| Title | The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 175-189 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| This brief comparison between Plato and Aristotle reveals once again the attitude of our Alexandrian commentators—Philoponus, Olympiodorus, and Elias in the case I have just discussed—towards the philosophers: for them, the two philosophers are mutually complementary, but the genius of the divine Plato is superior to Aristotle. Aristotle only knows how to establish logical rules, which he discovers by analyzing the logical elements in Plato’s work, whereas Plato practiced logical proof spontaneously and intuitively without formulating the rules for it. Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle’s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations. Thanks to Marinus’ Life of Proclus and Damascius’ Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato’s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or ‘minor’ mysteries. So, in directing Proclus’ studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and ‘does not leap over the threshold’; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. Isidore, too, came to Plato’s philosophy after studying Aristotle. I hope to have shown in this paper that the part played by the study of and commentary on Aristotle’s works remained the same up to the end of Neoplatonism. Aristotle was never studied for his own sake by the Neoplatonists, but always as a necessary preparation for the philosophy of Plato. [conclusion p. 188-189] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mXkoXV2wq7SgBs3 |
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Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle\u2019s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations.\r\n\r\nThanks to Marinus\u2019 Life of Proclus and Damascius\u2019 Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato\u2019s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or \u2018minor\u2019 mysteries.\r\n\r\nSo, in directing Proclus\u2019 studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and \u2018does not leap over the threshold\u2019; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. Isidore, too, came to Plato\u2019s philosophy after studying Aristotle.\r\n\r\nI hope to have shown in this paper that the part played by the study of and commentary on Aristotle\u2019s works remained the same up to the end of Neoplatonism. Aristotle was never studied for his own sake by the Neoplatonists, but always as a necessary preparation for the philosophy of Plato. 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The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3 |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 165-173 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought—a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call "imagination," at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle’s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle’s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor. It used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form "I imagine that P" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images. For example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with "non-paradigmatic sensory experiences"—phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai ("It looks like an X"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle’s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle’s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions. More recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum’s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as "the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception." Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image. My concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images. In this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima—those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus’ commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus’ own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus’ views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) [introduction p. 165-167] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lzX0JUImw1D2csY |
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","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1539,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3","main_title":{"title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3"},"abstract":"Aristotle\u2019s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought\u2014a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call \"imagination,\" at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle\u2019s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle\u2019s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor.\r\n\r\nIt used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle\u2019s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form \"I imagine that P\" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images.\r\n\r\nFor example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with \"non-paradigmatic sensory experiences\"\u2014phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai (\"It looks like an X\"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle\u2019s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle\u2019s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions.\r\n\r\nMore recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum\u2019s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as \"the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception.\" Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image.\r\n\r\nMy concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images.\r\n\r\nIn this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima\u2014those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus\u2019 commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus\u2019 own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus\u2019 views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) 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The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Aristotle’s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 1-7 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Kerferd, George B. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| In his De caelo (3.1, 298b 14–24 — 28 A 25 DK), Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics. But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows: "Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gnôseôs ê phronêseôs) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (tôn ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes." Aristotle’s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold: Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions. Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed. Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes. But there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated "the earliest natural philosophers." The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena. A resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle’s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrachê dieile tas peri geneseôs doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be: No generation at all. All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently. Most things are generated but not the primary substances. All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities. Whatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)—no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether. On the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here: "The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d." [introduction p. 1-3] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE |
