| Title | Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Published in | The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism |
| Pages | 323-338 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
| Editor(s) | Remes, Pauliina , Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla |
| Translator(s) |
| Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a conscious activity, including even the reception of primary sense qualities such as colors and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense object upon the sense organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotle's Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them. The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense perception implies awareness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense organs of the capacity to perceive. Moreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle’s De Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. At the beginning of De Anima 3.2, he presents the following aporia: "Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense]. But in that case, there will be the same [sense] for sight and the color which is the subject for sight—so that either there will be two senses for the same thing or {the sense} itself will be the one for itself." (425b 12-16, trans. Hamlyn) The distinction between perception and perception of perception—perceptual consciousness—is here taken for granted, and the fact that a subject perceives that he perceives is something that calls for explanation. In principle, the problem posed by Physics 7.2 is now resolved. On the account of the De Anima, in order for the subject to be aware of it, sense perception must be understood as a change that takes place in the perceiving subject. According to a general principle of change, formulated in Physics 3.3 (202a21-b5), the change produced by some cause is always in the thing that is changed. Consequently, as a kind of qualitative change, sense perception takes place in the perceiving subject. Moreover, sense perception implies perceptual awareness because sense perception is a reception of sensible forms coming from without. Perceptual awareness comes about when the sense apprehends the sensible forms in itself and, on account of this, fulfills its function as sense. We perceive the change within ourselves. The two processes are one, differing only in account. For it is by receiving the form from the things perceived, which are outside, that we apprehend them, but it is by the sense having the form of the things perceived in itself that perceptual awareness comes about. To take the example of seeing, we see something in virtue of apprehending the perceptible’s form. By apprehending the form, the sense of sight sees, and at the same time, it comes to see itself seeing. On this account, sense perception is intimately linked to a certain kind of awareness. In sense perception, we simultaneously apprehend both the thing perceived and the activity of the sense in relation to the thing perceived. Perceptual awareness is tied to the fact that in sense perception, we must be aware of the reception of external influence. Hence, the reflexive nature of sense perception is somehow included in the activity of grasping the primary objects of sense perception. How shall we harmonize the two accounts? After all, it seems that in the De Anima, Alexander emphasizes the role of the common sense power, whereas in Quaestiones 3.7, he derives perceptual awareness from the general nature of sense perception. My suggestion is that the two accounts are complementary. The Quaestiones offer a general account of how perceptual awareness is possible. The reception of sensible forms requires awareness. Following Aristotle, Alexander assumes that this kind of awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty. It is not the rational faculty that such a task has been assigned to. In the De Anima, Alexander specifies the thesis by pointing out that perceptual awareness comes about by virtue of the activity of the center of our perceptual system. It may remain unclear as to what arguments led him to dismiss the possibility that the particular senses might be able to grasp the activity of their own. There seem to be two points that could not have been accepted, for different reasons, and they also marked the limits within which Alexander's argument must have moved. On the one hand, he accepted the Aristotelian thesis that perceptual awareness is the task of the perceptual system. On the other hand, he might have had doubts about the ability of the particular senses to grasp their own activities. Even if the act of seeing is somehow colored (De Anima 92.27-31), there must be a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. The difference is within the perceptual system and lies between the particular sense and the common sense power. [introduction p. 325-326] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/wW0wlLHdi7RUUn2 |
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This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense object upon the sense organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotle's Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them. The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense perception implies awareness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense organs of the capacity to perceive.\r\n\r\nMoreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle\u2019s De Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. At the beginning of De Anima 3.2, he presents the following aporia:\r\n\r\n\"Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense]. But in that case, there will be the same [sense] for sight and the color which is the subject for sight\u2014so that either there will be two senses for the same thing or {the sense} itself will be the one for itself.\" (425b 12-16, trans. Hamlyn)\r\n\r\nThe distinction between perception and perception of perception\u2014perceptual consciousness\u2014is here taken for granted, and the fact that a subject perceives that he perceives is something that calls for explanation. In principle, the problem posed by Physics 7.2 is now resolved. On the account of the De Anima, in order for the subject to be aware of it, sense perception must be understood as a change that takes place in the perceiving subject. According to a general principle of change, formulated in Physics 3.3 (202a21-b5), the change produced by some cause is always in the thing that is changed.