The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, 2018
By: Hauer, Mareike
Title The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories
Type Monograph
Language English
Date 2018
Publication Place Leuven
Publisher KU Leuven, Humanities and Social Sciences Group, Institute of Philosophy
Categories no categories
Author(s) Hauer, Mareike
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
The aim of this study was to analyze Simplicius’ explanation of qualitative properties in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. In this commentary, Simplicius discusses qualities in the framework of Aristotle’s categorial scheme and neither explicitly emphasizes the topic nor particularly problematizes it. In order to analyze Simplicius’ conception of quality, it was thus necessary to compile and systematize his remarks on qualities or remarks that might be relevant for an explanation of qualities from different places in the text. I grouped the different information in three main parts, each consisting of two to four chapters. The first part set out to provide some general information on Simplicius, his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories and the notion of quality in Aristotle in order to pave the way for an analysis of Simplicius’ explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. The second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius’ explanation of qualities. While the second part remained to a large extent within the terminological framework of the Categories, the third part mainly drew on Neoplatonic theorems and focused on the ontological explanation of qualities within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. In what follows, I will summarize the results of the three main parts of the study and present difficulties that the study faced, shortcomings that the study includes and questions that the study evokes. The first part of the study elaborated on Simplicius’ exegesis and the place of his commentary in the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Aristotle’s Categories. Its aim was to provide the reader with the textual and theoretical context in and with which Simplicius works. Hence, it focused in part on Simplicius as a member of the Neoplatonic school and his commentary as a part and witness of an exegetical tradition on Aristotle’s Categories that began centuries before Simplicius. However, Simplicius’ philosophical background, his sources and his presuppositions regarding Aristotle’s Categories are relevant for a study of his conception of qualities because they influence his treatment of the topic. Although Simplicius appears to have a keen interest in Aristotle’s text, he interprets it against the background of his own Neoplatonic views. As it has been pointed out in the first part of the study, there is the difficulty that Simplicius does not spell out or elaborate on Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrine in his commentary. Since the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework represents the theoretical framework in and with which Simplicius works, an understanding of its principles is necessary for an understanding of Simplicius’ discussions. In order to provide an explanation of Neoplatonic metaphysical assumptions when necessary, I thus relied on information that can be found in Neoplatonic authors prior to Simplicius. This way of proceeding implies the problematic assumption that Simplicius does not deviate from these authors regarding the understanding of the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. This assumption is problematic because it may obscure Simplicius’ actual position if it differs. At least on the basis of Simplicius’ text, there is no indication that Simplicius’ conception of general elements of Neoplatonic metaphysics would differ from that of his predecessors. It has been pointed out that Simplicius frequently refers to predecessors and even states explicitly that, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, he follows the commentaries by Porphyry and Iamblichus in their interpretation of the Categories. Simplicius’ commentaries are well known for the richness of references to and presentations of views held by predecessors. He has often been used as a source of information on other philosophers for works that are no longer extant otherwise. His Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories is no exception; it is rich in references to philosophers belonging not only to the Neoplatonic tradition but also to other philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism or the Peripatetic school. The present study does not elaborate on references to members of other philosophical schools. A lot could have been said about Simplicius’ presentation and discussion of views held by these philosophers. It may even be fruitful to examine in detail Simplicius’ treatment and use of views held by philosophers working in the Stoic or Peripatetic tradition. Such investigations would also be interesting for our understanding of the historical development of certain concepts. The omission thus requires an explanation. The explanation is, admittedly, of a rather pragmatic nature. A discussion of all the views that Simplicius mentions would have exceeded the scope of this study. A selection always requires good reasons. Apart from Porphyry and Iamblichus, I could not justify in a consistent manner, with regard to the topic of this study, why I would focus on the one view more than on the other. Hence, although I think that it would be interesting to investigate the possible influences of, for example, Alexander of Aphrodisias or of Stoic views on Simplicius, I did not conduct such investigations in this study. They may be topics for possible future projects. As stated, the main sources for his commentary are, according to Simplicius himself, Porphyry’s long commentary on the Categories and, even to a bigger extent, Iamblichus’ commentary. The unfortunate fact that the two commentaries are no longer extant and Simplicius’ modest self-presentation as a commentator make it difficult to assess the proportion between copying or paraphrasing his sources and presenting own ideas in Simplicius’ commentary. It has also been pointed out that some, if not all, presuppositions of Simplicius’ analysis of Aristotle’s Categories stem from his main source Iamblichus. Simplicius’ core presuppositions are his interpretation of the Categories’ σκοπός as a synthesis of words, beings and notions, his assumption that the main source of the Categories is the Pseudo-Pythagorean treatise On the Universal Formulae by Pseudo-Archytas, his conviction that Aristotle uses obscurity on purpose in his writings and the assumption that there is a harmony between Aristotle and Plato on the majority of points. As it has been shown in the course of the study, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, Simplicius appears to extend the idea of a harmony also to Porphyry and Iamblichus. Besides the attempt to provide the philosophical background of Simplicius’ commentary, to contextualize it within the commentary tradition on the Categories, and to introduce Simplicius’ main sources and core presuppositions in this commentary, the first part also includes an overview of the accounts of quality that can be found in Aristotle’s works. This overview is meant to show that Aristotle approaches qualities from different perspectives in his works. I distinguished between two main approaches: 1. the explanation of qualities from a logical-metaphysical perspective, included, for example, in Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics, and 2. the explanation of qualities from the perspective of natural philosophy, included, for example, in Aristotle’s De Caelo and De Generatione et Corruptione. As the analyses especially in part three suggested, Simplicius appears not only to be well acquainted with the explanations of qualities that Aristotle presents elsewhere, he also integrates elements of these explanations into his discussion of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. The second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius’ explanation of quality. As stated, in order to analyze Simplicius’ conception of quality, it was necessary to compile and systematize relevant remarks from different places in the text. This way of proceeding requires caution, as it runs the risk of neglecting the context of the relevant individual passages. Given that Simplicius works closely and in sequence with Aristotle’s text and discusses aspects of the text within the framework of the lemmata on which he comments, a consideration of the context, however, is as important as a thorough analysis of the relevant passages themselves. The present study tried to accommodate both methodological strategies. It thereby runs another risk common to compromises, namely to fail to do both a thorough investigation of individual passages and a consideration of the context properly. I gave priority to the thought that both methodological strategies are indispensable for an understanding of Simplicius’ conception of qualities. The second part aimed at providing a categorial analysis of quality. It focused on quality as one of the ten Aristotelian categories and thus dealt with the regulations and characteristics that apply to quality qua category. Aristotle draws a distinction between the category of substance and the other nine categories in that he ascribes an ontological priority to the former. As suggested by Aristotle’s fourfold division of τὰ ὄντα in the second chapter of the Categories but not explicitly articulated with regard to any of the nine non-substantial categories, Simplicius transposes the intracategorial structure and regulations spelled out for the category of substance onto the category of quality. The category of quality thus comprises genera and species of quality and their individual instantiations. Moreover, the genera of quality are synonymously predicated of their species which in turn are synonymously predicated of their instantiations. According to the rule of transitivity, which equally applies, the genera of quality are consequently also synonymously predicated of the instantiations. While the intracategorial relation, i.e. the relation between genera and species and instantiations of quality, is a relation of unilinear synonymous predication, the intercategorial relation, i.e. the relation between a quality and a substance, is a relation of homonymous predication. Although Aristotle does not explicitly mention all these features of quality in his Categories, they are compatible with his text. Aristotle’s text leaves quite a lot of room for interpretation which not only facilitates the transposition of regulations and structural elements within the categorial theory itself but also enables the integration of, or harmonization with, (Neo)Platonic theoretical elements. Simplicius’ harmonizing tendency as an interpretative strategy becomes most apparent in the analyses conducted in the second part of this study. It is suggested by Simplicius’ way of presenting predication and participation as two different but non-conflicting theories used to explain the relation among entities in the natural realm, by his interpretation of the predicate as an immanent universal, by his explanation of the ἴδιον of quality against the background of likeness and unlikeness and by his use of the idea of a latitude of participation in his discussion of the question whether the category of quality admits of a more and a less. The discussions in the second part have also shown that some problems or questions that scholars have raised with regard to Aristotle’s text appeared to be unproblematic for Simplicius, such as the compatibility of the categorial theory with hylomorphism or the interpretation of homonymy as comprehensive homonymy. It is worth noting that Simplicius displays a charitable interpretation of Aristotle’s text with regard to these questions. Other topics discussed in Aristotelian scholarship are more problematic for Simplicius, especially those which are in apparent conflict with Platonic doctrine. He explicitly addresses the apparent primacy of individual substances in the Categories and tries at length to reconcile it with the Platonic view that the forms are prior to the individuals. He does not openly address 219 but implicitly deviates from the assumption held by many Aristotelian scholars that synonymous predication yields essential predication. He argues that, although genera, species and differentiae are all synonymously predicated of that which is beneath them, only genera and species are also essentially predicated of that which is beneath them whereas the differentiae are not essentially but qualitatively predicated of that which is beneath them. It also becomes apparent in the second part that the study of quality in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories includes an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified. The differentiation of the possible meanings of the qualified represents the basis, or preparatory work, for such an analysis. The third part of the study exceeds to some extent the categorial framework and expands on the Neoplatonic elements of Simplicius’ explanation of quality and its relation to the qualified. In this regard, it also elaborates on certain notions that have already been introduced in the second part but become most relevant in the context of an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified within a Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The notion of participation is one of them. Simplicius does not only present participation, like predication, as a model to explain the relation between intracategorial entities in his omments on chapter five but he also explicitly applies it to the entities subsumed under the category of quality, when he refers to the quality as μετεχόμενον and to the qualified as μετέχον. Simplicius associates quality and the qualified with these two elements of the Neoplatonic triad of participation and analogically applies the characteristics of those elements (and their relation to each other) to quality and the qualified (and their relation to each other). For an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified, it was thus helpful to have a closer look at the structure of the triad of