| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because humans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as sent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is reason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational capacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because hu\u00admans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as\u00ad\r\nsent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is \r\nreason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, \r\nand if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational \r\ncapacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":[2016]}
| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 37 |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EIKXB0T5OT2ezjh |
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| Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2000 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 18 |
| Pages | 320-356 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/j0udJ8WCs6KOIWe |
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| Title | Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 50 |
| Pages | 237-288 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Coope, Ursula |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Humans are accountable for what they do and believe in a way that other animals are not. T h e Stoics held that this is because humans are rational, and in particular because they have the capacity for rational assent. But how exactly does the capacity for rational assent explain accountability? O ur Stoic sources do not explicitly answer this question, but I argue that they suggest the following view. Humans are responsible for assenting (and withholding as sent) just because o f the way in which the capacity for assent is reason-responsive: you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and if you know whether or not you should be assenting, you can be guided by this knowledge in either assenting or withholding assent.This view, however, raises certain further questions. What is it about the nature o f our capacity for assent that enables it to be reason-responsive in a way that other psychic capacities are not? Why can one assent for a reason, but not have at* impression of something's being the case for a reason? I argue that a basis for answering these questions can be found in a perhaps surprising source: ps.-Simplicius' sixth-century commentary on Aristotle's De anima. Ps.-Simplicius draws on the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain what is distinctive about the rational capacity for assent. His account, I claim, provides a basis for explaining the distinctively reason-responsive nature of our capacity for assent. [Introduction, p. 287] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/dvgVyUDHfWVEDyD |
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| Title | Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt. A Discussion of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2000 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 18 |
| Pages | 320-356 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Osborne, Catherine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Few interested parties in the scholarly world of ancient philosophy will, by this stage, be unaware of the story behind Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi’s publication. It has been hot news, and the publication eagerly awaited, ever since the announcement in 1994 that a papyrus on which Alain Martin was working, under the auspices of the Bibliothèque Nationale and University of Strasburg, had been identified as containing verses of Empedocles, some of them almost certainly previously unknown. Nevertheless—-since there seems no better opening for a reflection on the significance of this discovery and on the value of its elegant publication—1 propose to begin by summarizing what I take to be most important among the undisputed facts before proceeding to ask how they affect our understanding of Empedocles and of what we are doing with texts when we study the Presocratics. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/j0udJ8WCs6KOIWe |
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| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Volume | 37 |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6. 1. 6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. [Introduction, pp. 245 f.] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/EIKXB0T5OT2ezjh |
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