| Title | The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 7-23 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| All students of the history of philosophy are apt to be seduced by linearity. What I mean is this. Naturally, we read the texts of the history of philosophy in the chronological order in which they were written. So, for example, we read Aristotle after we read Plato. And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the “influence” of the earlier philosopher on the later or the “development” of the philosopher’s views. The employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment’s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect. Thus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another. Consider “development.” The perfectly anodyne sense of this term—namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought—is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato’s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought—apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none—you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change. I am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato’s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a “phase” after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful. The reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato. The reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an “objective and unbiased” account of the “development” of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called “the exegete of the Platonic revelation,” namely, Plotinus. Simplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy “in” the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle’s remark in Physics—that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature—puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides. Let us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato. As I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle’s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle’s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy. Instead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1510","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1510,"authors_free":[{"id":2623,"entry_id":1510,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism","main_title":{"title":"The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism"},"abstract":"All students of the history of philosophy are apt to be seduced by linearity. What I mean is this. Naturally, we read the texts of the history of philosophy in the chronological order in which they were written. So, for example, we read Aristotle after we read Plato. And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the \u201cinfluence\u201d of the earlier philosopher on the later or the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the philosopher\u2019s views.\r\n\r\nThe employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment\u2019s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect.\r\n\r\nThus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another.\r\n\r\nConsider \u201cdevelopment.\u201d The perfectly anodyne sense of this term\u2014namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought\u2014is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato\u2019s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought\u2014apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none\u2014you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change.\r\n\r\nI am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato\u2019s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a \u201cphase\u201d after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful.\r\n\r\nThe reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato.\r\n\r\nThe reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an \u201cobjective and unbiased\u201d account of the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called \u201cthe exegete of the Platonic revelation,\u201d namely, Plotinus.\r\n\r\nSimplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy \u201cin\u201d the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle\u2019s remark in Physics\u2014that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature\u2014puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides.\r\n\r\nLet us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato.\r\n\r\nAs I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy.\r\n\r\nInstead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1510,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"2","issue":"4","pages":"7-23"}},"sort":[2014]}
| Title | The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2011 |
| Publication Place | Cambridge |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Volume | 2 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Translator(s) |
| The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity comprises over forty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of the period 200–800 CE. Designed as a successor to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (edited by A. H. Armstrong), it takes into account some forty years of scholarship since the publication of that volume. The contributors examine philosophy as it entered literature, science and religion, and offer new and extensive assessments of philosophers who until recently have been mostly ignored. The volume also includes a complete digest of all philosophical works known to have been written during this period. It will be an invaluable resource for all those interested in this rich and still emerging field. [author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kHhRvU7UkRlktbW |
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| Title | Simplicius of Cilicia |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2011 |
| Published in | The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II |
| Pages | 711-732 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
| Editor(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Translator(s) |
