{"_index":"sire","_id":"708","_score":null,"_source":{"id":708,"authors_free":[{"id":1056,"entry_id":708,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":97,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Dillon, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Dillon","norm_person":{"id":97,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Dillon","full_name":"Dillon, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/123498058","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa \tsurvie","main_title":{"title":"Review of Hadot 1987: Simplicius: Sa vie, son \u0153uvre, sa \tsurvie"},"abstract":"Simplicius is a man who might seem destined forever to be used simply as a source for other thinkers, without being given much credit for thinking himself. After all, his surviving works are overtly commentaries on one work or another (overwhelmingly of Aristotle)\u2014though, in fact, small bits of more original work are embedded in these, such as the Corollaries on Space and Time in the Physics commentary. He is also a man of exemplary modesty about his own contributions, always making clear his debts to previous authorities, quoting his sources to an extent unusual in Neoplatonist circles (or indeed in the ancient world in general).\r\n\r\nIt was therefore a happy idea of Mme. Hadot to call together a conference of distinguished Neoplatonists to honor Simplicius and to produce this impressive volume as a result. The work is divided into four (unequal) parts:\r\n\r\n A biographical introduction\r\n A series of essays on doctrinal and methodological questions\r\n A shorter section on textual problems\r\n A pair of essays on Simplicius' Nachleben\r\n\r\nAll are of interest and importance.\r\n\r\nFirst, we have an essay by Ilsetraut Hadot herself (depending in one important respect on the essay of Michel Tardieu, which follows it) on the chronology of Simplicius' life and works. Tardieu, by a fine piece of detective work (Simplicius et les calendriers de Harran), argues with at least great probability that when Simplicius returned with the other philosophers from Persia in 532, it was not to Athens or any other major center but rather to the town of Harran (Carrhae) in Osrhoene. There, a tradition of non-conformist Christianity was tolerant of philosophy, and it is likely where he composed most, if not all, of his commentaries. Certain remarks Simplicius makes in In Phys. 874.23 ff., about the four different calendars \"we\" use, seem to require his presence at the only known place where four calendars were simultaneously in use, as we know from later Arab sources.\r\n\r\nThe central part of the collection comprises six essays on aspects of doctrine:\r\n\r\n Two by Philippe Hoffmann (Categories et langage selon Simplicius: on the purpose (skopos) of Aristotle's Categories and an analysis of Simplicius\u2019 invective against John Philoponus)\r\n One by Henry Blumenthal on the doctrine of the De Anima commentary of Simplicius (if it is indeed by Simplicius)\r\n One by Concetta Luna on Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary\r\n One by Richard Sorabji on Simplicius: Prime Matter as Extension\r\n One by Nestor-Luis Cordero on Simplicius et l'\u00e9cole \u00e9l\u00e9ate\r\n\r\nHoffmann's studies frame this central portion of the work. His first examines Simplicius' account of the skopos of Aristotle's Categories, showing how Simplicius, following Porphyry, views the Categories as addressing \"utterances\" (phonai), \"things\" (pragmata, onta), \"concepts\" (noemata), or all of these. Simplicius interprets the study of language, particularly its primary constituents, as a preparation for the soul\u2019s ascent to the noetic world\u2014a higher interpretation inherited from Iamblichus. In his second study, Hoffmann examines Simplicius' strategies of polemic and invective against Philoponus, particularly in the De Caelo, and Simplicius' view of the higher purpose of studying celestial matters. For Simplicius, even prosaic texts like the Categories could become an elevating and prayerful experience.\r\n\r\nSorabji, in an elegant contribution, shows how Simplicius solves a problem bequeathed by Aristotle by identifying prime matter with extension, which Aristotle did not do. Cordero challenges the idea of an Eleatic \"school\" while listing Simplicius\u2019 quotations of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. Blumenthal discusses Simplicius\u2019 doctrine of the soul, though his uncertainty about the authorship of the De Anima commentary (potentially by Priscian) limits the analysis. Luna traces Iamblichean roots in Simplicius' doctrine of relation in the Categories commentary.\r\n\r\nThe final sections include discussions of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius, with contributions by Ilsetraut Hadot, Leonardo Taran, and Dieter Harlfinger. Taran critiques Diels\u2019 edition of Simplicius' Physics commentary, showing its deficiencies due to reliance on unreliable collations and limited understanding of Neoplatonic doctrine. Harlfinger analyzes contamination in the manuscript tradition of the commentary on Books I-IV.\r\n\r\nThe collection concludes with two papers on Simplicius\u2019 influence in the medieval West, one by Fernand Boissier on Latin translations and the influence of the In De Caelo commentary and another by Pierre Hadot on the survival of the Manuel d'\u00c9pict\u00e8te commentary in the 15th to 17th centuries.\r\n\r\nOverall, this collection has given Simplicius much of his due as a major commentator and preserver of earlier Greek philosophy. While only three papers\u2014those by Blumenthal, Luna, and Sorabji\u2014discuss any distinctive doctrines of Simplicius, this is perhaps reasonable given that he does not claim originality. Most of what seems distinctive likely goes back to Iamblichus or Syrianus\/Proclus. Yet, it might one day be possible to produce a focused volume on his doctrinal innovations. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hje0CYeAY915LhU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":97,"full_name":"Dillon, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":708,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"110","issue":"","pages":"244\u2013245"}},"sort":[1990]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"751","_score":null,"_source":{"id":751,"authors_free":[{"id":1116,"entry_id":751,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":81,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Ellis, John","free_first_name":"John","free_last_name":"Ellis","norm_person":{"id":81,"first_name":"John","last_name":"Ellis","full_name":"Ellis, John","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Trouble with Fragrance","main_title":{"title":"The Trouble with Fragrance"},"abstract":"By 'in a subject' I mean what (a) is in something, not as a part, and (b) cannot exist separately from what it is in. (Aristotle, Categories 1a24-5)\r\n\r\nThese lines have been extensively discussed in recent years. The crux of the debate is whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties. On the \"traditional\" interpretation, a property is in an individual thing as in a subject, say, Socrates, only if it cannot exist apart from Socrates. This implies that the properties of an individual thing are peculiar to it or non-sharable, in the sense that they cannot be in any other thing. The particular white in Socrates, for example, ceases to exist when he gets a tan. It does not move on to inhere in Callias or any other subject, nor is the white in Callias numerically the same white as the white in Socrates. Although both are white, perhaps even the same shade of white, nonetheless, they are numerically distinct particulars inhering in different individual things.\r\n\r\nMany recent commentators have tried to \"rescue\" Aristotle from the alleged commitment to such Stoutian particulars. Their strategy has been to weaken (b) so that the particular inherent property is not existentially dependent on the very particular substance it inheres in. G.E.L. Owen opened the debate by arguing that (b) can mean \"cannot exist without something to contain it,\" and thus Aristotle is only committed to the view that particular properties need some substance or other in order to exist. A particular white, for example, would be a particular shade of white, which could, of course, be exemplified by more than one particular substance.\r\n\r\nThe task I\u2019ve set for myself in this paper is not to argue for either the weak or the strong interpretation of inherence in Aristotle. That is already a well-trodden path. Instead, I shall look at what the ancient commentators on Aristotle had to say on the subject. Which interpretation, the strong or the weak, do they support? My strategy is to focus on one of the many problems they consider, that of fragrance, and to see if their treatment of it yields an answer.\r\n\r\nThe fragrance problem attacks the basis of Aristotle's ontology\u2014the distinction between substance and accident. Didn\u2019t Aristotle say that accidents cannot exist apart from that in which they inhere? But fragrances seem to travel to us from their subjects, and aren\u2019t they accidents? In the attempts, from Porphyry (232\u2013309 AD) to Elias (fl. 541), to save Aristotle\u2019s ontology from this objection, we shall find, I hope to show, an interesting development in the complexity of the discussions. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the problem, the discussions move into psychological theory, and we find that, in order for his ontology to be saved, Aristotle\u2019s psychological theory must be deepened.\r\nConcluding Remarks\r\n\r\nThere seems to be a clear development in the way the commentators construed \"in a subject.\" Starting with Porphyry\u2019s tense solution, it is possible to see a gradual movement away from that solution and the weak construal it implies, toward the stronger reading implied by the other solutions. Ammonius introduces an alternative, the effluence solution, albeit without indicating his preference. His students, Philoponus and Simplicius, add further developments or modifications to his view: Simplicius, by rejecting the tense solution and offering new alternatives; and Philoponus, by turning the discussion more toward psychology and revealing both the conflict between the effluence and diosmic theories and his preference for the latter.\r\n\r\nThis shift in the discussion toward psychology is evidenced by Olympiodorus, who responds to the fragrance problem only with alternative psychological theories, making no mention of the tense solution. Finally, Elias, although mentioning the tense solution, devotes most of his energy to evaluating the alternative psychological answers to the fragrance problem. [introduction p. 290-291; conclusion p. 302]","btype":3,"date":"1990","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/HQWPG36viwyMCbr","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":81,"full_name":"Ellis, John","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":751,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"35","issue":"3","pages":"290-302"}},"sort":[1990]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"831","_score":null,"_source":{"id":831,"authors_free":[{"id":1235,"entry_id":831,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":421,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bels, Jacques","free_first_name":"Jacques","free_last_name":"Bels","norm_person":{"id":421,"first_name":"Jacques","last_name":"Bels","full_name":"Bels, Jacques","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le th\u00e8me de la grande ann\u00e9e d'H\u00e9raclite aux Stoiciens","main_title":{"title":"Le th\u00e8me de la grande ann\u00e9e d'H\u00e9raclite aux Stoiciens"},"abstract":"D\u2019H\u00e9raclite aux sto\u00efciens, en passant par Platon qui adopte un point de vue analogue \u00e0 celui de l\u2019\u00c9ph\u00e9sien, le discours sur la Grande Ann\u00e9e est au c\u0153ur m\u00eame de la conception philosophique, m\u00eame s\u2019il subit une modification dans son appr\u00e9hension. En effet, \u00e0 une lecture (re)g\u00e9n\u00e9rante, le sto\u00efcisme substitue une perspective finaliste quand il privil\u00e9gie le lien Grande Ann\u00e9e-ekpyrosis. Cette accentuation d\u2019une Grande Ann\u00e9e con\u00e7ue comme limite, au d\u00e9triment de la r\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, se marque \u00e9galement dans la liaison ekpyrosis-fin de la survie limit\u00e9e. En effet, selon les sto\u00efciens, \u00e0 la disparition des corps, la partie spirituelle subsiste un certain temps avant de dispara\u00eetre \u00e0 son tour.\r\n\r\nCons\u00e9quence logique de la th\u00e8se selon laquelle ce qui est engendr\u00e9 doit dispara\u00eetre, cette mort de l\u2019\u00e2me correspond, chez Cl\u00e9anthe et Chrysippe, \u00e0 la conflagration universelle. Pour le premier, en effet, toutes les \u00e2mes survivent jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019embrasement final, tandis que, pour le second, seules les \u00e2mes des sages connaissent ce privil\u00e8ge, celles des \"insens\u00e9s\" disparaissant plus rapidement.\r\n\r\nD\u00e8s lors, quand il \u00e9tablit une parent\u00e9 entre les sto\u00efciens et H\u00e9raclite, Simplicius a partiellement raison : ces penseurs ont pos\u00e9 l\u2019existence d\u2019une Grande Ann\u00e9e. Il oublie simplement de pr\u00e9ciser qu\u2019ils lui ont assign\u00e9 des priorit\u00e9s diff\u00e9rentes. [conclusion p. 183]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Wt3OVL4zzPJWT2a","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":421,"full_name":"Bels, Jacques","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":831,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"7","issue":"2","pages":"169-183"}},"sort":[1989]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1296","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1296,"authors_free":[{"id":1889,"entry_id":1296,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":85,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"de Libera, Alain ","free_first_name":"Alain","free_last_name":"de Libera ","norm_person":{"id":85,"first_name":"Alain","last_name":"De Libera","full_name":"De Libera, Alain","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130219002","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l'analogie de l'\u00eatre","main_title":{"title":"Les sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l'analogie de l'\u00eatre"},"abstract":"C'est ici le lieu de revenir sur le concept de denominatio. Dans les versions latines d'Aristote, le mot denominativa d\u00e9signe, on l'a dit, les \u00ab paronymes \u00bb, c'est-\u00e0-dire ces \u00ab r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui, tout en diff\u00e9rant d'une autre (r\u00e9alit\u00e9) par la d\u00e9sinence de leur nom, ont une appellation conforme au nom (de cette autre r\u00e9alit\u00e9) \u00bb.