| Title | Soul and the structure of being in late Neoplatonism : Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius ; Papers and discussions of a colloquium held at Liverpool, 15-16 April 1982 |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1982 |
| Publication Place | Liverpool |
| Publisher | Liverpool University Press |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Lloyd, Antony C. |
| Translator(s) |
| This short and not inexpensive book contains the papers and discussions of a colloquium held at Liverpool on 15-16 April 1982. There are four papers dealing in turn with 'Monad and Dyad as Cosmic Principles in Syrianus' by A. D. R. Sheppard; 'Procession and Division in Proclus' by A. C. Lloyd; 'La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'âme raisonnable humaine dans le Commentaire sur le manuel d'Epictète' by I. Hadot, and fourthly 'The Psychology of (?) Simplicius' Commentary on the De anima' by H. J. Blumenthal. The other participants in the colloquium must have made it a memorable and worthwhile, though rather short-lived occasion. The foremost living experts in the field of later Platonism were present, including A. H. Armstrong, P. Hadot, J. Rist, and A. Smith. Arguably the most interesting feature of the collection is the difference of opinion among at least two of the participants about the validity of C. G. Steel's 'The changing self: a study of the soul in later Neoplatonism; Iamblichus, Damascius, and Priscianus' (cf. the review by A. Smith in JHS 100 [1980]). There, it is argued that the three authors mentioned were the only later Platonists to teach the mutability as distinct from the fall of the soul. So it is well enough known that Proclus dissented from Plotinus in his assertion at e.g. Elements 211 that the soul completely falls. But it is also argued that Proclus dissented from Iamblichus in denying the changeableness of the fallen soul. With Steel's hypothesis, Blumenthal is in a large measure of agreement, whereas Ilsetraut Hadot feels that such a view is oversimplified. She suggests that even Plotinus is prepared to admit a greater degree of alteration in the soul than some exegetes allow for. It must be said in defense of her position that despite the evidence of Ennead 4.8.8 and 4.1, there are disturbing passages at 4.4.3 and 5.1.1 which challenge a too simple evaluation of Plotinus. In this particular collection, the issue is rather over the interpretation of Simplicius, De Anima 220.2-4 (cf. p. 91). Blumenthal argues that Simplicius' language need only mean that the soul has a temporary change. Against such an interpretation, Hadot argues that it overlooks the fact that Simplicius was a pupil of Damascius and he certainly believed in the change of the human soul. Perhaps, though, the views are not as far apart as the foregoing remarks may suggest. After all, it is hard to be supposed that the change in the soul argued for by Iamblichus and his followers was in itself irreversible. The whole Platonist school had to offer some sort of rationale for the obvious fact of the weakness and sinfulness of the human being. Whether one talks of 'fall', 'change', or 'weakness' seems hardly to matter. Nor is the problem restricted to pagans. A few apt quotations from St. Augustine illustrate the universal nature of the problem which faces any thinker who is prepared to take seriously both the goodness of the human soul and the existence of evil. (Review by Anthony Meredith) |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lObq1J6nadR8CdJ |
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There are four papers dealing in turn with 'Monad and Dyad as Cosmic Principles in Syrianus' by A. D. R. Sheppard; 'Procession and Division in Proclus' by A. C. Lloyd; 'La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'\u00e2me raisonnable humaine dans le Commentaire sur le manuel d'Epict\u00e8te' by I. Hadot, and fourthly 'The Psychology of (?) Simplicius' Commentary on the De anima' by H. J. Blumenthal. The other participants in the colloquium must have made it a memorable and worthwhile, though rather short-lived occasion. The foremost living experts in the field of later Platonism were present, including A. H. Armstrong, P. Hadot, J. Rist, and A. Smith.\r\nArguably the most interesting feature of the collection is the difference of opinion among at least two of the participants about the validity of C. G. Steel's 'The changing self: a study of the soul in later Neoplatonism; Iamblichus, Damascius, and Priscianus' (cf. the review by A. Smith in JHS 100 [1980]). There, it is argued that the three authors mentioned were the only later Platonists to teach the mutability as distinct from the fall of the soul. So it is well enough known that Proclus dissented from Plotinus in his assertion at e.g. Elements 211 that the soul completely falls. But it is also argued that Proclus dissented from Iamblichus in denying the changeableness of the fallen soul. With Steel's hypothesis, Blumenthal is in a large measure of agreement, whereas Ilsetraut Hadot feels that such a view is oversimplified. She suggests that even Plotinus is prepared to admit a greater degree of alteration in the soul than some exegetes allow for. It must be said in defense of her position