{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1549","_score":null,"_ignored":["booksection.book.abstract.keyword"],"_source":{"id":1549,"authors_free":[{"id":2706,"entry_id":1549,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Licciardi, Ivan Adriano","free_first_name":"Ivan Adriano","free_last_name":"Licciardi","norm_person":null},{"id":2707,"entry_id":1549,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Brisson, Luc","free_first_name":"Luc","free_last_name":"Brisson","norm_person":null},{"id":2708,"entry_id":1549,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Mac\u00e9, Arnaud","free_first_name":"Arnaud","free_last_name":"Mac\u00e9","norm_person":null},{"id":2709,"entry_id":1549,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Renaut, Olivier","free_first_name":"Olivier","free_last_name":"Renaut","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"Simplicio, in Cael. 556, 3-560, 10, a margine di Platone, Prm. 135b8-c1. Prolegomeni a una genealogia del parallelism onto-epistemologico","main_title":{"title":"Simplicio, in Cael. 556, 3-560, 10, a margine di Platone, Prm. 135b8-c1. Prolegomeni a una genealogia del parallelism onto-epistemologico"},"abstract":"Simplicius, in Cael. 556,3-560,10 interprets Cael. III 1, 298b14-24, in which Aristotle criti\u00adcizes Parmenides and Melissus, who deny coming-to-be and consider it only an apparent phenomenon. On the one hand, Aristotle asserts that the Eleatics realized that the condition for a science of being can be that the latter refers to ungenerated and immobile, and therefore ontologically stable, objects; on the other hand, at the same time, they do not admit any other essence aside from sensible beings. Aristotle concludes by saying that the Eleatics came to believe that generation is only apparent, and that they proceeded on the assumption of the isomorphism between the stability of the object and the incontrovertibil\u00adity of science itself. All in all, Aristotle has pointed out that the Eleatics mixed physics and metaphysics. Simplicius demonstrates that Aristotle\u2019s criticism is not aimed to refute Parmenides, but to prevent superficial listeners from being misled by the outward aspects of his doctrines, because Parmenides\u2019 investigation is metaphysical and regards the intelligible world. Simplicius quotes Prm. 135b8-c1, where Parmenides, turning towards Socrates, says that whoever denies the theory of ideas, that is the theory that admits eternal entities which exist separately, will be quite at a loss, since there can be no science of the things that always flow, that is of the sensible. This is the reason why Plato, before Simplicius, identifies a theorical continuity between Eleaticsm and his own philosophy, finding in Parmenides a supporter of the onto-epistemological parallelism. In Simplicius\u2019 opinion the historical Parmenides and the platonic Parmenides coincide, so the platonic passage shows that Eleatics were the first philosophers that admitted the principle of the onto-epistemological parallelism. [author's abstract]","btype":2,"date":"2022","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-khttps:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hKs84wMWfJoNNGjoeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hKs84wMWfJoNNGj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1549,"section_of":1550,"pages":"517-526","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1550,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"bibliography","type":4,"language":"no language selected","title":"Plato\u2019s Parmenides: Selected Papers of the XIIth Symposium Platonicum","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Brisson2022","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2022","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"This book contains proceedings of the Symposium Platonicum held in Paris in 2019. The format follows that of its predecessors, in which a selected dialogue (or two) is covered by scholars from diverse research traditions using various interpretative approaches. The published papers are usually shorter notes on specific passages, sometimes growing into longer articles on larger issues, but rarely into a discussion between themselves. The present collection is the largest of its kind (53 papers: 32 in English, 12 in Italian, 4 in German, 3 in French, 2 in Spanish). It examines a particularly difficult dialogue, the Parmenides, from six angles that make up this book\u2019s six thematic sections: (I) the dramatic framework, (II) the influence of earlier philosophers on the Parmenides, (III) Plato\u2019s conception of dialectics, (IV) the critique of the theory of forms, (V) the hypotheses and deductions, and (VI) the influence of the Parmenides on later authors.\r\n\r\nThe Parmenides is a minefield of philosophical questions: how are we to take the dramatic presence of the Eleatics Parmenides and Zeno in terms of the dialogue\u2019s aims and methods? Which of the arguments criticizing the theory of forms, if any, are valid? Do the deductions lead to a genuine impasse or is there some qualified sense in which some of them are productive? And what is the overall purpose of this dialogue: to ridicule the Eleatic monism, to expose the problems surrounding the theory of forms, to solve them, or perhaps to introduce the metaphysics of the One? The reader should not approach this volume in order to find a scholarly consensus on any of these questions, but for the clear formulation of a particular problem, or a promising outline of a solution, or an interesting historical connection to other philosophers offered by some of its contributions.