{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"210","_score":null,"_source":{"id":210,"authors_free":[{"id":267,"entry_id":210,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":438,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Vogel, C.","free_first_name":"C.","free_last_name":"Vogel","norm_person":{"id":438,"first_name":"Christian","last_name":"Vogel","full_name":"Vogel, Christian","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1111515123","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung: Simplikios' Kommentar zu Epiktets Handb\u00fcchlein der Moral","main_title":{"title":"Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung: Simplikios' Kommentar zu Epiktets Handb\u00fcchlein der Moral"},"abstract":"Die stoische Philosophie steht in ihren grunds\u00e4tzlichen Annahmen zur Erkenntnistheorie, zur Ontologie und zur Psychologie dem Platonismus diametral entgegen. Wenn mit Simplikios ein Philosoph der neuplatonischen Schule das Werk eines Stoikers durch eine ausf\u00fchrliche Kommentierung w\u00fcrdigt und diesem im Curriculum des Philosophieunterrichts einen Platz einr\u00e4umt, scheinen sich die g\u00e4ngigen Vorurteile gegen den Neuplatonismus als eine alles vereinnahmende und harmonisierende Philosophie zu best\u00e4tigen. Ein Blick auf das Bildungsverst\u00e4ndnis des Neuplatonismus und den in den Texten ausf\u00fchrlich reflektierten erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen bietet jedoch Anlass sowohl zur Skepsis gegen\u00fcber diesen Vorw\u00fcrfen als auch zu einer differenzierten Untersuchung des Verh\u00e4ltnisses von platonischer und stoischer Ethik in der Sp\u00e4tantike. Am Beispiel von Simplikios' Kommentar zum 'Handb\u00fcchlein der Moral' des Epiket soll im vorliegenden Buch die M\u00f6glichkeit der Verwendung stoischer Texte als Vorbereitung f\u00fcr den Einstieg in das neuplatonische Bildungsprogramm dargelegt und begr\u00fcndet werden, ohne dass der Einsatz dieser Texte zu einer Vermischung der stoischen mit den platonisch-aristotelischen Theorien f\u00fchrt. So liefert Simplikios mit seinem Kommentar eine wissenschaftliche Ethik des Neuplatonismus, die mit der Darlegung und Beschreibung der Anweisungen Epiktets dem Unkundigen sowohl einen ersten Zugang in das philosophische Leben bietet als auch mit seinen weiterf\u00fchrenden Kommentierungen die rationalen Begr\u00fcndungen dieser Handlungsaufforderungen offenlegt.","btype":1,"date":"2013","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/tbI3orMZBaXG2xX","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":438,"full_name":"Vogel, Christian","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":{"id":210,"pubplace":"Heidelberg","publisher":"Universit\u00e4tsverlag","series":"Studien zu Literatur und Erkenntnis","volume":"5","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung: Simplikios' Kommentar zu Epiktets Handb\u00fcchlein der Moral"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1434","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1434,"authors_free":[{"id":2263,"entry_id":1434,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":426,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Champion, M.","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":426,"first_name":"M.","last_name":"Champion","full_name":"Champion, M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Eternity of the World in the Sixth Century: Philoponus, Simplicius and Cosmas Indicopleustes (Honours thesis, University of Melbourne)","main_title":{"title":"The Eternity of the World in the Sixth Century: Philoponus, Simplicius and Cosmas Indicopleustes (Honours thesis, University of Melbourne)"},"abstract":"","btype":1,"date":"2004","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4Hd8huMWKST6rH2","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":426,"full_name":"Champion, M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["The Eternity of the World in the Sixth Century: Philoponus, Simplicius and Cosmas Indicopleustes (Honours thesis, University of Melbourne)"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1553","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1553,"authors_free":[{"id":2716,"entry_id":1553,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"The Peripatetics: Aristotle\u2019s Heirs 322 BCE - 200 CE","main_title":{"title":"The Peripatetics: Aristotle\u2019s Heirs 322 BCE - 200 CE"},"abstract":" The Peripatetics explores the development of Peripatetic thought from Theophrastus and Strato to the work of the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. The book examines whether the internal dynamics of this philosophical school allowed for a unity of Peripatetic thought, or whether there was a fundamental tension between philosophical creativity and the notions of core teachings and canonisation. The book discusses the major philosophical preoccupations of the Peripatetics, interactions with Hellenistic schools of thought, and the shift in focus among Greek philosophers in a changing political landscape. It is the first book of its kind to provide a survey of this important philosophical tradition. [author's abstract]","btype":1,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/V65LMjETUYeWctJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["The Peripatetics: Aristotle\u2019s Heirs 322 BCE - 200 CE"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1395","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1395,"authors_free":[{"id":2171,"entry_id":1395,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories","main_title":{"title":"The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories"},"abstract":"The