Mathematical Explanation and the Philosphy of Nature in Late Ancient Philosophy: Astronomy and the Theory of the Elements, 2012
By: Opsomer, Jan
Title Mathematical Explanation and the Philosphy of Nature in Late Ancient Philosophy: Astronomy and the Theory of the Elements
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
Volume 23
Pages 65-106
Categories no categories
Author(s) Opsomer, Jan
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
Late ancient Platonists discuss two theories in which geometric entities explain natural phenomena : the regular polyhedra of geometric atomism and the eccentrics and epicycles of astronomy. Simplicius explicitly compares the status of the first to the hypotheses of the astronomers. The point of comparison is the fallibility of both theories, not the (lack of) reality of the entities postulated. Simplicius has strong realist commitments as far as astronomy is concerned. Syrianus and Proclus too do not consider the polyhedra as devoid of physical reality. Proclus rejects epicycles and eccentrics, but accepts the reality of material homocentric spheres, moved by their own souls. The spheres move the astral objects contained in them, which, however, add motions caused by their own souls. The epicyclical and eccntric hypotheses are useful, as they help us to understand the complex motions resulting from the interplay of spherical motions and volitional motions of the planets. Yet astral souls do not think in accordance with human theoretical constructs, but rather grasp the complex patterns of their motions directly. Our understanding of astronomy depends upon our own cognition of intelligible patterns and their mathematical images. [Author's abstract]

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Self-motion according to Iamblichus, 2012
By: Opsomer, Jan
Title Self-motion according to Iamblichus
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Elenchos
Volume 33
Issue 2
Pages 259-290
Categories no categories
Author(s) Opsomer, Jan
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the “changing self”. Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion. [Author's abstract]

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Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter ("De mal. subs." 30-7), 2001
By: Opsomer, Jan
Title Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter ("De mal. subs." 30-7)
Type Article
Language English
Date 2001
Journal Phronesis
Volume 46
Issue 2
Pages 154-188
Categories no categories
Author(s) Opsomer, Jan
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In De malorum subsistentia chs 30-7, Proclus criticizes the view that evil is to be identified with matter. His main target is Plotinus' account in Enn. 1,8 [51]. Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul, and that it is evil or a principle of evil. According to Proclus, matter is good, because it is produced by the One. Plotinus' doctrine of matter-evil is the result of a different conception of emanation, according to which matter does not revert to its principle. Proclus claims that to posit a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dualism, or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus does not seem to be able to escape the latter consequence, if he is to remain committed to the Neoplatonic conception of causation. Plotinus equated matter with privation and said it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance, thus violating fundamental Aristotelian tenets. Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy, as does Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories. It is possible that Iamblichus was the source of both Proclus and Simplicius, and that he was the originator of the parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments. [Author’s abstract]

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  • PAGE 1 OF 1
Mathematical Explanation and the Philosphy of Nature in Late Ancient Philosophy: Astronomy and the Theory of the Elements, 2012
By: Opsomer, Jan
Title Mathematical Explanation and the Philosphy of Nature in Late Ancient Philosophy: Astronomy and the Theory of the Elements
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
Volume 23
Pages 65-106
Categories no categories
Author(s) Opsomer, Jan
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
Late ancient Platonists discuss two theories in which geometric entities explain natural 
phenomena :  the  regular  polyhedra  of  geometric  atomism  and  the  eccentrics  and  epicycles 
of astronomy. Simplicius explicitly compares the status of the first to the hypotheses of the astronomers. The point of comparison is the fallibility of both theories, not the (lack of) reality 
of the entities postulated. Simplicius has strong realist commitments as far as astronomy is concerned. Syrianus and Proclus too do not consider the polyhedra as devoid of physical reality. Proclus rejects epicycles and eccentrics, but accepts the reality of material homocentric spheres, moved by their own souls. The spheres move the astral objects contained in them, which, however, add motions caused by their own souls. The epicyclical and eccntric hypotheses are useful, as they help us to understand the complex motions resulting from the interplay of spherical motions and volitional motions of the planets. Yet astral souls do not think in accordance with human theoretical constructs, but rather grasp the complex patterns of their motions directly. Our understanding of astronomy depends upon our own cognition of intelligible patterns and their mathematical images. [Author's abstract]

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Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter ("De mal. subs." 30-7), 2001
By: Opsomer, Jan
Title Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter ("De mal. subs." 30-7)
Type Article
Language English
Date 2001
Journal Phronesis
Volume 46
Issue 2
Pages 154-188
Categories no categories
Author(s) Opsomer, Jan
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In De malorum subsistentia chs 30-7, Proclus criticizes the view that evil is to be identified with matter. His main target is Plotinus' account in Enn. 1,8 [51]. Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul, and that it is evil or a principle of evil. According to Proclus, matter is good, because it is produced 
by the One. Plotinus' doctrine of matter-evil is the result of a different conception of emanation, according to which matter does not revert to its principle. Proclus claims that to posit a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dualism, or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil. Plotinus does not seem to be able to escape the latter consequence, if he is to remain committed to the Neoplatonic conception of causation. Plotinus equated matter with privation and said it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance, thus violating fundamental Aristotelian tenets. Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy, as does Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories. It is possible that Iamblichus was the source of both Proclus and Simplicius, and that he was the originator of the parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments. [Author’s abstract]

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Self-motion according to Iamblichus, 2012
By: Opsomer, Jan
Title Self-motion according to Iamblichus
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Elenchos
Volume 33
Issue 2
Pages 259-290
Categories no categories
Author(s) Opsomer, Jan
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the “changing self”. Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion. [Author's abstract]

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  • PAGE 1 OF 1