{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"623","_score":null,"_source":{"id":623,"authors_free":[{"id":879,"entry_id":623,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":71,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Drews, Friedemann","free_first_name":"Friedemann","free_last_name":"Drews","norm_person":{"id":71,"first_name":"Friedemann","last_name":"Drews","full_name":"Drews, Friedemann","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/142475742","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Intelligibles = Sinnliches? Simplikios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik","main_title":{"title":"Intelligibles = Sinnliches? Simplikios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik"},"abstract":"Simplikios nimmt Parmenides sowohl vor dem potentiellen Vorwurf, er w\u00fcrde nicht hinreichend zwischen Intelligiblem und Sinnlichem unterscheiden, in Schutz als auch integriert er Aristoteles' Kritik im Sinne einer potentiellen Missverst\u00e4ndnissen vor beugenden Vorsichtsma\u00dfnahme in seine neuplatonische Parmeni des-Interpretation und weist ihr so einen berechtigten Platz zu. Simplikios' Gr\u00fcnde daf\u00fcr erscheinen vor dem Hintergrund seines neuplatonischen Denkens plausibel. Ob seine Parmenides-Interpretation als solche dem Eleaten gerecht wird, ist eine andere Frage; zumindest w\u00fcrde Simplikios gegen\u00fcber einer Deutung des parmenideischen Seins-Begriffs in dem Sinne, dass \u201ejeder Gegenstand, den wir untersuchen, existieren mu\u00df\", wohl einwenden wollen, dass dies einer Reduktion von Parmenides' \u03c4\u03bf \u03ad\u03cc\u03bd auf ein abstraktes Erkenntniskriterium gleichk\u00e4me, dessen eigene, nur f\u00fcr das \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u0390\u03bd erkennbare Seinsf\u00fclle dann aus dem Blick geraten w\u00e4re. Auch erschiene es in dieser Perspektive fraglich, warum zum Erschlie\u00dfen eines allgemeinen Existenz-Postulats ein Weg \u201efernab der Menschen\" eingeschlagen werden musste oder gar eine g\u00f6ttliche Offenbarung des \u201eunersch\u00fctterlichen Herzens der wohl\u00fcberzeugenden Wahrheit\", von der Parmenides schreibt, n\u00f6tig war. [conclusion, p. 410-411]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/jwKKP36AWW9gmTT","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":71,"full_name":"Drews, Friedemann","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":623,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie","volume":"155","issue":"3\/4","pages":"389-412"}},"sort":["Intelligibles = Sinnliches? Simplikios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1091","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1091,"authors_free":[{"id":1649,"entry_id":1091,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":281,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","free_first_name":"Chiara","free_last_name":"Pal\u00f9","norm_person":{"id":281,"first_name":"Chiara","last_name":"Pal\u00f9","full_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock","main_title":{"title":"L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/b71ZOb3TOzDoasL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":281,"full_name":"Pal\u00f9, Chiara","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1091,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"23","issue":"2","pages":"75-92"}},"sort":["L'\u00e9criture et les Pr\u00e9socratiques: Analyse de l'interpr\u00e9tation de Eric Havelock"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1509","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1509,"authors_free":[{"id":2622,"entry_id":1509,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":129,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","free_first_name":"Pantelis","free_last_name":"Golitsis","norm_person":{"id":129,"first_name":"Pantelis","last_name":"Golitsis","full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La critique aristot\u00e9licienne des Id\u00e9es en Physique II 2 et l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation de Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"La critique aristot\u00e9licienne des Id\u00e9es en Physique II 2 et l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation de Simplicius"},"abstract":"This paper examines Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Ideas in Physics II 2 and the interpretation of Simplicius. Aristotle's critique focuses on the separation of physical realities, performed unconsciously by proponents of Ideas, which he compares to the method of mathematicians. In Physics II 2, Aristotle aims to clarify the distinction between the tasks of mathematicians and physicists. While mathematicians separate accidents (such as figures and numbers) from natural bodies to study them independently, physicists, like geometers, consider figures as essential accidents inherent to natural substances. The paper argues that the Platonic philosophers inadvertently separate natural realities from matter to establish the existence of Ideas. Aristotle maintains that the definitions of mathematical entities do not include motion, whereas definitions of natural entities, like the \"camus\" nose, involve movement or refer to it. The proponents of Ideas, by separating realities from matter, establish metaphysical and immaterial Ideas, conceiving them erroneously in a material mode due to their participation in physical realities. Aristotle's criticism does not imply petitio principii because it targets the unawareness of Platonic philosophers. They mistakenly posit Ideas as existing independently, akin to mathematical objects separated in thought but not in reality. This leads them to an