| The few facts we have about Simplicius’ life come from his own works and a few other sources. He came from Cilicia (south-eastern Anatolia), as Agathias tells us (Hist. 2.30). He was educated by Ammonius in Alexandria (fl. 490 CE, cf. In Cael. 26.18–19) and Damascius (fl. 520 CE) in Athens (In Phys. 601.19). Among influential figures on his philosophical outlook are Porphyry, the learned pupil and biographer of Plotinus (245–320), Iamblichus (fl. 300 CE, referred to as "the divine Iamblichus," In Phys. 60.7; 639.23, etc.), and Proclus ("the teacher of my teachers," In Phys. 611.11–12, cf. 795.4–5). The expulsion of Platonists from Athens in 532 CE after Justinian’s ban on pagan teaching ended school activities in 529 CE (Malalas Chronicle 18.47), the cross-references between the extant works, and the lack of evidence after 540 CE suggest that his lifespan roughly spans 480–560 CE. Allusive comments in a discussion of the role of the philosopher in the city in his commentary on Epictetus (In Epict. 32.65.30–9 D., with reference to Plato Rep. 496d) make it probable that he wrote that commentary before the others, while still in Athens, as does his mention of the oppressive situation in Athens (ibid., epilogue). His personal note on friendship (In Epict. 87.39–44/354 Hadot) indicates that he experienced help from friends who looked after his family while he was away, but we cannot establish the nature and date of this event. There has been much debate and speculation about where he might have gone after the trip to Persia with Damascius and other colleagues (531 CE), when the hope of an ideal state under a "philosopher-king," the enlightened ruler Chosroes I (Khusrau), was not fulfilled. However, the issue has not been resolved so far. The treaty of 532 with Justinian apparently had a clause added to guarantee the safety of the pagan philosophers, but it is not easy to see how guarantees could have been given. Simplicius may have stayed in Harran (i.e., Carrhae) in Syria near the border of, and inside, the Persian Empire as a safe haven for non-Christians. Tardieu (1987) has made a strong case to this effect on the basis of references to local features (rafts made of inflated animal skins typical for the Euphrates and different types of calendars found in Harran). The Harranians certainly received special treatment from Chosroes for retaining their paganism (Procopius Wars 2.13.7). Others have suggested he may have returned to Athens and worked there in isolation (Alexandria has been ruled out because of its volatile political conditions). Wherever he was, his richly sourced works suggest he had access to a sizeable library. Tardieu’s further thesis, argued with great ingenuity, that Harran had a continuing presence of a Platonic school into Arabic and medieval times cannot be proven fully beyond the seventh century and has met with objections. The account of their travels by Agathias is clearly biased, and some details of the Persia episode have raised suspicion about this tale of Greek missionary zeal and Persian enlightenment. There are also three epigrams in praise of Simplicius confirming his reputation as rhetor and philosopher (180), acknowledging his elucidations of the Categories (181) and the Physics (182) of Aristotle. Finally, a distich found in a manuscript (codex Ambrosianus 306) confirms his authorship of the In Cat. and seems to have been added by a scribe as an apotropaic since he had accused the "divine Iamblichus" of inconsistency. [introduction p. 711-712] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PftkJOubxPYtz2C |
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He came from Cilicia (south-eastern Anatolia), as Agathias tells us (Hist. 2.30). He was educated by Ammonius in Alexandria (fl. 490 CE, cf. In Cael. 26.18\u201319) and Damascius (fl. 520 CE) in Athens (In Phys. 601.19). Among influential figures on his philosophical outlook are Porphyry, the learned pupil and biographer of Plotinus (245\u2013320), Iamblichus (fl. 300 CE, referred to as \"the divine Iamblichus,\" In Phys. 60.7; 639.23, etc.), and Proclus (\"the teacher of my teachers,\" In Phys. 611.11\u201312, cf. 795.4\u20135).\r\n\r\nThe expulsion of Platonists from Athens in 532 CE after Justinian\u2019s ban on pagan teaching ended school activities in 529 CE (Malalas Chronicle 18.47), the cross-references between the extant works, and the lack of evidence after 540 CE suggest that his lifespan roughly spans 480\u2013560 CE. Allusive comments in a discussion of the role of the philosopher in the city in his commentary on Epictetus (In Epict. 32.65.30\u20139 D., with reference to Plato Rep. 496d) make it probable that he wrote that commentary before the others, while still in Athens, as does his mention of the oppressive situation in Athens (ibid., epilogue). His personal note on friendship (In Epict. 87.39\u201344\/354 Hadot) indicates that he experienced help from friends who looked after his family while he was away, but we cannot establish the nature and date of this event.\r\n\r\nThere has been much debate and speculation about where he might have gone after the trip to Persia with Damascius and other colleagues (531 CE), when the hope of an ideal state under a \"philosopher-king,\" the enlightened ruler Chosroes I (Khusrau), was not fulfilled. However, the issue has not been resolved so far. The treaty of 532 with Justinian apparently had a clause added to guarantee the safety of the pagan philosophers, but it is not easy to see how guarantees could have been given. Simplicius may have stayed in Harran (i.e., Carrhae) in Syria near the border of, and inside, the Persian Empire as a safe haven for non-Christians. Tardieu (1987) has made a strong case to this effect on the basis of references to local features (rafts made of inflated animal skins typical for the Euphrates and different types of calendars found in Harran). The Harranians certainly received special treatment from Chosroes for retaining their paganism (Procopius Wars 2.13.7).