that despite the evidence of Ennead 4.8.8 and 4.1, there are disturbing passages at 4.4.3 and 5.1.1 which challenge a too simple evaluation of Plotinus. In this particular collection, the issue is rather over the interpretation of Simplicius, De Anima 220.2-4 (cf. p. 91). Blumenthal argues that Simplicius' language need only mean that the soul has a temporary change. Against such an interpretation, Hadot argues that it overlooks the fact that Simplicius was a pupil of Damascius and he certainly believed in the change of the human soul. Perhaps, though, the views are not as far apart as the foregoing remarks may suggest. After all, it is hard to be supposed that the change in the soul argued for by Iamblichus and his followers was in itself irreversible. The whole Platonist school had to offer some sort of rationale for the obvious fact of the weakness and sinfulness of the human being. Whether one talks of 'fall', 'change', or 'weakness' seems hardly to matter. Nor is the problem restricted to pagans. A few apt quotations from St. Augustine illustrate the universal nature of the problem which faces any thinker who is prepared to take seriously both the goodness of the human soul and the existence of evil. (Review by Anthony Meredith)","btype":4,"date":"1982","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lObq1J6nadR8CdJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":465,"full_name":"Lloyd, Antony C.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":{"id":133,"pubplace":"Liverpool","publisher":"Liverpool University Press","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":null,"valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":[1982]}
| Title | Simplicius |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1967 |
| Published in | The Encyclopedia of Philosophy |
| Pages | 448-449 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lloyd, Antony C. |
| Editor(s) | Edwards, Paul |
| Translator(s) |
| "SIMPLICIUS, sixth-century Neoplatonist and commen tator on Aristotle, studied in Alexandria under Ammonius and in Athens under Damascius. The School at Athens was closed in 529, and Simplicius withdrew to Persia. When he returned, his paganism barred him from lecturing. His surviving commentaries (on Aristotle’s Categories, Physics, De Caelo, and De Anima) are both more learned and more polemic than would have been suitable for students. His chief importance in the history of philosophy probably lies in his being a source of our knowledge of other ancient philosophers, notably the pre-Socratics.Simplicius takes for granted the metaphysics of Neopla tonism as it had been systematized in the Athenian School of the fifth century. He accepts the usual three hypostases but follows Iamblichus and Damascius in making much of the distinction between each hypostasis and, indeed, be tween each self-subsistent reality as it is undifferentiated (remaining in the One) and as it is differentiated or plural- ized (proceeding). (See, for example, In De Caelo, pp. 93- 94, Heiberg.) It is one of the concepts or devices by which he carries out the task that dominates his work, to reconcile Plato and Aristotle. They appear to disagree, for instance, about motion: a self-moving or an unmoved mover, the motion or immobility of reason, and so on. According to Simplicius, Plato is usually writing of the primary kind of motion, and Aristotle of the secondary, or proceeding, kind. Simplicius’ interpretation of the De Anima is based on that of Iamblichus, which took it as a valid description of the embodied soul, to be supplemented by a metaphysical account of the “separate” intellectIn natural philosophy, Simplicius, like other Neoplaton- ists, is more ready to criticize Aristotle, so that the result is more often a compromise, rather than a reconciliation, with Plato. Aristotelian matter had long been identi fied with Plato's not-being; Simplicius has little to add here to Plotinus and Porphyry. But the problems of space, mo tion, place, and allied concepts had repeatedly been ex amined and were already beginning to suggest relational definitions foreign to Aristotle's physics. In an excursus on the notion of place (In Physica, VoL XI, pp. 601-645, Diels) Simplicius describes some interesting and original views of Darnascius, which he reconciles with Aristotle only by implying, implausibly, that the two are complemen tary, A similar but less scientific treatment of time as a kind of metaphysical cause of the existence of motion and things in motion depends on the distinction already referred to be tween remaining in the One and proceeding; the latter aspect accounts for flowing time, which is the measure of succession,Simplicius also wrote an extant commentary on the Stoic Epictetus' Enchiridion (or handbook of ethics). In moral philosophy the Neoplafconists borrowed much from Stoi cism, and while well expressed, most of the commentary is commonplace for the period. However, it does contain a semipopular presentation of Neoplatonic theology or metaphysics (pp. 95-101, Diibner), and this has been claimed as a survival of Alexandrian Platonism in which (as in the Middle Academy) the highest hypostasis is not the One, but Intellect, The text i% not unambiguous but dubiously supports the claim." [the whole entry] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EDqpmOHmXAWfsyj |