\r\n\r\nChez Ma\u00eetre Eckhart, la notion de \u00ab pr\u00e9dication d\u00e9nominative \u00bb, emprunt\u00e9e \u00e0 la Logica d'Avicenne (chap. 3, Venise, 1508, fol. 3 vb), rejoint la notion bo\u00e9cienne de praedicatio des accidentia secundum rem (De Trinitate, chap. 4), exprimant un aspect de la d\u00e9ficience ontologique constitutive de l\u2019\u00e9tant cr\u00e9\u00e9 comme tel. Pour lui, dire que \u00ab les neuf cat\u00e9gories sont pr\u00e9diqu\u00e9es d\u00e9nominativement de la substance \u00bb (novem praedicamenta accidentium praedicantur denominative de substantia) signifie que tout \u00e9tant cr\u00e9\u00e9 est un d\u00e9nominatif, c'est-\u00e0-dire un \u00e9tant-ceci ou cela (ens hoc et hoc), et qu'aucun \u00e9tant-ceci n'est en tant que ceci : tout \u00ab ceci \u00bb ajout\u00e9 \u00e0 la substance est l'expression de la d\u00e9faillance (casus, \u03c0\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) qui accidente le cr\u00e9\u00e9.\r\n\r\nC'est dans cette tradition complexe, \u00e0 la fois li\u00e9e \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie averro\u00efste de l'accident et aux th\u00e9ories avicennienne (ontologique) et bo\u00e9cienne (th\u00e9ologique) de la pr\u00e9dication\u2014et non \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie de l\u2019analogie selon Simplicius\u2014que se situe le c\u00e9l\u00e8bre passage d\u2019In Exodum, o\u00f9 le Thuringien expose sa th\u00e9orie des cat\u00e9gories, qu'on peut r\u00e9sumer ainsi :\r\n\r\n Les dix cat\u00e9gories ne sont pas les dix premiers \u00e9tants (decem prima entia), mais les dix genres premiers des \u00e9tants (decem prima entium genera).\r\n Il n'y a qu'un \u00e9tant, la substance ; les autres r\u00e9alit\u00e9s ne sont pas \u00ab \u00e9tant \u00bb (ens), mais \u00ab de ou \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tant \u00bb (entis), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire \u00ab \u00e9tant seulement par analogie au seul \u00e9tant au sens absolu, la substance, comme en t\u00e9moigne la M\u00e9taphysique, livre VII \u00bb.\r\n Les neuf pr\u00e9dicaments de l\u2019accident ne sont donc pas des \u00e9tants \u00ab au cas r\u00e9gime \u00bb (entia in recto), mais des \u00e9tants au \u00ab cas oblique \u00bb (in obliquo).\r\n C'est en ce sens \u00ab oblique \u00bb que l\u2019urine est dite \u00ab saine \u00bb, non par la sant\u00e9 \u00ab formellement inh\u00e9rente \u00bb, \u00ab mais seulement par analogie et renvoi extrins\u00e8que \u00e0 la sant\u00e9 elle-m\u00eame, qui au sens propre et formel se trouve seulement dans l\u2019animal \u00bb (non sanitate formaliter inhaerente, sed sola analogia et respectu ad ipsam sanitatem extra, quae proprie formaliter est in ipso animali).\r\n C\u2019est \u00e9galement en ce sens que le vin est dit \u00ab \u00eatre dans l\u2019enseigne \u00bb, signifiant qu\u2019il se trouve dans la taverne et la bouteille.\r\n\r\nTelle est donc la th\u00e9orie dont Nicolas pr\u00e9tend trouver les contours g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, ou plus exactement l\u2019instrumentation conceptuelle, chez Simplicius. Certes, il n'en laisse pas l\u2019application m\u00e9taphysique au commentateur lui-m\u00eame\u2014ce en quoi il a raison\u2014mais il a tort lorsqu'il lui pr\u00eate une formulation de l\u2019analogia attributionis, qu'il ne pouvait lire que chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Eckhart.\r\n\r\nOn peut sp\u00e9culer \u00e0 loisir sur une telle absence d'acribie. Mais n'est-ce pas Albert le Grand lui-m\u00eame qui en inaugure le principe lorsque, dans sa derni\u00e8re \u0153uvre, la Summa theologiae, il pr\u00eate \u00e0 Proclus une distinction entre quatre types de \u00ab pr\u00e9dication commune \u00bb : une selon l\u2019univocit\u00e9 stricte, trois selon l\u2019analogie\u2014un v\u00e9ritable montage qui, \u00e0 partir de certaines expressions de Proclus sur le caract\u00e8re salvifique du bien (\u00ab le bien est ce qui sauve tous les \u00eatres et devient ainsi le terme de leur tendance \u00bb), lui permet de retrouver en fait l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation averro\u00efste de la triade porphyrienne des homonymes \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd.\r\n\r\nPlut\u00f4t que d\u2019incriminer les l\u00e9g\u00e8ret\u00e9s ou les insuffisances de la doxographie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale, nous pr\u00e9f\u00e9rons voir l\u00e0 le t\u00e9moignage de la puissance d'assimilation et de la productivit\u00e9 de la grille de lecture originairement impos\u00e9e par Porphyre aux textes d\u2019Aristote.\r\n\r\nL\u2019histoire des sources gr\u00e9co-arabes de la th\u00e9orie m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l\u2019analogie est celle d\u2019un invariant structurel grec et de ses remplissements arabes, qui, pour finir, retrouve d\u2019autres Grecs traduits par Guillaume de Moerbeke. C\u2019est l\u2019histoire d\u2019une d\u00e9rive p\u00e9ripat\u00e9ticienne de l\u2019aristot\u00e9lisme qui commence chez Porphyre et s\u2019ach\u00e8ve dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme. La production m\u00e9di\u00e9vale de l\u2019analogie n\u2019est pas seulement une \u00ab replatonisation \u00bb d\u2019Aristote, c\u2019est aussi la marque de l\u2019affinit\u00e9 structurelle qui lie entre elles toutes les formes de n\u00e9oplatonisme. Plus d\u00e9cisif encore, elle proc\u00e8de moins d\u2019un rapprochement des \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 avec les synonymes que d\u2019une substitution des \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 aux paronymes.\r\n\r\nReconduite \u00e0 ses sources gr\u00e9co-arabes, l\u2019analogie appara\u00eet ainsi avant tout comme la th\u00e9orie d\u2019une transsumption cat\u00e9gorielle archi-fondatrice : celle qui articule toute pens\u00e9e du rapport entre la substance et l\u2019accident. [conclusion p. 343-345]","btype":3,"date":"1989","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FAqS35nEd0udN0w","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":85,"full_name":"De Libera, Alain","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1296,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3","issue":"4","pages":"319-345"}},"sort":[1989]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1524","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1524,"authors_free":[{"id":2649,"entry_id":1524,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":404,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","free_first_name":"Maria Luisa","free_last_name":"Silvestre","norm_person":{"id":404,"first_name":"Maria Luisa","last_name":"Silvestre","full_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1158446594","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras","main_title":{"title":"Nous, the Concept of Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Anaxagoras"},"abstract":"That the world of Anaxagoras is without any soul entails that Nous is for him the ultimate reality. It is not the end of our life, but the origin of the world and of ourselves. It is that which brings life and at the same time that which gives human beings the possibility of knowing anything whatsoever. This is all that we can deduce from Plato and Aristotle's presentation of Anaxagoras' doctrine on Nous. Simplicius cites a passage in which we can see that Nous is infinite, has power over everything, and knows the past, the present, and even future time:\r\n\r\n While other things have a share of everything, Nous is infinite, self-governing, and has been mixed with nothing ... For it is the lightest of all things and the purest, and maintains complete understanding over everything and wields the greatest power. And Nous controls all, large and small, that has life ... and whatever sort of things were to be\u2014what were and are no longer, what are, and what will be\u2014Nous put all in order. (B12; Sider, 1981, p. 94).\r\n\r\nWe are not sure if Anaxagoras' Nous really was all that Simplicius attributes to it, but there can be no doubt that Simplicius, like Plato and every other interpreter of Anaxagoras' Nous, agrees that Nous is the ultimate reality in Anaxagoras' philosophy.\r\n\r\nIn our view, Anaxagoras' Nous can be described as a force originating in the interior of the All, which suddenly frees itself and introduces a movement that upsets, separates, aggregates, and distinguishes. Yet at the same time, it is a rational force of understanding, since its characteristic function\u2014understanding\u2014for Anaxagoras means nothing else but putting persons and things in their proper places in relation to each other. [conclusion p. 254-255]","btype":3,"date":" 1989","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/WLkg0ul3k8yw6Tq","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":404,"full_name":"Silvestre, Maria Luisa","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1524,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ultimate Reality and Meaning","volume":"12","issue":"4","pages":"248-255"}},"sort":[1989]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1107","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1107,"authors_free":[{"id":1674,"entry_id":1107,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":275,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Narbonne, Jean-Marc","free_first_name":"Jean-Marc","free_last_name":"Narbonne","norm_person":{"id":275,"first_name":"Jean-Marc","last_name":"Narbonne","full_name":"Narbonne, Jean-Marc","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/124470408","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"D\u00e9finition et description: Le probl\u00e8me de la saisie des genres premiers et des individus chez Aristote dans l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"D\u00e9finition et description: Le probl\u00e8me de la saisie des genres premiers et des individus chez Aristote dans l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de Simplicius"},"abstract":"Simplicius uses (and distorts) the concept of hypographe (of Stoic origin) in order to describe the first genera and the particulars which, in Aristotle, are not susceptible to definition. However, a closer examination of the status of science in Aristotle (with reference to the doctrine of incommunicability of genera and the problem of individuation) shows that Simplicius\u2019 attempt is incompatible, or at least difficult to reconcile, with the aristotelianism (of Aristotle). [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1987","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/o2VUk12kzrbnaz0","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":275,"full_name":"Narbonne, Jean-Marc","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1107,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archives de Philosophie","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"529-554"}},"sort":[1987]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"628","_score":null,"_source":{"id":628,"authors_free":[{"id":888,"entry_id":628,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist?","main_title":{"title":"John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist?"},"abstract":"What, in the end, can we say about Philoponus\u2019 position as a Platonist, bearing in mind that our conclusions must still in some respects be provision\u00adal? That he was a Neoplatonist is indisputable. Since, however, few if any, of \r\nhis differences with other Neoplatonists seem to arise from the adoption of a specifically Alexandrian philosophical point of view, we must attribute them to his own philosophical - and theological - orientation. It turns out that, in \r\nhis case, \u00bbAlexandrian Platonist\u00ab may mean little more than a man whose philosophy was Neoplatonic, and who worked at Alexandria, though one might observe that there would not have been a warm welcome at Athens for a \r\nChristian Neoplatonist, however closely his views might conform to those codified by Proclus and developed by Damascius. One could go on to say \r\nthat, apart from the concentration on Aristotle, his differences from other Alexandrians were greater than theirs from the Athenians. In this connection \r\nwe should notice Philoponus\u2019 frequent appeals to Plato against Aristotle in the passages Simplicius singles out for complaint, and his relatively frequent reservations about the agreement, symph\u00f4nia, of Plato and Aristotle, which \r\nmost others eagerly sought to demonstrate. And since we started with a critique of P r a e c h t e r , who did so much to initiate the serious study of the \r\nAristotelian commentators, it might be appropriate to end with his characteri\u00ad\r\nsation of Philoponus in the De aeternitate mundi: \u00bbes ist der gelehrte Platoniker der spricht\u00ab. [conclusion, p. 334-335]\r\n","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/cP5twq2fWJQvBVn","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":628,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"114","issue":"","pages":"314\u2013335"}},"sort":[1986]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"548","_score":null,"_source":{"id":548,"authors_free":[{"id":772,"entry_id":548,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":113,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","free_first_name":"Aryeh","free_last_name":"Finkelberg","norm_person":{"id":113,"first_name":"Aryeh","last_name":"Finkelberg","full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1124815007","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Cosmology of Parmenides","main_title":{"title":"The Cosmology of Parmenides"},"abstract":"Our main source of information about the cosmological compo\u00adnent of Parmenides\u2019 doctrine of Opinion \u2014apart from the first three and a half abstruse lines of fr. 12 \u2014 is Aetius\u2019 account. This, however, is generally regarded as confused, garbled and incompatible with fr. 12. The reconstruction of Parmenides\u2019 cosmology is thus considered a hope\u00adless task, for \u201cit must inevitably be based on many conjectures.