| Title | Aquinas and the Platonists |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2002 |
| Published in | The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach |
| Pages | 279-324 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hankey, Wayne J. |
| Editor(s) | Gersh, Stephen , Hoenen, Maarten J. F. M. |
| Translator(s) |
| As with all thinkers who treat the philosophies on which they depend, Aquinas has two relations to his predecessors and, in particular, to the Platonic tradition. One is that of which he is conscious, sets out explicitly, is part of how he places himself within the history of philosophy, and is essential to his understanding of that place. The other is the unconscious dependence. In every thinker, these will diverge to some extent. First, no previous philosophy can answer later questions without being altered by the questioner: a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver. The alteration made by present need is especially marked in the schools deriving from the Hellenistic philosophies, with their dependence on the exegesis of authoritative texts constantly reread to supply answers required by the new needs of thought. Second, no one is capable of a complete grasp of what forms and moves their own thought. In the case of Thomas’ relation to Platonism, the divergences, inconsistencies, and even contradictions between what he says about Platonism, how he places himself in respect to it, and its real influence on his thought are very great. In fact, Thomas’ own system stands within a tradition whose foundation, as he represents it, he self-consciously opposes. Because his understanding of the Platonic tradition is deeply problematic in many ways, while his knowledge of it is extensive, and because the tradition is itself so complex, Aquinas is frequently (or, better, normally) criticizing one aspect of Platonism from the perspective of another. Such internal criticism is characteristic of Plato’s thought and of its tradition. The ancient Platonists were, however, far better informed about the history of the tradition in which they stood than were their Latin medieval successors. The Platonists of late antiquity, upon whom Thomas depends for much of his understanding of the history of philosophy, did not have the degree of naivete present in the self-opposition that characterizes Thomas’ relation to Platonism. Getting hold of Thomas’s self-conscious relation to Platonism has been largely accomplished, and many of the tools to complete the task are available. The lexicographical aspect of the work was substantially done almost fifty years ago by R.J. Henle. His Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas is almost complete in terms of the texts it considers. Henle lavishly reproduces the relevant passages in Latin. For the most part, he gives the likely sources of the doctrines attributed to the Platonists with the accuracy possible when he wrote. His analysis, within the parameters he sets and which his perspective sets for him, is thorough and inescapable. Beyond Henle’s work, it is necessary to add the few texts he missed, to correct his work on the basis of better editions than the ones he had available (or used), and to compensate for the limits of his undertaking and his biases. The principal problems with Henle’s work, once we accept its limits, lie in the vestiges of the neo-Scholastic mentality he retains. This mentality is opposed to that of the historian and was antipathetic to Platonic idealism. On this account, like Aquinas himself, he misses the extent to which Thomas’ representation of Platonism and of his own relation to it actually stands within its long and diverse tradition. Henle’s work accurately describes how, for Aquinas, a philosophical school is a fixed way of thinking, which results in “a series of like statements formulated in the several minds that teach it and learn it, that write it and read it” (as Mark Jordan puts it). Despite accepting this definition of a “philosophical teaching” from Jordan, as well as his crucial point that Aquinas is not a philosopher whose position is an Aristotelianismus in an Enlightenment or neo-Scholastic manner, I shall continue to write herein both of “Platonism” and of Thomas’ Platonism. As a matter of fact, for Aquinas, what the Platonici teach has been reduced to a fixed way of thinking, which he treats ahistorically, although he knows much of its history. Further, at several crucial points, he self-consciously sides with them. In rescuing Aquinas from neo-Scholastic representations of his philosophy, Jordan is importantly right that Aquinas did not think of Christians as philosophers. He neglects, however, the continuities that do exist between Scholastic and neo-Scholastic treatments of philosophy. Henle, working within these, through his analysis of the texts in which Thomas speaks of Plato and the Platonici, shows how Platonism is presented as one of these viae. This via Thomas criticizes, and for most purposes finds the way of Aristotle superior, even if he may accept some of the positions at which the Platonists arrive—positions that also may