\r\n\r\nConsequently, as a kind of qualitative change, sense perception takes place in the perceiving subject. Moreover, sense perception implies perceptual awareness because sense perception is a reception of sensible forms coming from without. Perceptual awareness comes about when the sense apprehends the sensible forms in itself and, on account of this, fulfills its function as sense. We perceive the change within ourselves. The two processes are one, differing only in account. For it is by receiving the form from the things perceived, which are outside, that we apprehend them, but it is by the sense having the form of the things perceived in itself that perceptual awareness comes about. To take the example of seeing, we see something in virtue of apprehending the perceptible\u2019s form. By apprehending the form, the sense of sight sees, and at the same time, it comes to see itself seeing.\r\n\r\nOn this account, sense perception is intimately linked to a certain kind of awareness. In sense perception, we simultaneously apprehend both the thing perceived and the activity of the sense in relation to the thing perceived. Perceptual awareness is tied to the fact that in sense perception, we must be aware of the reception of external influence. Hence, the reflexive nature of sense perception is somehow included in the activity of grasping the primary objects of sense perception.\r\n\r\nHow shall we harmonize the two accounts? After all, it seems that in the De Anima, Alexander emphasizes the role of the common sense power, whereas in Quaestiones 3.7, he derives perceptual awareness from the general nature of sense perception. My suggestion is that the two accounts are complementary. The Quaestiones offer a general account of how perceptual awareness is possible. The reception of sensible forms requires awareness. Following Aristotle, Alexander assumes that this kind of awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty. It is not the rational faculty that such a task has been assigned to.\r\n\r\nIn the De Anima, Alexander specifies the thesis by pointing out that perceptual awareness comes about by virtue of the activity of the center of our perceptual system. It may remain unclear as to what arguments led him to dismiss the possibility that the particular senses might be able to grasp the activity of their own. There seem to be two points that could not have been accepted, for different reasons, and they also marked the limits within which Alexander's argument must have moved.\r\n\r\nOn the one hand, he accepted the Aristotelian thesis that perceptual awareness is the task of the perceptual system. On the other hand, he might have had doubts about the ability of the particular senses to grasp their own activities. Even if the act of seeing is somehow colored (De Anima 92.27-31), there must be a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. The difference is within the perceptual system and lies between the particular sense and the common sense power. 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An international team of scholars situates and re-evaluates Neoplatonism within the history of ancient philosophy and thought, and explores its influence on philosophical and religious schools worldwide. Over thirty chapters are divided into seven clear parts:\r\n\r\n (Re)sources, instruction and interaction\r\n Methods and Styles of Exegesis\r\n Metaphysics and Metaphysical Perspectives\r\n Language, Knowledge, Soul, and Self\r\n Nature: Physics, Medicine and Biology\r\n Ethics, Political Theory and Aesthetics\r\n The legacy of Neoplatonism.\r\n\r\nThe Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism is a major reference source for all students and scholars in Neoplatonism and ancient philosophy, as well as researchers in the philosophy of science, ethics, aesthetics and religion. 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| Title | The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2004 |
| Published in | Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries, Volume 1 |
| Pages | 163-174 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
| Editor(s) | Stone, Martin W. F. , Baltussen, Han , Adamson, Peter |
| Translator(s) |
| I think we can draw the conclusion that, for the commentator, it is the more formal character of the koinê aisthêsis that makes it capable of performing all the tasks that were assigned to it by Aristotle. Pseudo-Simplicius justified this claim by appealing to distinctly Neoplatonic doctrines, such as the formal structure of perceptual judgment: the koinê aisthêsis operates by being present to each particular sense in respect of what they have in common with each other. Again, this is not to posit a sixth sense; the koinê aisthêsis and the particular senses are not different entities. In other words, they are not different faculties, only different activities of the same perceptual system. We can still speak of superiority here, but only superiority in terms of functional priority. That we are not dealing with distinct capacities is well demonstrated by the commentator at 196.4 ff. He claims that the koinê aisthêsis can also perceive color, but only by virtue of sight, just as it can perceive flavor only by virtue of taste. If the koinê aisthêsis and sight were wholly distinct, then we would fall back into the aporia that both Aristotle and Pseudo-Simplicius wished to avoid. The perceptual system as such, or the more formal structure of the whole perceptual system, can grasp the common sensibles, apprehend its own working, and discriminate different sense-objects by an instantaneous act of comprehension. It seems that the koinê aisthêsis emerges as a new activity on the basis of the particular senses. The commentator’s remarks at 196.29-30 corroborate this assumption. On explaining Aristotle’s thesis (De anima 426b10) that the koinê aisthêsis judges the differences in the underlying sense-objects, Pseudo-Simplicius notes that the koinê aisthêsis apprehends all sensory contraries such as white and black, rough and smooth, and does so by transcending them. This does not mean that koinê aisthêsis is transcendent, only that it is further away from the sensible objects. It is prior to the multitude of the particular senses and works together with all of them. This priority is not necessarily temporal; indeed, it is more