| Title | Light from Aristotle's "Physics" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1977 |
| Journal | Phronesis |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 10-12 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant). It would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides’ modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides’ (and Melissus’) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging ὄν deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the "only solution" (monoeidês lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics. In the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1015","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1015,"authors_free":[{"id":1531,"entry_id":1015,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K","main_title":{"title":"Light from Aristotle's \"Physics\" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K"},"abstract":"Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant).\r\nIt would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides\u2019 modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides\u2019 (and Melissus\u2019) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging \u1f44\u03bd deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the \"only solution\" (monoeid\u00eas lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics.\r\nIn the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12]","btype":3,"date":"1977","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1015,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"22","issue":"1","pages":"10-12"}},"sort":[1977]}
| Title | The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1971 |
| Journal | Phronesis |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 116-141 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them. Accounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that "all is one." The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and "ridiculous" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean "One." In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that "there are many" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more "ridiculous" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory. It is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (tôn symbebêkotôn ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack. Scholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fränkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fränkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called "easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades." Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)—the exuberance of the "youthful" Protagoras being an exception—and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor. But it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fränkel's doubts "as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity." For these doubts apply even farther than Fränkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the ὑποθέσεις in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device—especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1016","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1016,"authors_free":[{"id":1532,"entry_id":1016,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined","main_title":{"title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined"},"abstract":"This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them.\r\nAccounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that \"all is one.\" The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and \"ridiculous\" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean \"One.\" In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that \"there are many\" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more \"ridiculous\" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory.\r\nIt is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (t\u00f4n symbeb\u00eakot\u00f4n ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack.\r\nScholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fr\u00e4nkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fr\u00e4nkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called \"easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades.\" Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)\u2014the exuberance of the \"youthful\" Protagoras being an exception\u2014and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor.\r\nBut it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fr\u00e4nkel's doubts \"as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity.\" For these doubts apply even farther than Fr\u00e4nkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device\u2014especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1016,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"16","issue":"2","pages":"116-141"}},"sort":[1971]}
| Title | Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1965 |
| Journal | Phronesis |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 109-148 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his "cycle," originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences. The only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented. Perhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction— in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's—my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the Καθαρμοί out of the discussion of Περὶ φύσεως. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio. There are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to "reality" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/S9osco1gJvTdfSD |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"846","_score":null,"_source":{"id":846,"authors_free":[{"id":1250,"entry_id":846,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology","main_title":{"title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology"},"abstract":"In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his \"cycle,\" originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences.\r\n\r\nThe only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented.\r\n\r\nPerhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction\u2014 in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's\u2014my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the \u039a\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03af out of the discussion of \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio.\r\n\r\nThere are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to \"reality\" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/S9osco1gJvTdfSD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":846,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"10","issue":"2","pages":"109-148"}},"sort":[1965]}
| Title | Light from Aristotle's "Physics" on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1977 |
| Journal | Phronesis |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 10-12 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy is far from good. We do not plead for a revision of the current estimate. The last sentence copied above suggests a causal relation of doctrines that is hard to square with the facts. On the whole, however, he has in this instance done better than usual; for he has, with genuine historical understanding, realized how the early Presocratics, whose search was for physical explanations, were stopped in their tracks when Parmenides issued his peremptory veto of genesis and phthora (how they worked themselves out of this deadlock is irrelevant). It would be futile to assign this refutation of genesis in both of its forms to any thinker other than Parmenides and no less futile to surmise that Aristotle here, for the sake of completeness or for reasons similar to those operative with Parmenides’ modern interpreters, credited him with an argument he did not use but would have been well advised to use. Throughout a large part of Physics I, Parmenides’ (and Melissus’) position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality. The monolithic, unchanging ὄν deprives physics of the principles (archai) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable. Having conquered it, he constructs his own theory of genesis. It is the "only solution" (monoeidês lysis, 191a23; see above), he declares triumphantly and proceeds to look once more at the objections raised by the Eleatics. In the remainder of chapter 8, he sets forth, on the basis of his own theory, why genesis from Being and from not-Being are perfectly valid concepts. There are more ways than one to show that they are legitimate. [p. 11-12] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/T9uT5aXwXA1HemE |
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| Title | Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1965 |