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The School at Athens was \r\nclosed in 529, and Simplicius withdrew to Persia. When he \r\nreturned, his paganism barred him from lecturing. His \r\nsurviving commentaries (on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, Physics, \r\nDe Caelo, and De Anima) are both more learned and more \r\npolemic than would have been suitable for students. His \r\nchief importance in the history of philosophy probably lies \r\nin his being a source of our knowledge of other ancient \r\nphilosophers, notably the pre-Socratics.Simplicius takes for granted the metaphysics of Neopla\u00ad\r\ntonism as it had been systematized in the Athenian School \r\nof the fifth century. He accepts the usual three hypostases \r\nbut follows Iamblichus and Damascius in making much of \r\nthe distinction between each hypostasis and, indeed, be\u00ad\r\ntween each self-subsistent reality as it is undifferentiated \r\n(remaining in the One) and as it is differentiated or plural- \r\nized (proceeding). (See, for example, In De Caelo, pp. 93- \r\n94, Heiberg.) It is one of the concepts or devices by \r\nwhich he carries out the task that dominates his work, to \r\nreconcile Plato and Aristotle. They appear to disagree, for \r\ninstance, about motion: a self-moving or an unmoved \r\nmover, the motion or immobility of reason, and so on. \r\nAccording to Simplicius, Plato is usually writing of the \r\nprimary kind of motion, and Aristotle of the secondary, or \r\nproceeding, kind. Simplicius\u2019 interpretation of the De \r\nAnima is based on that of Iamblichus, which took it as a \r\nvalid description of the embodied soul, to be supplemented \r\nby a metaphysical account of the \u201cseparate\u201d intellectIn natural philosophy, Simplicius, like other Neoplaton- \r\nists, is more ready to criticize Aristotle, so that the result\r\nis more often a compromise, rather than a reconciliation, \r\nwith Plato. Aristotelian matter had long been identi\u00ad\r\nfied with Plato's not-being; Simplicius has little to add here \r\nto Plotinus and Porphyry. But the problems of space, mo\u00ad\r\ntion, place, and allied concepts had repeatedly been ex\u00ad\r\namined and were already beginning to suggest relational \r\ndefinitions foreign to Aristotle's physics. In an excursus \r\non the notion of place (In Physica, VoL XI, pp. 601-645, \r\nDiels) Simplicius describes some interesting and original \r\nviews of Darnascius, which he reconciles with Aristotle \r\nonly by implying, implausibly, that the two are complemen\u00ad\r\ntary, A similar but less scientific treatment of time as a kind \r\nof metaphysical cause of the existence of motion and things \r\nin motion depends on the distinction already referred to be\u00ad\r\ntween remaining in the One and proceeding; the latter \r\naspect accounts for flowing time, which is the measure of \r\nsuccession,Simplicius also wrote an extant commentary on the Stoic \r\nEpictetus' Enchiridion (or handbook of ethics). In moral \r\nphilosophy the Neoplafconists borrowed much from Stoi\u00ad\r\ncism, and while well expressed, most of the commentary is \r\ncommonplace for the period. However, it does contain a \r\nsemipopular presentation of Neoplatonic theology or \r\nmetaphysics (pp. 95-101, Diibner), and this has been \r\nclaimed as a survival of Alexandrian Platonism in which (as \r\nin the Middle Academy) the highest hypostasis is not the \r\nOne, but Intellect, The text i% not unambiguous but \r\ndubiously supports the claim.\" [the whole entry]","btype":2,"date":"1967","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EDqpmOHmXAWfsyj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":465,"full_name":"Lloyd, Antony C.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":237,"full_name":"Edwards, Paul","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":393,"section_of":1371,"pages":"448-449","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1371,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"bibliography","type":4,"language":"en","title":"The Encyclopedia of Philosophy","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Edwards1967","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1967","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"The first English-language reference of its kind, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy was hailed as \"a remarkable and unique work\" (Saturday Review) that contained \"the international who's who of philosophy and cultural history\" (Library Journal). [author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9TYFlO2oFqfGwvz","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":1371,"pubplace":"London, New York","publisher":"Crowell-Collier Publishing Company","series":"","volume":"7","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1967]}
| Title | Simplicius |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1967 |
| Published in | The Encyclopedia of Philosophy |
| Pages | 448-449 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lloyd, Antony C. |
| Editor(s) | Edwards, Paul |
| Translator(s) |