participation, and especially at its elements, their characteristics and their relations to each other. The association of quality with the μετεχόμενον and of the qualified with the μετέχον, however, transfers a problem to the category of quality that Simplicius, like other Neoplatonists, mainly discusses in the course of his comments on the category of substance: the question of ontological dependence and, particularly, whether the ontological relation between quality and the qualified is a relation of ontological priority and posteriority or of ontological simultaneity. Simplicius describes quality as that which is participated in by the qualified, as that which is in the qualified and of which its being and its being participated in is one. The qualified in turn participates in quality and receives its being qualified from the quality. Simplicius thus appears to describe the relation between quality and the qualified, on the one hand, as a relation of an ontological priority of the quality over the qualified and, on the other hand, as a relation of ontological simultaneity. It has been shown in the third part of the study that it is possible to reconcile these apparently conflicting assumptions in Simplicius by means of two disambiguations: first, the differentiation of ontological priority into existential priority and essential priority and, second, the distinction between qualified qua single instantiation of the corresponding quality and qualified qua sum of all instantiations of the corresponding quality. While these investigations of the relation between quality and the qualified conducted in the first two chapters of the third part of the study involve the understanding of the qualified as an instantiation of the corresponding quality, the analyses of the third and fourth chapter involve the understanding of the qualified as a qualified substance. If the qualified is understood as a qualified substance, an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified evokes several questions. The third chapter deals with the following two: first, how can differences among participants of the same quality be explained, i.e. what is the reason for gradual differences of participation or instantiations and, second, how can it be explained that a particular quality is instantiated in one substance rather than in another substance, i.e. what is the condition for participation as such. In order to answer these questions, the notion of ἐπιτηδειότης becomes crucial. This notion had already been introduced in the second part of the study in the course of an analysis of the more and the less in the category of quality. As stated, Simplicius connects this question with the idea that participation involves latitude. The latitude of participation, in turn, is in accordance with the participant’s ἐπιτηδειότης to receive the information from that in which it participates. The use of the notion of ἐπιτηδειότης in the context of the analysis of the relation between quality and qualified has its roots in the use of ἐπιτηδειότης in the theory of participation established by Simplicius’ predecessors, where it frequently occurs as an aspect of the explanation of the relation between μετεχόμενον and μετέχον. However, the question whether ἐπιτηδειότης is a technical term in late Antiquity or a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of δύναμις has been a subject of debate among scholars. Since also Simplicius uses these two terms, especially in his comments on the category of quality, I tried to clarify Simplicius’ understanding of ἐπιτηδειότης and of the relation between ἐπιτηδειότης and δύναμις in his comments on quality. The analysis in the third chapter suggested that Simplicius distinguishes between a sense of ἐπιτηδειότης that can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of δύναμις and a sense of ἐπιτηδειότης that cannot be associated with the Aristotelian notion of δύναμις. Ἐπιτηδειότης in the latter sense is simpler, precedes δύναμις and appears to be a simple propensity of the participant for something more complete than itself, rooted in higher principles within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The difficulty that this analysis faced was the fact that, although it was suggested by Simplicius’ remarks, Simplicius himself does not explicitly distinguish between ἐπιτηδειότης and δύναμις in his comments on the category of quality. As I argued, however, this fact could be interpreted again as a strategy to accommodate and harmonize the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian theory. The fourth and last chapter deals with another important question that arises in the framework of an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified qua qualified substance. Based on the possibility to distinguish between attributes that always belong to their subjects and are even completive or essential to their subject and attributes that are adventitious to their subject, the question of the categorial status of essential qualities arises. While the classification of adventitious attributes as accidents appears to be more or less unproblematic, the integration of completive attributes into Aristotle’s categorial scheme poses a problem. The answer to this question builds on the results of the previous analyses and eventually leads to the attempt to present a comprehensive answer to the initial question of the categorial status and the ontological explanation of qualities (both essential and adventitious qualities) in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. By means of an analysis of different passages on, or involving, essential qualities and a comparison with Simplicius’ conception of differentiae, I argued against the claim held by scholars that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as substances. According to the interpretation presented in the fourth chapter, Simplicius ascribes both a substantial and a qualitative aspect to essential qualities and differentiae. Depending on the context, he stresses the one or the other aspect. Simplicius, a proponent of the idea that Aristotle’s categorial scheme is complete and exhaustive, does not appear to think that these entities would not fit into Aristotle’s scheme. Rather, Simplicius explains their double structure by their participation in both substance and quality. He does not discuss or even problematize the fact that such a conception would challenge Aristotle’s scheme. Interestingly, Simplicius’ assumption that these entities are substantial but no substances also suggests that he distinguishes between that which is substantial and that which is a substance. Although Simplicius undoubtedly conceives of those qualities as being substantial, he appears to distinguish them from substances and restricts the latter to matter, form and the matter-form compound. By means of a recourse to Proclus’ remarks in his Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, I tried to show that such a distinction including essential qualities can already be found among Simplicius’ predecessors. Moreover, I tried to present an ontological explanation of qualities that takes Simplicius’ remarks on both essential and adventitious qualities into account. I argued that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as belonging to the immanent form which sends forth these qualities as soon as it unfolds itself in body. These qualities thus naturally inhere in the subject and cannot be separated without the corruption of the subject. Adventitious qualities are immanent logoi which do not belong to the form. They enter the subject after the compounding of matter and form; or in other words, the participation in these logoi is posterior to the constitution of the subject. In this way, they come in from outside and can be separated without the corruption of the subject. However, they do not appear to operate independently from the immanent form. The immanent form prefigures the subject, limits its possibilities in participation and determines its capacities for receiving contraries. It thereby establishes the conditions for these logoi to operate. As it has been pointed out, Simplicius does not transfer the distinction between essential and adventitious to the level of natural logoi and, consequently, does not make the logos of each quality twofold. On the contrary, he restricts this distinction to the realm of bodies and can thus maintain the assumption that the logos of each quality is one. This account is an attempt to provide a consistent explanation of qualities in Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. However, it leaves a number of questions open for further research. One group of questions concerns the relation between essential qualities and differentiae. As stated, Simplicius does not only treat them similarly, he also often uses the same examples for essential qualities and differentiae. This situation is probably the reason why scholars on Simplicius have discussed these topics together (with different results though). However, if both differentiae and essential qualities are substantial and belong to the form but are not substances, the question arises how their differences can be explained. One of these differences is that, according to Simplicius, an essential quality, such as the whiteness of snow, can admit of a more and a less, whereas no differentia admits of a more and a less. A related question regarding differentiae is the following: if the differentiae are intermediates and participate in both substance and quality, why is there actually no differentia that admits of a more and a less? Is there, eventually, perhaps a distinction or hierarchy among essential attributes? On the basis of the analysis of essential and adventitious qualities, Simplicius’ conception of immanent forms is a topic that is highly interesting and would deserve further investigation. According to the analysis conducted in the last chapter, both essential qualities and adventitious qualities depend on immanent forms. The former do so because they belong to this form, the latter because the immanent form prefigures the subject and thus determines what qualities it can receive and to what extent it can receive them. In connection with this topic, it would also be interesting to investigate the question as to what there are natural logoi of. Another highly interesting topic linked to the research conducted in this study would be the comparison of Simplicius’ explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories with the presentation of material properties in the framework of a discussion of Plato’s geometric atomism included in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus and Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo. Such a comparison could be very interesting because it may contribute to the clarification of strategies that some Neoplatonists have adopted in order to deal with the differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories about elemental constitution (including elemental properties) and may thus contribute to our understanding of Neoplatonic natural philosophy in general. Although I think that this comparison is highly interesting, I have focused in this study on Simplicius’ explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. I hope that the preceding pages have shown that this explanation was worth a study of its own. [conclusion, pp. 215-223]

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In this commentary, Simplicius discusses qualities in \r\nthe framework of Aristotle\u2019s categorial scheme and neither explicitly emphasizes the topic nor \r\nparticularly problematizes it. In order to analyze Simplicius\u2019 conception of quality, it was thus \r\nnecessary to compile and systematize his remarks on qualities or remarks that might be \r\nrelevant for an explanation of qualities from different places in the text. I grouped the \r\ndifferent information in three main parts, each consisting of two to four chapters. The first \r\npart set out to provide some general information on Simplicius, his Commentary on \r\nAristotle\u2019s Categories and the notion of quality in Aristotle in order to pave the way for an \r\nanalysis of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. \r\nThe second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities. \r\nWhile the second part remained to a large extent within the terminological framework of the \r\nCategories, the third part mainly drew on Neoplatonic theorems and focused on the \r\nontological explanation of qualities within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. In what \r\nfollows, I will summarize the results of the three main parts of the study and present \r\ndifficulties that the study faced, shortcomings that the study includes and questions that the \r\nstudy evokes. \r\nThe first part of the study elaborated on Simplicius\u2019 exegesis and the place of his commentary \r\nin the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Its aim was to provide the \r\nreader with the textual and theoretical context in and with which Simplicius works. Hence, it \r\nfocused in part on Simplicius as a member of the Neoplatonic school and his commentary as a \r\npart and witness of an exegetical tradition on Aristotle\u2019s Categories that began centuries \r\nbefore Simplicius. However, Simplicius\u2019 philosophical background, his sources and his \r\npresuppositions regarding Aristotle\u2019s Categories are relevant for a study of his conception of \r\nqualities because they influence his treatment of the topic. Although Simplicius appears to \r\nhave a keen interest in Aristotle\u2019s text, he interprets it against the background of his own \r\nNeoplatonic views. As it has been pointed out in the first part of the study, there is the \r\ndifficulty that Simplicius does not spell out or elaborate on Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrine \r\nin his commentary. Since the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework represents the theoretical \r\nframework in and with which Simplicius works, an understanding of its principles is necessary for an understanding of Simplicius\u2019 discussions. In order to provide an explanation of Neoplatonic metaphysical assumptions when necessary, I thus relied on information that can be found in Neoplatonic authors prior to Simplicius. This way of proceeding implies the