{"_index":"sire","_id":"880","_score":null,"_source":{"id":880,"authors_free":[{"id":1291,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":236,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lautner, Peter","free_first_name":"Peter","free_last_name":"Lautner","norm_person":{"id":236,"first_name":"Peter","last_name":"Lautner","full_name":"Lautner, Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157740766","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1292,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":118,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Remes, Pauliina","free_first_name":"Pauliina","free_last_name":"Remes","norm_person":{"id":118,"first_name":"Pauliina","last_name":"Remes","full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1103255665","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1293,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":119,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","free_first_name":"Svetla","free_last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","norm_person":{"id":119,"first_name":"Svetla","last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137698070","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators","main_title":{"title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators"},"abstract":"Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a conscious activity, including even the reception of primary sense qualities such as colors and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense object upon the sense organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotle's Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them. The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense perception implies awareness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense organs of the capacity to perceive.\r\n\r\nMoreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle\u2019s De Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. At the beginning of De Anima 3.2, he presents the following aporia:\r\n\r\n\"Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense]. But in that case, there will be the same [sense] for sight and the color which is the subject for sight\u2014so that either there will be two senses for the same thing or {the sense} itself will be the one for itself.\" (425b 12-16, trans. Hamlyn)\r\n\r\nThe distinction between perception and perception of perception\u2014perceptual consciousness\u2014is here taken for granted, and the fact that a subject perceives that he perceives is something that calls for explanation. In principle, the problem posed by Physics 7.2 is now resolved. On the account of the De Anima, in order for the subject to be aware of it, sense perception must be understood as a change that takes place in the perceiving subject. According to a general principle of change, formulated in Physics 3.3 (202a21-b5), the change produced by some cause is always in the thing that is changed.\r\n\r\nConsequently, as a kind of qualitative change, sense perception takes place in the perceiving subject. Moreover, sense perception implies perceptual awareness because sense perception is a reception of sensible forms coming from without. Perceptual awareness comes about when the sense apprehends the sensible forms in itself and, on account of this, fulfills its function as sense. We perceive the change within ourselves. The two processes are one, differing only in account. For it is by receiving the form from the things perceived, which are outside, that we apprehend them, but it is by the sense having the form of the things perceived in itself that perceptual awareness comes about. To take the example of seeing, we see something in virtue of apprehending the perceptible\u2019s form. By apprehending the form, the sense of sight sees, and at the same time, it comes to see itself seeing.\r\n\r\nOn this account, sense perception is intimately linked to a certain kind of awareness. In sense perception, we simultaneously apprehend both the thing perceived and the activity of the sense in relation to the thing perceived. Perceptual awareness is tied to the fact that in sense perception, we must be aware of the reception of external influence. Hence, the reflexive nature of sense perception is somehow included in the activity of grasping the primary objects of sense perception.\r\n\r\nHow shall we harmonize the two accounts? After all, it seems that in the De Anima, Alexander emphasizes the role of the common sense power, whereas in Quaestiones 3.7, he derives perceptual awareness from the general nature of sense perception. My suggestion is that the two accounts are complementary. The Quaestiones offer a general account of how perceptual awareness is possible. The reception of sensible forms requires awareness. Following Aristotle, Alexander assumes that this kind of awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty. It is not the rational faculty that such a task has been assigned to.\r\n\r\nIn the De Anima, Alexander specifies the thesis by pointing out that perceptual awareness comes about by virtue of the activity of the center of our perceptual system. It may remain unclear as to what arguments led him to dismiss the possibility that the particular senses might be able to grasp the activity of their own. There seem to be two points that could not have been accepted, for different reasons, and they also marked the limits within which Alexander's argument must have moved.\r\n\r\nOn the one hand, he accepted the Aristotelian thesis that perceptual awareness is the task of the perceptual system. On the other hand, he might have had doubts about the ability of the particular senses to grasp their own activities. Even if the act of seeing is somehow colored (De Anima 92.27-31), there must be a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. The difference is within the perceptual system and lies between the particular sense and the common sense power. [introduction p. 325-326]","btype":2,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/wW0wlLHdi7RUUn2","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":236,"full_name":"Lautner, Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":118,"full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":119,"full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":880,"section_of":345,"pages":"323-338","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":345,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Remes\/Slaveva-Griffin2014","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2014","edition_no":null,"free_date":"2014","abstract":"The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism is an authoritative and comprehensive survey of the most important issues and developments in one of the fastest growing areas of research in ancient philosophy. An international team of scholars situates and re-evaluates Neoplatonism within the history of ancient philosophy and thought, and explores its influence on philosophical and religious schools worldwide. Over thirty chapters are divided into seven clear parts:\r\n\r\n (Re)sources, instruction and interaction\r\n Methods and Styles of Exegesis\r\n Metaphysics and Metaphysical Perspectives\r\n Language, Knowledge, Soul, and Self\r\n Nature: Physics, Medicine and Biology\r\n Ethics, Political Theory and Aesthetics\r\n The legacy of Neoplatonism.\r\n\r\nThe Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism is a major reference source for all students and scholars in Neoplatonism and ancient philosophy, as well as researchers in the philosophy of science, ethics, aesthetics and religion. [author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/i2TdBQo2LLSOZ3S","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":345,"pubplace":"London \u2013 New York","publisher":"Routledge","series":"Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators"]}