"SIMPLICIUS, sixth-century Neoplatonist and commen tator on Aristotle, studied in Alexandria under Ammonius and in Athens under Damascius. The School at Athens was closed in 529, and Simplicius withdrew to Persia. When he returned, his paganism barred him from lecturing. His surviving commentaries (on Aristotle’s Categories, Physics, De Caelo, and De Anima) are both more learned and more polemic than would have been suitable for students. His chief importance in the history of philosophy probably lies in his being a source of our knowledge of other ancient philosophers, notably the pre-Socratics.Simplicius takes for granted the metaphysics of Neopla tonism as it had been systematized in the Athenian School of the fifth century. He accepts the usual three hypostases but follows Iamblichus and Damascius in making much of the distinction between each hypostasis and, indeed, be tween each self-subsistent reality as it is undifferentiated (remaining in the One) and as it is differentiated or plural- ized (proceeding). (See, for example, In De Caelo, pp. 93- 94, Heiberg.) It is one of the concepts or devices by which he carries out the task that dominates his work, to reconcile Plato and Aristotle. They appear to disagree, for instance, about motion: a self-moving or an unmoved mover, the motion or immobility of reason, and so on. According to Simplicius, Plato is usually writing of the primary kind of motion, and Aristotle of the secondary, or proceeding, kind. Simplicius’ interpretation of the De Anima is based on that of Iamblichus, which took it as a valid description of the embodied soul, to be supplemented by a metaphysical account of the “separate” intellectIn natural philosophy, Simplicius, like other Neoplaton- ists, is more ready to criticize Aristotle, so that the result is more often a compromise, rather than a reconciliation, with Plato. Aristotelian matter had long been identi fied with Plato's not-being; Simplicius has little to add here to Plotinus and Porphyry. But the problems of space, mo tion, place, and allied concepts had repeatedly been ex amined and were already beginning to suggest relational definitions foreign to Aristotle's physics. In an excursus on the notion of place (In Physica, VoL XI, pp. 601-645, Diels) Simplicius describes some interesting and original views of Darnascius, which he reconciles with Aristotle only by implying, implausibly, that the two are complemen tary, A similar but less scientific treatment of time as a kind of metaphysical cause of the existence of motion and things in motion depends on the distinction already referred to be tween remaining in the One and proceeding; the latter aspect accounts for flowing time, which is the measure of succession,Simplicius also wrote an extant commentary on the Stoic Epictetus' Enchiridion (or handbook of ethics). In moral philosophy the Neoplafconists borrowed much from Stoi cism, and while well expressed, most of the commentary is commonplace for the period. However, it does contain a semipopular presentation of Neoplatonic theology or metaphysics (pp. 95-101, Diibner), and this has been claimed as a survival of Alexandrian Platonism in which (as in the Middle Academy) the highest hypostasis is not the One, but Intellect, The text i% not unambiguous but dubiously supports the claim." [the whole entry] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EDqpmOHmXAWfsyj |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"393","_score":null,"_source":{"id":393,"authors_free":[{"id":516,"entry_id":393,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":465,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lloyd, Antony C.","free_first_name":"Antony C.","free_last_name":"Lloyd","norm_person":{"id":465,"first_name":"Antony C.","last_name":"Lloyd, Antony C.","full_name":"Lloyd, Antony C.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1052318118","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":517,"entry_id":393,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":237,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Edwards, Paul","free_first_name":"Paul","free_last_name":"Edwards","norm_person":{"id":237,"first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Edwards","full_name":"Edwards, Paul","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius"},"abstract":"\"SIMPLICIUS, sixth-century Neoplatonist and commen\u00ad\r\ntator on Aristotle, studied in Alexandria under Ammonius \r\nand in Athens under Damascius. The School at Athens was \r\nclosed in 529, and Simplicius withdrew to Persia. When he \r\nreturned, his paganism barred him from lecturing. His \r\nsurviving commentaries (on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, Physics, \r\nDe Caelo, and De Anima) are both more learned and more \r\npolemic than would have been suitable for students. His \r\nchief importance in the history of philosophy probably lies \r\nin his being a source of our knowledge of other ancient \r\nphilosophers, notably the pre-Socratics.Simplicius takes for granted the metaphysics of Neopla\u00ad\r\ntonism as it had been systematized in the Athenian School \r\nof the fifth century. He accepts the usual three hypostases \r\nbut follows Iamblichus and Damascius in making much of \r\nthe distinction between each hypostasis and, indeed, be\u00ad\r\ntween