problematic assumption that Simplicius does not deviate from these authors regarding the understanding of the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. This assumption is problematic because it may obscure Simplicius\u2019 actual position if it differs. At least on the basis of Simplicius\u2019 text, there is no indication that Simplicius\u2019 conception of general elements of Neoplatonic metaphysics would differ from that of his predecessors. \r\nIt has been pointed out that Simplicius frequently refers to predecessors and even states explicitly that, in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, he follows the commentaries by Porphyry and Iamblichus in their interpretation of the Categories. Simplicius\u2019 commentaries are well known for the richness of references to and presentations of views held by \r\npredecessors. He has often been used as a source of information on other philosophers for \r\nworks that are no longer extant otherwise. His Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories is no \r\nexception; it is rich in references to philosophers belonging not only to the Neoplatonic tradition but also to other philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism or the Peripatetic school. The present study does not elaborate on references to members of other philosophical schools. A lot could have been said about Simplicius\u2019 presentation and discussion of views held by these philosophers. It may even be fruitful to examine in detail Simplicius\u2019 treatment and use of views held by philosophers working in the Stoic or Peripatetic tradition. Such \r\ninvestigations would also be interesting for our understanding of the historical development of \r\ncertain concepts. The omission thus requires an explanation. The explanation is, admittedly, \r\nof a rather pragmatic nature. A discussion of all the views that Simplicius mentions would \r\nhave exceeded the scope of this study. A selection always requires good reasons. Apart from \r\nPorphyry and Iamblichus, I could not justify in a consistent manner, with regard to the topic \r\nof this study, why I would focus on the one view more than on the other. Hence, although I \r\nthink that it would be interesting to investigate the possible influences of, for example, \r\nAlexander of Aphrodisias or of Stoic views on Simplicius, I did not conduct such investigations in this study. They may be topics for possible future projects. As stated, the main sources for his commentary are, according to Simplicius himself, \r\nPorphyry\u2019s long commentary on the Categories and, even to a bigger extent, Iamblichus\u2019 \r\ncommentary. The unfortunate fact that the two commentaries are no longer extant and \r\nSimplicius\u2019 modest self-presentation as a commentator make it difficult to assess the \r\nproportion between copying or paraphrasing his sources and presenting own ideas in \r\nSimplicius\u2019 commentary. It has also been pointed out that some, if not all, presuppositions of \r\nSimplicius\u2019 analysis of Aristotle\u2019s Categories stem from his main source Iamblichus. Simplicius\u2019 core presuppositions are his interpretation of the Categories\u2019 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 as a synthesis of words, beings and notions, his assumption that the main source of the Categories is the Pseudo-Pythagorean treatise On the Universal Formulae by Pseudo-Archytas, his conviction that Aristotle uses obscurity on purpose in his writings and the assumption that there is a harmony between Aristotle and Plato on the majority of points. As it has been shown in the course of the study, in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, Simplicius appears to extend the idea of a harmony also to Porphyry and Iamblichus. \r\nBesides the attempt to provide the philosophical background of Simplicius\u2019 commentary, to contextualize it within the commentary tradition on the Categories, and to introduce Simplicius\u2019 main sources and core presuppositions in this commentary, the first part also includes an overview of the accounts of quality that can be found in Aristotle\u2019s works. This overview is meant to show that Aristotle approaches qualities from different perspectives in his works. I distinguished between two main approaches: 1. the explanation of qualities from \r\na logical-metaphysical perspective, included, for example, in Aristotle\u2019s Categories and Metaphysics, and 2. the explanation of qualities from the perspective of natural philosophy, \r\nincluded, for example, in Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo and De Generatione et Corruptione. As the \r\nanalyses especially in part three suggested, Simplicius appears not only to be well acquainted \r\nwith the explanations of qualities that Aristotle presents elsewhere, he also integrates elements \r\nof these explanations into his discussion of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s \r\nCategories. The second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of quality. As stated, in order to analyze Simplicius\u2019 conception of quality, it was necessary to compile \r\nand systematize relevant remarks from different places in the text. This way of proceeding \r\nrequires caution, as it runs the risk of neglecting the context of the relevant individual \r\npassages. Given that Simplicius works closely and in sequence with Aristotle\u2019s text and \r\ndiscusses aspects of the text within the framework of the lemmata on which he comments, a \r\nconsideration of the context, however, is as important as a thorough analysis of the relevant \r\npassages themselves. The present study tried to accommodate both methodological strategies. \r\nIt thereby runs another risk common to compromises, namely to fail to do both a thorough investigation of individual passages and a consideration of the context properly. I gave priority to the thought that both methodological strategies are indispensable for an \r\nunderstanding of Simplicius\u2019 conception of qualities. The second part aimed at providing a categorial analysis of quality. It focused on quality as one of the ten Aristotelian categories and thus dealt with the regulations and characteristics that apply to quality qua category. Aristotle draws a distinction between the category of substance and the other nine categories in that he ascribes an ontological priority to the former. As suggested by Aristotle\u2019s fourfold division of \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 in the second chapter of the Categories but not explicitly articulated with regard to any of the nine non-substantial \r\ncategories, Simplicius transposes the intracategorial structure and regulations spelled out for the category of substance onto the category of quality. The category of quality thus comprises \r\ngenera and species of quality and their individual instantiations. Moreover, the genera of \r\nquality are synonymously predicated of their species which in turn are synonymously \r\npredicated of their instantiations. According to the rule of transitivity, which equally applies, \r\nthe genera of quality are consequently also synonymously predicated of the instantiations. \r\nWhile the intracategorial relation, i.e. the relation between genera and species and \r\ninstantiations of quality, is a relation of unilinear synonymous predication, the intercategorial \r\nrelation, i.e. the relation between a quality and a substance, is a relation of homonymous \r\npredication. Although Aristotle does not explicitly mention all these features of quality in his \r\nCategories, they are compatible with his text. Aristotle\u2019s text leaves quite a lot of room for \r\ninterpretation which not only facilitates the transposition of regulations and structural \r\nelements within the categorial theory itself but also enables the integration of, or \r\nharmonization with, (Neo)Platonic theoretical elements. Simplicius\u2019 harmonizing tendency as \r\nan interpretative strategy becomes most apparent in the analyses conducted in the second part \r\nof this study. It is suggested by Simplicius\u2019 way of presenting predication and participation as \r\ntwo different but non-conflicting theories used to explain the relation among entities in the \r\nnatural realm, by his interpretation of the predicate as an immanent universal, by his \r\nexplanation of the \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd of quality against the background of likeness and unlikeness and by \r\nhis use of the idea of a latitude of participation in his discussion of the question whether the \r\ncategory of quality admits of a more and a less. \r\nThe discussions in the second part have also shown that some problems or questions that \r\nscholars have raised with regard to Aristotle\u2019s text appeared to be unproblematic for \r\nSimplicius, such as the compatibility of the categorial theory with hylomorphism or the \r\ninterpretation of homonymy as comprehensive homonymy. It is worth noting that Simplicius \r\ndisplays a charitable interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s text with regard to these questions. Other \r\ntopics discussed in Aristotelian scholarship are more problematic for Simplicius, especially \r\nthose which are in apparent conflict with Platonic doctrine. He explicitly addresses the \r\napparent primacy of individual substances in the Categories and tries at length to reconcile it \r\nwith the Platonic view that the forms are prior to the individuals. He does not openly address \r\n219 \r\n \r\nbut implicitly deviates from the assumption held by many Aristotelian scholars that \r\nsynonymous predication yields essential predication. He argues that, although genera, species and differentiae are all synonymously predicated of that which is beneath them, only genera and species are also essentially predicated of that which is beneath them whereas the \r\ndifferentiae are not essentially but qualitatively predicated of that which is beneath them. It \r\nalso becomes apparent in the second part that the study of quality in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary \r\non Aristotle\u2019s Categories includes an analysis of the relation between quality and the \r\nqualified. The differentiation of the possible meanings of the qualified represents the basis, or \r\npreparatory work, for such an analysis. \r\nThe third part of the study exceeds to some extent the categorial framework and expands on \r\nthe Neoplatonic elements of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of quality and its relation to the \r\nqualified. In this regard, it also elaborates on certain notions that have already been introduced \r\nin the second part but become most relevant in the context of an analysis of the relation \r\nbetween quality and the qualified within a Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The notion \r\nof participation is one of them. Simplicius does not only present participation, like predication, as a model to explain the relation between intracategorial entities in his \r\nomments on chapter five but he also explicitly applies it to the entities subsumed under the \r\ncategory of quality, when he refers to the quality as \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and to the qualified as \r\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. Simplicius associates quality and the qualified with these two elements of the \r\nNeoplatonic triad of participation and analogically applies the characteristics of those elements (and their relation to each other) to quality and the qualified (and their relation to \r\neach other). For an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified, it was thus \r\nhelpful to have a closer look at the structure of the triad of participation, and especially at its \r\nelements, their characteristics and their relations to each other. The association of quality with \r\nthe \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and of the qualified with the \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, however, transfers a problem to the \r\ncategory of quality that Simplicius, like other Neoplatonists, mainly discusses in the course of \r\nhis comments on the category of substance: the question of ontological dependence and, \r\nparticularly, whether the ontological relation between quality and the qualified is a relation of \r\nontological priority and posteriority or of ontological simultaneity. Simplicius describes \r\nquality as that which is participated in by the qualified, as that which is in the qualified and of \r\nwhich its being and its being participated in is one. The qualified in turn participates in quality \r\nand receives its being qualified from the quality. Simplicius thus appears to describe the \r\nrelation between quality and the qualified, on the one hand, as a relation of an ontological \r\npriority of the quality over the qualified and, on the other hand, as a relation of ontological simultaneity. It has been shown in the third part of the study that it is possible to reconcile \r\nthese apparently conflicting assumptions in Simplicius by means of two disambiguations: \r\nfirst, the differentiation of ontological priority into existential priority and essential priority \r\nand, second, the distinction between qualified qua single instantiation of the corresponding \r\nquality and qualified qua sum of all instantiations of the corresponding quality. While these investigations of the relation between quality and the qualified conducted in the first two \r\nchapters of the third part of the study involve the understanding of the qualified as an \r\ninstantiation of the corresponding quality, the analyses of the third and fourth chapter involve \r\nthe understanding of the qualified as a qualified substance. If the qualified is understood as a qualified substance, an analysis of the relation between \r\nquality and the qualified evokes several questions. The third chapter deals with the following \r\ntwo: first, how can differences among participants of the same quality be explained, i.e. what \r\nis the reason for gradual differences of participation or instantiations and, second, how can it be explained that a particular quality is instantiated in one substance rather than in another substance, i.e. what is the condition for participation as such. In order to answer these \r\nquestions, the notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 becomes crucial. This notion had already been \r\nintroduced in the second part of the study in the course of an analysis of the more and the less \r\nin the category of quality. As stated, Simplicius connects this question with the idea that \r\nparticipation involves latitude. The latitude of participation, in turn, is in accordance with the \r\nparticipant\u2019s \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 to receive the information from that in which it participates. The use of the notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the context of the analysis of the relation between quality \r\nand qualified has its roots in the use of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the theory of participation established by Simplicius\u2019 predecessors, where it frequently occurs as an aspect of the explanation of the \r\nrelation between \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. However, the question whether \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 is \r\na technical term in late Antiquity or a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \r\nhas been a subject of debate among scholars. Since also Simplicius uses these two terms, \r\nespecially in his comments on the category of quality, I tried to clarify Simplicius\u2019 understanding of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and of the relation between \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 in his \r\ncomments on quality. The analysis in the third chapter suggested that Simplicius distinguishes \r\nbetween a sense of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 that can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of \r\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and a sense of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 that cannot be associated with the Aristotelian notion of \r\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2. \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the latter sense is simpler, precedes \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and appears to be a \r\nsimple propensity of the participant for something more complete than itself, rooted in higher principles within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The difficulty that this analysis \r\nfaced was the fact that, although it was suggested by Simplicius\u2019 remarks, Simplicius himself \r\ndoes not explicitly distinguish between \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 in his comments on the category of quality. As I argued, however, this fact could be interpreted again as a strategy to \r\naccommodate and harmonize the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian theory. The fourth and last chapter deals with another important question that arises in the framework \r\nof an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified qua qualified substance. Based \r\non the possibility to distinguish between attributes that always belong to their subjects and are \r\neven completive or essential to their subject and attributes that are adventitious to their \r\nsubject, the question of the categorial status of essential qualities arises. While the \r\nclassification of adventitious attributes as accidents appears to be more or less unproblematic, the integration of completive attributes into Aristotle\u2019s categorial scheme poses a problem. \r\nThe answer to this question builds on the results of the previous analyses and eventually leads \r\nto the attempt to present a comprehensive answer to the initial question of the categorial status \r\nand the ontological explanation of qualities (both essential and adventitious qualities) in \r\nSimplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. \r\nBy means of an analysis of different passages on, or involving, essential qualities and a \r\ncomparison with Simplicius\u2019 conception of differentiae, I argued against the claim held by \r\nscholars that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as substances. According to the \r\ninterpretation presented in the fourth chapter, Simplicius ascribes both a substantial and a \r\nqualitative aspect to essential qualities and differentiae. Depending on the context, he stresses \r\nthe one or the other aspect. Simplicius, a proponent of the idea that Aristotle\u2019s categorial \r\nscheme is complete and exhaustive, does not appear to think that these entities would not fit \r\ninto Aristotle\u2019s scheme. Rather, Simplicius explains their double structure by their participation in both substance and quality. He does not discuss or even problematize the fact that such a conception would challenge Aristotle\u2019s scheme. Interestingly, Simplicius\u2019 assumption that these entities are substantial but no substances also suggests that he distinguishes between that which is substantial and that which is a substance. Although \r\nSimplicius undoubtedly conceives of those qualities as being substantial, he appears to \r\ndistinguish them from substances and restricts the latter to matter, form and the matter-form \r\ncompound. By means of a recourse to Proclus\u2019 remarks in his Commentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus, I tried to show that such a distinction including essential qualities can already be \r\nfound among Simplicius\u2019 predecessors. Moreover, I tried to present an ontological explanation of qualities that takes Simplicius\u2019 remarks on both essential and adventitious qualities into account. I argued that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as belonging to \r\nthe immanent form which sends forth these qualities as soon as it unfolds itself in body. These \r\nqualities thus naturally inhere in the subject and cannot be separated without the corruption of \r\nthe subject. Adventitious qualities are immanent logoi which do not belong to the form. They \r\nenter the subject after the compounding of matter and form; or in other words, the participation in these logoi is posterior to the constitution of the subject. In this way, they \r\ncome in from outside and can be separated without the corruption of the subject. However, \r\nthey do not appear to operate independently from the immanent form. The immanent form \r\nprefigures the subject, limits its possibilities in participation and determines its capacities for \r\nreceiving contraries. It thereby establishes the conditions for these logoi to operate. As it has \r\nbeen pointed out, Simplicius does not transfer the distinction between essential and adventitious to the level of natural logoi and, consequently, does not make the logos of each \r\nquality twofold. On the contrary, he restricts this distinction to the realm of bodies and can \r\nthus maintain the assumption that the logos of each quality is one. This account is an attempt to provide a consistent explanation of qualities in Simplicius\u2019 \r\nCommentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. However, it leaves a number of questions open for \r\nfurther research. One group of questions concerns the relation between essential qualities and \r\ndifferentiae. As stated, Simplicius does not only treat them similarly, he also often uses the \r\nsame examples for essential qualities and differentiae. This situation is probably the reason why scholars on Simplicius have discussed these topics together (with different results \r\nthough). However, if both differentiae and essential qualities are substantial and belong to the \r\nform but are not substances, the question arises how their differences can be explained. One \r\nof these differences is that, according to Simplicius, an essential quality, such as the whiteness \r\nof snow, can admit of a more and a less, whereas no differentia admits of a more and a less. A \r\nrelated question regarding differentiae is the following: if the differentiae are intermediates \r\nand participate in both substance and quality, why is there actually no differentia that admits \r\nof a more and a less? Is there, eventually, perhaps a distinction or hierarchy among essential \r\nattributes? On the basis of the analysis of essential and adventitious qualities, Simplicius\u2019 \r\nconception of immanent forms is a topic that is highly interesting and would deserve further \r\ninvestigation. According to the analysis conducted in the last chapter, both essential qualities \r\nand adventitious qualities depend on immanent forms. The former do so because they belong \r\nto this form, the latter because the immanent form prefigures the subject and thus determines \r\nwhat qualities it can receive and to what extent it can receive them. In connection with this \r\ntopic, it would also be interesting to investigate the question as to what there are natural logoi of. Another highly interesting topic linked to the research conducted in this study would be \r\nthe comparison of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s \r\nCategories with the presentation of material properties in the framework of a discussion of \r\nPlato\u2019s geometric atomism included in Proclus\u2019 Commentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus and Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo. Such a comparison could be very interesting because it may contribute to the clarification of strategies that some Neoplatonists \r\nhave adopted in order to deal with the differences between Plato\u2019s and Aristotle\u2019s theories about elemental constitution (including elemental properties) and may thus contribute to our understanding of Neoplatonic natural philosophy in general. Although I think that this \r\ncomparison is highly interesting, I have focused in this study on Simplicius\u2019 explanation of \r\nqualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. I hope that the preceding pages have shown that this explanation was worth a study of its own. [conclusion, pp. 215-223]","btype":1,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Lz85xNWHRXpvd29","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":{"id":1395,"pubplace":"Leuven","publisher":"KU Leuven, Humanities and Social Sciences Group, Institute of Philosophy","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":[2018]}

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The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, 2018
By: Hauer, Mareike
Title The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories
Type Monograph
Language English
Date 2018
Publication Place Leuven
Publisher KU Leuven, Humanities and Social Sciences Group, Institute of Philosophy
Categories no categories
Author(s) Hauer, Mareike
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
The  aim  of  this  study  was  to  analyze  Simplicius’  explanation  of  qualitative  properties  in  his 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories.  In this commentary, Simplicius discusses qualities in 
the framework of Aristotle’s categorial scheme and neither explicitly emphasizes the topic nor 
particularly problematizes it. In order to analyze Simplicius’ conception of quality, it was thus 
necessary  to  compile  and  systematize  his  remarks  on  qualities  or  remarks  that  might  be 
relevant  for  an  explanation  of  qualities  from  different  places  in  the  text.  I  grouped  the 
different  information  in  three  main  parts,  each  consisting  of  two  to  four  chapters.  The  first 
part set out to provide some general information on Simplicius, his Commentary on 
Aristotle’s  Categories  and  the  notion  of  quality  in  Aristotle  in  order  to  pave  the  way  for  an 
analysis of Simplicius’ explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. 
The second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius’ explanation of qualities. 
While the second part remained to a large extent within the terminological framework of the 
Categories, the third part mainly drew on Neoplatonic theorems and focused on the 
ontological explanation of qualities within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. In what 
follows,  I  will  summarize  the  results  of  the  three  main  parts  of  the  study  and  present 
difficulties  that  the  study  faced,  shortcomings  that  the  study  includes  and  questions  that  the 
study evokes.  
The first part of the study elaborated on Simplicius’ exegesis and the place of his commentary 
in the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Aristotle’s Categories. Its aim was to provide the 
reader with the textual and theoretical context in and with which Simplicius works. Hence, it 
focused in part on Simplicius as a member of the Neoplatonic school and his commentary as a 
part  and  witness  of  an  exegetical  tradition  on  Aristotle’s  Categories  that  began  centuries 
before  Simplicius.  However,  Simplicius’  philosophical  background,  his  sources  and  his 
presuppositions regarding Aristotle’s Categories are relevant for a study of his conception of 
qualities  because  they  influence  his  treatment  of  the  topic.  Although  Simplicius  appears  to 
have  a  keen  interest  in  Aristotle’s  text,  he  interprets  it  against  the  background  of  his  own 
Neoplatonic  views.  As  it  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  first  part  of  the  study,  there  is  the 
difficulty that Simplicius does not spell out or elaborate on Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrine 
in his commentary. Since the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework represents the theoretical 
framework in and with which Simplicius works, an understanding of its principles is necessary for an understanding of Simplicius’ discussions. In order to provide an explanation of  Neoplatonic  metaphysical  assumptions  when  necessary,  I  thus  relied  on  information  that can be found in Neoplatonic authors prior to Simplicius. This way of proceeding implies the problematic  assumption  that  Simplicius  does  not  deviate  from  these  authors  regarding  the understanding  of  the  Neoplatonic  metaphysical  framework.  This  assumption  is  problematic because  it  may  obscure  Simplicius’  actual  position  if  it  differs.  At  least  on  the  basis  of Simplicius’  text,  there  is  no  indication  that  Simplicius’  conception  of  general  elements  of Neoplatonic metaphysics would differ from that of his predecessors. 
