{"_index":"sire","_id":"594","_score":null,"_source":{"id":594,"authors_free":[{"id":845,"entry_id":594,"agent_type":null,"is_normalised":null,"person_id":117,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Fleet, Barrie","free_first_name":"Barrie","free_last_name":"Fleet","norm_person":{"id":117,"first_name":"Barrie","last_name":"Fleet","full_name":"Fleet, Barrie","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/172866235","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)","main_title":{"title":"\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)"},"abstract":"At the outset of Physics 1, Aristotle states that systematic knowledge of natural things and their changing character derives from a group of \"principles (arkhai), causes (aitia), or elements (stoikheiai).\" In this first book, he does not formally distinguish between these three terms, focusing instead on principles, although later commentators went to great lengths to formalize distinctions among them. Books 1 and 2 of Physics are devoted to seeking out the principles of change within the realm of natural science. Aristotle begins with commonly accepted propositions, \u201cconstantly appealing to what is ordinarily said or thought\u201d (W. Charlton, Aristotle\u2019s Physics I, II, Oxford, 1970, xi).\r\n\r\nAristotle posits axiomatically that the principles of change in natural bodies are inherent in what comes into being from them, that they do not arise from one another or from external things, but that all things originate from these principles. He seeks to identify the rationally distinguishable factors inherent in the world of physical change. In chapters 1\u20134, he briefly reviews earlier theorists, such as Parmenides and Melissus, who posited a single principle and denied qualitative change, thereby placing themselves outside the scope of Aristotle\u2019s inquiry. Aristotle concludes that principles must be multiple, either finite or infinite in number.\r\n\r\nThe Neoplatonists, in general, prioritize Aristotle for questions of natural science and Plato for metaphysics. Book 1 of Physics straddles these two domains, and Simplicius, a 6th-century AD commentator, is eager throughout to demonstrate the harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius appeals particularly to Phaedo, Sophist, Philebus, Phaedrus, and Timaeus to suggest that many of Aristotle\u2019s ideas were anticipated by Plato.\r\n\r\nIn chapter 5, Aristotle asserts that everyone agrees the opposites (ta enantia) are principles, though there is considerable variation regarding what these opposites, as primary principles of physical change, are. Aristotle's approach differs from Plato\u2019s Argument from Opposites in Phaedo. He reduces physical change to an underlying matter and, rather than a pair of opposites, considers the presence or absence of an opposite. The absence is redefined as \"privation\" (ster\u00easis) of a form, with a possible critique of John Philoponus\u2014though this is contested by Sorabji (Introduction, pp. 4\u20137). Simplicius provides a detailed analysis of Aristotle\u2019s arguments, distinguishing between primary and secondary principles, substance and contraries, per accidens and per se, and potential and actual\u2014though M. suggests (n. 16) that at least once \u201cSimplicius has no clue.\u201d\r\n\r\nSimplicius draws parallels between Aristotelian matter and Plato\u2019s Receptacle in Timaeus and the great-and-small in Philebus. He defines matter explicitly at 230,22 and finds congruence between Plato and Aristotle regarding the distinction between the first form, which is genuinely separate, and the natural form immanent in individual compound objects, which perishes with the compound.\r\n\r\nSimplicius uses Aristotle\u2019s discussion of privation in chapters 7\u20139 to defend Plato against the charge of giving undue credence to Parmenides' unitary concept of Being. He extensively quotes Sophist to show that Plato recognized but did not emphasize privation, opting instead to discuss the presence or absence of form. Where Aristotle uses privation, Plato prefers the concept of \"the other.\" Simplicius concludes that Plato and Aristotle are not in conflict regarding principles: Plato sought the per se causes of being that are elemental and inherent, while Aristotle sought causes of change, including privation as a per accidens cause.\r\n\r\nSimplicius frequently cites other commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, offering a dense and complex analysis that illuminates not only Aristotle\u2019s text but also its reception by a Neoplatonist of the 6th century AD.\r\n\r\nThis edition, translated by four contributors with glossaries by Sebastian Gertz and editorial notes by Richard Sorabji, provides accurate and fluent translations with minimal errors, despite being a collective effort. However, a more detailed note on logos, often left untranslated, would be valuable. Note 252 on p. 155 repeats paragraph 3 of the Introduction (p. 11). Overall, this translation is a significant contribution to Aristotelian studies. [The entire review p. 113-114]","btype":3,"date":"2014","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/nqkDsZcyl8kNw0V","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":117,"full_name":"Fleet, Barrie","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":594,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":"8","issue":"1","pages":"113-114"}},"sort":["\u2018Simplicius\u2019 (Review of: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, translated by Hans Baltussen, Michael Atkinson, Michael Share and Ian Mueller)"]}