| Title | Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, préface par Ph. Hoffmann |
| Type | Article |
| Language | French |
| Date | 2015 |
| Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
| Volume | 33 |
| Pages | 115-128 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un résumé analytique du texte de Simplicius. À défaut d’une traduction complète (qui est annoncée aux éditions des Belles Lettres), il s’agit là d’un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses. Simplicius n’a ni le prestige d’un Proclus ni l’audace philosophique d’un Damascius. Sans doute son rôle de Commentateur d’Aristote est à la fois la cause de sa relégation et le cœur de son originalité. Contraint de suivre la logique d’un texte différent de celle du système qui lui sert de grille d’analyse, il tire de cette lecture systématique des éléments qu’il doit harmoniser avec l’orthodoxie néoplatonicienne. À cet égard, la question de l’infini est symptomatique de sa méthode, puisqu’elle montre de quelle façon se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristotélicien et de la toile de fond néoplatonicienne : Simplicius évince l’ἄπειρον du sensible, pour le réserver à l’intelligible, mais il retient un procès à l’infini, τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n’admet pas simplement un « bon » et un « mauvais » infini, l’un qui vaudrait dans l’intelligible, l’autre qui en serait l’image sensible et dégradée. Il pose plutôt une forme positive de l’infinité dans le sensible même. On peut dès lors remercier Ph. Soulier d’avoir fait la pleine lumière sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les dernières pages du néoplatonisme tardo-antique, c’est-à-dire d’avoir exposé avec une telle minutie comment l’analyse de la Physique permettait de déployer les propriétés de l’infini qui étaient caractéristiques du sensible, en accord avec la thèse néoplatonicienne la plus autorisée. [conclusion p. 127-128] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"406","_score":null,"_source":{"id":406,"authors_free":[{"id":2456,"entry_id":406,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann"},"abstract":"Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 analytique du texte de Simplicius. \u00c0 d\u00e9faut d\u2019une traduction compl\u00e8te (qui est annonc\u00e9e aux \u00e9ditions des Belles Lettres), il s\u2019agit l\u00e0 d\u2019un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses.\r\n\r\nSimplicius n\u2019a ni le prestige d\u2019un Proclus ni l\u2019audace philosophique d\u2019un Damascius. Sans doute son r\u00f4le de Commentateur d\u2019Aristote est \u00e0 la fois la cause de sa rel\u00e9gation et le c\u0153ur de son originalit\u00e9. Contraint de suivre la logique d\u2019un texte diff\u00e9rent de celle du syst\u00e8me qui lui sert de grille d\u2019analyse, il tire de cette lecture syst\u00e9matique des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qu\u2019il doit harmoniser avec l\u2019orthodoxie n\u00e9oplatonicienne.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la question de l\u2019infini est symptomatique de sa m\u00e9thode, puisqu\u2019elle montre de quelle fa\u00e7on se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristot\u00e9licien et de la toile de fond n\u00e9oplatonicienne : Simplicius \u00e9vince l\u2019\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd du sensible, pour le r\u00e9server \u00e0 l\u2019intelligible, mais il retient un proc\u00e8s \u00e0 l\u2019infini, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u1fbd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n\u2019admet pas simplement un \u00ab bon \u00bb et un \u00ab mauvais \u00bb infini, l\u2019un qui vaudrait dans l\u2019intelligible, l\u2019autre qui en serait l\u2019image sensible et d\u00e9grad\u00e9e. Il pose plut\u00f4t une forme positive de l\u2019infinit\u00e9 dans le sensible m\u00eame.\r\n\r\nOn peut d\u00e8s lors remercier Ph. Soulier d\u2019avoir fait la pleine lumi\u00e8re sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les derni\u00e8res pages du n\u00e9oplatonisme tardo-antique, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire d\u2019avoir expos\u00e9 avec une telle minutie comment l\u2019analyse de la Physique permettait de d\u00e9ployer les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s de l\u2019infini qui \u00e9taient caract\u00e9ristiques du sensible, en accord avec la th\u00e8se n\u00e9oplatonicienne la plus autoris\u00e9e.\r\n[conclusion p. 127-128]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":406,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"33","issue":"","pages":"115-128"}},"sort":[2015]}
| Title | Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4 |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2012 |
| Journal | The Classical Review |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 465-467 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Thanks to the Ancient Commentators project, almost all of Simplicius' commentaries are now translated. This volume completes the gigantic On Aristotle's Physics. Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides). In Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements. In Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition. This volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately. As to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues. T. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments). The translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios). Now for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither "mental" nor "intellectual" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai hênôtai kata Anaxagoran ta eidê kai amphô dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms. H. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou mê ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1). One could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit. Finally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Postérité de l'Être. Simplicius interprète de Parménide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Empédocle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here. With its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels. [author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG |
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Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides).\r\nIn Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements.\r\nIn Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition.\r\nThis volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately.\r\nAs to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues.\r\nT. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments).\r\nThe translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios).\r\nNow for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither \"mental\" nor \"intellectual\" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai h\u00ean\u00f4tai kata Anaxagoran ta eid\u00ea kai amph\u00f4 dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms.\r\nH. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou m\u00ea ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1).\r\nOne could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit.\r\nFinally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00catre. Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here.\r\nWith its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels.\r\n[author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1465,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"62","issue":"2","pages":"465-467"}},"sort":[2012]}
| Title | Confronter les Idées. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius |
| Type | Article |
| Language | French |
| Date | 2011 |
| Journal | Études platoniciennes |
| Volume | 8 |
| Pages | 145-160 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Dans ce lemme, Simplicius n’emploie pas la méthode à laquelle il recourt habituellement pour concilier des doctrines. Entre Aristote et Platon, le problème ne provient pas d’une différence d'expression (lexis), derrière laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d’un problème semblable en des termes différents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d’une question différente mais en recourant à des termes similaires. Sans être formulée ici par Simplicius de façon explicite, la divergence apparaît à la première lecture : lorsqu’Aristote s’en prend à la doctrine des Idées, il ne peut pas, d’une certaine façon, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier à la soutenir. D’emblée, Simplicius élude le problème en redirigeant l’attaque contre d’autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d’abord la véritable cible de l’objection, avant qu’il devienne possible d’en mesurer l’apport à l’égard de la doctrine générale des Idées. La conciliation des doctrines au cœur de l’exégèse d’Aristote suit un parcours précis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture littérale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de façon surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d’Aristote contre elle-même : en faire non plus un adversaire de la théorie des Idées séparées, mais l’auteur d’un critère de validité de la séparation. Dans un deuxième temps, notre exégète s’emploie à montrer la teneur authentiquement aristotélicienne de cette doctrine des Idées séparées. Il isole d’abord les caractères reconnus aux Idées, avant de démontrer qu’ils sont admis au sein même de la pensée d’Aristote. De plus, étant donné que l’enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste à trouver chez Aristote la double caractérisation des Idées que leur attribuent leurs partisans – être à la fois des causes et des modèles semblables pour les réalités naturelles –, il répertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et insère des éléments provenant de la tradition néoplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les réalités qui admettent des Formes séparées et celles qui n’en admettent pas. Comme souvent chez Simplicius, l’examen aboutit à l’énoncé d’un critère net et précis. Il doit permettre ici de démarquer l’homonymie vulgaire des Idées de l’éponymie légitime. La première résulte d’un dépouillement de la forme en dehors de la matière, mais qui continue à raisonner à partir d’ici-bas : elle cherche des Idées séparées pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais être complètement abstraites de la matière à laquelle elles sont liées. La seconde reconnaît que certains noms sont propres aux composés ici-bas et, par conséquent, ne correspondent à aucune réalité là-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Idées, à la fois causes et modèles des composés ici-bas, qui possèdent une subsistance séparée. Si le travail exégétique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son génie philosophique, il s’emploie à chercher des solutions à certains des problèmes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu’il propose, en dépit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, lève la difficulté d’une façon nette et précise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une leçon à méditer. [conclusion p. 159-160] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O |