\u201d I, however, cannot accept this conclusion, for, as I argue below, it is possible to provide a reasonably intelligible account of Aetius\u2019 report (except for the corrupt sentence about the goddess) which is also com\u00adpatible with fr. 12, provided, of course, that we are not bent upon prov\u00ading our sources incompatible, but rather seek to reconcile them. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3OYYrw5qTwsrSkx","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":113,"full_name":"Finkelberg, Aryeh","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":548,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"107","issue":"3","pages":"303-317"}},"sort":[1986]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1331","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1331,"authors_free":[{"id":1964,"entry_id":1331,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":135,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","free_first_name":"Hans B.","free_last_name":"Gottschalk,","norm_person":{"id":135,"first_name":"Hans B.","last_name":"Gottschalk","full_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1161498559","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists","main_title":{"title":"Boethus' Psychology and the Neoplatonists"},"abstract":"Three writers of late antiquity, all of them Neoplatonists, refer to the psychological doctrine of a certain Boethus. Several philosophers of that name are known, and the fragments have been variously assigned to the Stoic, Boethus of Sidon, who lived in the middle of the second century BC, and his Peripatetic namesake, active about a century later. ' The purpose of this article is to see what exactly we can learn about this thinker from the extant fragments and then to determine which of the various Boethi he is most likely to have been. [introduction, p. 243]","btype":3,"date":"1986","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5lu8RgGIGt7Wnhe","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":135,"full_name":"Gottschalk, Hans B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1331,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"31","issue":"3","pages":"243-257"}},"sort":[1986]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"858","_score":null,"_source":{"id":858,"authors_free":[{"id":1262,"entry_id":858,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":303,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rist, John M.","free_first_name":"John M.","free_last_name":"Rist","norm_person":{"id":303,"first_name":"John M.","last_name":"Rist","full_name":"Rist, John M.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137060440","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The End of Aristotle's on Prayer","main_title":{"title":"The End of Aristotle's on Prayer"},"abstract":"Jean P\u00e9pin recently devoted a lengthy study to Aristotle's On Prayer. There is good reason to think that the work never existed. On Prayer is listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotle's writings (5.22) and in the Vita Hesychii. The only other evidence for its existence is a passage of Simplicius that tells us that at the end of On Prayer, Aristotle says clearly that God is either mind or somehow beyond mind (\u1f22 \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6).\r\n\r\nThe claim that God is beyond mind is unique in an unemended Aristotelian text, but the notion would be acceptable to Simplicius both because, as a Neoplatonist, he would believe it to be true, and because as a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle, he would be happy to find evidence of the basic philosophical harmony of Aristotle and Plato. Our problem, therefore, is to see why Simplicius thought that Aristotle held this view. The immediate answer is that he thought he had found it in a text of Aristotle's called On Prayer (or perhaps more likely in an anthology of Aristotelian material claiming that this was Aristotle's view in such a work).\r\n\r\nBut if there was no such work On Prayer, how could Simplicius (or his source) think there was, and what is the actual source of the apparent fragment that claims that for Aristotle, God might be \"beyond mind\"? It is possible to understand how Simplicius was misled.\r\n\r\nThere is a Latin work in two chapters called De Bona Fortuna. It is composed of Magna Moralia 2.8 and Eudemian Ethics 8.2. Of the 56 surviving manuscripts of De Bona Fortuna, the earliest datable version is Vat. Lat. 2083, of the year 1284. The producer of this text is unknown. De Bona Fortuna is not an excerpt from existing Latin translations of Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics, because although Bartholomew of Messina translated the Magna Moralia between 1258 and 1266, and although a Greek manuscript of the Eudemian Ethics may have been known in Messina before 1250, there are no medieval Latin translations of the Eudemian Ethics as a whole; indeed, the only other section of the text translated is E.E. 8.3.\r\n\r\nThe original sources of De Bona Fortuna were known to at least some of those who copied it in Latin, but the work itself is a direct translation from Greek. So, unless the translator also both excerpted and combined the two parts of the De Bona Fortuna himself, and showed no concern for the fact that the rest of the Eudemian Ethics was still untranslated, and perhaps even still unknown (which is highly unlikely), he must have used a Greek original of De Bona Fortuna in the form of a separate treatise composed of M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2.\r\n\r\nThe title of the treatise, presumably, was the Greek equivalent of De Bona Fortuna, that is, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. We have no means of telling when it was assembled, but there is no reason why it should not be ancient and indeed have been available to Simplicius or (if Simplicius is quoting an anthology of some sort) to his source.\r\n\r\nE.E. 8.2 (1248A28) unemended, reads as follows: \u03a4\u03af \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2. Spengel added the words \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 after \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9, following the reading et intellectu found in De Bona Fortuna. Thus, the Greek original of De Bona Fortuna read: \u03a4\u03af \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2. Thus, in \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, God is greater than mind.\r\n\r\nAdmittedly, \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 did not say that God is \"beyond mind\" (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6), only that he is greater than mind. But in Platonic or Neopythagorean writings of late antiquity, these phrases are virtually interchangeable. The most striking evidence is from Plotinus, who uses \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 dozens of times and also gives the best examples of the One being \"greater (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd)\" than mind (5.3.14.16-18, 5.3.16.38, 5.3.17.1-3).\r\n\r\nSimplicius thought he knew about an Aristotelian text On Prayer (\u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2). Let us suppose that he had direct or indirect access to a work originally called On Good Fortune (\u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2). The corruption of \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 to \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 is easy. In this text, Simplicius found the remark that God is \"greater than mind.\" There is no reason to assume that Simplicius is quoting On Good Fortune verbatim. For Simplicius, as a Neoplatonist, to say that God is \"greater than mind\" is the same as to say that he is \"beyond (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1) mind.\"\r\n\r\nThe use of \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 in this way derives, of course, from Neoplatonic, Middle Platonic, and Neopythagorean interpretations of Plato's Republic 509B.\r\n\r\nLet us therefore posit the following sequence of events. A Greek text, including (but not necessarily restricted to) M.M. 2.8 and E.E. 8.2, is compiled and originally entitled \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2. It comes to contain, at some point, an un-Aristotelian phrase (absent from the original text of the E.E. and based on a misinterpretation of that text) saying that God is \"greater than mind.\" The title of the work is at some stage corrupted: \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 becomes \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2.\r\n\r\nSimplicius either reads it under this title or, more likely, finds it so cited by an excerpter or commentator of Platonizing tendencies. Either Simplicius or the excerpter paraphrases \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 as \u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6. Hence, our alleged fragment of Aristotle's work On Prayer, found in Simplicius, is really a corrupted fragment of \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, a work whose origin is lost but which reaches Simplicius, or becomes known to him, through the medium of a Platonizing tradition.\r\n\r\nThe date of the original compilation \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 remains unknown, but it must have been early enough for its title, in a mistaken form, to have found its way onto the lists of Aristotle's writings. The corruption of the title was probably achieved by a librarian's error long before the crucial phrase \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 (absent, as we have seen, from the Eudemian Ethics) was imported into the text itself. This can hardly have occurred before the revival of Neopythagoreanism, that is, before the second century B.C. It is not impossible that it was post-Plotinian. [the entire text]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7iwkew2wm2p3qeo","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":303,"full_name":"Rist, John M.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":858,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The American Journal of Philology","volume":"106","issue":"1","pages":"110-113"}},"sort":[1985]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"593","_score":null,"_source":{"id":593,"authors_free":[{"id":844,"entry_id":593,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":101,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":101,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130051187","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aurore, \u00c9ros et Anank\u00e9 autour des dieux Parm\u00e9nidiens (f. 12-f. 13)","main_title":{"title":"Aurore, \u00c9ros et Anank\u00e9 autour des dieux Parm\u00e9nidiens (f. 12-f. 13)"},"abstract":"Deux textes de Platon dans Le Banquet et un d'Aristote dans La M\u00e9taphysique commentent ce passage de Parm\u00e9nide sur \u00c9ros. Dans Le Banquet, en 195a, Agathon dit : \u00ab Je d\u00e9clare que c'est \u00c9ros le plus jeune des dieux... ; qu'inversement ces antiques divinit\u00e9s qu'\u00e9noncent sur les dieux H\u00e9siode et Parm\u00e9nide appartiendraient \u00e0 la N\u00e9cessit\u00e9 et non pas \u00e0 l'Amour. \u00bb Et en 178a, Ph\u00e8dre s'exprimait ainsi : \u00ab Quant \u00e0 Parm\u00e9nide, voici ce qu'il dit de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration : le premier de tous les dieux dont s'avisa [la D\u00e9esse], ce fut l'Amour. \u00bb\r\n\r\nPour ce qui est d'Aristote, au livre A, chapitre 4, de La M\u00e9taphysique, examinant la th\u00e8se des penseurs qui, tel Anaxagore, firent du \u00ab la fois la cause de la beaut\u00e9 et la cause du mouvement des \u00eatres \u00bb, Aristote rapproche \u00e0 son tour H\u00e9siode et Parm\u00e9nide comme penseurs qui ont pos\u00e9 l'Amour ou le D\u00e9sir pour principes des \u00eatres ; Aristote cite alors le vers que citait Le Banquet en 178a, vers qui constitue le fragment 13 du po\u00e8me de Parm\u00e9nide. Ainsi, les deux t\u00e9moignages de Platon et d'Aristote s'accordent-ils : dans le panth\u00e9on parm\u00e9nidien, Anank\u00e8 est l'origine ; en provient l'Amour, \u00c9ros, lequel domine les autres dieux.\r\n\r\nDans le commentaire de La Physique d'Aristote, Simplicius apporte \u00e0 son tour des textes et des indications concernant Anank\u00e8 et \u00c9ros. C'est gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 ces passages de Simplicius que les \u00e9diteurs de Parm\u00e9nide ont ordonn\u00e9 plusieurs fragments de la seconde partie du po\u00e8me (f. 9 et suiv.). Cependant, l'ordonnance des fragments ici retenue par la plupart des \u00e9diteurs, si l'on y apporte quelque attention, semble loin de s'imposer. Relisant de pr\u00e8s le texte de Simplicius, nous voudrions ici d\u00e9gager conjointement plusieurs th\u00e8mes.\r\n\r\nD'abord, en ce qui concerne Simplicius, nous voudrions apporter des pr\u00e9cisions sur sa technique de citation des fragments. \u00c0 partir de l\u00e0, nous pourrions envisager une nouvelle structuration des fragments portant sur Anank\u00e8 et \u00c9ros. Enfin, nous pourrions ainsi essayer de mieux d\u00e9gager certains aspects de la place du divin dans l'\u0153uvre parm\u00e9nidienne. [introduction p. 460]","btype":3,"date":"1985","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/RFpfl1LBytLVPZJ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":101,"full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":593,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"4","issue":"","pages":" 459-470"}},"sort":[1985]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"845","_score":null,"_source":{"id":845,"authors_free":[{"id":1249,"entry_id":845,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"(Neo-) Platonica","main_title":{"title":"(Neo-) Platonica"},"abstract":"Filosofie is ons vooral in de vorm van teksten toegankelijk. Wie filosofie wil studeren, zal onvermijdelijk teksten moeten bestuderen en zal het resultaat van zijn eigen onderzoek weer in de vorm van teksten produceren. Wel heeft de filosofie van oudsher ook met de mogelijkheid rekening gehouden dat men inzichten kan verwerven die niet discursief uitgedrukt kunnen worden, die niet \u201etextf\u00e4hig\u201c zijn; maar toch is de filosofie weinig be\u00efnvloed geworden door deze principi\u00eble mogelijkheid. Tenslotte kan men weer reflecteren en schrijven over deze niet-tekstmatige inzichten, zodat het erop lijkt dat men nooit uit de toverban van de tekst geraken kan. Niemand zal eraan denken het voordeel prijs te geven dat de filosofie heeft door zich aan teksten te binden en zo haar inzichten te objectiveren. Maar toch is het bedenkelijk dat men de binding van filosofisch inzicht aan de tekst als vanzelfsprekend ziet. Zo wordt ook niet meer duidelijk wat de \u201ezaak\u201c is waarop de filosofische tekst betrekking heeft. Is er wel een \u201ezaak-los-van-de-tekst\u201c? Het is bekend dat Plato tegenover het fenomeen \u201etekst\u201c bewust afstand heeft genomen. Men kan hem zeker niet verwijten dat hij een na\u00efef vertrouwen heeft in de tekst als medium van filosofisch inzicht: waar het in de filosofie eigenlijk om gaat is niet in tekst uit te drukken. Al is hij zelf meer dan wie ook tekst-kunstenaar, hij blijft zich bewust van de grenzen van de tekst. Wie uit Plato\u2019s dialogen een doctrine construeert, een systeem van uitspraken over \u201ewat het geval is\u201c, verliest deze reserve ten opzichte van de tekst en reduceert de vele \u201evormen van kennis\u201c tot objectief \u201epropositioneel\u201c kennen.