be reached otherwise. For Thomas, Platonism has a fundamental point of departure, established in Plato’s attempt to save certain knowledge from the consequences of the doctrine of the ancient Physicists (Priores Naturales), with whom he accepts that philosophy began. For him, Plato’s flawed solution to the epistemological problem determines Platonic ontology. The Platonic philosophical position as a whole proceeds according to a distinct method of reasoning to arrive at positions. It is a series of syllogisms whose basic premises are deficient. In the thirteenth century, only the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Timaeus were available to the Latin West. Henle concluded that Aquinas had no direct knowledge of any of them. Thus, much as with Augustine, he knows only what he takes to be Plato’s doctrines and is without knowledge of the dialogues themselves. Thomas’ approach to philosophy gave him little sympathy for the kind of dialectic by which the fundamentals of philosophy are questioned and reconsidered within and between the dialogues. The substance of Thomas’ own thinking shows almost no development—except, significantly, in his coming to accept that knowledge involves the formation of a Plotinian-Augustinian inner word in the mind, the verbum mentis. There is certainly no development remotely comparable to that within Plato’s corpus. In consequence, his picture of Plato’s way of thinking is not only lacking in the most basic information but is also without the intellectual necessities for a sympathetic representation. [introduction p. 1-3] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/LajmF4jRGYCVzFn |
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First, no previous philosophy can answer later questions without being altered by the questioner: a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver. The alteration made by present need is especially marked in the schools deriving from the Hellenistic philosophies, with their dependence on the exegesis of authoritative texts constantly reread to supply answers required by the new needs of thought. Second, no one is capable of a complete grasp of what forms and moves their own thought. In the case of Thomas\u2019 relation to Platonism, the divergences, inconsistencies, and even contradictions between what he says about Platonism, how he places himself in respect to it, and its real influence on his thought are very great.\r\n\r\nIn fact, Thomas\u2019 own system stands within a tradition whose foundation, as he represents it, he self-consciously opposes. Because his understanding of the Platonic tradition is deeply problematic in many ways, while his knowledge of it is extensive, and because the tradition is itself so complex, Aquinas is frequently (or, better, normally) criticizing one aspect of Platonism from the perspective of another. Such internal criticism is characteristic of Plato\u2019s thought and of its tradition. The ancient Platonists were, however, far better informed about the history of the tradition in which they stood than were their Latin medieval successors. The Platonists of late antiquity, upon whom Thomas depends for much of his understanding of the history of philosophy, did not have the degree of naivete present in the self-opposition that characterizes Thomas\u2019 relation to Platonism.\r\n\r\nGetting hold of Thomas\u2019s self-conscious relation to Platonism has been largely accomplished, and many of the tools to complete the task are available. The lexicographical aspect of the work was substantially done almost fifty years ago by R.J. Henle. His Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas is almost complete in terms of the texts it considers. Henle lavishly reproduces the relevant passages in Latin. For the most part, he gives the likely sources of the doctrines attributed to the Platonists with the accuracy possible when he wrote. His analysis, within the parameters he sets and which his perspective sets for him, is thorough and inescapable. Beyond Henle\u2019s work, it is necessary to add the few texts he missed, to correct his work on the basis of better editions than the ones he had available (or used), and to compensate for the limits of his undertaking and his biases.\r\n\r\nThe principal problems with Henle\u2019s work, once we accept its limits, lie in the vestiges of the neo-Scholastic mentality he retains. This mentality is opposed to that of the historian and was antipathetic to Platonic idealism. On this account, like Aquinas himself, he misses the extent to which Thomas\u2019 representation of Platonism and of his own relation to it actually stands within its long and diverse tradition.\r\n\r\nHenle\u2019s work accurately describes how, for Aquinas, a philosophical school is a fixed way of thinking, which results in \u201ca series of like statements formulated in the several minds that teach it and learn it, that write it and read it\u201d (as Mark Jordan puts it). Despite accepting this definition of a \u201cphilosophical teaching\u201d from Jordan, as well as his crucial point that Aquinas is not a philosopher whose position is an Aristotelianismus in an Enlightenment or neo-Scholastic manner, I shall continue to write herein both of \u201cPlatonism\u201d and of Thomas\u2019 Platonism.