Type of Media 1
Author 1
Date 7
Type of Media
Author
Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists, 1972
By: Edmunds, Lowell
Title Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists
Type Article
Language English
Date 1972
Journal Phoenix
Volume 26
Issue 4
Pages 342-357
Categories no categories
Author(s) Edmunds, Lowell
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In sum, the position of Democritus is decidedly against tyche (chance), and tyche is regarded as a subjective phenomenon. "Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness." There remains only one noteworthy fragment that mentions chance: "Daring is the beginning of action, but chance is responsible for the end." Since this fragment contradicts everything else Democritus says about chance, and since the form of Stobaeus' quotation obscures the reference of these words, we are entitled to ask whether we should think of this as Democritus' view of chance in general, or whether he was referring to persons who, contrary to the advice of his other sententiae on chance, relied on moderation and committed themselves to overreaching and tychistic projects. The note of moral exhortation suggests that man has a free choice between alternative ways of life, and thus that he is not in the grip of the original necessity which created the cosmos and him and endowed him with the arts. From the ethical point of view, man seems to emerge as an island of freedom—a floating island, perhaps, in a sea of necessity. If so, then Democritus' system is either dualistic or self-contradictory. However, the example of chance in the ethical thought of Democritus has shown how freedom, if it has any place at all in Democritus' system, should be understood. Man is free to trust to luck through willful disregard for or ignorance of the laws of nature, given by necessity. But he is powerless to change the facts of necessity, and from this point of view, his freedom is an illusion, like the appearance of color. His freedom is merely subjective and of infinite unconcern to the rest of the universe. The atomic theory, which accounted so well for the various appearances of the same phenomena to various people—tragedies and comedies are composed of the same alphabet—also accounted for a specious freedom. [conclusion p. 356-357]

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  • PAGE 1 OF 1
Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists, 1972
By: Edmunds, Lowell
Title Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists
Type Article
Language English
Date 1972
Journal Phoenix
Volume 26
Issue 4
Pages 342-357
Categories no categories
Author(s) Edmunds, Lowell
Editor(s)
Translator(s) 
In sum, the position of Democritus is decidedly against tyche (chance), and tyche is regarded as a subjective phenomenon. "Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness." There remains only one noteworthy fragment that mentions chance: "Daring is the beginning of action, but chance is responsible for the end." Since this fragment contradicts everything else Democritus says about chance, and since the form of Stobaeus' quotation obscures the reference of these words, we are entitled to ask whether we should think of this as Democritus' view of chance in general, or whether he was referring to persons who, contrary to the advice of his other sententiae on chance, relied on moderation and committed themselves to overreaching and tychistic projects.

The note of moral exhortation suggests that man has a free choice between alternative ways of life, and thus that he is not in the grip of the original necessity which created the cosmos and him and endowed him with the arts. From the ethical point of view, man seems to emerge as an island of freedom—a floating island, perhaps, in a sea of necessity. If so, then Democritus' system is either dualistic or self-contradictory.

However, the example of chance in the ethical thought of Democritus has shown how freedom, if it has any place at all in Democritus' system, should be understood. Man is free to trust to luck through willful disregard for or ignorance of the laws of nature, given by necessity. But he is powerless to change the facts of necessity, and from this point of view, his freedom is an illusion, like the appearance of color. His freedom is merely subjective and of infinite unconcern to the rest of the universe.

The atomic theory, which accounted so well for the various appearances of the same phenomena to various people—tragedies and comedies are composed of the same alphabet—also accounted for a specious freedom. [conclusion p. 356-357]

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