each self-subsistent reality as it is undifferentiated \r\n(remaining in the One) and as it is differentiated or plural- \r\nized (proceeding). (See, for example, In De Caelo, pp. 93- \r\n94, Heiberg.) It is one of the concepts or devices by \r\nwhich he carries out the task that dominates his work, to \r\nreconcile Plato and Aristotle. They appear to disagree, for \r\ninstance, about motion: a self-moving or an unmoved \r\nmover, the motion or immobility of reason, and so on. \r\nAccording to Simplicius, Plato is usually writing of the \r\nprimary kind of motion, and Aristotle of the secondary, or \r\nproceeding, kind. Simplicius\u2019 interpretation of the De \r\nAnima is based on that of Iamblichus, which took it as a \r\nvalid description of the embodied soul, to be supplemented \r\nby a metaphysical account of the \u201cseparate\u201d intellectIn natural philosophy, Simplicius, like other Neoplaton- \r\nists, is more ready to criticize Aristotle, so that the result\r\nis more often a compromise, rather than a reconciliation, \r\nwith Plato. Aristotelian matter had long been identi\u00ad\r\nfied with Plato's not-being; Simplicius has little to add here \r\nto Plotinus and Porphyry. But the problems of space, mo\u00ad\r\ntion, place, and allied concepts had repeatedly been ex\u00ad\r\namined and were already beginning to suggest relational \r\ndefinitions foreign to Aristotle's physics. In an excursus \r\non the notion of place (In Physica, VoL XI, pp. 601-645, \r\nDiels) Simplicius describes some interesting and original \r\nviews of Darnascius, which he reconciles with Aristotle \r\nonly by implying, implausibly, that the two are complemen\u00ad\r\ntary, A similar but less scientific treatment of time as a kind \r\nof metaphysical cause of the existence of motion and things \r\nin motion depends on the distinction already referred to be\u00ad\r\ntween remaining in the One and proceeding; the latter \r\naspect accounts for flowing time, which is the measure of \r\nsuccession,Simplicius also wrote an extant commentary on the Stoic \r\nEpictetus' Enchiridion (or handbook of ethics). In moral \r\nphilosophy the Neoplafconists borrowed much from Stoi\u00ad\r\ncism, and while well expressed, most of the commentary is \r\ncommonplace for the period. However, it does contain a \r\nsemipopular presentation of Neoplatonic theology or \r\nmetaphysics (pp. 95-101, Diibner), and this has been \r\nclaimed as a survival of Alexandrian Platonism in which (as \r\nin the Middle Academy) the highest hypostasis is not the \r\nOne, but Intellect, The text i% not unambiguous but \r\ndubiously supports the claim.\" [the whole entry]","btype":2,"date":"1967","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EDqpmOHmXAWfsyj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":465,"full_name":"Lloyd, Antony C.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":237,"full_name":"Edwards, Paul","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":393,"section_of":1371,"pages":"448-449","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1371,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"bibliography","type":4,"language":"en","title":"The Encyclopedia of Philosophy","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Edwards1967","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1967","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"The first English-language reference of its kind, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy was hailed as \"a remarkable and unique work\" (Saturday Review) that contained \"the international who's who of philosophy and cultural history\" (Library Journal). [author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/9TYFlO2oFqfGwvz","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":1371,"pubplace":"London, New York","publisher":"Crowell-Collier Publishing Company","series":"","volume":"7","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Simplicius"]}
| Title | Soul and the structure of being in late Neoplatonism : Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius ; Papers and discussions of a colloquium held at Liverpool, 15-16 April 1982 |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1982 |
| Publication Place | Liverpool |
| Publisher | Liverpool University Press |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Blumenthal, Henry J. , Lloyd, Antony C. |
| Translator(s) |
This short and not inexpensive book contains the papers and discussions of a colloquium held at Liverpool on 15-16 April 1982. There are four papers dealing in turn with 'Monad and Dyad as Cosmic Principles in Syrianus' by A. D. R. Sheppard; 'Procession and Division in Proclus' by A. C. Lloyd; 'La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'âme raisonnable humaine dans le Commentaire sur le manuel d'Epictète' by I. Hadot, and fourthly 'The Psychology of (?) Simplicius' Commentary on the De anima' by H. J. Blumenthal. The other participants in the colloquium must have made it a memorable and worthwhile, though rather short-lived occasion. The foremost living experts in the field of later Platonism were present, including A. H. Armstrong, P. Hadot, J. Rist, and A. Smith. Arguably the most interesting feature of the collection is