\r\n\r\nAs a matter of fact, for Aquinas, what the Platonici teach has been reduced to a fixed way of thinking, which he treats ahistorically, although he knows much of its history. Further, at several crucial points, he self-consciously sides with them. In rescuing Aquinas from neo-Scholastic representations of his philosophy, Jordan is importantly right that Aquinas did not think of Christians as philosophers. He neglects, however, the continuities that do exist between Scholastic and neo-Scholastic treatments of philosophy. Henle, working within these, through his analysis of the texts in which Thomas speaks of Plato and the Platonici, shows how Platonism is presented as one of these viae.\r\n\r\nThis via Thomas criticizes, and for most purposes finds the way of Aristotle superior, even if he may accept some of the positions at which the Platonists arrive\u2014positions that also may be reached otherwise. For Thomas, Platonism has a fundamental point of departure, established in Plato\u2019s attempt to save certain knowledge from the consequences of the doctrine of the ancient Physicists (Priores Naturales), with whom he accepts that philosophy began. For him, Plato\u2019s flawed solution to the epistemological problem determines Platonic ontology. The Platonic philosophical position as a whole proceeds according to a distinct method of reasoning to arrive at positions. It is a series of syllogisms whose basic premises are deficient.\r\n\r\nIn the thirteenth century, only the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Timaeus were available to the Latin West. Henle concluded that Aquinas had no direct knowledge of any of them. Thus, much as with Augustine, he knows only what he takes to be Plato\u2019s doctrines and is without knowledge of the dialogues themselves. Thomas\u2019 approach to philosophy gave him little sympathy for the kind of dialectic by which the fundamentals of philosophy are questioned and reconsidered within and between the dialogues.\r\n\r\nThe substance of Thomas\u2019 own thinking shows almost no development\u2014except, significantly, in his coming to accept that knowledge involves the formation of a Plotinian-Augustinian inner word in the mind, the verbum mentis. There is certainly no development remotely comparable to that within Plato\u2019s corpus. In consequence, his picture of Plato\u2019s way of thinking is not only lacking in the most basic information but is also without the intellectual necessities for a sympathetic representation.\r\n[introduction p. 1-3]","btype":2,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/LajmF4jRGYCVzFn","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":167,"full_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":450,"full_name":"Gersh, Stephen","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":451,"full_name":"Hoenen, Maarten J. F. M. ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1348,"section_of":327,"pages":"279-324","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":327,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"no language selected","title":"The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Gersh2002","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2002","edition_no":null,"free_date":"2002","abstract":"Das Handbuch beschreitet neue Wege in der Schilderung der komplexen Geschichte jener geistigen Str\u00f6mungen, die gemeinhin unter der Bezeichnung 'platonisch' bzw. 'neuplatonisch' zusammengefa\u00dft werden. Es behandelt in chronologischer Folge die bedeutendsten philosophischen Denkrichtungen innerhalb dieser Tradition. Die Beitr\u00e4ge untersuchen die wichtigsten platonischen Begriffe und ihre semantischen Implikationen, erl\u00e4utern die mit ihnen verbundenen philosophischen und theologischen Anspr\u00fcche, legen die Quellen der Begriffe dar und stellen sie in den Kontext der auf sie rekurrierenden bzw. ihnen zuwiderlaufenden geistigen Traditionen. So entsteht ein lebhaftes Bild des intellektuellen Lebens im Mittelalter und in der Fr\u00fchen Neuzeit. Das Werk enth\u00e4lt Beitr\u00e4ge in englischer und deutscher Sprache. [Author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AyyoAnYvbV6wAyu","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":327,"pubplace":"Berlin","publisher":"de Gruyter","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":null,"valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":[2002]}
| Title | Aquinas and the Platonists |
| Type | Book Section |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2002 |
| Published in | The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach |
| Pages | 279-324 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Hankey, Wayne J. |
| Editor(s) | Gersh, Stephen , Hoenen, Maarten J. F. M. |
| Translator(s) |
