| Title | Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter ("Physics" IV:2, 209 B 17–32) |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2006 |
| Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
| Volume | 48 |
| Pages | 45-63 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Fritsche, Johannes |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| In Physics IV.2, Aristotle argues for private Space of a body as its form (209 b 1-6) and as its matter (209 b 6-11) to conclude that Plato maintains that χώρα, matter, and space are the same (209 b 11-17). Subsequently, he réfutés both possibilities of conceiving Space (209 b 17-28). In a paper on 209 b 6-17,1 have tried to show that his view of Plato is right.1 In this paper, I would like to show that in his réfutation of both possibilities Aristotle argues dialectically in the proper sense; that is, he does not use any assumption that is peculiar to his own theory and not shared by his Opponent. For this purpose I présent (I.) Aristotle's différent usages of (ού) χωρίζεται/χωριστός (»[not] separated/separable«) and (II.) the three différent interprétations of 209 b 22-28 in Philoponus, Simplicius, and Sorabji, and I rule out Sorabji's interprétation. Thereafter, I will give three reasons for Simplicius's interprétation. The first relates to (III.) the issue of prin ciples as the main topic of the Physics in général. Secondly, (IV.) Philoponus's interprétation of 209 b 22-28 contradicts Aristotle's own définition of Space. Thirdly, (V.) only in Simplicius's interprétation is the argument dialectically va lid. Thereafter, I will show (VI.) that the argument in Simplicius's interprétation is conclusive against Plato's reasoning in the Timaeus to finish with (VII.) some général remarks on this paper and the paper on 209 b 1-17. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nDk2A18WGuyUJrT |
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| Title | Aristotle on Space, Form, and Matter ("Physics" IV:2, 209 B 17–32) |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2006 |
| Journal | Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte |
| Volume | 48 |
| Pages | 45-63 |
| Categories | no categories |
| Author(s) | Fritsche, Johannes |
| Editor(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
In Physics IV.2, Aristotle argues for private Space of a body as its form (209 b 1-6) and as its matter (209 b 6-11) to conclude that Plato maintains that χώρα, matter, and space are the same (209 b 11-17). Subsequently, he réfutés both possibilities of conceiving Space (209 b 17-28). In a paper on 209 b 6-17,1 have tried to show that his view of Plato is right.1 In this paper, I would like to show that in his réfutation of both possibilities Aristotle argues dialectically in the proper sense; that is, he does not use any assumption that is peculiar to his own theory and not shared by his Opponent. For this purpose I présent (I.) Aristotle's différent usages of (ού) χωρίζεται/χωριστός (»[not] separated/separable«) and (II.) the three différent interprétations of 209 b 22-28 in Philoponus, Simplicius, and Sorabji, and I rule out Sorabji's interprétation. Thereafter, I will give three reasons for Simplicius's interprétation. The first relates to (III.) the issue of prin ciples as the main topic of the Physics in général. Secondly, (IV.) Philoponus's interprétation of 209 b 22-28 contradicts Aristotle's own définition of Space. Thirdly, (V.) only in Simplicius's interprétation is the argument dialectically va lid. Thereafter, I will show (VI.) that the argument in Simplicius's interprétation is conclusive against Plato's reasoning in the Timaeus to finish with (VII.) some général remarks on this paper and the paper on 209 b 1-17. [Author's abstract] |
| Online Resources | https://uni-koeln.sciebo.de/s/nDk2A18WGuyUJrT |
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