Rediscovered Categories Commentary: Porphyry(?) with Fragments of Boethus, 2016
By: Chiaradonna, Riccardo, Rashed, Marwan, Sedley, David N., Sorabji, Richard (Ed.)
Title Rediscovered Categories Commentary: Porphyry(?) with Fragments of Boethus
Type Book Section
Language English
Date 2016
Published in Aristotle Re-Interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators
Pages 231-262
Categories no categories
Author(s) Chiaradonna, Riccardo , Rashed, Marwan , Sedley, David N.
Editor(s) Sorabji, Richard
Translator(s)
Riccardo Chiaradonna has studied Boethus’ downgrading also of universals, again by reference to the Categories ’ defi nition of substance. On this ground, universals are not even a something (a Stoic category, lower than substance). Simplicius tells us: ‘Boethus says fi rst that the universal does not even exist in reality ( einai en hupostasei ), according to Aristotle, and even if it did have any reality, it would not be a something . Aristotle rather said it was in something’. Chiaradonna concludes from a discussion of a number of passages that Boethus thought of a universal as nothing but a collection of particulars. Th e recently recovered fragments of Porphyry’s lost commentary on the Categories in Chapter 8 below, speaking of animal, similarly say ‘none of these generic items is a subject’. The text of Porphyry translated and analysed in this chapter includes among others a further new fragment on Boethus’ treatment of division by differentia at 14,4–15. Rashed has drawn attention to yet another way in which Boethus downgrades something of Aristotle’s: the priority of Aristotle’s fi rst fi gure of syllogism. Or at least he puts Aristotle’s figures all on the same level. The figures are Aristotle’s patterns of valid argument concerning all, some, or none of a class of things, and Aristotle thought that certain arguments in the second and third figures had to be proved equivalent to certain arguments in the fi rst, before they could be seen as valid. I shall discuss below the resumption of the debate in the fourth century by the commentator Themistius. Rashed has translated Th emistius’ text from the superior of two Arabic manuscripts into French. It is to be hoped that Chiaradonna and Rashed, two of the translators of the fragment in Chapter 8, will carry out their plan of compiling the fi rst collection of fragments of Boethus, of which Michael Griffin has already noticed around fifty. [introduction]

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On this ground, universals are not even a something (a Stoic category, lower than substance). Simplicius tells us: \u2018Boethus says fi rst that the universal does not even exist in reality ( einai en hupostasei ), according to Aristotle, and even if it did have any reality, it would not be a something . Aristotle rather said it was in something\u2019. Chiaradonna concludes from a discussion of a number of passages that Boethus thought of a universal as nothing but a collection of particulars. Th e recently recovered fragments of Porphyry\u2019s lost commentary on the Categories in Chapter 8 below, speaking of animal, similarly say \u2018none of these generic items is a subject\u2019. The text of Porphyry translated and analysed in this chapter includes among others a further new fragment on Boethus\u2019 treatment of division by differentia at 14,4\u201315. Rashed has drawn attention to yet another way in which Boethus downgrades something of Aristotle\u2019s: the priority of Aristotle\u2019s fi rst fi gure of syllogism. Or at least he puts Aristotle\u2019s figures all on the same level. The figures are Aristotle\u2019s patterns of valid argument concerning all, some, or none of a class of things, and Aristotle thought that certain arguments in the second and third figures had to be proved equivalent to certain arguments in the fi rst, before they could be seen as valid. I shall discuss below the resumption of the debate in the fourth century by the commentator Themistius. Rashed has translated Th emistius\u2019 text from the superior of two Arabic manuscripts into French. It is to be hoped that Chiaradonna and Rashed, two of the translators of the fragment in Chapter 8, will carry out their plan of compiling the fi rst collection of fragments of Boethus, of which Michael Griffin has already noticed around fifty. 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Building on the strength of the series, which has been hailed as \u2018a scholarly marvel\u2019, \u2018a truly breath-taking achievement\u2019 and \u2018one of the great scholarly achievements of our time\u2019 and on the widely praised edited volume brought out in 1990 (Aristotle Transformed) this new book brings together critical new scholarship that is a must-read for any scholar in the field.\r\n\r\nWith a wide range of contributors from across the globe, the articles look at the commentators themselves, discussing problems of analysis and interpretation that have arisen through close study of the texts. Richard Sorabji introduces the volume and himself contributes two new papers. A key recent area of research has been into the Arabic, Latin and Hebrew versions of texts, and several important essays look in depth at these. 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Boethus’ Aristotelian Ontology, 2016
By: Rashed, Marwan, Sorabji, Richard (Ed.)
