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The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius, 2004
By: Lautner, Peter, Stone, Martin W. F. (Ed.), Baltussen, Han (Ed.), Adamson, Peter (Ed.)

Title	The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius
Type	Book Section
Language	English
Date	2004
Published in	Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries, Volume 1
Pages	163-174
Categories	no categories
Author(s)	Lautner, Peter
Editor(s)	Stone, Martin W. F. , Baltussen, Han , Adamson, Peter
Translator(s)

I think we can draw the conclusion that, for the commentator, it is the more formal character of the koinê aisthêsis that makes it capable of performing all the tasks that were assigned to it by Aristotle. Pseudo-Simplicius justified this claim by appealing to distinctly Neoplatonic doctrines, such as the formal structure of perceptual judgment: the koinê aisthêsis operates by being present to each particular sense in respect of what they have in common with each other. Again, this is not to posit a sixth sense; the koinê aisthêsis and the particular senses are not different entities. In other words, they are not different faculties, only different activities of the same perceptual system. We can still speak of superiority here, but only superiority in terms of functional priority. That we are not dealing with distinct capacities is well demonstrated by the commentator at 196.4 ff. He claims that the koinê aisthêsis can also perceive color, but only by virtue of sight, just as it can perceive flavor only by virtue of taste. If the koinê aisthêsis and sight were wholly distinct, then we would fall back into the aporia that both Aristotle and Pseudo-Simplicius wished to avoid. The perceptual system as such, or the more formal structure of the whole perceptual system, can grasp the common sensibles, apprehend its own working, and discriminate different sense-objects by an instantaneous act of comprehension. It seems that the koinê aisthêsis emerges as a new activity on the basis of the particular senses. The commentator’s remarks at 196.29-30 corroborate this assumption. On explaining Aristotle’s thesis (De anima 426b10) that the koinê aisthêsis judges the differences in the underlying sense-objects, Pseudo-Simplicius notes that the koinê aisthêsis apprehends all sensory contraries such as white and black, rough and smooth, and does so by transcending them. This does not mean that koinê aisthêsis is transcendent, only that it is further away from the sensible objects. It is prior to the multitude of the particular senses and works together with all of them. This priority is not necessarily temporal; indeed, it is more likely causal, where causality does not imply a relation between two different entities—he may have in mind the relation of the whole to its parts. In any case, we have already seen that the koinê aisthêsis cannot be a cause that exists independently of the particular senses. Our comparison of the views of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koinê aisthêsis has yielded two important points. First, the two disagree about the status of the koinê aisthêsis. While Proclus seems to assume that it differs from the particular senses, Pseudo-Simplicius clearly denies that and, under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, claims that there is no sixth sense to perform those functions that were traditionally attributed to the koinê aisthêsis. Proclus’ arguments for his position are not clear from the extant corpus, but those put forward by Pseudo-Simplicius are overwhelmingly Neoplatonic, not Peripatetic. Second, they also disagree about which capacity is responsible for perceptual awareness. Their disagreement is deeply rooted in their respective notions of the human soul. While Pseudo-Simplicius places perceptual awareness firmly within the scope of the perceptual system, Proclus felt the need to postulate a distinct capacity in the rational soul whose role is to be aware of every psychic activity. The difference left its mark on their discussion of the various functions of our perceptual capacities. But the divergence in their vision of the human soul is all the more interesting insofar as they are said to have held much the same views on metaphysics. [conclusion p. 172-173]

Online Resources

https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4LJXmhF8cXPYjb4

PAGE 1 OF 1

The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius, 2004
By: Lautner, Peter, Stone, Martin W. F. (Ed.), Baltussen, Han (Ed.), Adamson, Peter (Ed.)

Title	The κοινη αισθεσις in Proclus and Ps.-Simplicius
Type	Book Section
Language	English
Date	2004
Published in	Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries, Volume 1
Pages	163-174
Categories	no categories
Author(s)	Lautner, Peter
Editor(s)	Stone, Martin W. F. , Baltussen, Han , Adamson, Peter
Translator(s)

That we are not dealing with distinct capacities is well demonstrated by the commentator at 196.4 ff. He claims that the koinê aisthêsis can also perceive color, but only by virtue of sight, just as it can perceive flavor only by virtue of taste. If the koinê aisthêsis and sight were wholly distinct, then we would fall back into the aporia that both Aristotle and Pseudo-Simplicius wished to avoid. The perceptual system as such, or the more formal structure of the whole perceptual system, can grasp the common sensibles, apprehend its own working, and discriminate different sense-objects by an instantaneous act of comprehension.

It seems that the koinê aisthêsis emerges as a new activity on the basis of the particular senses. The commentator’s remarks at 196.29-30 corroborate this assumption. On explaining Aristotle’s thesis (De anima 426b10) that the koinê aisthêsis judges the differences in the underlying sense-objects, Pseudo-Simplicius notes that the koinê aisthêsis apprehends all sensory contraries such as white and black, rough and smooth, and does so by transcending them. This does not mean that koinê aisthêsis is transcendent, only that it is further away from the sensible objects. It is prior to the multitude of the particular senses and works together with all of them.

This priority is not necessarily temporal; indeed, it is more likely causal, where causality does not imply a relation between two different entities—he may have in mind the relation of the whole to its parts. In any case, we have already seen that the koinê aisthêsis cannot be a cause that exists independently of the particular senses.

Our comparison of the views of Proclus and Pseudo-Simplicius on the koinê aisthêsis has yielded two important points. First, the two disagree about the status of the koinê aisthêsis. While Proclus seems to assume that it differs from the particular senses, Pseudo-Simplicius clearly denies that and, under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, claims that there is no sixth sense to perform those functions that were traditionally attributed to the koinê aisthêsis. Proclus’ arguments for his position are not clear from the extant corpus, but those put forward by Pseudo-Simplicius are overwhelmingly Neoplatonic, not Peripatetic.

Second, they also disagree about which capacity is responsible for perceptual awareness. Their disagreement is deeply rooted in their respective notions of the human soul. While Pseudo-Simplicius places perceptual awareness firmly within the scope of the perceptual system, Proclus felt the need to postulate a distinct capacity in the rational soul whose role is to be aware of every psychic activity. The difference left its mark on their discussion of the various functions of our perceptual capacities. But the divergence in their vision of the human soul is all the more interesting insofar as they are said to have held much the same views on metaphysics. [conclusion p. 172-173]

Online Resources

https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/4LJXmhF8cXPYjb4

PAGE 1 OF 1