\r\n\r\nDit is de invalshoek van waaruit Wolfgang Wieland, vooral bekend wegens zijn originele studie over Aristoteles\u2019 Physica, zijn Plato-boek geschreven heeft: Platon und die Formen des Wissens. Het boek bevat drie delen. Het eerste is gewijd aan Plato\u2019s verhouding tot de geschreven tekst. Uitgaande van de bekende passage in de Phaidros onderzoekt Wieland waarom Plato zo kritisch is ten opzichte van het schrift. Plato verzet zich tegen elke poging om het weten te objectiveren alsof men in de tekst over inzicht als over een stuk bezit zou kunnen beschikken. Elke formulering in taal blijft werktuig, iets voorlopigs. Het \u201egebruiksweten\u201c dat in de omgang met de dingen tot stand komt, heeft voorrang op het weten dat in proposities is uitgedrukt. Hier staan we meteen voor het centrale thema van Wielands boek. Het is echter de vraag of dit bij Plato wel zo centraal is. Bij Plato gaat het vooreerst om kritiek op het schrift, en niet op het propositionele weten als zodanig.\r\n\r\nVanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook de dialoog als medium van filosofisch denken begrijpen. Indien men ondanks alle reserves toch niet aan tekst verzaken kan, dan biedt de dialoogvorm een uitweg. E\u00e9n van de tekorten van de tekst heeft namelijk te maken met het ontbreken van een re\u00eble context van het woord. De dialoog brengt deze context op dramatisch-fictieve wijze tot stand. De dialoog is geen didactisch hulpmiddel, geen inkleding van een leer. De uitspraken blijven er als \u201ewerktuigen\u201c in de gespreksactie fungeren. Vanuit de schriftkritiek kan men ook het statuut van de mythe binnen de tekst begrijpen, het metaforische karakter van vele passages, het gebruik van de ironie. Tenslotte wijst Wieland in \u00a7 5 op het belang van de fictieve chronologie bij het beoordelen van een dialoog. Men kan namelijk, uitgaande van de dramatische situatie van de verschillende dialogen, een fictieve chronologie opstellen: zo zal niemand betwisten dat de Parmenides later is geschreven dan de Phaidon (re\u00eble chronologie), maar in de fictieve chronologie komt de Parmenides veel eerder, omdat hierin de jonge Socrates optreedt, terwijl in de Phaidon Socrates voor de dood staat. In de interpretatie heeft men te weinig rekening gehouden met de plaats van een dialoog in deze fictieve chronologie.\r\n[introduction p. 319-320] \u00dcbersetzung: Philosophie ist uns vor allem in der Form von Texten zug\u00e4nglich. Wer Philosophie studieren will, muss zwangsl\u00e4ufig Texte studieren und wird die Ergebnisse seiner eigenen Forschung wiederum in Form von Texten pr\u00e4sentieren. Die Philosophie hat jedoch seit jeher auch die M\u00f6glichkeit ber\u00fccksichtigt, dass Erkenntnisse gewonnen werden k\u00f6nnen, die nicht diskursiv ausgedr\u00fcckt werden k\u00f6nnen, die also nicht \u201etextf\u00e4hig\u201c sind. Dennoch hat diese prinzipielle M\u00f6glichkeit die Philosophie kaum beeinflusst. Letztendlich kann man auch \u00fcber diese nicht-textlichen Erkenntnisse reflektieren und schreiben, sodass es scheint, als k\u00f6nne man niemals aus dem Bann des Textes entkommen. Niemand wird daran denken, den Vorteil aufzugeben, den die Philosophie dadurch hat, sich an Texte zu binden und ihre Erkenntnisse so zu objektivieren. Doch es ist bedenklich, dass man die Bindung philosophischer Erkenntnis an den Text als selbstverst\u00e4ndlich betrachtet. Dadurch wird auch unklar, was die \u201eSache\u201c ist, auf die sich der philosophische Text bezieht. Gibt es \u00fcberhaupt eine \u201eSache au\u00dferhalb des Textes\u201c?\r\n\r\nEs ist bekannt, dass Platon dem Ph\u00e4nomen \u201eText\u201c bewusst distanziert gegen\u00fcberstand. Man kann ihm sicher nicht vorwerfen, ein naives Vertrauen in den Text als Medium philosophischer Erkenntnis gehabt zu haben: Worauf es in der Philosophie eigentlich ankommt, l\u00e4sst sich nicht in Texten ausdr\u00fccken. Auch wenn er selbst mehr als jeder andere ein K\u00fcnstler des Textes war, war er sich stets der Grenzen des Textes bewusst. Wer aus Platons Dialogen eine Doktrin konstruiert, ein System von Aussagen \u00fcber \u201edas, was der Fall ist\u201c, verliert diese kritische Distanz zum Text und reduziert die vielen \u201eFormen des Wissens\u201c auf ein objektives \u201epropositionales\u201c Wissen.\r\n\r\nDies ist die Perspektive, aus der Wolfgang Wieland, vor allem bekannt f\u00fcr seine originelle Studie \u00fcber Aristoteles\u2019 Physik, sein Platon-Buch Platon und die Formen des Wissens geschrieben hat. Das Buch besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil widmet sich Platons Verh\u00e4ltnis zum geschriebenen Text. Ausgehend von der bekannten Passage im Phaidros untersucht Wieland, warum Platon dem Schreiben so kritisch gegen\u00fcberstand. Platon wendet sich gegen jede Versuchung, Wissen zu objektivieren, als k\u00f6nne man in einem Text \u00fcber Erkenntnisse verf\u00fcgen wie \u00fcber einen Besitz. Jede Formulierung in Sprache bleibt ein Werkzeug, etwas Vorl\u00e4ufiges. Das \u201eGebrauchswissen\u201c, das im Umgang mit den Dingen entsteht, hat Vorrang vor dem Wissen, das in Propositionen ausgedr\u00fcckt ist. Hier begegnen wir dem zentralen Thema von Wielands Buch. Es bleibt jedoch die Frage, ob dies bei Platon tats\u00e4chlich zentral ist. Bei Platon geht es zun\u00e4chst um Kritik am Schreiben und nicht um Kritik am propositionalen Wissen als solches.\r\n\r\nAus der Schriftkritik l\u00e4sst sich auch die Dialogform als Medium des philosophischen Denkens verstehen. Wenn man trotz aller Vorbehalte nicht auf den Text verzichten kann, bietet die Dialogform einen Ausweg. Ein Mangel des Textes liegt n\u00e4mlich im Fehlen eines realen Kontexts des Wortes. Der Dialog stellt diesen Kontext auf dramatisch-fiktive Weise her. Der Dialog ist kein didaktisches Hilfsmittel, keine Verpackung einer Lehre. Die Aussagen fungieren in der Dialoghandlung weiterhin als \u201eWerkzeuge\u201c. Aus der Schriftkritik l\u00e4sst sich auch der Status des Mythos im Text verstehen, ebenso wie der metaphorische Charakter vieler Passagen und die Verwendung von Ironie. Schlie\u00dflich weist Wieland in \u00a7 5 auf die Bedeutung der fiktiven Chronologie f\u00fcr die Beurteilung eines Dialogs hin. Ausgehend von der dramatischen Situation der verschiedenen Dialoge l\u00e4sst sich eine fiktive Chronologie erstellen: Niemand wird bestreiten, dass der Parmenides sp\u00e4ter geschrieben wurde als der Phaidon (reale Chronologie), aber in der fiktiven Chronologie kommt der Parmenides viel fr\u00fcher, da dort der junge Sokrates auftritt, w\u00e4hrend im Phaidon Sokrates vor seinem Tod steht. In der Interpretation hat man die Stellung eines Dialogs in dieser fiktiven Chronologie bisher zu wenig ber\u00fccksichtigt.","btype":3,"date":"1984","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/H1e3T5fZsfMIh5O","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":845,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"46","issue":"2","pages":"319-330"}},"sort":[1984]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"713","_score":null,"_source":{"id":713,"authors_free":[{"id":1063,"entry_id":713,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition du temps dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme tardif","main_title":{"title":"Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecs \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition du temps dans le n\u00e9oplatonisme tardif"},"abstract":"Ainsi, le concept de paralasis est profond\u00e9ment solidaire d\u2019un th\u00e8me qui est au c\u0153ur de la pens\u00e9e de Damascius : la distinction entre ce qui est en train de se diff\u00e9rencier et ce dont la diff\u00e9renciation est achev\u00e9e. C\u2019est aussi la distinction entre la procession et la conversion, entre la puissance et l\u2019activit\u00e9, entre la vie et l\u2019intellect, entre le second diacosme (intelligible et intellectif) et le troisi\u00e8me (intellectif) : dans tous ces couples, le premier terme se distingue du second comme, dans Physique VI, \u00ab l\u2019action de se mouvoir se distingue du mouvement accompli \u00bb (95).\r\n\r\nAristote est la source avou\u00e9e de Damascius, qui lui consacrait des cours (on sait par exemple que le premier livre du Commentaire de Simplicius au De Caelo a vraisemblablement \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9dig\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de notes prises au cours de Damascius) (96) : il \u00ab pense le temps \u00e0 la fois \u00e0 partir du Parm\u00e9nide de Platon et \u00e0 partir des livres IV et VI de la Physique d\u2019Aristote. C\u2019est \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re d\u2019Aristote qu\u2019il interpr\u00e8te Platon. C\u2019est \u00e0 Aristote lui-m\u00eame qu\u2019il emprunte les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de sa r\u00e9solution des apories pos\u00e9es en Physique IV. Et la cl\u00e9 de sa doctrine du temps est \u00e0 chercher en Physique VI \u00bb (97).\r\n\r\nIl faut ajouter imm\u00e9diatement que c\u2019est \u00e0 partir de la pens\u00e9e sto\u00efcienne du temps que Damascius lit Physique VI et \u00e9labore sa th\u00e9orie du \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb. Le \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb, qui demeure \u00ab tout entier \u00e0 la fois dans la subsistance \u00bb, est pens\u00e9 selon l\u2019\u00eatre-ensemble de ses parties. Analogue au maintenant diast\u00e8matique, qui est partie et non limite du temps, il a pour image le pr\u00e9sent de la danse, en qui pass\u00e9 et futur sont contenus et r\u00e9sorb\u00e9s : bien qu\u2019elle se d\u00e9route dans une succession, la danse est pr\u00e9sentement en train d\u2019\u00eatre dans\u00e9e (98), et c\u2019est sur le m\u00eame mode que le combat est lui aussi pr\u00e9sent.\r\n\r\nLa subsistance d\u2019un tel pr\u00e9sent se fonde sur l\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u2019une action en devenir, qui s\u2019exprime par un verbe au pr\u00e9sent extensif. L\u2019influence du sto\u00efcisme sur Damascius semble d\u00e9terminante : on reconna\u00eet sans peine dans ses analyses le pr\u00e9sent \u00e9tendu qui est le pr\u00e9sent sensible de l\u2019exp\u00e9rience pratique, celui en qui vient se loger une action comme \u00ab je marche \u00bb (action port\u00e9e \u00e0 \u00e9locution par un pr\u00e9sent extensif) ; et son \u00ab temps int\u00e9gral \u00bb n\u2019est pas sans analogie avec le mode de pr\u00e9sence de la p\u00e9riode cosmique sto\u00efcienne (99).\r\n\r\n\u00c0 cette influence philosophique du sto\u00efcisme, il faut ajouter son influence grammaticale. Damascius fut pendant neuf ans professeur de rh\u00e9torique. C\u2019est sans aucun doute \u00e0 cette longue pratique des textes et des mots qu\u2019il faut rapporter l\u2019attention extr\u00eame qu\u2019il pr\u00eate au langage, ainsi que la th\u00e9matisation des probl\u00e8mes du langage au sein m\u00eame de sa pens\u00e9e philosophique (100). C\u2019est \u00e0 une grammaire d\u2019inspiration sto\u00efcienne qu\u2019il faut rapporter sa m\u00e9thode d\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se, ou plut\u00f4t le contenu de son ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de Physique IV (221 a 6-9) : l\u2019infinitif \u00eatre, compris comme activit\u00e9 d\u2019\u00eatre, est envisag\u00e9 dans l\u2019extension aspectuelle, et Damascius le consid\u00e8re comme l\u2019\u00e9quivalent de paratasis tou einai. Cette explication de texte scrupuleuse, qui est bien dans la mani\u00e8re de Damascius, permet \u00e0 celui-ci de proposer sa d\u00e9finition du temps, tout en soulignant sa fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 par rapport \u00e0 la double autorit\u00e9 d\u2019Archytas et d\u2019Aristote. [conclusion p. 23-25]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/LNb8H8UiMDNsVyS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":713,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue des \u00c9tudes Grecques","volume":"96","issue":"455\/459","pages":"1-26"}},"sort":[1983]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"770","_score":null,"_source":{"id":770,"authors_free":[{"id":1134,"entry_id":770,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: \u00dcber die Zeit","main_title":{"title":"Review of Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: \u00dcber die Zeit"},"abstract":"Like a well-trained Neoplatonist commentator, Sonderegger outlines the skopos of his book on the first page. It is to consider Simplicius' thought about time and make it available to a wider audience (an audience that would, however, need to know Greek). His basis is the 28-page excursus at the end of Simplicius' commentary on Physics 4, known as the Corollarium de Tempore (hereafter, with S., CdT), to which, in the main body of the book, he attends with the minimum of excursions. This is partly dictated by his announced interest in Simplicius himself rather than his relation to other thinkers: as he rightly says, that cannot be treated until it is clear what Simplicius himself thought. In the present state of work on late Neoplatonism, this is not a trivial point.