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Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators, 2014
By: Lautner, Peter, Remes, Pauliina (Ed.), Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla (Ed.)

Title	Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators
Type	Book Section
Language	English
Date	2014
Published in	The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism
Pages	323-338
Categories	no categories
Author(s)	Lautner, Peter
Editor(s)	Remes, Pauliina , Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla
Translator(s)

Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a con scious activity, including even the reception of primary sense-qualities such as colours and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense-object upon the sense-organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotles Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them.1 The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense-perception implies aware ness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense-organs of the capacity to perceive. Moreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense-perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact, but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle’s de Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. [p. 323]

Online Resources

https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7cDpha17XNcRZsE

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The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius, 2004
By: Lautner, Peter, Stone, Martin W. F. (Ed.), Baltussen, Han (Ed.), Adamson, Peter (Ed.)

Title	The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius
Type	Book Section
Language	English
Date	2004
Published in	Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries, Volume 1
Pages	163-174
Categories	no categories
Author(s)	Lautner, Peter
Editor(s)	Stone, Martin W. F. , Baltussen, Han , Adamson, Peter
Translator(s)

Although the metaphysical systems of the Neoplatonists at Athens were much the same, their views on the human soul, particularly on its activities, showed great divergence. This is all the more striking because they were all heavily influenced by Iamblichus. But the mode and extent of that influence varied a great deal, and their theories of the human soul varied accordingly. As a case study, I shall examine the position of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koinê aisthêsis. Both authors took Aristotle's views as the point of departure; that is obvious in Pseudo-Simplicius' commentary on the De anima and easily detectable in Proclus' commentary on the Timaeus. Moreover, both of them paid special attention to the problem of whether this sense is separate from the five particular senses or just a joint activity of the senses. My aim is to show that the different conceptions are signs of a deeper divergence. Despite the similarity of their metaphysical outlook, their views on the structure of the human soul were considerably different, and this left its mark on their accounts of the koinê aisthêsis. [Introduction, p. 163]

Online Resources

https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mmogdVPzGKbtNc8

PAGE 1 OF 1

Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators, 2014
By: Lautner, Peter, Remes, Pauliina (Ed.), Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla (Ed.)

Title	Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators
Type	Book Section
Language	English
Date	2014
Published in	The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism
Pages	323-338
Categories	no categories
Author(s)	Lautner, Peter
Editor(s)	Remes, Pauliina , Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla
Translator(s)

Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a con
scious activity, including even the reception of primary sense-qualities such as colours 
and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the 
specific impact exerted by the sense-object  upon  the sense-organ. The commentators 
can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotles Physics 7.2, according to which what 
is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them.1 The problem 
with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others 
involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense-perception implies aware
ness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion 
seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense-organs of the capacity to perceive. 
Moreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense-perception is that we are 
aware not only of the specific impact, but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory 
power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle’s de Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists 
that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual 
system is capable of grasping its own operations. [p. 323]

Online Resources

https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7cDpha17XNcRZsE

The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius, 2004
By: Lautner, Peter, Stone, Martin W. F. (Ed.), Baltussen, Han (Ed.), Adamson, Peter (Ed.)

Title	The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius
Type	Book Section
Language	English
Date	2004
Published in	Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries, Volume 1
Pages	163-174
Categories	no categories
Author(s)	Lautner, Peter
Editor(s)	Stone, Martin W. F. , Baltussen, Han , Adamson, Peter
Translator(s)

Although the metaphysical systems of the Neoplatonists at Athens were much the same, their views on the human soul, particularly on its activities, showed great divergence. This is all the more striking because they were all heavily influenced by Iamblichus. But the mode and extent of that influence varied a great deal, and their theories of the human soul varied accordingly. As a case study, I shall examine the position of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koinê aisthêsis. Both authors took Aristotle's views as the point of departure; that is obvious in Pseudo-Simplicius' commentary on the De anima and easily detectable in Proclus' commentary on the Timaeus. Moreover, both of them paid special attention to the problem of whether this sense is separate from the five particular senses or just a joint activity of the senses. My aim is to show that the different conceptions are signs of a deeper divergence. Despite the similarity of their metaphysical outlook, their views on the structure of the human soul were considerably different, and this left its mark on their accounts of the koinê aisthêsis. [Introduction, p. 163]

Online Resources

https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/mmogdVPzGKbtNc8

PAGE 1 OF 1