\r\n\r\nOthers have suggested he may have returned to Athens and worked there in isolation (Alexandria has been ruled out because of its volatile political conditions). Wherever he was, his richly sourced works suggest he had access to a sizeable library. Tardieu\u2019s further thesis, argued with great ingenuity, that Harran had a continuing presence of a Platonic school into Arabic and medieval times cannot be proven fully beyond the seventh century and has met with objections. The account of their travels by Agathias is clearly biased, and some details of the Persia episode have raised suspicion about this tale of Greek missionary zeal and Persian enlightenment.\r\n\r\nThere are also three epigrams in praise of Simplicius confirming his reputation as rhetor and philosopher (180), acknowledging his elucidations of the Categories (181) and the Physics (182) of Aristotle. Finally, a distich found in a manuscript (codex Ambrosianus 306) confirms his authorship of the In Cat. and seems to have been added by a scribe as an apotropaic since he had accused the \"divine Iamblichus\" of inconsistency. 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[author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kHhRvU7UkRlktbW","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":964,"pubplace":"Cambridge","publisher":"Cambridge University Press","series":"","volume":"2","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[2011]}
| Title | What is Platonism? |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2005 |
| Journal | Journal of the History of Philosophy |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 253-276 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of “top-downism.” So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there are at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be similarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1317","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1317,"authors_free":[{"id":1951,"entry_id":1317,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What is Platonism?","main_title":{"title":"What is Platonism?"},"abstract":"My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of \u201ctop-downism.\u201d So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there\r\nare at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be\r\nsimilarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1317,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the History of Philosophy","volume":"43","issue":"3","pages":"253-276"}},"sort":[2005]}
| Title | Aristotle and Other Platonists |
| Type | Monograph |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2005 |
| Publication Place | Ithaca, NY |
| Publisher | Cornell University Press |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| In a wide-ranging book likely to cause controversy, Lloyd P. Gerson sets out the case for the "harmony" of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the standard view in late antiquity. [autor's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/rxVkkaQrVPjZeXg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1431","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1431,"authors_free":[{"id":2256,"entry_id":1431,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle and Other Platonists","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle and Other Platonists"},"abstract":"In a wide-ranging book likely to cause controversy, Lloyd P. Gerson sets out the case for the \"harmony\" of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the standard view in late antiquity. [autor's abstract]","btype":1,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/rxVkkaQrVPjZeXg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":{"id":1431,"pubplace":"Ithaca, NY","publisher":"Cornell University Press","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":[2005]}
| Title | Aristotle and Other Platonists |
| Type | Monograph |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2005 |
| Publication Place | Ithaca, NY |
| Publisher | Cornell University Press |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
In a wide-ranging book likely to cause controversy, Lloyd P. Gerson sets out the case for the "harmony" of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the standard view in late antiquity. [autor's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/rxVkkaQrVPjZeXg |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1431","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1431,"authors_free":[{"id":2256,"entry_id":1431,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aristotle and Other Platonists","main_title":{"title":"Aristotle and Other Platonists"},"abstract":"In a wide-ranging book likely to cause controversy, Lloyd P. Gerson sets out the case for the \"harmony\" of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the standard view in late antiquity. [autor's abstract]","btype":1,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/rxVkkaQrVPjZeXg","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":{"id":1431,"pubplace":"Ithaca, NY","publisher":"Cornell University Press","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["Aristotle and Other Platonists"]}
| Title | Simplicius of Cilicia |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2011 |
| Published in | The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II |
| Pages | 711-732 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Baltussen, Han |
| Editor(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Translator(s) |
The few facts we have about Simplicius’ life come from his own works and a few other sources. He came from Cilicia (south-eastern Anatolia), as Agathias tells us (Hist. 2.30). He was educated by Ammonius in Alexandria (fl. 490 CE, cf. In Cael. 26.18–19) and Damascius (fl. 520 CE) in Athens (In Phys. 601.19). Among influential figures on his philosophical outlook are Porphyry, the learned pupil and biographer of Plotinus (245–320), Iamblichus (fl. 300 CE, referred to as "the divine Iamblichus," In Phys. 60.7; 639.23, etc.), and Proclus ("the teacher of my teachers," In Phys. 611.11–12, cf. 795.4–5).