\r\n\r\nA good case of the first is Amber D. Carpenter\u2019s paper. Plato\u2019s Socrates wants forms to be separated from sensibles and ontologically independent of them. Parmenides attacks this position by noticing that the separation of forms and sensibles implies a symmetrical relation since forms are separated from sensibles as much sensibles are separated from forms. But the paper explores a further problem: if being separated from sensibles means being independent of them, then sensibles are equally independent of forms. Even if one gives up separation in order to salvage independence, the problem persists in a weakness captured by Parmenides\u2019 \u2018master-slave\u2019 example, which Carpenter explains as follows: \u2018his being a master does depend on someone else\u2019s being a slave \u2013 and so the master (as Hegel observed) depends on his slave\u2019 (p. 249). Of course Plato, as another paper by Kezhou Liu claims, wants to maintain an asymmetrical relation, but none of the papers in Section IV provide compelling evidence from the Parmenides to counter Carpenter\u2019s argument.\r\n\r\nOther contributions explore how certain mistakes in the Parmenides were solved in other dialogues. For instance, Notomi Noburu examines why the dialogues after the Parmenides abandoned the form of Similarity (homoion) in favor of the form of Sameness (tauton). The answer is that a relation of similarity between forms and sensibles ends up generating a regress. Francisco J. Gonzalez argues that the notion of the third (to triton), which is discussed at 155e\u2013157b (sometimes called the third deduction, usually taken as an appendix to the first two), is pivotal in solving the antinomies of the Parmenides. According to this paper, this notion encompasses any two opposed things and transcends them, thus giving a conceptual basis for various \u2018thirds\u2019 in the Philebus, the Sophist, and the Timaeus. B\u00e9atrice Lienemann explores the predication of forms. This paper adopts Meinwald\u2019s distinction between two types of predication and argues that predication in relation to the thing itself (pros heauto) expresses the essential property of such a thing (e.g. the form of human being is rationality). However, it should not be confused with the necessary properties, such as identity, that belong to all forms. Lienemann then explores the Phaedo and the Sophist to confirm that Plato indeed employs something close to the distinction between the essential and necessary properties.\r\n\r\nAs for the historical part, two papers stand out. Mathilde Br\u00e9mond gives good textual evidence to show that the second part of the Parmenides examines pairs of contradictory claims leading to impossibilities in the way the sophist Gorgias does. In addition, this paper argues that having Gorgias in mind can explain why the second part is neither constructive in its outcomes, nor openly called \u2018dialectics\u2019. The reason is that the argumentation here resembles antilogic. Lloyd P. Gerson\u2019s paper is about the elephant in the room: the Neoplatonic reading of the Parmenides that is mostly ignored throughout the volume. Gerson shows that Plotinus\u2019 interpretation of the first three hypotheses was not arbitrary, but rather based on a defendable understanding of the One and the need to find a philosophically sound answer to Aristotle\u2019s question \u2018what is ousia?\u2019.\r\n\r\nThe broader value of this volume is that it gives a good representation of the current status quaestionis and provides a number of useful discussions of shorter passages. However, most of its pieces do not formulate a self-standing argument and should be read in conjunction with Cornford\u2019s Plato and Parmenides (1935), Allen\u2019s Plato\u2019s Parmenides (1983), Meinwald\u2019s Plato\u2019s Parmenides (1991), Sayre\u2019s Parmenides\u2019 Lesson (1996), Scolnicov\u2019s Plato\u2019s Parmenides (2003), Rickless\u2019 Plato\u2019s Forms in Transition (2006), and Gill\u2019s Philosophos (2012): the papers assume close familiarity with them. Finally, this volume needed more careful editing: it contains different treatments of Greek (e.g. pp. 183-191 use transliterations, while pp. 193-200 do not); there are typos and missing characters in the text and titles (e.g. \u2018Plato\u2019 Parmenides\u2019 on p. 10) and missing references in the bibliography (e.g. Helmig 2007 and Migliori 2000 from p. 63).","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/BAdPSglZoxI7r9D","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":1550,"pubplace":"Baden-Baden","publisher":"Academia","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Simplicio, in Cael. 556, 3-560, 10, a margine di Platone, Prm. 135b8-c1. Prolegomeni a una genealogia del parallelism onto-epistemologico"]}