| Title | The Will and its Freedom: Epictetus and Simplicius on what is up to us |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Published in | What is up to us? Studies on Agency and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 329-350 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Wildberg, Christian |
| Editor(s) | Destrée, Pierre , Zingano, Marco |
| Translator(s) |
| The text explores the historical development of the concept of free will, drawing parallels with the evolution of understanding projectile motion. Three distinct periods are identified: an initial stage marked by a misunderstanding of projectile motion, where objects were thought to require continuous external motion; a second stage where the concept of "impetus" was introduced to explain forced motion at a distance; and a final stage, ushered in by Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, where the correct understanding of inertia emerged. The discovery of free will is compared to the discovery of the will as a distinct human faculty in late antiquity. Similar to the concept of impetus, the will is depicted as capable of being strong or weak and has significant influence over human actions. The philosophical discussion surrounding free will is likened to the debates on projectile motion, with various perspectives on its existence and nature. Some argue for the existence of free will, while others contend that it is unnecessary and incoherent. The text concludes by pointing out the need for a deeper understanding of the historical context and metaphysical assumptions underlying the concept of free will. It suggests that the concept of free will is a remnant of past intellectual certainty about metaphysical truths and may not be as morally neutral as commonly believed. The modern discussion on free will is encouraged to consider its historical development and potential implications more carefully. [introduction] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mOZ7OMN3pKwTAfd |
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| Title | The Will and its Freedom: Epictetus and Simplicius on what is up to us |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Published in | What is up to us? Studies on Agency and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 329-350 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Wildberg, Christian |
| Editor(s) | Destrée, Pierre , Zingano, Marco |
| Translator(s) |
The text explores the historical development of the concept of free will, drawing parallels with the evolution of understanding projectile motion. Three distinct periods are identified: an initial stage marked by a misunderstanding of projectile motion, where objects were thought to require continuous external motion; a second stage where the concept of "impetus" was introduced to explain forced motion at a distance; and a final stage, ushered in by Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, where the correct understanding of inertia emerged. The discovery of free will is compared to the discovery of the will as a distinct human faculty in late antiquity. Similar to the concept of impetus, the will is depicted as capable of being strong or weak and has significant influence over human actions. The philosophical discussion surrounding free will is likened to the debates on projectile motion, with various perspectives on its existence and nature. Some argue for the existence of free will, while others contend that it is unnecessary and incoherent. The text concludes by pointing out the need for a deeper understanding of the historical context and metaphysical assumptions underlying the concept of free will. It suggests that the concept of free will is a remnant of past intellectual certainty about metaphysical truths and may not be as morally neutral as commonly believed. The modern discussion on free will is encouraged to consider its historical development and potential implications more carefully. [introduction] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mOZ7OMN3pKwTAfd |
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