aim of this study was to analyze Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualitative properties in his \r\nCommentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. In this commentary, Simplicius discusses qualities in \r\nthe framework of Aristotle\u2019s categorial scheme and neither explicitly emphasizes the topic nor \r\nparticularly problematizes it. In order to analyze Simplicius\u2019 conception of quality, it was thus \r\nnecessary to compile and systematize his remarks on qualities or remarks that might be \r\nrelevant for an explanation of qualities from different places in the text. I grouped the \r\ndifferent information in three main parts, each consisting of two to four chapters. The first \r\npart set out to provide some general information on Simplicius, his Commentary on \r\nAristotle\u2019s Categories and the notion of quality in Aristotle in order to pave the way for an \r\nanalysis of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. \r\nThe second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities. \r\nWhile the second part remained to a large extent within the terminological framework of the \r\nCategories, the third part mainly drew on Neoplatonic theorems and focused on the \r\nontological explanation of qualities within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. In what \r\nfollows, I will summarize the results of the three main parts of the study and present \r\ndifficulties that the study faced, shortcomings that the study includes and questions that the \r\nstudy evokes. \r\nThe first part of the study elaborated on Simplicius\u2019 exegesis and the place of his commentary \r\nin the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Its aim was to provide the \r\nreader with the textual and theoretical context in and with which Simplicius works. Hence, it \r\nfocused in part on Simplicius as a member of the Neoplatonic school and his commentary as a \r\npart and witness of an exegetical tradition on Aristotle\u2019s Categories that began centuries \r\nbefore Simplicius. However, Simplicius\u2019 philosophical background, his sources and his \r\npresuppositions regarding Aristotle\u2019s Categories are relevant for a study of his conception of \r\nqualities because they influence his treatment of the topic. Although Simplicius appears to \r\nhave a keen interest in Aristotle\u2019s text, he interprets it against the background of his own \r\nNeoplatonic views. As it has been pointed out in the first part of the study, there is the \r\ndifficulty that Simplicius does not spell out or elaborate on Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrine \r\nin his commentary. Since the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework represents the theoretical \r\nframework in and with which Simplicius works, an understanding of its principles is necessary for an understanding of Simplicius\u2019 discussions. In order to provide an explanation of Neoplatonic metaphysical assumptions when necessary, I thus relied on information that can be found in Neoplatonic authors prior to Simplicius. This way of proceeding implies the problematic assumption that Simplicius does not deviate from these authors regarding the understanding of the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. This assumption is problematic because it may obscure Simplicius\u2019 actual position if it differs. At least on the basis of Simplicius\u2019 text, there is no indication that Simplicius\u2019 conception of general elements of Neoplatonic metaphysics would differ from that of his predecessors. \r\nIt has been pointed out that Simplicius frequently refers to predecessors and even states explicitly that, in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, he follows the commentaries by Porphyry and Iamblichus in their interpretation of the Categories. Simplicius\u2019 commentaries are well known for the richness of references to and presentations of views held by \r\npredecessors. He has often been used as a source of information on other philosophers for \r\nworks that are no longer extant otherwise. His Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories is no \r\nexception; it is rich in references to philosophers belonging not only to the Neoplatonic tradition but also to other philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism or the Peripatetic school. The present study does not elaborate on references to members of other philosophical schools. A lot could have been said about Simplicius\u2019 presentation and discussion of views held by these philosophers. It may even be fruitful to examine in detail Simplicius\u2019 treatment and use of views held by philosophers working in the Stoic or Peripatetic tradition. Such \r\ninvestigations would also be interesting for our understanding of the historical development of \r\ncertain concepts. The omission thus requires an explanation. The explanation is, admittedly, \r\nof a rather pragmatic nature. A discussion of all the views that Simplicius mentions would \r\nhave exceeded the scope of this study. A selection always requires good reasons. Apart from \r\nPorphyry and Iamblichus, I could not justify in a consistent manner, with regard to the topic \r\nof this study, why I would focus on the one view more than on the other. Hence, although I \r\nthink that it would be interesting to investigate the possible influences of, for example, \r\nAlexander of Aphrodisias or of Stoic views on Simplicius, I did not conduct such investigations in this