It  has  been  pointed  out  that  Simplicius  frequently  refers  to  predecessors  and  even  states explicitly that, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, he follows the commentaries by Porphyry  and  Iamblichus  in  their  interpretation  of  the  Categories.  Simplicius’  commentaries are well known for the richness of references to and presentations of views held by 
predecessors.  He  has  often  been  used  as  a  source  of  information  on  other  philosophers  for 
works  that  are  no  longer  extant  otherwise.  His  Commentary  on  Aristotle’s  Categories  is  no 
exception;  it  is  rich  in  references  to  philosophers  belonging  not  only  to  the  Neoplatonic tradition but also to other philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism or the Peripatetic school. The present study does not elaborate on references to members of other philosophical schools. A  lot  could  have  been  said  about  Simplicius’  presentation  and  discussion  of  views  held  by these philosophers. It may even be fruitful to examine in detail Simplicius’ treatment and use of views held by philosophers working in the Stoic or Peripatetic tradition. Such 
investigations would also be interesting for our understanding of the historical development of 
certain  concepts.  The  omission  thus  requires  an  explanation.  The  explanation  is,  admittedly, 
of  a  rather  pragmatic  nature.  A  discussion  of  all  the  views  that  Simplicius  mentions  would 
have exceeded the scope of this study. A selection always requires good reasons. Apart from 
Porphyry and  Iamblichus,  I could not justify in a consistent manner, with regard  to the topic 
of this study, why  I would focus on the one view more than on the other. Hence,  although  I 
think  that  it  would  be  interesting  to  investigate  the  possible  influences  of,  for  example, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias or of Stoic views on Simplicius, I did not conduct such investigations in this study. They may be topics for possible future projects. As  stated,  the  main  sources  for  his  commentary  are,  according  to Simplicius  himself, 
Porphyry’s  long  commentary  on  the  Categories  and,  even  to  a  bigger  extent,  Iamblichus’ 
commentary.  The  unfortunate  fact  that  the  two  commentaries  are  no  longer  extant  and 
Simplicius’ modest self-presentation as a commentator make it difficult to assess the 
proportion between copying or paraphrasing his sources and presenting own ideas in 
Simplicius’ commentary. It has also been pointed out that some, if not all, presuppositions of 
Simplicius’ analysis of Aristotle’s Categories stem from his main source Iamblichus. Simplicius’  core  presuppositions  are  his  interpretation  of  the Categories’  σκοπός  as  a synthesis of words, beings and notions, his assumption that the main source of the Categories is  the  Pseudo-Pythagorean  treatise  On  the  Universal  Formulae  by  Pseudo-Archytas,  his conviction  that  Aristotle  uses  obscurity  on  purpose  in  his  writings  and  the  assumption  that there  is  a  harmony  between  Aristotle  and  Plato  on  the  majority  of  points.  As  it  has  been shown  in  the  course  of  the  study,  in  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle’s  Categories,  Simplicius appears to extend the idea of a harmony also to Porphyry and Iamblichus.  
Besides  the  attempt  to  provide  the  philosophical  background  of  Simplicius’  commentary,  to contextualize it within the commentary tradition on the Categories, and to introduce Simplicius’  main  sources  and  core  presuppositions  in  this  commentary,  the  first  part  also includes  an  overview  of  the  accounts  of  quality  that  can  be  found  in  Aristotle’s  works.  This overview  is  meant  to  show  that  Aristotle  approaches  qualities  from  different  perspectives  in his works. I distinguished between two main approaches: 1. the explanation of qualities from 
a  logical-metaphysical  perspective,  included,  for  example,  in  Aristotle’s  Categories  and Metaphysics,  and  2.  the  explanation  of  qualities  from  the  perspective  of  natural  philosophy, 
included,  for  example,  in  Aristotle’s  De  Caelo  and  De  Generatione  et  Corruptione.  As  the 
analyses especially in part three suggested, Simplicius appears not only to be well acquainted 
with the explanations of qualities that Aristotle presents elsewhere, he also integrates elements 
of  these  explanations  into  his  discussion  of  qualities  in  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle’s 
Categories. The second  and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius’ explanation of quality. As stated, in order to analyze Simplicius’ conception of quality, it was necessary to compile 
and  systematize  relevant  remarks  from  different  places  in  the  text.  This  way  of  proceeding 
requires  caution,  as  it  runs  the  risk  of  neglecting  the  context  of  the  relevant  individual 
passages.  Given  that  Simplicius  works  closely  and  in  sequence  with  Aristotle’s  text  and 
discusses aspects of the text within the framework of the lemmata on which he comments, a 
consideration  of  the  context,  however,  is  as  important  as  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  relevant 
passages themselves. The present study tried to accommodate both methodological strategies. 
It  thereby  runs  another  risk  common  to  compromises,  namely  to  fail  to  do  both  a  thorough investigation  of  individual  passages  and  a  consideration  of  the  context  properly.  I  gave priority to the thought that both methodological strategies are indispensable for an 
understanding of Simplicius’ conception of qualities.  The  second  part  aimed  at  providing  a  categorial  analysis  of  quality.  It  focused  on  quality  as one  of  the  ten  Aristotelian  categories  and  thus  dealt  with  the  regulations  and  characteristics that  apply  to  quality  qua  category.  Aristotle  draws  a  distinction  between  the  category  of substance  and  the  other  nine  categories  in  that  he  ascribes  an  ontological  priority  to  the former. As suggested by Aristotle’s fourfold division of τὰ ὄντα in the second chapter of the Categories  but  not  explicitly  articulated  with  regard  to  any  of  the  nine  non-substantial 
categories,  Simplicius  transposes  the  intracategorial  structure  and  regulations  spelled  out  for the category of substance onto the category of quality. The category of quality thus comprises 
genera  and  species  of  quality  and  their  individual  instantiations.  Moreover,  the  genera  of 
quality are synonymously predicated of their species which in turn are synonymously 
predicated of their instantiations. According to the rule of transitivity, which equally applies, 
the  genera  of  quality  are  consequently  also  synonymously  predicated  of  the  instantiations. 
While the intracategorial relation, i.e. the relation between genera and species and 
instantiations of quality, is a relation of unilinear synonymous predication, the intercategorial 
relation,  i.e.  the  relation  between  a  quality  and  a  substance,  is  a  relation  of  homonymous 
predication. Although Aristotle does not explicitly mention all these features of quality in his 
Categories,  they  are  compatible  with  his  text.  Aristotle’s  text  leaves  quite  a  lot  of  room  for 
interpretation which not only facilitates the transposition of regulations and structural 
elements within the categorial theory itself but also enables the integration of, or 
harmonization with, (Neo)Platonic theoretical elements. Simplicius’ harmonizing tendency as 
an interpretative strategy becomes most apparent in the analyses conducted in the second part 
of this study. It is suggested by Simplicius’ way of presenting predication and participation as 
two  different  but  non-conflicting  theories  used  to  explain  the  relation  among  entities  in  the 
natural  realm,  by  his  interpretation  of  the  predicate  as  an  immanent  universal, by  his 
explanation of the ἴδιον of quality  against the background of likeness  and unlikeness and  by 
his use of the idea of a latitude of participation in his discussion of the question whether the 
category of quality admits of a more and a less.  
The  discussions  in  the  second  part  have  also  shown  that  some  problems  or  questions  that 
scholars have raised with regard to Aristotle’s text appeared to be unproblematic for 
Simplicius,  such  as  the  compatibility  of  the  categorial  theory  with  hylomorphism  or  the 
interpretation of homonymy as comprehensive homonymy. It is worth noting that Simplicius 
displays  a  charitable  interpretation  of  Aristotle’s  text  with  regard  to  these  questions.  Other 
topics  discussed  in  Aristotelian  scholarship  are  more  problematic  for  Simplicius,  especially 
those  which  are  in  apparent  conflict  with  Platonic  doctrine.  He  explicitly  addresses  the 
apparent primacy of individual substances in the Categories and tries at length to reconcile it 
with the Platonic view that the forms are prior to the individuals. He does not openly address 
219 
 
but implicitly deviates from the assumption held by many Aristotelian scholars that 
synonymous predication yields essential predication. He argues that, although genera, species and  differentiae  are  all  synonymously  predicated  of  that  which  is  beneath  them,  only  genera and  species  are  also  essentially  predicated  of  that  which  is  beneath  them  whereas  the 
differentiae  are  not  essentially  but  qualitatively  predicated  of  that  which  is  beneath  them.  It 
also becomes apparent in the second part that the study of quality in Simplicius’ Commentary 
on  Aristotle’s  Categories  includes  an  analysis  of  the  relation  between  quality and  the 
qualified. The differentiation of the possible meanings of the qualified represents the basis, or 
preparatory work, for such an analysis. 
