| Title | A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1960 |
| Journal | The Classical Review |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 4-5 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Wasserstein, Abraham |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Παντάπασι δ' οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου εἰ μὴ ὁ νοῦς· νοῦς δέ ἐστι καθαρὸς ἐκ πάντων καὶ εὐλαβῶν. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν οὐδὲν διακρίνεται ἑτέρῳ ὅμοιον οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἑτέρου κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἄρα τί ἐστι καθαρὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐκρᾶτον καὶ εὐδιακριτὸν τῶν ἄλλων νοῦς τῶν πάντων διαφέρει. These are the last few lines of fragment 12 of Anaxagoras as printed in Diels-Kranz6, ii. 39: D.-K. follow closely, with only a minor modification, the Berlin text of Simplicius in Phys., p. 157, which is the source of our knowledge of this fragment. It seems to me necessary, or at any rate highly desirable, that any interpretation of this passage should, inter alia, satisfy the following three conditions: ὁμοῖος should have the same meaning when applied to νοῦς and when applied to ἕτερον in the next line. The clause ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ... should contain a contrast to the clause νοῦς δέ ..., i.e. we should be able to understand that something is true of νοῦς that is not true of anything other (ἕτερον) than νοῦς. The clause ἀλλ’ ... should follow naturally on the preceding two clauses. This set of conditions is not satisfied by any interpretation that I know. Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet: Diels (loc. cit.): "Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der größere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding." Tannery (Pour l’histoire de la science hellénique, p. 311): "Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable à aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus." Burnet: "And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it." It will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties: In all three cases ὁμοῖος, which, when applied to νοῦς, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like "homogeneous" (i.e. ὁμοῖος κατὰ φύσιν), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause ἕτερον δὲ ... is that any other thing is "like" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are "homogeneous," which had been asserted of νοῦς. But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between νοῦς and anything other than νοῦς. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between νοῦς and other things is made in terms of being ὁμοῖος; but such a comparison loses all point if ὁμοῖος is used in two different senses. It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause ἀλλ’ .... What is ἀλλὰ supposed to mean here? But? ("sondern"? "mais"?) How is this clause related to what precedes? All these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that οὐδενί be excised. Read: νοῦς δὲ ἰσαῖς μέτροις ὅμοιος· ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅμοιον· ἀλλὰ τῶν πλεῖστων εἶναι τὰ φαινόμενα ἔνθα καὶ ἦν. And interpret: "Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it." Thus, if we excise οὐδενί, ὁμοῖος has the same sense ("homogeneous") both as applied to νοῦς and as applied to ἕτερον. There is a pointed comparison between νοῦς and other things: something is true of νοῦς that is not true of other things. The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: "But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?" "No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it." This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι, such as ἐν παντὶ παντός μορφὴ ἐνέστηκε (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: τὰ ἐν παντὶ πλείω μετέχει κτλ. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with τῶν πλείστων εἶναι κτλ.). Lest it be thought that the excision of οὐδενί is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of οὐδενί seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον ὁμοιομέρειαν Ἀναξαγόρας ὑπέθετο λέγειν, ὃς δ’ ἐστὶν πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν. Now, the words ἐπιπεπτῶκεν are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after οὐδενί here are, of course, Diels’s, not Simplicius’s; perhaps we ought to put them before οὐδενί and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν, he may also have added οὐδενί. [the whole text] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/0UZZOhtjCwUNKOl |
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Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet:\r\n\r\n Diels (loc. cit.): \"Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der gr\u00f6\u00dfere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding.\"\r\n Tannery (Pour l\u2019histoire de la science hell\u00e9nique, p. 311): \"Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable \u00e0 aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus.\"\r\n Burnet: \"And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.\"\r\n\r\nIt will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties:\r\n\r\n In all three cases \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2, which, when applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like \"homogeneous\" (i.e. \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 ... is that any other thing is \"like\" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are \"homogeneous,\" which had been asserted of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\r\n\r\n But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and anything other than \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things is made in terms of being \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2; but such a comparison loses all point if \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 is used in two different senses.\r\n\r\n It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 .... What is \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 supposed to mean here? But? (\"sondern\"? \"mais\"?) How is this clause related to what precedes?\r\n\r\nAll these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af be excised. Read:\r\n\r\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f26\u03bd.\r\n\r\nAnd interpret:\r\n\"Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it.\"\r\n\r\nThus, if we excise \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af,\r\n\r\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 has the same sense (\"homogeneous\") both as applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and as applied to \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\r\n\r\n There is a pointed comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things: something is true of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 that is not true of other things.\r\n\r\n The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: \"But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?\" \"No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it.\" This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, such as \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb.).\r\n\r\nLest it be thought that the excision of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f08\u03bd\u03b1\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f43\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd. Now, the words \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af here are, of course, Diels\u2019s, not Simplicius\u2019s; perhaps we ought to put them before \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, he may also have added \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af. [the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1960","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/0UZZOhtjCwUNKOl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":356,"full_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":444,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"10","issue":"1","pages":"4-5"}},"sort":[1960]}
| Title | A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1960 |
| Journal | The Classical Review |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 4-5 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Wasserstein, Abraham |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Παντάπασι δ' οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου εἰ μὴ ὁ νοῦς· νοῦς δέ ἐστι καθαρὸς ἐκ πάντων καὶ εὐλαβῶν. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν οὐδὲν διακρίνεται ἑτέρῳ ὅμοιον οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἑτέρου κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἄρα τί ἐστι καθαρὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐκρᾶτον καὶ εὐδιακριτὸν τῶν ἄλλων νοῦς τῶν πάντων διαφέρει.