The expulsion of Platonists from Athens in 532 CE after Justinian’s ban on pagan teaching ended school activities in 529 CE (Malalas Chronicle 18.47), the cross-references between the extant works, and the lack of evidence after 540 CE suggest that his lifespan roughly spans 480–560 CE. Allusive comments in a discussion of the role of the philosopher in the city in his commentary on Epictetus (In Epict. 32.65.30–9 D., with reference to Plato Rep. 496d) make it probable that he wrote that commentary before the others, while still in Athens, as does his mention of the oppressive situation in Athens (ibid., epilogue). His personal note on friendship (In Epict. 87.39–44/354 Hadot) indicates that he experienced help from friends who looked after his family while he was away, but we cannot establish the nature and date of this event.
There has been much debate and speculation about where he might have gone after the trip to Persia with Damascius and other colleagues (531 CE), when the hope of an ideal state under a "philosopher-king," the enlightened ruler Chosroes I (Khusrau), was not fulfilled. However, the issue has not been resolved so far. The treaty of 532 with Justinian apparently had a clause added to guarantee the safety of the pagan philosophers, but it is not easy to see how guarantees could have been given. Simplicius may have stayed in Harran (i.e., Carrhae) in Syria near the border of, and inside, the Persian Empire as a safe haven for non-Christians. Tardieu (1987) has made a strong case to this effect on the basis of references to local features (rafts made of inflated animal skins typical for the Euphrates and different types of calendars found in Harran). The Harranians certainly received special treatment from Chosroes for retaining their paganism (Procopius Wars 2.13.7).
Others have suggested he may have returned to Athens and worked there in isolation (Alexandria has been ruled out because of its volatile political conditions). Wherever he was, his richly sourced works suggest he had access to a sizeable library. Tardieu’s further thesis, argued with great ingenuity, that Harran had a continuing presence of a Platonic school into Arabic and medieval times cannot be proven fully beyond the seventh century and has met with objections. The account of their travels by Agathias is clearly biased, and some details of the Persia episode have raised suspicion about this tale of Greek missionary zeal and Persian enlightenment.
There are also three epigrams in praise of Simplicius confirming his reputation as rhetor and philosopher (180), acknowledging his elucidations of the Categories (181) and the Physics (182) of Aristotle. Finally, a distich found in a manuscript (codex Ambrosianus 306) confirms his authorship of the In Cat. and seems to have been added by a scribe as an apotropaic since he had accused the "divine Iamblichus" of inconsistency. [introduction p. 711-712] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/PftkJOubxPYtz2C |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"965","_score":null,"_source":{"id":965,"authors_free":[{"id":1449,"entry_id":965,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":39,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Baltussen, Han","free_first_name":"Han","free_last_name":"Baltussen","norm_person":{"id":39,"first_name":"Han","last_name":"Baltussen","full_name":"Baltussen, Han","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/136236456","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}},{"id":2091,"entry_id":965,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Simplicius of Cilicia","main_title":{"title":"Simplicius of Cilicia"},"abstract":"The few facts we have about Simplicius\u2019 life come from his own works and a few other sources. He came from Cilicia (south-eastern Anatolia), as Agathias tells us (Hist. 2.30). He was educated by Ammonius in Alexandria (fl. 490 CE, cf. In Cael. 26.18\u201319) and Damascius (fl. 520 CE) in Athens (In Phys. 601.19). Among influential figures on his philosophical outlook are Porphyry, the learned pupil and biographer of Plotinus (245\u2013320), Iamblichus (fl. 300 CE, referred to as \"the divine Iamblichus,\" In Phys. 60.7; 639.23, etc.), and Proclus (\"the teacher of my teachers,\" In Phys. 611.11\u201312, cf. 795.4\u20135).\r\n\r\nThe expulsion of Platonists from Athens in 532 CE after Justinian\u2019s ban on pagan teaching ended school activities in 529 CE (Malalas Chronicle 18.47), the cross-references between the extant works, and the lack of evidence after 540 CE suggest that his lifespan roughly spans 480\u2013560 CE. Allusive comments in a discussion of the role of the philosopher in the city in his commentary on Epictetus (In Epict. 32.65.30\u20139 D., with reference to Plato Rep. 496d) make it probable that he wrote that commentary before the others, while still in Athens, as does his mention of the oppressive situation in Athens (ibid., epilogue). His personal note on friendship (In Epict. 87.39\u201344\/354 Hadot) indicates that he experienced help from friends who looked after his family while he was away, but we cannot establish the nature and date of this event.\r\n\r\nThere has been much debate and speculation about where he might have gone after the trip to Persia with Damascius and other colleagues (531 CE), when the hope of an ideal state under a \"philosopher-king,\" the enlightened ruler Chosroes I (Khusrau), was not fulfilled. However, the issue has not been resolved so far. The treaty of 532 with Justinian apparently had a clause added to guarantee the safety of the pagan philosophers, but it is not easy to see how guarantees could have been given. Simplicius may have stayed in Harran (i.e., Carrhae) in Syria near the border of, and inside, the Persian Empire as a safe haven for non-Christians. Tardieu (1987) has made a strong case to this effect on the basis of references to local features (rafts made of inflated animal skins typical for the Euphrates and different types of calendars found in Harran). The Harranians certainly received special treatment from Chosroes for retaining their paganism (Procopius Wars 2.13.7).