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But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows:\r\n\r\n\"Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gn\u00f4se\u00f4s \u00ea phron\u00ease\u00f4s) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (t\u00f4n ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes.\"\r\n\r\nAristotle\u2019s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold:\r\n\r\n Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions.\r\n Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed.\r\n Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes.\r\n\r\nBut there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated \"the earliest natural philosophers.\" The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena.\r\n\r\nA resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle\u2019s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrach\u00ea dieile tas peri genese\u00f4s doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be:\r\n\r\n No generation at all.\r\n All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently.\r\n Most things are generated but not the primary substances.\r\n All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities.\r\n\r\nWhatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)\u2014no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether.\r\n\r\nOn the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here:\r\n\r\n\"The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d.\" [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":215,"full_name":"Kerferd, George B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":889,"section_of":354,"pages":"1-7","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Nous pathêtikos in later Greek philosophy |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 191-205 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous poietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos never occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. 430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators subsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, even if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. Similarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in the pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous poietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, however, though the expression occurs in Aristotle’s De anima, its reference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often appears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do with the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous literature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous pathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This paper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- platonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and clarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Di0rd034eeOOHeY |
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Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of \r\nT\u00fcbingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous \r\npoietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos \r\nnever occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. \r\n430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators \r\nsubsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, \r\neven if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. \r\nSimilarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in \r\nthe pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous \r\npoietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, \r\nhowever, though the expression occurs in Aristotle\u2019s De anima, its \r\nreference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often \r\nappears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do \r\nwith the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous \r\nliterature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous \r\npathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This \r\npaper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- \r\nplatonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and \r\nclarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Di0rd034eeOOHeY","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":894,"section_of":354,"pages":"191-205","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1991]}
| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Series | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
| This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK |
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| Title | Aristotle’s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 1-7 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Kerferd, George B. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
In his De caelo (3.1, 298b 14–24 — 28 A 25 DK), Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics. But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows:
"Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gnôseôs ê phronêseôs) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (tôn ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes."
Aristotle’s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold:
Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions.
Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed.
Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes.
But there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated "the earliest natural philosophers." The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena.
A resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi prôtoi physiologêsantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle’s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrachê dieile tas peri geneseôs doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be:
No generation at all.
All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently.
Most things are generated but not the primary substances.
All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities.
Whatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)—no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether.
On the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here:
"The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d." [introduction p. 1-3] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"889","_score":null,"_source":{"id":889,"authors_free":[{"id":1309,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":215,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Kerferd, George B.","free_first_name":"George B.","free_last_name":"Kerferd","norm_person":{"id":215,"first_name":" George B.","last_name":"Kerferd","full_name":"Kerferd, George B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158138547","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1310,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1311,"entry_id":889,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides"},"abstract":"In his De caelo (3.1, 298b 14\u201324 \u2014 28 A 25 DK), Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics. But before we discuss this in detail, it will be best first to give a translation of the context as a whole, with the relevant statement italicized, and to consider the way in which he is there classifying earlier thinkers. The passage reads as follows:\r\n\r\n\"Perhaps the first question for consideration is whether generation is a fact or not. Earlier searchers after wisdom concerning reality differed both from the accounts which we are now offering and from one another. Some of them abolished generation and destruction completely. Nothing that is, they declare, is either generated or destroyed; it merely seems to us that it is so. Such were Melissus and Parmenides and their followers, and these men, although in other respects their doctrines are excellent, are not to be regarded as speaking from the point of view of natural science. For the existence of certain entities that are neither generated nor subject to any kind of change is a matter not for natural science but for a different and higher study. These men, however, since they supposed there was nothing else at all apart from the existence of things perceived and on the other hand were the first to contemplate some such (unchanging) entities as a prerequisite for any knowledge or understanding (gn\u00f4se\u00f4s \u00ea phron\u00ease\u00f4s) as a result transferred to sensible objects those accounts which come from the other (higher) source (t\u00f4n ekei then logous). Others again, as if from set purpose, came to hold the opposite opinion to that held by these men. For there are some who say that nothing in the world is ungenerated, but all things are subject to generation, and that when generated some things remain indestructible and others are again destroyed. This view was held above all by Hesiod and his followers, and thereafter by the first natural philosophers. These say that all other things are in process of being generated and flow, and nothing is stable. But there is one thing only which persists, from which all these other things are produced by natural transformations. This seems to be the meaning intended by Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. But there are some who suppose that all body also is generated, combining it out of plane surfaces and separating it again into such planes.