illusory metaphysics, as they consider Ideas as less separable from matter than mathematical entities are. Instead of grounding a physics that studies forms within matter, they engage in a misguided metaphysical endeavor. [introduction]","btype":3,"date":"2017","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/1pNKYrIvZMIsMEt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":129,"full_name":"Golitsis, Pantelis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1509,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Th\u00e9ologiques","volume":"101","issue":"","pages":"569-584"}},"sort":["La critique aristot\u00e9licienne des Id\u00e9es en Physique II 2 et l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation de Simplicius"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1279","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1279,"authors_free":[{"id":1868,"entry_id":1279,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":54,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","free_last_name":"Cordero","norm_person":{"id":54,"first_name":"N\u00e9stor-Luis","last_name":"Cordero","full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1055808973","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)","main_title":{"title":"La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)"},"abstract":"The text discusses Parmenides' difficult philosophical ideas, particularly the enigmatic line 8.35 in his poem. The author argues for a specific interpretation of the line and responds to objections raised by P. Aubenque. Parmenides emphasizes the relationship between being and thought, with thought being possible \"thanks to\" or \"because of\" being. The author defends the use of the preposition epi + datif, which suggests a causal relationship between being and the ability to name things. Ultimately, Parmenides' philosophy stresses the importance of grounding thought and speech in what actually exists. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"2004","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/mYlIp5PP7fWrXfD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":54,"full_name":"Cordero, N\u00e9stor-Luis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1279,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"194","issue":"1","pages":"5-13"}},"sort":["La pens\u00e9e s'exprime \u00abgr\u00e2ce\u00bb \u00e0 l'\u00eatre (Parm\u00e9nide, fr. 8.35)"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"581","_score":null,"_source":{"id":581,"authors_free":[{"id":824,"entry_id":581,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie","main_title":{"title":"Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie"},"abstract":"A six-page Prologue introduces the commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo written by Simplicius after 529 AD. As usual in the exegeses typical of the Neoplatonic schools of late Antiquity, this Prologue addresses a series of preliminary \r\nquestions that are meant to steer the interpretation in its entirety, as well as to frame the text to be commented upon within the reading canon of the Aristotelian works, which were intended to provide the propaedeutics to the reading canon of Plato\u2019s dialogues. Simplicius addresses the question of the scope of De Caelo, discussing the interpretations advanced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Iamblichus, and Syrianus. According to Alexander, this treatise deals with the universe as a whole, as well as with the five simple bodies contained in it. It was with Iamblichus, who advocated the idea that for each Platonic dialogue there was only one skopos, that the unity of a philosophical work was raised \r\nto the rank of a general rule. According to Iamblichus, the skopos of the De Caelo is the divine body of heaven. As a consequence, the primary elements that depend upon the heavens are included in the treatise. Syrianus deepens \r\nthe theological tendency implied in Iamblichus\u2019 interpretation: for him, the skopos of the De Caelo is primarily the divine body of heaven, and only secondarily the set of sublunar elements. Simplicius treasures the commentary by \r\nAlexander; nevertheless, he questions the skopos assigned by him: Alexander underestimated the importance of the unity of the treatise, even though his intention to account for each and every question raised by Aristotle was laudable. Contrarily, Syrianus was right in emphasizing the theological vein of the De Caelo, but focussed only on the section on the divine body of heaven, playing down books III and IV as if they were only ancillary, thus forgetting that the skopos must account for the whole of the treatise at hand. Between the two positions, Simplicius advocates the idea of a synthetical skopos, following in the footsteps of Iamblichus\u2019 interpretation, but taking systematically into account the best of Alexander\u2019s. The skopos of the De Caelo is the divine heaven, that \u201ccommunicates\u201d its perfections to the \r\nentire universe. Simplicius\u2019 position is revealed to be very different with respect to that of other commentators like Ammonius and Philoponus, who both considered that the title was self-evident and required no special investigation. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/B70TifrHFuHw23y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":581,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Studia graeco-arabica","volume":"5","issue":"","pages":"27-51"}},"sort":["Le \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 du trait\u00e9 aristot\u00e9licien Du Ciel selon Simplicius. Ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, dialectique, th\u00e9ologie"]}