Type of Media 1
Author 1
Date 7
Type of Media
Author
Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics, 2016
By: Coope, Ursula
Title Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Volume 50
Pages 237-288
Categories no categories
Author(s) Coope, Ursula
Editor(s)
Translator(s)
In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason. Ps.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will. On this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons. This account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions? You are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent. [conclusion p. 286]

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason.\r\n\r\nPs.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will.\r\n\r\nOn this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons.\r\n\r\nThis account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions?\r\n\r\nYou are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent.\r\n[conclusion p. 286]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":[2016]}

  • PAGE 1 OF 1
Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics, 2016
By: Coope, Ursula
Title Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Volume 50
Pages 237-288
Categories no categories
Author(s) Coope, Ursula
Editor(s)
Translator(s) 
In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason.

Ps.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will.

On this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons.

This account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions?

You are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent.
[conclusion p. 286]

{"_index":"sire","_id":"1276","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1276,"authors_free":[{"id":1865,"entry_id":1276,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":53,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Coope, Ursula","free_first_name":"Ursula","free_last_name":"Coope","norm_person":{"id":53,"first_name":"Ursula","last_name":"Coope","full_name":"Coope, Ursula","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1078072639","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics","main_title":{"title":"Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"},"abstract":"In this paper, we have seen how ps.-Simplicius draws upon the Neoplatonic notion of self-reversion to explain the nature of rational assent. I have argued that this account of assent provides a basis for explaining a fundamental difference between assenting and having impressions: the fact that we can assent for a reason but cannot (in the same sense) have an impression for a reason.\r\n\r\nPs.-Simplicius' account thus suggests an interesting new view of the nature of assent, a view that combines elements of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neoplatonist thought. From the Stoics, he inherits the view that believing involves assenting. He draws upon the Neoplatonist notion of self-reversion to explain the essentially self-reflexive nature of assent. This enables him to defend Aristotle's claim that we cannot believe at will.\r\n\r\nOn this account, though we do not believe at will, we nevertheless have a kind of rational control over our beliefs: beliefs, by their very nature, are such as to be revised or maintained for reasons.\r\n\r\nThis account thus provides an answer to the question we raised for the Stoics: what is it about the nature of assent that explains why you are responsible for assenting in a way in which you are not responsible for having impressions?\r\n\r\nYou are responsible for assenting just because you can assent (or withhold assent) for reasons, and you can assent for reasons just because of the essentially self-reflexive nature of the act of assent.\r\n[conclusion p. 286]","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/EAq0q2QllqJrF4y","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":53,"full_name":"Coope, Ursula","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1276,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ","volume":"50","issue":"","pages":"237-288"}},"sort":["Rational Assent and Self-Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics"]}

  • PAGE 1 OF 1