As with all thinkers who treat the philosophies on which they depend, Aquinas has two relations to his predecessors and, in particular, to the Platonic tradition. One is that of which he is conscious, sets out explicitly, is part of how he places himself within the history of philosophy, and is essential to his understanding of that place. The other is the unconscious dependence. In every thinker, these will diverge to some extent. First, no previous philosophy can answer later questions without being altered by the questioner: a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver. The alteration made by present need is especially marked in the schools deriving from the Hellenistic philosophies, with their dependence on the exegesis of authoritative texts constantly reread to supply answers required by the new needs of thought. Second, no one is capable of a complete grasp of what forms and moves their own thought. In the case of Thomas’ relation to Platonism, the divergences, inconsistencies, and even contradictions between what he says about Platonism, how he places himself in respect to it, and its real influence on his thought are very great. In fact, Thomas’ own system stands within a tradition whose foundation, as he represents it, he self-consciously opposes. Because his understanding of the Platonic tradition is deeply problematic in many ways, while his knowledge of it is extensive, and because the tradition is itself so complex, Aquinas is frequently (or, better, normally) criticizing one aspect of Platonism from the perspective of another. Such internal criticism is characteristic of Plato’s thought and of its tradition. The ancient Platonists were, however, far better informed about the history of the tradition in which they stood than were their Latin medieval successors. The Platonists of late antiquity, upon whom Thomas depends for much of his understanding of the history of philosophy, did not have the degree of naivete present in the self-opposition that characterizes Thomas’ relation to Platonism. Getting hold of Thomas’s self-conscious relation to Platonism has been largely accomplished, and many of the tools to complete the task are available. The lexicographical aspect of the work was substantially done almost fifty years ago by R.J. Henle. His Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas is almost complete in terms of the texts it considers. Henle lavishly reproduces the relevant passages in Latin. For the most part, he gives the likely sources of the doctrines attributed to the Platonists with the accuracy possible when he wrote. His analysis, within the parameters he sets and which his perspective sets for him, is thorough and inescapable. Beyond Henle’s work, it is necessary to add the few texts he missed, to correct his work on the basis of better editions than the ones he had available (or used), and to compensate for the limits of his undertaking and his biases. The principal problems with Henle’s work, once we accept its limits, lie in the vestiges of the neo-Scholastic mentality he retains. This mentality is opposed to that of the historian and was antipathetic to Platonic idealism. On this account, like Aquinas himself, he misses the extent to which Thomas’ representation of Platonism and of his own relation to it actually stands within its long and diverse tradition. Henle’s work accurately describes how, for Aquinas, a philosophical school is a fixed way of thinking, which results in “a series of like statements formulated in the several minds that teach it and learn it, that write it and read it” (as Mark Jordan puts it). Despite accepting this definition of a “philosophical teaching” from Jordan, as well as his crucial point that Aquinas is not a philosopher whose position is an Aristotelianismus in an Enlightenment or neo-Scholastic manner, I shall continue to write herein both of “Platonism” and of Thomas’ Platonism. As a matter of fact, for Aquinas, what the Platonici teach has been reduced to a fixed way of thinking, which he treats ahistorically, although he knows much of its history. Further, at several crucial points, he self-consciously sides with them. In rescuing Aquinas from neo-Scholastic representations of his philosophy, Jordan is importantly right that Aquinas did not think of Christians as philosophers. He neglects, however, the continuities that do exist between Scholastic and neo-Scholastic treatments of philosophy. Henle, working within these, through his analysis of the texts in which Thomas speaks of Plato and the Platonici, shows how Platonism is presented as one of these viae. This via Thomas criticizes, and for most purposes finds the way of Aristotle superior, even if he may accept some of the positions at which the Platonists arrive—positions that also may be reached otherwise. For Thomas, Platonism has a fundamental point of departure, established in Plato’s attempt to save certain knowledge from the consequences of the doctrine of the ancient Physicists (Priores Naturales), with whom he accepts that philosophy began. For him, Plato’s flawed solution to the epistemological problem determines Platonic ontology. The Platonic philosophical position as a whole proceeds according to a distinct method of reasoning to arrive at positions. It is a series of syllogisms whose basic