| Title | Simplicius and Avicenna on the Essential Corporeity of Material Substance |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2001 |
| Published in | Aspects of Avicenna |
| Pages | 73-130 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Stone, Abraham D. |
| Editor(s) | Wisnovsky, Robert |
| Translator(s) |
| Simplicius and Avicenna face the same difficult problems, and both reach interpretatively and conceptually radical solutions. The interpretative radicalness is reflected in the fact that their discussions of this issue are unusually disengaged from Aristotle’s text. The main discussion in Simplicius appears in the commentary on Physics 1.7—a chapter in which Aristotle does not mention body at all—and begins on its own, without reference to any particular textual segment. Avicenna’s main discussion of corporeity in Shifa’ II, 2.2-3 is likewise, and unlike most other chapter-length parts of the Shifa’, not easily associated with any one locus in Aristotle. Both Avicenna and Simplicius, moreover, introduce terminology—“corporeal form,” “indeterminate dimensions,” “deviation”—that is neither Aristotelian nor even Plotinian. The conceptual radicalness can be summed up by saying that both of these solutions reduce corporeity, in the relevant sense, to something extremely abstract. Both refuse to identify it with any of the familiar and easily picturable properties of bodies (extension, volume, surface, three-dimensionality, rigidity, resistance, inertia, weight). This resort to a high degree of conceptual abstraction and interpretative independence reflects both the extreme difficulty of the metaphysical problems and the strong pressure to achieve systematically maintainable solutions where such fundamental issues are at stake. The two solutions agree to a great extent in detail. The abstract property with which both Simplicius and Avicenna wish to identify corporeity is divisibility or partibility: the potency or aptitude by which a material substance, one in actu, is at the same time potentially many. The difference between them is subtle. Avicenna thinks of corporeity, roughly speaking, as the kind of unity (ultimately: substantial unity) that possesses such divisibility. He therefore identifies corporeity with a certain substantial form. Simplicius, on the other hand, thinks of corporeity as the privation by which an enmattered substantial form “deviates” from its intelligible archetype—i.e., by which it deviates from true unity and true being. He therefore identifies corporeity with matter. Both solutions are relatively tenable within their own systematic contexts; neither, however, could likely survive transplantation to the other system. Simplicius’ solution ultimately relies on a full-blown Neoplatonic theory of emanation that Avicenna does not share, while Avicenna’s depends on his non-Neoplatonic views about essential and accidental properties and about the coexistence of multiple substantial forms in a single composite substance. [conclusion p. 113-114] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GJWf1yj79pw3EdQ |
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The interpretative radicalness is reflected in the fact that their discussions of this issue are unusually disengaged from Aristotle\u2019s text. The main discussion in Simplicius appears in the commentary on Physics 1.7\u2014a chapter in which Aristotle does not mention body at all\u2014and begins on its own, without reference to any particular textual segment. Avicenna\u2019s main discussion of corporeity in Shifa\u2019 II, 2.2-3 is likewise, and unlike most other chapter-length parts of the Shifa\u2019, not easily associated with any one locus in Aristotle.\r\n\r\nBoth Avicenna and Simplicius, moreover, introduce terminology\u2014\u201ccorporeal form,\u201d \u201cindeterminate dimensions,\u201d \u201cdeviation\u201d\u2014that is neither Aristotelian nor even Plotinian. The conceptual radicalness can be summed up by saying that both of these solutions reduce corporeity, in the relevant sense, to something extremely abstract. Both refuse to identify it with any of the familiar and easily picturable properties of bodies (extension, volume, surface, three-dimensionality, rigidity, resistance, inertia, weight).\r\n\r\nThis resort to a high degree of conceptual abstraction and interpretative independence reflects both the extreme difficulty of the metaphysical problems and the strong pressure to achieve systematically maintainable solutions where such fundamental issues are at stake. The two solutions agree to a great extent in detail.\r\n\r\nThe abstract property with which both Simplicius and Avicenna wish to identify corporeity is divisibility or partibility: the potency or aptitude by which a material substance, one in actu, is at the same time potentially many. The difference between them is subtle. Avicenna thinks of corporeity, roughly speaking, as the kind of unity (ultimately: substantial unity) that possesses such divisibility. He therefore identifies corporeity with a certain substantial form.