\r\n\r\nSonderegger's aims have produced a very different book from the little-noticed work of H. Meyer, Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles \u00fcber die Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969). Meyer's book is more philosophical and also differs in that his purpose was primarily to understand Aristotle, with no notion of being exoteric. Of this book, Sonderegger takes virtually no account, on the grounds that its presuppositions are very different from his own. What Sonderegger has given us is a very detailed and careful descriptive analysis of CdT, with special attention to the organization of the discussions (pp. 38\u2013139), preceded by an introduction on Simplicius' Physics commentary, his excursuses, and Neoplatonism in general, and followed by some 30 pages of translation and 20 of appendices. These include a table of the uses and contexts of key terms in CdT, examinations of the extent and authenticity of quotations from Ps.-Archytas, Iamblichus, and Damascius, and a translation of Simplicius In Categorias 356.8\u201325, which contains in nuce much of the thought of CdT.\r\n\r\nSonderegger is clearly aware that Simplicius wrote commentaries to expound his own philosophy, yet he tends to exaggerate the difference in thought rather than merely presentation, which might be expected in CdT and the analogous digressions on chance and place, as opposed to those parts of the commentary that start from specific lemmata. Even if CdT is more connected, it still proceeds largely by discussing quoted texts, and, as Sonderegger reminds us, Simplicius' aim is always to arrive at his own view of time. That, he claims, will help us to understand Aristotle (773.12\u201314): one recalls uneasily the project of expounding the De anima while following Iamblichus (In De an. 1.18\u201320). Sonderegger perhaps underestimates the extent to which Simplicius saw himself as engaged in the same enterprise as Aristotle\u2014and Plato.\r\n\r\nThough he can cite texts for Simplicius' awareness of the difference between what he and Aristotle say, it does not always follow that Simplicius saw the difference between what he and Aristotle think. The texts Sonderegger quotes at p. 25 n.50 rather point out that Aristotle's intentions are the same, even if his language is not. Thus, 356.31 ff. clearly shows that Simplicius thinks the views on time (chronos) of Aristotle and hoi Neoteroi (the Neoplatonists) are not different. Conversely, in his sketch of the Neoplatonist background, which, as he says, constantly appears in Simplicius' commentary, Sonderegger is inclined to underplay divergences. It is only in the broadest sense true that the outlines of Simplicius' Neoplatonism were determined by Plotinus. The qualification that he liked to attach himself to Iamblichus and used terminology that can be traced back to Proclus is more important.\r\n\r\nThe extent of Proclus' influence is thoroughly documented by I. Hadot, Le Probl\u00e8me du N\u00e9oplatonisme Alexandrin: Hi\u00e9rocl\u00e8s et Simplicius (Paris, 1978), cited on p. 26 n. 51. I cannot understand the arguments here (29\u201335) that, for Simplicius, the hypostases are somehow unreal. This is conducted in terms drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, which, to an English-speaking reader, are not immediately illuminating. Incidentally, diakrisis is not an entity. To treat it as if it were is a kind of hyper-Neoplatonic realism: the meaning of \"differentiation\" is normally adequate.\r\n\r\nOn time itself, there is a major difference between Plotinus and his post-Iamblichean successors on a point which concerns Sonderegger throughout: the invention of a further type of time that almost becomes a separate hypostasis. This is the psychic time that Simplicius calls protos chronos, as opposed to ordinary physical time on the one hand and aion on the other. The exposition and defense of this first time is the main aim of CdT. It is even more clearly a product of late Neoplatonic triadic thinking than Sonderegger's discussion (69\u201374) shows.\r\n\r\nIf there is a triad of things permanent and ungenerated, permanent and generated, impermanent and generated, a mediating time is required for the second member of the triad. That this is Simplicius' thinking is shown by the way he has opposed aion as adiakritos and physical time as ho en ti thesei the\u00f4rmenos (784.34 ff.), a relation justifying, if not requiring, a higher time. The most notable recasting of Aristotle in Neoplatonist terms is the transformation of his definition into metron tou kata to einai rhontos (not quite \"Mass des Seins des Physischen\"), which, for all his concern to show that Simplicius distinguishes between Aristotle's views and his own, Sonderegger seems inclined to accept (cf. esp. 43 f. and 138).\r\n\r\nThe translation aims at utility rather than elegance. Its value is greater at a time when interest in the thought of late antiquity is spreading among the wholly or nearly Greekless. Translations are increasingly called for. But who would translate the 1,366 pages of Simplicius' Physics commentary, or, indeed, publish the translation? [the entire review]","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ZCYOjLO9LGrxQNt","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":770,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review, New Series","volume":"33","issue":"2","pages":"337-338"}},"sort":[1983]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1563","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1563,"authors_free":[{"id":2730,"entry_id":1563,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Conti, A. D. ","free_first_name":"A. D. ","free_last_name":"Conti","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"La teoria della relazione nei commenti neoplatonici alle Categorie di Aristotele","main_title":{"title":"La teoria della relazione nei commenti neoplatonici alle Categorie di Aristotele"},"abstract":"","btype":3,"date":"1983","language":"Italian","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/OTIdcLG5JO15mv8","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1563,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosof\u00eda ","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"159-283"}},"sort":[1983]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1101","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1101,"authors_free":[{"id":1664,"entry_id":1101,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":144,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"O'Brien, Denis","free_first_name":"Denis","free_last_name":"O'Brien","norm_person":{"id":144,"first_name":"Denis","last_name":"O'Brien","full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/134134079","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"La taille et la forme des atomes dans les syst\u00e8mes de D\u00e9mocrite et d'\u00c9picure (\u00abPr\u00e9jug\u00e9\u00bb et \u00abpr\u00e9suppos\u00e9\u00bb en histoire de la philosophie)","main_title":{"title":"La taille et la forme des atomes dans les syst\u00e8mes de D\u00e9mocrite et d'\u00c9picure (\u00abPr\u00e9jug\u00e9\u00bb et \u00abpr\u00e9suppos\u00e9\u00bb en histoire de la philosophie)"},"abstract":"Qu'on n'aille pas en conclure que nous suivons aveugl\u00e9ment tout propos du Stagirite. Une observation permettra d'att\u00e9nuer la valeur de son t\u00e9moignage et de nuancer la conclusion \u00e0 laquelle nous sommes arriv\u00e9s jusqu'ici.\r\n\r\nSelon l'hypoth\u00e8se \u00e9labor\u00e9e ci-dessus, D\u00e9mocrite et \u00c9picure ne se seraient pas oppos\u00e9s sur la question de la grandeur des atomes. Pour l'un et l'autre philosophe, la gamme des grandeurs aura \u00e9t\u00e9 en effet finie. Mais scrutons de plus pr\u00e8s les deux th\u00e8ses concernant la forme des atomes. \u00c9picure pr\u00e9cise que les vari\u00e9t\u00e9s de forme sont, non pas \u00ab infinies \u00bb, mais \u00ab insaisissables \u00bb (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9). Quant \u00e0 D\u00e9mocrite et \u00e0 Leucippe, Aristote affirme deux fois que les vari\u00e9t\u00e9s de forme sont \u00ab infinies \u00bb, d'une part en parlant de la multiplicit\u00e9 \u00ab infinie \u00bb des atomes, d'autre part en opposant la th\u00e9orie de Leucippe \u00e0 celle de Platon.\r\n\r\nEn revanche, lorsqu'il pr\u00e9sente le syst\u00e8me atomiste dans le fragment Sur D\u00e9mocrite, les diff\u00e9rences de forme sont dites, non plus \u00ab infinies \u00bb, mais \u00ab innombrables \u00bb (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03b8\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2).\r\n\r\n\u00c0 en juger d'apr\u00e8s l'Index de Bonitz, ce dernier terme est un hapax dans l'\u0153uvre d'Aristote. S'ensuit-il qu'il soit, sinon un vocable d'emprunt, du moins un terme transpos\u00e9, plus proche de l'expression originale de D\u00e9mocrite ?\r\n\r\nMais qu'est-ce qui s\u00e9pare alors la doctrine des Abd\u00e9ritains et celle d'\u00c9picure ? O\u00f9 passe la distinction entre diff\u00e9rences \u00ab innombrables \u00bb (D\u00e9mocrite) et diff\u00e9rences \u00ab insaisissables \u00bb (\u00c9picure) ?\r\n\r\nUn dernier paradoxe semble poindre : on peut en effet se demander si, en refusant l'hypoth\u00e8se d'une vari\u00e9t\u00e9 infinie de formes, \u00c9picure ne s'opposait pas \u00e0 la formulation qu'en avait donn\u00e9e Aristote, bien plus qu'il ne songeait \u00e0 rectifier la th\u00e9orie de D\u00e9mocrite.\r\n\r\nMais nous effleurons ici un probl\u00e8me nouveau, celui de l'\u00e9laboration progressive des notions d'infini et de fini ; impossible de l'approfondir sans balayer les \u00ab pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s \u00bb et les \u00ab pr\u00e9suppos\u00e9s \u00bb qui, sur ce point aussi, nous s\u00e9parent des notions primitives par une proximit\u00e9 illusoire.\r\n\r\nProbl\u00e8me trop vaste pour qu'on puisse l'aborder dans cet article. [conclusion 201-203]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AhK7pfqowUhUex4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":144,"full_name":"O'Brien, Denis","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1101,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'\u00c9tranger","volume":"172","issue":"2","pages":"187-203"}},"sort":[1982]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"730","_score":null,"_source":{"id":730,"authors_free":[{"id":1093,"entry_id":730,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":460,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Makin, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Makin","norm_person":{"id":460,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Makin","full_name":"Makin, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zeno on Plurality","main_title":{"title":"Zeno on Plurality"},"abstract":" We want to \r\ndiscuss some Eleatic arguments against plurality, which are of interest \r\nboth in themselves and as precursors of Atomist thought. The arguments to \r\nbe considered are from Zeno. \r\nWe will have two guides in interpreting the arguments. First, they should \r\nbe such that Atomist theory provides a plausible response to them; second, \r\nthey should pose no threat to the Eleatic theory. [introduction p. 223]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/wOq1opqPtXhX1E6","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":460,"full_name":"Makin, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":730,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"27","issue":"3","pages":"223-238"}},"sort":[1982]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1359","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1359,"authors_free":[{"id":2035,"entry_id":1359,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":203,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Janko, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Janko","norm_person":{"id":203,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Janko","full_name":"Janko, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1013357299","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A Fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, concerning Synonymy","main_title":{"title":"A Fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, concerning Synonymy"},"abstract":"An important fragment of the lost portion of Aristotle's Poetics is the definition of synonyms preserved by Simplicius,' which corresponds to Aristotle's own citation of the Poetics for synonyms in the Rhetoric, 3. 2. 1404b 37 ff. I shall argue elsewhere that this derives from a discussion of the sources of verbal humour in the lost account of \r\ncomedy and humour. Here it is my aim to show that Simplicius definitely derived the quotation from Porphyry, which pushes back the attestation of this part of the Poetics by more than two centuries (although the citation in the Antiatticist, Poet. fr. 4 Kassel, is older still). Furthermore, I shall show that some of the words in the \r\ndefinition are a gloss added by Porphyry for the purposes of his own polemic. [introduction, p. 323]","btype":3,"date":"1982","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/FEkzGy6BAHpTaIG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":203,"full_name":"Janko, Richard","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1359,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Quarterly","volume":"32","issue":"2","pages":"323-326"}},"sort":[1982]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"745","_score":null,"_source":{"id":745,"authors_free":[{"id":1108,"entry_id":745,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":101,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","free_first_name":"Jean","free_last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","norm_person":{"id":101,"first_name":"Jean","last_name":"Fr\u00e8re","full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130051187","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Les pr\u00e9socratiques et la question de l'infini","main_title":{"title":"Les pr\u00e9socratiques et la question de l'infini"},"abstract":"Bien avant la philosophie de Platon et celle d'Aristote, la pens\u00e9e grecque a rencontr\u00e9 la question du rapport entre l'infini (apeiros) et la perfection. Mais, pour aborder ce que les Grecs veulent nommer par le \u00ab non-limit\u00e9 \u00bb, il convient de partir du d\u00e9bat que les linguistes ont engag\u00e9 autour du terme. Plusieurs interpr\u00e9tations s\u00e9mantiques sont envisag\u00e9es dans le rapport entre apeiros et peirar\/peras. Dans une premi\u00e8re solution, le pr\u00e9fixe n\u00e9gatif a- se combine avec peras ; dans une seconde, le a- privatif porte sur la racine per (per\u00f4, peir\u00f4, perain\u00f4), qui signifie passage et travers\u00e9e. En ce qui concerne peras, les linguistes sont de nouveau partag\u00e9s entre \u00ab limite, bout, extr\u00e9mit\u00e9 \u00bb ou \u00ab lien \u00bb.