The third part of the study exceeds to some extent the categorial framework and expands on 
the Neoplatonic elements of Simplicius’ explanation of quality and  its relation to the 
qualified. In this regard, it also elaborates on certain notions that have already been introduced 
in  the  second  part  but  become  most  relevant  in  the  context  of  an  analysis  of  the  relation 
between quality  and the  qualified within a Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The notion 
of participation is one of them. Simplicius does not only present participation, like predication, as a model to explain the relation between intracategorial entities in his 
omments on chapter five but he also explicitly applies it to the entities subsumed under the 
category  of  quality,  when  he  refers  to  the  quality  as  μετεχόμενον  and  to  the  qualified  as 
μετέχον.  Simplicius  associates  quality  and  the  qualified  with  these  two  elements  of  the 
Neoplatonic triad of participation and analogically applies the characteristics of those elements  (and  their  relation  to  each  other)  to  quality  and  the  qualified  (and  their  relation  to 
each  other).  For  an  analysis  of  the  relation  between  quality  and  the  qualified,  it  was  thus 
helpful to have a closer look at the structure of the triad of participation, and especially at its 
elements, their characteristics and their relations to each other. The association of quality with 
the μετεχόμενον and of the qualified with the μετέχον, however, transfers a problem to the 
category of quality that Simplicius, like other Neoplatonists, mainly discusses in the course of 
his  comments  on  the  category  of  substance:  the  question  of  ontological  dependence  and, 
particularly, whether the ontological relation between quality and the qualified is a relation of 
ontological  priority  and  posteriority  or  of  ontological  simultaneity.  Simplicius  describes 
quality as that which is participated in by the qualified, as that which is in the qualified and of 
which its being and its being participated in is one. The qualified in turn participates in quality 
and  receives  its  being  qualified  from  the  quality.  Simplicius  thus  appears  to  describe  the 
relation  between  quality  and  the  qualified,  on  the  one  hand,  as  a  relation  of  an  ontological 
priority  of  the  quality  over  the  qualified  and,  on  the  other  hand,  as  a  relation  of  ontological simultaneity.  It  has  been  shown  in  the  third  part  of  the  study  that  it  is  possible  to  reconcile 
these  apparently  conflicting  assumptions  in  Simplicius  by  means  of  two  disambiguations: 
first,  the  differentiation  of  ontological  priority  into  existential  priority  and  essential  priority 
and,  second,  the  distinction  between  qualified  qua  single  instantiation  of  the  corresponding 
quality  and  qualified  qua  sum  of  all  instantiations  of  the  corresponding  quality.  While  these investigations  of  the  relation  between  quality  and  the  qualified  conducted  in  the  first  two 
chapters  of  the  third  part  of  the  study  involve  the  understanding  of  the  qualified  as  an 
instantiation of the corresponding quality, the analyses of the third and fourth chapter involve 
the understanding of the qualified as a qualified substance.  If  the  qualified  is  understood  as  a  qualified  substance,  an  analysis  of  the  relation  between 
quality and the qualified evokes several questions. The third chapter deals with the following 
two: first, how can differences among participants of the same quality be explained, i.e. what 
is the reason for gradual differences of participation or instantiations and, second, how can it be  explained  that  a  particular  quality  is  instantiated  in  one  substance  rather  than  in  another substance,  i.e.  what  is  the  condition  for  participation  as  such.  In  order  to  answer  these 
questions, the notion of ἐπιτηδειότης becomes crucial. This notion had already been 
introduced in the second part of the study in the course of an analysis of the more and the less 
in  the  category  of  quality.  As  stated,  Simplicius  connects  this  question  with  the  idea  that 
participation involves latitude. The latitude of participation, in turn, is in accordance with the 
participant’s  ἐπιτηδειότης  to  receive  the  information  from  that  in  which  it  participates.  The use of the notion of ἐπιτηδειότης in the context of the analysis of the relation between quality 
and qualified has its roots in the use of ἐπιτηδειότης in the theory of participation established by Simplicius’ predecessors, where it frequently occurs as an aspect of the explanation of the 
relation between μετεχόμενον and μετέχον. However, the question whether ἐπιτηδειότης is 
a technical term in late  Antiquity or  a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of  δύναμις 
has  been  a  subject  of  debate  among  scholars.  Since  also  Simplicius  uses  these  two  terms, 
especially in his comments on the category of quality, I tried to clarify Simplicius’ understanding of ἐπιτηδειότης and of the relation between ἐπιτηδειότης and δύναμις in his 
comments on quality. The analysis in the third chapter suggested that Simplicius distinguishes 
between  a  sense  of  ἐπιτηδειότης  that  can  be  associated  with  the  Aristotelian  notion  of 
δύναμις and a sense of ἐπιτηδειότης that cannot be associated with the Aristotelian notion of 
δύναμις.  Ἐπιτηδειότης  in  the  latter  sense  is  simpler,  precedes  δύναμις  and  appears  to  be  a 
simple propensity of the participant for something more complete than itself, rooted in higher principles  within  the  Neoplatonic  metaphysical  framework.  The  difficulty  that  this  analysis 
faced was the fact that, although it was suggested by Simplicius’ remarks, Simplicius himself 
does  not  explicitly  distinguish  between  ἐπιτηδειότης  and  δύναμις  in  his  comments  on  the category of quality. As I argued, however, this fact could be interpreted again as a strategy to 
accommodate and harmonize the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian theory. The fourth and last chapter deals with another important question that arises in the framework 
of an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified qua qualified substance. Based 
on the possibility to distinguish between attributes that always belong to their subjects and are 
even  completive  or  essential  to  their  subject  and  attributes  that  are  adventitious  to  their 
subject, the question of the categorial status of essential qualities arises. While the 
classification of adventitious attributes as accidents appears to be more or less unproblematic, the  integration  of  completive  attributes  into  Aristotle’s  categorial  scheme  poses  a  problem. 
The answer to this question builds on the results of the previous analyses and eventually leads 
to the attempt to present a comprehensive answer to the initial question of the categorial status 
and  the  ontological  explanation  of  qualities  (both  essential  and  adventitious  qualities)  in 
Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. 
By  means  of  an  analysis  of  different  passages  on,  or  involving,  essential  qualities  and  a 
comparison  with  Simplicius’  conception  of  differentiae,  I  argued  against  the  claim  held  by 
scholars  that  Simplicius  conceives  of  essential  qualities  as  substances.  According  to  the 
interpretation  presented  in  the  fourth  chapter,  Simplicius  ascribes  both  a  substantial  and  a 
qualitative aspect to essential qualities and differentiae. Depending on the context, he stresses 
the  one  or  the  other  aspect.  Simplicius,  a  proponent  of  the  idea  that  Aristotle’s  categorial 
scheme is complete and  exhaustive, does not appear to think that these entities would not fit 
into Aristotle’s scheme. Rather, Simplicius explains their double structure by their participation in both substance and quality. He does not discuss or even problematize the fact that such a conception would challenge Aristotle’s scheme. Interestingly, Simplicius’ assumption that these entities are substantial but no substances also suggests that he distinguishes  between  that  which  is  substantial  and  that  which  is  a  substance.  Although 
Simplicius  undoubtedly  conceives  of  those  qualities  as  being  substantial,  he  appears  to 
distinguish  them  from  substances  and  restricts  the  latter  to  matter,  form  and  the  matter-form 
compound.  By  means  of  a  recourse  to  Proclus’  remarks  in  his  Commentary  on  Plato’s Timaeus,  I  tried  to  show  that  such  a  distinction  including  essential  qualities  can  already  be 
found among Simplicius’ predecessors. Moreover, I tried to present an ontological explanation  of  qualities  that  takes  Simplicius’  remarks  on  both  essential  and  adventitious qualities into account. I argued that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as belonging to 
the immanent form which sends forth these qualities as soon as it unfolds itself in body. These 
qualities thus naturally inhere in the subject and cannot be separated without the corruption of 
the subject. Adventitious qualities are immanent logoi which do not belong to the form. They 
enter the subject after the compounding of matter and form; or in other words, the participation  in  these  logoi  is  posterior  to  the  constitution  of  the  subject.  In  this  way,  they 
come  in  from  outside  and  can  be  separated  without  the  corruption  of  the  subject.  However, 
they  do  not  appear  to  operate  independently  from  the  immanent  form.  The  immanent  form 
prefigures the subject, limits its possibilities in participation and determines its capacities for 
receiving contraries. It thereby establishes the conditions for these logoi to operate. As it has 
been pointed out, Simplicius does not transfer the distinction between essential and adventitious to the level of natural logoi and, consequently, does not make the logos of each 
quality  twofold.  On  the  contrary,  he  restricts  this  distinction  to  the  realm  of  bodies  and  can 
thus maintain the assumption that the logos of each quality is one. This  account  is  an  attempt  to  provide  a  consistent  explanation  of  qualities  in  Simplicius’ 
Commentary  on  Aristotle’s  Categories.  However,  it  leaves  a  number  of  questions  open  for 
further research. One group of questions concerns the relation between essential qualities and 
differentiae.  As  stated,  Simplicius  does  not  only  treat  them  similarly,  he  also  often  uses  the 
same  examples  for  essential  qualities  and  differentiae.  This  situation  is  probably  the  reason why  scholars  on  Simplicius  have  discussed  these  topics  together  (with  different  results 
though). However, if both differentiae and essential qualities are substantial and belong to the 
form but are not substances, the question arises how their differences can  be explained. One 
of these differences is that, according to Simplicius, an essential quality, such as the whiteness 
of snow, can admit of a more and a less, whereas no differentia admits of a more and a less. A 
related  question  regarding  differentiae  is  the  following:  if  the  differentiae  are  intermediates 
and participate in both substance and quality, why is there actually no differentia that admits 
of a more and a less? Is there, eventually, perhaps a distinction or hierarchy among essential 
attributes?  On  the  basis  of  the  analysis  of  essential  and  adventitious  qualities,  Simplicius’ 
conception of immanent  forms  is a topic that is highly interesting and would deserve further 
investigation. According to the analysis conducted in the last chapter, both essential qualities 
and adventitious qualities depend on immanent forms. The former do so because they belong 
to this form, the latter because the immanent form prefigures the subject and thus determines 
what  qualities  it  can  receive  and  to  what  extent  it  can  receive  them.  In  connection  with  this 
topic, it would also be interesting to investigate the question as to what there are natural logoi of.  Another  highly  interesting  topic  linked  to  the  research  conducted  in  this  study  would  be 
the  comparison  of  Simplicius’  explanation  of  qualities  in  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle’s 
Categories  with  the  presentation  of  material  properties  in  the  framework  of  a  discussion  of 
Plato’s geometric atomism included in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus and Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo. Such a comparison could be very interesting because it may contribute to the clarification of strategies that some Neoplatonists 
have  adopted  in  order  to  deal  with  the  differences  between  Plato’s  and  Aristotle’s  theories about  elemental  constitution  (including  elemental  properties)  and  may  thus  contribute  to  our understanding  of  Neoplatonic  natural  philosophy  in  general.  Although  I  think  that  this 
comparison  is  highly  interesting,  I  have  focused  in  this  study  on  Simplicius’  explanation  of 
qualities  in  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle’s  Categories.  I  hope  that  the  preceding  pages  have shown that this explanation was worth a study of its own. [conclusion, pp. 215-223]

