| Title | Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Published in | The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism |
| Pages | 323-338 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
| Editor(s) | Remes, Pauliina , Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla |
| Translator(s) |
| Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a con scious activity, including even the reception of primary sense-qualities such as colours and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense-object upon the sense-organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotles Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them.1 The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense-perception implies aware ness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense-organs of the capacity to perceive. Moreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense-perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact, but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle’s de Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. [p. 323] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7cDpha17XNcRZsE |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"880","_score":null,"_source":{"id":880,"authors_free":[{"id":1291,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":236,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lautner, Peter","free_first_name":"Peter","free_last_name":"Lautner","norm_person":{"id":236,"first_name":"Peter","last_name":"Lautner","full_name":"Lautner, Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157740766","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1292,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":118,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Remes, Pauliina","free_first_name":"Pauliina","free_last_name":"Remes","norm_person":{"id":118,"first_name":"Pauliina","last_name":"Remes","full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1103255665","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1293,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":119,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","free_first_name":"Svetla","free_last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","norm_person":{"id":119,"first_name":"Svetla","last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137698070","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators","main_title":{"title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators"},"abstract":"Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a con\u00ad\r\nscious activity, including even the reception of primary sense-qualities such as colours \r\nand sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the \r\nspecific impact exerted by the sense-object upon the sense-organ. The commentators \r\ncan also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotles Physics 7.2, according to which what \r\nis distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them.1 The problem \r\nwith that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others \r\ninvolve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense-perception implies aware\u00ad\r\nness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion \r\nseemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense-organs of the capacity to perceive. \r\nMoreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense-perception is that we are \r\naware not only of the specific impact, but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory \r\npower. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle\u2019s de Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists \r\nthat we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual \r\nsystem is capable of grasping its own operations. [p. 323]","btype":2,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7cDpha17XNcRZsE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":236,"full_name":"Lautner, Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":118,"full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":119,"full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":880,"section_of":345,"pages":"323-338","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":345,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Remes\/Slaveva-Griffin2014","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2014","edition_no":null,"free_date":"2014","abstract":"","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lTQftUHeNx8oAUo","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":345,"pubplace":"London \u2013 New York","publisher":"Routledge","series":"Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[2014]}
| Title | Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Published in | The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism |
| Pages | 323-338 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Lautner, Peter |
| Editor(s) | Remes, Pauliina , Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla |
| Translator(s) |
Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a con scious activity, including even the reception of primary sense-qualities such as colours and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense-object upon the sense-organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotles Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them.1 The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense-perception implies aware ness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense-organs of the capacity to perceive. Moreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense-perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact, but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle’s de Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. [p. 323] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/7cDpha17XNcRZsE |
{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"880","_score":null,"_source":{"id":880,"authors_free":[{"id":1291,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":236,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Lautner, Peter","free_first_name":"Peter","free_last_name":"Lautner","norm_person":{"id":236,"first_name":"Peter","last_name":"Lautner","full_name":"Lautner, Peter","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1157740766","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1292,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":118,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Remes, Pauliina","free_first_name":"Pauliina","free_last_name":"Remes","norm_person":{"id":118,"first_name":"Pauliina","last_name":"Remes","full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1103255665","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":1293,"entry_id":880,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":119,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","free_first_name":"Svetla","free_last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","norm_person":{"id":119,"first_name":"Svetla","last_name":"Slaveva-Griffin","full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/137698070","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators","main_title":{"title":"Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators"},"abstract":"Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a con\u00ad\r\nscious activity, including even the reception of primary sense-qualities such as colours \r\nand sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the \r\nspecific impact exerted by the sense-object upon the sense-organ. The commentators \r\ncan also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotles Physics 7.2, according to which what \r\nis distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them.1 The problem \r\nwith that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others \r\ninvolve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense-perception implies aware\u00ad\r\nness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion \r\nseemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense-organs of the capacity to perceive. \r\nMoreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense-perception is that we are \r\naware not only of the specific impact, but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory \r\npower. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle\u2019s de Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists \r\nthat we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual \r\nsystem is capable of grasping its own operations. [p. 323]","btype":2,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/7cDpha17XNcRZsE","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":236,"full_name":"Lautner, Peter","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":118,"full_name":"Remes, Pauliina","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":119,"full_name":"Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":880,"section_of":345,"pages":"323-338","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":345,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Remes\/Slaveva-Griffin2014","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2014","edition_no":null,"free_date":"2014","abstract":"","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/lTQftUHeNx8oAUo","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":345,"pubplace":"London \u2013 New York","publisher":"Routledge","series":"Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators"]}