\r\n\r\nPour ce qui est de la langue grecque, non encore conceptualis\u00e9e par la d\u00e9marche philosophique, ce que \u00ab illimit\u00e9 \u00bb peut v\u00e9hiculer de non clair pour la raison ou de non rassurant pour le sentiment ne comporte pourtant aucune dimension de cette angoisse et de ce vertige que retiendra Pascal. Lorsque Hom\u00e8re ou H\u00e9siode parlent de la \u00ab terre sans limite \u00bb, lorsque Pindare chante la \u00ab renomm\u00e9e infinie \u00bb du h\u00e9ros, l\u2019adjectif apeir\u00f4n se relie g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9loge de qualit\u00e9s concernant choses ou hommes. Il y a aussi l\u2019id\u00e9e de profondeur sans fin (le sommeil, hypnos, Odyss\u00e9e VII, 286) ou d\u2019ampleur (une foule d\u2019hommes, Iliade XXIV, 776). C\u2019est moins son aspect infini que son pouvoir d\u2019engloutir qui fait caract\u00e9riser comme terrible la mer infinie. De m\u00eame, l\u2019adjectif apeir\u00f4n, infini, renvoie \u00e0 l\u2019immensit\u00e9 comme profusion et comme richesse, qu\u2019il s\u2019agisse du lieu, du temps ou du nombre.\r\n\r\nAvec les pr\u00e9socratiques, apeiros\/to apeiron s\u2019installent dans la pens\u00e9e philosophique. \u00c0 travers des textes fragmentaires, il est difficile de savoir avec certitude la conception de l\u2019infini (apeiron) que les pr\u00e9socratiques, de Thal\u00e8s \u00e0 Anaxagore et aux sophistes, avaient pu \u00e9laborer. N\u00e9anmoins, le probl\u00e8me de apeiron n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 sans importance pour eux. Que l\u2019un d\u2019eux, Anaximandre, ait fait de l\u2019apeiron l\u2019arch\u00ea de l\u2019univers en est la marque. Et M\u00e9lissos caract\u00e9rise le principe (arch\u00ea) comme infini (apeiron). L\u2019apeiron n\u2019est donc point pour les pr\u00e9socratiques uniquement li\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019imperfection que sera l\u2019apeiron du Philebe.\r\n\r\nIl y a dans la pens\u00e9e grecque des premiers temps comme un pressentiment de la richesse de l\u2019infini, aussi bien qu\u2019il d\u00e9signe une absence de limite o\u00f9 la raison se perd. L\u2019apeiron renvoie surtout \u00e0 la spatialit\u00e9, se lie \u00e0 la grandeur (megethos), comme l\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 (to aidion) se lie au temps. Dans les philosophies o\u00f9 la nature (physis) est aux confins du divin et du mat\u00e9riel, le principe, le tout, les mondes sont caract\u00e9ris\u00e9s d\u2019abord par l\u2019infini de grandeur, l\u2019illimit\u00e9. Mais l\u2019infini est aussi envisag\u00e9 comme ind\u00e9fini qualitatif.\r\n\r\nToutefois, face \u00e0 l\u2019infini qui est d\u00e9termin\u00e9 par sa richesse, certains pr\u00e9socratiques ont envisag\u00e9 aussi l\u2019infini qui est pure ind\u00e9termination, degr\u00e9 incomplet de l\u2019\u00catre et forme du moindre \u00catre. On trouve ici l\u2019esquisse des conceptions philosophiques qui vont se pr\u00e9ciser dans les th\u00e9ories plus \u00e9labor\u00e9es de Platon et d\u2019Aristote. [introduction p. 19-20]","btype":3,"date":"1981","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/TpFRmhxNzvv4XUL","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":101,"full_name":"Fr\u00e8re, Jean","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":745,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"1","issue":"","pages":"19-33"}},"sort":[1981]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"686","_score":null,"_source":{"id":686,"authors_free":[{"id":1019,"entry_id":686,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":138,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe","free_first_name":"Philippe","free_last_name":"Hoffmann","norm_person":{"id":138,"first_name":"Philippe ","last_name":"Hoffmann","full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/189361905","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Jamblique ex\u00e9g\u00e8te du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalit\u00e9s d\u2019une doctrine du temps","main_title":{"title":"Jamblique ex\u00e9g\u00e8te du pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalit\u00e9s d\u2019une doctrine du temps"},"abstract":"Le d\u00e9veloppement de la philosophie grecque tardive est ins\u00e9parable de l'ex\u00e9g\u00e8se de textes canoniques, parmi lesquels les trait\u00e9s d'Aristote et les dialogues de Platon occupent une place tout \u00e0 fait particuli\u00e8re. Dans le cadre d'une pratique essentiellement scolaire, la t\u00e2che du commentateur est d'expliciter une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 suppos\u00e9e donn\u00e9e \u00e0 l'origine, pr\u00e9sente dans le texte qui est lu. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait remarquer la f\u00e9condit\u00e9 philosophique des faux sens, contresens ou d\u00e9viations qui ne manquent pas de se produire \u00e0 l'occasion de ces ex\u00e9g\u00e8ses : c'est par ce travail de l'erreur qu'appara\u00eet souvent une nouveaut\u00e9 doctrinale, et tout se passe comme si la philosophie aimait \u00e0 se nourrir d'analyses philologiquement erron\u00e9es ou insoutenables.\r\n\r\nNous voudrions pr\u00e9senter ici un exemple typique de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne : comment une ex\u00e9g\u00e8se n\u00e9oplatonicienne d'un \"faux\" pythagoricien a permis l'apparition d'une pens\u00e9e nouvelle du temps.\r\n\r\nLorsqu'il explique la doctrine aristot\u00e9licienne du temps dans ses commentaires aux Cat\u00e9gories et \u00e0 la Physique, Simplicius suit les traces de Jamblique, aux yeux de qui la source d'Aristote est le pythagoricien Archytas de Tarente. [introduction p. 307]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/67kpJTeAGPd2zao","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":138,"full_name":"Hoffmann, Philippe ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":686,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3","issue":"","pages":"307-323"}},"sort":[1980]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"842","_score":null,"_source":{"id":842,"authors_free":[{"id":1246,"entry_id":842,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":340,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Todd, Robert B.","free_first_name":"Robert B.","free_last_name":"Todd","norm_person":{"id":340,"first_name":"Robert B.","last_name":"Todd","full_name":"Todd, Robert B.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/129460788","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Some Concepts in Physical Theory in John Philoponus' Aristotelian Commentaries","main_title":{"title":"Some Concepts in Physical Theory in John Philoponus' Aristotelian Commentaries"},"abstract":"I have tried, then, to establish the significance of some ideas in Philoponus' commentaries that, in different ways, reveal this commentator's individuality. Individuality is not, of course, the same as originality, and indeed both my examples have shown how dependent Philoponus was on the many philosophical sources that converge in his commentaries. But this very complexity, at times reaching an eclectic inconsistency, is what makes the Aristotelian exegetical tradition in antiquity worth continued study.\r\n\r\nAt their best, these commentaries involve the interaction between, on the one hand, an inventive commentator with prejudices of his own and, on the other hand, a mass of inherited material. The result may not always illuminate Aristotle, but it will invariably shed light on the continuity of the Greek philosophical tradition in late antiquity. [conclusion p. 170]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6cdjUb25vOM63SC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":340,"full_name":"Todd, Robert B.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":842,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte","volume":"24","issue":"2","pages":"151-170"}},"sort":[1980]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"544","_score":null,"_source":{"id":544,"authors_free":[{"id":768,"entry_id":544,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":123,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","free_first_name":"Marie-Claire","free_last_name":"Galperine","norm_person":{"id":123,"first_name":"Marie-Claire","last_name":"Galperine","full_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Le temps int\u00e9gral selon Damascius","main_title":{"title":"Le temps int\u00e9gral selon Damascius"},"abstract":"This text explores Aristotle's unresolved aporias on the nature of time in Physics IV (217b30 - 218a30), highlighting a metaphysical dilemma: whether time belongs to being or non-being. Aristotle leaves the question undecided, shifting focus to the nature of time, a problem he may have deliberately avoided. Ancient thinkers, however, did not shy away from addressing these aporias.\r\n\r\nDamascius offers a resolution to Aristotle\u2019s dilemmas in his commentary on Plato\u2019s Parmenides and his lost treatise on number, place, and time, fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius. Damascius\u2019 concept of \"integral time\" distinguishes between two meanings of \"now\": Aristotle\u2019s punctual \"now,\" a limit of time, and Damascius\u2019 \"present,\" a temporal continuum. Simplicius, though critical of Damascius\u2019 ideas, acknowledges this distinction as key to resolving Aristotle\u2019s aporias.\r\n\r\nSimplicius' Corollarium de tempore expands on this, presenting time as simultaneously existent in its entirety (\"integral time\"), a concept rooted in Damascius\u2019 philosophy. However, Simplicius\u2019 partial understanding of Damascius\u2019 thought highlights his struggle to reconcile Damascius\u2019 notion of time with Aristotelian paradigms.\r\n\r\nThe analysis situates Damascius\u2019 ideas within the framework of both Plato\u2019s Parmenides and Aristotle\u2019s Physics, showcasing how he integrates Platonic metaphysics with Aristotelian logic to address foundational questions about the nature and being of time. [introduction p. 325-327]","btype":3,"date":"1980","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/K2X5R1lQigoI37E","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":123,"full_name":"Galperine, Marie-Claire","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":544,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes philosophiques","volume":"3: Doctrines du temps","issue":"","pages":"325-341"}},"sort":[1980]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1078","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1078,"authors_free":[{"id":1634,"entry_id":1078,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":11,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bormann, Karl ","free_first_name":"Karl","free_last_name":"Bormann","norm_person":{"id":11,"first_name":"Karl ","last_name":"Bormann","full_name":"Bormann, Karl ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/119138816","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius"},"abstract":"The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were\u2014as is well known\u2014interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem.Regarding the one being, there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the esse copulae or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being (\"Sein des Seienden\"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical demography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the First part, the aletheia. We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately; in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part. [Introduction, p. 30]","btype":3,"date":"1979","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/KVjmlyMlPhuG3iK","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":11,"full_name":"Bormann, Karl ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1078,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Monist","volume":"62","issue":"1","pages":"30\u201342"}},"sort":[1979]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"843","_score":null,"_source":{"id":843,"authors_free":[{"id":1247,"entry_id":843,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":330,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo","free_first_name":"Leonardo","free_last_name":"Tar\u00e1n","norm_person":{"id":330,"first_name":"Tar\u00e1n","last_name":" Leonardo ","full_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1168065100","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy","main_title":{"title":"Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy"},"abstract":"Modern scholarship since the middle of the last century has generally accepted it as an established fact that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of words or names (onomata) in relation to the concepts they express and that he gave definitions of homonyma and synonyma only in reference to words and their meanings. That is to say, for him, homonyma and synonyma are properties of linguistic terms and not of things, whereas for Aristotle, especially in the first chapter of the Categories, they are properties of things.\r\n\r\nIn 1904, E. Hambruch attempted to show that sometimes Aristotle himself uses synonyma in the Speusippean sense just outlined and that in so doing, he was influenced by Speusippus. This thesis of Hambruch has been accepted by several scholars, including Lang, Stenzel, and Cherniss. Although some doubts about its soundness were expressed from different perspectives, it was only in 1971 that Mr. Jonathan Barnes made a systematic assault on it. Barnes contends, first, that Speusippus\u2019s conception of homonyma and synonyma is essentially the same as that of Aristotle, with the slight differences between their respective definitions being trivial, and second, that even though Aristotle occasionally uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of linguistic terms, this is because Aristotle's use of these words is not as rigid as the Categories might suggest. Barnes argues that Aristotle could not have been influenced by Speusippus, because Speusippus conceived homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, and, in any case, if influence were assumed, it could as well have been Aristotle influencing Speusippus.