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Entre Aristote et Platon, le probl\u00e8me ne provient pas d\u2019une diff\u00e9rence d'expression (lexis), derri\u00e8re laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d\u2019un probl\u00e8me semblable en des termes diff\u00e9rents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d\u2019une question diff\u00e9rente mais en recourant \u00e0 des termes similaires. Sans \u00eatre formul\u00e9e ici par Simplicius de fa\u00e7on explicite, la divergence appara\u00eet \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re lecture : lorsqu\u2019Aristote s\u2019en prend \u00e0 la doctrine des Id\u00e9es, il ne peut pas, d\u2019une certaine fa\u00e7on, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier \u00e0 la soutenir. D\u2019embl\u00e9e, Simplicius \u00e9lude le probl\u00e8me en redirigeant l\u2019attaque contre d\u2019autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d\u2019abord la v\u00e9ritable cible de l\u2019objection, avant qu\u2019il devienne possible d\u2019en mesurer l\u2019apport \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de la doctrine g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Id\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nLa conciliation des doctrines au c\u0153ur de l\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se d\u2019Aristote suit un parcours pr\u00e9cis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture litt\u00e9rale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de fa\u00e7on surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d\u2019Aristote contre elle-m\u00eame : en faire non plus un adversaire de la th\u00e9orie des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es, mais l\u2019auteur d\u2019un crit\u00e8re de validit\u00e9 de la s\u00e9paration. Dans un deuxi\u00e8me temps, notre ex\u00e9g\u00e8te s\u2019emploie \u00e0 montrer la teneur authentiquement aristot\u00e9licienne de cette doctrine des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es. Il isole d\u2019abord les caract\u00e8res reconnus aux Id\u00e9es, avant de d\u00e9montrer qu\u2019ils sont admis au sein m\u00eame de la pens\u00e9e d\u2019Aristote. De plus, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 que l\u2019enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste \u00e0 trouver chez Aristote la double caract\u00e9risation des Id\u00e9es que leur attribuent leurs partisans \u2013 \u00eatre \u00e0 la fois des causes et des mod\u00e8les semblables pour les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s naturelles \u2013, il r\u00e9pertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et ins\u00e8re des \u00e9l\u00e9ments provenant de la tradition n\u00e9oplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui admettent des Formes s\u00e9par\u00e9es et celles qui n\u2019en admettent pas.\r\n\r\nComme souvent chez Simplicius, l\u2019examen aboutit \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9nonc\u00e9 d\u2019un crit\u00e8re net et pr\u00e9cis. Il doit permettre ici de d\u00e9marquer l\u2019homonymie vulgaire des Id\u00e9es de l\u2019\u00e9ponymie l\u00e9gitime. La premi\u00e8re r\u00e9sulte d\u2019un d\u00e9pouillement de la forme en dehors de la mati\u00e8re, mais qui continue \u00e0 raisonner \u00e0 partir d\u2019ici-bas : elle cherche des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais \u00eatre compl\u00e8tement abstraites de la mati\u00e8re \u00e0 laquelle elles sont li\u00e9es. La seconde reconna\u00eet que certains noms sont propres aux compos\u00e9s ici-bas et, par cons\u00e9quent, ne correspondent \u00e0 aucune r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l\u00e0-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Id\u00e9es, \u00e0 la fois causes et mod\u00e8les des compos\u00e9s ici-bas, qui poss\u00e8dent une subsistance s\u00e9par\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nSi le travail ex\u00e9g\u00e9tique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son g\u00e9nie philosophique, il s\u2019emploie \u00e0 chercher des solutions \u00e0 certains des probl\u00e8mes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu\u2019il propose, en d\u00e9pit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, l\u00e8ve la difficult\u00e9 d\u2019une fa\u00e7on nette et pr\u00e9cise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une le\u00e7on \u00e0 m\u00e9diter. [conclusion p. 159-160]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1313,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"\u00c9tudes platoniciennes","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"145-160"}},"sort":[2011]}
| Title | Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation |
| Type | Article |
| Language | French |
| Date | 2011 |
| Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 85-158 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Intent upon harmonizing doctrines of their predecessors, some Neoplatonic com-mentators are faced with a problem of resolving doctrinal discrepancies so as to restore the συμφωνία in the history of philosophy. This article considers a parti-cular example of this attempt ats harmonization: how Simplicius reconciles Aris-totle’s Categories with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the Pseudo-Archytas. The chronological inversion introduced by the counterfeiter produces remarkable effects on the late Platonic doctrine about general terms, to the extent that a commentator such as Simplicius works to reduce the dissonance between Archytas’ and Aristotle’s words. This paper has three aims: to restore the general grid that Simplicius uses for reading and commenting on Archytas through Aristotle; to identify the exegeti-cal strategies aimed at a doctrinal reconciliation; to consider a specific case, pro-vided by the doctrine of weight, which engenders a new physical theory by Simplicius. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CcW2PJaT6w7pONA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1312","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1312,"authors_free":[{"id":1946,"entry_id":1312,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation","main_title":{"title":"Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation"},"abstract":"Intent upon harmonizing doctrines of their predecessors, some Neoplatonic com-mentators are faced with a problem of resolving doctrinal discrepancies so as to restore the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 in the history of philosophy. This article considers a parti-cular example of this attempt ats harmonization: how Simplicius reconciles Aris-totle\u2019s Categories with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the Pseudo-Archytas. The chronological inversion introduced by the counterfeiter produces remarkable effects on the late Platonic doctrine about general terms, to the extent that a commentator such as Simplicius works to reduce the dissonance between Archytas\u2019 and Aristotle\u2019s words. This paper has three aims: to restore the general grid that Simplicius uses for reading and commenting on Archytas through Aristotle; to identify the exegeti-cal strategies aimed at a doctrinal reconciliation; to consider a specific case, pro-vided by the doctrine of weight, which engenders a new physical theory by Simplicius. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CcW2PJaT6w7pONA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1312,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"5","issue":"1","pages":"85-158"}},"sort":[2011]}
| Title | Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation |
| Type | Article |
| Language | French |
| Date | 2011 |
| Journal | The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 85-158 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Intent upon harmonizing doctrines of their predecessors, some Neoplatonic com-mentators are faced with a problem of resolving doctrinal discrepancies so as to restore the συμφωνία in the history of philosophy. This article considers a parti-cular example of this attempt ats harmonization: how Simplicius reconciles Aris-totle’s Categories with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the Pseudo-Archytas. The chronological inversion introduced by the counterfeiter produces remarkable effects on the late Platonic doctrine about general terms, to the extent that a commentator such as Simplicius works to reduce the dissonance between Archytas’ and Aristotle’s words. This paper has three aims: to restore the general grid that Simplicius uses for reading and commenting on Archytas through Aristotle; to identify the exegeti-cal strategies aimed at a doctrinal reconciliation; to consider a specific case, pro-vided by the doctrine of weight, which engenders a new physical theory by Simplicius. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/CcW2PJaT6w7pONA |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1312","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1312,"authors_free":[{"id":1946,"entry_id":1312,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation","main_title":{"title":"Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation"},"abstract":"Intent upon harmonizing doctrines of their predecessors, some Neoplatonic com-mentators are faced with a problem of resolving doctrinal discrepancies so as to restore the \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 in the history of philosophy. This article considers a parti-cular example of this attempt ats harmonization: how Simplicius reconciles Aris-totle\u2019s Categories with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the Pseudo-Archytas. The chronological inversion introduced by the counterfeiter produces remarkable effects on the late Platonic doctrine about general terms, to the extent that a commentator such as Simplicius works to reduce the dissonance between Archytas\u2019 and Aristotle\u2019s words. This paper has three aims: to restore the general grid that Simplicius uses for reading and commenting on Archytas through Aristotle; to identify the exegeti-cal strategies aimed at a doctrinal reconciliation; to consider a specific case, pro-vided by the doctrine of weight, which engenders a new physical theory by Simplicius. [Author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/CcW2PJaT6w7pONA","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1312,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"5","issue":"1","pages":"85-158"}},"sort":["Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation"]}
| Title | Confronter les Idées. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius |
| Type | Article |
| Language | French |
| Date | 2011 |
| Journal | Études platoniciennes |
| Volume | 8 |