premises are deficient. In the thirteenth century, only the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Timaeus were available to the Latin West. Henle concluded that Aquinas had no direct knowledge of any of them. Thus, much as with Augustine, he knows only what he takes to be Plato’s doctrines and is without knowledge of the dialogues themselves. Thomas’ approach to philosophy gave him little sympathy for the kind of dialectic by which the fundamentals of philosophy are questioned and reconsidered within and between the dialogues. The substance of Thomas’ own thinking shows almost no development—except, significantly, in his coming to accept that knowledge involves the formation of a Plotinian-Augustinian inner word in the mind, the verbum mentis. There is certainly no development remotely comparable to that within Plato’s corpus. In consequence, his picture of Plato’s way of thinking is not only lacking in the most basic information but is also without the intellectual necessities for a sympathetic representation. [introduction p. 1-3] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/LajmF4jRGYCVzFn |
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F. M. ","free_first_name":"Maarten J. F. M. ","free_last_name":"Hoenen","norm_person":{"id":451,"first_name":"Maarten J. F. M. ","last_name":"Hoenen","full_name":"Hoenen, Maarten J. F. M. ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172140307","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Aquinas and the Platonists","main_title":{"title":"Aquinas and the Platonists"},"abstract":"As with all thinkers who treat the philosophies on which they depend, Aquinas has two relations to his predecessors and, in particular, to the Platonic tradition. One is that of which he is conscious, sets out explicitly, is part of how he places himself within the history of philosophy, and is essential to his understanding of that place. The other is the unconscious dependence. In every thinker, these will diverge to some extent. First, no previous philosophy can answer later questions without being altered by the questioner: a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver. The alteration made by present need is especially marked in the schools deriving from the Hellenistic philosophies, with their dependence on the exegesis of authoritative texts constantly reread to supply answers required by the new needs of thought. Second, no one is capable of a complete grasp of what forms and moves their own thought. In the case of Thomas\u2019 relation to Platonism, the divergences, inconsistencies, and even contradictions between what he says about Platonism, how he places himself in respect to it, and its real influence on his thought are very great.\r\n\r\nIn fact, Thomas\u2019 own system stands within a tradition whose foundation, as he represents it, he self-consciously opposes. Because his understanding of the Platonic tradition is deeply problematic in many ways, while his knowledge of it is extensive, and because the tradition is itself so complex, Aquinas is frequently (or, better, normally) criticizing one aspect of Platonism from the perspective of another. Such internal criticism is characteristic of Plato\u2019s thought and of its tradition. The ancient Platonists were, however, far better informed about the history of the tradition in which they stood than were their Latin medieval successors. The Platonists of late antiquity, upon whom Thomas depends for much of his understanding of the history of philosophy, did not have the degree of naivete present in the self-opposition that characterizes Thomas\u2019 relation to Platonism.\r\n\r\nGetting hold of Thomas\u2019s self-conscious relation to Platonism has been largely accomplished, and many of the tools to complete the task are available. The lexicographical aspect of the work was substantially done almost fifty years ago by R.J. Henle. His Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas is almost complete in terms of the texts it considers. Henle lavishly reproduces the relevant passages in Latin. For the most part, he gives the likely sources of the doctrines attributed to the Platonists with the accuracy possible when he wrote. His analysis, within the parameters he sets and which his perspective sets for him, is thorough and inescapable. Beyond Henle\u2019s work, it is necessary to add the few texts he missed, to correct his work on the basis of better editions than the ones he had available (or used), and to compensate for the limits of his undertaking and his biases.\r\n\r\nThe principal problems with Henle\u2019s work, once we accept its limits, lie in the vestiges of the neo-Scholastic mentality he retains. This mentality is opposed to that of the historian and was antipathetic to Platonic idealism. On this account, like Aquinas himself, he misses the extent to which Thomas\u2019 representation of Platonism and of his own relation to it actually stands within its long and diverse tradition.