ works are now being studied hard for themselves and as wholes. The French metacommentary may be regarded, and should be welcomed, as a part of this enterprise. But I am, I suspect, not alone in hoping that the next nine fascicles may prove a touch more sprightly and a touch more lithe. [conclusion p. 280-281] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FBuj9EwgXQZ5fXT |
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| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Volume | X |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
| Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretative methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field. [offical abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dS81MCQI85uHYdS |
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| Title | The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 175-189 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| This brief comparison between Plato and Aristotle reveals once again the attitude of our Alexandrian commentators—Philoponus, Olympiodorus, and Elias in the case I have just discussed—towards the philosophers: for them, the two philosophers are mutually complementary, but the genius of the divine Plato is superior to Aristotle. Aristotle only knows how to establish logical rules, which he discovers by analyzing the logical elements in Plato’s work, whereas Plato practiced logical proof spontaneously and intuitively without formulating the rules for it. Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle’s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations. Thanks to Marinus’ Life of Proclus and Damascius’ Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato’s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or ‘minor’ mysteries. So, in directing Proclus’ studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and ‘does not leap over the threshold’; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. Isidore, too, came to Plato’s philosophy after studying Aristotle. I hope to have shown in this paper that the part played by the study of and commentary on Aristotle’s works remained the same up to the end of Neoplatonism. Aristotle was never studied for his own sake by the Neoplatonists, but always as a necessary preparation for the philosophy of Plato. [conclusion p. 188-189] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mXkoXV2wq7SgBs3 |
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Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle\u2019s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations.\r\n\r\nThanks to Marinus\u2019 Life of Proclus and Damascius\u2019 Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato\u2019s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or \u2018minor\u2019 mysteries.\r\n\r\nSo, in directing Proclus\u2019 studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and \u2018does not leap over the threshold\u2019; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. Isidore, too, came to Plato\u2019s philosophy after studying Aristotle.\r\n\r\nI hope to have shown in this paper that the part played by the study of and commentary on Aristotle\u2019s works remained the same up to the end of Neoplatonism. Aristotle was never studied for his own sake by the Neoplatonists, but always as a necessary preparation for the philosophy of Plato. 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The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3 |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 165-173 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought—a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call "imagination," at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle’s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle’s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor. It used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form "I imagine that P" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images. For example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with "non-paradigmatic sensory experiences"—phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai ("It looks like an X"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle’s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle’s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions. More recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum’s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as "the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception." Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image. My concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images. In this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima—those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus’ commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus’ own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus’ views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) [introduction p. 165-167] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lzX0JUImw1D2csY |
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","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1539,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3","main_title":{"title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3"},"abstract":"Aristotle\u2019s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought\u2014a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call \"imagination,\" at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle\u2019s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle\u2019s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor.\r\n\r\nIt used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle\u2019s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form \"I imagine that P\" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images.\r\n\r\nFor example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with \"non-paradigmatic sensory experiences\"\u2014phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai (\"It looks like an X\"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle\u2019s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle\u2019s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions.\r\n\r\nMore recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum\u2019s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as \"the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception.\" Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image.\r\n\r\nMy concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images.\r\n\r\nIn this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima\u2014those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus\u2019 commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus\u2019 own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus\u2019 views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) [introduction p. 165-167]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lzX0JUImw1D2csY","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":43,"full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1021,"section_of":354,"pages":"165-173","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Aristotle’s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 1-7 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Kerferd, George B. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| In his De caelo (3.1, 298b 14–24 — 28 A 25 DK), Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics. But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows: "Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gnôseôs ê phronêseôs) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (tôn ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes." Aristotle’s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold: Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions. Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed. Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes. But there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated "the earliest natural philosophers." The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena. A resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle’s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrachê dieile tas peri geneseôs doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be: No generation at all. All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently. Most things are generated but not the primary substances. All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities. Whatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)—no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether. On the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here: "The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d." [introduction p. 1-3] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"889","_score":null,"_source":{"id":889,"authors_free":[{"id":1309,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":215,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kerferd, George B.","free_first_name":"George B.","free_last_name":"Kerferd","norm_person":{"id":215,"first_name":" George B.","last_name":"Kerferd","full_name":"Kerferd, George B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158138547","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1310,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1311,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides"},"abstract":"In his De caelo (3.1, 298b 14\u201324 \u2014 28 A 25 DK), Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics. But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows:\r\n\r\n\"Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gn\u00f4se\u00f4s \u00ea phron\u00ease\u00f4s) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (t\u00f4n ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes.\"\r\n\r\nAristotle\u2019s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold:\r\n\r\n Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions.\r\n Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed.\r\n Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes.\r\n\r\nBut there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated \"the earliest natural philosophers.\" The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena.\r\n\r\nA resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle\u2019s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrach\u00ea dieile tas peri genese\u00f4s doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be:\r\n\r\n No generation at all.\r\n All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently.\r\n Most things are generated but not the primary substances.\r\n All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities.\r\n\r\nWhatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)\u2014no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether.\r\n\r\nOn the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here:\r\n\r\n\"The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d.\" [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":215,"full_name":"Kerferd, George B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":889,"section_of":354,"pages":"1-7","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Nous pathêtikos in later Greek philosophy |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 191-205 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous poietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos never occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. 430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators subsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, even if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. Similarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in the pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous poietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, however, though the expression occurs in Aristotle’s De anima, its reference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often appears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do with the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous literature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous pathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This paper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- platonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and clarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Di0rd034eeOOHeY |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"894","_score":null,"_source":{"id":894,"authors_free":[{"id":1317,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1319,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1320,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy"},"abstract":"In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of \r\nT\u00fcbingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous \r\npoietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos \r\nnever occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. \r\n430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators \r\nsubsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, \r\neven if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. \r\nSimilarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in \r\nthe pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous \r\npoietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, \r\nhowever, though the expression occurs in Aristotle\u2019s De anima, its \r\nreference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often \r\nappears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do \r\nwith the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous \r\nliterature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous \r\npathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This \r\npaper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- \r\nplatonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and \r\nclarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Di0rd034eeOOHeY","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":894,"section_of":354,"pages":"191-205","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Series | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"354","_score":null,"_source":{"id":354,"authors_free":[{"id":460,"entry_id":354,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":461,"entry_id":354,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","main_title":{"title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition"},"abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","btype":4,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Aristotle’s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 1-7 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Kerferd, George B. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
In his De caelo (3.1, 298b 14–24 — 28 A 25 DK), Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics. But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows:
"Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gnôseôs ê phronêseôs) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (tôn ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes."
Aristotle’s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold:
Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions.
Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed.
Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes.
But there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated "the earliest natural philosophers." The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena.
A resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle’s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrachê dieile tas peri geneseôs doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be:
No generation at all.
All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently.
Most things are generated but not the primary substances.
All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities.
Whatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)—no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether.