\r\n\r\nOthers have suggested he may have returned to Athens and worked there in isolation (Alexandria has been ruled out because of its volatile political conditions). Wherever he was, his richly sourced works suggest he had access to a sizeable library. Tardieu\u2019s further thesis, argued with great ingenuity, that Harran had a continuing presence of a Platonic school into Arabic and medieval times cannot be proven fully beyond the seventh century and has met with objections. The account of their travels by Agathias is clearly biased, and some details of the Persia episode have raised suspicion about this tale of Greek missionary zeal and Persian enlightenment.\r\n\r\nThere are also three epigrams in praise of Simplicius confirming his reputation as rhetor and philosopher (180), acknowledging his elucidations of the Categories (181) and the Physics (182) of Aristotle. Finally, a distich found in a manuscript (codex Ambrosianus 306) confirms his authorship of the In Cat. and seems to have been added by a scribe as an apotropaic since he had accused the \"divine Iamblichus\" of inconsistency. [introduction p. 711-712]","btype":2,"date":"2011","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/PftkJOubxPYtz2C","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":39,"full_name":"Baltussen, Han","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":965,"section_of":964,"pages":"711-732","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":964,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"en","title":"The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Gerson2011","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2011","edition_no":null,"free_date":"2010","abstract":"The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity comprises over forty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of the period 200\u2013800 CE. Designed as a successor to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (edited by A. H. Armstrong), it takes into account some forty years of scholarship since the publication of that volume. The contributors examine philosophy as it entered literature, science and religion, and offer new and extensive assessments of philosophers who until recently have been mostly ignored. The volume also includes a complete digest of all philosophical works known to have been written during this period. It will be an invaluable resource for all those interested in this rich and still emerging field. [author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kHhRvU7UkRlktbW","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":964,"pubplace":"Cambridge","publisher":"Cambridge University Press","series":"","volume":"2","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Simplicius of Cilicia"]}
| Title | The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2014 |
| Journal | Quaestiones Disputatae |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 7-23 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
All students of the history of philosophy are apt to be seduced by linearity. What I mean is this. Naturally, we read the texts of the history of philosophy in the chronological order in which they were written. So, for example, we read Aristotle after we read Plato. And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the “influence” of the earlier philosopher on the later or the “development” of the philosopher’s views. The employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment’s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect. Thus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another. Consider “development.” The perfectly anodyne sense of this term—namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought—is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato’s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought—apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none—you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change. I am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato’s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a “phase” after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful. The reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato. The reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an “objective and unbiased” account of the “development” of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called “the exegete of the Platonic revelation,” namely, Plotinus. Simplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy “in” the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle’s remark in Physics—that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature—puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides. Let us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato. As I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle’s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle’s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy. Instead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA |
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And we read the supposedly later works of Plato after the earlier ones. Perfectly reasonable. But in pursuing the task of trying to figure out the meaning of what we have read, we tend to seek out or suppose the \u201cinfluence\u201d of the earlier philosopher on the later or the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the philosopher\u2019s views.\r\n\r\nThe employment of these two seemingly innocuous and certainly ubiquitous terms is in fact rarely edifying. An easy means of seeing why this is so is to ask what sort of Aristotelian cause influence and development are supposed to indicate. Since we are talking about temporal succession, presumably we would have in mind efficient or moving causes. But it only requires a moment\u2019s reflection to realize that the views of one philosopher never stand in relation to the views of another as efficient cause to effect.\r\n\r\nThus, for example, it is not because Plato believed that nominalism is false that Aristotle believed that nominalism is false, even if it is indeed the case that Aristotle accepted Platonic arguments to this effect. If, however, we loosen the connection between Plato and Aristotle and agree that the views of the former did not cause the views of the latter, what is the influence supposed to amount to? Indeed, why claim that Aristotle is influenced by Plato, with whom he happened to agree on many issues, and not by, say, Democritus, with whom he happened to disagree? Surely, one can be inspired to embrace a position that is exactly the opposite of that which one hears from another.\r\n\r\nConsider \u201cdevelopment.\u201d The perfectly anodyne sense of this term\u2014namely, that according to which the sequence of writings in an author indicates the progress or course of his thought\u2014is quite useless. But as soon as you try to gin up this weak sense of development into something more portentous, you get into serious trouble. If, for example, you say that Plato\u2019s thought developed in the sense that his later dialogues represent an advancement in, or even a change from, his earlier thought\u2014apart from cases of outright contradiction of which there are few or none\u2014you have to specify what the development is a development of; that is, to use Aristotelian terminology once again, what is the underlying substrate for the development? But this underlying substrate will be the locus of continuity throughout the putative development; continuity that may be far more important than any change.\r\n\r\nI am not suggesting that Plato or any other philosopher never changed his mind. I am suggesting that the changes cannot ever be viewed uncritically as going from false to true or wrong to right. Consider someone who believes that the high point of Plato\u2019s thinking occurred in the early or middle dialogues. Someone like this would not consider the middle or late dialogues developments in any sense but the anodyne one mentioned above. Some scholars, looking at the identical texts, believe that Aristotle developed from a Platonist to something like an anti-Platonist, while others believe that his anti-Platonism was only a \u201cphase\u201d after which he developed into a Platonist once again. None of this is very helpful.\r\n\r\nThe reason I bring it up is that the Platonists of late antiquity who introduced the philosophical curriculum wherein the commentaries played such an important role were mostly impervious to the siren song of linearity. As we know from the accounts of the philosophical curriculum, perhaps introduced by Iamblichus or Porphyry in the late third century, students were obliged to study Aristotle before studying Plato. Studying Aristotle, or at least some of the works of Aristotle, was thought to be the most suitable preparation for studying Plato.\r\n\r\nThe reason for this is quite simple: the Platonists were aiming at truth rather than what we might like to think of as an \u201cobjective and unbiased\u201d account of the \u201cdevelopment\u201d of the history of philosophy. But we still should want to ask why the study of Aristotle was supposed to be conducive to understanding the truth as it is revealed in Plato and articulated by the man whom Proclus called \u201cthe exegete of the Platonic revelation,\u201d namely, Plotinus.\r\n\r\nSimplicius provides a preliminary answer to this question when he says in his Physics commentary that Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world as Plato was for the intelligible world. Beginning the study of philosophy \u201cin\u201d the sensible world, in accord with Aristotle\u2019s remark in Physics\u2014that we start with things more intelligible to us and move to things more intelligible by nature\u2014puts the student in a better position to appreciate the more difficult insights found in the two works that comprise the culmination of philosophical study: namely, Timaeus and Parmenides.\r\n\r\nLet us be quite specific. The study of Categories is supposed to assist the student in preparing for the study of the intelligible world. Initially, this seems far-fetched. Indeed, it is not uncommon for contemporary Aristotle scholars to take Categories as in a way programmatic for an anti-Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, the focus of which is the individual sensible substance. So, on this showing, Iamblichus was naive to think that he was molding disciples of Platonism by having the students read Categories even before they encountered a dialogue of Plato.