| Pages | 145-160 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Dans ce lemme, Simplicius n’emploie pas la méthode à laquelle il recourt habituellement pour concilier des doctrines. Entre Aristote et Platon, le problème ne provient pas d’une différence d'expression (lexis), derrière laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d’un problème semblable en des termes différents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d’une question différente mais en recourant à des termes similaires. Sans être formulée ici par Simplicius de façon explicite, la divergence apparaît à la première lecture : lorsqu’Aristote s’en prend à la doctrine des Idées, il ne peut pas, d’une certaine façon, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier à la soutenir. D’emblée, Simplicius élude le problème en redirigeant l’attaque contre d’autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d’abord la véritable cible de l’objection, avant qu’il devienne possible d’en mesurer l’apport à l’égard de la doctrine générale des Idées. La conciliation des doctrines au cœur de l’exégèse d’Aristote suit un parcours précis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture littérale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de façon surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d’Aristote contre elle-même : en faire non plus un adversaire de la théorie des Idées séparées, mais l’auteur d’un critère de validité de la séparation. Dans un deuxième temps, notre exégète s’emploie à montrer la teneur authentiquement aristotélicienne de cette doctrine des Idées séparées. Il isole d’abord les caractères reconnus aux Idées, avant de démontrer qu’ils sont admis au sein même de la pensée d’Aristote. De plus, étant donné que l’enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste à trouver chez Aristote la double caractérisation des Idées que leur attribuent leurs partisans – être à la fois des causes et des modèles semblables pour les réalités naturelles –, il répertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et insère des éléments provenant de la tradition néoplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les réalités qui admettent des Formes séparées et celles qui n’en admettent pas. Comme souvent chez Simplicius, l’examen aboutit à l’énoncé d’un critère net et précis. Il doit permettre ici de démarquer l’homonymie vulgaire des Idées de l’éponymie légitime. La première résulte d’un dépouillement de la forme en dehors de la matière, mais qui continue à raisonner à partir d’ici-bas : elle cherche des Idées séparées pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais être complètement abstraites de la matière à laquelle elles sont liées. La seconde reconnaît que certains noms sont propres aux composés ici-bas et, par conséquent, ne correspondent à aucune réalité là-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Idées, à la fois causes et modèles des composés ici-bas, qui possèdent une subsistance séparée. Si le travail exégétique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son génie philosophique, il s’emploie à chercher des solutions à certains des problèmes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu’il propose, en dépit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, lève la difficulté d’une façon nette et précise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une leçon à méditer. [conclusion p. 159-160] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1313","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1313,"authors_free":[{"id":1947,"entry_id":1313,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius","main_title":{"title":"Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius"},"abstract":"Dans ce lemme, Simplicius n\u2019emploie pas la m\u00e9thode \u00e0 laquelle il recourt habituellement pour concilier des doctrines. Entre Aristote et Platon, le probl\u00e8me ne provient pas d\u2019une diff\u00e9rence d'expression (lexis), derri\u00e8re laquelle le sens fondamental (nous) serait identique. Chacun ne parle pas d\u2019un probl\u00e8me semblable en des termes diff\u00e9rents, pas plus que chacun ne traite d\u2019une question diff\u00e9rente mais en recourant \u00e0 des termes similaires. Sans \u00eatre formul\u00e9e ici par Simplicius de fa\u00e7on explicite, la divergence appara\u00eet \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re lecture : lorsqu\u2019Aristote s\u2019en prend \u00e0 la doctrine des Id\u00e9es, il ne peut pas, d\u2019une certaine fa\u00e7on, viser le divin Platon, qui fut le premier \u00e0 la soutenir. D\u2019embl\u00e9e, Simplicius \u00e9lude le probl\u00e8me en redirigeant l\u2019attaque contre d\u2019autres adversaires. Concilier impose en effet de comprendre tout d\u2019abord la v\u00e9ritable cible de l\u2019objection, avant qu\u2019il devienne possible d\u2019en mesurer l\u2019apport \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de la doctrine g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Id\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nLa conciliation des doctrines au c\u0153ur de l\u2019ex\u00e9g\u00e8se d\u2019Aristote suit un parcours pr\u00e9cis. Dans un premier temps, Simplicius propose une lecture litt\u00e9rale de la Physique, expliquant chacun des arguments contenus dans le lemme. Toutefois, de fa\u00e7on surprenante pour nous, il souligne une tournure qui va lui permettre de retourner la position d\u2019Aristote contre elle-m\u00eame : en faire non plus un adversaire de la th\u00e9orie des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es, mais l\u2019auteur d\u2019un crit\u00e8re de validit\u00e9 de la s\u00e9paration. Dans un deuxi\u00e8me temps, notre ex\u00e9g\u00e8te s\u2019emploie \u00e0 montrer la teneur authentiquement aristot\u00e9licienne de cette doctrine des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es. Il isole d\u2019abord les caract\u00e8res reconnus aux Id\u00e9es, avant de d\u00e9montrer qu\u2019ils sont admis au sein m\u00eame de la pens\u00e9e d\u2019Aristote. De plus, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 que l\u2019enjeu de la tentative de conciliation consiste \u00e0 trouver chez Aristote la double caract\u00e9risation des Id\u00e9es que leur attribuent leurs partisans \u2013 \u00eatre \u00e0 la fois des causes et des mod\u00e8les semblables pour les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s naturelles \u2013, il r\u00e9pertorie les passages du corpus aristotelicum qui abondent dans ce sens, les combine et ins\u00e8re des \u00e9l\u00e9ments provenant de la tradition n\u00e9oplatonicienne. Enfin, il utilise la critique pour poser une limite claire au sein de la nature entre les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui admettent des Formes s\u00e9par\u00e9es et celles qui n\u2019en admettent pas.