{"_index":"sire","_type":"_doc","_id":"1395","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1395,"authors_free":[{"id":2171,"entry_id":1395,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":174,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hauer, Mareike","free_first_name":"Mareike","free_last_name":"Hauer","norm_person":{"id":174,"first_name":"Mareike","last_name":"Hauer","full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories","main_title":{"title":"The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories"},"abstract":"The aim of this study was to analyze Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualitative properties in his \r\nCommentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. In this commentary, Simplicius discusses qualities in \r\nthe framework of Aristotle\u2019s categorial scheme and neither explicitly emphasizes the topic nor \r\nparticularly problematizes it. In order to analyze Simplicius\u2019 conception of quality, it was thus \r\nnecessary to compile and systematize his remarks on qualities or remarks that might be \r\nrelevant for an explanation of qualities from different places in the text. I grouped the \r\ndifferent information in three main parts, each consisting of two to four chapters. The first \r\npart set out to provide some general information on Simplicius, his Commentary on \r\nAristotle\u2019s Categories and the notion of quality in Aristotle in order to pave the way for an \r\nanalysis of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. \r\nThe second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities. \r\nWhile the second part remained to a large extent within the terminological framework of the \r\nCategories, the third part mainly drew on Neoplatonic theorems and focused on the \r\nontological explanation of qualities within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. In what \r\nfollows, I will summarize the results of the three main parts of the study and present \r\ndifficulties that the study faced, shortcomings that the study includes and questions that the \r\nstudy evokes. \r\nThe first part of the study elaborated on Simplicius\u2019 exegesis and the place of his commentary \r\nin the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. Its aim was to provide the \r\nreader with the textual and theoretical context in and with which Simplicius works. Hence, it \r\nfocused in part on Simplicius as a member of the Neoplatonic school and his commentary as a \r\npart and witness of an exegetical tradition on Aristotle\u2019s Categories that began centuries \r\nbefore Simplicius. However, Simplicius\u2019 philosophical background, his sources and his \r\npresuppositions regarding Aristotle\u2019s Categories are relevant for a study of his conception of \r\nqualities because they influence his treatment of the topic. Although Simplicius appears to \r\nhave a keen interest in Aristotle\u2019s text, he interprets it against the background of his own \r\nNeoplatonic views. As it has been pointed out in the first part of the study, there is the \r\ndifficulty that Simplicius does not spell out or elaborate on Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrine \r\nin his commentary. Since the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework represents the theoretical \r\nframework in and with which Simplicius works, an understanding of its principles is necessary for an understanding of Simplicius\u2019 discussions. In order to provide an explanation of Neoplatonic metaphysical assumptions when necessary, I thus relied on information that can be found in Neoplatonic authors prior to Simplicius. This way of proceeding implies the problematic assumption that Simplicius does not deviate from these authors regarding the understanding of the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. This assumption is problematic because it may obscure Simplicius\u2019 actual position if it differs. At least on the basis of Simplicius\u2019 text, there is no indication that Simplicius\u2019 conception of general elements of Neoplatonic metaphysics would differ from that of his predecessors. \r\nIt has been pointed out that Simplicius frequently refers to predecessors and even states explicitly that, in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, he follows the commentaries by Porphyry and Iamblichus in their interpretation of the Categories. Simplicius\u2019 commentaries are well known for the richness of references to and presentations of views held by \r\npredecessors. He has often been used as a source of information on other philosophers for \r\nworks that are no longer extant otherwise. His Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories is no \r\nexception; it is rich in references to philosophers belonging not only to the Neoplatonic tradition but also to other philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism or the Peripatetic school. The present study does not elaborate on references to members of other philosophical schools. A lot could have been said about Simplicius\u2019 presentation and discussion of views held by these philosophers. It may even be fruitful to examine in detail Simplicius\u2019 treatment and use of views held by philosophers working in the Stoic or Peripatetic tradition. Such \r\ninvestigations would also be interesting for our understanding of the historical development of \r\ncertain concepts. The omission thus requires an explanation. The explanation is, admittedly, \r\nof a rather pragmatic nature. A discussion of all the views that Simplicius mentions would \r\nhave exceeded the scope of this study. A selection always requires good reasons. Apart from \r\nPorphyry and Iamblichus, I could not justify in a consistent manner, with regard to the topic \r\nof this study, why I would focus on the one view more than on the other. Hence, although I \r\nthink that it would be interesting to investigate the possible influences of, for example, \r\nAlexander of Aphrodisias or of Stoic views on Simplicius, I did not conduct such investigations in this study. They may be topics for possible future projects. As stated, the main sources for his commentary are, according to Simplicius himself, \r\nPorphyry\u2019s long commentary on the Categories and, even to a bigger extent, Iamblichus\u2019 \r\ncommentary. The unfortunate fact that the two commentaries are no longer extant and \r\nSimplicius\u2019 modest self-presentation as a commentator make it difficult to assess the \r\nproportion between copying or paraphrasing his sources and presenting own ideas in \r\nSimplicius\u2019 commentary. It has also been pointed out that some, if not all, presuppositions of \r\nSimplicius\u2019 analysis of Aristotle\u2019s Categories stem from his main source Iamblichus. Simplicius\u2019 core presuppositions are his interpretation of the Categories\u2019 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2 as a synthesis of words, beings and notions, his assumption that the main source of the Categories is the Pseudo-Pythagorean treatise On the Universal Formulae by Pseudo-Archytas, his conviction that Aristotle uses obscurity on purpose in his writings and the assumption that there is a harmony between Aristotle and Plato on the majority of points. As it has been shown in the course of the study, in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories, Simplicius appears to extend the idea of a harmony also to Porphyry and Iamblichus. \r\nBesides the attempt to provide the philosophical background of Simplicius\u2019 commentary, to contextualize it within the commentary tradition on the Categories, and to introduce Simplicius\u2019 main sources and core presuppositions in this commentary, the first part also includes an overview of the accounts of quality that can be found in Aristotle\u2019s works. This overview is meant to show that Aristotle approaches qualities from different perspectives in his works. I distinguished between two main approaches: 1. the explanation of qualities from \r\na logical-metaphysical perspective, included, for example, in Aristotle\u2019s Categories and Metaphysics, and 2. the explanation of qualities from the perspective of natural philosophy, \r\nincluded, for example, in Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo and De Generatione et Corruptione. As the \r\nanalyses especially in part three suggested, Simplicius appears not only to be well acquainted \r\nwith the explanations of qualities that Aristotle presents elsewhere, he also integrates elements \r\nof these explanations into his discussion of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s \r\nCategories. The second and third part focused on different aspects of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of quality. As stated, in order to analyze Simplicius\u2019 conception of quality, it was necessary to compile \r\nand systematize relevant remarks from different places in the text. This way of proceeding \r\nrequires caution, as it runs the risk of neglecting the context of the relevant individual \r\npassages. Given that Simplicius works closely and in sequence with Aristotle\u2019s text and \r\ndiscusses aspects of the text within the framework of the lemmata on which he comments, a \r\nconsideration of the context, however, is as important as a thorough analysis of the relevant \r\npassages themselves. The present study tried to accommodate both methodological strategies. \r\nIt thereby runs another risk common to compromises, namely to fail to do both a thorough investigation of individual passages and a consideration of the context properly. I gave priority to the thought that both methodological strategies are indispensable for an \r\nunderstanding of Simplicius\u2019 conception of qualities. The second part aimed at providing a categorial analysis of quality. It focused on quality as one of the ten Aristotelian categories and thus dealt with the regulations and characteristics that apply to quality qua category. Aristotle draws a distinction between the category of substance and the other nine categories in that he ascribes an ontological priority to the former. As suggested by Aristotle\u2019s fourfold division of \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 in the second chapter of the Categories but not explicitly articulated with regard to any of the nine non-substantial \r\ncategories, Simplicius transposes the intracategorial structure and regulations spelled out for the category of substance onto the category of quality. The category of quality thus comprises \r\ngenera and species of quality and their individual instantiations. Moreover, the genera of \r\nquality are synonymously predicated of their species which in turn are synonymously \r\npredicated of their instantiations. According to the rule of transitivity, which equally applies, \r\nthe genera of quality are consequently also synonymously predicated of the instantiations. \r\nWhile the intracategorial relation, i.e. the relation between genera and species and \r\ninstantiations of quality, is a relation of unilinear synonymous predication, the intercategorial \r\nrelation, i.e. the relation between a quality and a substance, is a relation of homonymous \r\npredication. Although Aristotle does not explicitly mention all these features of quality in his \r\nCategories, they are compatible with his text. Aristotle\u2019s text leaves quite a lot of room for \r\ninterpretation which not only facilitates the transposition of regulations and structural \r\nelements within the categorial theory itself but also enables the integration of, or \r\nharmonization with, (Neo)Platonic theoretical elements. Simplicius\u2019 harmonizing tendency as \r\nan interpretative strategy becomes most apparent in the analyses conducted in the second part \r\nof this study. It is suggested by Simplicius\u2019 way of presenting predication and participation as \r\ntwo different but non-conflicting theories used to explain the relation among entities in the \r\nnatural realm, by his interpretation of the predicate as an immanent universal, by his \r\nexplanation of the \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd of quality against the background of likeness and unlikeness and by \r\nhis use of the idea of a latitude of participation in his discussion of the question whether the \r\ncategory of quality admits of a more and a less. \r\nThe discussions in the second part have also shown that some problems or questions that \r\nscholars have raised with regard to Aristotle\u2019s text appeared to be unproblematic for \r\nSimplicius, such as the compatibility of the categorial theory with hylomorphism or the \r\ninterpretation of homonymy as comprehensive homonymy. It is worth noting that Simplicius \r\ndisplays a charitable interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s text with regard to these questions. Other \r\ntopics discussed in Aristotelian scholarship are more problematic for Simplicius, especially \r\nthose which are in apparent conflict with Platonic doctrine. He explicitly addresses the \r\napparent primacy of individual substances in the Categories and tries at length to reconcile it \r\nwith the Platonic view that the forms are prior to the individuals. He does not openly address \r\n219 \r\n \r\nbut implicitly deviates from the assumption held by many Aristotelian scholars that \r\nsynonymous predication yields essential predication. He argues that, although genera, species and differentiae are all synonymously predicated of that which is beneath them, only genera and species are also essentially predicated of that which is beneath them whereas the \r\ndifferentiae are not essentially but qualitatively predicated of that which is beneath them. It \r\nalso becomes apparent in the second part that the study of quality in Simplicius\u2019 Commentary \r\non Aristotle\u2019s Categories includes an analysis of the relation between quality and the \r\nqualified. The differentiation of the possible meanings of the qualified represents the basis, or \r\npreparatory work, for such an analysis. \r\nThe third part of the study exceeds to some extent the categorial framework and expands on \r\nthe Neoplatonic elements of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of quality and its relation to the \r\nqualified. In this regard, it also elaborates on certain notions that have already been introduced \r\nin the second part but become most relevant in the context of an analysis of the relation \r\nbetween quality and the qualified within a Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The notion \r\nof participation is one of them. Simplicius does not