Title | The Stoics on cases, predicates, and the unity of the proposition |
Type | Book Section |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Published in | Aristotle and after |
Pages | 91-107 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gaskin, Richard |
Editor(s) | Sorabji, Richard |
Translator(s) |
As far as traditional classifications go, the Stoics count as materialists. But it is notorious that there were four things in their world-view which do not fit this caracterization: time, place, the void and the so-called ‘sayables', or lekta (SE AM 10.218 = FDS 720). Lekta consist of three main kinds of quasi-linguistic item: centrally, simple propositions (as well as certain non-assertoric, but grammatically autonomous, items) are ‘complete’ lekta (DL 7 .6-8 = FDS 696, 874; SE AM 8.70-74). From these propositions, more complex ‘complete’ lekta maybe constructed, such as conditionals (DL 7.71) or syllogisms (DL 7.63). And within the structure of complete lekta, ‘incomplete’ lekta, such as predicates, maybe discerned. I call lekta quasi-linguistic, rather than linguistic, because, as we learn from an important passage in Sextus (AM 8.11-13 = FDS 67), the Stoics distinguished lekta both from language and from physical objects in the world. Hence linguistic items such as the verb (rhêma) ‘writes’ and the complete sentence (logos) ‘Socrates writes’ should be kept rigorously apart from their corresponding lekta - the predicate (katigorema) writes and the complete proposition (axidma) Socrates writes - which the linguistic expressions signify (semainein: SE AM 8.11 - 12, DL 7.56, 58, 65). In this paper I shall examine the Stoic treatment of the main constituents of the complete lekton: cases and predicates. I shall argue that cases are, like predicates, (incomplete) lekta, and that the verbal noun played a central role in Stoic thinking about lekta. In the light of these reflections, I shall conclude with some speculative remarks on the unity of the proposition. [Introduction, p. 91] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hsCVIlyqpBpc4yJ |
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But it is notorious that there were four things in their world-view which do not fit this caracterization: time, place, the void and the so-called \u2018sayables', or lekta (SE AM 10.218 = FDS 720). Lekta consist of three main kinds of quasi-linguistic item: centrally, simple propositions (as well as certain non-assertoric, but grammatically autonomous, items) are \u2018complete\u2019 lekta (DL 7 .6-8 = FDS 696, 874; SE AM 8.70-74). From these propositions, more complex \u2018complete\u2019 lekta maybe constructed, such as conditionals (DL 7.71) or syllogisms (DL 7.63). And within the structure of complete lekta, \u2018incomplete\u2019 lekta, such as predicates, maybe discerned. I call lekta quasi-linguistic, rather than linguistic, because, as we learn from an important passage in Sextus (AM 8.11-13 = FDS 67), the Stoics distinguished lekta both from language and from physical objects in the world. Hence linguistic items such as the verb (rh\u00eama) \u2018writes\u2019 and the complete sentence (logos) \u2018Socrates writes\u2019 should be kept rigorously apart from their corresponding lekta - the predicate (katigorema) writes and the complete proposition (axidma) Socrates writes - which the linguistic expressions signify (semainein: SE AM 8.11 - 12, DL 7.56, 58, 65). \r\nIn this paper I shall examine the Stoic treatment of the main constituents of the complete lekton: cases and predicates. I shall argue that cases are, like predicates, (incomplete) lekta, and that the verbal noun played a central role in Stoic thinking about lekta. In the light of these reflections, I shall conclude with some speculative remarks on the unity of the proposition. [Introduction, p. 91]","btype":2,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hsCVIlyqpBpc4yJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":132,"full_name":"Gaskin, Richard ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":133,"full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1177,"section_of":199,"pages":"91-107","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":199,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Aristotle and after","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Sorabji1997a","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1997","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1997","abstract":"A selection of papers given at the Institute of Classical Studies during 1996. They cover a variety of new work on the 900 years of philosophy from Aristotle to Simplicius. 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[authors abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YmwXqTgEl5I3UF5","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":199,"pubplace":"University of London","publisher":"Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study","series":"BICS (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies) Supplement","volume":"68","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1997]}
Title | A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion |
Type | Book Section |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Published in | Aristotle and after |
Pages | 181-195 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rashed, Marwan |
Editor(s) | Sorabji, Richard |
Translator(s) |