\r\n\r\nSimplicius, on the other hand, thinks of corporeity as the privation by which an enmattered substantial form \u201cdeviates\u201d from its intelligible archetype\u2014i.e., by which it deviates from true unity and true being. He therefore identifies corporeity with matter.\r\n\r\nBoth solutions are relatively tenable within their own systematic contexts; neither, however, could likely survive transplantation to the other system. Simplicius\u2019 solution ultimately relies on a full-blown Neoplatonic theory of emanation that Avicenna does not share, while Avicenna\u2019s depends on his non-Neoplatonic views about essential and accidental properties and about the coexistence of multiple substantial forms in a single composite substance.\r\n[conclusion p. 113-114]","btype":2,"date":"2001","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/GJWf1yj79pw3EdQ","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":409,"full_name":"Stone, Abraham D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":483,"full_name":"Wisnovsky, Robert","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1425,"section_of":1452,"pages":"73-130","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1452,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"reference","type":4,"language":"no language selected","title":"Aspects of Avicenna","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2001","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"The articles in this volume aim to further our understanding of the work and thought of the philosopher and physician Ab\u016b \u02bfAl\u012b al-\u1e24usain ibn \u02bfAbd All\u0101h ibn S\u012bn\u0101 (born before 370 AH\/980 CE-died 428 AH\/1037 CE), known in the West by his Latinized name Avicenna. \r\nIt seems to me that what much of the best new schlorahip has in common, and what the articles in this volume aspire to, is a mature and subtle appreciation of the history of Avicenna\u2019s philosophy. By this I mean two things. First, the increasing availability of edited Avicennian texts has allowed scholars to examine a broader spectrum of passages about particular topic than they were able to in the past. This, in turn, has made possible the recent and ongoing attempts to periodize Avicenna\u2019s philosophical career through the careful dating of individual work. Scholars now have to come to terms with the fact that there may not be a single Avicennian position on a given issue, but rather a history of positions, adopted at different periods of his life. \r\nSecond, many of the ancient commentaries on Aristotle, though available in the original Greek for a hundred years now, have only recently been translated into English. These translations, along with the new scholarly work on the commentators which has followed in their wake, have made a massive but heretofore forbidden resource for the history of late-antique and early-medieval philosophy easily accessible to speciallists in Arabic philosophy. The more precisely we understand how Greek philosophy developed durig the period between 200 CE and 600 CE, the better able we shall be to situate the theories of philosophers such as Avicenny in their intellectual-historical context. 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| Title | Simplicius and Avicenna on the Essential Corporeity of Material Substance |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2001 |
| Published in | Aspects of Avicenna |
| Pages | 73-130 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Stone, Abraham D. |
| Editor(s) | Wisnovsky, Robert |
| Translator(s) |
Simplicius and Avicenna face the same difficult problems, and both reach interpretatively and conceptually radical solutions. The interpretative radicalness is reflected in the fact that their discussions of this issue are unusually disengaged from Aristotle’s text. The main discussion in Simplicius appears in the commentary on Physics 1.7—a chapter in which Aristotle does not mention body at all—and begins on its own, without reference to any particular textual segment. Avicenna’s main discussion of corporeity in Shifa’ II, 2.2-3 is likewise, and unlike most other chapter-length parts of the Shifa’, not easily associated with any one locus in Aristotle. Both Avicenna and Simplicius, moreover, introduce terminology—“corporeal form,” “indeterminate dimensions,” “deviation”—that is neither Aristotelian nor even Plotinian. The conceptual radicalness can be summed up by saying that both of these solutions reduce corporeity, in the relevant sense, to something extremely abstract. Both refuse to identify it with any of the familiar and easily picturable properties of bodies (extension, volume, surface, three-dimensionality, rigidity, resistance, inertia, weight). This resort to a high degree of conceptual abstraction and interpretative independence reflects both the extreme difficulty of the metaphysical problems and the strong pressure to achieve systematically maintainable solutions where such fundamental issues are at stake. The two solutions agree to a great