Title Boethus’ Aristotelian Ontology
Type Book Section
Language English
Date 2016
Published in Aristotle Re-Interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators
Pages 103-124
Categories no categories
Author(s) Rashed, Marwan
Editor(s) Sorabji, Richard
Translator(s)
Boethus of Sidon is crucial for the tradition of commentary on Aristotle, in that he is said to have recommended the remarkable project of writing a word by word commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (exegoumenos kat’ hekasten lexin), and he did write such a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories . Th is was eventually to have a momentous infl uence on the commentary tradition, although the earliest surviving commentaries aft er him are not as thorough. In addition, Boethus, in defending Aristotle’s system, seems to have downgraded his key terms, interpreting them as belonging to the lowest available level. Th is is true of Aristotle’s form, of diff erentia, of universal, and of his fi rst fi gure of syllogism. In Chapter 2, Marwan Rashed takes up Boethus’ downgrading of form as non- substance on the basis of Aristotle’s requirement in Categories 2a11–13; 3a7–9, that a substance is a subject of predicates, and not a predicate, so not in a subject. From this, Simplicius tells us, 21 Boethus concluded that, although a compound of matter and form, like Socrates, can be a substance, and so can matter, for example the fl esh and bones of Socrates, this is not possible for the form of Socrates, his soul. His form cannot be a substance, because form, though not mentioned in Aristotle’s Categories , is said in his Physics 4.3, to be present in matter. Th is exclusion of form was to prove unacceptable more than two hundred years later to Aristotle’s greatest defender, Alexander of Aphrodisias, discussed below in Chapters 3 and 4, because in works other than the Categories, Aristotle treats soul as substance, even though it is in body as a subject (Aristotle, De Anima ( DA ) or On the Soul 2.1). Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book 7 also treats form as a good candidate for being substance, and Metaphysics 8 speaks as if a different criterion for substancehood had already been implied in Book 7 (see 7.17): the cause of a thing’s being. 22 Alexander himself corrected Boethus by holding that form is a part of the compound substance, and a part of a substance is a substance. Rashed in Chapter 2 below cites a treatise in Arabic On Diff erence , existing in two versions, which he argues come from a lost Q uestion about diff erentiae by Alexander. It insists that the diff erentia of a genus, for example rational as diff erentiating a species of animal, is substance because it is a part of a substance, apparently because the differentia (rational) is form and form is part of the genus (animal). Th e Question also criticises someone who denies this by again relying on one of the criteria in Aristotle’s Categories for substancehood (just as Boethus relied on another one in his disqualification of form from substancehood), and this is one of Rashed’s reasons for thinking that Alexander’s opponent is Boethus. Th is time, the unsatisfi ed criterion is that substances receive contrary characteristics. Alexander in the Arabic version replies that it is not diff erentiae but individual substances that have to receive contraries. [introduction]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1536","_score":null,"_ignored":["booksection.book.abstract.keyword"],"_source":{"id":1536,"authors_free":[{"id":2679,"entry_id":1536,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2680,"entry_id":1536,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":133,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Sorabji, Richard","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":133,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Sorabji","full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130064165","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Boethus\u2019 Aristotelian Ontology","main_title":{"title":"Boethus\u2019 Aristotelian Ontology"},"abstract":"Boethus of Sidon is crucial for the tradition of commentary on Aristotle, in that he is said to have recommended the remarkable project of writing a word by word commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories (exegoumenos kat\u2019 hekasten lexin), and he did write such a commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories . Th is was eventually to have a momentous infl uence on the commentary tradition, although the earliest surviving commentaries aft er him are not as thorough. In addition, Boethus, in defending Aristotle\u2019s system, seems to have downgraded his key terms, interpreting them as belonging to the lowest available level. Th is is true of Aristotle\u2019s form, of diff erentia, of universal, and of his fi rst fi gure of syllogism. In