likely causal, where causality does not imply a relation between two different entities—he may have in mind the relation of the whole to its parts. In any case, we have already seen that the koinê aisthêsis cannot be a cause that exists independently of the particular senses. Our comparison of the views of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koinê aisthêsis has yielded two important points. First, the two disagree about the status of the koinê aisthêsis. While Proclus seems to assume that it differs from the particular senses, Pseudo-Simplicius clearly denies that and, under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, claims that there is no sixth sense to perform those functions that were traditionally attributed to the koinê aisthêsis. Proclus’ arguments for his position are not clear from the extant corpus, but those put forward by Pseudo-Simplicius are overwhelmingly Neoplatonic, not Peripatetic. Second, they also disagree about which capacity is responsible for perceptual awareness. Their disagreement is deeply rooted in their respective notions of the human soul. While Pseudo-Simplicius places perceptual awareness firmly within the scope of the perceptual system, Proclus felt the need to postulate a distinct capacity in the rational soul whose role is to be aware of every psychic activity. The difference left its mark on their discussion of the various functions of our perceptual capacities. But the divergence in their vision of the human soul is all the more interesting insofar as they are said to have held much the same views on metaphysics. [conclusion p. 172-173] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4LJXmhF8cXPYjb4 |
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Pseudo-Simplicius justified this claim by appealing to distinctly Neoplatonic doctrines, such as the formal structure of perceptual judgment: the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis operates by being present to each particular sense in respect of what they have in common with each other. Again, this is not to posit a sixth sense; the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis and the particular senses are not different entities. In other words, they are not different faculties, only different activities of the same perceptual system. We can still speak of superiority here, but only superiority in terms of functional priority.\r\n\r\nThat we are not dealing with distinct capacities is well demonstrated by the commentator at 196.4 ff. He claims that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis can also perceive color, but only by virtue of sight, just as it can perceive flavor only by virtue of taste. If the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis and sight were wholly distinct, then we would fall back into the aporia that both Aristotle and Pseudo-Simplicius wished to avoid. The perceptual system as such, or the more formal structure of the whole perceptual system, can grasp the common sensibles, apprehend its own working, and discriminate different sense-objects by an instantaneous act of comprehension.\r\n\r\nIt seems that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis emerges as a new activity on the basis of the particular senses. The commentator\u2019s remarks at 196.29-30 corroborate this assumption. On explaining Aristotle\u2019s thesis (De anima 426b10) that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis judges the differences in the underlying sense-objects, Pseudo-Simplicius notes that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis apprehends all sensory contraries such as white and black, rough and smooth, and does so by transcending them. This does not mean that koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis is transcendent, only that it is further away from the sensible objects. It is prior to the multitude of the particular senses and works together with all of them.\r\n\r\nThis priority is not necessarily temporal; indeed, it is more likely causal, where causality does not imply a relation between two different entities\u2014he may have in mind the relation of the whole to its parts. In any case, we have already seen that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis cannot be a cause that exists independently of the particular senses.\r\n\r\nOur comparison of the views of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis has yielded two important points. First, the two disagree about the status of the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis. While Proclus seems to assume that it differs from the particular senses, Pseudo-Simplicius clearly denies that and, under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, claims that there is no sixth sense to perform those functions that were traditionally attributed to the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis. Proclus\u2019 arguments for his position are not clear from the extant corpus, but those put forward by Pseudo-Simplicius are overwhelmingly Neoplatonic, not Peripatetic.\r\n\r\nSecond, they also disagree about which capacity is responsible for perceptual awareness. Their disagreement is deeply rooted in their respective notions of the human soul. While Pseudo-Simplicius places perceptual awareness firmly within the scope of the perceptual system, Proclus felt the need to postulate a distinct capacity in the rational soul whose role is to be aware of every psychic activity. The difference left its mark on their discussion of the various functions of our perceptual capacities. 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| Title | Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Published in | The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism |
| Pages | 323-338 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
| Editor(s) | Remes, Pauliina , Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla |
| Translator(s) |
Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a conscious activity, including even the reception of primary sense qualities such as colors and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense object upon the sense organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotle's Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them. The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense perception implies awareness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense organs of the capacity to perceive.
Moreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle’s De Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. At the beginning of De Anima 3.2, he presents the following aporia:
"Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense]. But in that case, there will be the same [sense] for sight and the color which is the subject for sight—so that either there will be two senses for the same thing or {the sense} itself will be the one for itself." (425b 12-16, trans. Hamlyn)
The distinction between perception and perception of perception—perceptual consciousness—is here taken for granted, and the fact that a subject perceives that he perceives is something that calls for explanation. In principle, the problem posed by Physics 7.2 is now resolved. On the account of the De Anima, in order for the subject to be aware of it, sense perception must be understood as a change that takes place in the perceiving subject. According to a general principle of change, formulated in Physics 3.3 (202a21-b5), the change produced by some cause is always in the thing that is changed.
Consequently, as a kind of qualitative change, sense perception takes place in the perceiving subject. Moreover, sense perception implies perceptual awareness because sense perception is a reception of sensible forms coming from without. Perceptual awareness comes about when the sense apprehends the sensible forms in itself and, on account of this, fulfills its function as sense. We perceive the change within ourselves. The two processes are one, differing only in account. For it is by receiving the form from the things perceived, which are outside, that we apprehend them, but it is by the sense having the form of the things perceived in itself that perceptual awareness comes about. To take the example of seeing, we see something in virtue of apprehending the perceptible’s form. By apprehending the form, the sense of sight sees, and at the same time, it comes to see itself seeing.
On this account, sense perception is intimately linked to a certain kind of awareness. In sense perception, we simultaneously apprehend both the thing perceived and the activity of the sense in relation to the thing perceived. Perceptual awareness is tied to the fact that in sense perception, we must be aware of the reception of external influence. Hence, the reflexive nature of sense perception is somehow included in the activity of grasping the primary objects of sense perception.
How shall we harmonize the two accounts? After all, it seems that in the De Anima, Alexander emphasizes the role of the common sense power, whereas in Quaestiones 3.7, he derives perceptual awareness from the general nature of sense perception. My suggestion is that the two accounts are complementary. The Quaestiones offer a general account of how perceptual awareness is possible. The reception of sensible forms requires awareness. Following Aristotle, Alexander assumes that this kind of awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty. It is not the rational faculty that such a task has been assigned to.
In the De Anima, Alexander specifies the thesis by pointing out that perceptual awareness comes about by virtue of the activity of the center of our perceptual system. It may remain unclear as to what arguments led him to dismiss the possibility that the particular senses might be able to grasp the activity of their own. There seem to be two points that could not have been accepted, for different reasons, and they also marked the limits within which Alexander's argument must have moved.