These are the last few lines of fragment 12 of Anaxagoras as printed in Diels-Kranz6, ii. 39: D.-K. follow closely, with only a minor modification, the Berlin text of Simplicius in Phys., p. 157, which is the source of our knowledge of this fragment.
It seems to me necessary, or at any rate highly desirable, that any interpretation of this passage should, inter alia, satisfy the following three conditions:
ὁμοῖος should have the same meaning when applied to νοῦς and when applied to ἕτερον in the next line.
The clause ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ... should contain a contrast to the clause νοῦς δέ ..., i.e. we should be able to understand that something is true of νοῦς that is not true of anything other (ἕτερον) than νοῦς.
The clause ἀλλ’ ... should follow naturally on the preceding two clauses.
This set of conditions is not satisfied by any interpretation that I know. Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet:
Diels (loc. cit.): "Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der größere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding."
Tannery (Pour l’histoire de la science hellénique, p. 311): "Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable à aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus."
Burnet: "And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it."
It will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties:
In all three cases ὁμοῖος, which, when applied to νοῦς, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like "homogeneous" (i.e. ὁμοῖος κατὰ φύσιν), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause ἕτερον δὲ ... is that any other thing is "like" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are "homogeneous," which had been asserted of νοῦς.
But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between νοῦς and anything other than νοῦς. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between νοῦς and other things is made in terms of being ὁμοῖος; but such a comparison loses all point if ὁμοῖος is used in two different senses.
It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause ἀλλ’ .... What is ἀλλὰ supposed to mean here? But? ("sondern"? "mais"?) How is this clause related to what precedes?
All these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that οὐδενί be excised. Read:
νοῦς δὲ ἰσαῖς μέτροις ὅμοιος· ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅμοιον· ἀλλὰ τῶν πλεῖστων εἶναι τὰ φαινόμενα ἔνθα καὶ ἦν.
And interpret:
"Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it."
Thus, if we excise οὐδενί,
ὁμοῖος has the same sense ("homogeneous") both as applied to νοῦς and as applied to ἕτερον.
There is a pointed comparison between νοῦς and other things: something is true of νοῦς that is not true of other things.
The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: "But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?" "No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it." This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι, such as ἐν παντὶ παντός μορφὴ ἐνέστηκε (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: τὰ ἐν παντὶ πλείω μετέχει κτλ. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with τῶν πλείστων εἶναι κτλ.).