Chapter 2, Marwan Rashed takes up Boethus\u2019 downgrading of form as non- substance on the basis of Aristotle\u2019s requirement in Categories 2a11\u201313; 3a7\u20139, that a substance is a subject of predicates, and not a predicate, so not in a subject. From this, Simplicius tells us, 21 Boethus concluded that, although a compound of matter and form, like Socrates, can be a substance, and so can matter, for example the fl esh and bones of Socrates, this is not possible for the form of Socrates, his soul. His form cannot be a substance, because form, though not mentioned in Aristotle\u2019s Categories , is said in his Physics 4.3, to be present in matter. Th is exclusion of form was to prove unacceptable more than two hundred years later to Aristotle\u2019s greatest defender, Alexander of Aphrodisias, discussed below in Chapters 3 and 4, because in works other than the Categories, Aristotle treats soul as substance, even though it is in body as a subject (Aristotle, De Anima ( DA ) or On the Soul 2.1). Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics Book 7 also treats form as a good candidate for being substance, and Metaphysics 8 speaks as if a different criterion for substancehood had already been implied in Book 7 (see 7.17): the cause of a thing\u2019s being. 22 Alexander himself corrected Boethus by holding that form is a part of the compound substance, and a part of a substance is a substance. Rashed in Chapter 2 below cites a treatise in Arabic On Diff erence , existing in two versions, which he argues come from a lost Q uestion about diff erentiae by Alexander. It insists that the diff erentia of a genus, for example rational as diff erentiating a species of animal, is substance because it is a part of a substance, apparently because the differentia (rational) is form and form is part of the genus (animal). Th e Question also criticises someone who denies this by again relying on one of the criteria in Aristotle\u2019s Categories for substancehood (just as Boethus relied on another one in his disqualification of form from substancehood), and this is one of Rashed\u2019s reasons for thinking that Alexander\u2019s opponent is Boethus. Th is time, the unsatisfi ed criterion is that substances receive contrary characteristics. Alexander in the Arabic version replies that it is not diff erentiae but individual substances that have to receive contraries. [introduction]","btype":2,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/TD2RfQpCG4DFyG1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":133,"full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1536,"section_of":1419,"pages":"103-124","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1419,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"reference","type":4,"language":"en","title":"Aristotle Re-Interpreted. 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Building on the strength of the series, which has been hailed as \u2018a scholarly marvel\u2019, \u2018a truly breath-taking achievement\u2019 and \u2018one of the great scholarly achievements of our time\u2019 and on the widely praised edited volume brought out in 1990 (Aristotle Transformed) this new book brings together critical new scholarship that is a must-read for any scholar in the field.\r\n\r\nWith a wide range of contributors from across the globe, the articles look at the commentators themselves, discussing problems of analysis and interpretation that have arisen through close study of the texts. Richard Sorabji introduces the volume and himself contributes two new papers. A key recent area of research has been into the Arabic, Latin and Hebrew versions of texts, and several important essays look in depth at these. 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A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion, 1997
By: Rashed, Marwan, Sorabji, Richard (Ed.)
Title A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion
Type Book Section
Language English
Date 1997
Published in Aristotle and after
Pages 181-195
Categories no categories
Author(s) Rashed, Marwan
Editor(s) Sorabji, Richard
Translator(s)
[Conclusion, pp. 181 f.]: To conclude, then, the historical evolution of the polemics may be summarised as follows: 1. ‘Aristotelian’ claim of the intellect from without; 2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move; 3. Aristoteles of Mytilene (as reported by Alexander in Cl) defends the intellect from without by claiming its ubiquity; 4. Alexander (De intell., C2) criticises Aristoteles’ solution to Atticus’ criticisms and gives an alternative reply to Atticus by accounting for separation in terms of thought processes; 5. Alexander {In Phys.) attacks Atticus’ vehicle-theory on the grounds that it does not resolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution. Thus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an earlier one than the commentary on the Physics.