study. They may be topics for possible future projects. As stated, the main sources for his commentary are, according to Simplicius himself, \r\nPorphyry\u2019s long commentary on the Categories and, even to a bigger extent, Iamblichus\u2019 \r\ncommentary. The unfortunate fact that the two commentaries are no longer extant and \r\nSimplicius\u2019 modest self-presentation as a commentator make it difficult to assess the \r\nproportion between copying or paraphrasing his sources and presenting own ideas in \r\nSimplicius\u2019 commentary. It has also been pointed out that some, if not all, presuppositions of \r\nSimplicius\u2019 analysis of Aristotle\u2019s Categories stem from his main source Iamblichus. Simplicius\u2019 core presuppositions are his interpretation of the Categories\u2019 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 as a synthesis of words, beings and notions, his assumption that the main source of the Categories is the Pseudo-Pythagorean treatise On the Universal Formulae by Pseudo-Archytas, his conviction that Aristotle uses obscurity on purpose in his writings and the assumption that there is a harmony between Aristotle and Plato on the majority of points. As it has been shown in the course of the study, in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, Simplicius appears to extend the idea of a harmony also to Porphyry and Iamblichus. \r\nBesides the attempt to provide the philosophical background of Simplicius\u2019 commentary, to contextualize it within the commentary tradition on the Categories, and to introduce Simplicius\u2019 main sources and core presuppositions in this commentary, the first part also includes an overview of the accounts of quality that can be found in Aristotle\u2019s works. This overview is meant to show that Aristotle approaches qualities from different perspectives in his works. I distinguished between two main approaches: 1. the explanation of qualities from \r\na logical-metaphysical perspective, included, for example, in Aristotle\u2019s Categories and Metaphysics, and 2. the explanation of qualities from the perspective of natural philosophy, \r\nincluded, for example, in Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo and De Generatione et Corruptione. As the \r\nanalyses especially in part three suggested, Simplicius appears not only to be well acquainted \r\nwith the explanations of qualities that Aristotle presents elsewhere, he also integrates elements \r\nof these explanations into his discussion of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s \r\nCategories. The second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of quality. As stated, in order to analyze Simplicius\u2019 conception of quality, it was necessary to compile \r\nand systematize relevant remarks from different places in the text. This way of proceeding \r\nrequires caution, as it runs the risk of neglecting the context of the relevant individual \r\npassages. Given that Simplicius works closely and in sequence with Aristotle\u2019s text and \r\ndiscusses aspects of the text within the framework of the lemmata on which he comments, a \r\nconsideration of the context, however, is as important as a thorough analysis of the relevant \r\npassages themselves. The present study tried to accommodate both methodological strategies. \r\nIt thereby runs another risk common to compromises, namely to fail to do both a thorough investigation of individual passages and a consideration of the context properly. I gave priority to the thought that both methodological strategies are indispensable for an \r\nunderstanding of Simplicius\u2019 conception of qualities. The second part aimed at providing a categorial analysis of quality. It focused on quality as one of the ten Aristotelian categories and thus dealt with the regulations and characteristics that apply to quality qua category. Aristotle draws a distinction between the category of substance and the other nine categories in that he ascribes an ontological priority to the former. As suggested by Aristotle\u2019s fourfold division of \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 in the second chapter of the Categories but not explicitly articulated with regard to any of the nine non-substantial \r\ncategories, Simplicius transposes the intracategorial structure and regulations spelled out for the category of substance onto the category of quality. The category of quality thus comprises \r\ngenera and species of quality and their individual instantiations. Moreover, the genera of \r\nquality are synonymously predicated of their species which in turn are synonymously \r\npredicated of their instantiations. According to the rule of transitivity, which equally applies, \r\nthe genera of quality are consequently also synonymously predicated of the instantiations. \r\nWhile the intracategorial relation, i.e. the relation between genera and species and \r\ninstantiations of quality, is a relation of unilinear synonymous predication, the intercategorial \r\nrelation, i.e. the relation between a quality and a substance, is a relation of homonymous \r\npredication. Although Aristotle does not explicitly mention all these features of quality in his \r\nCategories, they are compatible with his text. Aristotle\u2019s text leaves quite a lot of room for \r\ninterpretation which not only facilitates the transposition of regulations and structural \r\nelements within the categorial theory itself but also enables the integration of, or \r\nharmonization with, (Neo)Platonic theoretical elements. Simplicius\u2019 harmonizing tendency as \r\nan