\r\n\r\nComme souvent chez Simplicius, l\u2019examen aboutit \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9nonc\u00e9 d\u2019un crit\u00e8re net et pr\u00e9cis. Il doit permettre ici de d\u00e9marquer l\u2019homonymie vulgaire des Id\u00e9es de l\u2019\u00e9ponymie l\u00e9gitime. La premi\u00e8re r\u00e9sulte d\u2019un d\u00e9pouillement de la forme en dehors de la mati\u00e8re, mais qui continue \u00e0 raisonner \u00e0 partir d\u2019ici-bas : elle cherche des Id\u00e9es s\u00e9par\u00e9es pour des formes naturelles qui ne peuvent jamais \u00eatre compl\u00e8tement abstraites de la mati\u00e8re \u00e0 laquelle elles sont li\u00e9es. La seconde reconna\u00eet que certains noms sont propres aux compos\u00e9s ici-bas et, par cons\u00e9quent, ne correspondent \u00e0 aucune r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l\u00e0-bas. En revanche, elle pose des Id\u00e9es, \u00e0 la fois causes et mod\u00e8les des compos\u00e9s ici-bas, qui poss\u00e8dent une subsistance s\u00e9par\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nSi le travail ex\u00e9g\u00e9tique de Simplicius ne brille pas toujours par son g\u00e9nie philosophique, il s\u2019emploie \u00e0 chercher des solutions \u00e0 certains des probl\u00e8mes les plus complexes de la tradition platonicienne. Comme souvent, la solution qu\u2019il propose, en d\u00e9pit du bricolage doctrinal sur lequel elle se fonde, l\u00e8ve la difficult\u00e9 d\u2019une fa\u00e7on nette et pr\u00e9cise. Il offre une nouvelle fois aux commentateurs que nous sommes une le\u00e7on \u00e0 m\u00e9diter. [conclusion p. 159-160]","btype":3,"date":"2011","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/ihW4uaycr2RFg3O","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1313,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"\u00c9tudes platoniciennes","volume":"8","issue":"","pages":"145-160"}},"sort":["Confronter les Id\u00e9es. Un exemple de conciliation litigieuse chez Simplicius"]}
| Title | Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4 |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2012 |
| Journal | The Classical Review |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 465-467 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Thanks to the Ancient Commentators project, almost all of Simplicius' commentaries are now translated. This volume completes the gigantic On Aristotle's Physics. Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides). In Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements. In Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition. This volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately. As to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues. T. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments). The translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios). Now for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither "mental" nor "intellectual" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai hênôtai kata Anaxagoran ta eidê kai amphô dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms. H. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou mê ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1). One could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit. Finally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Postérité de l'Être. Simplicius interprète de Parménide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Empédocle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here. With its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels. [author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"1465","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1465,"authors_free":[{"id":2538,"entry_id":1465,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3\u20134","main_title":{"title":"Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3\u20134"},"abstract":"Thanks to the Ancient Commentators project, almost all of Simplicius' commentaries are now translated. This volume completes the gigantic On Aristotle's Physics. Within this monument, Book 1 must be the most read by scholars today because Aristotle's criticism of several physical theories leads Simplicius to multiply quotations of his forerunners and to preserve for his contemporaries (as well as for us) much Presocratic material (by Simplicius' time much of this had already become very rare: see In Phys. 144.25-9 on Parmenides).\r\nIn Chapter 1.3, Aristotle discusses the unity of Being he ascribes to the Eleatic philosophers. Simplicius comments abundantly. Citing Theophrastus, Alexander, and Porphyry, he reproduces the 'Eleatic syllogism,' which affirms Being and excludes not-Being, so as to prove Parmenides' thesis that Being is one and to assert, via Plato's Sophist, that Parmenides recognizes the existence of not-Being. Moreover, he assigns this reading to Aristotle himself, considering his criticism as an expression of later conceptual and linguistic refinements.\r\nIn Chapter 1.4, Aristotle discusses Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Here again, Simplicius contributes to the debate by his numerous quotations and by his analysis of rival commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, and Nicolaus of Damascus). He considers how Anaxagoras and Empedocles can say that their principles are both one and many. Then, confronted with Aristotle's criticism of homoiomeria and nous, he gives a non-physical reading of Anaxagoras' account, explaining that it talks figuratively about a level of reality exceeding our mental capacities. In other words, in both these chapters, he attempts to reconcile Aristotle's physics with Presocratic philosophy so as to build a coherent system from the whole pagan tradition.