| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because humans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as sent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is reason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational capacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD |
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| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because humans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as sent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is reason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational capacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD |
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