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  • PAGE 1 OF 1
A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion, 1997
By: Rashed, Marwan, Sorabji, Richard (Ed.)
Title A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion
Type Book Section
Language English
Date 1997
Published in Aristotle and after
Pages 181-195
Categories no categories
Author(s) Rashed, Marwan
Editor(s) Sorabji, Richard
Translator(s)
[Conclusion, pp. 181 f.]: To  conclude,  then,  the  historical  evolution  of  the  polemics 
may be summarised as follows:
1.  ‘Aristotelian’  claim of the intellect from without;
2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move;
3.  Aristoteles  of Mytilene  (as  reported by  Alexander  in  Cl)  defends  the  intellect from 
without by claiming its ubiquity;
4.  Alexander  (De intell.,  C2)  criticises  Aristoteles’  solution  to  Atticus’  criticisms  and 
gives  an  alternative  reply  to  Atticus  by  accounting  for  separation  in  terms  of  thought 
processes;
5.  Alexander {In Phys.)  attacks Atticus’  vehicle-theory  on  the grounds that it does  not 
resolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution.
Thus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an 
earlier one than the commentary on the Physics.

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1061","_score":null,"_ignored":["booksection.book.abstract.keyword"],"_source":{"id":1061,"authors_free":[{"id":1610,"entry_id":1061,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"Marwan","free_last_name":"Rashed","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1611,"entry_id":1061,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":133,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Sorabji, Richard","free_first_name":"Richard","free_last_name":"Sorabji","norm_person":{"id":133,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Sorabji","full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130064165","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion","main_title":{"title":"A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion"},"abstract":"[Conclusion, pp. 181 f.]: To conclude, then, the historical evolution of the polemics \r\nmay be summarised as follows:\r\n1. \u2018Aristotelian\u2019 claim of the intellect from without;\r\n2. Atticus attacks the intellect from without because of its inability to move;\r\n3. Aristoteles of Mytilene (as reported by Alexander in Cl) defends the intellect from \r\nwithout by claiming its ubiquity;\r\n4. Alexander (De intell., C2) criticises Aristoteles\u2019 solution to Atticus\u2019 criticisms and \r\ngives an alternative reply to Atticus by accounting for separation in terms of thought \r\nprocesses;\r\n5. Alexander {In Phys.) attacks Atticus\u2019 vehicle-theory on the grounds that it does not \r\nresolve the question at all and alludes indirectly to his previous solution.\r\nThus, we may conclude that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander, but an \r\nearlier one than the commentary on the Physics.","btype":2,"date":"1997","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/uG5k4khKdCtgMTb","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":133,"full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1061,"section_of":199,"pages":"181-195","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":199,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"Aristotle and after","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Sorabji1997a","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"1997","edition_no":null,"free_date":"1997","abstract":"A selection of papers given at the Institute of Classical Studies during 1996. They cover a variety of new work on the 900 years of philosophy from Aristotle to Simplicius. There is a strong concentration on stoicism with papers by: Michael Frede ( Euphrates of Tyre ); A. A. Long ( Property ownership and community ); Brad Inwood ( 'Why do fools fallin love?' ); Susanne Bobzein ( freedom and ethics ); Richard Gaskin ( cases, predicates and the unity of the proposition ); Richard Sorabji ( stoic philosophy and psychotherapy ); Bernard Williams ( reply to Richard Sorabji ). The other papers are by: Heinrich von Staden ( Galen and the 'Second Sophistic' ); Hans B. Gottschalk ( continuity and change in Aristotelianism ); Travis Butler ( the homonymy of signification in Aristotle ); Andrea Falcon ( Aristotle's theory of division ); Sylvia Berryman (Horror Vacui in the third century BC ); M. B. Trapp ( On the Tablet of Cebes ); Marwan Rashed ( a 'new' text of Alexander on the soul's motion ). [authors abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/YmwXqTgEl5I3UF5","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":199,"pubplace":"University of London","publisher":"Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study","series":"BICS (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies) Supplement","volume":"68","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["A \u201cNew\u201d Text of Alexander on the Soul\u2019s Motion"]}

Boethus’ Aristotelian Ontology, 2016
By: Rashed, Marwan, Sorabji, Richard (Ed.)