interpretative strategy becomes most apparent in the analyses conducted in the second part \r\nof this study. It is suggested by Simplicius\u2019 way of presenting predication and participation as \r\ntwo different but non-conflicting theories used to explain the relation among entities in the \r\nnatural realm, by his interpretation of the predicate as an immanent universal, by his \r\nexplanation of the \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd of quality against the background of likeness and unlikeness and by \r\nhis use of the idea of a latitude of participation in his discussion of the question whether the \r\ncategory of quality admits of a more and a less. \r\nThe discussions in the second part have also shown that some problems or questions that \r\nscholars have raised with regard to Aristotle\u2019s text appeared to be unproblematic for \r\nSimplicius, such as the compatibility of the categorial theory with hylomorphism or the \r\ninterpretation of homonymy as comprehensive homonymy. It is worth noting that Simplicius \r\ndisplays a charitable interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s text with regard to these questions. Other \r\ntopics discussed in Aristotelian scholarship are more problematic for Simplicius, especially \r\nthose which are in apparent conflict with Platonic doctrine. He explicitly addresses the \r\napparent primacy of individual substances in the Categories and tries at length to reconcile it \r\nwith the Platonic view that the forms are prior to the individuals. He does not openly address \r\n219 \r\n \r\nbut implicitly deviates from the assumption held by many Aristotelian scholars that \r\nsynonymous predication yields essential predication. He argues that, although genera, species and differentiae are all synonymously predicated of that which is beneath them, only genera and species are also essentially predicated of that which is beneath them whereas the \r\ndifferentiae are not essentially but qualitatively predicated of that which is beneath them. It \r\nalso becomes apparent in the second part that the study of quality in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary \r\non Aristotle\u2019s Categories includes an analysis of the relation between quality and the \r\nqualified. The differentiation of the possible meanings of the qualified represents the basis, or \r\npreparatory work, for such an analysis. \r\nThe third part of the study exceeds to some extent the categorial framework and expands on \r\nthe Neoplatonic elements of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of quality and its relation to the \r\nqualified. In this regard, it also elaborates on certain notions that have already been introduced \r\nin the second part but become most relevant in the context of an analysis of the relation \r\nbetween quality and the qualified within a Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The notion \r\nof participation is one of them. Simplicius does not only present participation, like predication, as a model to explain the relation between intracategorial entities in his \r\nomments on chapter five but he also explicitly applies it to the entities subsumed under the \r\ncategory of quality, when he refers to the quality as \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and to the qualified as \r\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. Simplicius associates quality and the qualified with these two elements of the \r\nNeoplatonic triad of participation and analogically applies the characteristics of those elements (and their relation to each other) to quality and the qualified (and their relation to \r\neach other). For an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified, it was thus \r\nhelpful to have a closer look at the structure of the triad of participation, and especially at its \r\nelements, their characteristics and their relations to each other. The association of quality with \r\nthe \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and of the qualified with the \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, however, transfers a problem to the \r\ncategory of quality that Simplicius, like other Neoplatonists, mainly discusses in the course of \r\nhis comments on the category of substance: the question of ontological dependence and, \r\nparticularly, whether the ontological relation between quality and the qualified is a relation of \r\nontological priority and posteriority or of ontological simultaneity. Simplicius describes \r\nquality as that which is participated in by the qualified, as that which is in the qualified and of \r\nwhich its being and its being participated in is one. The qualified in turn participates in quality \r\nand receives its being qualified from the quality. Simplicius thus appears to describe the \r\nrelation between quality and the qualified, on the one hand, as a relation of an ontological \r\npriority of the quality over the qualified and, on the other hand, as a relation of ontological simultaneity. It has been shown in the third part of the study that it is possible to reconcile \r\nthese apparently conflicting assumptions in Simplicius by means of two disambiguations: \r\nfirst, the differentiation of ontological priority into existential priority and essential priority \r\nand, second, the distinction between qualified qua single instantiation of the corresponding \r\nquality and qualified qua sum of all instantiations of the corresponding quality. While these investigations of the relation between quality and the qualified conducted in the first two \r\nchapters of the third part of the study involve the understanding of the qualified as an \r\ninstantiation of the corresponding quality, the analyses of the third and fourth chapter involve \r\nthe understanding of the qualified as a qualified substance. If the qualified is understood as a qualified substance, an analysis of the relation between \r\nquality and the qualified evokes several questions. The third chapter deals with the following \r\ntwo: first, how can differences among participants of the same quality be explained, i.e. what \r\nis the reason for gradual differences of participation or instantiations and, second, how can it be explained that a particular quality is instantiated in one substance rather than in another substance, i.e. what is the condition for participation as such. In order to answer these \r\nquestions, the notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 becomes crucial. This notion had already been \r\nintroduced in the second part of the study in the course of an analysis of the more and the less \r\nin the category of quality. As stated, Simplicius connects this question with the idea that \r\nparticipation involves latitude. The latitude of participation, in turn, is in accordance with the \r\nparticipant\u2019s \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 to receive the information from that in which it participates. The use of the notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the context of the analysis of the relation between quality \r\nand qualified has its roots in the use of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the theory of participation established by Simplicius\u2019 predecessors, where it frequently occurs as an aspect of the explanation of the \r\nrelation between \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. However, the question whether \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 is \r\na technical term in late Antiquity or a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \r\nhas been a subject of debate among scholars. Since also Simplicius uses these two terms, \r\nespecially in his comments on the category of quality, I tried to clarify Simplicius\u2019 understanding of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and of the relation between \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 in his \r\ncomments on quality. The analysis in the third chapter suggested that Simplicius distinguishes \r\nbetween a sense of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 that can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of \r\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and a sense of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 that cannot be associated with the Aristotelian notion of \r\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2. \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the latter sense is simpler, precedes \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and appears to be a \r\nsimple propensity of the participant for something more complete than itself, rooted in higher principles within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The difficulty that this analysis \r\nfaced was the fact that, although it was suggested by Simplicius\u2019 remarks, Simplicius himself \r\ndoes not explicitly distinguish between \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 in his comments on the category of quality. As I argued, however, this fact could be interpreted again as a strategy to \r\naccommodate and harmonize the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian theory. The fourth and last chapter deals with another important question that arises in the framework \r\nof an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified qua qualified substance. Based \r\non the possibility to distinguish between attributes that always belong to their subjects and are \r\neven completive or essential to their subject and attributes that are adventitious to their \r\nsubject, the question of the categorial status of essential qualities arises. While the \r\nclassification of adventitious attributes as accidents appears to be more or less unproblematic, the integration of completive attributes into Aristotle\u2019s categorial scheme poses a problem. \r\nThe answer to this question builds on the results of the previous analyses and eventually leads \r\nto the attempt to present a comprehensive answer to the initial question of the categorial status \r\nand the ontological explanation of qualities (both essential and adventitious qualities) in \r\nSimplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. \r\nBy means of an analysis of different passages on, or involving, essential qualities and a \r\ncomparison with Simplicius\u2019 conception of differentiae, I argued against the claim held by \r\nscholars that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as substances. According to the \r\ninterpretation presented in the fourth chapter, Simplicius ascribes both a substantial and a \r\nqualitative aspect to essential qualities and differentiae. Depending on the context, he stresses \r\nthe one or the other aspect. Simplicius, a proponent of the idea that Aristotle\u2019s categorial \r\nscheme is complete and exhaustive, does not appear to think that these entities would not fit \r\ninto Aristotle\u2019s scheme. Rather, Simplicius explains their double structure by their participation in both substance and quality. He does not discuss or even problematize the fact that such a conception would challenge Aristotle\u2019s