{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1506","_score":null,"_ignored":["booksection.book.abstract.keyword"],"_source":{"id":1506,"authors_free":[{"id":2616,"entry_id":1506,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":434,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Tuominen, Miira","free_first_name":"Miira","free_last_name":"Tuominen","norm_person":{"id":434,"first_name":"Miira","last_name":"Tuominen","full_name":"Tuominen, Miira","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2617,"entry_id":1506,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":559,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Silva, Jos\u00e9 Filipe","free_first_name":"Jos\u00e9 Filipe","free_last_name":"Silva","norm_person":{"id":559,"first_name":"Jos\u00e9 Filipe","last_name":"Silva","full_name":"Silva, Jos\u00e9 Filipe","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1050222717","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"On Activity and Passivity in Perception: Aristotle, Philoponus, and Pseudo-Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"On Activity and Passivity in Perception: Aristotle, Philoponus, and Pseudo-Simplicius"},"abstract":"Ancient and late ancient theories of perception are often described by a generalisation according to which Aristotle held a passive theory whereas Plato, the Platonists and the Neoplatonists supposed perception to be something active. I shall argue that, despite this general difference, there are important points of convergence in the theories of Aristotle and his Neoplatonic commentators. First, the notion of activity is important for Aristotle\u2019s theory as well. Perception not only is an activity (energeia) for Aristotle. It is a perfect activity, the perfection of which is the activity itself and is thus not dependent on an external product. Further, the reception of forms without matter is by no means an exhaustive description of perceptual cognition in Aristotle. The sensitive soul is also capable of memory, imagination, and non-universal generalisation Aristotle calls \u2018experience\u2019. Human beings who have reason also make perceptual judgments that, however, are not identified with perceptions in Aristotle\u2019s theory.\r\n\r\nWhile the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle\u2019s De anima modified his theory in several ways and underlined the activity of the soul, I contend that they also maintained some of Aristotle\u2019s core assumptions. By contrast to Aristotle, they identified perception with rational perceptual judgments. However, I argue that they still retained the assumption that there also is sensation of external objects but ascribed this to the sense organism rather than the sensitive soul. The point is rather clear in Pseudo-Simplicius and I also argue that it is likely that Philoponus maintained a similar view. [author's abstract]","btype":2,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/8hnpXzad7gCFriC","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":434,"full_name":"Tuominen, Miira","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":559,"full_name":"Silva, Jos\u00e9 Filipe","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":{"id":1506,"pubplace":"Berlin","publisher":"Springer","series":"Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind","volume":"14","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":{"id":1506,"section_of":1507,"pages":"55-78","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1507,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"bibliography","type":4,"language":"en","title":"Active Perception in the History of Philosophy From Plato to Modern Philosophy ","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2014","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"The aim of the present work is to show the roots of the conception of perception as an active process, tracing the history of its development from Plato to modern philosophy. The contributors inquire into what activity is taken to mean in different theories, challenging traditional historical accounts of perception that stress the passivity of percipients in coming to know the external world. Special attention is paid to the psychological and physiological mechanisms of perception, rational and non-rational perception and the role of awareness in the perceptual process. Perception has often been conceived as a process in which the passive aspects - such as the reception of sensory stimuli - were stressed and the active ones overlooked. However, during recent decades research in cognitive science and philosophy of mind has emphasized the activity of the subject in the process of sense perception, often associating this activity to the notions of attention and intentionality. Although it is recognized that there are ancient roots to the view that perception is fundamentally active, the history remains largely unexplored. The book is directed to all those interested in contemporary debates in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology who would like to become acquainted with the historical background of active perception, but for historical reliability the aim is to make no compromises. [author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/QMx2DVooYGq5eIs","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":1507,"pubplace":"Berlin","publisher":"Springer","series":"Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind","volume":"14","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["On Activity and Passivity in Perception: Aristotle, Philoponus, and Pseudo-Simplicius"]}