[Conclusion, pp. 181 f.]: To conclude, then, the historical evolution of the polemics may be summarised as follows: 1. ‘Aristotelian’ claim of the intellect from without; 2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move; 3. Aristoteles of Mytilene (as reported by Alexander in Cl) defends the intellect from without by claiming its ubiquity; 4. Alexander (De intell., C2) criticises Aristoteles’ solution to Atticus’ criticisms and gives an alternative reply to Atticus by accounting for separation in terms of thought processes; 5. Alexander {In Phys.) attacks Atticus’ vehicle-theory on the grounds that it does not resolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution. Thus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an earlier one than the commentary on the Physics. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/uG5k4khKdCtgMTb |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1061","_score":null,"_ignored":["booksection.book.abstract.keyword"],"_source":{"id":1061,"authors_free":[{"id":1610,"entry_id":1061,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"Marwan","free_last_name":"Rashed","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1611,"entry_id":1061,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":133,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Sorabji, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Sorabji","norm_person":{"id":133,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Sorabji","full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130064165","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion","main_title":{"title":"A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion"},"abstract":"[Conclusion, pp. 181 f.]: To conclude, then, the historical evolution of the polemics \r\nmay be summarised as follows:\r\n1. \u2018Aristotelian\u2019 claim of the intellect from without;\r\n2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move;\r\n3. Aristoteles of Mytilene (as reported by Alexander in Cl) defends the intellect from \r\nwithout by claiming its ubiquity;\r\n4. Alexander (De intell., C2) criticises Aristoteles\u2019 solution to Atticus\u2019 criticisms and \r\ngives an alternative reply to Atticus by accounting for separation in terms of thought \r\nprocesses;\r\n5. Alexander {In Phys.) attacks Atticus\u2019 vehicle-theory on the grounds that it does not \r\nresolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution.\r\nThus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an \r\nearlier one than the commentary on the Physics.","btype":2,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/uG5k4khKdCtgMTb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":133,"full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1061,"section_of":199,"pages":"181-195","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":199,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Aristotle and after","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Sorabji1997a","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1997","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1997","abstract":"A selection of papers given at the Institute of Classical Studies during 1996. They cover a variety of new work on the 900 years of philosophy from Aristotle to Simplicius. There is a strong concentration on stoicism with papers by: Michael Frede ( Euphrates of Tyre ); A. A. Long ( Property ownership and community ); Brad Inwood ( 'Why do fools fallin love?' ); Susanne Bobzein ( freedom and ethics ); Richard Gaskin ( cases, predicates and the unity of the proposition ); Richard Sorabji ( stoic philosophy and psychotherapy ); Bernard Williams ( reply to Richard Sorabji ). The other papers are by: Heinrich von Staden ( Galen and the 'Second Sophistic' ); Hans B. Gottschalk ( continuity and change in Aristotelianism ); Travis Butler ( the homonymy of signification in Aristotle ); Andrea Falcon ( Aristotle's theory of division ); Sylvia Berryman (Horror Vacui in the third century BC ); M. B. Trapp ( On the Tablet of Cebes ); Marwan Rashed ( a 'new' text of Alexander on the soul's motion ). [authors abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YmwXqTgEl5I3UF5","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":199,"pubplace":"University of London","publisher":"Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study","series":"BICS (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies) Supplement","volume":"68","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[1997]}
Title | A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion |
Type | Book Section |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Published in | Aristotle and after |
Pages | 181-195 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Rashed, Marwan |
Editor(s) | Sorabji, Richard |
Translator(s) |
[Conclusion, pp. 181 f.]: To conclude, then, the historical evolution of the polemics may be summarised as follows: 1. ‘Aristotelian’ claim of the intellect from without; 2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move; 3. Aristoteles of Mytilene (as reported by Alexander in Cl) defends the intellect from without by claiming its ubiquity; 4. Alexander (De intell., C2) criticises Aristoteles’ solution to Atticus’ criticisms and gives an alternative reply to Atticus by accounting for separation in terms of thought processes; 5. Alexander {In Phys.) attacks Atticus’ vehicle-theory on the grounds that it does not resolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution. Thus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an earlier one than the commentary on the Physics. |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/uG5k4khKdCtgMTb |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1061","_score":null,"_ignored":["booksection.book.abstract.keyword"],"_source":{"id":1061,"authors_free":[{"id":1610,"entry_id":1061,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"Marwan","free_last_name":"Rashed","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1611,"entry_id":1061,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":133,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Sorabji, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Sorabji","norm_person":{"id":133,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Sorabji","full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130064165","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion","main_title":{"title":"A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion"},"abstract":"[Conclusion, pp. 181 f.]: To conclude, then, the historical evolution of the polemics \r\nmay be summarised as follows:\r\n1. \u2018Aristotelian\u2019 claim of the intellect from without;\r\n2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move;\r\n3. Aristoteles of Mytilene (as reported by Alexander in Cl) defends the intellect from \r\nwithout by claiming its ubiquity;\r\n4. Alexander (De intell., C2) criticises Aristoteles\u2019 solution to Atticus\u2019 criticisms and \r\ngives an alternative reply to Atticus by accounting for separation in terms of thought \r\nprocesses;\r\n5. Alexander {In Phys.) attacks Atticus\u2019 vehicle-theory on the grounds that it does not \r\nresolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution.\r\nThus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an \r\nearlier one than the commentary on the Physics.","btype":2,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/uG5k4khKdCtgMTb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":133,"full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1061,"section_of":199,"pages":"181-195","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":199,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Aristotle and after","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Sorabji1997a","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1997","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1997","abstract":"A selection of papers given at the Institute of Classical Studies during 1996. They cover a variety of new work on the 900 years of philosophy from Aristotle to Simplicius. There is a strong concentration on stoicism with papers by: Michael Frede ( Euphrates of Tyre ); A. A. Long ( Property ownership and community ); Brad Inwood ( 'Why do fools fallin love?' ); Susanne Bobzein ( freedom and ethics ); Richard Gaskin ( cases, predicates and the unity of the proposition ); Richard Sorabji ( stoic philosophy and psychotherapy ); Bernard Williams ( reply to Richard Sorabji ). The other papers are by: Heinrich von Staden ( Galen and the 'Second Sophistic' ); Hans B. Gottschalk ( continuity and change in Aristotelianism ); Travis Butler ( the homonymy of signification in Aristotle ); Andrea Falcon ( Aristotle's theory of division ); Sylvia Berryman (Horror Vacui in the third century BC ); M. B. Trapp ( On the Tablet of Cebes ); Marwan Rashed ( a 'new' text of Alexander on the soul's motion ). [authors abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YmwXqTgEl5I3UF5","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":199,"pubplace":"University of London","publisher":"Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study","series":"BICS (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies) Supplement","volume":"68","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion"]}
Title | The Stoics on cases, predicates, and the unity of the proposition |
Type | Book Section |
Language | English |
Date | 1997 |
Published in | Aristotle and after |
Pages | 91-107 |
Categories | no categories |
Author(s) | Gaskin, Richard |
Editor(s) | Sorabji, Richard |
Translator(s) |
As far as traditional classifications go, the Stoics count as materialists. But it is notorious that there were four things in their world-view which do not fit this caracterization: time, place, the void and the so-called ‘sayables', or lekta (SE AM 10.218 = FDS 720). Lekta consist of three main kinds of quasi-linguistic item: centrally, simple propositions (as well as certain non-assertoric, but grammatically autonomous, items) are ‘complete’ lekta (DL 7 .6-8 = FDS 696, 874; SE AM 8.70-74). From these propositions, more complex ‘complete’ lekta maybe constructed, such as conditionals (DL 7.71) or syllogisms (DL 7.63). And within the structure of complete lekta, ‘incomplete’ lekta, such as predicates, maybe discerned. I call lekta quasi-linguistic, rather than linguistic, because, as we learn from an important passage in Sextus (AM 8.11-13 = FDS 67), the Stoics distinguished lekta both from language and from physical objects in the world. Hence linguistic items such as the verb (rhêma) ‘writes’ and the complete sentence (logos) ‘Socrates writes’ should be kept rigorously apart from their corresponding lekta - the predicate (katigorema) writes and the complete proposition (axidma) Socrates writes - which the linguistic expressions signify (semainein: SE AM 8.11 - 12, DL 7.56, 58, 65). In this paper I shall examine the Stoic treatment of the main constituents of the complete lekton: cases and predicates. I shall argue that cases are, like predicates, (incomplete) lekta, and that the verbal noun played a central role in Stoic thinking about lekta. In the light of these reflections, I shall conclude with some speculative remarks on the unity of the proposition. [Introduction, p. 91] |
Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/hsCVIlyqpBpc4yJ |
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But it is notorious that there were four things in their world-view which do not fit this caracterization: time, place, the void and the so-called \u2018sayables', or lekta (SE AM 10.218 = FDS 720). Lekta consist of three main kinds of quasi-linguistic item: centrally, simple propositions (as well as certain non-assertoric, but grammatically autonomous, items) are \u2018complete\u2019 lekta (DL 7 .6-8 = FDS 696, 874; SE AM 8.70-74). From these propositions, more complex \u2018complete\u2019 lekta maybe constructed, such as conditionals (DL 7.71) or syllogisms (DL 7.63). And within the structure of complete lekta, \u2018incomplete\u2019 lekta, such as predicates, maybe discerned. I call lekta quasi-linguistic, rather than linguistic, because, as we learn from an important passage in Sextus (AM 8.11-13 = FDS 67), the Stoics distinguished lekta both from language and from physical objects in the world. Hence linguistic items such as the verb (rh\u00eama) \u2018writes\u2019 and the complete sentence (logos) \u2018Socrates writes\u2019 should be kept rigorously apart from their corresponding lekta - the predicate (katigorema) writes and the complete proposition (axidma) Socrates writes - which the linguistic expressions signify (semainein: SE AM 8.11 - 12, DL 7.56, 58, 65). \r\nIn this paper I shall examine the Stoic treatment of the main constituents of the complete lekton: cases and predicates. I shall argue that cases are, like predicates, (incomplete) lekta, and that the verbal noun played a central role in Stoic thinking about lekta. In the light of these reflections, I shall conclude with some speculative remarks on the unity of the proposition. 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