Lest it be thought that the excision of οὐδενί is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of οὐδενί seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον ὁμοιομέρειαν Ἀναξαγόρας ὑπέθετο λέγειν, ὃς δ’ ἐστὶν πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν. Now, the words ἐπιπεπτῶκεν are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after οὐδενί here are, of course, Diels’s, not Simplicius’s; perhaps we ought to put them before οὐδενί and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words πλεῖστον αὐτῷ ἐπιπεπτῶκεν, he may also have added οὐδενί. [the whole text] |
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{"_index":"sire","_id":"444","_score":null,"_source":{"id":444,"authors_free":[{"id":596,"entry_id":444,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":356,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","free_first_name":"Abraham","free_last_name":"Wasserstein","norm_person":{"id":356,"first_name":"Abraham","last_name":"Wasserstein","full_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119380102","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"\u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4' \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bd. \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1ff3 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9.\r\n\r\nThese are the last few lines of fragment 12 of Anaxagoras as printed in Diels-Kranz6, ii. 39: D.-K. follow closely, with only a minor modification, the Berlin text of Simplicius in Phys., p. 157, which is the source of our knowledge of this fragment.\r\n\r\nIt seems to me necessary, or at any rate highly desirable, that any interpretation of this passage should, inter alia, satisfy the following three conditions:\r\n\r\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 should have the same meaning when applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and when applied to \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd in the next line.\r\n\r\n The clause \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd ... should contain a contrast to the clause \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad ..., i.e. we should be able to understand that something is true of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 that is not true of anything other (\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd) than \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\r\n\r\n The clause \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 ... should follow naturally on the preceding two clauses.\r\n\r\nThis set of conditions is not satisfied by any interpretation that I know. Here are the translations of Diels, Tannery, Burnet:\r\n\r\n Diels (loc. cit.): \"Geist aber ist allemal von gleicher Art, der gr\u00f6\u00dfere wie der kleinere. Sonst aber ist nichts dem anderen gleichartig, sondern wovon am meisten in einem Dinge enthalten ist, dies als das deutlichst Erkennbare ist und war das eine Einzelding.\"\r\n Tannery (Pour l\u2019histoire de la science hell\u00e9nique, p. 311): \"Tout le noas est semblable, le plus grand et le plus petit; il n'y a, par ailleurs, aucune chose qui soit semblable \u00e0 aucune autre, mais chacune est pour l'apparence ce dont elle contient le plus.\"\r\n Burnet: \"And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.\"\r\n\r\nIt will be seen at once that all these translation-interpretations involve us in a number of difficulties:\r\n\r\n In all three cases \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2, which, when applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, quite naturally (and, surely, inevitably) means something like \"homogeneous\" (i.e. \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd), is understood in a different sense and construed in a different way when it is used again in the same sentence. For what is, according to these interpretations, denied in the clause \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 ... is that any other thing is \"like\" (gleichartig, semblable) anything else, not that they are \"homogeneous,\" which had been asserted of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\r\n\r\n But if that is right, there is no immediately obvious contrast between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and anything other than \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2. Such a contrast is obviously intended; at any rate, a comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things is made in terms of being \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2; but such a comparison loses all point if \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 is used in two different senses.\r\n\r\n It is further to be observed that in all these interpretations there is no real point in the third clause \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 .... What is \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 supposed to mean here? But? (\"sondern\"? \"mais\"?) How is this clause related to what precedes?\r\n\r\nAll these difficulties can be removed very easily. I propose that \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af be excised. Read:\r\n\r\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f30\u03c3\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f26\u03bd.\r\n\r\nAnd interpret:\r\n\"Nous is all homogeneous, both the greater and the smaller; nothing else is homogeneous; but [the apparent homogeneity of other things like, e.g., gold, is due to the fact that] each thing is (or appears to be) most manifestly that of which there is most in it.\"\r\n\r\nThus, if we excise \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af,\r\n\r\n \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 has the same sense (\"homogeneous\") both as applied to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and as applied to \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\r\n\r\n There is a pointed comparison between \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and other things: something is true of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 that is not true of other things.\r\n\r\n The last clause follows naturally on the earlier statements; for, after making the comparison, Anaxagoras goes on to remove a possible objection: \"But is not gold, or iron, or anything else like that, also homogeneous?\" \"No, it is not; it only looks as if it were, because everything looks like that of which it has most in it.\" This statement is, of course, immediately intelligible in the light of other statements about \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, such as \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 (frg. 11); or the beginning of our fragment 12: \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb. (Cf. also Simplicius, in Phys., p. 27, where frg. 11 is quoted together with \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb.).\r\n\r\nLest it be thought that the excision of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af is altogether too radical an expedient, I may mention one other point: Simplicius is capable of extending his quotations by the addition of his own words; that is to say, he could add words to explain what he took to be the meaning of a passage he quoted. Thus, if he misunderstood this statement of Anaxagoras in a sense which made the addition of \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af seem natural, he may well, without even noticing it himself, have added it. We know that elsewhere, quoting this very same sentence, he adds a few words of his own. He writes (in Phys., p. 165, 13): \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f08\u03bd\u03b1\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f43\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd. Now, the words \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd are generally thought to be not part of the quotation but an explanatory addition by Simplicius; the quotation marks after \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af here are, of course, Diels\u2019s, not Simplicius\u2019s; perhaps we ought to put them before \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af and make that too part of the (mistaken) explanation of Simplicius? If Simplicius could add (as seems to be admitted by all scholars with the one exception of Schorn) the words \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd, he may also have added \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af. [the whole text]","btype":3,"date":"1960","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/0UZZOhtjCwUNKOl","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":356,"full_name":"Wasserstein, Abraham","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":444,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"10","issue":"1","pages":"4-5"}},"sort":["A Note on Fragment 12 of Anaxagoras"]}