\r\n\r\nThough I believe Barnes\u2019 two main contentions are mistaken, I am here mainly concerned with the first part of his thesis. If he were right in believing that, for Speusippus, homonyma and synonyma are properties of things and not of names or linguistic terms, then Hambruch\u2019s notion that Speusippus influenced Aristotle when the latter uses synonymon as a property of names would be wrong, even if Barnes were mistaken in his analysis of the Aristotelian passages he reviews in the second part of his paper.\r\n\r\nOn the other hand, if Speusippus's classification is truly of onomata, then, since Barnes himself admits that Aristotle sometimes uses homonyma and synonyma as properties of names, the influence of Speusippus on Aristotle is at least possible. It becomes plausible and probable\u2014regardless of the relative chronology of their respective works\u2014when it is seen, as I shall try to show, that in some cases, Aristotle is in fact attacking doctrines that presuppose a use of homonyma and synonyma such as can be ascribed to Speusippus or is using synonymon in the Speusippean sense, different from Aristotle's own notion of synonymous words. [introduction p. 73-75]","btype":3,"date":"1978","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DXL3umbA2JfHxYC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":330,"full_name":"Tar\u00e1n, Leonardo ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":843,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"106","issue":"1","pages":"73-99"}},"sort":[1978]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1261","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1261,"authors_free":[{"id":1847,"entry_id":1261,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":33,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Allen, Michael J. B.","free_first_name":"Michael J. B.","free_last_name":"Allen","norm_person":{"id":33,"first_name":"Michael J. B. ","last_name":"Allen","full_name":"Allen, Michael J. B. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/12310405X","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Ficino's Lecture on the Good?","main_title":{"title":"Ficino's Lecture on the Good?"},"abstract":"This article discusses Plato's Lecture on the Good, the only lecture attributed to Plato by ancient sources. The lecture was attended by Aristotle and other students of Plato and was described as a blend of formal exposition, digressions, and asides. Although it was not a public success, the Lecture became famous in the ancient world for what the Neoplatonists presumed was its Pythagorean content. The Lecture played a role in the history of fifteenth-century Florentine Platonism under its chief architect, Marsilio Ficino, who was interested in reviving Neoplatonism and wedding it to Christianity while also dreaming of revitalizing the day-to-day life of the ancient Athenian Academy. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/P2WTHK3pKgeUa4u","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":33,"full_name":"Allen, Michael J. B. ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1261,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Renaissance Quarterly ","volume":"30","issue":"2","pages":"160-171"}},"sort":[1977]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1015","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1015,"authors_free":[{"id":1531,"entry_id":1015,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K","main_title":{"title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K"},"abstract":"Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant).\r\nIt would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides\u2019 modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides\u2019 (and Melissus\u2019) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging \u1f44\u03bd deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the \"only solution\" (monoeid\u00eas lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics.\r\nIn the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1015,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"22","issue":"1","pages":"10-12"}},"sort":[1977]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"877","_score":null,"_source":{"id":877,"authors_free":[{"id":1288,"entry_id":877,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on \"Phantasia\"","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on \"Phantasia\""},"abstract":"The ancient commentaries on Aristotle have for the most part \r\nremained in that strange kind of no-man's land between Classical \r\nand Medieval studies that even now holds so many of the productions \r\nof later antiquity. On the whole it would be true to say that students \r\nof Neoplatonism?for the commentators were usually Neoplatonists \r\n?prefer to occupy themselves with openly Neoplatonic writings. \r\nModern Aristotelian scholars, on the other hand, tend to take very \r\nlittle account of the opinions of their ancient predecessors. In this \r\nway they differ from the Medie vals, both Christian and Moslem: as \r\nis well known, Aquinas instigated the translation of many of these \r\ncommentaries by his fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke, while a \r\ncentury before, Averroes, the greatest of the Arabic commentators, \r\nhad made ample use of at least the earlier Greek expositions. [Introduction, p. 242]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/xdGhkQhUkY7sWbE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":877,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Review of Metaphysics","volume":"31","issue":"2","pages":"242-257"}},"sort":[1977]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"612","_score":null,"_source":{"id":612,"authors_free":[{"id":867,"entry_id":612,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":108,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","free_first_name":"Henry J.","free_last_name":"Blumenthal","norm_person":{"id":108,"first_name":"Henry J.","last_name":"Blumenthal","full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1051543967","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Neoplatonic Elements in the \"de Anima\" Commentaries","main_title":{"title":"Neoplatonic Elements in the \"de Anima\" Commentaries"},"abstract":"Most scholars who refer to the Greek commentators for help in the understanding of difficult Aristotelian texts seem to expect straightforward scholarly treatment of their problems. Not infrequently they are disappointed and complain about the irrelevance of the commentary they read, or inveigh against the incompetence of the commentators. Only Alexander is generally exempt from such censure, and that in itself is significant. For he is the only major commentator whose work survives in any considerable quantity who wrote before Neoplatonism.\r\n\r\nShortly after Alexander, the kind of thought that is conveniently described by this label came to dominate Greek philosophy, and nearly all pagan philosophy and philosophical scholarship was pursued under its influence, if not by its active adherents. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that these facts are not trivial items of background interest but are fundamental to a proper assessment of the later commentators' opinions on points of Aristotelian scholarship. It is necessary to take account of the ideas and purpose of these commentators if one is to make any serious critical use of their work, and this cannot be done if one merely dips into their voluminous works in the hope of occasional enlightenment.\r\n\r\nThat these men were swayed by their own opinions and preconceptions is perhaps obvious once stated. Even Simplicius, notwithstanding his reputation for careful scholarship, is no exception. Simplicius may have done us a great service by preserving fragments of the pre-Socratics, but he was nevertheless a man who entertained ideas which were not likely to lead to the correct interpretation of Aristotle, as Hicks for one saw\u2014Ross, it seems, did not. In fact, one might go so far as to say that Simplicius was less well-fitted than some of the other commentators to give a good account of his subject.\r\n\r\nThose whose immediate reaction to such a statement is that it is grossly unfair to so fine a scholar might be disturbed by some of the material in the preface to Simplicius' De Anima commentary\u2014as they would by that in Philoponus' as well\u2014material which often escapes notice for the simple reason that one normally refers to these works for help with specific passages and does not read them as a whole.\r\n\r\nThis is not to say that there are no obvious signs of what is going on in the body of the commentaries, for there certainly are. A case in point is Simplicius' claim in the De Caelo commentary (640.27\u201332) that Aristotle's criticisms of Plato are directed not against Plato himself but against those who failed to grasp Plato's real meaning.\r\n\r\nIn the preface to the commentary on the Categories, Simplicius goes further and says that in dealing with Aristotle's attacks on Plato, one should not consider only the philosophers' language and complain about their discord, but rather one should concentrate on their thought and seek out their accord on most matters (In Cat. 7.29\u201332). Here we have two expressions of the normal Neoplatonic view that Plato and Aristotle were usually trying to say the same thing.\r\n\r\nThis view can, of course, be traced back to the revival of positive teaching in the New Academy. This is not to say that no Neoplatonist was aware of the differences, and certain Aristotelian doctrines remained unacceptable. In the passage we have just mentioned, Simplicius talks about he en tois pleistois symphonia, and elsewhere he shows that he is alive to differences (e.g., In De Caelo 454.23 ff.), even if he does regard Aristotle as Plato's truest pupil (ib. 378.20 f.) or his best interpreter (In De An. 245.12).\r\n\r\nPhiloponus, moreover, actually protested against the view that Aristotle's attacks on Plato's ideas were not directed at Plato himself, a view that seems to have had some currency (cf. De Aet. M. II.2 29.2\u20138 R). None the less, ever since Plotinus, whose adoption of much Aristotelian thought would be clear enough without Porphyry's explicit statement on the point (Vita Plot. 14.4 ff.), the new Platonism had been more or less Aristotelianized: the controversies about whether or not Aristotelian views could be accepted by Platonists which had been current in the Middle Platonic period were no longer live.\r\n\r\nBy the time Simplicius and Philoponus composed their commentaries, Aristotle's philosophy had been used as the standard introduction to Plato for at least two centuries. The tendency among certain modern scholars to see Aristotle simply as a Platonist has a precedent in the activities of the Neoplatonists: in both cases, it depends on a somewhat special understanding of Plato. [introduction 64-66]","btype":3,"date":"1976","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/3j2gfRYnCCVhtJC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":108,"full_name":"Blumenthal, Henry J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":612,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"21","issue":"1","pages":"64-87"}},"sort":[1976]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"854","_score":null,"_source":{"id":854,"authors_free":[{"id":1258,"entry_id":854,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":285,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Schofield, Malcom","free_first_name":"Malcom","free_last_name":"Schofield","norm_person":{"id":285,"first_name":"Malcolm","last_name":"Schofield","full_name":"Schofield, Malcolm","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132323737","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Doxographica Anaxagorea","main_title":{"title":"Doxographica Anaxagorea"},"abstract":"The information provided by these three texts that Anaxagoras made special application of his general theory of mixture to problems of growth and nutrition derives in each case from Theophrastus, whose word we have no reason to doubt, and who is in any case supported by Aristotle in De Generatione Animalium. The view, again presented in all three texts, that it was from reflection upon such problems, chiefly or in part, that Anaxagoras was led to formulate his general theory again derives from Theophrastus (and solely from him in Aetius's case) or from Aristotle glossed by Theophrastus (in the case of Simplicius and the scholium). For it is Aristotle who says that it was from seeing everything coming out of everything that Anaxagoras arrived at the theory of mixture, it is Aristotle who invariably illustrates Anaxagoras's \"all things\" by flesh and bone, and it is upon texts of Aristotle containing this explanation and these illustrations that both Simplicius's commentary and the scholium are based. Aristotle does not concentrate on biological processes exclusively, to be sure, but no doubt Theophrastus was acting in the spirit of Aristotle when he illustrates his own Aristotelian exposition of Anaxagoras's train of thought by reference to the problem of nutrition.