| Journal | Phronesis |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 109-148 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his "cycle," originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences. The only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented. Perhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction— in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's—my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the Καθαρμοί out of the discussion of Περὶ φύσεως. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio. There are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to "reality" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/S9osco1gJvTdfSD |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"846","_score":null,"_source":{"id":846,"authors_free":[{"id":1250,"entry_id":846,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology","main_title":{"title":"Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology"},"abstract":"In Heraclitus and Parmenides, assumptions which form the basis of our interpretation are subject to frequent reexaminations and revisions. With Empedocles, matters are different. Here, large hypotheses have for a long time remained unchallenged and are now near the point of hardening into dogmas. In particular, the reconstruction of a dual cosmogony in his \"cycle,\" originally a theory which had to contend with others, is now often regarded as established, treated as though it were a fact, and used as a premise for further inferences.\r\n\r\nThe only full-scale interpretation of the evidence which backs up this theory is Ettore Bignone's Empedocle; yet, whatever the merits of this book, it can hardly be denied that in the fifty years since its publication we have learned many new lessons regarding the relative value of testimonies and fragments, the trustworthiness of Aristotle's reports on his precursors, and other questions of vital bearing on the reconstruction of a Presocratic system. A recent textbook which seeks to fit the material into the framework of two cosmogonies does not, in my opinion, succeed in strengthening this position; on the contrary, it may be said that difficulties which were less apparent as long as the discussion confined itself to individual fragments or groups of fragments become more visible when the entire scheme is worked out and presented.\r\n\r\nPerhaps the wisest course would be to admit ignorance on crucial points. If I, nevertheless, prefer to offer an alternative reconstruction\u2014 in essential aspects a revival of von Arnim's\u2014my hope is that, whether right or wrong, it will serve a good purpose if it shows that opinions currently accepted are not firmly grounded in the evidence at our disposal. I have made no methodical commitment except to keep the \u039a\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03af out of the discussion of \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. Similar or identical motifs, like the fundamental importance of Love and Strife, the kinship of all living beings, are clearly present in both poems, but to argue from recurring motifs to an identity or similarity of doctrine is nothing less than a petitio.\r\n\r\nThere are too many unknown factors. The time interval may have been long or short. The question of priority has not been settled. We cannot assume that Empedocles' mind was of a rigidly dogmatic cast incapable of responding to new experiences and impressions (nor can we know what these experiences may have been). What we do see is that his attitude to \"reality\" differs in the two works. Surely, the place for a comparison is after the reconstruction of the poems, not prior to or in the course of it. [introduction p. 109-110]","btype":3,"date":"1965","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/S9osco1gJvTdfSD","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":846,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"10","issue":"2","pages":"109-148"}},"sort":["Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology"]}
| Title | The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 1971 |
| Journal | Phronesis |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 116-141 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Solmsen, Friedrich |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them. Accounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that "all is one." The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and "ridiculous" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean "One." In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that "there are many" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more "ridiculous" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory. It is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (tôn symbebêkotôn ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack. Scholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fränkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fränkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called "easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades." Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)—the exuberance of the "youthful" Protagoras being an exception—and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor. But it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fränkel's doubts "as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity." For these doubts apply even farther than Fränkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the ὑποθέσεις in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device—especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1016","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1016,"authors_free":[{"id":1532,"entry_id":1016,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":316,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","free_first_name":"Friedrich","free_last_name":"Solmsen","norm_person":{"id":316,"first_name":"Friedrich","last_name":"Solmsen","full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/117754641","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined","main_title":{"title":"The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined"},"abstract":"This paper makes no attempt to compete with the brilliant studies through which, in the last thirty years, several scholars have advanced our understanding of the evidence for Zeno of Elea, and in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact, my intention is not to replace theories with other theories but to create doubt about matters that, for some time, have been taken for granted, and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would tolerate others alongside them.\r\nAccounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting point some well-known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides. Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole, the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose must seem priceless. It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we read here, wrote against those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that \"all is one.\" The opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out contradictions and \"ridiculous\" consequences resulting from the Parmenidean \"One.\" In return, Zeno took the adversaries' position that \"there are many\" as the basis for his reasoning, deducing from it, in each of his arguments, contradictions and other results even more \"ridiculous\" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides' theory.\r\nIt is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself distinguishes between what is certain and what allows doubt and more than one explanation. Doubt is possible about certain accidental aspects (t\u00f4n symbeb\u00eakot\u00f4n ti, Zeno says, 128c5 ff.), i.e., whether the ultimate convergence of the two treatises was meant to be obvious or to be concealed from the reader, and also whether Zeno was anxious to build up a philosophical stature for himself or merely to help Parmenides against the detractors. Yet, precisely because doubt is allowed on such items of secondary importance, the far more important statements concerning the subject matter, the method, and the objectives of Zeno's treatise seem immune to attack.\r\nScholars writing on Zeno have usually accepted Plato's testimony as a matter of course or with the most perfunctory justification. A few have given reasons why the testimony deserves confidence, and no reason could be more attractive than the sensitive comments of Hermann Fr\u00e4nkel about Plato as being, by his own individuality and temperament, exceptionally qualified to appreciate the peculiar, rather wanton humor that Fr\u00e4nkel has found lurking in Zeno's sallies. I should be loath to disagree with this argument, even if it did not form part of what Gregory Vlastos has justly called \"easily the most important philological monograph published on the subject in several decades.\" Still, I am not the first to question the element of wantonness and trickery in Zeno's proofs, and even if it were granted, one might wonder whether Plato's own humor is not normally more gentle and urbane (asteion)\u2014the exuberance of the \"youthful\" Protagoras being an exception\u2014and whether even a congenial sense of humor would guarantee the correct understanding of a philosophical endeavor.\r\nBut it is perhaps more profitable to develop Fr\u00e4nkel's doubts \"as to how much Plato, or his readers for that matter, would be interested in problems of mere historicity.\" For these doubts apply even farther than Fr\u00e4nkel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all the \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 in the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance it is? Why, anyhow, must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic device\u2014especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments in the dialogue? [introduction p. 116-118]","btype":3,"date":"1971","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/6pPpfWHeO2IY3ri","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":316,"full_name":"Solmsen, Friedrich","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1016,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"16","issue":"2","pages":"116-141"}},"sort":["The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-Examined"]}