Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 2021
By: Harari, Orna
Title Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics
Type Article
Language English
Date 2021
Journal History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Volume 24
Issue 1
Pages 122-139
Categories no categories
Author(s) Harari, Orna
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius’ use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle’s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius’ assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle’s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle’s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1463","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1463,"authors_free":[{"id":2536,"entry_id":1463,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics","main_title":{"title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics"},"abstract":"In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius\u2019 use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle\u2019s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius\u2019 assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle\u2019s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle\u2019s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mWf9pkyGLYXgUke","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1463,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"122-139"}},"sort":[2021]}

Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs, 2012
By: Harari, Orna
Title Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Volume 43
Pages 366-375
Categories no categories
Author(s) Harari, Orna
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius’ view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Phiioponus' account of these proofs. Specifically. I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Phiioponus, he conceives of the argu­ment that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato’s un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Phiioponus’ account of tekmeriodic proofs grants. [Author's abstract]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1152","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1152,"authors_free":[{"id":1727,"entry_id":1152,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs"},"abstract":"In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius\u2019 view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Phiioponus' account of these proofs. Specifically. I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Phiioponus, he conceives of the argu\u00adment that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato\u2019s un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Phiioponus\u2019 account of tekmeriodic proofs grants. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vbzFJm961Y8HIGw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1152,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"43","issue":"","pages":"366-375"}},"sort":[2012]}

Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change, 2009
By: Harari, Orna
Title Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change
Type Article
Language English
Date 2009
Journal Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Volume 37
Pages 245-274
Categories no categories
Author(s) Harari, Orna
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1145","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1145,"authors_free":[{"id":1718,"entry_id":1145,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change"},"abstract":"The ancient commentators\u2019 approach to Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f71) or a character (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1f75\u03c1) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (\u1f00\u03c0\u1f79\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus\u2019 Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus\u2019 construal of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EIKXB0T5OT2ezjh","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1145,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"37","issue":"","pages":"245-274"}},"sort":[2009]}

  • PAGE 1 OF 1
Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 2021
By: Harari, Orna
Title Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics
Type Article
Language English
Date 2021
Journal History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Volume 24
Issue 1
Pages 122-139
Categories no categories
Author(s) Harari, Orna
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius’ use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle’s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius’ assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle’s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle’s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1463","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1463,"authors_free":[{"id":2536,"entry_id":1463,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics","main_title":{"title":"Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics"},"abstract":"In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius\u2019 use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle\u2019s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius\u2019 assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle\u2019s prose, hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle\u2019s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. [conclusion, p. 138]","btype":3,"date":"2021","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mWf9pkyGLYXgUke","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1463,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":"24","issue":"1","pages":"122-139"}},"sort":["Logic and Interpretation: Syllogistic Reconstructions in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics"]}

Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs, 2012
By: Harari, Orna
Title Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Volume 43
Pages 366-375
Categories no categories
Author(s) Harari, Orna
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius’ view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Phiioponus' account of these proofs. Specifically. I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Phiioponus, he conceives of the argu­ment that leads to the principles of natural  philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and  (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato’s  un-hypothetical  science, hence denying natural  philosophy  the  autonomy  from  metaphysics  that  Phiioponus’  account  of tekmeriodic  proofs grants. [Author's abstract]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1152","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1152,"authors_free":[{"id":1727,"entry_id":1152,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs"},"abstract":"In this study I examine the sole detailed evidence we have for Simplicius\u2019 view of sign-based, i.e. tekmeriodic proofs, thereby questing the widespread assumption that he espouses Phiioponus' account of these proofs. Specifically. I argue that (1) it is more plausible to understand the signs on which Simplicius bases his tekmeriodic proofs as refutable, (2) he grounds the epistemic worth of these proofs in the evidential strength of their premises rather than in their validity, (3) unlike Phiioponus, he conceives of the argu\u00adment that leads to the principles of natural philosophy, which tekmeriodic proofs are aimed to prove, as inductive, and (4) he evaluates these proofs against Plato\u2019s un-hypothetical science, hence denying natural philosophy the autonomy from metaphysics that Phiioponus\u2019 account of tekmeriodic proofs grants. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/vbzFJm961Y8HIGw","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1152,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"43","issue":"","pages":"366-375"}},"sort":["Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proofs"]}

Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change, 2009
By: Harari, Orna
Title Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change
Type Article
Language English
Date 2009
Journal Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Volume 37
Pages 245-274
Categories no categories
Author(s) Harari, Orna
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
The ancient  commentators’  approach  to  Aristotle’s  account  of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity,  in which  relatives  are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms.  He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and  the supervening  relational  attribute  an  inclination (ἀπόνευσις).  In  this  study  I  attempt  to  clarify  the significance of this  terminology,  arguing  that  through  the  notion  of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives,  as  formulated  in  Plotinus’ Ennead  6.  1.  6-9.  To  expound this contention,  I outline Plotinus’  construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1145","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1145,"authors_free":[{"id":1718,"entry_id":1145,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":169,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Harari, Orna","free_first_name":"Orna","free_last_name":"Harari","norm_person":{"id":169,"first_name":"Orna","last_name":"Harari","full_name":"Harari Orna","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change"},"abstract":"The ancient commentators\u2019 approach to Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f71) or a character (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1f75\u03c1) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (\u1f00\u03c0\u1f79\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus\u2019 Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus\u2019 construal of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.]","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EIKXB0T5OT2ezjh","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":169,"full_name":"Harari Orna","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1145,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy","volume":"37","issue":"","pages":"245-274"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change"]}

  • PAGE 1 OF 1