Title Boethus’ Aristotelian Ontology
Type Book Section
Language English
Date 2016
Published in Aristotle Re-Interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators
Pages 103-124
Categories no categories
Author(s) Rashed, Marwan
Editor(s) Sorabji, Richard
Translator(s)
Boethus of Sidon is crucial for the tradition of commentary on Aristotle, in that he is said to have recommended the remarkable project of writing a word by word commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (exegoumenos kat’ hekasten lexin), and he did write such a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories . Th is was eventually to have a momentous infl uence on the commentary tradition, although the earliest surviving commentaries aft er him are not as thorough. In addition, Boethus, in defending Aristotle’s system, seems to have downgraded his key terms, interpreting them as belonging to the lowest available level. Th is is true of Aristotle’s form, of diff erentia, of universal, and of his fi rst fi gure of syllogism. In Chapter 2, Marwan Rashed takes up Boethus’ downgrading of form as non- substance on the basis of Aristotle’s requirement in Categories 2a11–13; 3a7–9, that a substance is a subject of predicates, and not a predicate, so not in a subject. From this, Simplicius tells us, 21 Boethus concluded that, although a compound of matter and form, like Socrates, can be a substance, and so can matter, for example the fl esh and bones of Socrates, this is not possible for the form of Socrates, his soul. His form cannot be a substance, because form, though not mentioned in Aristotle’s Categories , is said in his Physics 4.3, to be present in matter. Th is exclusion of form was to prove unacceptable more than two hundred years later to Aristotle’s greatest defender, Alexander of Aphrodisias, discussed below in Chapters 3 and 4, because in works other than the Categories, Aristotle treats soul as substance, even though it is in body as a subject (Aristotle, De Anima ( DA ) or On the Soul 2.1). Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book 7 also treats form as a good candidate for being substance, and Metaphysics 8 speaks as if a different criterion for substancehood had already been implied in Book 7 (see 7.17): the cause of a thing’s being. 22 Alexander himself corrected Boethus by holding that form is a part of the compound substance, and a part of a substance is a substance. Rashed in Chapter 2 below cites a treatise in Arabic On Diff erence , existing in two versions, which he argues come from a lost Q uestion about diff erentiae by Alexander. It insists that the diff erentia of a genus, for example rational as diff erentiating a species of animal, is substance because it is a part of a substance, apparently because the differentia (rational) is form and form is part of the genus (animal). Th e Question also criticises someone who denies this by again relying on one of the criteria in Aristotle’s Categories for substancehood (just as Boethus relied on another one in his disqualification of form from substancehood), and this is one of Rashed’s reasons for thinking that Alexander’s opponent is Boethus. Th is time, the unsatisfi ed criterion is that substances receive contrary characteristics. Alexander in the Arabic version replies that it is not diff erentiae but individual substances that have to receive contraries. [introduction]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1536","_score":null,"_ignored":["booksection.book.abstract.keyword"],"_source":{"id":1536,"authors_free":[{"id":2679,"entry_id":1536,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":194,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Rashed, Marwan","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":194,"first_name":"Marwan","last_name":"Rashed","full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1054568634","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2680,"entry_id":1536,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":133,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Sorabji, Richard","free_first_name":"","free_last_name":"","norm_person":{"id":133,"first_name":"Richard","last_name":"Sorabji","full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/130064165","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Boethus\u2019 Aristotelian Ontology","main_title":{"title":"Boethus\u2019 Aristotelian Ontology"},"abstract":"Boethus of Sidon is crucial for the tradition of commentary on Aristotle, in that he is said to have recommended the remarkable project of writing a word by word commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories (exegoumenos kat\u2019 hekasten lexin), and he did write such a commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories . Th is was eventually to have a momentous infl uence on the commentary tradition, although the earliest surviving commentaries aft er him are not as thorough. In addition, Boethus, in defending Aristotle\u2019s system, seems to have downgraded his key terms, interpreting them as belonging to the lowest available level. Th is is true