\r\n\r\nAs I have argued elsewhere, Iamblichus and Simplicius and many other prominent Platonists of late antiquity believed that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. The way I characterized harmony was to argue that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy stood to Platonism analogous to the way that Newtonian mechanics stood to quantum mechanics. I was and am not altogether happy with letting my argument rest on an analogy in part because, in trying to explore further the details of harmony, one soon runs up against the limitations of the analogy.\r\n\r\nInstead, I would like to pursue a different approach here. I would like to argue that what underlies the claims of harmony is a set of shared principles; shared not only by self-proclaimed Platonists and by Aristotle, but by virtually all philosophers from at least 200 CE until perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century, with only a few notable exceptions. It will become clear as I proceed why I have cast my net so widely. And I hope it will also become clear why the Aristotelian commentary tradition remains a critical component in the larger Platonic project. [introduction p. 7-9]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fH9zEC1gXGTy5tA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1510,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"2","issue":"4","pages":"7-23"}},"sort":["The Aristotelian Commentaries and Platonism"]}
| Title | The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II |
| Type | Edited Book |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2011 |
| Publication Place | Cambridge |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Volume | 2 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | |
| Editor(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Translator(s) |
The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity comprises over forty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of the period 200–800 CE. Designed as a successor to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (edited by A. H. Armstrong), it takes into account some forty years of scholarship since the publication of that volume. The contributors examine philosophy as it entered literature, science and religion, and offer new and extensive assessments of philosophers who until recently have been mostly ignored. The volume also includes a complete digest of all philosophical works known to have been written during this period. It will be an invaluable resource for all those interested in this rich and still emerging field. [author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/kHhRvU7UkRlktbW |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"964","_score":null,"_source":{"id":964,"authors_free":[{"id":1448,"entry_id":964,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II","main_title":{"title":"The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II"},"abstract":"The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity comprises over forty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of the period 200\u2013800 CE. Designed as a successor to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (edited by A. H. Armstrong), it takes into account some forty years of scholarship since the publication of that volume. The contributors examine philosophy as it entered literature, science and religion, and offer new and extensive assessments of philosophers who until recently have been mostly ignored. The volume also includes a complete digest of all philosophical works known to have been written during this period. It will be an invaluable resource for all those interested in this rich and still emerging field. [author's abstract]","btype":4,"date":"2011","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/kHhRvU7UkRlktbW","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":{"id":964,"pubplace":"Cambridge","publisher":"Cambridge University Press","series":"","volume":"2","edition_no":"","valid_from":null,"valid_until":null},"booksection":null,"article":null},"sort":["The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Volume II"]}
| Title | What is Platonism? |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2005 |
| Journal | Journal of the History of Philosophy |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 253-276 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gerson, Lloyd P. |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of “top-downism.” So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there are at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be similarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1317","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1317,"authors_free":[{"id":1951,"entry_id":1317,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":46,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","free_first_name":"Lloyd P.","free_last_name":"Gerson","norm_person":{"id":46,"first_name":"Lloyd P.","last_name":"Gerson","full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/131525573","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"What is Platonism?","main_title":{"title":"What is Platonism?"},"abstract":"My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of \u201ctop-downism.\u201d So understanding it, we havea relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there\r\nare at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be\r\nsimilarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.[conclusion, p. 276]","btype":3,"date":"2005","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/Y1wq12FmpF2tnaH","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":46,"full_name":"Gerson, Lloyd P.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1317,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Journal of the History of Philosophy","volume":"43","issue":"3","pages":"253-276"}},"sort":["What is Platonism?"]}