\"\r\n\r\nAristotle\u2019s classification here would seem at first sight to be threefold:\r\n\r\n Those who deny all generation and destruction as mere illusions.\r\n Those who say nothing is ungenerated but everything comes to be, although once generated, some things are exempt from destruction while others are again destroyed.\r\n Those who would generate all solids from geometrical shapes or planes.\r\n\r\nBut there is an obscurity about the second group, said to be led by Hesiod and his followers, with whom are to be associated \"the earliest natural philosophers.\" The reference to Hesiod must surely be to his doctrine of Chaos, which was the first to come into existence (Theogony 116) and from which, in due course, all other things arose. Grouped with him are the earliest natural philosophers (hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes), which suggests to us at first reading the Ionians. But in this case, Aristotle would be saying, for example, that the water of Thales itself came into existence before other things were generated from it. This seems in conflict both with the usual view of the Ionians in antiquity and also with what seems to be their characterization in the following two sentences, which describe a doctrine according to which there is a single substance persisting through the various transmutations that produce phenomena.\r\n\r\nA resolution of this problem is propounded by Simplicius in his commentary on the passage. He takes the words hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes to refer to those whom Aristotle elsewhere calls hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes (Metaphysics 983b28), namely Orpheus and Musaeus. This opens the way to the view that the Ionians are first referred to in the sentence following next after hoi pr\u00f4toi physiolog\u00easantes, which begins with the words hoi de. The result is to divide Aristotle\u2019s second class into two, producing a total of four, not three, classifications. This was indeed what Simplicius intended, as can be seen in his statement tetrach\u00ea dieile tas peri genese\u00f4s doxas (In De caelo, 556.3). These will then be:\r\n\r\n No generation at all.\r\n All things are generated, and some of these things then persist permanently.\r\n Most things are generated but not the primary substances.\r\n All bodily things are generated from ungenerated geometrical entities.\r\n\r\nWhatever may be the correct analysis of what Aristotle is saying here, there can be no doubt that he places the Eleatics in category (1)\u2014no generation at all. But a major difficulty arises from his statement that for the Eleatics there is nothing else apart from things perceived and that they applied to things perceived the concepts appropriate to unchanging entities, which belong to a different field altogether.\r\n\r\nOn the whole, this statement seems to have provoked irritation rather than interest or respect, and it is commonly dismissed as mistaken. Harold Chemiss, writing in 1935, says that here:\r\n\r\n\"The Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, Parmenides 135b-c. But cf. Sophist 249b-d.\" [introduction p. 1-3]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8A6Irhi7CRu4EpE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":215,"full_name":"Kerferd, George B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":889,"section_of":354,"pages":"1-7","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Aristotle\u2019s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides"]}
| Title | Nous pathêtikos in later Greek philosophy |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 191-205 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
In 1911 H. Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous poietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos never occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. 430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators subsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, even if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. Similarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in the pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous poietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, however, though the expression occurs in Aristotle’s De anima, its reference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often appears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do with the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous literature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous pathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This paper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- platonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and clarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Di0rd034eeOOHeY |
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Kurfess obtained a doctorate from the University of \r\nT\u00fcbingen with a dissertation on the history of the interpretation of nous \r\npoietikos and nous pathetikos} Notoriously the expression nous poietikos \r\nnever occurs in the text of Aristotle, but its derivation from De mim. \r\n430*11-12 is an easy step, and when philosophers and commentators \r\nsubsequently discuss it, we know what it is that they are talking about, \r\neven if its nature and status remained, and remain, controversial. \r\nSimilarly nouspathetikos, or rather ho pathetikos nous, occurs only once in \r\nthe pages of Aristotle, but appears often, if less frequently than nous \r\npoietikos, in the texts of his successors and interpreters. In its case, \r\nhowever, though the expression occurs in Aristotle\u2019s De anima, its \r\nreference is unclear. To aggravate matters, nous pathetikos quite often \r\nappears in his successors in contexts which seem to have nothing to do \r\nwith the intellect. Yet while nous poietikos has generated an enormous \r\nliterature from the ancient world up until today, the phrase nous \r\npathetikos has received nothing like the attention of its partner. This \r\npaper will examine some of its uses in both commentators and Neo- \r\nplatonist philosophers in the hope of explaining its appearance and \r\nclarifying its meaning. [Introduction, p. 191]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Di0rd034eeOOHeY","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":894,"section_of":354,"pages":"191-205","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Nous path\u00eatikos in later Greek philosophy"]}
| Title | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Publication Place | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Series | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK |
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| Title | Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3 |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 165-173 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Sheppard, Anne D. |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought—a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call "imagination," at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle’s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle’s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor.