On the one hand, he accepted the Aristotelian thesis that perceptual awareness is the task of the perceptual system. On the other hand, he might have had doubts about the ability of the particular senses to grasp their own activities. Even if the act of seeing is somehow colored (De Anima 92.27-31), there must be a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. The difference is within the perceptual system and lies between the particular sense and the common sense power. [introduction p. 325-326] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/wW0wlLHdi7RUUn2 |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"880","_score":null,"_source":{"id":880,"authors_free":[{"id":1291,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":236,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lautner, Peter","free_first_name":"Peter","free_last_name":"Lautner","norm_person":{"id":236,"first_name":"Peter","last_name":"Lautner","full_name":"Lautner, Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157740766","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1292,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":118,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Remes, Pauliina","free_first_name":"Pauliina","free_last_name":"Remes","norm_person":{"id":118,"first_name":"Pauliina","last_name":"Remes","full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1103255665","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1293,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":119,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","free_first_name":"Svetla","free_last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","norm_person":{"id":119,"first_name":"Svetla","last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137698070","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators","main_title":{"title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators"},"abstract":"Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a conscious activity, including even the reception of primary sense qualities such as colors and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense object upon the sense organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotle's Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them. The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense perception implies awareness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense organs of the capacity to perceive.\r\n\r\nMoreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle\u2019s De Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. At the beginning of De Anima 3.2, he presents the following aporia:\r\n\r\n\"Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense]. But in that case, there will be the same [sense] for sight and the color which is the subject for sight\u2014so that either there will be two senses for the same thing or {the sense} itself will be the one for itself.\" (425b 12-16, trans. Hamlyn)\r\n\r\nThe distinction between perception and perception of perception\u2014perceptual consciousness\u2014is here taken for granted, and the fact that a subject perceives that he perceives is something that calls for explanation. In principle, the problem posed by Physics 7.2 is now resolved. On the account of the De Anima, in order for the subject to be aware of it, sense perception must be understood as a change that takes place in the perceiving subject. According to a general principle of change, formulated in Physics 3.3 (202a21-b5), the change produced by some cause is always in the thing that is changed.\r\n\r\nConsequently, as a kind of qualitative change, sense perception takes place in the perceiving subject. Moreover, sense perception implies perceptual awareness because sense perception is a reception of sensible forms coming from without. Perceptual awareness comes about when the sense apprehends the sensible forms in itself and, on account of this, fulfills its function as sense. We perceive the change within ourselves. The two processes are one, differing only in account. For it is by receiving the form from the things perceived, which are outside, that we apprehend them, but it is by the sense having the form of the things perceived in itself that perceptual awareness comes about. To take the example of seeing, we see something in virtue of apprehending the perceptible\u2019s form. By apprehending the form, the sense of sight sees, and at the same time, it comes to see itself seeing.\r\n\r\nOn this account, sense perception is intimately linked to a certain kind of awareness. In sense perception, we simultaneously apprehend both the thing perceived and the activity of the sense in relation to the thing perceived. Perceptual awareness is tied to the fact that in sense perception, we must be aware of the reception of external influence. Hence, the reflexive nature of sense perception is somehow included in the activity of grasping the primary objects of sense perception.\r\n\r\nHow shall we harmonize the two accounts? After all, it seems that in the De Anima, Alexander emphasizes the role of the common sense power, whereas in Quaestiones 3.7, he derives perceptual awareness from the general nature of sense perception. My suggestion is that the two accounts are complementary. The Quaestiones offer a general account of how perceptual awareness is possible. The reception of sensible forms requires awareness. Following Aristotle, Alexander assumes that this kind of awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty. It is not the rational faculty that such a task has been assigned to.\r\n\r\nIn the De Anima, Alexander specifies the thesis by pointing out that perceptual awareness comes about by virtue of the activity of the center of our perceptual system. It may remain unclear as to what arguments led him to dismiss the possibility that the particular senses might be able to grasp the activity of their own. There seem to be two points that could not have been accepted, for different reasons, and they also marked the limits within which Alexander's argument must have moved.