only present participation, like predication, as a model to explain the relation between intracategorial entities in his \r\nomments on chapter five but he also explicitly applies it to the entities subsumed under the \r\ncategory of quality, when he refers to the quality as \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and to the qualified as \r\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. Simplicius associates quality and the qualified with these two elements of the \r\nNeoplatonic triad of participation and analogically applies the characteristics of those elements (and their relation to each other) to quality and the qualified (and their relation to \r\neach other). For an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified, it was thus \r\nhelpful to have a closer look at the structure of the triad of participation, and especially at its \r\nelements, their characteristics and their relations to each other. The association of quality with \r\nthe \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and of the qualified with the \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, however, transfers a problem to the \r\ncategory of quality that Simplicius, like other Neoplatonists, mainly discusses in the course of \r\nhis comments on the category of substance: the question of ontological dependence and, \r\nparticularly, whether the ontological relation between quality and the qualified is a relation of \r\nontological priority and posteriority or of ontological simultaneity. Simplicius describes \r\nquality as that which is participated in by the qualified, as that which is in the qualified and of \r\nwhich its being and its being participated in is one. The qualified in turn participates in quality \r\nand receives its being qualified from the quality. Simplicius thus appears to describe the \r\nrelation between quality and the qualified, on the one hand, as a relation of an ontological \r\npriority of the quality over the qualified and, on the other hand, as a relation of ontological simultaneity. It has been shown in the third part of the study that it is possible to reconcile \r\nthese apparently conflicting assumptions in Simplicius by means of two disambiguations: \r\nfirst, the differentiation of ontological priority into existential priority and essential priority \r\nand, second, the distinction between qualified qua single instantiation of the corresponding \r\nquality and qualified qua sum of all instantiations of the corresponding quality. While these investigations of the relation between quality and the qualified conducted in the first two \r\nchapters of the third part of the study involve the understanding of the qualified as an \r\ninstantiation of the corresponding quality, the analyses of the third and fourth chapter involve \r\nthe understanding of the qualified as a qualified substance. If the qualified is understood as a qualified substance, an analysis of the relation between \r\nquality and the qualified evokes several questions. The third chapter deals with the following \r\ntwo: first, how can differences among participants of the same quality be explained, i.e. what \r\nis the reason for gradual differences of participation or instantiations and, second, how can it be explained that a particular quality is instantiated in one substance rather than in another substance, i.e. what is the condition for participation as such. In order to answer these \r\nquestions, the notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 becomes crucial. This notion had already been \r\nintroduced in the second part of the study in the course of an analysis of the more and the less \r\nin the category of quality. As stated, Simplicius connects this question with the idea that \r\nparticipation involves latitude. The latitude of participation, in turn, is in accordance with the \r\nparticipant\u2019s \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 to receive the information from that in which it participates. The use of the notion of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the context of the analysis of the relation between quality \r\nand qualified has its roots in the use of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the theory of participation established by Simplicius\u2019 predecessors, where it frequently occurs as an aspect of the explanation of the \r\nrelation between \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd and \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd. However, the question whether \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 is \r\na technical term in late Antiquity or a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \r\nhas been a subject of debate among scholars. Since also Simplicius uses these two terms, \r\nespecially in his comments on the category of quality, I tried to clarify Simplicius\u2019 understanding of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and of the relation between \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 in his \r\ncomments on quality. The analysis in the third chapter suggested that Simplicius distinguishes \r\nbetween a sense of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 that can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of \r\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and a sense of \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 that cannot be associated with the Aristotelian notion of \r\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2. \u1f18\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 in the latter sense is simpler, precedes \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and appears to be a \r\nsimple propensity of the participant for something more complete than itself, rooted in higher principles within the Neoplatonic metaphysical framework. The difficulty that this analysis \r\nfaced was the fact that, although it was suggested by Simplicius\u2019 remarks, Simplicius himself \r\ndoes not explicitly distinguish between \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 in his comments on the category of quality. As I argued, however, this fact could be interpreted again as a strategy to \r\naccommodate and harmonize the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian theory. The fourth and last chapter deals with another important question that arises in the framework \r\nof an analysis of the relation between quality and the qualified qua qualified substance. Based \r\non the possibility to distinguish between attributes that always belong to their subjects and are \r\neven completive or essential to their subject and attributes that are adventitious to their \r\nsubject, the question of the categorial status of essential qualities arises. While the \r\nclassification of adventitious attributes as accidents appears to be more or less unproblematic, the integration of completive attributes into Aristotle\u2019s categorial scheme poses a problem. \r\nThe answer to this question builds on the results of the previous analyses and eventually leads \r\nto the attempt to present a comprehensive answer to the initial question of the categorial status \r\nand the ontological explanation of qualities (both essential and adventitious qualities) in \r\nSimplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. \r\nBy means of an analysis of different passages on, or involving, essential qualities and a \r\ncomparison with Simplicius\u2019 conception of differentiae, I argued against the claim held by \r\nscholars that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as substances. According to the \r\ninterpretation presented in the fourth chapter, Simplicius ascribes both a substantial and a \r\nqualitative aspect to essential qualities and differentiae. Depending on the context, he stresses \r\nthe one or the other aspect. Simplicius, a proponent of the idea that Aristotle\u2019s categorial \r\nscheme is complete and exhaustive, does not appear to think that these entities would not fit \r\ninto Aristotle\u2019s scheme. Rather, Simplicius explains their double structure by their participation in both substance and quality. He does not discuss or even problematize the fact that such a conception would challenge Aristotle\u2019s scheme. Interestingly, Simplicius\u2019 assumption that these entities are substantial but no substances also suggests that he distinguishes between that which is substantial and that which is a substance. Although \r\nSimplicius undoubtedly conceives of those qualities as being substantial, he appears to \r\ndistinguish them from substances and restricts the latter to matter, form and the matter-form \r\ncompound. By means of a recourse to Proclus\u2019 remarks in his Commentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus, I tried to show that such a distinction including essential qualities can already be \r\nfound among Simplicius\u2019 predecessors. Moreover, I tried to present an ontological explanation of qualities that takes Simplicius\u2019 remarks on both essential and adventitious qualities into account. I argued that Simplicius conceives of essential qualities as belonging to \r\nthe immanent form which sends forth these qualities as soon as it unfolds itself in body. These \r\nqualities thus naturally inhere in the subject and cannot be separated without the corruption of \r\nthe subject. Adventitious qualities are immanent logoi which do not belong to the form. They \r\nenter the subject after the compounding of matter and form; or in other words, the participation in these logoi is posterior to the constitution of the subject. In this way, they \r\ncome in from outside and can be separated without the corruption of the subject. However, \r\nthey do not appear to operate independently from the immanent form. The immanent form \r\nprefigures the subject, limits its possibilities in participation and determines its capacities for \r\nreceiving contraries. It thereby establishes the conditions for these logoi to operate. As it has \r\nbeen pointed out, Simplicius does not transfer the distinction between essential and adventitious to the level of natural logoi and, consequently, does not make the logos of each \r\nquality twofold. On the contrary, he restricts this distinction to the realm of bodies and can \r\nthus maintain the assumption that the logos of each quality is one. This account is an attempt to provide a consistent explanation of qualities in Simplicius\u2019 \r\nCommentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. However, it leaves a number of questions open for \r\nfurther research. One group of questions concerns the relation between essential qualities and \r\ndifferentiae. As stated, Simplicius does not only treat them similarly, he also often uses the \r\nsame examples for essential qualities and differentiae. This situation is probably the reason why scholars on Simplicius have discussed these topics together (with different results \r\nthough). However, if both differentiae and essential qualities are substantial and belong to the \r\nform but are not substances, the question arises how their differences can be explained. One \r\nof these differences is that, according to Simplicius, an essential quality, such as the whiteness \r\nof snow, can admit of a more and a less, whereas no differentia admits of a more and a less. A \r\nrelated question regarding differentiae is the following: if the differentiae are intermediates \r\nand participate in both substance and quality, why is there actually no differentia that admits \r\nof a more and a less? Is there, eventually, perhaps a distinction or hierarchy among essential \r\nattributes? On the basis of the analysis of essential and adventitious qualities, Simplicius\u2019 \r\nconception of immanent forms is a topic that is highly interesting and would deserve further \r\ninvestigation. According to the analysis conducted in the last chapter, both essential qualities \r\nand adventitious qualities depend on immanent forms. The former do so because they belong \r\nto this form, the latter because the immanent form prefigures the subject and thus determines \r\nwhat qualities it can receive and to what extent it can receive them. In connection with this \r\ntopic, it would also be interesting to investigate the question as to what there are natural logoi of. Another highly interesting topic linked to the research conducted in this study would be \r\nthe comparison of Simplicius\u2019 explanation of qualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s \r\nCategories with the presentation of material properties in the framework of a discussion of \r\nPlato\u2019s geometric atomism included in Proclus\u2019 Commentary on Plato\u2019s Timaeus and Simplicius\u2019 Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s De Caelo. Such a comparison could be very interesting because it may contribute to the clarification of strategies that some Neoplatonists \r\nhave adopted in order to deal with the differences between Plato\u2019s and Aristotle\u2019s theories about elemental constitution (including elemental properties) and may thus contribute to our understanding of Neoplatonic natural philosophy in general. Although I think that this \r\ncomparison is highly interesting, I have focused in this study on Simplicius\u2019 explanation of \r\nqualities in his Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories. I hope that the preceding pages have shown that this explanation was worth a study of its own. [conclusion, pp. 215-223]","btype":1,"date":"2018","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Lz85xNWHRXpvd29","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":174,"full_name":"Hauer, Mareike","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":{"id":1395,"pubplace":"Leuven","publisher":"KU Leuven, Humanities and Social Sciences Group, Institute of Philosophy","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["The explanation of qualitative properties in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle\u2019s Categories"]}

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