{"_index":"sire","_id":"989","_score":null,"_source":{"id":989,"authors_free":[{"id":1490,"entry_id":989,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":253,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","free_first_name":"Richard D.","free_last_name":"McKirahan","norm_person":{"id":253,"first_name":"Richard D.","last_name":"McKirahan","full_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131702254","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment","main_title":{"title":"Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment"},"abstract":"Having established the attributes of \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that \u2018you cannot know what is not...nor can you declare it\u2019 (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8. He begins by stating (B8.34) that \u2018what is to be thought of is the same as that on account of which the thought is\u2019 and goes on to give an argument for that claim (B8.35-38a). He then (B8.38b-41) states as a consequence of the claim, that \u2018it (that is, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03cc\u03bd) has been named all things that mortals, persuaded that they are real, have posited both to be generated and to perish, both to be and not, and to change place and alter bright color\u2019. His treatment of these issues, which concern the relations among reality, thought, and language, is one of the most philosophically important parts of his work; it is arguably the very heart of his philosophy. It is also one of the most obscure. The philosophical difficulties are compounded by the facts that the Greek text is uncertain and its grammatical structure is hard to make out.\r\n\r\nOne of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato\u2019s Theaetetus and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line\u2014a misquotation of the true version, or an altogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently.\r\n\r\nThe first step towards understanding the passage is to establish the text of B8.38. Ideally such a text would have substantial support in the ancient sources, it would be a line of the dactylic hexameter verse in which Parmenides wrote, it would make grammatical sense, it would give a good philosophical sense in the place where it occurs, it would suit Parmenides\u2019 manner of presenting his ideas and arguments, and it would make sense in relation to the rest of his philosophy.\r\n\r\nIn part I, I survey the evidence for B8.38 and argue that if the version reported by Plato and his commentator is accepted as a separate fragment, then one of the metrically acceptable versions of the line preserved in the manuscripts of Simplicius is more strongly supported than has previously been thought and, in fact, from this point of view it becomes the leading candidate. In part II, I argue that this version can be read in a way that is philologically unobjectionable, and I propose a way of reading it that fits well with its context, is characteristic of Parmenides\u2019 philosophical style, and gives at least as good philosophical sense as previous construals do. I also defend my interpretation against recent claims by Kingsley, Vlastos, and Mourelatos.\r\n\r\nFinally, in part III, I take up the question of Cornford\u2019s fragment (as the line quoted by Plato and his commentator is known). I boost the alleged fragment\u2019s claim to authenticity by proposing a new way to understand the text that makes the line metrically and philologically unobjectionable and presenting two ways of construing it that make philosophical sense and make claims that do not repeat what Parmenides says elsewhere but accord well with his views. [introduction p. 1-2]","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/SqC5oF6JPgbuN3v","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":253,"full_name":"McKirahan, Richard D.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":989,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"30","issue":"1","pages":"1-14"}},"sort":["Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford\u2019s Fragment"]}