It used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form "I imagine that P" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images.
For example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with "non-paradigmatic sensory experiences"—phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai ("It looks like an X"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle’s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle’s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions.
More recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum’s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as "the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception." Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image.
My concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images.
In this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima—those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus’ commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus’ own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus’ views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) [introduction p. 165-167] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lzX0JUImw1D2csY |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1021","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1021,"authors_free":[{"id":1537,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":43,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","free_first_name":"Anne D.","free_last_name":"Sheppard","norm_person":{"id":43,"first_name":"Anne D.","last_name":"Sheppard","full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158024592","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1538,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J. ","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1539,"entry_id":1021,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":139,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Robinson, Howard","free_first_name":"Howard","free_last_name":"Robinson","norm_person":{"id":139,"first_name":"Robinson","last_name":"Howard ","full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172347122","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3","main_title":{"title":"Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3"},"abstract":"Aristotle\u2019s treatment of phantasia in De anima 3.3 is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind that cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought\u2014a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call \"imagination,\" at least has much in common with it. It is tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is difficult to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been several recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle\u2019s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere. I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination. In all three cases, the way they interpret Aristotle\u2019s position is influenced by the account of imagination they themselves favor.\r\n\r\nIt used to be taken for granted that imagination involves having mental images, but this assumption was among the many challenged in the works of Wittgenstein and in Gilbert Ryle\u2019s The Concept of Mind. It is now more fashionable to analyze propositions of the form \"I imagine that P\" than to inquire into hypothetical pictures in the mind. Accordingly, some current interpreters of Aristotle claim that he is interested in the logic of the verb phainesthai, or in a power that interprets the data of perception, rather than in mental images.\r\n\r\nFor example, Malcolm Schofield claims that Aristotle is concerned with the verb phainesthai and the sense in which it expresses a non-committal attitude toward the veridical character of sensory or quasi-sensory experiences. According to Schofield, Aristotle is concerned with \"non-paradigmatic sensory experiences\"\u2014phenomena that make one say cautiously phainetai (\"It looks like an X\"). Mental imagery is only one type of such experience and is not Aristotle\u2019s main concern. Martha Nussbaum also emphasizes the connection with the verb phainesthai and explicitly attacks the view that mental images are central to either Aristotelian phantasia or our notion of imagination. Nussbaum claims that Aristotle has a very general interest in how things appear to living creatures. She examines Aristotle\u2019s account of the role of phantasia in animal movement and its relationship to aisthesis and argues that, for Aristotle, aisthesis is simply the passive reception of sense-impressions, while the role of phantasia is to interpret such impressions.\r\n\r\nMore recently, Deborah Modrak has argued for an interpretation of Aristotelian phantasia that once again makes mental images important. She argues against Nussbaum\u2019s interpretation of aisthesis as purely passive and describes phantasia as \"the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception.\" Such awareness, she argues, can perfectly well take the form of a mental image.\r\n\r\nMy concern here is not so much to adjudicate among these rival modern interpretations of Aristotle as to inquire what light the Neoplatonist commentators on the De anima throw on the issues raised. It might be thought that this is a futile enterprise, given the very different presuppositions with which the ancient commentators approached Aristotle. Henry Blumenthal has demonstrated in a number of articles that these commentators read Aristotle through Platonizing spectacles and that their interpretation of his psychology is colored by their Platonist assumptions. Nevertheless, if we examine the discussions of De anima 3.3 by the Neoplatonists, some interesting light is cast on the question of whether phantasia involves mental images.