of Aristotle\u2019s form, of diff erentia, of universal, and of his fi rst fi gure of syllogism. In Chapter 2, Marwan Rashed takes up Boethus\u2019 downgrading of form as non- substance on the basis of Aristotle\u2019s requirement in Categories 2a11\u201313; 3a7\u20139, that a substance is a subject of predicates, and not a predicate, so not in a subject. From this, Simplicius tells us, 21 Boethus concluded that, although a compound of matter and form, like Socrates, can be a substance, and so can matter, for example the fl esh and bones of Socrates, this is not possible for the form of Socrates, his soul. His form cannot be a substance, because form, though not mentioned in Aristotle\u2019s Categories , is said in his Physics 4.3, to be present in matter. Th is exclusion of form was to prove unacceptable more than two hundred years later to Aristotle\u2019s greatest defender, Alexander of Aphrodisias, discussed below in Chapters 3 and 4, because in works other than the Categories, Aristotle treats soul as substance, even though it is in body as a subject (Aristotle, De Anima ( DA ) or On the Soul 2.1). Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics Book 7 also treats form as a good candidate for being substance, and Metaphysics 8 speaks as if a different criterion for substancehood had already been implied in Book 7 (see 7.17): the cause of a thing\u2019s being. 22 Alexander himself corrected Boethus by holding that form is a part of the compound substance, and a part of a substance is a substance. Rashed in Chapter 2 below cites a treatise in Arabic On Diff erence , existing in two versions, which he argues come from a lost Q uestion about diff erentiae by Alexander. It insists that the diff erentia of a genus, for example rational as diff erentiating a species of animal, is substance because it is a part of a substance, apparently because the differentia (rational) is form and form is part of the genus (animal). Th e Question also criticises someone who denies this by again relying on one of the criteria in Aristotle\u2019s Categories for substancehood (just as Boethus relied on another one in his disqualification of form from substancehood), and this is one of Rashed\u2019s reasons for thinking that Alexander\u2019s opponent is Boethus. Th is time, the unsatisfi ed criterion is that substances receive contrary characteristics. Alexander in the Arabic version replies that it is not diff erentiae but individual substances that have to receive contraries. [introduction]","btype":2,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/TD2RfQpCG4DFyG1","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":194,"full_name":"Rashed, Marwan","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":133,"full_name":"Sorabji, Richard","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1536,"section_of":1419,"pages":"103-124","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":1419,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":"reference","type":4,"language":"en","title":"Aristotle Re-Interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2016","edition_no":null,"free_date":null,"abstract":"This volume presents collected essays \u2013 some brand new, some republished, and others newly translated \u2013 on the ancient commentators on Aristotle and showcases the leading research of the last three decades. Through the work and scholarship inspired by Richard Sorabji in his series of translations of the commentators started in the 1980s, these ancient texts have become a key field within ancient philosophy. Building on the strength of the series, which has been hailed as \u2018a scholarly marvel\u2019, \u2018a truly breath-taking achievement\u2019 and \u2018one of the great scholarly achievements of our time\u2019 and on the widely praised edited volume brought out in 1990 (Aristotle Transformed) this new book brings together critical new scholarship that is a must-read for any scholar in the field.\r\n\r\nWith a wide range of contributors from across the globe, the articles look at the commentators themselves, discussing problems of analysis and interpretation that have arisen through close study of the texts. Richard Sorabji introduces the volume and himself contributes two new papers. A key recent area of research has been into the Arabic, Latin and Hebrew versions of texts, and several important essays look in depth at these. With all text translated and transliterated, the volume is accessible to readers without specialist knowledge of Greek or other languages, and should reach a wide audience across the disciplines of Philosophy, Classics and the study of ancient texts. [author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/thdAvlIvWl4EdKB","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":1419,"pubplace":"New York","publisher":"Bloomsbury Academic","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Boethus\u2019 Aristotelian Ontology"]}

Rediscovered Categories Commentary: Porphyry(?) with Fragments of Boethus, 2016
By: Chiaradonna, Riccardo, Rashed, Marwan, Sedley, David N., Sorabji, Richard (Ed.)