\r\n\r\nHow much, then, are the texts to which Jaeger appealed for his account of Anaxagoras's \"methodical point of departure\" worth? Just and only as much as are Aristotle and Theophrastus. But whether they are right is, as I have said, another story. [conclusion p. 24]","btype":3,"date":"1975","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/dX7s9j2RuDMGCdU","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":285,"full_name":"Schofield, Malcolm","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":854,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Hermes","volume":"103","issue":"1","pages":"1-24"}},"sort":[1975]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1293","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1293,"authors_free":[{"id":1882,"entry_id":1293,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":69,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich","free_first_name":"Heinrich","free_last_name":"D\u00f6rrie","norm_person":{"id":69,"first_name":"Heinrich ","last_name":"D\u00f6rrie","full_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/118526375","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Zur Methodik antiker Exegese","main_title":{"title":"Zur Methodik antiker Exegese"},"abstract":"Der Artikel behandelt die Exegese antiker Texte und beginnt mit einem Fokus auf die Auslegung Homers. Die homerischen Epen wurden f\u00fcr mehr als 1000 Jahre als Quelle f\u00fcr Bildung und Literatur betrachtet und waren daher von gro\u00dfer Bedeutung f\u00fcr die antike Exegese. Obwohl sich die Sprache, die Werte und die mythologischen \u00dcberzeugungen von antiken Texten von der modernen Welt unterscheiden, blieben sie von Bedeutung. Die allegorische Auslegung Homers war ein Schl\u00fcsselthema, das sp\u00e4ter auch auf die christliche Exegese angewendet wurde. Die antike Exegese befasste sich nicht nur mit literarischen Werken, sondern auch mit Orakeln, Sprichw\u00f6rtern und Riten. Die Methode der antiken Exegese wurde in Alexandrien von den Philologen auf wenige, einfache Fakten reduziert, aber im Allgemeinen blieb sie kontinuierlich und best\u00e4tigte das Bildungserbe, auf das sie zur\u00fcckgriff. Die christliche Exegese wurde stark von der vorausgehenden antiken Exegese beeinflusst, insbesondere von der stoischen Exegese, die Werkzeuge zur Interpretation von Texten bereitstellte. Die Artikel er\u00f6rtert die Kontinuit\u00e4t der Exegese im Laufe der Jahrhunderte und betont, dass antike Exegese ein Bildungserbe darstellt, das \u00fcber Jahrhunderte hinweg bewahrt wurde. [introduction\/conclusion]","btype":3,"date":"1974","language":"German","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/pWm7MqqJ0rmmM7F","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":69,"full_name":"D\u00f6rrie, Heinrich ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1293,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Zeitschrift f\u00fcr die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der \u00c4lteren Kirche","volume":"65","issue":"","pages":"121-138"}},"sort":[1974]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"861","_score":null,"_source":{"id":861,"authors_free":[{"id":1265,"entry_id":861,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":296,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","free_first_name":"Herbert David","free_last_name":"Rankin","norm_person":{"id":296,"first_name":"Herbert David","last_name":"Rankin","full_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1058155474","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u2019\u0391\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2","main_title":{"title":"Antisthenes Fg. 50B (Caizzi): A Possible Section of \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u2019\u0391\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2"},"abstract":"This passage (Simplicii in Categoriarum c. 8 [Arist. p. ]) is placed by Caizzi among a group of passages of epistemological interest but not clearly attributable to any of the works which Antisthenes is said to have composed. Its argument is characteristic enough, being one of the representations of Antisthenes' opposition to Plato's e\u00eed\u0113, and an assertion of his view that the concrete phenomenal object is the starting point of our capability of knowledge, which in his view is probably limited by the restrictions placed upon us by the narrow capacity of our language with regard to logical discourse.\r\n\r\nThe purpose of this article is to consider whether a part of this passage is a quotation from Antisthenes' own writings and to suggest a possible place for it in one of the works with which he is credited. [introduction p. 178]","btype":3,"date":"1973","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/a36SykFCN2qyzot","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":296,"full_name":"Rankin, Herbert David","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":861,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"L'Antiquit\u00e9 Classique","volume":"42","issue":"1","pages":"178-180"}},"sort":[1973]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1077","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1077,"authors_free":[{"id":1632,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":12,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Bossier, Fernand","free_first_name":"Fernand","free_last_name":"Bossier","norm_person":{"id":12,"first_name":"Fernand ","last_name":"Bossier","full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1017981663","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1633,"entry_id":1077,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":14,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Steel, Carlos","free_first_name":"Carlos","free_last_name":"Steel","norm_person":{"id":14,"first_name":"Carlos ","last_name":"Steel","full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/122963083","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Priscianus Lydus en de \"In De Anima\" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius"},"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous avons essay\u00e9 d'examiner la valeur de l'attribution traditionnelle du commentaire In De Anima \u00e0 Simplicius. En comparant ce trait\u00e9 aux grands commentaires de Simplicius (sur les Cat\u00e9gories, la Physique et le De Caelo d'Aristote), nous avons en effet \u00e9t\u00e9 frapp\u00e9s par les divergences de style et de langue, ainsi que par la diff\u00e9rente mani\u00e8re de commenter.\r\n\r\nDans la premi\u00e8re partie, nous d\u00e9montrons que l'auteur de In D.A. a \u00e9galement \u00e9crit la Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, qui nous a \u00e9t\u00e9 transmise sous le nom de Priscien le Lydien.\r\n1\u00b0 Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie \u00e0 une de ses \u0153uvres, qu'il appelle Epitom\u00e9 de la Physique de Th\u00e9ophraste. En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, cette r\u00e9f\u00e9rence se rapporte \u00e0 un passage de la Metaphrase de Priscien, o\u00f9 la m\u00eame probl\u00e9matique est expos\u00e9e dans des termes identiques.\r\n2\u00b0 Une comparaison d\u00e9taill\u00e9e portant sur l'ensemble des deux \u0153uvres nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le une telle ressemblance de style et de pens\u00e9e \u2013 il y a m\u00eame des phrases \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s identiques \u2013 qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer que par l'hypoth\u00e8se de l'identit\u00e9 de l'auteur.\r\n\r\nDans la deuxi\u00e8me partie, nous essayons d'identifier l'auteur de ces deux \u0153uvres qui, pourtant, nous ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transmises sous deux noms diff\u00e9rents. L'\u00e9tude de la tradition directe et indirecte n'apporte gu\u00e8re de solution, puisque l'attribution des deux textes, l'un \u00e0 Simplicius, l'autre \u00e0 Priscien, y para\u00eet tr\u00e8s solide. Ce n'est donc que par une critique interne de In D.A., notamment par la confrontation avec les commentaires de Simplicius, dont l'attribution est certaine, que la question pourra \u00eatre tranch\u00e9e.\r\n1\u00b0 Dans In D.A., l'auteur renvoie trois fois \u00e0 son commentaire sur la Physique. Pourtant, il est bien difficile de retrouver dans le grand commentaire de Simplicius trois passages dont le contenu et surtout le vocabulaire prouvent que l'auteur s'y r\u00e9f\u00e8re.\r\n2\u00b0 Dans In D.A., on ne retrouve pas les traits caract\u00e9ristiques de la m\u00e9thode de commentaire de Simplicius, ni l'approche du texte par la documentation historique, ni les longues discussions avec les ex\u00e9g\u00e8tes ant\u00e9rieurs, ni l'expos\u00e9 prolixe et bien structur\u00e9. D'autre part, aucun des commentaires de Simplicius ne t\u00e9moigne de la phras\u00e9ologie tortueuse de notre \u0153uvre, ni de ses formules st\u00e9r\u00e9otyp\u00e9es.\r\n3\u00b0 La diff\u00e9rence doctrinale est encore plus importante. Nulle part chez Simplicius n'appara\u00eet la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e2me comme epist\u00eam\u00ea, qui est si fondamentale dans In D.A. (epist\u00eam\u00ea y est un concept-cl\u00e9). Les rares digressions de In D.A. \u00e0 propos de questions physiques et logiques ne correspondent pas aux expos\u00e9s de Simplicius sur les m\u00eames probl\u00e8mes.\r\n\r\nAinsi, nous avons confront\u00e9 la doctrine de la physis, de l'\u00e2me et de son automotion, et enfin le rapport entre le genre et les diff\u00e9rences constitutives et di\u00e9r\u00e9tiques. De tout cela se d\u00e9gage une telle divergence entre In D.A. et les autres commentaires qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer par une \u00e9volution chez Simplicius lui-m\u00eame. In D.A. lui est donc faussement attribu\u00e9 ; et puisque nous avons \u00e9tabli que ce commentaire est du m\u00eame auteur que la Metaphrase, nous pouvons conclure qu'il a \u00e9t\u00e9 vraisemblablement \u00e9crit par Priscien le Lydien, un philosophe n\u00e9oplatonicien dont nous savons seulement qu'il a accompagn\u00e9 Damascius et Simplicius en exil en exil en Perse. [author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"Dutch","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/r917awdAL4tkrdc","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":12,"full_name":"Bossier, Fernand ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":14,"full_name":"Steel, Carlos ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1077,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Tijdschrift voor Filosofie","volume":"34","issue":"4","pages":"761-822"}},"sort":[1972]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"859","_score":null,"_source":{"id":859,"authors_free":[{"id":1263,"entry_id":859,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":302,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","free_first_name":"Margaret E.","free_last_name":"Reesor","norm_person":{"id":302,"first_name":"Margaret E.","last_name":"Reesor","full_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy","main_title":{"title":"Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy"},"abstract":"The second category, poia, is the most puzzling of the four Stoic categories. The general term poion (qualified) included the koinos poion (generically qualified) and the idios poion (individually qualified), but the relationship between these two concepts is by no means clear. It is even more difficult to see how they were connected with the idia poiotes (particular quality) and the koine poiotis (common quality).\r\n\r\nIn order to explain how the four terms were related, I shall undertake in this paper as thorough an investigation as possible of a diaeresis described by Boethius in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione.\r\n\r\nBoethius outlines a diaeresis of possible and necessary propositions in Stoic philosophy. He writes: \"They (the Stoics) divide propositions in this way: of propositions, they say, some are possible, others impossible; of the possible, some are necessary, others non-necessary; again, of the non-necessary, some are possible and others impossible, foolishly and recklessly deciding that the possible is both a genus and a species of the non-necessary.\"\r\n\r\nIn the chart below, I have reconstructed this diaeresis, using the definitions of the terms and the examples given by Diogenes Laertius. [introduction p. 279]","btype":3,"date":"1972","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/DItDwer65QVZSCC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":302,"full_name":"Reesor, Margaret E.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":859,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"17","issue":"3","pages":"279-285"}},"sort":[1972]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1016","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1016,"authors_free":[{"id":1532,"entry_id":1016,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined","main_title":{"title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined"},"abstract":"This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them.\r\nAccounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that \"all is one.\" The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and \"ridiculous\" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean \"One.\" In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that \"there are many\" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more \"ridiculous\" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory.\r\nIt is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (t\u00f4n symbeb\u00eakot\u00f4n ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack.\r\nScholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fr\u00e4nkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fr\u00e4nkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called \"easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades.\" Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)\u2014the exuberance of the \"youthful\" Protagoras being an exception\u2014and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor.\r\nBut it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fr\u00e4nkel's doubts \"as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity.\" For these doubts apply even farther than Fr\u00e4nkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device\u2014especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1016,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"16","issue":"2","pages":"116-141"}},"sort":[1971]}

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1342","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1342,"authors_free":[{"id":2000,"entry_id":1342,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":165,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hall, J.J","free_first_name":"J.J.","free_last_name":"Hall","norm_person":{"id":165,"first_name":"J.J","last_name":"Hall","full_name":"Hall, J. J","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff.","main_title":{"title":"'Planets' in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff."},"abstract":"Thus all that Simplicius is saying, on Eudemus\u2019 \r\nauthority, is that Anaximander \u2018was the first to \r\ndiscuss\u2019 the sizes and distances of \u2018planets\u2019, using the latter term to include sun and moon; and this agrees with what the doxographers tell us: Anaximander had views about the distances of sun and moon, and the size of the sun.11 A sceptic, like Dicks, may question this whole tradition; but it should not be claimed that what Simplicius says of Anaximander and plan\u00f4mena in 471.2-6 is incon\u00adsistent with our other authorities. [conclusion, p. 139]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/K5sTJaihiZL0lG5","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":165,"full_name":"Hall, J. J","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1342,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Journal of Hellenic Studies","volume":"91","issue":"","pages":"138-139"}},"sort":[1971]}