\r\n\r\nOn the one hand, he accepted the Aristotelian thesis that perceptual awareness is the task of the perceptual system. On the other hand, he might have had doubts about the ability of the particular senses to grasp their own activities. Even if the act of seeing is somehow colored (De Anima 92.27-31), there must be a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. The difference is within the perceptual system and lies between the particular sense and the common sense power. [introduction p. 325-326]","btype":2,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/wW0wlLHdi7RUUn2","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":236,"full_name":"Lautner, Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":118,"full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":119,"full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":880,"section_of":345,"pages":"323-338","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":345,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Remes\/Slaveva-Griffin2014","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2014","edition_no":null,"free_date":"2014","abstract":"The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism is an authoritative and comprehensive survey of the most important issues and developments in one of the fastest growing areas of research in ancient philosophy. An international team of scholars situates and re-evaluates Neoplatonism within the history of ancient philosophy and thought, and explores its influence on philosophical and religious schools worldwide. Over thirty chapters are divided into seven clear parts:\r\n\r\n (Re)sources, instruction and interaction\r\n Methods and Styles of Exegesis\r\n Metaphysics and Metaphysical Perspectives\r\n Language, Knowledge, Soul, and Self\r\n Nature: Physics, Medicine and Biology\r\n Ethics, Political Theory and Aesthetics\r\n The legacy of Neoplatonism.\r\n\r\nThe Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism is a major reference source for all students and scholars in Neoplatonism and ancient philosophy, as well as researchers in the philosophy of science, ethics, aesthetics and religion. [author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/i2TdBQo2LLSOZ3S","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":345,"pubplace":"London \u2013 New York","publisher":"Routledge","series":"Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators"]}
| Title | The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2004 |
| Published in | Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries, Volume 1 |
| Pages | 163-174 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
| Editor(s) | Stone, Martin W. F. , Baltussen, Han , Adamson, Peter |
| Translator(s) |
I think we can draw the conclusion that, for the commentator, it is the more formal character of the koinê aisthêsis that makes it capable of performing all the tasks that were assigned to it by Aristotle. Pseudo-Simplicius justified this claim by appealing to distinctly Neoplatonic doctrines, such as the formal structure of perceptual judgment: the koinê aisthêsis operates by being present to each particular sense in respect of what they have in common with each other. Again, this is not to posit a sixth sense; the koinê aisthêsis and the particular senses are not different entities. In other words, they are not different faculties, only different activities of the same perceptual system. We can still speak of superiority here, but only superiority in terms of functional priority. That we are not dealing with distinct capacities is well demonstrated by the commentator at 196.4 ff. He claims that the koinê aisthêsis can also perceive color, but only by virtue of sight, just as it can perceive flavor only by virtue of taste. If the koinê aisthêsis and sight were wholly distinct, then we would fall back into the aporia that both Aristotle and Pseudo-Simplicius wished to avoid. The perceptual system as such, or the more formal structure of the whole perceptual system, can grasp the common sensibles, apprehend its own working, and discriminate different sense-objects by an instantaneous act of comprehension. It seems that the koinê aisthêsis emerges as a new activity on the basis of the particular senses. The commentator’s remarks at 196.29-30 corroborate this assumption. On explaining Aristotle’s thesis (De anima 426b10) that the koinê aisthêsis judges the differences in the underlying sense-objects, Pseudo-Simplicius notes that the koinê aisthêsis apprehends all sensory contraries such as white and black, rough and smooth, and does so by transcending them. This does not mean that koinê aisthêsis is transcendent, only that it is further away from the sensible objects. It is prior to the multitude of the particular senses and works together with all of them. This priority is not necessarily temporal; indeed, it is more likely causal, where causality does not imply a relation between two different entities—he may have in mind the relation of the whole to its parts. In any case, we have already seen that the koinê aisthêsis cannot be a cause that exists independently of the particular senses. Our comparison of the views of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koinê aisthêsis has yielded two important points. First, the two disagree about the status of the koinê aisthêsis. While Proclus seems to assume that it differs from the particular senses, Pseudo-Simplicius clearly denies that and, under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, claims that there is no sixth sense to perform those functions that were traditionally attributed to the koinê aisthêsis. Proclus’ arguments for his position are not clear from the extant corpus, but those put forward by Pseudo-Simplicius are overwhelmingly Neoplatonic, not Peripatetic. Second, they also disagree about which capacity is responsible for perceptual awareness. Their disagreement is deeply rooted in their respective notions of the human soul. While Pseudo-Simplicius places perceptual awareness firmly within the scope of the perceptual system, Proclus felt the need to postulate a distinct capacity in the rational soul whose role is to be aware of every psychic activity. The difference left its mark on their discussion of the various functions of our perceptual capacities. But the divergence in their vision of the human soul is all the more interesting insofar as they are said to have held much the same views on metaphysics. [conclusion p. 172-173] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4LJXmhF8cXPYjb4 |
