| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | Brad Inwood |
| Translator(s) |
| The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. In the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers’ mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof. Corresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle’s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus’ distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations. The first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes. Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7). How to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius’ and the other late commentators’ discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius’ discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates. In the second section, I turn to Simplicius’ criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates. In light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius’ discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination. In conclusion, I show that Simplicius’ conception of relations originates in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and in Damascius’ account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius’ motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. [introduction p. 245-248] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR |
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Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac) or a character (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus\u2019 construal of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives.\r\n\r\nIn the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers\u2019 mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof.\r\n\r\nCorresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus\u2019 distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations.\r\n\r\nThe first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes.\r\n\r\nPlotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7).\r\n\r\nHow to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius\u2019 and the other late commentators\u2019 discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius\u2019 discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn the second section, I turn to Simplicius\u2019 criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius\u2019 discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination.\r\n\r\nIn conclusion, I show that Simplicius\u2019 conception of relations originates in Proclus\u2019 commentary on Plato\u2019s Parmenides and in Damascius\u2019 account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius\u2019 motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. 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| Title | Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Published in | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy |
| Pages | 245-274 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Harari, Orna |
| Editor(s) | Brad Inwood |
| Translator(s) |
The ancient commentators’ approach to Aristotle’s account of relatives in Categories 7 is shaped by the conception that prevailed in later antiquity, in which relatives are composites of a substrate, i.e. an attribute that belongs to the other categories, and a relation. Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (διαφορά) or a character (χαρακτήρ) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (ἀπόνευσις). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle’s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus’ construal of Aristotle’s category of relatives. In the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers’ mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof. Corresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle’s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus’ distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations. The first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes. Plotinus’ Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7). How to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius’ and the other late commentators’ discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius’ discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates. In the second section, I turn to Simplicius’ criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates. In light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius’ discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination. In conclusion, I show that Simplicius’ conception of relations originates in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and in Damascius’ account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius’ motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. [introduction p. 245-248] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PleABvrSeQ8LVfR |
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Simplicius shares this conception with the other commentators, but he formulates it in different terms. He calls the substrate on which relational attributes supervene a difference (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac) or a character (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1) and the supervening relational attribute an inclination (\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). In this study, I attempt to clarify the significance of this terminology, arguing that through the notion of inclination Simplicius answers the question of the unity of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives, as formulated in Plotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9. To expound this contention, I outline Plotinus\u2019 construal of Aristotle\u2019s category of relatives.\r\n\r\nIn the opening paragraph of his discussion of relatives in Categories 7, Aristotle presents two lists of examples; the first contains greater and double, the second contains states, conditions, perception, knowledge, and position (6a38-b3). Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish these lists, they seem to exemplify two different notions of relatives. The first list seems to contain relational attributes whose bearers possess them merely due to their mutual dependence, whereas the second list seems to contain attributes which, in addition to arising from their bearers\u2019 mutual dependence, are internal qualitative states thereof.\r\n\r\nCorresponding to this distinction, Plotinus in Ennead 6.1.9 distinguishes two types of relational attributes: those that come about by participation and those that result from an activity. In so doing, he associates Aristotle\u2019s account of relatives with the question of the reality of relations, which does not appear in Categories 7 but arises from the Stoic notion of relatives. Consequently, Plotinus\u2019 distinction of these types of relatives leads to two different accounts of the reality of relations.\r\n\r\nThe first account, in which relational attributes are acquired by participation, secures the reality of relations by preventing their reduction to their substrates. By this account, relational attributes are not mere dispositions of their substrates, as the Stoics hold, but exist over and above their substrates. The second account, in which relational attributes are activities of their substrates, secures the reality of relations by grounding them in the inner nature of their substrates. It thereby confronts the contention found in Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics N 1 (1088u29-35) and in Sextus Empiricus (M. 8.455-8) that relational attributes are ontologically inferior because their substrates do not undergo an intrinsic change when they acquire and lose their relational attributes.\r\n\r\nPlotinus\u2019 Ennead 6.1.6-9 leaves this dilemma unsettled. On the one hand, he considers active relations less problematic than relations by participation (6.1.6.13-18); on the other hand, he argues that the unity of the category of relatives is secured if relations are considered to be forms acquired by participation (6.1.9.25-7).\r\n\r\nHow to distinguish relations from their relata without jeopardizing the subject-attribute scheme remains an open question. In substantiating my interpretation, I analyze in the first section Simplicius\u2019 and the other late commentators\u2019 discussions of the reality of relations. I show that Simplicius\u2019 discussion gives rise to the formulation of a precise distinction between relations and their substrates, whereas the other late commentators stress the dependence of relations on their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn the second section, I turn to Simplicius\u2019 criticism of the Stoic distinction between relatives and relatively disposed attributes, showing that, despite the distinction between relations and their substrates, Simplicius follows the other commentators in stressing the dependence of relational attributes on the inner nature of their substrates.\r\n\r\nIn light of these conclusions, in the third section I seek to show how Simplicius succeeds in accommodating the distinction between relations and their substrates with his view that relations depend on their substrates. Here, I analyze Simplicius\u2019 discussion of relational change and show that it facilitates the integration of these two accounts and that it underlies the notion of inclination.\r\n\r\nIn conclusion, I show that Simplicius\u2019 conception of relations originates in Proclus\u2019 commentary on Plato\u2019s Parmenides and in Damascius\u2019 account of the relation between the higher and lower grades of reality in Neoplatonic metaphysics. This discussion lends further support to my attempt to articulate the notion of inclination and offers a possible explanation of Simplicius\u2019 motivation for deviating from the stance of the other late commentators. 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The volumes feature original essays on a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient philosophy, from its earliest beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. It is anonymously peer-reviewed and appears twice a year.\r\n\r\nThe series was founded in 1983, and in 2016 published its 50th volume. The series format was chosen so that it might include essays of more substantial length than is customarily allowed in journals, as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Past editors include Julia Annas, Christopher Taylor, David Sedley, Brad Inwood, and Victor Caston. The current editor, as of July 2022, is Rachana Kamtekar. 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