the difference of opinion among at least two of the participants about the validity of C. G. Steel's 'The changing self: a study of the soul in later Neoplatonism; Iamblichus, Damascius, and Priscianus' (cf. the review by A. Smith in JHS 100 [1980]). There, it is argued that the three authors mentioned were the only later Platonists to teach the mutability as distinct from the fall of the soul. So it is well enough known that Proclus dissented from Plotinus in his assertion at e.g. Elements 211 that the soul completely falls. But it is also argued that Proclus dissented from Iamblichus in denying the changeableness of the fallen soul. With Steel's hypothesis, Blumenthal is in a large measure of agreement, whereas Ilsetraut Hadot feels that such a view is oversimplified. She suggests that even Plotinus is prepared to admit a greater degree of alteration in the soul than some exegetes allow for. It must be said in defense of her position that despite the evidence of Ennead 4.8.8 and 4.1, there are disturbing passages at 4.4.3 and 5.1.1 which challenge a too simple evaluation of Plotinus. In this particular collection, the issue is rather over the interpretation of Simplicius, De Anima 220.2-4 (cf. p. 91). Blumenthal argues that Simplicius' language need only mean that the soul has a temporary change. Against such an interpretation, Hadot argues that it overlooks the fact that Simplicius was a pupil of Damascius and he certainly believed in the change of the human soul. Perhaps, though, the views are not as far apart as the foregoing remarks may suggest. After all, it is hard to be supposed that the change in the soul argued for by Iamblichus and his followers was in itself irreversible. The whole Platonist school had to offer some sort of rationale for the obvious fact of the weakness and sinfulness of the human being. Whether one talks of 'fall', 'change', or 'weakness' seems hardly to matter. Nor is the problem restricted to pagans. A few apt quotations from St. Augustine illustrate the universal nature of the problem which faces any thinker who is prepared to take seriously both the goodness of the human soul and the existence of evil. (Review by Anthony Meredith) |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/lObq1J6nadR8CdJ |
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There are four papers dealing in turn with 'Monad and Dyad as Cosmic Principles in Syrianus' by A. D. R. Sheppard; 'Procession and Division in Proclus' by A. C. Lloyd; 'La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'\u00e2me raisonnable humaine dans le Commentaire sur le manuel d'Epict\u00e8te' by I. Hadot, and fourthly 'The Psychology of (?) Simplicius' Commentary on the De anima' by H. J. Blumenthal. The other participants in the colloquium must have made it a memorable and worthwhile, though rather short-lived occasion. The foremost living experts in the field of later Platonism were present, including A. H. Armstrong, P. Hadot, J. Rist, and A. Smith.\r\nArguably the most interesting feature of the collection is the difference of opinion among at least two of the participants about the validity of C. G. Steel's 'The changing self: a study of the soul in later Neoplatonism; Iamblichus, Damascius, and Priscianus' (cf. the review by A. Smith in JHS 100 [1980]). There, it is argued that the three authors mentioned were the only later Platonists to teach the mutability as distinct from the fall of the soul. So it is well enough known that Proclus dissented from Plotinus in his assertion at e.g. Elements 211 that the soul completely falls. But it is also argued that Proclus dissented from Iamblichus in denying the changeableness of the fallen soul. With Steel's hypothesis, Blumenthal is in a large measure of agreement, whereas Ilsetraut Hadot feels that such a view is oversimplified. She suggests that even Plotinus is prepared to admit a greater degree of alteration in the soul than some exegetes allow for. It must be said in defense of her position that despite the evidence of Ennead 4.8.8 and 4.1, there are disturbing passages at 4.4.3 and 5.1.1 which challenge a too simple evaluation of Plotinus. In this particular collection, the issue is rather over the interpretation of Simplicius, De Anima 220.2-4 (cf. p. 91). Blumenthal argues that Simplicius' language need only mean that the soul has a temporary change. Against such an interpretation, Hadot argues that it overlooks the fact that Simplicius was a pupil of Damascius and he certainly believed in the change of the human soul. Perhaps, though, the views are not as far apart as the foregoing remarks may suggest. After all, it is hard to be supposed that the change in the soul argued for by Iamblichus and his followers was in itself irreversible. The whole Platonist school had to offer some sort of rationale for the obvious fact of the weakness and sinfulness of the human being. Whether one talks of 'fall', 'change', or 'weakness' seems hardly to matter. Nor is the problem restricted to pagans. A few apt quotations from St. Augustine illustrate the universal nature of the problem which faces any thinker who is prepared to take seriously both the goodness of the human soul and the existence of evil. 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