{"_index":"sire","_id":"1289","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1289,"authors_free":[{"id":1878,"entry_id":1289,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":49,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","free_first_name":"Riccardo ","free_last_name":"Chiaradonna","norm_person":{"id":49,"first_name":"Riccardo ","last_name":"Chiaradonna","full_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1142403548","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null}}],"entry_title":"Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication","main_title":{"title":"Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication"},"abstract":"Porphyry\u2019s interpretation of Aristotle\u2019s theories of genus and substantial predication is based on two related assumptions:\r\n\r\n That a clear separation exists between logic and metaphysics (= doctrine of transcendent realities).\r\n That there is a close relation between logic and physics.\r\n\r\nSince Porphyry\u2019s physics is part of his ontology, logic and ontology (i.e., the logic and the ontology of the physical world) stand in close relation with each other. Porphyry only makes very partial references to metaphysics in his logical works. What I have argued is that Porphyry\u2019s conception of genus in the Isagoge reflects the Platonic theory of the hierarchy of beings, since Porphyry presents his genus as an aph\u2019 henos hierarchical relation. This, on the other hand, does not imply that Porphyry\u2019s treatment of genus in the Isagoge refers to transcendent ante rem principles. Porphyry carefully introduces a doctrine in the Isagoge, the complete significance of which emerges in a different context: the \u2018Porphyrean tree\u2019 is thus a mere analogon of the Platonic hierarchy of beings.\r\n\r\nThe presence of physical doctrines is far more essential to Porphyry\u2019s views of universals and predication. Physical entities such as bodiless immanent forms provide real correlates for Porphyry\u2019s universal predicates: Aristotle\u2019s substantial predication \u2018mirrors\u2019 the relation between a particular and its immanent form. Physical forms are not outside the scope of logic; rather, they provide the \u2018real\u2019 foundation for Porphyry\u2019s views on predication. Such a foundation is presented in an introductory way in Porphyry\u2019s logical writings and is only made explicit in his more \u2018systematic\u2019 works.\r\n\r\nIamblichus\u2019 attitude is different in that his Platonizing of Aristotle\u2019s logic is more direct and pervasive. Consequently, Iamblichus offers a Platonizing reading of the Aristotelian theory of substantial predication, which refers to ante rem genera and to the metaphysical relation of participation. Iamblichus is well aware that an ante rem form cannot be a universal synonymous predicate of its particular instantiations, and he conceives of substantial predication as a paronymous relation. Neither Porphyry nor Iamblichus believe that an ante rem form can be predicated synonymously of corporeal individuals.\r\n[conclusion p. 17-18]","btype":3,"date":"2007","language":"English","online_url":"","online_resources":"https:\/\/uni-koeln.sciebo.de\/s\/sra714DdTLHJIcS","doi_url":null,"categories":[],"authors":[{"id":49,"full_name":"Chiaradonna, Riccardo ","role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"}}],"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1289,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale","volume":"18","issue":"","pages":"123-140"}},"sort":["Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication"]}