\r\nThis volume could be said to consist of two books. Each translation is due to a different author; there are two introductions, two translations, and two selections of notes, and only the index and bibliography are in common. There are only minor differences in the style of the translations, but greater ones occur elsewhere. I shall discuss them separately.\r\nAs to H.'s introduction, two things must be noted. First, she contributes to the fierce debate by proposing a stimulating hypothesis about the place where such a large commentary could have been written: discrepancies, sometimes substantial, occurring in Simplicius' treatment of his sources are the result of his having written in various places. However, they could also be explained by the difficulty at that time of keeping every useful book constantly at hand: scholars were often compelled to write from memory. Second, H. summarizes the treatment Simplicius gives of Melissus and Parmenides, moving abruptly from one episode to the other. She perfectly communicates the sometimes confusing character of Simplicius' text. Her notes provide useful documentation rather than an explanatory commentary: she mentions parallels and justifies her translation but avoids going into detail about the philosophical issues.\r\nT. opts to draw a clear map of the text, insisting on its structure and summing up its main arguments. Moreover, most of the references are given within the translation (in brackets), while end-notes (fewer but longer) are devoted to explaining the contents of and issues in Simplicius' commentary (i.e., his reading of the Presocratic fragments).\r\nThe translation is remarkably successful in rendering the stylistic variations in Simplicius' text, which constantly moves from paraphrase to quotation or philosophical commentary. The Greek text largely follows H. Diels' edition (1882), sometimes as emended by later editors of the Presocratic fragments (DK inter alios).\r\nNow for some points of detail. In this Neoplatonic context, H. first suggests translating noeros as 'thinker' (and related words), 'because neither \"mental\" nor \"intellectual\" have the grammatical flexibility required' (p. 100 on In Phys. 143.18-19). Nevertheless, a little further on (p. 57 = In Phys. 147.26) she translates en tois noerois as 'in the mental area.' Another point concerns T.'s translation of Anaxagoras' vovs as 'Mind' (pp. 81-4). My intention here is not to contest this translation for interpreting Anaxagoras but to remind the reader that Simplicius must have connected this concept with his Neoplatonic vocabulary so that 'Intellect' seems a better translation. Otherwise, it becomes very problematic to translate the following: kai diakekritai oun kai h\u00ean\u00f4tai kata Anaxagoran ta eid\u00ea kai amph\u00f4 dia ton noun echei. T. writes: 'In Anaxagoras' view, the kinds owe both their separation and their unity to Mind' (p. 84 = In Phys. 176.31-2); but it is difficult to exclude the likelihood that Simplicius, with his Neoplatonic background, was reading these words with reference to Intellect and Forms.\r\nH. translates to on hen men esti, polla de ouk estin as 'Being is one and not many' (p. 37 = In Phys. 126.8). Since Simplicius has just referred to the Sophist and next opposes Being to rest and motion, it would be preferable to translate as 'is not many things.' Further (p. 46 = In Phys. 135.24), H. emends a quotation from the Sophist, turning tou ontos into tou m\u00ea ontos, following Plato's manuscripts. However, the text given by Simplicius makes sense and ought not to be altered (see my Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste (2007), pp. 140-1).\r\nOne could wonder why both authors have chosen, as is often done in this collection, to give the full lemmas from Aristotle's Physics, while Simplicius' manuscripts and Diels' edition give only a shortened version (i.e., 'from ... to ...'). Although it is risky to translate a text that possibly was not the one read by Simplicius, the decision should at least have been made explicit.\r\nFinally, the bibliography. On Simplicius, H. and T. refer only to two recent books: H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (2008), and P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon \u00e0 la Physique d'Aristote (2008). The remainder of the short bibliography concerns the Presocratics and Aristotle. One would expect at least to find reference to a book and a paper written by A. Stevens: Post\u00e9rit\u00e9 de l'\u00catre. Simplicius interpr\u00e8te de Parm\u00e9nide (1989) and 'La Physique d'Emp\u00e9docle selon Simplicius,' RBPh (1989), 65-74. They provide commentaries on and (partial) translations of the chapters studied here.\r\nWith its English-Greek glossary, Greek-English index, subject index, and index of passages, this book is an extraordinarily useful tool for scholars. It provides an up-to-date translation of some of the richest pages about Presocratic philosophy. Now we can dream about a new edition of this commentary to replace the often misleading version of Diels.\r\n[author's abstract]","btype":3,"date":"2012","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/fltNdJ3NAIOLUAG","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1465,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The Classical Review","volume":"62","issue":"2","pages":"465-467"}},"sort":["Review of Huby, Taylor 2011: Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3\u20134"]}