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Pseudo-Simplicius justified this claim by appealing to distinctly Neoplatonic doctrines, such as the formal structure of perceptual judgment: the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis operates by being present to each particular sense in respect of what they have in common with each other. Again, this is not to posit a sixth sense; the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis and the particular senses are not different entities. In other words, they are not different faculties, only different activities of the same perceptual system. We can still speak of superiority here, but only superiority in terms of functional priority.\r\n\r\nThat we are not dealing with distinct capacities is well demonstrated by the commentator at 196.4 ff. He claims that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis can also perceive color, but only by virtue of sight, just as it can perceive flavor only by virtue of taste. If the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis and sight were wholly distinct, then we would fall back into the aporia that both Aristotle and Pseudo-Simplicius wished to avoid. The perceptual system as such, or the more formal structure of the whole perceptual system, can grasp the common sensibles, apprehend its own working, and discriminate different sense-objects by an instantaneous act of comprehension.\r\n\r\nIt seems that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis emerges as a new activity on the basis of the particular senses. The commentator\u2019s remarks at 196.29-30 corroborate this assumption. On explaining Aristotle\u2019s thesis (De anima 426b10) that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis judges the differences in the underlying sense-objects, Pseudo-Simplicius notes that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis apprehends all sensory contraries such as white and black, rough and smooth, and does so by transcending them. This does not mean that koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis is transcendent, only that it is further away from the sensible objects. It is prior to the multitude of the particular senses and works together with all of them.\r\n\r\nThis priority is not necessarily temporal; indeed, it is more likely causal, where causality does not imply a relation between two different entities\u2014he may have in mind the relation of the whole to its parts. In any case, we have already seen that the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis cannot be a cause that exists independently of the particular senses.\r\n\r\nOur comparison of the views of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis has yielded two important points. First, the two disagree about the status of the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis. While Proclus seems to assume that it differs from the particular senses, Pseudo-Simplicius clearly denies that and, under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, claims that there is no sixth sense to perform those functions that were traditionally attributed to the koin\u00ea aisth\u00easis. Proclus\u2019 arguments for his position are not clear from the extant corpus, but those put forward by Pseudo-Simplicius are overwhelmingly Neoplatonic, not Peripatetic.\r\n\r\nSecond, they also disagree about which capacity is responsible for perceptual awareness. Their disagreement is deeply rooted in their respective notions of the human soul. While Pseudo-Simplicius places perceptual awareness firmly within the scope of the perceptual system, Proclus felt the need to postulate a distinct capacity in the rational soul whose role is to be aware of every psychic activity. The difference left its mark on their discussion of the various functions of our perceptual capacities. But the divergence in their vision of the human soul is all the more interesting insofar as they are said to have held much the same views on metaphysics. [conclusion p. 172-173]","btype":2,"date":"2004","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/4LJXmhF8cXPYjb4","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":236,"full_name":"Lautner, Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":111,"full_name":"Stone, Martin W. 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These volumes, which are intended to build on the massive achievement of Professor Sorabji\u2019s Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, focus on the commentary as a vehicle of philosophical and scientific thought. Volume One deals with the Greek tradition, including one paper on Byzantine philosophy and one on the Latin author Calcidius, who is very close to the late Greek tradition in outlook. The volume begins with an overview of the tradition of commenting on Aristotle and of the study of this tradition in the modern era. It concludes with an up-to-date bibliography of scholarship devoted to the commentators.","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nqTHgI2QahbENt5","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":233,"pubplace":"London","publisher":"Institute of Classical Studies","series":"Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (BICS)","volume":"Supplement 83.1","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["The \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius"]}