extent in detail. The abstract property with which both Simplicius and Avicenna wish to identify corporeity is divisibility or partibility: the potency or aptitude by which a material substance, one in actu, is at the same time potentially many. The difference between them is subtle. Avicenna thinks of corporeity, roughly speaking, as the kind of unity (ultimately: substantial unity) that possesses such divisibility. He therefore identifies corporeity with a certain substantial form. Simplicius, on the other hand, thinks of corporeity as the privation by which an enmattered substantial form “deviates” from its intelligible archetype—i.e., by which it deviates from true unity and true being. He therefore identifies corporeity with matter. Both solutions are relatively tenable within their own systematic contexts; neither, however, could likely survive transplantation to the other system. Simplicius’ solution ultimately relies on a full-blown Neoplatonic theory of emanation that Avicenna does not share, while Avicenna’s depends on his non-Neoplatonic views about essential and accidental properties and about the coexistence of multiple substantial forms in a single composite substance. [conclusion p. 113-114] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/GJWf1yj79pw3EdQ |
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The interpretative radicalness is reflected in the fact that their discussions of this issue are unusually disengaged from Aristotle\u2019s text. The main discussion in Simplicius appears in the commentary on Physics 1.7\u2014a chapter in which Aristotle does not mention body at all\u2014and begins on its own, without reference to any particular textual segment. Avicenna\u2019s main discussion of corporeity in Shifa\u2019 II, 2.2-3 is likewise, and unlike most other chapter-length parts of the Shifa\u2019, not easily associated with any one locus in Aristotle.\r\n\r\nBoth Avicenna and Simplicius, moreover, introduce terminology\u2014\u201ccorporeal form,\u201d \u201cindeterminate dimensions,\u201d \u201cdeviation\u201d\u2014that is neither Aristotelian nor even Plotinian. The conceptual radicalness can be summed up by saying that both of these solutions reduce corporeity, in the relevant sense, to something extremely abstract. Both refuse to identify it with any of the familiar and easily picturable properties of bodies (extension, volume, surface, three-dimensionality, rigidity, resistance, inertia, weight).\r\n\r\nThis resort to a high degree of conceptual abstraction and interpretative independence reflects both the extreme difficulty of the metaphysical problems and the strong pressure to achieve systematically maintainable solutions where such fundamental issues are at stake. The two solutions agree to a great extent in detail.\r\n\r\nThe abstract property with which both Simplicius and Avicenna wish to identify corporeity is divisibility or partibility: the potency or aptitude by which a material substance, one in actu, is at the same time potentially many. The difference between them is subtle. Avicenna thinks of corporeity, roughly speaking, as the kind of unity (ultimately: substantial unity) that possesses such divisibility. He therefore identifies corporeity with a certain substantial form.\r\n\r\nSimplicius, on the other hand, thinks of corporeity as the privation by which an enmattered substantial form \u201cdeviates\u201d from its intelligible archetype\u2014i.e., by which it deviates from true unity and true being. He therefore identifies corporeity with matter.\r\n\r\nBoth solutions are relatively tenable within their own systematic contexts; neither, however, could likely survive transplantation to the other system. 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By this I mean two things. First, the increasing availability of edited Avicennian texts has allowed scholars to examine a broader spectrum of passages about particular topic than they were able to in the past. This, in turn, has made possible the recent and ongoing attempts to periodize Avicenna\u2019s philosophical career through the careful dating of individual work. Scholars now have to come to terms with the fact that there may not be a single Avicennian position on a given issue, but rather a history of positions, adopted at different periods of his life. \r\nSecond, many of the ancient commentaries on Aristotle, though available in the original Greek for a hundred years now, have only recently been translated into English. These translations, along with the new scholarly work on the commentators which has followed in their wake, have made a massive but heretofore forbidden resource for the history of late-antique and early-medieval philosophy easily accessible to speciallists in Arabic philosophy. The more precisely we understand how Greek philosophy developed durig the period between 200 CE and 600 CE, the better able we shall be to situate the theories of philosophers such as Avicenny in their intellectual-historical context. 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