| Title | Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, préface par Ph. Hoffmann |
| Type | Article |
| Language | French |
| Date | 2015 |
| Journal | Revue de Philosophie Ancienne |
| Volume | 33 |
| Pages | 115-128 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Gavray, Marc-Antoine |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un résumé analytique du texte de Simplicius. À défaut d’une traduction complète (qui est annoncée aux éditions des Belles Lettres), il s’agit là d’un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses. Simplicius n’a ni le prestige d’un Proclus ni l’audace philosophique d’un Damascius. Sans doute son rôle de Commentateur d’Aristote est à la fois la cause de sa relégation et le cœur de son originalité. Contraint de suivre la logique d’un texte différent de celle du système qui lui sert de grille d’analyse, il tire de cette lecture systématique des éléments qu’il doit harmoniser avec l’orthodoxie néoplatonicienne. À cet égard, la question de l’infini est symptomatique de sa méthode, puisqu’elle montre de quelle façon se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristotélicien et de la toile de fond néoplatonicienne : Simplicius évince l’ἄπειρον du sensible, pour le réserver à l’intelligible, mais il retient un procès à l’infini, τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n’admet pas simplement un « bon » et un « mauvais » infini, l’un qui vaudrait dans l’intelligible, l’autre qui en serait l’image sensible et dégradée. Il pose plutôt une forme positive de l’infinité dans le sensible même. On peut dès lors remercier Ph. Soulier d’avoir fait la pleine lumière sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les dernières pages du néoplatonisme tardo-antique, c’est-à-dire d’avoir exposé avec une telle minutie comment l’analyse de la Physique permettait de déployer les propriétés de l’infini qui étaient caractéristiques du sensible, en accord avec la thèse néoplatonicienne la plus autorisée. [conclusion p. 127-128] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi |
{"_index":"sire","_id":"406","_score":null,"_source":{"id":406,"authors_free":[{"id":2456,"entry_id":406,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":125,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","free_first_name":"Marc-Antoine","free_last_name":"Gavray","norm_person":{"id":125,"first_name":"Marc-Antoine","last_name":"Gavray","full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078511411","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann","main_title":{"title":"Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann"},"abstract":"Ajoutons que Ph. Soulier donne en annexe un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 analytique du texte de Simplicius. \u00c0 d\u00e9faut d\u2019une traduction compl\u00e8te (qui est annonc\u00e9e aux \u00e9ditions des Belles Lettres), il s\u2019agit l\u00e0 d\u2019un formidable support pour suivre les analyses aussi denses que rigoureuses.\r\n\r\nSimplicius n\u2019a ni le prestige d\u2019un Proclus ni l\u2019audace philosophique d\u2019un Damascius. Sans doute son r\u00f4le de Commentateur d\u2019Aristote est \u00e0 la fois la cause de sa rel\u00e9gation et le c\u0153ur de son originalit\u00e9. Contraint de suivre la logique d\u2019un texte diff\u00e9rent de celle du syst\u00e8me qui lui sert de grille d\u2019analyse, il tire de cette lecture syst\u00e9matique des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qu\u2019il doit harmoniser avec l\u2019orthodoxie n\u00e9oplatonicienne.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la question de l\u2019infini est symptomatique de sa m\u00e9thode, puisqu\u2019elle montre de quelle fa\u00e7on se construit une doctrine originale sur la base du texte aristot\u00e9licien et de la toile de fond n\u00e9oplatonicienne : Simplicius \u00e9vince l\u2019\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd du sensible, pour le r\u00e9server \u00e0 l\u2019intelligible, mais il retient un proc\u00e8s \u00e0 l\u2019infini, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u1fbd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, et lui attribue une assise ontologique. Autrement dit, il n\u2019admet pas simplement un \u00ab bon \u00bb et un \u00ab mauvais \u00bb infini, l\u2019un qui vaudrait dans l\u2019intelligible, l\u2019autre qui en serait l\u2019image sensible et d\u00e9grad\u00e9e. Il pose plut\u00f4t une forme positive de l\u2019infinit\u00e9 dans le sensible m\u00eame.\r\n\r\nOn peut d\u00e8s lors remercier Ph. Soulier d\u2019avoir fait la pleine lumi\u00e8re sur la revalorisation du sensible dans les derni\u00e8res pages du n\u00e9oplatonisme tardo-antique, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire d\u2019avoir expos\u00e9 avec une telle minutie comment l\u2019analyse de la Physique permettait de d\u00e9ployer les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s de l\u2019infini qui \u00e9taient caract\u00e9ristiques du sensible, en accord avec la th\u00e8se n\u00e9oplatonicienne la plus autoris\u00e9e.\r\n[conclusion p. 127-128]","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"French","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/5DpQiBfHF99tVXi","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":125,"full_name":"Gavray, Marc-Antoine","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":406,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Revue de Philosophie Ancienne","volume":"33","issue":"","pages":"115-128"}},"sort":["Review of: Ph. Soulier, Simplicius et l'infini, pr\u00e9face par Ph. Hoffmann"]}