{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1141","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1141,"authors_free":[{"id":1715,"entry_id":1141,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire","main_title":{"title":"Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire"},"abstract":"Griffin, Rashed, and Chiaradonna have shown how we can use Simplicius\u2019 Categories commentary to reconstruct much of Porphyry\u2019s greater Categories commentary (also witnessed by the Archimedes Palimpsest), and then use this to reconstruct much of the work of Boethus, and to a lesser extent Andronicus, on the Categories. In some cases \r\nbuilding on Griffin, in other cases disagreeing with him, I bring out some ways in which Andronicus and Boethus differ from most later interpreters; this can help us understand Alexander\u2019s and Porphyry\u2019s responses. I reconstruct (i) Andronicus\u2019 interpretation of \u2018in\u2019 and \u2018said of, which is based on Aristotle\u2019s distinction between abstract nouns and paronymous concrete nouns, and avoids the metaphysical freight that later interpreters load onto the notion of \u2018said o f; (ii) Boethus\u2019 use of De Interpretation 1 to explain how \r\na universal term can be synonymous without positing either universals in re or Stoic \r\nXeKid, and the consequences he draws for the different aims of the Categories and De Interpretation; and (iii) Boethus\u2019 solution to the tension between Aristotle\u2019s hylomorphism and the Categories\u2019 account of substance. Boethus, unlike later interpreters, thinks the \r\nform is in the matter, and is therefore not a substance but (typically) a quality, but that it \r\nis nonetheless able to constitute the composite as a substance distinct from the matter. I bring out the Aristotelian basis for Boethus\u2019 reading, connect it with Boethus\u2019 accounts of differentiae and of the soul, and show how Boethus\u2019 views help motivate Porphyry\u2019s responses. In some cases Porphyry constructs his views by triangulating between Boethus and Alexander. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/f40u6koKhn1exfj","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1141,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"29","issue":"","pages":"13-43"}},"sort":["Andronicus and Boethus: Reflections on Michael Griffin\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Categories in the Early Roman Empire"]}

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"977","_score":null,"_source":{"id":977,"authors_free":[{"id":1476,"entry_id":977,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":255,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Menn, Stephen","free_first_name":"Stephen","free_last_name":"Menn","norm_person":{"id":255,"first_name":"Stephen","last_name":"Menn","full_name":"Menn, Stephen","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/174092768","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)"},"abstract":"Aristotle in Physics 1,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate \"cognition according to the definition and through the elements,\" and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 and the ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to recon struct Simplicius' reading of \"Socrates' Dream,\" its place in the Theaetetus larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. ","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/hFUY0I2JzLFnSQG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":255,"full_name":"Menn, Stephen","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":977,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Phronesis","volume":"55","issue":"3","pages":"255-270"}},"sort":["Simplicius on the \"Theaetetus\" (\"In Physica\" 17,38-18,23 Diels)"]}