\r\n\r\nHenle\u2019s work accurately describes how, for Aquinas, a philosophical school is a fixed way of thinking, which results in \u201ca series of like statements formulated in the several minds that teach it and learn it, that write it and read it\u201d (as Mark Jordan puts it). Despite accepting this definition of a \u201cphilosophical teaching\u201d from Jordan, as well as his crucial point that Aquinas is not a philosopher whose position is an Aristotelianismus in an Enlightenment or neo-Scholastic manner, I shall continue to write herein both of \u201cPlatonism\u201d and of Thomas\u2019 Platonism.\r\n\r\nAs a matter of fact, for Aquinas, what the Platonici teach has been reduced to a fixed way of thinking, which he treats ahistorically, although he knows much of its history. Further, at several crucial points, he self-consciously sides with them. In rescuing Aquinas from neo-Scholastic representations of his philosophy, Jordan is importantly right that Aquinas did not think of Christians as philosophers. He neglects, however, the continuities that do exist between Scholastic and neo-Scholastic treatments of philosophy. Henle, working within these, through his analysis of the texts in which Thomas speaks of Plato and the Platonici, shows how Platonism is presented as one of these viae.\r\n\r\nThis via Thomas criticizes, and for most purposes finds the way of Aristotle superior, even if he may accept some of the positions at which the Platonists arrive\u2014positions that also may be reached otherwise. For Thomas, Platonism has a fundamental point of departure, established in Plato\u2019s attempt to save certain knowledge from the consequences of the doctrine of the ancient Physicists (Priores Naturales), with whom he accepts that philosophy began. For him, Plato\u2019s flawed solution to the epistemological problem determines Platonic ontology. The Platonic philosophical position as a whole proceeds according to a distinct method of reasoning to arrive at positions. It is a series of syllogisms whose basic premises are deficient.\r\n\r\nIn the thirteenth century, only the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Timaeus were available to the Latin West. Henle concluded that Aquinas had no direct knowledge of any of them. Thus, much as with Augustine, he knows only what he takes to be Plato\u2019s doctrines and is without knowledge of the dialogues themselves. Thomas\u2019 approach to philosophy gave him little sympathy for the kind of dialectic by which the fundamentals of philosophy are questioned and reconsidered within and between the dialogues.\r\n\r\nThe substance of Thomas\u2019 own thinking shows almost no development\u2014except, significantly, in his coming to accept that knowledge involves the formation of a Plotinian-Augustinian inner word in the mind, the verbum mentis. There is certainly no development remotely comparable to that within Plato\u2019s corpus. In consequence, his picture of Plato\u2019s way of thinking is not only lacking in the most basic information but is also without the intellectual necessities for a sympathetic representation.\r\n[introduction p. 1-3]","btype":2,"date":"2002","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/LajmF4jRGYCVzFn","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":167,"full_name":"Hankey, Wayne J.","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}},{"id":450,"full_name":"Gersh, Stephen","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}},{"id":451,"full_name":"Hoenen, Maarten J. F. M. ","role":{"id":2,"role_name":"editor"}}],"book":null,"booksection":{"id":1348,"section_of":327,"pages":"279-324","is_catalog":null,"book":{"id":327,"bilderberg_idno":null,"dare_idno":null,"catalog_idno":null,"entry_type":null,"type":4,"language":"no language selected","title":"The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","short_title":"Gersh2002","has_no_author":null,"volume":null,"date":"2002","edition_no":null,"free_date":"2002","abstract":"Das Handbuch beschreitet neue Wege in der Schilderung der komplexen Geschichte jener geistigen Str\u00f6mungen, die gemeinhin unter der Bezeichnung 'platonisch' bzw. 'neuplatonisch' zusammengefa\u00dft werden. Es behandelt in chronologischer Folge die bedeutendsten philosophischen Denkrichtungen innerhalb dieser Tradition. Die Beitr\u00e4ge untersuchen die wichtigsten platonischen Begriffe und ihre semantischen Implikationen, erl\u00e4utern die mit ihnen verbundenen philosophischen und theologischen Anspr\u00fcche, legen die Quellen der Begriffe dar und stellen sie in den Kontext der auf sie rekurrierenden bzw. ihnen zuwiderlaufenden geistigen Traditionen. So entsteht ein lebhaftes Bild des intellektuellen Lebens im Mittelalter und in der Fr\u00fchen Neuzeit. Das Werk enth\u00e4lt Beitr\u00e4ge in englischer und deutscher Sprache. [Author's abstract]","republication_of":null,"online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/AyyoAnYvbV6wAyu","translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"is_catalog":0,"in_bibliography":0,"is_inactive":0,"notes":null,"doi_url":null,"book":{"id":327,"pubplace":"Berlin","publisher":"de Gruyter","series":"","volume":"","edition_no":null,"valid_from":null,"valid_until":null}}},"article":null},"sort":["Aquinas and the Platonists"]}