scheme. Interestingly, Simplicius\u2019 assumption that these entities are substantial but no substances also suggests that he distinguishes between that which is substantial and that which is a substance. Although \r\nSimplicius undoubtedly conceives of those qualities as being substantial, he appears to \r\ndistinguish them from substances and restricts the latter to matter, form and the matter-form \r\ncompound. By means of a recourse to Proclus\u2019 remarks in his Commentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus, I tried to show that such a distinction including essential qualities can already be \r\nfound among Simplicius\u2019 predecessors. Moreover, I tried to present an ontological explanation of qualities that takes Simplicius\u2019 remarks on both essential and adventitious qualities into account. I argued that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as belonging to \r\nthe immanent form which sends forth these qualities as soon as it unfolds itself in body. These \r\nqualities thus naturally inhere in the subject and cannot be separated without the corruption of \r\nthe subject. Adventitious qualities are immanent logoi which do not belong to the form. They \r\nenter the subject after the compounding of matter and form; or in other words, the participation in these logoi is posterior to the constitution of the subject. In this way, they \r\ncome in from outside and can be separated without the corruption of the subject. However, \r\nthey do not appear to operate independently from the immanent form. The immanent form \r\nprefigures the subject, limits its possibilities in participation and determines its capacities for \r\nreceiving contraries. It thereby establishes the conditions for these logoi to operate. As it has \r\nbeen pointed out, Simplicius does not transfer the distinction between essential and adventitious to the level of natural logoi and, consequently, does not make the logos of each \r\nquality twofold. On the contrary, he restricts this distinction to the realm of bodies and can \r\nthus maintain the assumption that the logos of each quality is one. This account is an attempt to provide a consistent explanation of qualities in Simplicius\u2019 \r\nCommentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. However, it leaves a number of questions open for \r\nfurther research. One group of questions concerns the relation between essential qualities and \r\ndifferentiae. As stated, Simplicius does not only treat them similarly, he also often uses the \r\nsame examples for essential qualities and differentiae. This situation is probably the reason why scholars on Simplicius have discussed these topics together (with different results \r\nthough). However, if both differentiae and essential qualities are substantial and belong to the \r\nform but are not substances, the question arises how their differences can be explained. One \r\nof these differences is that, according to Simplicius, an essential quality, such as the whiteness \r\nof snow, can admit of a more and a less, whereas no differentia admits of a more and a less. A \r\nrelated question regarding differentiae is the following: if the differentiae are intermediates \r\nand participate in both substance and quality, why is there actually no differentia that admits \r\nof a more and a less? Is there, eventually, perhaps a distinction or hierarchy among essential \r\nattributes? On the basis of the analysis of essential and adventitious qualities, Simplicius\u2019 \r\nconception of immanent forms is a topic that is highly interesting and would deserve further \r\ninvestigation. According to the analysis conducted in the last chapter, both essential qualities \r\nand adventitious qualities depend on immanent forms. The former do so because they belong \r\nto this form, the latter because the immanent form prefigures the subject and thus determines \r\nwhat qualities it can receive and to what extent it can receive them. In connection with this \r\ntopic, it would also be interesting to investigate the question as to what there are natural logoi of. Another highly interesting topic linked to the research conducted in this study would be \r\nthe comparison of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s \r\nCategories with the presentation of material properties in the framework of a discussion of \r\nPlato\u2019s geometric atomism included in Proclus\u2019 Commentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus and Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo. Such a comparison could be very interesting because it may contribute to the clarification of strategies that some Neoplatonists \r\nhave adopted in order to deal with the differences between Plato\u2019s and Aristotle\u2019s theories about elemental constitution (including elemental properties) and may thus contribute to our understanding of Neoplatonic natural philosophy in general. Although I think that this \r\ncomparison is highly interesting, I have focused in this study on Simplicius\u2019 explanation of \r\nqualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. I hope that the preceding pages have shown that this explanation was worth a study of its own. [conclusion, pp. 215-223]","btype":1,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Lz85xNWHRXpvd29","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":{"id":1395,"pubplace":"Leuven","publisher":"KU Leuven, Humanities and Social Sciences Group, Institute of Philosophy","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories"]}

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