On the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here:
"The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d." [introduction p. 1-3] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"889","_score":null,"_source":{"id":889,"authors_free":[{"id":1309,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":215,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kerferd, George B.","free_first_name":"George B.","free_last_name":"Kerferd","norm_person":{"id":215,"first_name":" George B.","last_name":"Kerferd","full_name":"Kerferd, George B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158138547","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1310,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1311,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides"},"abstract":"In his De caelo (3.1, 298b 14\u201324 \u2014 28 A 25 DK), Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics. But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows:\r\n\r\n\"Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gn\u00f4se\u00f4s \u00ea phron\u00ease\u00f4s) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (t\u00f4n ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes.\"\r\n\r\nAristotle\u2019s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold:\r\n\r\n Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions.\r\n Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed.\r\n Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes.\r\n\r\nBut there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated \"the earliest natural philosophers.\" The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena.\r\n\r\nA resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle\u2019s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrach\u00ea dieile tas peri genese\u00f4s doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be:\r\n\r\n No generation at all.\r\n All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently.\r\n Most things are generated but not the primary substances.\r\n All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities.\r\n\r\nWhatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)\u2014no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether.\r\n\r\nOn the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here:\r\n\r\n\"The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d.\" [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":215,"full_name":"Kerferd, George B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":889,"section_of":354,"pages":"1-7","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides"]}
| Title | Metacommentary |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 267-281 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Barnes, Jonathan |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
Simplicius is in the scholarly news; the Neoplatonists are making a comeback; and the Greek commentaries on Aristotle are submitting to renewed scholarly scrutiny and enjoying some little publicity. Students of Greek philosophy have always referred to Simplicius and his fellows; but they have usually read a page here and a paragraph there, and their primary interest in the works has been in their value as sources for earlier thought (for the Presocratics, for the Stoics). This approach to a text has its dangers; and it is an unqualified good that Simplicius’ works are now being studied hard for themselves and as wholes. The French metacommentary may be regarded, and should be welcomed, as a part of this enterprise. But I am, I suspect, not alone in hoping that the next nine fascicles may prove a touch more sprightly and a touch more lithe. [conclusion p. 280-281] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/FBuj9EwgXQZ5fXT |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"646","_score":null,"_source":{"id":646,"authors_free":[{"id":924,"entry_id":646,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":416,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Barnes, Jonathan","free_first_name":"Jonathan","free_last_name":"Barnes","norm_person":{"id":416,"first_name":"Jonathan","last_name":"Barnes","full_name":"Barnes, Jonathan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134306627","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":925,"entry_id":646,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":415,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Annas, Julia","free_first_name":"Julia","free_last_name":"Annas","norm_person":{"id":415,"first_name":"Julia","last_name":"Annas","full_name":"Annas, Julia","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/112065120","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Metacommentary","main_title":{"title":"Metacommentary"},"abstract":"Simplicius is in the scholarly news; the Neoplatonists are making a comeback; and the Greek commentaries on Aristotle are submitting to renewed scholarly scrutiny and enjoying some little publicity. Students of Greek philosophy have always referred to Simplicius and his fellows; but they have usually read a page here and a paragraph there, and their primary interest in the works has been in their value as sources for earlier thought (for the Presocratics, for the Stoics). This approach to a text has its dangers; and it is an unqualified good that Simplicius\u2019 works are now being studied hard for themselves and as wholes. The French metacommentary may be regarded, and should be welcomed, as a part of this enterprise. But I am, I suspect, not alone in hoping that the next nine fascicles may prove a touch more sprightly and a touch more lithe. [conclusion p. 280-281]","btype":2,"date":"1992","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FBuj9EwgXQZ5fXT","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":416,"full_name":"Barnes, Jonathan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":415,"full_name":"Annas, Julia","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":646,"section_of":285,"pages":"267-281","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":285,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Annas1992","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1992","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1992","abstract":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretative methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field. [offical abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dS81MCQI85uHYdS","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":285,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"","volume":"X","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Metacommentary"]}
| Title | Nous pathêtikos in later Greek philosophy |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 191-205 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous poietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos never occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. 430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators subsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, even if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. Similarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in the pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous poietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, however, though the expression occurs in Aristotle’s De anima, its reference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often appears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do with the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous literature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous pathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This paper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- platonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and clarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Di0rd034eeOOHeY |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"894","_score":null,"_source":{"id":894,"authors_free":[{"id":1317,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1319,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1320,"entry_id":894,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy"},"abstract":"In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of \r\nT\u00fcbingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous \r\npoietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos \r\nnever occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. \r\n430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators \r\nsubsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, \r\neven if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. \r\nSimilarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in \r\nthe pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous \r\npoietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, \r\nhowever, though the expression occurs in Aristotle\u2019s De anima, its \r\nreference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often \r\nappears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do \r\nwith the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous \r\nliterature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous \r\npathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This \r\npaper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- \r\nplatonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and \r\nclarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Di0rd034eeOOHeY","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":894,"section_of":354,"pages":"191-205","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy"]}
| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1992 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Volume | X |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Annas, Julia |
| Translator(s) |
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretative methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field. [offical abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dS81MCQI85uHYdS |
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| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Volume | XXXVII |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Brad Inwood |
| Translator(s) |
One of the leading series on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy presents outstanding new work in the field. The volumes feature original essays on a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient philosophy, from its earliest beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. It is anonymously peer-reviewed and appears twice a year. The series was founded in 1983, and in 2016 published its 50th volume. The series format was chosen so that it might include essays of more substantial length than is customarily allowed in journals, as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Past editors include Julia Annas, Christopher Taylor, David Sedley, Brad Inwood, and Victor Caston. The current editor, as of July 2022, is Rachana Kamtekar. [official abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1602","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1602,"authors_free":[{"id":2805,"entry_id":1602,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Brad Inwood","free_first_name":"Brad","free_last_name":"Inwood","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy"},"abstract":"One of the leading series on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy presents outstanding new work in the field. The volumes feature original essays on a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient philosophy, from its earliest beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. It is anonymously peer-reviewed and appears twice a year.\r\n\r\nThe series was founded in 1983, and in 2016 published its 50th volume. The series format was chosen so that it might include essays of more substantial length than is customarily allowed in journals, as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Past editors include Julia Annas, Christopher Taylor, David Sedley, Brad Inwood, and Victor Caston. The current editor, as of July 2022, is Rachana Kamtekar. [official abstract]","btype":4,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":{"id":1602,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Oxford University Press","series":"","volume":"XXXVII","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy"]}
| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Series | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK |
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| Title | Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3 |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 165-173 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought—a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call "imagination," at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle’s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle’s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor.
It used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form "I imagine that P" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images.
For example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with "non-paradigmatic sensory experiences"—phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai ("It looks like an X"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle’s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle’s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions.
More recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum’s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as "the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception." Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image.
My concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images.
In this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima—those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus’ commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus’ own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus’ views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) [introduction p. 165-167] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lzX0JUImw1D2csY |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1021","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1021,"authors_free":[{"id":1537,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":43,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","free_first_name":"Anne D.","free_last_name":"Sheppard","norm_person":{"id":43,"first_name":"Anne D.","last_name":"Sheppard","full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158024592","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1538,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J. ","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1539,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3","main_title":{"title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3"},"abstract":"Aristotle\u2019s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought\u2014a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call \"imagination,\" at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle\u2019s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle\u2019s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor.\r\n\r\nIt used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle\u2019s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form \"I imagine that P\" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images.\r\n\r\nFor example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with \"non-paradigmatic sensory experiences\"\u2014phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai (\"It looks like an X\"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle\u2019s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle\u2019s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions.\r\n\r\nMore recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum\u2019s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as \"the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception.\" Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image.\r\n\r\nMy concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images.\r\n\r\nIn this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima\u2014those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus\u2019 commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus\u2019 own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus\u2019 views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) [introduction p. 165-167]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lzX0JUImw1D2csY","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":43,"full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1021,"section_of":354,"pages":"165-173","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3"]}
| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason. Ps.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will. On this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons. This account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions? You are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent. [conclusion p. 286] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason.\r\n\r\nPs.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will.\r\n\r\nOn this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons.\r\n\r\nThis account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions?\r\n\r\nYou are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent.\r\n[conclusion p. 286]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":["Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"]}
| Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2000 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 18 |
| Pages | 320-356 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/QrDNAw4eAA3LZ35 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"414","_score":null,"_source":{"id":414,"authors_free":[{"id":555,"entry_id":414,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":280,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Osborne, Catherine","free_first_name":"Catherine","free_last_name":"Osborne","norm_person":{"id":280,"first_name":"Catherine","last_name":"Rowett","full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142220116","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg","main_title":{"title":"Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg"},"abstract":"Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi\u2019s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 \r\nthat a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the \r\nauspices of the Biblioth\u00e8que Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless\u2014-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication\u20141 propose \r\nto begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among \r\nthe undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2000","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QrDNAw4eAA3LZ35","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":280,"full_name":"Rowett, Catherine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":414,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"18","issue":"","pages":"320-356"}},"sort":["Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L\u2019Emp\u00e9docle de Strasbourg"]}
| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | Brad Inwood |
| Translator(s) |
The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. In the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers’ mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof. Corresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle’s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus’ distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations. The first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes. Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7). How to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius’ and the other late commentators’ discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius’ discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates. In the second section, I turn to Simplicius’ criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates. In light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius’ discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination. In conclusion, I show that Simplicius’ conception of relations originates in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and in Damascius’ account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius’ motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. [introduction p. 245-248] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1145","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1145,"authors_free":[{"id":1718,"entry_id":1145,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2804,"entry_id":1145,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Brad Inwood","free_first_name":"Brad","free_last_name":"Inwood","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change"},"abstract":"The ancient commentators\u2019 approach to Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac) or a character (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus\u2019 construal of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives.\r\n\r\nIn the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers\u2019 mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof.\r\n\r\nCorresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus\u2019 distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations.\r\n\r\nThe first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes.\r\n\r\nPlotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7).\r\n\r\nHow to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius\u2019 and the other late commentators\u2019 discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius\u2019 discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn the second section, I turn to Simplicius\u2019 criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius\u2019 discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination.\r\n\r\nIn conclusion, I show that Simplicius\u2019 conception of relations originates in Proclus\u2019 commentary on Plato\u2019s Parmenides and in Damascius\u2019 account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius\u2019 motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. [introduction p. 245-248]","btype":2,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1145,"section_of":1602,"pages":"245-274","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1602,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"bibliography","type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Inwood2009","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2009","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"One of the leading series on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy presents outstanding new work in the field. The volumes feature original essays on a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient philosophy, from its earliest beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. It is anonymously peer-reviewed and appears twice a year.\r\n\r\nThe series was founded in 1983, and in 2016 published its 50th volume. The series format was chosen so that it might include essays of more substantial length than is customarily allowed in journals, as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Past editors include Julia Annas, Christopher Taylor, David Sedley, Brad Inwood, and Victor Caston. The current editor, as of July 2022, is Rachana Kamtekar. [official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":1602,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Oxford University Press","series":"","volume":"XXXVII","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":{"id":1145,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"37","issue":"","pages":"245-274"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change"]}
| Title | The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 175-189 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
This brief comparison between Plato and Aristotle reveals once again the attitude of our Alexandrian commentators—Philoponus, Olympiodorus, and Elias in the case I have just discussed—towards the philosophers: for them, the two philosophers are mutually complementary, but the genius of the divine Plato is superior to Aristotle. Aristotle only knows how to establish logical rules, which he discovers by analyzing the logical elements in Plato’s work, whereas Plato practiced logical proof spontaneously and intuitively without formulating the rules for it. Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle’s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations. Thanks to Marinus’ Life of Proclus and Damascius’ Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato’s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or ‘minor’ mysteries. So, in directing Proclus’ studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and ‘does not leap over the threshold’; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. Isidore, too, came to Plato’s philosophy after studying Aristotle. I hope to have shown in this paper that the part played by the study of and commentary on Aristotle’s works remained the same up to the end of Neoplatonism. Aristotle was never studied for his own sake by the Neoplatonists, but always as a necessary preparation for the philosophy of Plato. [conclusion p. 188-189] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mXkoXV2wq7SgBs3 |
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Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle\u2019s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations.\r\n\r\nThanks to Marinus\u2019 Life of Proclus and Damascius\u2019 Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato\u2019s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or \u2018minor\u2019 mysteries.\r\n\r\nSo, in directing Proclus\u2019 studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and \u2018does not leap over the threshold\u2019; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. 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