\r\n\r\nIn this paper, I shall confine myself to the two Neoplatonist commentaries on the De anima\u2014those attributed to Simplicius and Philoponus. (Themistius, who was not a Neoplatonist, would require separate discussion.) Both commentaries raise problems of authorship, although these do not significantly affect the present inquiry. F. Bossier and C. Steel have argued that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is not by him but by his contemporary Priscianus Lydus. Whether this is correct or not, the commentary is a product of sixth-century Athenian Neoplatonism. Book 3 of the Greek version of Philoponus\u2019 commentary has been much more conclusively demonstrated to be by the later Alexandrian commentator Stephanus. Part of a Latin translation of Philoponus\u2019 own work on De anima 3 survives, but his comments on 3.3 are not preserved. Those I shall be discussing are by Stephanus. (Where it is possible to compare the two commentators, the views of Stephanus are sometimes quite close to those of Philoponus, so it is likely that Philoponus\u2019 views on 3.3 were not very different from those we find in Stephanus.) [introduction p. 165-167]","btype":2,"date":"1991","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lzX0JUImw1D2csY","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":43,"full_name":"Sheppard, Anne D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":139,"full_name":"Robinson, Howard ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1021,"section_of":354,"pages":"165-173","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":354,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Blumenthal\/Robinson1991","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1991","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1991","abstract":"This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.[official abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jxVlK6YghFkMcPK","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":354,"pubplace":"Oxford","publisher":"Clarendon Press","series":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De Anima, 3.3"]}
| Title | The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1991 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition |
| Pages | 175-189 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hadot, Ilsetraut |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Robinson, Howard |
| Translator(s) |
This brief comparison between Plato and Aristotle reveals once again the attitude of our Alexandrian commentators—Philoponus, Olympiodorus, and Elias in the case I have just discussed—towards the philosophers: for them, the two philosophers are mutually complementary, but the genius of the divine Plato is superior to Aristotle. Aristotle only knows how to establish logical rules, which he discovers by analyzing the logical elements in Plato’s work, whereas Plato practiced logical proof spontaneously and intuitively without formulating the rules for it. Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle’s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations. Thanks to Marinus’ Life of Proclus and Damascius’ Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato’s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or ‘minor’ mysteries. So, in directing Proclus’ studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and ‘does not leap over the threshold’; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. Isidore, too, came to Plato’s philosophy after studying Aristotle. I hope to have shown in this paper that the part played by the study of and commentary on Aristotle’s works remained the same up to the end of Neoplatonism. Aristotle was never studied for his own sake by the Neoplatonists, but always as a necessary preparation for the philosophy of Plato. [conclusion p. 188-189] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mXkoXV2wq7SgBs3 |
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Here again, we meet the principle of Aristotle\u2019s inferiority to Plato, which determines the harmonizing trend as well as its limitations.\r\n\r\nThanks to Marinus\u2019 Life of Proclus and Damascius\u2019 Life of Isidore, we know the role of the study of the works of Aristotle with commentary in the teaching of the School of Athens at the time when Syrianus, then Proclus, then Isidore ran the School. Syrianus initiated Proclus into Plato\u2019s mystical doctrine after Proclus had been adequately prepared by studying the works of Aristotle, as if, so to speak, by way of preparatory or \u2018minor\u2019 mysteries.\r\n\r\nSo, in directing Proclus\u2019 studies, Syrianus proceeds in due order, as Marinus emphasizes, and \u2018does not leap over the threshold\u2019; in other words, Proclus proceeds in the set order and does not miss out any step in the teaching. Isidore, too, came to Plato\u2019s philosophy after studying Aristotle.\r\n\r\nI hope to have shown in this paper that the part played by the study of and commentary on Aristotle\u2019s works remained the same up to the end of Neoplatonism. Aristotle was never studied for his own sake by the Neoplatonists, but always as a necessary preparation for the philosophy of Plato. 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