Title Rediscovered Categories Commentary: Porphyry(?) with Fragments of Boethus
Type Book Section
Language English
Date 2016
Published in Aristotle Re-Interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators
Pages 231-262
Categories no categories
Author(s) Chiaradonna, Riccardo , Rashed, Marwan , Sedley, David N.
Editor(s) Sorabji, Richard
Translator(s)
Riccardo Chiaradonna has studied Boethus’ downgrading also of universals, again by reference to the Categories ’ defi nition of substance. On this ground, universals are not even a something (a Stoic category, lower than substance). Simplicius tells us: ‘Boethus says fi rst that the universal does not even exist in reality ( einai en hupostasei ), according to Aristotle, and even if it did have any reality, it would not be a something . Aristotle rather said it was in something’. Chiaradonna concludes from a discussion of a number of passages that Boethus thought of a universal as nothing but a collection of particulars. Th e recently recovered fragments of Porphyry’s lost commentary on the Categories in Chapter 8 below, speaking of animal, similarly say ‘none of these generic items is a subject’. The text of Porphyry translated and analysed in this chapter includes among others a further new fragment on Boethus’ treatment of division by differentia at 14,4–15. Rashed has drawn attention to yet another way in which Boethus downgrades something of Aristotle’s: the priority of Aristotle’s fi rst fi gure of syllogism. Or at least he puts Aristotle’s figures all on the same level. The figures are Aristotle’s patterns of valid argument concerning all, some, or none of a class of things, and Aristotle thought that certain arguments in the second and third figures had to be proved equivalent to certain arguments in the fi rst, before they could be seen as valid. I shall discuss below the resumption of the debate in the fourth century by the commentator Themistius. Rashed has translated Th emistius’ text from the superior of two Arabic manuscripts into French. It is to be hoped that Chiaradonna and Rashed, two of the translators of the fragment in Chapter 8, will carry out their plan of compiling the fi rst collection of fragments of Boethus, of which Michael Griffin has already noticed around fifty.  [introduction]

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Rashed has drawn attention to yet another way in which Boethus downgrades something of Aristotle\u2019s: the priority of Aristotle\u2019s fi rst fi gure of syllogism. Or at least he puts Aristotle\u2019s figures all on the same level. The figures are Aristotle\u2019s patterns of valid argument concerning all, some, or none of a class of things, and Aristotle thought that certain arguments in the second and third figures had to be proved equivalent to certain arguments in the fi rst, before they could be seen as valid. I shall discuss below the resumption of the debate in the fourth century by the commentator Themistius. Rashed has translated Th emistius\u2019 text from the superior of two Arabic manuscripts into French. It is to be hoped that Chiaradonna and Rashed, two of the translators of the fragment in Chapter 8, will carry out their plan of compiling the fi rst collection of fragments of Boethus, of which Michael Griffin has already noticed around fifty. 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Building on the strength of the series, which has been hailed as \u2018a scholarly marvel\u2019, \u2018a truly breath-taking achievement\u2019 and \u2018one of the great scholarly achievements of our time\u2019 and on the widely praised edited volume brought out in 1990 (Aristotle Transformed) this new book brings together critical new scholarship that is a must-read for any scholar in the field.\r\n\r\nWith a wide range of contributors from across the globe, the articles look at the commentators themselves, discussing problems of analysis and interpretation that have arisen through close study of the texts. Richard Sorabji introduces the volume and himself contributes two new papers. A key recent area of research has been into the Arabic, Latin and Hebrew versions of texts, and several important essays look in depth at these. 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